For the reconnaissance on the battlefield itself—in contradistinction to the energetic action in the flanks and rear of the enemy—officers provided with good glasses must be employed. The scissors telescope, which no higher cavalry leader should be without, should also be used for this purpose. Observation should be made, when possible, from some secure place, and endeavours made to recognise the moment for action and intervention in the battle. Observation carried out by patrols from the front during the battle of the measures taken by the enemy is unpractical and only possible in peace, and is a procedure that is the outcome of the requirements of leaders lacking in determination, who wish to be continually informed down to the smallest details about the enemy, instead of trusting with self-confidence to the compelling force of their own measures. Patrol service during the battle itself is a matter for the infantry, and can be carried out by no other troops.
II. RECONNAISSANCE BY THE DIVISIONAL CAVALRY
Generally speaking, the conduct of the various reconnoitring organs of the divisional cavalry will be regulated according to the same principles as hold good for the army cavalry. As for the latter, so is it a matter of great importance for the divisional cavalry whether it is acting in friendly or in hostile country. Its methods, too, must be regulated according to its distance from the enemy. It will also endeavour to establish a material and moral superiority over the hostile cavalry. In its relative weakness, however, and its distribution to the columns of the army there must lie certain factors which will leave their stamp upon the conduct of the divisional cavalry.
First of all it is important what part the division to which the cavalry belongs plays in the general scheme. Various cases can be conceived which may have no inconsiderable influence on the character of the reconnaissance which the divisional cavalry must carry out.
It may belong to a column which is advancing between others, and where it has but a comparatively small front for reconnaissance allotted to it. The army cavalry may be in front of it. Or it may be given the task of carrying out the frontal reconnaissance independently. The latter case must be considered the most usual in a great army, when the concentration of the army cavalry in the decisive direction takes place. Or again, it may belong to the flank column of an advancing army, which may or may not be covered by the army cavalry. Finally, it may be part of an independently operating, more or less detached force, and have to perform all the cavalry duties for it. In the last case it will generally be advisable to strengthen it, if possible, from the armycavalry; but in any case its methods will necessarily be of a different kind.
The most simple case is where the front upon which the divisional cavalry finds itself is covered by the army cavalry. It is then most important to keep up communication with, and to be continually informed of the intentions of the army cavalry, in order that the duties of reconnaissance may be taken over whenever the army cavalry is compelled to clear the front by a flank movement or to uncover the flank. The reconnoitring organs of the divisional cavalry must then be sent forward early enough to effect a relief of the corresponding detachments of the army cavalry, so that the service of observation of the enemy in the first line will not be interrupted.
Where the divisional cavalry cannot rely upon the army cavalry for assistance in reconnaissance the conditions are different.
This leads to the question of the strategical exploration. These duties—in contradistinction to those of the army cavalry—will be distinguished by the fact that the divisional cavalry cannot advance as an independent unit separated from the mass of infantry, but must remain in continual conjunction with the detachments of the other arms to which it belongs. It is, on the one hand, too weak to be able to operate independently, and, on the other, is bound to the column of the other arms by ties of local service, which at any moment may make fresh demands upon it. It will therefore not be denied that the divisional cavalry, if it would reconnoitre, must cleave to the infantry. Its method of procedure will rather be to advance from point to point with those portions of its strength which can be spared from the local service of the division. In so doing, it must arrange forsupport in case of necessity during the fight from the rear, and can rest at night covered by the infantry outposts without being compelled to march to the rear. To take its own measures for security would make too great demand upon its strength, and would quickly deplete it. Only when the distance from the enemy renders an attack out of the question can the divisional cavalry remain in advanced positions. This consideration, also, must have its due influence on the method of advance adopted.
The advance by stages from one point of vantage to another, according to the map, or from one defensible locality to another, will be found advisable. The divisional cavalry, like the reconnoitring squadrons, should always be surrounded by a close screen of local patrols, which will ensure its immediate safety and concealment.
In this lack of freedom in the conduct of the divisional cavalry two facts become apparent. Firstly, that only in very rare cases will the divisional cavalry be able to clear the way for its patrols, as the army cavalry will continually have to do. It is generally, indeed, too weak to fight independently with any prospect of success. It is also, as we have seen, locally dependent, and cannot advance with full freedom even where hindrances to the reconnaissance demand its intervention. Secondly, only in exceptional cases will it be feasible for the divisional cavalry to immediately support its patrols by reconnoitring squadrons.
If the army corps is marching in two columns, the cavalry of each is obviously too weak to push forward squadrons of this kind perhaps several days' march ahead, and, when necessary, to provide for their relief. Somewhat different are the conditions of theadvance of a corps upon one road. If it is accompanied by columns on each side, it will generally be possible to mass the greater part of the cavalry of both divisions at the head of the corps, and it will then at times be possible to push forward a reconnoitring squadron. In the case of a flank column, however, the cavalry of the rear division will generally be occupied with securing the flank, and will therefore not usually be available for reinforcing the reconnoitring cavalry in front.
The divisional cavalry will thus usually be able to detail only weak patrols for the distant reconnaissance, and these will often have to reckon with superior hostile cavalry. At least the conditions which obtain in the army of our probable opponents compel us to make these presumptions. The reconnoitring patrols of the divisional cavalry must therefore rely chiefly on cunning and speed in carrying out their duty, and will only be able to attack under especially favourable circumstances, where the enemy whom they meet has no support behind him, or can be attacked with obvious advantage. It is far more important for them than for the patrols of the army cavalry to gain contact with the enemy unsuspected, and not to betray their presence. They must always try first to get distant observation of the enemy, as they will have no fighting support behind them to help them to break through the hostile screen of patrols and win their way to the head of the enemy's columns. Their reports, also, will have to be brought back through the enemy's cavalry.
The distant patrols of the divisional cavalry will therefore often be obliged, even in their advance, to avoid the main avenues of approach of the enemy, as upon them the enemy's cavalry is certain to be metwith. They must use secondary roads, and as secretly as possible, a matter of considerable difficulty in unknown hostile country. To avoid possible ambush they should retire by a different road from that by which they advanced. They will very rarely be able to get under cover for the night, especially when in the enemy's country.
Such duties can only be successfully carried out, if at all, where the commander has at his disposal a number of efficient officers and under-officers, and horses trained to endurance and cross-country work. In order to be able to carry out their task properly, the men must be clever, determined horsemen, well trained in the use of their weapons and resourceful. They must also be absolutely reliable men, who will not shrink from encountering odds when necessary. In such patrols as these the cavalry spirit must be developed to its utmost.
It is a somewhat easier matter if the divisional cavalry is not confined to a purely frontal and limited area, but can reconnoitre from the head of a flank column. It will then get opportunities of obtaining observation by moving round the enemy's outer flank. It will, however, only succeed in obtaining and transmitting intelligence by wide détours, and the demands on the endurance of man and horse will be great in proportion. It is obvious how necessary it will be, under such circumstances, that the intelligence so hardly won should at least be transmitted quickly and safely. Some detachment must therefore be detailed to perform the duties of the reporting or communicating station usually formed by a reconnoitring squadron. I see nothing for it but to devote bodies of cyclists to this purpose, which can be pushed forward as reporting centres on the main avenues, andequipped, whenever possible, with the light-signal apparatus. A few mounted men must be sent with them for scouting purposes. Without these, they would be confined to the roads for the close reconnaissance of the surrounding country, a procedure which would not suffice in the face of a determined enemy, especially in difficult country.
Besides the distant reconnaissance, the close reconnaissance along by far the greater part of the front of the army falls to the lot of the divisional cavalry. As we have seen, the army cavalry will only in exceptional cases be able to support it in this task as, on the near approach of the enemy, it will probably have occasion to draw off to a flank. But nowadays this close reconnaissance appears, by reason of the increased distances and the greater range of firearms, to have become considerably more difficult. Hostile armies move to battle nowadays on a front of 50 to 100 miles.
That it has naturally become much more difficult under such circumstances to estimate the enemy's strength and to obtain the necessary knowledge of his dispositions and of the ground, no further proof is needed. It thus becomes possible for the cavalryman in general to get no closer to the enemy than his rifle will carry, and to be compelled to observe him from a distance. There should be no mistake about this.
The importance of observation has grown in proportion to its difficulty. Troops nowadays have to be deployed for the fight at long ranges, where it is practically out of the question that a commander will be able to survey the enemy and the country with his own eyes, as was formerly almost invariably the case. Should, for example, the opponents be advancing towards each other and still 5 miles apart, another 1¼ miles will bring them into effective artillery range of each other. If they are going to wait to deploy until they reach this point, the deployment will have to be completed under the fire of the enemy's guns, a thing which, of all others, is to be avoided. It therefore follows that in a battle of encounter deployment should take place, at the latest, when still 5 miles distant from the enemy. It is better to begin to draw the forces apart even earlier, so that the army is already deployed when it moves into the range of the enemy's shrapnel.
Under these circumstances it will usually be quite impossible for the leader to make his dispositions according to his personal observations. He is, rather, almost entirely dependent in his appreciation of the enemy on the reconnaissance of the cavalry, and may find himself at a great disadvantage if this should fail or lead him to erroneous conclusions.
Reports as to the character of the country, suitable positions for artillery, decisive localities or points, thus increase greatly in importance, and it is obviously most necessary for cavalry officers to be able judiciously to appreciate such matters and to report them clearly and intelligibly. The tactical conduct, and at the same time tactical success, will often be as dependent on the tactical reconnaissance of the divisional cavalry as the strategical measures of the commander-in-chief are upon the results of the strategical exploration of the army cavalry.
Tactically and strategically the service of the divisional cavalry is of equal importance if it belongs to a force operating independently. In such cases it will often be obliged to move with more freedom than when employed in purely frontal reconnaissancewith the main army. For rest, also, it will not always be able to seek the protection of the infantry, but will frequently have to be pushed out for the night on the flanks, in order to secure the main body while at rest from these directions, or the better to observe the enemy. It should, however, never lose its immediate connection with its force, and will therefore not always be in a position to measure its strength with any hostile cavalry that may be met during the period of reconnaissance.
When the tactical decision is in prospect, or when contact has been gained between the opposing forces, the divisional cavalry must redouble its efforts in reconnaissance. It is then a matter for it to reconnoitre from the flanks, and such reconnaissance can only be successful, as in the case of the army cavalry, if those portions of the country are occupied from which it is possible to observe the movements and dispositions of the enemy.
It is quite wrong to hang on the flank of the infantry, as is unfortunately often done in peace manœuvres, and to remain wherever possible under its protection, and to expect to force reconnaissance merely by sending out a number of patrols.
In such a situation patrols have generally small prospect of success. They will most frequently come in contact with the hostile screen, which will prevent them gaining the decisive points of the terrain, and can hinder the despatch-riders but too easily from finding their way to the rear. It is more than questionable under such circumstances whether it will be possible to gain any observation at all, or to send back information in time to be of use. In these moments of crisis, which will be of comparatively short duration, rude force can alone avail, and recourse must be hadto the sword. The artillery patrols, too, will only find it possible to reconnoitre successfully under the wing of a victorious cavalry. Their efforts will otherwise have little prospect of success.
Speaking generally, the reconnaissance must remain entirely in the hands of the cavalry leader who arranges it. Should the commander-in-chief interfere without due cause in his dispositions, he deprives him of responsibility and interrupts that systematic conduct of the reconnaissance which is absolutely essential if the strength of the divisional cavalry is to be equal to its task.
Reports, too, should, as a general rule, be sent to that unit of the cavalry from which the patrol is found, and which forms the reporting centre of the patrol. On the other hand, it is the duty of the cavalry leader to remain in communication with the Supreme Command by using all means at his disposal, even relays when necessary, so that all reports may reach the latter by the shortest route. Only exceptionally should patrols report direct to the Supreme Command, that is to say, when to send their messages through their own cavalry means a useless détour or a danger.
This particular method can, however, only be carried out in practice if the patrol is in continual communication with the cavalry from which it is found. This circumstance indicates also the necessity for detachments that are not limited in their zone of operation to advance during the fight against the enemy's flank, so that they may remain as close as possible behind their own patrols, continually prepared to support them and to hamper the hostile efforts at reconnaissance.
It does not appear advisable under such circumstances to unite all the available cavalry on one wing. It is certainly obvious that its main strength must be concentrated in what is considered the decisive direction, in order that it may be as strong as possible on the field of battle. This desire, however, should not go so far as to denude one flank wholly of cavalry. This flank would then be completely laid bare to the enemy's observation, and would itself be deprived of the possibility of ascertaining what was going on on the enemy's side. It is much more advisable to provide upon each flank a centre of reconnaissance, even if such consists of quite a weak detachment of cavalry, which will act as a reserve for patrols and a reporting centre. The offensive cannot, of course, be undertaken on the flank where the cavalry is weak, but reconnaissance must be carried out by patrols of scouts, and other action limited generally to keeping the enemy's patrols at a distance.
III. THE SCREEN
The idea of the screen is first touched on in the "Field Service Manual" of 1908; it is also, however, demanded by the conditions of modern war. For however important it may be to gain early intelligence as to the enemy in order thereby to be able to make the necessary dispositions, it is naturally just as important to deprive him of this advantage. Reflection and experience have shown that although the measures of reconnaissance considerably assist the screening if the enemy's cavalry is defeated, they are not of themselves sufficient to secure the army from hostile observation.
The "Field Service Manual" sums up, I think, the chief considerations as regards screening, for the mostpart to the point, especially where it deals with the defensive screen. There are no war experiences in modern times of this matter, and, according to my opinion, peace experiences are not comprehensive enough to allow of any appreciable amplification of the "Field Service Manual."
At the same time I would draw attention to some of the points which give occasion for further research and reflection.
In the first place, I think that what the "Field Service Manual" says as to offensive screens requires some explanation. Strong cavalry will be concentrated to keep the enemy at a distance from our own army.In addition to this, strong patrols and even cyclist detachments advance along all roads in order to throw back the hostile patrols. These arrangements can only apply, as a rule, for portions of thearmy cavalry. They presuppose, especially if the front of the modern army is to be screened, a mass of cavalry which could with difficulty be found from the divisional cavalry. By such methods, moreover, as long as strong cyclist detachments are not available for blocking the road communications, a cause of dissension will always arise as to how much strength can be used for blocking the roads and how much concentrated for battle, all the more so as the divisional cavalry can only with difficulty be used in this kind of screen.
The latter must, as we have seen, remain more or less locally tied to the division. The army cavalry, however, if it will undertake an offensive screen, must advance against the enemy, seek him out, force him back as far as possible from our own army, and endeavour to defeat him. For this task complete freedom of movement is necessary—not only for itself,but also for the screen of patrols that will accompany it. The divisional cavalry will thus generally only be able to form a second screening line behind the veil formed by the advancing army cavalry, and will not be in a position to spare for it patrols for the blocking of roads. Nor is it at all clear where the cyclist troops mentioned are to come from.
I am therefore inclined to think that the procedure advocated by the "Field Service Manual" can only be carried out in exceptional cases; and it would perhaps be advisable to alter it somewhat.
The principal task of the offensive screen is, according to my opinion, to defeat the hostile cavalry; and for this object all available force must be concentrated, for one cannot be too strong upon the field of battle. Even such cyclist detachments as are available will be best used by bringing them up for the fight. The blocking of roads, on the other hand, will, as a rule, be only undertaken when the enemy's cavalry has been beaten and thrown back. The screen of patrols can then be strengthened. But it must be quite clearly understood that troops are not to be simply disposed in a cordon; but that a sufficiently strong force must still remain in touch with the beaten enemy in order to prevent him, at all events, from taking up the offensive again, and breaking through the screen.
Until this moment of victory over the hostile cavalry the duties of screening must be left to the reconnoitring organs and to the divisional cavalry of the army which is following in rear of them.
According to the principles laid down in the "Field Service Manual" it is to the divisional cavalry that the task invariably falls of screening the movements of its division. I think that these duties cannot alwaysbe clearly regulated according to the idea of an offensive or defensive screen; they will more often be of a mixed nature. As far as its strength will admit, the divisional cavalry will endeavour to carry out the task by pushing back, by fighting, the hostile reconnoitring patrols and detachments before these have succeeded in gaining observation. As it is more or less locally confined to its own front, and will certainly often have to do with an opponent of superior strength, it will, on the other hand, frequently be obliged to join battle for favourable localities dismounted, supported whenever possible by machine-guns and cyclists from the infantry. In situations where the divisional cavalry cannot undertake an offensive fight against the superiority of the enemy, and can find nopoints d'appuiin the terrain, it must try all the more to block the roads with patrols which will attack all hostile patrols with the utmost determination, and endeavour to capture their despatch-riders. The divisional cavalry must show the greatest boldness and judgment if it will carry out this task. The great importance of its rôle in the army here again becomes obvious.
The army cavalry will only undertake an offensive screen when the army is advancing, and where the country does not afford suitable localities for the establishment of a defensive screen.
Such a screen (defensive), which can eventually be pushed forward from one area to another, is without doubt, as is emphasised by the "Field Service Manual," of much more use than an offensive screen.
Of great importance in a defensive screen is, first and foremost, the nature of the obstacles on which it is based. Watercourses and canals, which can only be crossed by bridges, form the best of these. Extensive woods, however, lend themselves easily to the purpose. They are doubtless, for cavalry patrols, a most unpleasant obstacle, as view is restricted in them, and an ambush may lurk behind every tree. In the campaign of 1870-71 the German cavalry patrols were, as far as I could ascertain, quite unable to penetrate into the wood of Orleans and that at Marchenoir. These woods, by their mere existence, formed an effective screen.
To utilise woods for this purpose it will be necessary, according to the circumstances, the depth and nature of the wood, to post the fighting detachments of the screening line either at the exit of the defile on the enemy's side or more towards the defender's side on the inner edge of the wood, if they can there find a good field of fire. In any case the opposite edge of the wood should be occupied by observation-posts; in order, in the first case, to get knowledge of and to neutralise any hostile patrol which may, in spite of all difficulties, have penetrated the wood, as soon as they emerge; and, in the second, to get early information of the entrance of hostile detachments into the wood, and to be able to hinder, report, and observe their further advance.
I think that penetration of such a screen is generally considered to be easier than it really is, especially if the defending cavalry is supported by cyclists, machine-guns, and even artillery. According to my opinion, reconnoitring squadrons would only, under favourable circumstances, be able to break through such a line that has been well disposed, and, even if successful in so doing, would find it even more difficult to return. It should never be forgotten that to overcome well-placed posts, defending themselves with fire action, requires a great superiority of force; thata squadron can only overcome quite weak detachments so placed, and will, if successful, very soon find itself confronted by a superior force of the enemy's reserves. Single patrols of picked scouts may perhaps creep through, but their return will be problematical unless they are strongly supported from the rear. It will therefore generally require strong forces of the army cavalry to break through a well-organised screening line composed of moderately strong cavalry detachments, and to maintain the breach so made long enough to carry out the object of the reconnaissance. The place where the screen is broken must in all cases, even where the main body of the victorious reconnoitring cavalry is obliged to advance farther, be so strongly occupied that it will under all circumstances remain open for the service of transmission and for the eventual retirement.
The greater the advantages of a defensive screen, the more must the divisional cavalry naturally endeavour to avail itself of it, in order to compensate in some measure for its numerical weakness. It will always seek, even during the advance of the army, to choose such favourable areas for an occasional halt, and to reach them by advancing inbonds successifs. Such procedure will facilitate at the same time the carrying out of its duties of screening and of warding off hostile detachments by defensive action. In order to secure the greatest possible effect for such action a similar procedure as regards time and space must be arranged with the cavalry of neighbouring columns, or ordered by superior authority.
During the night, when it is not possible to occupy advanced areas, the divisional cavalry should try to assist the screen by being so disposed that detached posts will lie on the main road in advance of the infantry outposts and at crossroads and defiles, with a view to capturing the enemy's patrols. The erection of temporary obstacles, particularly of wire, will considerably assist this action. In friendly country the inhabitants will be able to co-operate in this, and, by judicious conduct and the procuring of timely and sufficient intelligence, may be of great use to the force. In erecting such obstacles it must always be remembered that our own advanced patrols should be warned of them, or that by some kind of prearranged mark upon the road they should be made aware of their presence when returning with reports through their own line. It scarcely needs to be emphasised that such measures should be made use of by the army cavalry as well as by the divisional cavalry, in order to increase their own safety at night.
IV. RAIDS
The idea of the raid has been taken from the American War of Secession. Our new Regulations designate such undertakings as "Streifzüge" (527),[10]and do not appear to attach overmuch importance to them. Their use is only advocated if a superfluity of cavalry is at hand. They should not, it is said, distract the cavalry from their own duties or from co-operating in the battle (395).[11]
Whether one agrees with this estimation of the value of such enterprises naturally depends upon the view taken of the co-operation of cavalry in the battle and the general conception of the conditions of modern war. It appears to me that the importance of such undertakings has increased in the same measure as the value of cavalry on the main battlefield has diminished.
The great size of modern armies renders it, generally speaking, impossible for them to live on the country. A modern army marching once through the richest country will nowadays almost completely exhaust its resources, and yet the supplies carried will scarcely suffice to feed the columns during a protracted movement. Armies are far more dependent than formerly on the supplies from the rear—more, indeed, than in the time of Frederick the Great. In those days, if the bread-wagons ran short, it was possible to fill up from the country. The armies were never so great that this became impossible. The cavalry, indeed, devoted most of its time to foraging, and the soldier frequently bought his supplies, all except his bread, on the spot.
Nowadays the circumstances are quite changed. It is out of the question for the horses of the modern army to find the necessary forage in the country itself. That the men of the great armies of the present day can supply themselves when rations run out remains to be proved. On paper it is indeed often possible, taking into consideration the supplies available in peace; but these calculations cannot hold good for a real theatre of war where concentration has claimed all available resources.
Of the straits to which a great army may be reduced when supplies really give out, the campaign of 1812 in Russia is a good example. There, even during the advance to Moscow, Napoleon's army practically dissolved owing to lack of supplies. Only some 90,000 men of the mighty host arrived in Moscow; only these perished during the retreat. How fearfully the Napoleonic armies suffered and melted away owing to want of supplies gives cause for reflection. In the armies of millions of the present day such conditions become still more perilous. Matters appertaining to ammunition are of equal importance. The modern army carries enormous masses of artillery with it. All the guns are designed for a vast expenditure of ammunition, and therafalefrom covered positions and against covered positions will indeed make this necessary. Modern infantry, too, is armed in a manner that will entail a prodigious expenditure of cartridges. The replacement of this expended ammunition is of vital importance. Railways will have to be laid in rear of the armies to cope with these demands. Long trains of wagons and automobiles will move to and fro behind them. On every high-road and in every railway-station magazines will appear, and all operations must come to a standstill and miscarry as soon as this great organisation ceases from any cause to carry out its functions.
I hold, therefore, that such circumstances render a disturbance of the rear communications of an army an important matter. It will often do the opponent more damage, and contribute more to a favourable decision of arms than the intervention of a few cavalry divisions in the decisive battle itself.
The one does not, of course, exclude the possibility of the other. General Stuart, in the campaign ofGettysburg, rode all round the hostile army, broke up its communications, drew hostile troops away from the decisive point, and was yet in his place on the wing of the army on the day of battle. What this man performed with cavalry and the inestimable damage he inflicted on his opponent are worth studying. The fortune of war, which lay in might and in the nature of things, he could not turn. Nor could he bring the advance of an army to a standstill, because at that period and under those circumstances it was possible for the army of the North to live, at least for a time, upon the country. If we regard his achievement by the light of modern conditions, we shall certainly not fall into the error of underestimating the value of such enterprises. If we compare it with the performances of cavalry upon the battlefield in the latest war, we will be able to obtain a true impression of the degree of importance of modern cavalry action.
I am inclined to think that such enterprises will be of altogether extraordinary significance in a future war; least so, perhaps, during the earlier battles resulting from the concentration, when it will be difficult to get round the flanks of the enemy, but more so during the subsequent course of operations. We have only to imagine what the decisive consequences must have been if General von Werder, and, later, General von Manteuffel, had been in a position to continually interrupt the rear communications of the army of Bourbaki. In all probability the latter must have capitulated long before it reached the Swiss frontier, always granting that it was successful in getting so far as the battlefield of the Lisaine. The whole crisis of this campaign, which was very nearly ending in the defeat of the Germans, would thus possibly have been avoided.
There are plenty of examples of this. To indicate only one from the history of the latest war, I would call to mind the undertaking of the Russians against the rear communications of the Japanese army.
If this undertaking had been actually directed against the only railway at the disposal of the Japanese army, if it had been carried through by throwing into the scale the whole fighting strength of a really mobile and efficient cavalry, and if it had thereby succeeded in interrupting the supplies of the Japanese army for a period, the whole course of the campaign might have been changed. Victory in this tremendous conflict hung continually in the balance, and it needed but little more weight on either side to turn the scale of the fortunes of war.
The importance of such raids in modern war should not therefore, in my opinion, be underestimated. They are capable rather of exercising enormous influence on the course of events.
Rules, however, cannot be laid down for their conduct. The Regulations indicate, shortly, that attention must be paid to the transport of sufficient ammunition and supplies, and here, indeed, move in the right direction. It is absolutely indispensable that a cavalry mass destined to carry out such an enterprise should be independent of what it may find in the country and be perfectly free of movement.
The supply and ammunition columns, however, which accompany it, must also be so mobile that they are able to follow the troops closely, even at a rapid pace, as otherwise they will run the danger of falling into the hands of the enemy. The whole force designed for the enterprise must be able to advance rapidly as a concrete whole, and should not be allowed to take up too much room. Resources found uponthe enemy's lines of communication and magazines captured must be used for the sustenance of the troops as far as possible. It will then be able to reserve the supplies carried for critical times or for a further turning movement. Any of the enemy's supplies which are not used must be ruthlessly laid waste. His railways and magazines, particularly any important engineering structures, must be thoroughly destroyed, the necessary explosives being carried in sufficient quantities.
In contrast to Stuart's raids, however, one must count on meeting not inconsiderable bodies of the enemy's communication troops, which will probably be capable of rapid reinforcement. This entails corresponding preventive measures.
Hostile cavalry sent to secure the safety of the communications will generally have to be attacked in a determined manner. It may sometimes, however, be more advantageous to avoid it by rapid marching. For the rest, the factor of surprise is of decisive importance. Should the enemy early become aware of the approach, he will generally be in a position to bring up fresh forces, often by rail, and thereby imperil the success of the whole undertaking. Under such circumstances a covered approach, perhaps by night, careful screening, and the interruption of the enemy's telegraph-lines and transmission service are matters to which special attention must be paid. It is also a matter of consideration in the attack on communications and railways to destroy them at a sufficient distance above and below the objective by means of detachments deflected for that purpose, so that the enemy may be prevented from bringing up reinforcements. If the direction of the attack is fixed upon and assured, and if approach and deployment havebeen successfully effected unobserved, the attack must from the first be carried through with sufficient firepower and energy to allow the enemy no time for reflection.
It is therefore absolutely necessary that troops engaged in a raid should be of sufficient fighting strength to be able rapidly to break down any resistance. The scanty strength of a division of six regiments is much too small for such an undertaking in modern war. Stronger divisions must be formed for the purpose, and strengthened when necessary by cyclist battalions. An enterprise of this kind also requires thorough preparation, especially by an extensive system of espionage which will amplify the results of the cavalry reconnaissance. Before such a raid is undertaken all possible information must be to hand as to the conditions in the rear of the hostile army. Mobile light bridging equipment should accompany the expedition, with the necessary complement of mounted engineers. During the advance the cavalry should be surrounded by a screen of patrols, not too far distant from it, so that the enemy will not too early become aware of the expedition, and yet at the same time far enough to guard against surprise. After a successful surprise the force should withdraw with the same speed in order to escape from the enemy's counter-measures. Finally, the chief safety of such enterprises lies in their daring.
The leader of such a raid should be minutely instructed as to the advance and intended operations of his own army, so that he may be able to calculate when and where the decisive collision between the opposing armies will take place. He must regulate his own movements accordingly. As long as the two armies are still distant from each other he can strikethe enemy's communications far to the rear, destroying railways and magazines. The nearer, however, the opponent approaches to his own army, the more closely must he endeavour to hang on the rear of the hostile troops and to interrupt the supply of the immediate necessities, that is to say, to destroy the supply and ammunition columns of the army corps, and to capture the provision and baggage wagons of the troops. If circumstances demand, he must be able to appear upon the battlefield itself on the day of battle.
Keen perception and foresight, rapid decision, and relentless energy are indispensable qualities to the leader of such a raid. The ability to mystify and mislead the enemy will greatly facilitate the carrying out of the enterprise. A considerable measure of cavalry ability is, at the same time, necessary to ensure proper horse management. A combination of all these qualities goes to form the great cavalry leader, before whom, even in modern war, lie great prospects of distinction, if he but understands how to break loose from the routine and pedantry of the day.
FOOTNOTES:[6]"When advancing in separate columns, special measures must be taken to insure the cohesion of the forward movement. Every endeavour must be made to unite the columns before collision with the enemy; for a junction on the field of battle will seldom succeed, if only on account of the rapid course of the cavalry combat."[7]The lamp used by night and day in the German Army, combining the functions of our heliograph and lamp.[8]Compare "Unser Kavallerie im nächsten Kriege" ("Cavalry in a Future War," translated by Sydney Goldman), and paragraph 522 Cavalry Drill Regulations."During abattle, it is the duty of the army cavalry to operate against the enemy's flanks and rear, to attack his shaken infantry and unprotected artillery, to protect the flanks of its own army, and to prevent hostile reinforcements reaching the field of battle. According to the result of the encounter, it takes up the pursuit or covers the retirement."For such activity, the army cavalry will find opportunities on theflanks of the battle field. A position in front of the flank of the main body will facilitate the attack and, at the same time, constitute a threat. This position is also well adapted for clearing up the situation."[9]On June 24, 1870, Captain Count Zeppelin, of the Würtemburg General Staff, with a patrol of 3 Baden officers and 8 dragoons, crossed the Rhine at Lauterburg, with orders to ascertain certain of the French dispositions. Reaching Selzbach, after various encounters, and finding it occupied by French cavalry, the patrol took refuge on the 25th in the little inn at Schirlenhof for a well-earned rest. Here they were surprised by a squadron of French hussars, who had received information of their presence from a boy at the inn. The inhabitants having locked the Germans' horses into the stable, nothing remained but to fight or surrender. The brave Germans chose the former course. Lieutenant Winsloe here killed was the first casualty of the war on the German side. The whole patrol was finally killed or captured, with the exception of Count Zeppelin himself, who escaped on one of the French hussars' horses. This officer succeeded after a nine hours' ride in winning his way back across the frontier with valuable information.—Trans.(Count Zeppelin is the well-known airship constructor.)[10]"Enterprises of long duration by large bodies of cavalry against the enemy's lines of communication separate them from their principal duties. Such raids are to be undertaken only when cavalry is redundant. Sufficient ammunition and supplies must be carefully arranged for."[11]"Attempts on the more distant hostile communications may produce valuable results; but they must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. In the event of an engagement, co-operation with a view to victory must be the watchword of every formation, whether great or small."
FOOTNOTES:
[6]"When advancing in separate columns, special measures must be taken to insure the cohesion of the forward movement. Every endeavour must be made to unite the columns before collision with the enemy; for a junction on the field of battle will seldom succeed, if only on account of the rapid course of the cavalry combat."
[6]"When advancing in separate columns, special measures must be taken to insure the cohesion of the forward movement. Every endeavour must be made to unite the columns before collision with the enemy; for a junction on the field of battle will seldom succeed, if only on account of the rapid course of the cavalry combat."
[7]The lamp used by night and day in the German Army, combining the functions of our heliograph and lamp.
[7]The lamp used by night and day in the German Army, combining the functions of our heliograph and lamp.
[8]Compare "Unser Kavallerie im nächsten Kriege" ("Cavalry in a Future War," translated by Sydney Goldman), and paragraph 522 Cavalry Drill Regulations."During abattle, it is the duty of the army cavalry to operate against the enemy's flanks and rear, to attack his shaken infantry and unprotected artillery, to protect the flanks of its own army, and to prevent hostile reinforcements reaching the field of battle. According to the result of the encounter, it takes up the pursuit or covers the retirement."For such activity, the army cavalry will find opportunities on theflanks of the battle field. A position in front of the flank of the main body will facilitate the attack and, at the same time, constitute a threat. This position is also well adapted for clearing up the situation."
[8]Compare "Unser Kavallerie im nächsten Kriege" ("Cavalry in a Future War," translated by Sydney Goldman), and paragraph 522 Cavalry Drill Regulations.
"During abattle, it is the duty of the army cavalry to operate against the enemy's flanks and rear, to attack his shaken infantry and unprotected artillery, to protect the flanks of its own army, and to prevent hostile reinforcements reaching the field of battle. According to the result of the encounter, it takes up the pursuit or covers the retirement.
"For such activity, the army cavalry will find opportunities on theflanks of the battle field. A position in front of the flank of the main body will facilitate the attack and, at the same time, constitute a threat. This position is also well adapted for clearing up the situation."
[9]On June 24, 1870, Captain Count Zeppelin, of the Würtemburg General Staff, with a patrol of 3 Baden officers and 8 dragoons, crossed the Rhine at Lauterburg, with orders to ascertain certain of the French dispositions. Reaching Selzbach, after various encounters, and finding it occupied by French cavalry, the patrol took refuge on the 25th in the little inn at Schirlenhof for a well-earned rest. Here they were surprised by a squadron of French hussars, who had received information of their presence from a boy at the inn. The inhabitants having locked the Germans' horses into the stable, nothing remained but to fight or surrender. The brave Germans chose the former course. Lieutenant Winsloe here killed was the first casualty of the war on the German side. The whole patrol was finally killed or captured, with the exception of Count Zeppelin himself, who escaped on one of the French hussars' horses. This officer succeeded after a nine hours' ride in winning his way back across the frontier with valuable information.—Trans.(Count Zeppelin is the well-known airship constructor.)
[9]On June 24, 1870, Captain Count Zeppelin, of the Würtemburg General Staff, with a patrol of 3 Baden officers and 8 dragoons, crossed the Rhine at Lauterburg, with orders to ascertain certain of the French dispositions. Reaching Selzbach, after various encounters, and finding it occupied by French cavalry, the patrol took refuge on the 25th in the little inn at Schirlenhof for a well-earned rest. Here they were surprised by a squadron of French hussars, who had received information of their presence from a boy at the inn. The inhabitants having locked the Germans' horses into the stable, nothing remained but to fight or surrender. The brave Germans chose the former course. Lieutenant Winsloe here killed was the first casualty of the war on the German side. The whole patrol was finally killed or captured, with the exception of Count Zeppelin himself, who escaped on one of the French hussars' horses. This officer succeeded after a nine hours' ride in winning his way back across the frontier with valuable information.—Trans.(Count Zeppelin is the well-known airship constructor.)
[10]"Enterprises of long duration by large bodies of cavalry against the enemy's lines of communication separate them from their principal duties. Such raids are to be undertaken only when cavalry is redundant. Sufficient ammunition and supplies must be carefully arranged for."
[10]"Enterprises of long duration by large bodies of cavalry against the enemy's lines of communication separate them from their principal duties. Such raids are to be undertaken only when cavalry is redundant. Sufficient ammunition and supplies must be carefully arranged for."
[11]"Attempts on the more distant hostile communications may produce valuable results; but they must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. In the event of an engagement, co-operation with a view to victory must be the watchword of every formation, whether great or small."
[11]"Attempts on the more distant hostile communications may produce valuable results; but they must not distract the cavalry from its true battle objectives. In the event of an engagement, co-operation with a view to victory must be the watchword of every formation, whether great or small."
B. THE ACTION OF CAVALRY
I. GENERAL
As I have already indicated, the action of cavalry in the fight may be divided, according to its character, into two quite distinct groups—i.e.the fight of cavalry acting independently, and to which is detailed only a small proportion of the other arms; and the intervention of cavalry in the battle—in the great decision of the other arms.
It has been proposed, even for the cavalry, to divide tactical principles according to the idea of the prearranged battle and the battle of encounter. I do not, however, think that this grouping will meet the case. In a great battle the fighting is always of a prearranged nature; in the fight of the independent cavalry it is possible to distinguish between an encounter and an arranged affair. On the other hand, the conditions of prearranged action in a battle and in an independent conflict of the cavalry are quite different, and cannot be examined from a single point of view.
The grouping, then, proposed by me is still that which best corresponds to the actual circumstances. In this grouping, in the first case, the cavalry appears as the chief arm, whose spirit and character set the tone of the whole nature of the fight; in the second, it is merely an auxiliary, and must conform to the law of the other arms in great matters and small.
But the fight is deeply influenced, even in the first case, by the co-operation of these other arms, and I believe that only in exceptional cases will a purely cavalry combat take place, at all events on a large scale. Where squadrons, regiments, and perhaps even brigades unassisted by the other arms, come into collision with each other, the charge may still often suffice for a decision. But where it is an affair of larger masses it will never be possible to dispense with the co-operation of firearms, and in most cases a combination of cavalry combat, of dismounted fighting and artillery action, will ensue.
We must not conceal from ourselves the fact that in a future war it will by no means be always a matter of choice whether we will fight mounted or dismounted. Rather, by himself, seizing the rifle, will the opponent be able to compel us to adopt dismounted action. Onour manœuvre-grounds the charge on horseback is always the order of the day, even against artillery or machine-guns. The umpires continually allow such attacks to succeed, and the troops ride on as if nothing had happened. Equally fearless of consequences do they expose themselves to rifle-fire. But there are no bullets.
In real war it is different. Even then many a charge will naturally be successful, but victory will mean such sacrifices that the troops will often become too weak to carry out their further tactical and strategical duties. Such losses will not be incurred without necessity, and troops will give way, where possible, or themselves adopt dismounted action. The last will often indeed be necessary, as space and time will frequently be wanting for a turning movement, and even if such a movement were undertaken it would often lead to a fresh obligation to fight on foot in another place. This was repeatedly proved by the events of the campaign of 1870-71. Again and again was it necessary to detail infantry to the cavalry divisions in order to brush aside by offensive action resistance that hindered the advance of the cavalry, and which could not be broken down even by the horse artillery which accompanied it.
That the English in the South African war were finally repeatedly successful in forcing the mounted Boers back by turning movements without actual attacks proves nothing for European conditions. The explanation lies in the clumsiness of the Boers, who were hampered for rapid movement by their wagons and possessed no offensive strength of any kind, at least during the decisive portion of the campaign. Otherwise they could easily have anticipated the efforts of the English at a turning movement by theshortest line, or would have been able by taking the offensive to punish the dispersion that the turning movement entailed. We must not fall into any misconception of the fact that turning movements always contain an element of danger and can often bring about very unfavourable situations. They lay bare our own communications or lead to dangerous dispersion of force. It is necessary too, not only toseebehind the enemy, but also todefeathim, in order to gain afree handfor reconnaissance. To this end we will have to attack, and often on foot, as we may be quite sure that our possible opponent will use the rifle.
Circumstances have distinctly altered since 1870-71. If we had at that time no real cavalry opponent to face, we may yet be certain next time of having to deal with a numerous and determined cavalry who will quite conceivably endeavour to meet us in shock action with thearme blanche. There will always be dashing soldierly natures everywhere who will make a bid for success by risking all. Whether the hostile cavalry, once beaten, will return to the attack, is more than doubtful. I do not think so.
It lies deeply embedded in human nature that he who feels himself the weaker will act on the defensive. Both opponents will often endeavour to exploit the advantages of the defensive. It frequently happens during manœuvres that the cavalry endeavours to seize some commanding position, and so force the enemy to attack it under the fire of artillery posted there. The other side, however, may make corresponding endeavours. An indecisive artillery duel is the usual result of such efforts. But if such action is frequent in peace, how much more frequent will it be under the pressure of responsibility which war bringswith it, especially where one side is tactically the weaker?
It requires an enormous moral strength, personal influence over troops, and firmness of character to be able to maintain the offensive spirit, even after an unfavourable conflict, and continually to invoke the ultimate decision anew. In general, it may be relied upon that defence will be carried out according to tactical defensive principles, and that with the firearm. There can be no doubt upon that point to those who have studied human nature by the light of military history.
Our probable opponents, too, will certainly often advance dismounted. At all events they are endeavouring to strengthen cavalry divisions by cyclist battalions and infantry, and perhaps by mounted infantry, and thereby already show a remarkable inclination to conduct the fight, even of cavalry, with the firearm, and only to use their horses as a means of mobility, as was the custom of the Boers in Africa.
The rôle of cavalry in the fight will then apparently consist of a combination of the various methods of fighting. In explanation of this view I would cite a well-known example.
The task of the German army cavalry in the battle of Mars la Tour was to relieve the left flank of the German army by a determined attack against the right of the French, and thus to bring the apprehended advance of the enemy to a standstill. It did not accomplish this task, but was satisfied with trying conclusions with the French cavalry; but did not either win a decisive victory over the latter nor reap the necessary tactical benefit from the action. It certainly maintained its superiority over the enemy, but it made no attempt to interfere decisively in thecourse of the battle itself. This honour was left to the 1st Dragoons of the Guard.
But if we assume for a moment that this cavalry, after driving the French from the field, had made an attempt to operate further against the right flank of the French army, Cissey's Division, how would matters have stood?
The French infantry had occupied the Gréyère Farm as a support to their right flank. The Chasseurs d'Afrique, on the other hand, who initiated the cavalry fight, retired after they had been beaten by the 13th Dragoons in a northerly direction, and occupied with dismounted fire the southern edge of a small wood near Ville sur Yron, which the French call Bois de la Grange and the German official history Bois de Gréyère. It is bordered on the south by the plateau of Ville sur Yron. The dismounted Chasseurs here formed an échelon behind the right flank of the French infantry.
How should the German cavalry have acted under such circumstances in order to gain contact with the right flank of the French infantry so protected? The strongly occupied Gréyère Farm commanded the crossing of the Fond de la Cuve, which stretches in a northerly direction from Mars la Tour towards Château Moncel, while to the north the wood occupied by the Chasseurs limited freedom of movement. What else remained but a determined attack of both objectives and their capture, and that on foot? Artillery alone would not have sufficed against the Gréyère Farm, for this point would have had to be strongly occupied with riflemen, and nowadays also with machine guns, before the crossing of the Fond de la Cuve which the farm commanded, and whichdivided our cavalry from the French infantry, could be accomplished.
We can thus see that even in the action of cavalry in battle the combination of the several methods of fighting can scarcely, if ever, be avoided. In flank and rear, also, the opponent will endeavour to secure himself by occupying points of support as soon as he becomes aware of our intention to operate in these directions. Our cavalry must thus be continually prepared to pave the way by dismounted action for the mounted combat.
Our new Regulations mention quite incidentally (390)[12]that cavalry will often have to combine mounted and dismounted action, that "on occasions" also, in combination with shock action, dismounted cavalry must be ready to hold supporting points to cover deployment or to co-operate in the engagement (438).[13]
I do not think that this passing mention of the importance of combination of the two methods of fighting of the cavalry sufficiently emphasises the matter. After due reflection over all the circumstances appertaining to the question, I am, on the other hand, firmly convinced that the mutual relationship between thefight on foot and on horseback will give the modern cavalry combat its peculiar character. This relationship willalwayshave to be reckoned with, and all tactical considerations must be guided by it.
In my opinion all the principles of cavalry tactics should spring from this co-operation of the several methods of fighting and not from its attitude towards the various arms considered separately. The modern battle suffers no division of the action of one arm, or of one manner of fighting from another. As every kind of country has to be utilised for the fight, so also must the most varied kind of action of the arms be taken into account. It must, of course, be clearly established how these can best be applied against the various adversaries—cavalry, artillery, or infantry. Such reflections, however, can refer only to tactical formations. On the other hand, as soon as it becomes a question of tactical leading, such combination of all arms must, from the first, be taken into account as war may demand.
Military history affords us vivid examples of such co-operation of the arms in a cavalry fight, not, indeed, in a European theatre of war, but in the Civil War in America. They are woven, above all, round the heroic figure of General "Jeb" Stuart, and if weapons and other circumstances of the time and place were different from those obtaining in Europe to-day, the principle of action has still remained the same.
"Soon after the outbreak of the war Stuart distinguished himself as a cavalry leader, and his strategical work in blindfolding the enemy and in enlightening his own army has never been surpassed. As a cavalry tactician he is not only the first, but hitherto the only, leader of the arm who understood how to combine the effects of fire and shock, how torender effective service in fighting on foot without losing the power to strike on horseback when opportunity offered."[14]
There, indeed, was a man worthy of emulation.
We must, I think, be resolute in freeing ourselves from all old-fashioned conceptions of those knightly cavalry combats which have in reality become obsolete owing to the necessities of modern war. We do not in this need to break with our ancient and honoured traditions, for the spirit of tradition consists not in the retention of antiquated forms, but in acting in that spirit which in the past led to such glorious success. But this spirit points to the road of progress and bids us not allow ourselves to be urged by events, but, hurrying before them, to gain a start in development and therewith a decisive advantage over our enemies. To maintain in the troops, under modern conditions, the spirit of discipline and independence, and of the greatest effort and self-sacrifice,thatis the old Prussian tradition, and not the adherence to dead forms, which in our history has been bloodily enough avenged.
This principle has been embraced in all the other spheres of military development; it is only the cavalry that has remained behind the times.
In order to be able to deal with the functions of the mounted arm in accordance with the old Prussian principles, we must try to get a clear and unprejudiced conception of the spirit of the modern cavalry combat. We must look forward and pierce the veil of the future uninfluenced by the ghosts of the past. The probable events and conditions of the modern battle must be our guiding star, and when we have realised how the spirit of cavalry may be adapted to them, howthe results of modern technical improvements in arms influence and strengthen the action of the cavalry masses, then alone can we lay down principles for the conduct and tactics of cavalry in the fight.
II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE
Mobility is that prominent characteristic of the cavalry on which the justification of its existence is chiefly based. That it is able to come into action rapidly at distant points, and to observe the enemy while still afar off, makes it indispensable in the composition of an army. Anything that hinders its free mobility militates against its purpose and its characteristics. Nothing, therefore, is more justifiable or more in accordance with its spirit than that it should endeavour to preserve its mobility in the fight, and that mounted shock action, therefore, should be regarded as its proper rôle in battle. In this rôle, cavalry is able not only to force a decision quickly, but to continue its movement mounted, even from the fight itself.
These advantages, inherent in the nature of the arm, must not be expected in dismounted action. Such action always entails delay and hampers the movements of the troops, not only by the method of operation, but also by the separation of the men from their horses. It is therefore natural that cavalry should only undertake an attack on foot when there is no prospect of obtaining their object by shock action, or when the latter would entail such sacrifice that it might imperil the further successful action of the troops.
The more, however, the disadvantageous factors of dismounted action are realised and appreciated, themore, in my opinion, will endeavours be made to give it an offensive character, in order to remove as quickly as possible obstacles which hinder the free movement of the cavalry. All delay and hesitation are in opposition to the very spirit of the arm. To preserve its peculiar element of mobility a rapid decision is imperative in every situation.
Mounted, the cavalry knows only the charge and has no defensive power, a circumstance which strengthens its action considerably in carrying out its offensive principles, by relieving the leader of the onus of choice. On foot it is a different matter. The application of the firearm, under all tactical and topographical conditions, particularly facilitates defence and enables it to appear, to a certain extent, the stronger form of action. Herein lies the reason why defensive action is continually sought. All the more, therefore, must it be kept in view that it is theoffensiveon foot that the cavalry will require. To operate in combination with shock tactics to assist the offensive, and pave the way for free movement is, however, the real object of dismounted action.
It would perhaps have been better if the new Regulations had upheld this principle a little more definitely. In them, however, it is the defensive strength which cavalry has gained in dismounted action which is chiefly emphasised (390),[15]and the attack is only dealt with as a method of fighting from which the troops "need not shrink." Attention is certainly drawn(455)[16]to various cases in which an attack upon foot may be undertaken. That, however, does not alter the fundamental utterance that the dismounted fight will chiefly be undertaken on the defensive. This interpretation is strengthened on reading in the directions for the action of the army cavalry during operations that "Especial additions to the force (cyclist detachments, infantry in wagons, etc.) are mainly intended for the duty of strengthening local resistance, or of overcoming such resistance on the part of the enemy." The thought involuntarily occurs to the reader that in the spirit of the Regulations such additions to the force will be just as necessary in face of a serious hostile resistance, in order to free the way for the cavalry. We would, then, again find ourselves in just the same state which the war of 1870-71 proved to be so undesirable, and the cavalry would again find the wings of its mobility clipped.
The Regulations of course only intend to convey on this point that,ifsuch special additions to the cavalry were forthcoming, the task mentioned would be their principal duty. It is, however, a matter of significance that it is here presupposed that infantry in wagons may be detailed to accompany the strategic army cavalry. If it were but a matter of cyclists, that would be a quite different matter. But there cannot at present be any question of this, as there is no sufficient number of them in the army.
If the Regulations discuss these kind of possibilities I fear that the demand for infantry will very soon be heard from the army cavalry when there is any question of a serious attack on foot, and herewith the free action of the cavalry will be limited once and for all.
Military history and theoretical reflection teach us equally that the great masses of the army cavalry must under all circumstances be independent, at least for their offensive undertakings—that they cannot rely, in any case for these, on the "occasional" support of infantry. For they would thus find their mobility hampered, and themselves tied to the very troops from which they expect support, and would then be unable to carry out those important duties which fall to their share. The army cavalry, then, can only preserve its necessary independence if it can rely upon its own strength even in an attack on foot. It must at any moment be prepared to throw all its force into the conduct of a decisive attack. This is a method of fighting from which not only should it not "shrink," but in which its dismounted rôle essentially consists. When an attack on foot has been determined on, it must, however, be first perfectly clear that the results will justify the sacrifice which such an attack, under any circumstances, must mean—that is to say, the expenditure not only in lives, but also in time, which must both be regarded as lost in estimating the further operative value of the force.
The new Regulations take this point of view also into consideration, but in a manner that gives cause for serious reflection. They would limit the time expended in an attack on foot, and during which the arm is deprived of its free mobility, and therefore demand(456)[17]that, if such an attack be found necessary, endeavour must be made to carry it outwith the utmost rapidity. Here is expressed a desire easy to understand. But I do not think that the object will thus be attained of limiting the time that a dismounted fight demands. To carry an attack rapidly through under modern conditions demands the employment of overwhelming fire power and numerical superiority.
In so far as the Regulations express the idea that an attack should only be undertaken when this superiority is assured, there is great justification for the definition laid down in paragraph 456. But the cavalry must then generally confine itself to the attack of quite weak hostile posts, for even the division contains but an insignificant number of rifles. But such limitations, on the other hand, in no way take into account the necessities of grave situations. The army cavalry will often find itself in a situation where a difficult attackmustbe carried through without any overwhelming superiority, unless it means to renounce the accomplishment of the duties entrusted to it.
I do not think that we should interpret the wording of the Regulations in this sense. Taken literally, great danger lies in them—the danger, that is, of seeing in the wording of paragraph 456, a demand for the hastening of the conduct of the attack. We should thus see ourselves prevailed upon to carry out a necessary attack in a precipitate manner without the necessary fire preparation in order to fulfil the demand for haste. In peace manœuvres such conduct is but too often seen.In war it must inevitably lead to defeat. Under modern conditions of weapons an attack does not allow of being accelerated by force. It must take its own time. We must not therefore deceive ourselves into thinking that voluntary acceleration of the offensive fight is possible, but quite clear that every decision to attack on foot signifies considerable loss in time as well as men.
After considering these circumstances it would almost seem advisable to alter the wording of paragraph 456, to make it somewhat more precise, and to eliminate the idea of acceleration of the attack. Every trooper must be conscious that from the moment he dismounts for fire action he is no longer a cavalryman, but a foot soldier. He must follow the laws of fighting on foot, and can only reach his horse again by successful action according to these laws. Then, certainly, the dismounted troops must strive with all means in their power to reassume their mounted rôle with the utmost celerity.
The same holds good for the defence.
Cavalry will only undertake this when absolutely obliged. It may be that the conditions of force do not allow of the attack, or that the maintenance of some locality is the chief object of the fight. In the consciousness, however, that any hampering of initiative and free movement is opposed to the spirit of cavalry action, so must the defence—if circumstances in any way permit—be carried out with the idea of emerging as soon as possible from the defensive rôle imposed, to regain freedom of movement, and then to lay down the law to the enemy. This can only be attained by conducting the defence in an offensive spirit, that compels the opponent to a decision in accordance with our will.
This point of view does not, according to my thinking, receive sufficient attention in the new Regulations. Daring and initiative carry in them the seeds of great success. The cavalry should continually remember this, even in defence. On the other hand, however, it must also be ready when occasion demands to defend itself with the utmost obstinacy to the last man. The resolute defence of Sandepu by a Japanese cavalry brigade against heavy odds gives us a good example to follow. This action made the timely arrival of the Japanese reinforcements possible.
III. CAVALRY IN COMBAT AGAINST THE VARIOUS ARMS, MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED
In the mounted combat against cavalry, every effort must be directed towards falling upon the enemy at full gallop in a serried mass, and thus to overthrow him. It is not sufficient to succeed in coming to blows with the enemy. His tactical formation must be destroyed, and he must be rendered incapable either of evolution or battle. And this must be done without losing cohesion or power of command. The material damage done to the enemy is a matter for the mounted pursuit, which need only be carried out by part of the troops, or, in default of this, by shrapnel.
For the conduct of the purely cavalry fight we should, in my opinion, rely upon men like Frederick the Great, Seydlitz, and the prominent Napoleonic cavalry leaders. In the relations of cavalry to cavalry, nothing has altered since their day, and the experiences of these men are, in their lessons, just as applicable to-day as at the time in which they lived. And what do they teach us?
It is the serried formation of the attack that is,above all else, to be aimed at. Frederick the Great certainly changed his formation from the three-rank to the two-rank line. This was owing to his desire to render the troops more mobile, and in some way to compensate for the numerical superiority of his opponent. The longer his experience of war, however, the more did the king insist upon close formation in the attack, and to the end that the attack should leadnotto a mêlée, but to the breaking up of the enemy by the impact of the solid mass. Napoleon, whose cavalry was not so proficient in the saddle, sought to obtain this result by greater depth, while in the infrequent cavalry fights of the present day it has become thoroughly apparent that cohesion in the shock is the deciding factor. At Mars la Tour the French Hussar Brigade of Montaigu was overthrown by the closely formed 13th Dragoons, after having made an easy prey of the 10th Hussars, while the other attacks only led to long and indecisive mêlées. Frederick the Great, in order to attain the greatest possible cohesion, finally abolished all intervals between the tactical units and required the knee-to-knee riding. As, however, he was perfectly well aware that, in spite of all regulations, the ranks must open out while crossing country, he would never allow the enemy's cavalry to be attacked without a second line following the first, not in échelon, but directly in rear of it, a measure which repeatedly proved itself necessary, if not decisive. Napoleon's cavalry leaders held that a still greater depth was necessary owing to the looser riding of the French squadrons. As far as I know, there is no example of their attacking in large masses without depth of formation. Peace experience teaches us, that riding across country must loosen cohesion, while the modern firearm obliges us to take refuge in broken country, where the closest touch cannot always be kept, and to this end riding stirrup to stirrup has been introduced. Is it, however, ordained that we should attack in this formation and neglect the decisive factor of the charge in favour of mobility, a proceeding which is almost always seen in charges at manœuvres?