The disadvantages of such methods are certainly not apparent in peace, as the troops do not come into real collision, and rapidity and ability to deploy receive therefore more attention than cohesion in the attack. At inspections on the drill-ground such cohesion is certainly demanded, but at manœuvres it is generally conspicuous by its absence. In war I am firmly convinced that such habits will be heavily punished.
I think, therefore, that we must return to the principles of Frederick the Great, which up to now have been neglected. In approach and deployment we must indeed ride stirrup to stirrup, and under certain circumstances in even looser formation. But for the charge against cavalry we need a closer formation, knee to knee as of old, which can be effected on the move by word of command, as in France, where the order "Serrez les rangs!" is still in use. Besides this, we require always a second line in the Frederician sense, to assist, when necessary, in maintaining cohesion, and to be ready to meet the vicissitudes of the attack. This is a matter of experience which allows of no misinterpretation.
Another point comes under consideration. Commanders always seem to be particularly desirous of retaining close formation throughout the attack, and of preventing the whole of the troops becoming involved in a mêlée or pursuit. This originates from the necessity of having to reckon with the enemy's reserves, which may appear suddenly on the field atthe decisive moment to extricate their beaten comrades. We must always be in a position to meet them, and the rapid rally from the mêlée is therefore to-day diligently practised, in the hope that the troops may quickly be got in hand ready to be led against a fresh foe.
It is indeed astounding that we should give way to such self-deception. Such rallies can only appear possible if we disregard all the moral forces which the fight sets loose. Whoever has had experience of a single charge in war knows what excitement possesses the men and what time and trouble are required to tactically concentrate troops that have once been launched to the attack, and render them capable of evolution. In peace this is delightfully easy after a little practice; in war it is an absolute impossibility.
We must therefore be perfectly clear in our minds that only those troops which have not been engaged in the mêlée, those parts of the first and second lines which have remained formed during the charge, and the reserve which has been held in rear, will be available to meet any hostile forces which may suddenly appear.
Up to now our Regulations have followed the teachings of military history in so far as they provided for supporting squadrons behind the front line in the attack against cavalry. The new Regulations, however, not only retain the "stirrup feeling,"[18]even in the attack against cavalry, but have also greatly limited the employment of supporting squadrons, and rendered it exceptional. The Regulations practically ignore the use of the second line in the attack against cavalry. To preserve cohesion in the attack in spiteof this, the men in the rear rank are to advance into the front rank in order to fill the larger gaps which may there occur (106).[19]This will lead under certain circumstances to a loose, almost single-line attack against cavalry. These measures give ground for some concern. They can scarcely lead to any other end than to render steady riding to the charge impossible, to create disorder, and to deprive the already thin line of its force of impact.
It appears to me to be very questionable whether such directions could be carried out at all in practice. They will most certainly not attain the object which the Regulations apparently expect, that is to say, of securing cohesion in the attack, and thereby a victory for one thin attacking line. The necessity for a second line under such circumstances appears all the more obvious. The Regulations in this respect direct (200)[20]that, "if the situation demands it, even single squadrons can follow in column formation," also as an exception. This indicates a distinct divergence from the proven results of all experience, and cannot, in my opinion, be even theoretically justified.
Such dispositions cannot therefore be regarded asjustifiable.I consider it to be my unavoidable duty to express myself clearly upon this point.They in no wise alter the fact that to attack the enemy successfully our cavalry must, where its comparative strength in any way allows, be fundamentally formed in two lines, and be launched to the charge in the closest attack formation, knee to knee. For it was thus that the Prussian squadrons gained their laurels in all the splendid victories of the Frederician and Napoleonic wars.
At Mars la Tour, also, the success of the cavalry fight was decided by the 16th Dragoons, who threw themselves into the mêlée from the rear, acting as a second line entirely in accordance with the Frederician spirit. The 10th Hussars also attacked as a second line; and it was the cohesion of the 13th Dragoons, as we have already seen, that allowed them on two occasions rapidly to secure a victory.
If the conditions of the fight of cavalry against cavalry to-day have remained practically unaltered as compared to those of the past, it is a very different matter where the attack is against troops armed with modern firearms, essentially infantry and artillery.
In the old days, where infantry fought in serried masses, standing up, and were only able to cover a short distance to their front with a comparatively slow fire, the cavalry were able, even as against their own arm, to ride them down with shock action in close formation. They were therefore justified in attackinginfantry in the same formation and with the same cohesion as they attacked cavalry. This has now changed. Nowadays, when infantry can cover the ground to a distance of 1,500 or even 2,000 yards with a hot and rapid fire, and offer in their wide extension no sort of objective for shock action, an attack on unshaken, steadily firing infantry, which has any sort of adequate field of fire, is quite out of the question. Only infantry whose morale has been shaken, or which can be surprised at quite close range, can still be charged with a prospect of success. It is, then, no question of attack in cohesion, but a matter of crossing as rapidly as possible the zone swept by the enemy's fire in some formation which will allow a portion at least of the cavalry to escape its full effect.
These conditions may be fulfilled by the formation in lines. The first line must receive the fire, and will thereby provide cover to some extent to the lines behind and the possibility of reaching the enemy without suffering too severely. It will usually be no advantage to form the first line in two ranks, as such a disposition would but increase losses and the disorder caused by them. It will be better, generally, that the leading line or lines should consist of one rank at quite loose interval. This is principally on account of the ground, as the horses, in order to rapidly cover the necessary distance, must have room to gallop freely, and to avoid such obstacles as may lie in front of them or may be caused by losses in the leading line.
It is obvious, in my opinion, that such attacks cannot be ridden home according to the same principles that govern the attack against cavalry. It is an arbitrary assumption that a line of cavalry 1,500 or 2,000 yards wide can cross country stirrup to stirrup at theregulation pace of the charge,[21]as the Regulations demand. Not only must the leading line ride at quite loose interval, but the main attack must also have a looser formation than is here demanded. It is therefore indicated that such extension should be laid down in the Regulations. For it can in no case be avoided, but is the outcome of the force of circumstances. In the formation in lines, however, there is always room to open out, and troops or squadrons may be used in single rank.
The same principles that govern the attack against infantry hold good for that against artillery. Here also it is a matter of crossing the zone of fire at a rapid pace in widely extended order, or drawing the fire of the artillery by the advance of the leading line, and of compelling it to repeatedly alter its elevation. To this end it may perhaps at first be advisable to expose only weak portions of the charging first line to the fire of the guns, in order to disturb it, and to pave the way for the success of the main attack. This will have to ride in line, or perhaps better still in squadron column, in order to make full use of the unexposed portions of the ground. Thus in this case, also, the leading lines in single rank extended and loose riding in the changing formations of the main attacking line are advocated.
The new Regulations arrive partially at the conclusions inevitable from these reflections. The attack in several lines, and the formation of a first line in single rank for the attack against fire action have beenadopted by them (113 and 174).[22]In one point only according to my view, they do not take sufficient account of the demands of reality, and this is in the matter of extension. As before, the attack in close formation against infantry which the Regulations advocate, will be carried out and practised according to the same principles as against cavalry. As before, infantryfiring lying extended under cover, as also artillery, are to be charged in the same method as cavalry advancing in close formation.
I think we have proved that the attendant conditions of the two cases differ widely. If the Regulations had but taken them into consideration, the difference between the two methods of attack would have thereby been made more intelligible to all officers from the first than could be done by general instructions of this nature.
The cavalry has now a demand made upon it by Regulation which, although it can be met on the drill-ground, will be impossible of fulfilment in war. It will therefore be necessary to discard in war what we have taken such pains to learn, a thing which frequently happens in manœuvres, and even on the exercise-ground.
In the formation for attack and the deployment, the Regulations follow the logical sequence of their point of view that, in the attack upon cavalry, no second line is necessary, and in this matter adhere to the directions laid down in the old Regulations. From my point ofview, this does not seem to correspond at all with the necessities of the fight.
In my "Reflections on the New Cavalry Drill Regulations" I laid down "that it should always be possible for cavalry to change from the manœuvre column straightway into attack formation with flank protection, without first forming line, as hitherto has been deemed necessary." In opposition to the Regulations I still hold fast to this principle.
We have seen that the formation in lines is the necessary one forallcharges, and that an attack inoneline will only be possible in exceptional cases where weakness forbids the formation of several lines, or where the surprised and demoralised condition of the enemy appears to render a second line superfluous.
The logical conclusions resulting from these reflections are that all column formations employed in the approach march must keep in view first and foremost the rapid adoption of the attack formation, and that deployment must in principle lead to the formation in lines for attack. The complete deployment in line of any units from the regiment upwards can only be necessary in exceptional cases. It can be formed from the attack formation or direct from column when specially ordered.
Taking into consideration the rapidity with which approach, deployment, and attack will often follow each other, I would even advocate that a trumpet-call, "Form for attack!" should be laid down in the Regulations. The strength of the various lines will generally have to be ordered according as the objective consists of cavalry or troops using fire action. It will not always be possible to find time for detailed arrangements, particularly during the rapid vicissitudes of a cavalry combat. The trumpet-call would then justifyitself, and the lines would be formed by the independent action of squadron leaders, according to the formation the troops were in and the expected breadth of frontage of the enemy. It should be laid down as a guide that of four squadrons one at least should form a second line, and that an unprotected flank should, when possible, be covered by a squadron in échelon. The squadrons nearest the enemy would form a first line, and the remainder would act according to circumstances, and either follow the first line, échelon themselves in rear of it, or, when necessary, prolong it. For the deployment into one line a special call could be used.
For the conduct of the fight on foot the same principles hold good as for the infantry. The duties and conditions of the fight are similar, and demand similar general tactical directions. The arrangements for the led horses, however, render the introduction and the conduct of the fight considerably more difficult. There is also a certain difference according as the opponent is infantry or cavalry.
For, in the first case, there is generally no danger of a further turning movement, or of threats against the led horses from the flank or rear. In the greater number of cases when arranging for the position and safety of the led horses, only small hostile patrols need be expected. An action may therefore generally be conducted with more boldness under these circumstances than when opposed to cavalry which might seriously threaten the led horses by a mounted reserve.
These circumstances must be taken into consideration when dealing with the principles for the conduct of the led horses.
In defence, the measures required are comparatively simple. The conformation of the ground usuallychosen with a view to the peculiarities of defensive action will often allow of the led horses being kept close to the firing-line, where it will also be possible to mount out of the enemy's range and to withdraw from his fire under cover of the ground. The led horses should only be left to the rear if the position is to be maintained until the enemy comes to close quarters, and then should be, if possible, behind some fresh position, where it seems likely that resistance may be renewed. In defence, the led horses will generally be left quite immobile,[23]though this method should not be considered imperative. For even in defence the led horses must be sometimes kept mobile; for instance, when it is necessary to rapidly occupy on foot some locality in the neighbourhood of which there is no suitable position for the led horses. In such a case they will have to be sent behind cover, which can only be done if they are mobile. The horses will only be kept in the immediate neighbourhood when it is intended merely to bring off a fire surprise, and not when carrying out an attack or making an obstinate resistance (471-473).[24]
For the attack the conditions are different. The troops must then be often completely separated from their horses. It is therefore all the more necessary that the latter should be secured against all hostile attack. If, for instance, hostile cavalry threatens, they must have a special escort. The possibility of a reverse must be taken into consideration when selecting the position for led horses, and the retiring troops must be able not only to mount, but to withdraw under cover.
It is of especial importance that the troops should regain their mobility after an attack has been carried out. When the led horses can be moved, this is an easy matter. Where, however, they are immobile, as will generally be the case where full force has to be put into the fight, there will be considerable loss of time unless it be possible for the led horses to be brought up, part at a time, by any mounted reserve that may have been left in the rear. In spite of this disadvantage, the desire to render the led horses mobile should not be allowed to lead to the undertaking of a dismounted action with insufficient numbers.
This desire to regain the horses as rapidly as possible is frequently to be observed at manœuvres, and not only leads to dismounting and leaving the led horses mobile, but is sometimes allowed to exercise too much influence on the question of where the horses are to be left. In war this consideration should never influence the conduct of the fight, nor lead to the undertaking of a dismounted fight in a half-hearted manner, or precipitately, and thus paralysing the energy of the attack. It should never induce a commander to keep his horses too close to the battlefield and thereby exposed to danger, in order that he may more quickly regain them. If dismounted action has been determined on, the main condition is that the attack should be successfully carried out, and all other matters must be subordinated to this end.
The precepts of the new Regulations do not, to be sure, harmonise with this view. According to them, even when led horses are not required to be mobile, only three-quarters of the men dismount, and each man will hold four horses (366).[25]The number of rifles will be greatly diminished by these measures (by about a quarter); and it is not quite clear, at least to me, what corresponding advantage is to be gained. The measure is, however, so far-reaching that it merits special criticism—the more so as the Regulations themselves lay stress upon the rapid energetic conduct of the fight, and at the same time make such action more difficult by weakening the numbers in the firing-line.
Will the horses thus retain a certain degree of mobility? This would be a mischievous delusion. Even if such measures allow of short distances being coveredat a walk on the level drill-ground, such a thing is out of the question in the field and in the proximity of a fight. How will one man lead four horses, and at the same time carry four lances? A practical impossibility.
The Regulations also give no clear directions as to how the lances are to be carried during these evolutions. On the other hand, the number of men formerly detailed fully sufficed for holding the horses when it was not required to move them. There seems therefore to be some other reason for this measure.
I have asked myself the question as to whether the fact that more men are to be left with the horses than formerly will perhaps make it possible to defend the led horses by dismounted patrols. The directions contained in the Regulations (368)[26]that hostile patrols must be kept at a distance by single sentries posted by the commander of the led horses indicates that such was perhaps the intention. But it appears to me that eventhisobject cannot be obtained in such a way. The sentries, if they are to defend the led horses from long-range fire in open country, must be pushed forward in considerable numbers, and very far, almost at rifle range. With single sentries close at hand, no proper protection is afforded, nor can posts be sent out 1,000 yards without giving them a strength which the force cannot afford. If, however, the protection of the led horses in difficult country is to be provided for, afew sentries will most assuredly not suffice to prevent hostile patrols approaching unobserved.
In order to properly protect the led horses they must either be so disposed that they are actually covered from the view and fire of the enemy, or else secured by an escort strong enough to prevent hostile action against them. There is no third course.
Taking these things into consideration I cannot regard the limitation of the number of rifles in the firing-line imposed by the Regulations as justifiable. It seems to me that here a sacrifice is made with no corresponding advantage resulting.
This anxiety seems also to have influenced, to a certain degree, the text of the Regulations. In paragraph 367[27]the attempt is made to compensate in some measure for the danger created by the weakening of the firing-line. That is to say, the squadron leader is allowed in either method of dismounting (with half or three-quarters of the men) to reinforce the firing-line, if the situation demands, by diminishing the number of horse-holders. But it seems to me that this arrangement is not quite practicable, and does not sufficiently take into account the difficulties that will continually result therefrom in the conduct of a real fight.
First of all, it must be regarded as extremely hazardous to leave such measures altogether in the hands of squadron leaders. Only consider, for example, the case of a brigade commander who dismounts half his men in order to keep his led horses mobile, and during the attack makes the discovery that the horses cannotfollow because the squadron leaders have reinforced the firing-line from the horse-holders! Throughout the Regulations there are no sort of directions for limiting the initiative of the squadron leader in such matters in the case of the larger bodies of troops.
But if this is to be disregarded, what becomes of the whole measure? Is it to be determined when dismounting that the number of horse-holders is to be diminished, or are these men only to be brought up in the course of the fight? Against the first method there is naturally nothing to urge. But the second, also, is quite allowable according to the letter of the Regulations. It will, however, result in grave disadvantages.
If in defence the led horses are close to the firing-line, such procedure is certainly possible, but only, it seems to me, in this one case. If fighting a defensive action where the horses must be left far to the rear, or indeed in an attack, how and when are these reinforcements to be brought up? It is generally in the middle of a fight that the discovery is made that the troops are insufficient. How is the order then to be sent to the squadron leader that the few men who can still be spared from the led horses are now to advance? How will these men be led to the front, perhaps 1,000 or 1,500 yards, or still farther? How long will the squadron wait for their arrival? And in the end will it not only be a matter of comparatively few men for each squadron which will dribble gradually into the fight? These cannot be regarded as reserves, but, at best, weak supports far in rear, which can only be employed in the fight with difficulty and loss of time, if at all.
I think, therefore, that what the Regulations prescribe in this matter is not suitable for real war, and that it would be better from the commencement to employ all the men that are considered necessary, andrather to dismount as before, and leave the led horses quite immobile, than afterwards to allow single men to dribble into the fight. Asreserves, formed detachments must be directed against the decisive points, and not a few troops brought up to reinforce the whole length of the line at the discretion of the squadron leader.
IV. THE FIGHT OF THE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY
Such fights will occur during the offensive reconnaissance of the cavalry, in screening, and in enterprises against the enemy's communications and lines of approach. Cavalry may also be entrusted with the task of dispersing gatherings of hostile partisans, of levying contributions on a large scale in the enemy's country, and of carrying out other similar undertakings. Serious encounters must often be expected under such circumstances.
It is naturally impossible to give tactical guides and directions for all these various cases; each problem, rather, will demand its own solution. At the same time certain typical phenomena continually repeat themselves in all such combats, for which general principles and rules for guidance may be profitably set forth.
The fight will be either offensive or defensive. In the offensive it will either be a matter, if the enemy is also pressing forward, of the battle of encounter, or else the attack against localities or positions. In fighting against partisans, also, it will more frequently be a case, as it was in France, of a struggle for localities. In the defence, on the other hand, localities, positions, or defiles will have to be defended. Beyond these groups no real fight can be considered with the exception of surprises, which merit separate consideration.
It is therefore, in my opinion, advisable to develop the tactical principles according to some corresponding grouping of the material. Only thus can clear and reasoned conclusions be arrived at. For if we take all the various principles evolved from different tactical situations and jumble them illogically together, or discuss them from points of view which are not closely based on the probable happenings of reality, we run a danger of confusing the judgment instead of clearing it.
1.The Battle of Encounter
When lesser bodies of cavalry, unaccompanied by the other arms, meet during a mutual advance, it is essentially a matter of endeavouring to deploy more quickly than the adversary, of surprising him if possible while still deploying, and of seizing the advantages of the terrain. It is by good screening of the approach, superior reconnaissance, a quick eye for the possibilities of the ground, and rapid decision that here, as before, superiority can be maintained.
It may happen in exceptional cases, under modern conditions, that the larger bodies of cavalry, accompanied by a proportion of other arms, are unable at the moment of collision to employ them—e.g.in close country. There may then be a purely cavalry fight on a large scale, and action must of course be taken according to the tactical principles involved. Early deployment, maintenance of exterior lines, rapid decision, are, as regards the leading, the important factors of success.
It is quite another matter where co-operation of the other arms can be seriously counted on. It is then chiefly the artillery which will set its stamp upon thedevelopment of the fight, and it will no longer be possible to act according to purely cavalry tactical principles. A brigade or division, in column of route, or even in several formed columns, if exposed to the enemy's artillery fire, will suffer such material and moral loss that such formations, unless compelled by circumstances, are particularly to be avoided. Whoever is obliged to effect the deployment of his force under the enemy's guns casts from him one of the most important elements of success.
It will therefore be necessary, when advancing against the enemy, to adopt the approach formation, and to seek cover as soon as it is calculated that the hostile artillery are within effective range. In order rightly to calculate this moment the enemy's probable advance must of course be taken into consideration, and, as this may vary greatly according to the pace adopted, it is advisable in this respect not to be too optimistic, but to be deployed rather too early than too late.
Taking into consideration the range of modern artillery, the deployment should commence, therefore, in open country, at latest when some 6,500 yards from the enemy.[28]As this distance will diminish very quickly when the opponents are both rapidly advancing, it will certainly be advisable, if the knowledge of the situation in any way allows, to take up the required breadth of front still earlier.
I would here lay down that a too rapid advance of our own troops, unless rendered necessary by the situation, is in no way advantageous. It is not generally a question of striking the enemy as far to the front as possible, but of striking surely, and of having sufficient strength in hand to annihilate him in the pursuit.
A steady and well-thought-out advance should therefore be undertaken; for a precipitate forward movement distresses the horses quite unnecessarily, renders an appreciation of the situation more difficult, and generally allows of no well-considered action. There is also another reason for avoiding a too rapid advance. This is the fact that in such a case the most important reports generally come in when the force is already in the immediate proximity of the enemy. This disadvantage increases with the rapidity of the advance, as a rapidly moving force will follow more closely on the heels of its reconnoitring patrols. To ride slowly forward and to give the patrols time to send back reports will generally lead to better information as to the situation, and will allow of a better and quicker decision being made. The enormous advantage may then be gained of being deployed earlier than the enemy, and of gaining exterior lines[29]from the beginning.
In spite of this, most cavalry leaders, especially at manœuvres, regard their task as a matter of rapidly covering a certain distance, and see in this the essence of the cavalry spirit. This is, however, by no means so. Coolness, reflection, economy of force in approach and deployment, but that lightning-like decision and action at the proper moment, which can only resultfrom a clear appreciation of the situation, alone make the great cavalry leader. It is just because such opposite qualities must be united in the soul ofoneman that such leaders are so rare and so difficult to recognise in time of peace.
When a collision with the enemy is in any way in prospect, the commander must in principle remain, during the advance, with the foremost detachments of the advanced guard, in order that reports may reach him as early as possible. When in close proximity to the enemy he will often be obliged to advance with a sufficient escort from point to point, in order that he may be able to study the ground from good points of view, and, where possible, himself observe the movements and dispositions of the enemy. He will thus be in a position to make his preliminary arrangements rapidly and effectively, to spare his troops unnecessary marching, and to counteract any unsuitable dispositions made by his subordinates. He must not, however, conceal from himself that even the most effective measures of reconnaissance may fail, and that he may be faced by the necessity of coming to a decision without full knowledge as to the enemy.
In such cases, when it can be estimated that deploying distance from the enemy has been arrived at, further reconnaissance should not be waited for to assist decision; but the initiative must, under all circumstances, be maintained. The leader, then, must act according to his own judgment, and impose the law upon his opponent, and yet be ready, by careful dispositions, to meet unforeseen events.
It may happen that the opponent is unexpectedly met with, and has gained an advantage in deployment. In such a case a forward deployment generally leads to the dribbling up of the force, hampered, as it will be,by the proximity of the enemy. The deployment should therefore be made either on the existing line of front or to the rear, according to the distance from the enemy, and should be covered, where necessary, by the dismounted action of the advanced guard and by artillery fire. Only thus can the lost freedom of action be regained, as superior breadth of deployment is the first and perhaps the most important step towards the maintenance of the initiative.
We must not, however, assume that this deployment—in a cavalry division, for instance—requires that the various brigades shall draw away from each other at regulation intervals, and that the division will, in this formation, advance towards the enemy. This will generally be impossible; first, because it is usually advisable to seek the cover of the ground in order to be secure from possible hostile fire surprise, even when the enemy's artillery is not yet located; secondly, because the regulation frontage of deployment of a cavalry division is much too narrow to allow it to gain exterior lines, or to affect a concentric attack. The deployment must rather be carried out according to the demands of the situation at the moment, without regard to regulation intervals. The division commander will first of all detail a reserve for himself. To this he will then give the orders necessary for its conduct as well as to the advanced guard, the various groups of the main body, and the artillery and machine-guns. The direction of march of the various subdivisions will thus be determined according to the ground and the intentions of the commander, and it will also usually be necessary, in order to keep the troops well in hand, to order the advance by stages, and to regulate the pace.
If the advance has been carried out in separatecolumns, the action of the smaller columns must be regulated before the deployment of the main column. A certain loss of time will here generally be found inevitable. The necessary preparations must therefore be made early enough to ensure that, if the junction of a detachment with the main body is intended, it will be possible to carry it out before contact with the enemy is made. It is a matter for especially careful and well-considered action if one of the lesser columns is to intervene from a flank direction in a fight which is already raging, an operation which may be of the most decisive importance, but difficult to effect in the rapid course of cavalry action. If, however, it is desired to reap the benefits of such action, an endeavour must be made to gain time by dismounted action for the arrival of the column which is to strike the decisive blow. Such measures will always be risky, but may lead to glorious results.
The orders for the concentration and for the deployment form the framework on which the whole fight develops. They are therefore of the highest importance. Faults committed here can seldom be rectified later, and yet such orders will generally have to be issued before touch with the enemy is gained, except by patrols, and at a moment when the main features at most of the enemy's situation are known. Particular attention must, as we have seen, be paid to his artillery. No one will deny that herein lies the possibility of misapprehension and failure, and that many a leader will shrink from the necessity of such a decision. He, however, who, in spite of the uncertainty of the situation, succeeds in making up his mind betimes has an obvious advantage. For it is just in such a battle of encounter that success will fall to him who knows how to avail himself with rapidity and determination of thefavourable moment, who quickly possesses himself of important points and localities, and who anticipates the enemy, as advocated above, in broadening the front, and thereby in deployment.
Under such circumstances the dispositions made for the advanced guard will be of the greatest importance. Its conduct has often a deciding influence on the issue of the whole fight.
If it be carelessly handled, this circumstance may mean the loss of the initiative, and the commander may find himself compelled to turn his attention to the situation forced upon him by the advanced guard, and to conduct the fight otherwise than his own intentions and the general situation demand. On the other hand, a too careful employment of the advanced detachments is apt to entail loss of advantages which might be of decisive importance. The proper conduct of such an advanced guard demands, therefore, an unusually sure military instinct. Its commander must always be instructed in a detailed manner as to the intentions of the general, if he is expected to handle his detachment successfully according to them.
It will often be advisable for the advanced guard to occupy some point of support dismounted, in order that the deployment and the further tactical development may be undertaken under cover of it. In such circumstances there is no reason to shrink, when necessary, from bringing the advanced guard back to some suitable locality, if thereby full cover can be afforded for the rear detachments or for separated portions of the force that may be rejoining. It will often be found desirable also, in the critical moments of deployment, to strengthen the resisting power of the advanced guard by machine-guns. It may, however, on the other hand, be equally advantageous for the advanced detachments, on collision with the enemy, to charge him recklessly in order to reap full benefit from some favourable opportunity.
The handling of the artillery, particularly at the moment of deployment, is of especial importance. It may be a great advantage to bring it into action before the enemy's artillery, in order to profit by any carelessness of the hostile troops in deployment and approach, and to surprise their artillery when coming into position. The conduct of the advanced guard must therefore be influenced by the fact that a suitable position must be assured to the artillery. Its fire will often suffice to induce the enemy to show his strength or to evacuate localities which he has occupied.
As long as the strength of the enemy is unknown, and the possibilities of superior force have to be reckoned with, it would be a great error to stake the whole force as soon as contact has been gained. This is often done on training-grounds in quite a systematic way, because there is always a tacit understanding that the enemy is no stronger than one's own force. In war such action might lead to the gravest disasters.
If, therefore, complete uncertainty reigns as to the enemy's strength, it will be better at first to operate tentatively with a portion of the force until an opinion can be arrived at as to whether the decisive attack can be ventured on. Energetic contact with the enemy by fire action will generally soon clear up this point.
The view that a gradual and judicious employment of force is not in accordance with the principles of cavalry action (430)[30]can only be justified in the case ofthe pure cavalry combat mounted. This, however, in my opinion, should only be determined upon if the enemy's strength is known, at all events to some degree. I do not share the view of the Regulations that, if uncertainty reigns as to the strength and intentions of the enemy, freedom of action can be preserved, even in the mounted combat against cavalry, by the use of formations in échelon (424).[31]This is only possible by a protracted action in which gradual reinforcements are used, and only in such a manner can the enemy be forced to disclose his strength and intentions. A protracted fight, however, can only be carried out by fire action. A mounted advance, whether made in échelon or otherwise, cannot alter the rapid nature of a cavalry fight, and will not allow of sufficient time being gained to form a proper appreciation of the enemy. Échelon formations lead at best to eccentric attacks and thereby to unfavorable tactical situations.
If the situation is to be cleared up by fighting, fire action must be employed, and as soon as this occurs, whether on the part of the enemy or oneself, a gradual employment of force is not only no disadvantage, but is demanded by the circumstances. For at first the fight must be carried out from depth; the Napoleonic "Je m'engage et puis je vois"[32]holds good; one's own main force will only be engaged when the strength andintentions of the enemy become in some measure known. It will, however, be advisable in all cases to keep a strong reserve in hand until prepared to advance to a well-considered and planned attack.
The passage of defiles, also, is scarcely likely to be undertaken in serious war in the manner so often seen at manœuvres. Here the chief matter for consideration is generally to keep one side as far from the defile as possible, in order that the passage of the other may be possible. Such tender solicitude is scarcely to be expected of a real enemy, and it will, I opine, scarcely occur to anybody in war to attempt a defile without preparation, and to advance on the farther side against an enemy whose strength, as is generally the case in war, is unknown, thereby running the danger of being thrown back on the defile and of suffering enormous loss. Such a danger, to which the whole force is exposed, would certainly only be incurred when the gravest necessity compelled. What the Regulations say in this respect (434)[33]has, to my mind, but a limited practical significance.
Such directions would only be followed if the enemy were known to be still far distant and approaching, where there is time and space sufficient, and where the force is considered to be at least a match for the enemy. Even then, preparations should be made for a possible retirement. In all other cases, however, a defile on thefar side of which the enemy is supposed to be will only be crossed when the ground for deployment on the far side is at least commanded with fire in such a way that the enemy will not be able, in case a retirement becomes necessary, to pursue right into the defile.
It will therefore generally be advisable to throw forward a few squadrons at a rapid pace across the defile in order to occupy with dismounted action strong points on the far side, from which the foreground can be covered. This will secure the passage of the main body and arrest any possible pursuit. It will often be advantageous to provide such squadrons with machine-guns. Artillery can most suitably come into action on the near side of the defile, so that it may be able to cover the country on the far side with its fire.
Even if a defile occupied by the enemy has been captured by fire action it is advisable, before the main body crosses it, to secure a few strong points in the foreground, in order to secure the passage against counter-attack by the enemy's reserve.
Such necessary care in the preliminaries of an action, however, must in nowise lead commanders to allow themselves to be forced to adopt a defensive attitude or to abstain from decisive attack. That is not the intention. Such measures are only taken to clear up the situation, which cannot generally be done in war without fighting, and to diminish the risks of any further action which may ensue. If the enemy has so far shown himself that an appreciation can to some extent be arrived at as to its strength, if he has brought artillery into position, if perhaps he has attacked our advanced guard, or by the action of the latter has been forced to throw more men into the fight, if, in short, it can be determined that an attack has prospect of success, then the decisive offensive must be undertakenwith all the force hitherto kept back. Detachments, also, which have been dismounted can then, according to circumstances, be withdrawn from the fire fight and otherwise used. The attack, especially when mounted, will usually be delivered with greatest advantage from the flank, and must, as a rule, reach well out in order to escape as far as possible the artillery and machine-gun fire of the enemy. Whether it be undertaken mounted or dismounted will depend upon the attitude of the enemy and the attendant circumstances. In either case it will be advisable to husband a reserve as long as possible to meet the vicissitudes of the fight, or to be used for a bold stroke, when it is seen where a decision may be arrived at.
If dismounted action must be undertaken, the principles which govern the infantry attack hold good. The fire of the artillery and, where possible, the machine-guns must naturally be utilised for the support of the attacking troops. The dispositions for the action should, however, never depend upon the possibility of finding a good artillery position. The artillery must suit itself to the circumstances, and come into action wherever it can best co-operate in carrying out the commander's intentions. It can often be profitably employed in the protection of an exposed flank. It will be of advantage to shelter it behind some obstacle in order to save the necessity of finding a detachment for its security. Machine-guns may sometimes be advantageously used for the protection of the artillery. It is at the same time advisable that a specially detailed cavalry escort should be dismounted for this object.
A concentration of the batteries facilitates fire command and measures for protection. A dispersion by groups allows a better effect against the hostile artillery and usually affords a more extensive field of fire.Machine-guns, which must generally look for positions as far to the front as possible, or, if they are protected, to a flank, will usually be best concentrated in a single fire position. They may, however, be disposed by sections when occasion demands. This principle holds good also for the artillery. Hard-and-fast rules must be avoided if the many and varied demands of a cavalry fight are to be met. The line of fire, however, of artillery and machine-guns should never be allowed to limit the movements of our own cavalry.
In consequence of the peculiar nature of the cavalry fight it will often be desirable to keep the limbers with the guns. It may also be an advantage not to bring the first-line transport and a portion of the wagons on to the field itself. For similar reasons the light ammunition columns will at the commencement probably march with the baggage. Thus too it will often be necessary for the machine-gun detachments to keep their teams near the guns, or to shoot from the carriage and to leave the ammunition wagons in a safe place. All these measures contain, however, the danger that ammunition may not be at hand when wanted, or that these indispensable supplies may fall into the hands of hostile raiding parties. The failure of ammunition may, especially in the case of a protracted dismounted action, be of decisive importance. Such will be especially the case where the ground favours the use of the rifle, or where the hostile cavalry is strengthened by cyclists or mounted infantry and shows an eagerness (natural under such circumstances) to take advantage of such methods of fighting.
The cavalry leader will, under these conditions, only undertake what must be an obstinate combat when he cannot in any way avoid it, or at least is not compelled to attack frontally. He will rather endeavour, if thegeneral situation allows, to separate the hostile cavalry from the less mobile infantry by repeated turning movements and then to attack it when isolated. If the hostile cavalry and horse artillery can be driven from the field, the infantry detachments will form an easy prey for the artillery or can be surrounded. Under such circumstances, always with due regard to the general situation, the road on which the advance is being made may for a time be abandoned and the turning movement carried out with the whole force, if such a proceeding affords a favourable prospect of tactical success. Such a movement threatens the enemy's communications in the same way as it exposes our own. Victory, however, will secure the latter again, and will be the more decisive the farther the enemy can be driven from his natural line of retreat.
Should the cavalry meet a superior force of all arms, such as might be pushed forward by the enemy's army, to support the offensive of his own cavalry, or to serve as a pivot of manœuvre for them, a decisive battle must on no account be undertaken with it.
When the Regulations (519)[34]demand that endeavours must be made to force back such detachments or to break through them, I think that the tactical value of the arm is over-estimated. I cannot conceive any real case in which cavalry can break through hostile detachments of all arms. In my opinion the cavalry will generally have to be content to make such detachments deploy, by means of artillery fire, and especially by fire action from a flank, and thereby to lose time, to deflect them from their line of march, and, by threatening their rear and communications, prevent them from carrying out their intentions. Bold measures are in such cases the best, and will preserve to the cavalry the possibility of continuing the distant reconnaissance in rear of the hostile detachment.
As to the leading, in all such battles of encounter the commander's place, as has already been indicated, is at the head of the advanced guard. As soon, however, as contact has been gained he must, on the contrary, remain far enough behind the fighting-line to be able to watch his own troops and the enemy, and to be easily found. He should not be wandering about the battlefield, seeing everything and arranging everything himself. Only where it appears necessary to him to make a moral impression should he place himself at the head of an attacking force. He might, especially, lead his last reserve into battle, and by his personal example endeavour to inspire the troops to an impetuous attack. Such cases, however, will be very exceptional. It will always be most important that the supreme commander retains control over the whole of his troops, and can receive messages and at decisive moments issue orders and instructions to the force.
In the greater number of cases the commander will personally neither reconnoitre the ground whither he is sending a detachment nor yet the enemy which it shall engage. He will scarcely ever be able to give to single small units or even to the directing brigade, if indeed he has detailed one, the direction of attack. It will often be impossible for changes in orders to reach troops once set in motion in time to be of use, especially in a purely cavalry fight.
When the Regulations, in spite of this, declare it to be indispensable that the leaderhimselfmust be able to see if he takes the offensive against cavalry (403),[35]this is, under modern conditions and large formations, in most cases quite impracticable, even in manœuvres. As a rule the commander will only be able to indicatethe task, and it must be left to the subordinate leaders to carry it out to the best of their ability, according to the situation as they find it on the spot. The situation during the rapidly changing phases of the cavalry fight will often be quite different from what was expected when the tasks were allotted.
On the other hand, before the commencement of the engagement, all subordinate leaders must be informed as to the situation and the general idea of the fight, also as to what duties each one of the larger formations is to carry out; so that all may be in a position to act according to the views and intentions of the commander if circumstances should be found different from what was expected. It will in most cases be desirable to issue the order for deployment in such a way that at least every brigade commander is informed of the general situation, and then to give supplementary orders for the fight which will be issued to all units. Whether in a battle of encounter it will be always possible to detail a directing brigade I very much doubt. One brigade will often fight on foot, the other mounted, while the change from the advanced-guard rôle to deployment for battlewill generally render a handling of the division according to rule practically impossible. The idea that, with an independent army cavalry in the battle of encounter, one division can in some measure be handled as on the drill-ground, and can be put into the fight in proper cohesion, must be dismissed. That is an error that has grown upon the exercise-ground, and which the conditions of modern warfare will not admit.
The more, however, that the method of leading is compelled by the pressure of modern development to change from tactical routine and adopt a more or less strategic form, the more unconditionally is it demanded of subordinate leaders that they be, even when independent, continually conscious of the guiding tactical principles, and endeavour to act in accordance with them.
The necessary consideration for the effect of the enemy's fire should never lead to fainthearted dispositions or paralyse the idea of decisive offensive action. If the result of the fight appears doubtful, the most decisive measures must be taken with rapidity and determination, and the last reserve thrown into the fight, regardless of consequences, in order to wrest victory from the enemy. For daring is in itself a mighty factor of success, and one which exercises enormous influence on the fickle Goddess of Fortune. The calculated boldness of all, and the greatest initiative within reasonable limits of subordinate leaders, must give to the fight of the cavalry mass its peculiar character.
It appears to me that this principle cannot be too greatly emphasised when considering the cavalry tactics of the present day.
If the fight takes a favourable course, the commander will make timely preparations for an effective pursuit, get control of any reserves still intact, and takemeasures for the concentration of strong bodies of his troops, so as to be prepared for further tactical action. Artillery and machine-guns advance rapidly—when necessary, on their own initiative—in order to come to effective range as soon as possible. Should the fight take an unfavourable turn, the commander will first make dispositions for these arms, unless they are to remain in position and sacrifice themselves to facilitate retirement. They will generally be sent to the rear in good time to a previously selected position. Only then will measures be taken to extricate the troops involved with the enemy, to concentrate them in a safe place, and to make fresh dispositions. Should the enemy pursue with but weak detachments, the offensive should be renewed.
2.Attack of Localities
The attack of an enemy who takes up a defensive attitude can obviously only be carried out dismounted. It must be a matter, therefore, for careful consideration whether such an operation shall be undertaken or not. Considerable numerical superiority is necessary to ensure success. A reserve will be needed, which can be used dismounted, to give the final decision at the decisive point, or to meet unexpected events. Besides this, it will be necessary in most cases to make a detachment which shall provide for the security of the led horses, for reconnaissance, and for operating against the enemy's flank and rear. It is the task of such a detachment to seek out and overthrow the enemy's mounted reserve, that it may then be able to co-operate in the main attack. The expression "Mounted reserve," used in the Regulations to designate this detachment, hardly corresponds with the rôleof these troops, which will be offensive from the commencement.
Here also I find myself in disagreement with the idea of the Regulations that the dismounted reserve can be frequently detailed from the troops which have remained mounted (460).[36]The mounted reserve must, as we have seen, operate offensively. The Regulations themselves allot this task to it by laying down that it shall undertake operations against the enemy's flank, his led horses, and his reserves (464).[37]It is, however, not compatible with these duties that the mounted reserve shall at the same time find a dismounted reserve, which can only enter the fight from the rear, and until then must remain behind the fighting-line. Different troops must be detailed from the first for both these duties, otherwise neither of them will be properly carried out.
Should the cavalry commander not have at his disposal sufficient force to meet all these demands, he will generally be better advised to abstain from the attack, and to endeavour to carry out his mission in some othermanner. An unsuccessful enterprise not only entails unnecessary loss, but tends to lower the moral value of the troops. It is only when conscious of great moral and tactical superiority, or when there is a prospect of surprising the enemy, that an attack should be dared without the necessary numerical preponderance.
The more difficult and serious such an undertaking is, the greater efforts must be made to gain at least a favourable base for attack, as regards not only the direction of the attack but also any special advantages of the ground. The mobility of the troops renders rapid changes of direction possible, such as are unknown to the infantry. Unlike the case of the infantry, therefore, the line of advance and of attack need not coincide. If thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position, and the ground in front of it, is made in good time, it will often be possible to change the base of attack even at the last moment and to appear suddenly from an unexpected direction.
Therefore, even in the approach, the deployment, and the advance to effective range, the ground should be carefully utilised in order that cover from view and fire may be secured as long as possible. It is also important to clear the country where the approach and deployment will take place of the enemy's patrols, and to do everything possible to prevent his reconnaissance.
Artillery and machine-guns must come into action in such a way that they will be able to combine with the firing-line in concentrating an overwhelming fire against the decisive points of attack. The guns will generally be able to come into action under cover, and to fire indirect against the enemy in position. They will only engage the enemy's artillery if the latter shows itself in open or half-covered positions with theobject of turning its fire on the advancing attack. Otherwise the fire of the artillery will be directed against the enemy's firing-line or any mounted detachments that are visible. It is of importance that a sufficient quantity of ammunition should be brought up, and that it should not be wasted by random fire against invisible targets.
The orders for the fight must be issued with great care and clearness, for, once the battle is begun, it will not generally be possible to make changes of disposition. The difficulty, also, of changing the front of the fighting-line increases in proportion to the size of the units employed. It is therefore of the highest importance not only to determine the front of attack before the commencement of a fight, but also to give a clear order allotting a definite task to each unit, which should, when possible, be made known to all the troops. Only if this is achieved will they be able to act independently according to the spirit of the orders.
When all preparatory dispositions have been made, the attack should, if possible, be commenced simultaneously, unless circumstances demand that some detachments take up the fire fight before the others are ready to co-operate. From the moment that the attack is commenced, but one thought should inspire the troops: "Forward against the enemy, cost what it may." Pressing continually to the front, each must endeavour to surpass his neighbour. Should further advance be impossible without reinforcements, the ground won must be maintained at all costs, even against hostile counter-attack.
The strength of the first deployment of the firing-line must depend on circumstances. In any case the whole breadth of that part of the enemy's front must be simultaneously engaged which is able to direct itsfire against the attack, as otherwise the latter will be exposed to flanking or cross-fire.
If the ground allows of a covered approach to within effective range, a sufficiently thick firing-line should be established at once. On the other hand, where cover is scarce, it will sometimes be advisable, when sufficient time can be spared, to deploy at first only a loose, irregular firing-line, which will offer a difficult target to the enemy, or to remain at first under cover and gradually to strengthen the firing-line in the same way until it attains the strength necessary to commence the attack. In the further advance, supports must follow all the firing-lines, to make good losses, keep up the ammunition supply, and to put new moral strength into the fighting-line.
Open country in such cases demands increased depth in order to minimise loss, while close country requires that depth should be diminished, and it will be found advisable to act accordingly. Close formation can and must be maintained as long as the terrain and the hostile fire admit. It will of course be impossible to expose such formations within range of the enemy's fire. The advance will then consist of rushes, with pauses for breath, of distribution into small units, and the adoption of extended order. The nearer the decision of the fight, the closer must the supports follow, ready to co-operate.
In difficult country the order and cohesion of units must not be lost. It is especially important for the supports as well as the firing-line to make use of any available cover, so that units may be re-formed, ammunition supply regulated, and that the officers may regain their influence over the troops. This latter moral element deserves especial consideration.
When feeling its way forward the firing-line shouldavoid regular formation, and its rushes should not be made in too small bodies, as such a proceeding is apt to mask the fire of neighbouring detachments. It will likewise generally happen that some portions of the line are able to advance under cover of the ground more rapidly than others. These must then ask themselves the question whether their isolated advance might not lead to a reverse which would imperil the success of the attack. On the other hand, the unceasing pressing forward of all the various detachments is conditional to success. If localities exist in the foreground which might serve as supporting points for the further development of the attack, it should be considered whether they should not be occupied as rapidly as possible, and, where necessary, secured against counter-attack by being placed in a state of hasty defence. The advance of neighbouring detachments may then be facilitated from such points by energetic fire action. Such points at the same time secure the possession of the ground won and, under certain circumstances, protect those portions of the artillery and the machine-gun detachments which may accompany the attack, according as circumstances dictate. In any case such a measure (the co-operation of artillery and machine-guns) brings moral support to the attacking-line, and may at times prevent a defeat.
As soon as the firing-line has arrived within assaulting distance its fire must be increased to the utmost. All detachments in rear press forward regardless of loss as soon as they become aware that the first line is preparing for the assault. At the trumpet-call "Rapid advance"[38]the whole hurl themselves with the greatest determination and with loud cheers upon the enemy. Any reserves which may be still to the rear strainevery nerve to reach the advanced firing-line. The assault should, if possible, be simultaneous. But the effort to secure this should never lead to detachments waiting for each other. Where a possibility is offered to single portions of the force to penetrate into the enemy's position they must advance independently, and all other detachments must conform.
It is important that the assault should not be begun too early, but that the firing-line should work its way forward to the closest range before rising for the final charge. The Infantry Drill Regulations lay down 150 paces as a guide for this distance in peace. That is a great deal too much. I do not think that the firing-line, especially in deep ground or uphill, can "rush" forward in full marching order 150 paces after having already carried out a lengthy attack. These instructions of the Infantry Drill should certainly be modified. Cavalry, however, should not fall into this error. A premature assault may imperil the success of the attack, because physical force may fail, and the enemy's fire is given a chance of regaining its full strength. The fire weapon should rather be used up to the last moment. The assault should take place only from the closest possible distance, and this will ensure success. For the rest, I may draw attention to the instructions laid down in the Cavalry Drill for the dispositions for the attack and for its conduct. On these points it coincides with my view, and it would be superfluous here to repeat what lies therein. If I have gone into the question of the conduct of the attack rather more closely, it is to emphasise certain points that are not prominent enough in the compressed instructions of the Regulations, and which do not generally receive sufficient consideration.
As to surprise fire action, also, the Regulations contain all the essentials (471-473).[39]
I may, however, touch here upon another matter which is connected with dismounted action,i.e.the question of armament. It has often been proposed, and from influential quarters, to replace the cavalry sword by some kind of a bayonet. If, it is said, with a certain appearance of justification, cavalry are to assault hostile positions on foot, they must have somearme blanchefor the hand-to-hand fight, and this can only be a bayonet. The war in Manchuria, where such mêlées repeatedly took place, is cited as a proof of the necessity of such an armament. I cannot ally myself with such proposals. As to the repeated hand-to-hand fights in the Russo-Japanese war, these took place principally because the Russians found it impossible to evacuate their entrenchments in time, and that they took such full advantage of cover that they were in some measure surprised by the attacker. These examples can certainly not be adapted therefore to the dismounted action of our cavalry. With them it willnever be a question of prepared positions—which cavalry will, as a rule, neither attack nor defend—but of actions resulting from a battle of encounter. In such cases, however, as the experience of military history teaches us, a hand-to-hand fight is quite exceptional. Even the struggle for localities is fought out almost entirely with the firearm. If the defence should consist of dismounted cavalry and cyclists, it cannot as a rule be assumed that such troops will allow the attack to come to close quarters. They will more generally, as soon as the decision of the fire fight has become clear, endeavour to reach their horses or cycles and to escape the fire of the pursuit. As a matter of fact, therefore, dismounted cavalry would really only use the bayonet on foot in quite exceptional cases, and it would only be justifiable to introduce it if there were no attendant disadvantages. Such, however, is not the case. I would regard the abolition of the present sword as a great danger, calculated to seriously injure the morale of the cavalry.
Our lance is an excellent weapon for the charge, but for single combat only in cases where the men have freedom of movement. In the close turmoil of the fight it is very difficult to handle with success; besides which, it easily becomes unserviceable on striking an object too heavily. Should it pierce a body at the full speed of a horse's gallop it will generally bend on being drawn out (if indeed the rider in his haste extricates it at all), and then becomes unserviceable. In such a case the man needs his sword. A short bayonet can never replace this, and a compromise between a bayonet and a sword would be of but little service. If the sword is taken away from the cavalry soldier he will be rendered in many cases weaponless. There can be no doubt of this. And the consciousness of this drawback would verysoon be felt by the troops and would damp their eagerness for the fight.
The case, then, is this. When confronted by a hostile cavalry of any activity, the mounted combat, the mêlée, at least for smaller detachments and patrols, will be of almost daily occurrence; while, as we have seen, the hand-to-hand fight on foot must be most exceptional. To injure the efficiency of the troops for their daily rôle for the sake of such isolated occurrences I hold to be a great mistake, and therefore hope that the arm will be spared this fate.
3.Defence
As regards the principles of the defence, I may draw attention to the instructions laid down in the new Cavalry Regulations, which coincide with my views in all essentials. There are, however, still a few points to be raised which seem to me of importance.
First and foremost, I think that it follows, from the above arguments, that, in the case of cavalry operating independently, engagements may often take place which, with a generally offensive intention, must be conducted at times in a defensive spirit and with only part of the troops—that is to say, where it is not the intention to act on the defensive with the whole force, but to use the defence only as a means of resuming the general offensive later at the most advantageous time. It will be possible, especially in the battle of encounter, to defend favourable positions or localities with the advanced troops, either to gain time for the arrival of the main body, or else to oblige the enemy to weaken his reserves, against which the offensive is intended. This combination of attack and defence will frequently occur, I am convinced, even in the battle of encounter.