In such cases the defence must endeavour to deceive the opponent and to provoke the attack. Efforts will be made, while putting but few men into the fight, to give the impression of strength in the firing-line, and yet so to dispose the troops that attack will not appear impossible, if carried out in sufficient force. Groups of men on a broad front, a liberal expenditure of ammunition, and sometimes the holding back of artillery and machine-guns, are the means whereby the enemy may be thus misled.
But, even if the defensive on a large scale is adopted because the force is considered too weak to take the offensive in the open, the guiding principle will still be, as I have already indicated, to obtain a decision in the defensive fight by an offensive counter-stroke, in so far as the force and the circumstances of the ground in any way permit. This is a fundamental principle of the spirit of cavalry.
The force destined for the counter-attack should accordingly be detailed from the first. Efforts must be made, by using favourable country for the defensive front and thus being able to occupy it weakly, to spare every available man for the counter-attack, and to compensate for the weakness of the force in position by ample ammunition, well-arranged cross-fire, and similar measures. The troops designed to play the offensive rôle must first be placed in reserve, withdrawn, as far as possible, from view and fire of the enemy. As soon as the situation is cleared up, they will be placed in échelon behind that flank from which the counter-stroke will take place. Whether this will be a mounted or dismounted attack depends on the character of the ground and similar circumstances. In any case a base for attack outside the limits of the enemy's fire must be reached, and, where possible, by surprise.
It is therefore of the highest importance that the enemy shall be prevented from gaining observation as to the conduct of the reserve, in order that its presence may eventually come as a surprise to him. Hostile patrols must be attacked with remorseless energy wherever seen, and, if possible, put out of action. Those look-out points, on the other hand, from which observation can be made of the enemy must be occupied early in the fight.
The cavalry will, as a rule, only undertake a completely passive defence, where the object of the fight is to hold the crossing over some obstacle, to defend isolated localities, or to gain time. In such a case the question is one of the obstinate defence of a definite object, sometimes perhaps, also, of a retirement from one point to another. Such an operation, however, is always difficult to carry out on account of the led horses, and should only be attempted in very favorable country. It demands that the fight shall be broken off—always a difficult matter, and, to cavalry encumbered by their led horses, one of considerable danger. The horses certainly render it possible, by making a proper use of the ground, to withdraw more rapidly than could infantry in the same case. On the other hand, however, they tie the dismounted troops down to a definite direction of retreat, and remounting, when pressed by the enemy, is always a critical matter.
4.Breaking off the Fight, Retreat, and Pursuit
When it becomes apparent during the course of a fight that success cannot ensue, the commander must decide in good time whether he will carry the engagement through or break it off. To choose the right moment for the latter operation is generally extraordinarily difficult, even when it has been planned from the commencement. To make the necessary dispositions, also, demands great tactical skill. To continue the fight with determination, perhaps till nightfall, will often cost no greater sacrifice than the breaking off of the engagement and the attendant retreat.
Generally speaking, such engagements will only be those which are fought out on foot. The more open the country, the closer the enemy, and the greater the number of troops which have already been thrown into the fighting-line, so much the more difficult will it usually be to break off the fight. The circumstance also as to whether the led horses are mobile or immobile, and their position, will naturally influence the decision. On the other hand, it is easier to extricate the force after some success has been gained; whether it be that a hostile attack has been repulsed, or that our own troops have made a successful counter-stroke. History teaches us that at such moments there is generally a lull, during which the opponent is obliged to bring up fresh troops or to make fresh tactical dispositions.
Even under such favourable conditions, however, it will generally be impossible to break loose from the enemy without suffering heavy loss.
In defence, if the ground is especially favourable, it will certainly be possible at times to extricate a force without considerable loss. If it can rapidly withdraw from the firing-line and retire covered from pursuing fire, the whole force may under certain circumstances simultaneously evacuate a position, that is to say, if the enemy is still so far distant that he is unable to employ pursuing fire until the defender has reached a place of safety. How seldom, however, will such be the case! Small detachments will generally have to be sacrificedto secure the retreat of the main body. This means that various especially strong supporting points in the position will be occupied, and the force will withdraw under cover of them.
Military history offers us repeated examples where the attacker makes desperate endeavours to overpower such points, and in so doing forgets to pursue the withdrawing masses of the defender's troops. This, for example, was the part played at the battle of Weissenburg by Geisberg Castle and Schafbusch, and the château with its enclosed park at the battle of Coulmiers. Under cover of these points, against which all the efforts of the French were concentrated, the defenders were able in both cases to withdraw so slightly molested that even touch with them was completely lost.
The defence of such supporting points, which must be conducted with the utmost obstinacy, frequently ends in capture, but the end gained is worth the sacrifice. If the endeavour is made to withdraw the whole line of defence simultaneously under circumstances where it is possible for the attacker to bring to bear an effective pursuing fire from the captured position, loss will generally be much greater than that which would be deliberately incurred in arresting the pursuit.
The conditions are similar in attack. At manœuvres certainly we see the attacker when repulsed turn about, and, in a continuous retreat, lay himself open to a pursuing fire, which would mean absolute destruction. I do not think such a manœuvre possible in reality. As the advance has been by stages, so must be the retreat. But, whereas in the advance it was a matter of pressing forward on a wide connected front, in order to hold the whole of the enemy's position under fire, andnotof massing together where cover could beobtained, the exact contrary is the case in retreat, and the troops must seek any cover that will shelter them from the fire of the pursuit. Various strong points in the attack which have already been taken and occupied must be obstinately held during the retirement, and from them a heavy fire poured into the pursuit to bring it to a standstill. Care should be taken, even during an advance, to keep such places well supplied with ammunition, which can either be taken forward to the captured position or be at the disposal of the retiring troops.
I do not think that it will be possible in any other manner to break off an attack which has penetrated to within effective range of the enemy, or to carry out a compulsory retreat without disastrous loss.
The troops must fall back, obstinately contesting the ground and continually recommencing fire from any favourable position. The commander must make careful preparations, even when advancing, that a possible retreat shall not lead to disaster, but will be able to find prepared points of support. All detachments, however, that are outside the effective range of the enemy's fire, and still capable of manœuvre, especially artillery and machine-guns, must from commanding positions bring fire to bear on those troops which are harassing the retreat, regardless of the losses they may themselves incur. In such a moment everything must be subordinated to delivering the retreating masses from that destruction which the fire of the pursuit portends. Any advance of pursuing cavalry, also, must be met by heavy fire from such detachments, regardless of the expenditure of ammunition.
A retreat, then, requires particularly intelligent handling. The various detachments must be provided with instructions that are clear and definite. The commander must have his troops well in hand, must arrange for the occupation of any positions, decide which detachments shall cover the retreat, dispose of the artillery and machine-guns, determine the line of retreat of the various units, with due regard to the situation of their led horses, and arrange for the occupation of the rallying position. He should himself only leave the field when the force has got clear of the enemy. He must then, however, straightway attend to the rearrangement of the tactical dispositions, and take the other necessary measures. Any reserve still in hand must be used to check the pursuit where possible by a vigorous offensive. It is just in such situations that a determined counter-attack, even by a weak force, makes the greatest impression on the enemy.
As to the further conduct of the retreat after a successful extrication, definite instructions are naturally impossible. Everything depends on the circumstances of the moment. The possibilities of resuming the offensive must be borne in mind, even during a retirement. To this end it is frequently advisable to fall back partially towards a flank. Gneisenau, after the defeat at Ligny, directed the retreat on Wavre, in order to be able to take up the offensive again on the following day, and thus supplied us with a brilliant example well worthy of imitation even where the forces engaged are but small.
If it is a matter of mounted combat, the breaking off of the actual fight is quite impossible. Troops once engaged must carry the fight through. Even when retreating from the mêlée, fighting cavalry has no kind of means of extricating itself. It is then entirely dependent on the enemy, and can only retire at the most rapid speed. Reserves alone are able to bring the immediate pursuit to a standstill by intervening inthe running fight. Generally, however, this will only end when the horses of the victor are quite exhausted, or when the latter feels the necessity of getting his troops in hand and forming again for fresh duties. The further conduct of the vanquished troops must depend on the condition of the horses and the general situation. It is of importance to withdraw beyond the reach of the enemy as soon as possible in order that full freedom of action may be regained.
If the fire of the hostile artillery is to be feared, it is advisable to retire extended without regard to tactical formations, and making the best possible use of the ground. The troops will then only rally again beyond the range of the enemy's fire. The same naturally holds good for the retreat from a dismounted action after the men have remounted.
The commander will be well advised to inform his senior subordinates, if not all the troops, before the fight begins where the troops are to concentrate again in case of a reverse. The necessity for such dispositions generally passes unnoticed in peace, because pursuit is never thoroughly carried out, and the beaten troops are not so completely broken up as has repeatedly happened in war in the past and will happen again. We should not deceive ourselves in this matter, as otherwise there is a danger of completely losing control over the troops. Whoever expects to be able to rally a beaten cavalry division after a mounted fight by blowing the divisional call lays himself open to bitter disappointment. If the enemy is pursuing with energy, this will only be possible in the very rarest cases.
Before the commencement of the fight, arrangements must also be made for the rear communication, as there will otherwise be a danger of losing transport, and thereby ability to operate. Far to the rear or close athand are the two only possible positions for it. In the first case an escort whose strength will be dictated by the circumstances will always be necessary.
It should also be remembered that wagons should be able to turn round where they are halted. If single teams are unable to turn about on their own ground, it will be better to park the whole of the transport in such a way that it can easily be moved in any direction. It is then also easier to protect it against attack. If there is no fear of attack, the various columns may turn off the road with intervals corresponding to their length. It appears to me to be of especial importance to lay stress on these circumstances because in peace exercises there is no transport, and commanders consequently get accustomed to paying little attention to it.
As regards the pursuit, it is necessary to differentiate between a tactical and a strategical pursuit. The latter must crown the success of the former.
In mounted action, the beaten opponent must be kept at the point of the sword as long as the strength of the horses hold out. Detachments not immediately pursuing must be concentrated, and must seek to regain their ability for manœuvre as soon as possible.
After a dismounted action on the defensive, the pursuit will first be taken up by rifle fire. Any mounted reserve there may be should be launched to the charge against the retiring enemy as soon as the pursuing fire begins to cease to be effective. A victorious attack, on the other hand, must make every endeavour to gain the position vacated by the enemy, and to occupy ground from whence an effective pursuing fire is possible. The bringing up of the led horses will be of special importance in this case. If they are immobile, a portion of the men must be sent to the rear to bring them up, while the remainder hold the captured position. Anymounted reserves there may be can often be employed to bring up at least a portion of the led horses. Generally speaking, however, all troops not already engaged must, as we have already shown, take up the strategic pursuit as early as possible. This will supplement and complete the results of the tactical pursuit.
Never to let the enemy rest, even when the tactical pursuit has ceased, to prevent him regaining his cohesion, to capture prisoners, horses, and trophies, and, above all, to increase to the utmost the moral effects of his defeat, is the task before us. The immediate pursuit must therefore be combined, wherever possible, with a parallel pursuit commenced in good time. The latter must nip in the bud every attempt on the part of the retiring enemy to take up rearguard positions, by turning such positions and pressing forward with reckless energy against the actual lines of retreat. It must also endeavour to anticipate the enemy in the occupation of any defiles necessary to his retreat. At such times there must be no thought of sparing horseflesh. Even in this pursuit, however, the commander must give a definite object and a rallying point for the detachments following. He will otherwise, by reason of rapidity of the movements in progress, risk losing control of at least part of his troops, and of allowing them to go farther than the strategical situation demands or admits. For the rest, I may draw attention to the new Cavalry Drill Regulations, the compressed instructions of which contain much that is essential and coincide generally with my views.
V. THE ACTION OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE
In the battle of all arms, cavalry must be handled according to principles which are quite different andalmost diametrically opposed to those which characterise its independent action as army cavalry. For, in the latter case, not only is the defeat of the enemy kept in view, but another definite object has also to be pursued. This object can only be attained if successful in the fight, while an unsuccessful battle will paralyse the activity of the cavalry, and may cost the army the loss of its organs of reconnaissance. However daring its conduct then, it should never be engaged in hopeless enterprises, and should only undertake a fight where success can be reckoned upon with a certain measure of probability.
If, therefore, the strength and intentions of the enemy are not fully known, it will be better, as we have seen, to guard against engaging the whole force in such an uncertain enterprise. Efforts should rather be made, as I have endeavoured to show, to clear up the situation by a careful feeling of the enemy and a gradual engagement of force. Once possessed of this knowledge of the situation, it will be possible either to seek a decision or to break off the fight in time to avoid the risk of incurring too considerable a loss.
Quite different is the case in the main battle. Here the objective is contained in the battle itself. It is the destruction of the enemy that is sought. It is not expected that each single detachment engaged should be victorious, but that the net result of the battle should be a victory. The task of the various detachments is only to engage and to destroy so much of the enemy's force as lies within their power. This naturally holds good for the cavalry. It is not now demanded that each single action of the cavalry should of itself be successful, but that the general engagement of the cavalry should have the greatest possible effect. A considerable result may often be obtained by the attacking cavalry drawing the enemy's fire upon itself for a time, and thus affording the infantry the possibility of gaining ground to the front, or of re-forming and receiving reinforcements.
To break off the main battle is generally quite out of the question. The very fact that the battle has been begun betokens the intention of carrying it through to a final decision, even where the enemy has shown himself to be in superior force. The various troops which advance to the conflict need not therefore reflect whethertheyhave any special prospect of success, but must strive for this success with all their power. This means for the cavalry, in by far the greater number of cases, always at least where a charge is in prospect,the simultaneous engaging of its whole fighting strength, naturally in that tactical formation which the conditions of weapons demand. If in itsindependentoperations cavalry must be dealt with as a strategical body, and thus employed in the fight, it isin the main battlea purely tactical body, which must be engageden masse, and not in detail. This contrast appears, at least to me, to be an obvious one. There is another that is equally clear.
In independent operations it is the duty of the cavalry, before all else, to defeat the enemy'scavalry. Victory over the latter creates the possibility of carrying out its proper task, that of reconnoitring and screening, without being involved in further fighting on a large scale. In the main battle, however, it would be taking quite a false view of its duty if it were to restrict itself to driving the hostile cavalry from the field. Victory over the latter has indeed a certain value, as it paralyses its further action, but it will, in most cases, be comparatively useless for the main issue of the battle unless further consequences result fromit. A victory over the hostile cavalry only receives its particular importance when by it the possibility is gained of intervening in the decisive encounterof the other arms, and of acting unhindered when, in the course of events, it becomes a matter either of pursuit or of covering a retreat.
Finally, in independent operations, even small detachments can aim at great results, and a division of force will frequently be indicated. In the great battle, however, any considerable effect can only be attained by the action of the mass. The reason for this lies in the size of modern armies.
It will be advisable to concentrate the mass of the cavalry at what are considered the decisive points, in order to be able to engage it simultaneously. Any frittering away of force upon the field of battle will strike the troops with impotence. We have only to remember the battle of Coulmiers, where the richest prospects of success confronted a cavalry which achieved nothing, because it did not act in concert. Where great tactical units have to be concentrated which are not under a single command, it will be advisable that the laws of seniority be set aside, and the command given to that leader from whom the best performances are to be expected, even though he be not the senior. In the cavalry, more than in any other arm, success depends upon the leader. Nothing is more rare than a good cavalry leader, and it would therefore be a great mistake to ignore such a one, and thus perhaps to sacrifice the fortunes of the day to the Moloch of Seniority. We should rather act like Frederick the Great at Rossbach, when he placed Seydlitz at the head of his cavalry, and we must expect from Prussians to-day the same generosity as Frederick's generals showed in willingly serving under their junior.
The best of leaders, however, will only be capable of great performances if he is fully acquainted with the intentions of the Head Quarters and the idea of the battle. He must therefore be not only closely informed before the fight, but must remain throughout its progress in continual communication with the Head Quarters, and must be made aware of all dispositions and at the same time must share its observations and be in touch with its intentions. The German cavalry would certainly have been able to fight a more successful and connected action at Mars la Tour, as at Coulmiers, if it had been better informed as to the general situation, and had thus been in a position to appreciate for itself what was necessary and what was possible.
If, however, understanding between the commander-in-chief and the leader of the cavalry is established, and if full confidence in the judgment and energy of the latter exists, he must be allowed that necessary freedom and independence which alone ensure successful action. On the other hand, he should never wait for orders to intervene, but must himself turn any favourable moments of the fight to account by rapid and energetic independent action. Even if he is definitely placed at the disposal of the commander, he should not shrink at critical moments from acting on his own responsibility, informing, of course, his superior officer of his actions. As an example of the relations between the supreme command and the cavalry leader I would draw attention to the conduct of King Frederick and General von Seydlitz in the battle of Zorndorf. The King felt the necessity of restoring the wavering fortunes of the day by launching the cavalry to the attack, but Seydlitz independently chose the moment for the charge; and success justified them both. When, however, in the battle of Kunersdorf, the General was compelled toorder the charge against his better judgment, the consequences were a heavy defeat for the cavalry.
1.The Army Cavalry on the Flank of the Battle
I have already repeatedly indicated that the most favourable position for the army cavalry is to a flank and in advance of a flank of its own army, and, where possible, ofthatflank on which, in the battle of offence, the decision will be sought, or, when in defence, the main hostile attack may be expected.[40]The new Cavalry Regulations adopt this point of view. It is therefore superfluous to comment further on the advantages of such a position. Unless the cavalry is going to resign all claim to offensive action, this position will compel it to seek battle. This may also happen when the cavalry masses ofbothsides endeavour to take up such a position, and thereby naturally come into collision, so that a sort of battle of encounter results, but one, however, that will bear quite a different character from the battle of encounter in strategic operations.
There will already be a difference, in the fact that the strategic approach and the tactical disposition in advance guard, main body, and reserve, will be wanting. In the consciousness, moreover, that, whatever the relative strength may be, the decisive battle has, under any circumstances, to be sought, it must be prepared for systematically. The cavalry will therefore have to adopt a wider front, or even deploy while farther from the enemy, having to its front only the necessary bodies for reconnaissance and security. The reconnaissance must be of a double nature. Timely measures must first be taken to ascertain whether, on the probable lines of approach and communication ofthe enemy, further hostile forces, ammunition columns, or supply trains are hurrying to the battlefield. Where the squadrons already pushed forward have received the necessary further instructions, this reconnaissance will often develop from the corresponding strategic measures. It will, however, frequently be necessary to send forward new organs of reconnaissance, even up to the strength of squadrons, as is discussed in the chapter on "Close Reconnaissance and Reconnaissance for the Fight." Besides this far-reaching exploration, immediate tactical reconnaissance for the fight must also be arranged; this will, in general, be directed against such hostile troops as may be within tactical reach, and must at the same time comprise reconnaissance of the ground. This service must be carried out by contact patrols and it is obviously impossible to separate the two duties.
The reconnoitring organs suffice in such a case for safety to the front. To the flank, however, local flanking patrols must be pushed out during the advance. It may at the same time be advisable, for the protection of the main body, and as points of support for the reconnaissance, to occupy defiles and other important places to the flank or front by dismounted detachments up to the strength of a squadron or more.
Screened by these various measures, the cavalry mass now advances fully deployed for the fight. It must be écheloned so far from the flank of the army that it cannot come under the fire of its own infantry, and that it can, if in any way possible, turn the outer flank of the hostile cavalry. The latter may then easily become hampered in movement by its own troops, and will have to deploy eccentrically, a disadvantage under any circumstances. Connection with our own army must, naturally, not be lost, so that in case of an unfavourableissue of the fight the cavalry may not be completely severed from it. The tactical dispositions, which should always be of an elastic nature, must obviate this.
That depth must be maintained in so far as it allows the necessary frontage, is easily understood. In deploying concentrically the various groups do not by any means need to be in touch, as during the advance they will gradually approach each other. They can, or rather must, be disposed at wide intervals, and it is better that these should be too great than that the necessary depth should suffer. A reserve must always be detailed and at the disposal of the commander, in order that he may retain his influence over the decision and be ready to meet the vicissitudes of the conflict.
Artillery and machine-guns will generally be able to remain effectively in action longest on the inner flank, and in this position can also form a connecting-link between the cavalry and the flank of the army. Special circumstances, however, may, of course, lead to their employment elsewhere. Their employment on the extreme outer flank, however, so often seen in peace, is to be guarded against. From such a position they can indeed often bring an effective flanking fire to bear, but are, on the other hand, in great danger, especially when opposed to a numerically superior enemy. Should the outcome of the fight be unfavourable, they will generally not only themselves be lost, but may often contribute to the difficulties of the beaten squadrons. Machine-gun detachments must be pushed forward recklessly to within effective range of the enemy, and should not shrink from the danger of occasional capture.
Should the hostile cavalry be driven from the field, it must be pursued with sufficient force to prevent its rallying and re-forming, and to complete its materialand moral defeat. Should it seek shelter behind occupied points of support, farms, woods, and the like, these must be attacked immediately by employing the greatest possible fire power. It is a matter of absolute necessity to gain possession of such points, as they may otherwise stand in the way of further action.
All portions of the cavalry not required for the pursuit should endeavour quickly to regain their tactical cohesion, that they may be ready for further effort. If localities are at hand by the occupation of which the ground won can be secured, they must at once be garrisoned by dismounted men. Artillery and machine-guns will, in so far as they are not detailed for the pursuit, or as they return from it, be brought into position with a like object in view. Every effort must be made to utilise to the full the advantages which the different methods of action of which the arm is capable confer, and thereby to minimise the chances of defeat.To reckon with the charge alone is, even on the field of battle, out of date, and calculated to limit the effect of cavalry action.
If a position of readiness has at first to be taken up, as will generally be the case until it is known in what direction further developments will take place, it must be as secure as possible from the view and fire of the enemy, but must be one from which immediate action can be taken. A disposition in groups of units will generally be the most suitable formation. What else is to be done the circumstances of the various cases must decide; the indispensable condition is that the cavalry should never be present and inactive throughout the course of the battle. It must in all cases prevent the enemy's patrols from making observations as to the disposition of our own army, while, on the other hand, its own reconnaissance should never cease.
We should, however, be quite wrong to regard such action as sufficient; rather must our whole attention be devoted to participating in the decisive battle, if in any way possible. With this view the cavalry must be careful to ensure its own advance to that portion of the ground where the decisive battle will probably take place, so that the charge will not meet with unexpected resistance and obstacles when the moment comes to ride it home. When this crisis of the battle approaches, the cavalry must be ready to intervene, whether it be to complete the defeat of the enemy and to facilitate the victory of its own infantry, or to support the latter in difficult situations.
Deployment in masses and depth, if possible in several lines, is indispensable for such attacks. The outer flank must be secured by reserves against the action of freshly arriving hostile cavalry and the covering troops of the enemy's artillery. Only when reconnaissance has clearly shown that there are no more such hostile troops at hand can the reserves be dispensed with.
The attack will best take place from the flank, and will then generally find a double objective in the hostile artillery and any infantry that may be farther to the front; but both should be dealt withsimultaneously. There may also be a possibility and a necessity of attacking from the rear. Circumstances must decide this. In any case, there should be no question of a gradual engagement of a force, but the charge of the whole mass must, even when disposed in lines, be carried out in a simultaneous and preconcerted manner.
The moment chosen for the attack is also of great importance. As the crisis approaches, endeavours must be made to get as close to the enemy as possible, in order to shorten the distance that will have to becovered in the charge. In so doing, the protection of the ground must be used as long as possible for cover, at least from view, without adhering to stereotyped tactical formations.
However important and desirable it may be to contribute to the great decision by a glorious cavalry charge, it should be borne in mind that the possibility of this will only occur in very rare cases. The more cultivated and agricultural the country in which the war takes place, the rarer will be these opportunities, as the circumstances of the ground offer so many opportunities for local defence.
If we consider the battles of the Franco-Prussian, the Russo-Turkish, and the Manchurian wars, we must soon admit that great cavalry charges were practicable only in very isolated cases. The peculiarities of the ground rendered them impossible; nor can this alter in the future. If it is to the interests of the defence to seek open country with a good field of fire, the attacker, on the other hand, will endeavour to choose ground for the attack which will give him cover from fire and view. On the whole, the possible European theatres of war are but little suitable for charges, owing to the extent to which they have been cultivated. We must not be deceived in this matter by the experience of our peace manœuvres. For then suitable ground has to be sought for the operation of the three arms, and considerations of compensation make it necessary to choose country as free from cultivation as possible.
War, however, knows no such considerations, and we must not blind ourselves to the fact that the opportunity for great decisive charges will but seldom occur. The greatest imaginable error, therefore, which the cavalry could possibly commit would be to adopt a waiting attitude and renounce all other kind of action,in order that the possibility of a great charge might not slip by unutilised. Besides the decisive attack, there is another wide field of activity indicated by the conditions of modern war, where cavalry can operate without being compelled to renounce co-operation in the decisive battle when circumstances will allow.
This sphere of activity lies in rear of the hostile army. Here columns of supply of every kind are streaming forward to the fighting-line. Here are massed the hostile reserves, already waiting for the decisive moment. Here stands the heavy artillery of the enemy in action, often without an escort. And it is here that opportunities for decisive action must be sought.
If cavalry can succeed, especially in battles of several days' duration, in interrupting the hostile supplies from the rear, in surprising the enemy's reserves with fire, causing him heavy loss and compelling him to deploy against it, or if any advancing portions of the enemy's army can be brought to a halt and prevented from reaching the battlefield at the right time, greater results will probably be obtained than by a doubtful charge. This is quite apart from the great moral impression which such action must produce on leaders and troops when the alarm suddenly re-echoes from the rear, and the shrapnel of the cavalry carries confusion and consternation amongst the reserves and supports of the fighting-line. The enemy's artillery, also, firing from covered positions, and otherwise so difficult to reach, may then fall a prey to a bold cavalry, and will offer opportunities for a success of far-reaching importance.
Such action must, of course, be conducted with a due co-operation between mounted and dismounted action.
Against intact hostile reserves the firearm will be principally used, and endeavour must be made to surprise them in the formation of assembly or on the march. Against columns of wagons, also, it will be well to commence with fire action, by shooting down the horses of the leading teams, and so bringing the columns to a halt. They must then, however, be actually taken possession of and taken away or destroyed, in so far as this cannot be done by artillery fire.
The cavalry must therefore endeavour to be ever active, and to co-operate unceasingly by damaging the enemy and shaking his morale. Great results can, however, only be obtained if antiquated views, handed down from time immemorial, are discarded, and the demands of modern war and the capabilities of modern cavalry are recognised. It is not a question as to whether we cavalry men are to fight mounted or dismounted; but that we must be prepared and determined to take part in the decision, and to employ the whole of our great strength and mobility to this end.
2.The Army Cavalry as a Reserve behind the Front
The same principles hold good for those portions of the army cavalry which find themselvesbehindthe fighting-line, and not on the exposed flank. Such a position is generally, indeed, undesirable, but may be the outcome of circumstances.
The task before the cavalry is here naturally quite a different one from when on the flank of the army. The necessity, or even the possibility, will in this case scarcely ever occur of having to deal with hostile cavalry, and of opening thereby a way for intervention in the decisive battle. It is much more likely in thiscase to happen that the cavalry will have to adopt a waiting attitude, and see whether its engagement as a mounted arm will be necessary. During this period of waiting, the cavalry must remain beyond the range of hostile fire, but as near the fighting-line as intelligent use of the ground will permit. Its position should never be chosen so far to the rear that it cannot arrive on the spot at the right time for the attack; for the moments which offer a favourable prospect for a charge are often fleeting—they depend upon the tactical situation and the moral condition of the opponent. These conditions may, however, quickly change if, for instance, reinforcements should arrive on the field.
Thus, at Mars la Tour, when the 6th Cavalry Division advanced in order to attack the obviously shaken and retiring 2nd Corps of the French, it struck, according to the account of the German General Staff, not this corps, but the intact Guard Grenadier Division of Picard, which had already advanced in support, and the charge was frustrated.[41]
To be prepared to meet such conditions, it will generally be advisable not only to remain as close behind the fighting-line as possible, but to prepare for a rapid deployment to the front, so that a disposition in groups, with the necessary deploying intervals, may be adopted behind that part of the fighting-line where the ground is especially adapted to a charge of large masses. If it can be seen that the crisis of the fight is approaching, and that the intervention of the cavalry may be necessary, the latter should advance still closer to the fighting-line, making, of course, full use of theground for cover, but no longer taking heed of small losses.
The cavalry will advance to the charge in order either to complete the defeat of an already wavering enemy, and to capture his artillery, or to relieve its own infantry, exhausted in the fight or suffering from want of ammunition, when other reserves have been used up, or have not yet arrived on the spot. The attack will probably always have to be conducted against an extended front. Flanking and surprise attacks will rarely be possible under such circumstances. It will scarcely ever be practicable to carry outseparateattacks against the hostile infantry and artillery, as in the case of a flank attack. The charge will rather, in by far the greater number of cases, first strike the hostile line of infantry, and must endeavour to ride through this and then to fall upon the enemy's artillery.
The formation for attack must be chosen to correspond with this point of view. A considerable extension will be necessary for the first line, so that, although the wings of the attacking-line may be exposed to flanking fire, the main portion of the front of attack will only have to reckon with frontal fire, and the enemy will not be in a position to direct a concentric fire against it. The great range of modern weapons demands a very considerable extension for this purpose if success is to be ensured. Suitable ground, also, must be chosen for this deployment. It will often allow, if rightly used, of one or other flank finding cover. A previous close study of the ground over which the attack is to be made is therefore imperative for the cavalry leader, even though it may entail personal exposure to the enemy's fire.
Necessary, however, as this extension is, a formation in depth in two or three lines is also imperative if decisive results are to be gained—this is, as I have already pointed out, the formation especially necessary against firearms. To lay down the distances which must be taken up between the lines according as infantry or artillery is the objective, as is done in the Regulations, will naturally be impossible in most cases, as both arms will have to be reckoned with simultaneously. A mean distance of about 250 paces would generally meet the case.
It is obvious that not only the preliminary deployment, but the formation for attack must take place beyond the effective range of the enemy's fire, for, once inside this zone, flank movements can no longer be carried out, and nothing else can be done but to gallop straight to the front. As, however, our own infantry will have to be ridden through in the charge, it is impossible in such a case to attack in close order. The first lines should therefore be of loose single-rank formation, with wide intervals from man to man. This is also to be recommended on the ground that it will allow a greater breadth of front for the same strength. Behind the leading lines squadrons can then follow in column of troops, which can easily ride through their own infantry, and adapt themselves to the ground, utilizing for their advance the less exposed portions of the terrain. In such dispositions there can naturally be no talk of regular distances, and the circumstances of the case must decide.
If sufficient force is available, reserves must follow behind the centre and in échelon behind the flanks. Their duty will be to to turn against hostile cavalry and other troops which may take the advancing mass in flank or may threaten a charge.
The batteries and machine-guns belonging to the cavalry will usually remain at the disposal of the cavalry commander, even during the great battle. If a charge is launched it will sometimes be advantageous to use them for flank protection, for which purpose they may be temporarily held back. Such cases, however, will be rare. The commander will therefore have to consider whether it is not more advisable to let them take part in the general engagement, even when the cavalry is not yet called upon to intervene. For it must be clearly understood that in this case, as in the other, where the cavalry is on the flank of the army, there will seldom be an opportunity for the charge, for reasons already given.
As, however, the cavalry in the former case should not remain inactive even if there is no opportunity for thechargeduring the decisive battle, the same holds good where the cavalry is placed behind the front of the army.
Having a less extensive field of action than in the case of the cavalry on the flank, it is all the more necessary, if there is no chance of a charge, for it to act in the manner of a reserve. The cavalry must not shrink, when necessity demands, from employing its whole force in the fire fight, disregarding for this purpose its purely cavalry rôle, which may, perhaps, be resumed later. The first essential is that victory shall be won. To this end all available forces must co-operate. We will find a good example to follow in the battle of Fredericksburg and the manner in which Stuart threw the whole of his cavalry into the fight. The employment of cavalry in the War of Secession in North America, the study of which I have urgently recommended, can here again serve us as a guide to follow.
3.Pursuit and Retreat
In critical study of military history there is continual cause for complaint that after a victorious battle no effective pursuit, with a few brilliant exceptions, has ever taken place. These complaints are justified. It must, however, be conceded that a failure of the pursuit may be traced in most instances to the force of circumstances.
As the day of battle draws to a close and the decision has taken place, thevictorious attackerhas generally accomplished a long march to the battlefield and carried out an exceedingly exhausting attack. The troops have perhaps all been employed in the battle, down to the last reserve. Ammunition, food, and water are often lacking. It is therefore quite natural that the mere physical energy required for a pursuit is wanting. If, on the other hand, thedefenderis successful, it is generally against a superior enemy, or one that is thought to be superior. With the greatest expenditure of moral and physical force he has held his own. In the evening of the day of battle, when the attacks cease, he is still perhaps scarcely conscious of his victory, and still imagines that the enemy is endeavouring to turn his flank. He awaits renewed onslaughts, and will be fearful of imperilling his success by leaving the positions which he has maintained with such difficulty, in order, on his side, to take up the offensive. It is therefore but natural that a pursuit should at first remain in abeyance. If, however, it is not carried out at once, the favourable opportunity is generally lost forever.
Thebeaten defender, on the other hand, has often still a surplus of fresh troops. On the day of battle he will generally have had no exhausting marches toundertake. The battle has not imposed nearly such heavy physical demands upon him as upon the attacker. He has also been able to supply himself during the fight much better than the latter. To these factors of advantage must be added the instinct of self-preservation of the individual, which continually induces afresh the desire to escape from the grasp of the enemy. What can be more natural for the beaten defender after a lost battle than to march long distances, and thus successfully to evade pursuit, unless it be immediately undertaken? General von Goeben gave orders on the evening of the battle of St. Quentin that all troops must march five miles[42]the next day. But the French had already covered a similar distance during the night, and were no longer within reach.
Thebeaten attackeralso may, after the battle, no longer have at his disposal sufficient physical force to carry out a further immediate march, but, asbeforethe fight he was in superior force, or considered himself to be so, it will not be necessary for him to withdraw from the enemy as quickly as a beaten defender. The reason for this lies in the difficulty which exists for the latter of taking up the pursuit. The attacker can then utilise the time after the battle to secure himself in the terrain and to re-form his units. He falls back on his reserves of supply and ammunition. Unless he has suffered a destructive defeat, the pursuer will generally find him the next morning again in a condition to offer some resistance.
The factors of weakness, therefore, which allow but seldom of an effective pursuit have their origin in the nature of circumstances, and are exceedingly difficult to cope with.
Energy and activity sufficient to this end are only tobe found in moments of the greatest moral excitement, under the influence of overpowering personalities, or under special conditions, such, for example, as resulted after the battle of Waterloo. In the future, however, we shall generally have to reckon that these factors of weakness will prevail and the pursuit fail unless it is prepared with conscious intention in good time, and initiated with energy.
Here will certainly be required careful leading, good tactical judgment, and rapid decision.
Before all things, it is essential that any reserves still available should be sent forward in the directions important for pursuit as soon as it is judged that the battle is won, and that their supply should be arranged for before the pursuit begins.
I may cite the battle of Woerth as an example. The 4th Cavalry Division stood at the disposal of the commander. Observation troops were sufficient in the direction of Hagenau and Zabern. This cavalry mass was, however, only brought up late in the evening, and arrived on the field too late to take up the immediate pursuit, although it had long been realised that a pursuit would become necessary.
The infantry pursuit failed for different reasons. At the end of the day, when success inclined to the Germans, a fresh Württemberg brigade arrived upon the battlefield. Hot fighting still raged about Fröschweiler, in which the whole of the Vth and XIth Corps were involved. The Crown Prince, with a right appreciation of the situation, sent forward this brigade in a parallel pursuit against the right wing of the French in the direction of Reichshofen, where it could have denied the exit at Zabern to the French. This brigade, however, allowed itself to be deflected from its objective, and involved in the fighting round Fröschweiler, the capture of which was no longer of any real importance from the point of view of the Head Quarters.
If the affair is practically decided, as was the case at Woerth, the reserves still in hand should no longer allow themselves to be drawn towards the various foci of the battle, but must be sent forward by the Commander-in-Chief with boldness and determination in the now more decisive directions of the pursuit.
The same reasons and principles hold good for the pursuit by the cavalry.
The cavalry commander must continually keep his finger on the pulse of the battle, and not watch only that portion of the great drama which is being played under his own eyes.
Should the scales of victory incline in favour of his own army, if he considers that the intervention of his cavalry will no longer be necessary to complete the victory, he will often be well advised to renounce his share in the decisive battle, at least by a charge which would entail heavy loss, and to husband all his force for the pursuit, and to prepare and make dispositions for it. This consideration is of especial importance for that portion of the army cavalry which is concentrated on the flank, as to it must chiefly fall the task of pursuit.
Great attention should be paid, even during the battle, to nursing the horses. They should be fed, not from the small reserve of forage carried on the saddle, but from wagons, which can be easily sent to the flank of the army, emptied, and used later for the transport of the wounded. It is of great importance that these measures should be taken in good time. The forage carried will be needed during the pursuit, for supplies for the horses cannot be reckoned uponin country where armies have been on the move. It will even be advisable to take forage wagons with the pursuing force itself. When the maintenance of physical strength has thus been cared for, the next step is to push patrols and squadrons rapidly forward to reconnoitre the outer lines of retreat of the enemy. While these have been ascertained, the march in pursuit must be undertaken without hesitation, and continuedeven during the night. While daylight in any way allows, attempts will naturally be made to attack the withdrawing enemy in flank, and to carry disorder into his columns. As soon, however, as darkness falls and puts an end to the fighting, the march should be continued on parallel lines throughout the whole night, if possible in constant touch with the enemy, in order that he may again be attacked at dawn the next morning, or that his retreat may be barred at defiles or other favourable places. The trophies of pursuit will rarely fall into the hands of him who shrinks from spending the night after the battle marching, or neglects to prepare in every way for such an operation.
Direct frontal pursuit by the cavalry will generally yield but meagre results against the masses of the modern army and the firearm of the present day. Only when completely demoralised troops are retreating in the open, and cannot be reached by fire, will a charge be feasible. Generally, however, the frontal cavalry pursuit will be soon brought to a standstill by the hostile occupation of localities, woods and the like. Frontal pursuit is essentially a matter for the infantry, who must press the retreating enemy to the utmost. On the other hand, it is of course the duty of the cavalry to maintain touch with the enemy under all circumstances. With this object in view it must continue the frontal pursuit, sometimes even without seeking to draw on a fight, by day and night. When the strength of the infantry fails, it is the imperative duty of the cavalry to continue to harass the foe. In conjunction with the artillery it should be able to inflict considerable losses on the opponent. In the face of modern conditions, however, too great results must not be expected from such action.
When the army cavalry undertakes a frontal pursuit, it will be advisable to divide it by brigades, to which must be allotted the various roads along which the enemy is retreating. To each column must be assigned artillery, to enable it to be continually at grips with the enemy. Cases may also occur where, if the enemy's lines of retreat are not too close together, it will be possible to penetrate between them, and thus strike all the terrors of a parallel pursuit to the very heart of his army. The results that might thus be gained will justify great risks.
As to the covering of a retreat, I may draw attention to paragraph 518[43]of the new Regulations. All the essentials are here set forth in compressed form. Under such circumstances the cavalry must never renounce the offensive, as the maintenance of morale when things are going badly is imperative. Continual efforts must be made to confront the enemy, and to attack him whenever possible with the cold steel. Defensive fire tactics, however, will of course be employed whenever circumstances demand such action. Thus, when it becomes no longer possible to show a front to the pursuing cavalry in the open, measures must be taken to block the routes upon which his parallel pursuit is operating by barricading roads and occupying important points and defiles, especially during the night, and thus to secure the retreat of the army. Detachments to which these duties are confided must be despatched from the battlefield in good time, so that they may be able, if possible, to arrange their defensive measures by daylight. The more obstinately they hold well-chosen points, even at the risk of being cut off and captured, the better will they have done their duty.
4.The Rôle of the Divisional Cavalry
The numerical weakness of the divisional cavalry, and the variety of duties that fall to its lot, considerably limit the development of its fighting power. It will scarcely ever be able to seek battle with the enemy's cavalry in an offensive sense, nor in defence will it possess the requisite numbers for an effective counter-stroke. It is therefore all the more important that such isolated favourable opportunities for the charge as some fortunate chance may place in its way should not be allowed to slip by. Every tactical success raises the self-confidence of the troops, and operates towards the attainment of moral superiority over the enemy, even though he may be numerically the stronger force.
In the battle of all arms, as soon as fighting contact has been established with the enemy, and the close and combat reconnaissance is thus probably at an end, the divisional cavalry must endeavour to gain touch with the army cavalry, in order to strengthen the latter forthe battle. In so doing, it must not of course lose all connection with its own infantry division. When this cannot be done, and when no other chance of mounted action offers, the divisional cavalry must seize the rifle and act as an immediate support for the infantry. Opportunities for such action will occur more especially in defence, as was proved by the cavalry of General Stuart.
After the battle it is the duty of the divisional cavalry to advance in frontal pursuit, even though no great results are to be expected from such action. During a retreat after the battle it will be continually in action as the rearmost detachment, and must endeavour to arrest the pursuit by occupying favourable positions with fire action. Frequent opportunities for a charge on a small scale may here occur.
Should the infantry division to which the cavalry belongs be operating independently without army cavalry, the divisional cavalry must act in accordance with the principles laid down for the army cavalry, as far as they apply and in so far as its strength and other circumstances will allow. Parallel pursuit may be possible under such conditions.
In retreat, every effort within the power of the cavalry must be made to protect the flanks of the retiring division, and to arrest the pursuer by sudden bursts of fire on every possible occasion.
There is for the divisional cavalry no such wide field of possibilities as is open to the army cavalry: it will be less often mentioned in despatches. The tasks which fall to its share, however, are certainly immeasurably more arduous and call for greater sacrifices. It will often be confronted by the most important and dangerous duties, for the fulfilment of which its means are quite inadequate. Such duties can only be carried outif the troops are capable of the greatest efforts and determined to do great deeds, without the impulse that the prospect of distinction promotes.
VI. DEPTH AND ÉCHELON
It is an astonishing fact that the échelon,[44]and especially the rearward échelon, should have won for itself an importance in our cavalry tactics which, in my opinion, is quite undeserved and contradictory to the essence of cavalry action. It is the more astounding when we consider that this principle of échelon formation is said to be based on the tactics of Frederick the Great, which have no connection whatever with the échelon in its present form.
Frederick the Great arranged his cavalry in two lines, and within these lines the tactical units were on the same line of front. Detachments destined to turn the enemy's flank were attached in column to the outer flank of the leading line. As far as I know, a mention of échelon can only be found in one place. In a sketch that accompanies one of the Regulations of July 25, 1744, a squadron of the second line is shown thrown forward at half the distance between the lines and écheloned on the first line, with the obvious intention of securing the outer flank of the first line against local turning movements. Out of this one squadron the whole of our échelon system has grown. Here is the only justification for claiming that the échelon of the second line is of Frederician origin.
Nor, as far as I know, in the tactics of the Napoleonic cavalry is there any trace of échelon in the modern sense. We would do well to seek, in this period of experience in great cavalry battles instruction for the conduct of cavalry against cavalry, and not to sacrifice its lessons for imaginary advantages.
According to all appearances, our modern échelon is but the offspring of peace requirements. The troops were required to be mobile and capable of manœuvre, and a division was required to perform the same stereotyped evolutions as a regiment or a brigade. In the division the échelon of brigades met this requirement admirably, favouring as it did the change to line, a manœuvre which, on its part, was well suited to the necessities of drill in a limited area, and was regarded as thepièce de résistanceof all cavalry divisional manœuvres. Many a time have I assisted at these tactical orgies!
We must not neglect the warning that, even in manœuvres, as soon as there is any kind of approach to service conditions, such necessity for change of front never—literally never—occurs. Besides this, the échelon formation has shown itself to be quite unpractical where any real tactical deployment is required off the drill-ground. The question, then, of the circumstances for which it is particularly designed does not appear as yet to have been definitely asked or answered. We have been content with general representations that it increased the power of manœuvre, and thus added to our beloved stereotyped formations.
For years I have striven to clear up these views and to establish their true worth. As long ago as 1903, in my book "Cavalry in Future Wars," I wrote as follows: " ... It is obvious that the formations for approach and attack prescribed by the (old) Regulations are as unpromising of success as they well can be. While affording a possibility of quickly presenting the same formation in any direction, a feat of no possible advantage for war, they seriously impede any deployment to the front. If it is required to launch the first line against the enemy's flank because this is its shortest line, one at least of the following brigades will be masked, and will be hampered in its movements. If, again, it is desired to utilise one of the rear brigades for a flank movement or any similar purpose, the first line has to be checked until the others reach the required position, or else they will certainly arrive too late to co-operate. Furthermore, the formations advocated render it more difficult to derive full benefit from the configuration of the ground."
These deductions have remained, up to now, uncontested. In spite of this, however, the new Regulations uphold the point of view of the old as regards échelon formation in every way, and even vest it with increased importance by confiding to the échelon the duties of the real second line,i.e.of the supporting squadrons of the old Regulations. In the regiment, as in the brigade, depth is to consist in échelon formation, and only exceptionally is a real second line to be formed. The échelons are not only to protect the flank of their own units, and turn against any portions of the enemy's line that may break through, but are also to turn the enemy's flanks (170 and 200).[45]In the division, also,during the advance to attack cavalry, échelon formation will, "as a rule," be ordered. The transition formation thus remains with us not only in name, but in fact, only with the difference that brigades provide for their own depth and flank protection, thus, in fact, being again in themselves écheloned (223, 424, 425).[46]Only when a closer knowledge of the enemy is attained may the brigades come into the same alignment from the commencement, and assume the requisite frontage (426).[47]
In close connection with this modified transition formation, the "change to lines" has also been retained in fact, though no longer designated as such. That is to say, the possibility of a change of front "to the complete flank,"i.e.at right angles to the direction of march, is still contemplated (220),[48]and to this end a fresh formation of the division will generally be required, as well as a fresh directing brigade, which takes up the new line of march, and to which the remainder conform in the desired manner. It is apparently a matter of indifference whether the brigades are called lines or brigades. It is, and remains, a purely drill evolution of the division in close formation, a complete change of front to a flank, and is therefore something that would certainly not occur inwar if any reasonable sort of information were to hand. If it did occur, it would presuppose the entire failure of reconnaissance and the corresponding incapacity of the leader.
My cavalry instinct forbids me to share the tactical principles that these views entail, and I will therefore again endeavour to make clear that conception of the matter which I hold to be correct.
First, as regards the demands of the Regulations that échelon is to replace depth. In my opinion, the conditions of reality have not in this matter been taken into account. To be able to meet a hostile squadron that has broken through the line, the écheloned squadron, if still in column, must wheel into line, or if, as is probable, already in line, must wheel, and then charge behind the front of its own attacking-line. I consider this, of itself, to be impracticable in the excitement of the fight, a manœuvre that can only be carried out on the drill-ground. We have only to consult any one who has had experience of a cavalry attack to learn how difficult it is to perform such evolutions immediately before the charge.
Then, again, what is our conception of such a hostile squadron breaking through? It may be expected to be accompanied by a simultaneous rearward movement of a corresponding portion of our own line, so that no clear objective for attack from the flank would be likely to offer itself. Such retirements of single portions of the line can only be met and counteracted by throwing in fresh forces from the rear; such has always been the experience in cavalry fights, as far as the teachings of history show.
But there are other matters for consideration. How can the squadron, écheloned, for instance, on theouterflank of a brigade, intervene when this so-called rupture of the line takes place on theinnerflank? In the dust and excitement of a cavalry fight, will such a rupture, especially in undulating country, be even noticed? What if there is a simultaneous threatening of the other flank, which the échelon is obliged to meet? What if the échelon has advanced in an enveloping movement? Who is then to deal with the rupture of the line?
To go on trying to prove that the duties devolving on depth and échelon cannot be met by one and the same detachment, is like carrying coals to Newcastle. The formation of a second line in the fight against cavalry, regarded as exceptional by the Regulations, should be made aninvariable rule, from which departure is allowed only in exceptional cases, while safety for the flanks must be arranged forindependentlyof this.
Here again we come into collision with paragraph 170 of the Regulations, which lays down that an offensive flank attack may be undertaken from a rearward échelon; as if such a manœuvre could possibly be carried out! Detachments which are to turn the enemy's flank must, during the approach, advance into alignment with their own line separated from its flank by the necessary interval, or else must beécheloned forwardsfrom the commencement.
Forward échelon will generally be found to correspond with the offensive spirit of cavalry better than the more defensive rearward échelon. It is usually more practical and protects the flank better, while at the same time threatening the enemy's flank and laying down the law to him. Forward échelon is a very useful tactical cavalry formation, and deservesmore attention than the Regulations bestow upon it.[49]
On its offensive importance I need scarcely enlarge. Troops in forward échelon are already in a position which can only be reached after an exhausting gallop by those in rearward échelon, the position prescribed by the Regulations. They will be in a position to frustrate any offensive intentions of the hostile reserves, and will obtain quicker and surer information as to the enemy than will ever be possible at such a time by patrols alone. That they may at times come in contact with hostile troops in rearward échelon is obvious. If the flank of these cannot be turned, they must be dealt with frontally. Local dispositions and a vanguard must provide security against the action of hostile reserves.
Even in adefensivesense the forward échelon will often be more useful than the rearward. The latter formation surrenders the initiative to the enemy, and confines itself toparryingattacks, always a disadvantage in a cavalry fight. Forward échelon, on the contrary, seeks to forestall the enemy in the offence. As to how it may often be better adapted to warding off hostile attacks than the rearward échelon I will give an example.
A body of cavalry, in the approach formation, is advancing against the enemy, with blind ground on a flank, which would allow of the enemy's covered approach, and which perhaps it has been impossible to reconnoitre. Attack or fire surprise is feared from this quarter. How will the cavalry protect itself? The modern tactician would in most cases reply: "By an échelon to the rear." I do not think this would besuitable. How is such a formation to give safety from fire surprise, and to locate the enemy's advance and arrest it until the main body can take counter-measures? The forward échelon can here alone avail. It comes to close quarters with the enemy, attacks him before he can reach the flank of the main body, and thus gains time for defensive measures or retirement.
It is quite obvious that the cases for employment of the forward échelon do not allow of being formulated. I think, however, that we should make much more use of this formation than is at present the fashion. Properly applied, such methods will ensure to us considerable superiority over our opponents.