“The general is the head, the whole of an army. It was not the Roman army that subjugated Gaul, it was Caesar; nor was it the Carthagenian army that made the Republic tremble to the gates of Rome, it wasHannibal; it was not the Macedonian army which reached the Indus, it was Alexander; it was not the French army which carried war to the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne; it was not the Prussian army which for seven years defended Prussia against the three strongest powers of Europe, it was Frederic the Great.”
“The general is the head, the whole of an army. It was not the Roman army that subjugated Gaul, it was Caesar; nor was it the Carthagenian army that made the Republic tremble to the gates of Rome, it wasHannibal; it was not the Macedonian army which reached the Indus, it was Alexander; it was not the French army which carried war to the Weser and the Inn, it was Turenne; it was not the Prussian army which for seven years defended Prussia against the three strongest powers of Europe, it was Frederic the Great.”
From such opinions by men whose careers evince superlative knowledge of the subject, it is clear, that:
So abstruse are the processes of this greatest of all professions, that comprehension of it has been evidenced by eleven men only, viz.:
Epaminondas, Alexander, Caesar, Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, Frederic, Washington, Napoleon, Von Moltke.
Comprehension of this system can be attained, only by innate capability brought to perfection by intelligent study of the words and achievements of these great Captains.
For life is so short and our memories in general so defective, that we ought to seek instruction only from the purest sources.
None but men endowed by Nature with the military mind and trained in the school of the great Captains, are able to write intelligently on the acts and motives of generals of the first order. All the writings of mere literati relative to these uncommon men, no matter how excellent such authors may be, never can rise to anything more than elegant phraseology.
It is of enlightened critics, such as the former, that the youthful student always is first in need. Such will guide him along a road, in which he who has no conductor may easily lose himself. They will correct his blunders considerately, recollecting that should these be ridiculed or treated with severity, talent might be stifled which might hereafter bloom to perfection.
It is a difficult matter to form the average student, and to impart to him that degree of intelligent audacity and confident prudence which is requisite for the proper practice of the Art of Strategetics.
To secure proficiency, the student from the beginning must cheerfully submit himself to a mental discipline, which properly may be termed severe; in order to make his faculties obedient to his will.
Secondly, he must regularly exercise these faculties, in order to make them active and to acquire the habit of implicitly conforming to the laws of the Art; to make himself familiar with its processes, and to establish in his mind that confidence in its practice which can come only through experience.
The student daily should exercise his mind in the routine of deployments, developments, evolutions, manoeuvres, and operations, both on the offensive and on the defensive. These exercises should be imprinted on the memory by closely reviewing the lesson of the previous day.
Even with all this severe and constant effort, time is necessary for practical tactics to become habitual; for the student must become so familiar with these movements and formations that he can execute them instantly and with precision.
To acquire this degree of perfection, much study is necessary; it is a mistake to think otherwise. But this study is its own sufficient reward, for the student soon will find that it has extended his ideas, andthat he is beginning to think in the GREAT.
At the same time the student should thoroughly instruct himself in military history, topography, logic, mathematics, and the science of fortification. With all of these the strategist must be familiar.
But his chief aim must be to perfect his judgment and to bring it to the highest degree of broadness and exactness.
This is best done by contemplation of the works of the Great Masters.
The past history of Chess-play, is the true school for those who aspire to precedence in the Royal Game. It is their first duty to inform themselves of the processes of the great in every age, in order to shun their errors and to avail of their methods.
It is essential to grasp that system of play common to the Masters; to pursue it step by step. Particularly is it necessary to learn that he who can best deduce consequences in situations whose outcome is in doubt, is the competitor who will carry off the prize from others who act less rationally than himself.
Especially, should the student be wary in regard to what is termed chess analysis, as applied to the so-called “openings” and to the mid-game. Most chess analysts are compilers of falsities occasionally interspersed with truth. Among the prodigious number of variations which they pretend to establish or refute, none may be implicitly relied on in actual play; few are of value except for merely elementary purposes, and many are fallacies fatal to the user.
The reason for this is: whenever men invited by curiosity, seek to examine circumstantially even the less intricate situations on the Chess-board, they at once become lost in a labyrinth abounding in obscurities and contradictions. Those, who ignorant of the synthetic method of calculation, are compelled to depend upon their analytic powers, quickly find that these, on accountof the number of unknown quantities, are utterly inadequate.
Any attempt to calculate the true move in Chess-play by analysis, other than in situations devoid of unknown quantities, is futile.
Yet it is of such folly that the mediocre mind is most enamoured. Content with seeing much, it is oblivious to what it cannot see; and the analytical system consists merely in claiming that there is nothing to see, other than what it does see.
This is that slender reed upon which the so-called “chess-analyst” hangs his claims, oblivious to the basic truth that in analysis, unless all is known, nothing is known.
Many delude themselves to the contrary and strive to arrive at correct conclusions without first having arranged clearly before their minds all the facts.
Hence, their opinions and judgments, being founded in ignorance of all the facts, are to that extent defective; and their conclusions necessarily wrong.
Through action taken upon incomplete knowledge, men are beguiled into error; and it is to such unreason that most human catastrophes are to be attributed.
Most of those who attempt to write on Strategetics, and whether applied to Chess-play or to Warfare, very quickly are compelled to seek refuge in vague phrases; in order to conceal their uncertain grasp on the subject discussed. The uninformed believe in them, because of their reputation, and are satisfied that the thing is so, without understandingWHY.
Words intended to convey instruction, should not be used except in their proper meaning. Each word should be defined for the student and its use regulated. The true use of words being established, there is no longerdanger from a play upon them; or, from different and confused ideas annexed to them, either by the persons who read, or who employ them.
By means of this warning, the student easily may detect the empty mouthings of enthusiastic inexperience, and equally so, the casuistries of the subtle expert; who often uses language merely to conceal from youthful talent, knowledge which if imparted, might be fatal to his domination.
As the student progresses toward proficiency, he, sooner or later, will come to realize, that of all disgusting things, to a mind which revolts at nonsense, reasoning ill is the worst.
It is distressing, to be afflicted with the absurdities of men, who, victims of the fancy, confound enthusiasm with capability and mistake mania for talent. The world is full of such people, who, in all honesty thinking themselves philosophers, are only visionaries enamoured of their own lunatic illusions.
The true discipline for the student who aspires to proficiency at Chess-play, is, in every succeeding game, to imitate more closely the play of the Great Masters; and to endeavor to take his measures with more attention and judgment than in any preceding.
Every player at Chess has defects; many have very great ones. In searching for these one should not treat himself tenderly, and when examining his faults, he should grant himself no quarter.
Particularly should the student cultivate confidence in and rigidly adhere to the standard of skill, as interpreted by that immutable System of Chess-play, of which Morphy is the unapproachable and all-sufficient exponent.
Observing the lack of method displayed by the incompetent Chess-commander, the student of this system will remark with astonishment, the want of plan andthe entire absence of co-operation between the various Chessic corps d’armee, which under such leadership are incapable of a general effort.
How dense is such a leader in the selection of a project, how slow and slovenly in its execution; how many opportunities does he suffer to escape him and how many enormous faults does he not commit? To such things, the numerically weaker but more skillful opponent, often is indebted for safety and ultimately for success.
One who is opposed by such blockheads, necessarily must gain advantages continually; for conduct so opposite to all the laws of the Art, is, in itself, sufficient to incur ruin. It is for such negligence on his own part that one often has cause bitterly to reproach himself. But such errors, especially on the part of great players, are exemplary lessons for the student, who from them may learn to be more prudent, circumspect, and wise.
Those who make a mere pastime of Chess, who have no desire for the true benefit of the game, do not deserve information.
Such people are more numerous than may be supposed. They have few coherent ideas and are usually influenced by mere chatter and by writers whose sole excuse is enthusiasm.
These players at the game cannot benefit by example. The follies of others afford them no useful lesson. Each generation of such “wood-shifters,” has blindly followed in the footsteps of those preceding and daily is guilty of errors which times innumerable have been fully exposed.
It is the darling habit of such folk to treat the great things in Chess with levity and to dignify those insignificant matters which appertain to the game when used as a plaything.
Such people are merely enthusiastic; usually they areequally frivolous. They do everything from fancy, nothing from design. Their zeal is strong, but they can neither regulate nor control it.
Such bear about their Chessic disabilities in their character. Inflated in good fortune, groveling in adversity, these players never attain to that sage contemplation, which renders the scientific practice of Chess so indescribably beautiful.
There is another class of Chess-players who from mere levity of mind are incapable of steadily pursuing any fixed plan; but who overturn, move by move, even such advantages as their good fortune may have procured. There are others, who, although possessed of great vivacity of mind and eager for information, yet lack that patience necessary to receive instruction.
Lastly, there are not a few whose way of thinking and the validity of whose calculations, depend upon their good or ill digestion.
It is in vain that such people endeavor to divine things beyond their understanding. Hence it is, that among those incapable of thought, or too indolent for mental effort, the game proceeds in easy fashion until routine is over. Afterward, at each move, the most probable conjecture passes for the best reason and victory ultimately rests with him whose blunders are least immediately consequential.
Understanding of high art is dispensed only to the few; the great mass neither can comprehend nor enjoy it. In spite of the good natured Helvetius, all are not wise who wish to be so and men ever will remain what Nature made them. It is impossible for the stream to rise higher than its source.
“The progress of human reason,” writes the great Frederic, “is more slow than is imagined; the true causeof which is that most men are satisfied with vague notions of things and but few take time for examination and deep inquiry.
“Some, fettered by prejudice from their infancy, wish not, or are unable to break their chains; others, delighting in frivolity know not a word of mathematics and enjoy life without allowing their pleasures to be interrupted by a moment of reflection. Should one thinking man in a thousand be discovered it will be much; and it is for him that men of talent write.
“The rest naturally are offended, for nothing so enrages the mediocre mind as to be compelled to admit to itself its own inferiority. Consequently, they consign book, author, and reader conjointly to Satan. So much easier is it to condemn than to refute, or to learn.”
The early success of many young students does not permit them to observe that they often have departed from the rules of the Art. As they have escaped punishment for their errors, they remain unacquainted with the dangers to which they were exposed. Constant good fortune finally makes them over-confident and they do not suspect it necessary to change their measures, even when in the presence of an able foe.
Thus, the youthful tyro, inconsiderate, inconsistent, and turbulent, and oblivious to the innumerable dangers by which he is surrounded, plays his pieces hither and thither, as fancy and inclination dictate, culling bouquets of the most gorgeous flowers of the imagination; thoughtless of the future and perfectly happy because he cannot reflect.
To reason exactly, the student first must rid his mind of all preconceived notions; he must regard the matter under consideration as a blank sheet of paper, upon which nothing is to be written save those things whichby the processes of logic and demonstration, are established as facts.
There is much difference between the Art of Logic and mere conjecture.
The calculations of arithmeticians, though rigorous and exact, are never difficult; because they relate to known quantities and to the palpable objects of nature. But when it is required to argue from combining circumstances, the least ignorance of uncertain and obscure facts breaks the chain and we are deceived every moment.
This is no defect of the understanding, but error arising from plausible ideas, which wear the face of and are too quickly accepted for truth. A long chapter can be written on the different ways in which men lose themselves in their conjectures. Innumerable examples of this are not wanting, and all because they have suffered themselves to be hurried away and thus to be precipitate in drawing their conclusions.
The part that the General, whether in Chess-play or in Warfare, has to act, always is more difficult because he must not permit himself the least mistake, but is bound to behave with prudence and sagacity throughout a long series of intricate processes. A single false deduction, or a movement of the enemy unintelligible to a commander, may lead him to commit an irremediable error; and in cases wherein the situation is beyond comprehension, his ignorance is invincible.
For however extensive the human mind may be, it never is sufficiently so to penetrate those minute combinations necessary to be developed in order to foresee and regulate events, the sequence, utility and even existence of which, depend upon future contingencies.
Incidents which are past, can be explained clearly, because the reasons therefor are manifest. But men easily deceive themselves concerning the future, which,by a veil of innumerable and impenetrable secondary causes, is concealed from the most prying inspection.
In such situations, how puerile are the projects even of the greatest Strategist. To him, as much as to the tyro, is the future hidden; he knows not what shall happen, even on the next move. How then may he foresee those situations which secondary causes later may produce?
Circumstances most often oblige him to act contrary to his wishes; and in the flux and reflux of fortune, it is the part of prudence to conform to system and to act with consistency. It is impossible to foresee all events.
“It is not possible,” writes the Count de Saxe, “to establish a system without first being acquainted with theprinciplesthat must necessarily support it.”
In corroboration of this is the opinion of Frederic the Great:
“Condemned by my unfortunate stars to philosophies on contingencies and on probabilities I employ my whole attention to examine theprincipleon which my argument must rest and to procure all possible information on that point. Deprived of such precaution, the edifice I erect, wanting a base, would fall like a house of cards.”
Everyone who does not proceed on principle, is inconsistent in his conduct. Equally so, whenever the principle on which one acts is false,i.e., does not apply to the existing situation; all deductions based thereon, if applied to the existing situation, necessarily are false.
“Those principles which the Art of Warfare prescribes, never should be departed from,” writes Frederic the Great, “and generals rigidly should adhere to those circumspections and never swerve from implicit obedience to laws, upon whose exact observance depends the safety of their armies and the success of their projects.”
Thus the student will clearly see that all other calculations, though never so ingeniously imagined, are of small worth in comparison with comprehension of the use of Strategetic principles. By means of these latter, we are taught to control the raging forces which dominate in the competitive arts and to compel obedience from friend and foe alike.
“To the shame of humanity it must be confessed,” writes Frederic the Great, “that what often passes for authority and consequence is mere assumption, used as a cloak to conceal from the layman the extreme of official indolence and stupidity.
“To follow the routine of service, to be busied concerning food and clothing, and to eat when others eat, to fight when others fight, are the whole warlike deeds of the majority and constitute what is called having seen service and grown grey in arms.
“The reason why so many officers remain in a state of mediocrity, is because they neither know, nor trouble themselves to inquire into the causes either of their victories or defeats, although such causes are exceedingly real.”
In this connection, writes Polybius, the friend and biographer of Hannibal:
“Having made ourselves masters of the subject of Warfare, we shall no longer ascribe success to Fortune and blindly applaud mere conquerors, as the ignorant do; but we shall approve and condemn from Principle and Reason.”
To the Chess-student nothing can be more conclusive than the following:
“My success at Chess-play,” writes Paul Morphy, “is due to rigid adherence to fixed rules and Principles.”
“Chess is best fought on Principles, free from all deception and trickery.”—Wilhelm Steinitz.
“Chess is best fought on Principles, free from all deception and trickery.”—Wilhelm Steinitz.
GRAND RECONNAISSANCE“Man can sway the future, only by foreseeing through a clear understanding of the present, to what far off end matters are tending.”—Caesar.“From the erroneous ideas they form in regard to good and evil, the ignorant, the mis-educated and the inexperienced always act without precisely knowing what they ought to desire, or what they ought to fear; and it is not in the end they propose, but in the choice of means, that most deceive themselves.”—Aristotle.
GRAND RECONNAISSANCE
“Man can sway the future, only by foreseeing through a clear understanding of the present, to what far off end matters are tending.”—Caesar.
“Man can sway the future, only by foreseeing through a clear understanding of the present, to what far off end matters are tending.”—Caesar.
“From the erroneous ideas they form in regard to good and evil, the ignorant, the mis-educated and the inexperienced always act without precisely knowing what they ought to desire, or what they ought to fear; and it is not in the end they propose, but in the choice of means, that most deceive themselves.”—Aristotle.
“From the erroneous ideas they form in regard to good and evil, the ignorant, the mis-educated and the inexperienced always act without precisely knowing what they ought to desire, or what they ought to fear; and it is not in the end they propose, but in the choice of means, that most deceive themselves.”—Aristotle.
“In every situation the principal strategical requirements must clearly be defined and all other things must be subordinated to these considerations.”—Frederic the Great.
“In every situation the principal strategical requirements must clearly be defined and all other things must be subordinated to these considerations.”—Frederic the Great.
“One should seek to obtain a knowledge of causes, rather than of effects; and should endeavor to reason from the known, to the unknown.”—Euclid.
“One should seek to obtain a knowledge of causes, rather than of effects; and should endeavor to reason from the known, to the unknown.”—Euclid.
The province of Grand Reconnaissance is exactly to determine the relative advantages and disadvantages in time, numbers, organization, topography, mobility and position, which appertain to hostile armies contained in the same strategetic plane; and to designate those Corps d’armee by which such advantages are materially expressed.
Those processes which appertain to the making of Grand Reconnaissance, necessarily are argumentative; inasmuch as all the facts never are determinate.
Consequently, talent of the highest order is required for the deducing of conclusions which never can be based upon exact knowledge, and which always must contemplate the presence of numerous unknown quantities.
The responsibilities inherent to Grand Reconnaissance never are to be delegated to, nor thrust upon subordinates. Scouts, spies, and informers of every kind, have their manifold and proper uses, but such uses never rise above furnishing necessary information in regard to topographical, tactical, and logistic details.
The Commander-in-chief alone is presumed to possess knowledge and skill requisite to discern what strategetically is fact and what is not fact; and to ascribe to each fact its proper place and sequence.
Lack of military talent and of Strategetic knowledge, never is more strikingly shown than by negligence or inability in this regard.
Incompetents, ignorant of this truth, and oblivious to its importance, devolve such vital responsibility upon subordinates; and later, these legalized murderers palliate the slaughter of their troops and the national shame by publicly reprimanding men serving at shillings per month, for failing in a service, which were the latter able to perform, would entitle them to the gold epaulets and general’s pay, of which their commander is the unfit recipient.
Knowledge of the number, organization, position and movements of the enemy’s troops is the basic element for correct calculation in campaign and battle.
Such things to be accurately estimated must be closely inspected. All speculation and all conjecture in regard to these matters is but frivolity.
It is by being precipitate and hasty in making such conclusions, that men are deceived, for to judge rightly of things before they become clearly shown is most difficult.
To act on uncertainty is WRONG.
We do not know all the facts and a single iota of light later on may oblige us to condemn that which we previously have approved.
In the making of Grand Reconnaissance, one always must be wary of placing too much confidence in appearances and in first impressions. Especially must care be taken not to magnify the weaknesses of the hostile army, nor the efficacy of the kindred position.
Also, one never should underrate:
It is a first essential, constantly to note the movements of the enemy, in order to detect his plans and the exact location of his corps.
These things are the only reliable guides for determining the true course of procedure. It must be left to the enemy to show by his movements and the posts which he occupies, the measures he projects for the future, and until these are known, it is not proper toACT. Hence:
All movements of Corps Offensive should be governed by the POSITION of the hostile army, and all movements of Corps Defensive should be governed by the MOVEMENTS of the hostile army.
As soon as the enemy begins a movement, his intentions become clear. It is then possible to make precise calculations.
But be not hasty to build conclusions upon uncertain information and do not take any resolutions until certain what are the numbers, the position, the objectives, and the projects of the enemy.
However interesting an undertaking may appear, one should not be seduced by it while ill-informed of the obstacles to be met and the possibility of not having sufficient force in the theatre of action.
Chimerical schemes should be abandoned at their inception. Reason, instead of extravagancies of the fancy, always must be the guide. Men, most courageous, often undertake fearful difficulties, but impracticable things they leave to lunatics.
In all situations, one must beware of venturing beyond his depth. It is wiser to keep within the limits which the knowledge we possess shall prescribe.
Especially in crises, one must proceed most cautiously until sure information is acquired; for over-haste is exceedingly dangerous, when exact knowledge is lacking of the enemy’s numbers, position, and movements.
Situations always should be contemplated as they EXIST, never as they OUGHT to be, or, perhaps, MAY be.
In every important juncture, each step must be profoundly considered; as little as possible should be left to chance.
Particularly, must one never be inflated and rendered careless and negligent by success; nor made spiritless and fearful by reverses. At all times the General should see things only as they are and attempt what is dictated bythat Strategetic Principle which dominates the given situation. Fortune often does the rest.
“Napoleon bending over and sometimes lying at full length upon his map, with a pair of dividers opened to a distance on the scale of from 17 to 20 miles, equal to 22 to 25 miles over country, and marking the positions of his own and of the hostile armies by sticking into the map pins surmounted by little balls made of diverse colored sealing wax; in the twinkling of an eye calculated those wonderful concentrations of his Corps d’armee upon decisive points and dictated those instructions to his Marshals which in themselves are a title to glory.”—Baron de Jomini.
“Napoleon bending over and sometimes lying at full length upon his map, with a pair of dividers opened to a distance on the scale of from 17 to 20 miles, equal to 22 to 25 miles over country, and marking the positions of his own and of the hostile armies by sticking into the map pins surmounted by little balls made of diverse colored sealing wax; in the twinkling of an eye calculated those wonderful concentrations of his Corps d’armee upon decisive points and dictated those instructions to his Marshals which in themselves are a title to glory.”—Baron de Jomini.
“Phillip, King of Macedonia, is the single confidant of his own secrets, the sole dispenser of his treasure, the most able general of all Greece, the bravest soldier in his army. He foresees and executes everything himself; anticipates events, derives all possible advantages from them and yields to them when to yield is necessary.His troops are extremely well disciplined, he exercises them incessantly. Always himself at their head, they perform with arms and baggage marches of three hundred stadia with alarming expedition and making no difference between summer or winter, between fatigue and rest.He takes no step without mature reflection, nor proceeds to a second until he is assured of the success of the first and his operations are always dominated by considerations of time and place.”—Apollodorus.
“Phillip, King of Macedonia, is the single confidant of his own secrets, the sole dispenser of his treasure, the most able general of all Greece, the bravest soldier in his army. He foresees and executes everything himself; anticipates events, derives all possible advantages from them and yields to them when to yield is necessary.
His troops are extremely well disciplined, he exercises them incessantly. Always himself at their head, they perform with arms and baggage marches of three hundred stadia with alarming expedition and making no difference between summer or winter, between fatigue and rest.
He takes no step without mature reflection, nor proceeds to a second until he is assured of the success of the first and his operations are always dominated by considerations of time and place.”—Apollodorus.
The facility with which one familiar with the Strategetic Art may make Grand Reconnaissance, even of an invisible theatre of action, and may evolve accurate deductions from a mass of inexact and contradictory reports is illustrated by the following practical examples, viz.:
(From theNew York Journal, Dec. 26, 1899 ByFranklin K. Young.)
“The position of the British armies is deplorable.
“With the single exception of Gen. Buller’s force, the situation of these bodies of British troops, thus unfortunately circumstanced, is cause for the greatest anxiety.
“Strong indications point to a grand offensive movement on the part of the Boers, with the object of terminating the war in one campaign and by a single blow.
“True, this movement may be but a feint, but if it be a true movement, it is difficult to over-estimate the gravity of the situation of the British in South Africa.
“For if this movement is a true military movement, it shows as clearly as the sun in the sky to those who know the Strategetic Art, that the Boer armies are in transition from the defensive to an offensive plan of campaign, with the purpose of capturing DeArr and from thence advancing in force against the chief British depot, Capetown.”
The United States War Department,Report on the British-Boer War, published June 14, 1901, contains the following:
(ByCapt. S. L’H. Slocum, December 25, 1899. U. S. Military Attache with the British Army.)
“I consider the present situation to be the most critical for the English forces, since hostilities began.Should the Boers assume offensive operations, the English armies with their long and thinly guarded lines of communication, would be placed in great jeopardy.”
(ByChas. S. Goldmann, war correspondent with Gen. Buller and Lord Roberts in the South African Campaign. MacMillan & Co., 1902.)
“Had the defence (of Cape Colony) been entrusted to less capable hands than those of Gen. French, who, with a mere handful of troops succeeded not only in checking the Boer advance, but in driving them back on Colesberg, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the enemy would have been able to push on south and west to Craddock and Hex River range and thus bring about a state of affairs which might have shaken British rule in South Africa to its foundation.”
(Boston Globe, Jan. 12, 1900. ByFranklin K. Young.)
“Lord Roberts’ first object will be the rescue of Lord Methuen’s army now blockaded near Magersfontein by Gen. Conje.
“As the first step to effect this, the British commander-in-chief at once and with all his force, will occupy the line from Naauwpoort to De Arr. There, he will await the arrival of twenty-two transports now en route from England.
“With these reinforcements, he will advance directly to the Modder River by the route previously taken by Lord Methuen.”
(ByChas. S. Goldmann, Sp. Cor. British Army.)
“Slow to recognize their opportunities, the enemy were still in the midst of preparation, when Gen. French reached De Arr. Meanwhile a detachment under Major McCracken occupied Naauwpoort, to which place thirty days’ supplies for 3000 men and 1100 animals had been ordered.
“In the ten weeks of fighting which ensued, prior to the arrival of the British main army, Gen. French by his skillful tactics held a powerful force of Boers at bay, checked their descent into the southern part of the colony, defeated their attempt to display the Vierkleur across the cape peninsular, and materially influenced, if not absolutely determined, the entire future of the campaign.”
(ByChas. S. Goldmann, Sp. Cor. with British Army.)
“Arriving at Capetown on Jan. 10, Lord Roberts decided that the line of march should lead by way of Bloemfontein to Pretoria, initiating the operation by the concentration of large forces on the Modder River, forming there an advanced base.”
(Boston Globe, Jan. 21, 1900. ByFranklin K. Young.)
“It is plain that when the Boers took position at Colenso they prepared their plan for the protection of their flanks; to deny this would be to assume that men who had displayed superb military sagacity were ignorant of the simplest processes of warfare.
“What that plan is will be unfolded very rapidly should Gen. Buller attempt to pierce the line of Boer vedettes posted upon the Spion Kop and concealing as near as can be determined from the present meagre facts, either the Second, or the Fourth Ambuscade.
“In either case it signifies that the Boers are confident of annihilating Gen. Buller’s army if it should cross the Tugela.
“About this time the Boers are watching Gen. Warren and his command and watching him intently. Something may happen to him.”
(London Times, Jan. 22, 1900.)
“On Friday, Jan. 19, Gen. Warren began a long, circuitous march to the westward for the purpose of turning the right of the Boer position.
“This attempt was abandoned on account of the long ridge running from Spion Kop being occupied by the Boers in such strength as to command the entire route.
“Saturday, Jan. 20, Gen. Warren, having crossed the Tugela River with the bulk of his troops, ordered a frontal attack. Our men behaved splendidly under aheavy cross-fire for seven hours. Our casualties were slight. Three lines of rifle fire[1]were visible along the Boer main position.”
[1]The Second Ambuscade. Vide “Secret Instructions” of Frederic the Great.
[1]The Second Ambuscade. Vide “Secret Instructions” of Frederic the Great.
[1]The Second Ambuscade. Vide “Secret Instructions” of Frederic the Great.
(British War Office Bulletin, Jan. 22, 1900.)
“Gen. Warren has been engaged all day chiefly on his left, which he has swung forward a couple of miles.”
(Signed)Buller.
(British War Office Bulletin, Jan. 24, 1900.)
“Gen. Warren holds the position he gained two days ago. The Boer position is on higher ground than ours and can be approached only over bare and open slopes. An attempt will be made tonight to seize Spion Kop.”
(Signed)Buller.
(British War Office Bulletin, Jan. 25, 1900.)
“Gen. Warren’s troops last night occupied Spion Kop, surprising the small[2]garrison which fled.”
(Signed)Buller.
[2]Merely the outposts and vedettes of the Second Ambuscade.
[2]Merely the outposts and vedettes of the Second Ambuscade.
[2]Merely the outposts and vedettes of the Second Ambuscade.
(British War Office Bulletin, Jan. 26, 1900.)
“Gen. Warren’s garrison, I am sorry to say, I find this morning had in the night abandoned Spion Kop.”
(Signed)Buller.
(British War Office Bulletin, Jan. 28, 1900.)
“I decided that a second attack on Spion Kop was useless[3]and that the enemy’s right was too strong toallow me to force it. Accordingly I decided to withdraw the troops to the south side of the Tugela River.”
(Signed)Buller.
[3]The proffer of an untenable post always is the bait of the Second Ambuscade.
[3]The proffer of an untenable post always is the bait of the Second Ambuscade.
[3]The proffer of an untenable post always is the bait of the Second Ambuscade.
(London Daily Mail, Jan. 29, 1900.)
“The richest and what was hitherto considered the most powerful nation in the world is today in the humiliating position of seeing its armies beaten back with heavy losses by two small states.”
(Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1900, byFranklin K. Young.)
“Lord Roberts’ communications for nearly two hundred miles are exposed to the attack of an enemy, who at any moment is liable to capture and destroy his supply and ammunition trains and to reduce the British army to a condition wherein it will be obliged to fight a battle under most disadvantageous circumstances.”
(From United States War DepartmentReport on the British Boer War. ByCapt. S. L’H. Slocum, U. S. Attache with British Army.)
“Feb. 15, 1900. The main supply park of the army was attacked by the enemy near Watervale Drift.
“This park consisted of one hundred ox-wagons containing rations and one hundred more wagons filled with ammunition. One hundred and fifty of these wagons and three thousand oxen were captured by the Boers.
“The loss of these rations and munitions was a most serious blow. Lord Roberts was here confronted by a crisis which would have staggered and been the undoing of many commanders-in-chief placed as he was.
“He was in the enemy’s country, cut off from his base of supplies on the railroad and with an unknown number of the enemy in his rear and upon his line of communication. His transport was nearly all captured and his army was suddenly reduced to three days full rations on the eve of a great movement and the country afforded no food whatever. The crisis still further developed when a courier brought the report that the Boers were in position at Watervale Drift and commanding the ford with artillery.”
(Boston Globe, Feb. 25, 1900. ByFranklin K. Young.)
“There is reason to believe that should worse come to worse, the Boer Army, should it be compelled to abandon its position, will be able to save its personnel by a rapid flight across the Modder. Of course, in this case, the Boers would lose their supplies and cannon.”
(From United States War Department,Report on the British Boer War. ByCapt. S. L’H. Slocum, U. S. Attache, with British Army.)
“The enemy, under Cronje, with all his transport was in all practical effect surrounded, although by abandoning his wagons and supplies, a large number of the Boers undoubtedly could have escaped.”
(Boston Sunday Times, March, 1900. ByFranklin K. Young.)
“Cronje’s conduct was heroic and imbecile in the extreme. As the commander on the ground he is entitled to all the glory and must assume all the blame. One of the ablest of the Boer generals, he is the only one in the whole war to make a mistake.
“Cronje’s first duty was to decide whether he should stand or run; he decided to run, which was proper, but having so decided he should have run at once and not have stopped running until safe on the north bank of the Vaal River.
“Properly he sent his siege guns and trains off to the north across the Vaal and improperly held his position in force on the British front, instead of withdrawing his personnel after his material.
“This blunder, like all blunders of a commander-in-chief, quickly produced blunders by his subordinates. Commander Ferrera permitted French to get around Cronje’s left flank without a battle. The presence of this force on his rear cut Cronje off from his natural line of retreat across the Vaal and compelled him to flee toward Bloemfontein.
“Even now Cronje was all right; he easily and brilliantly out-manoeuvred the British and gained the protection of the Modder River. But a second time he blundered. Instead of first executing Ferrera and then abandoning everything and devoting all his efforts to saving his men, he neglected an obvious and imperative military duty and clung to his slow-moving cannon and wagons.
“Finally he took position on the Modder and resolved to fight the whole British army. This was fatal.
“Then for the fourth time he blundered. Having made his decision to fight he should not have surrenderedto the British on the anniversary of Majuba Hill. On the contrary, surrounded by the mightiest army the British empire ever put in the field and enveloped in the smoke of a hundred cannon, Cronje, upon a rampart formed by his dead army and with his last cartridge withstanding the destroyers of his country, would have presented to posterity a more spectacular and seemingly a more fitting termination of the career of the Lion of South Africa.”