Alloperations of mind which are not produced by material things acting upon the senses consist of a continual succession of conceptions. Some of these conceptions are exact pictures of past perceptions, and are attended by the consciousness that such things have existed before, and such are called ideas of memory. Others are conceptions which, by the process of association, are continually recurring, and arranging themselves in new combinations, according to certain laws or principles of association. Imagination has been defined as "that power which the mind possesses of arranging conceptions in new combinations," and it can readily be seen that this includes all the ordinary successions of thought except those of perception and memory. The term imagination has been used in rather a vague manner by writers on the subject. Sometimes it is used to signify all that succession of conceptions which recur according to the laws of association, and sometimes it is used in a more restricted sense. The more limited meaning is the one to which the term is most commonly applied, and it seems to be the one which precision and accuracy in the use of terms demand, and therefore it will now be pointed out.
The mind is susceptible of certain emotions, which are called emotions of taste. These, more specifically,are called emotions of beauty, sublimity, and novelty. Such emotions are awakened by certain objects in nature, by certain works of art, and by the use of language which recalls conceptions of these objects. Those objects which awaken such emotions are called objects of taste, and those arts which enable us to produce combinations that will awaken such emotions are called thefine arts.
Among the fine arts are ordinarily classed painting, music, sculpture, architecture, ornamental gardening, and poetry. The art of the painter consists in combining, according to certain rules of proportion and fitness of outline and color, certain objects, which, either from their peculiar character, or from the fitness of their combination in effecting a given design, awaken emotions of beauty or sublimity. The highest perfection of this art consists not so much in close imitation as in the nature of the combinations, and their unity and fitness in producing the effect designed by the artist.
The art of the sculptor is similar in its nature, and differs chiefly in the materials employed, and in being limited to a much more restricted number of objects for combination.
The art of the architect consists in planning and constructing edifices, intended either for use or ornament, and in so arranging the different parts as to awaken emotions of beauty or sublimity from the display of utility, fitness, grandeur of extent, or order of proportion.
The art of the musician consists in combining sounds so as to produce such melodies or harmonies as will awaken varied emotions in the mind. The power ofthis art over the human mind is much superior to that of the others enumerated, because it can call forth both a greater variety and more powerful emotions.
The art of the poet consists in such a use of language as will recall objects of beauty or sublimity in combinations that are pleasing to the mind, or as will, by the description and expression of varied emotion in other minds, awaken similar feelings in the breast of the reader.
The art of ornamental gardening consists in such an arrangement of the varied objects which compose a landscape as will awaken emotions of beauty from a display of unity of design, order, fitness, and utility.
The term imagination, then, in its most frequent use, signifiesthose new combinations of conceptions which will awaken the emotions of taste.
The painter or the poet, when he attempts the exercise of his art, has some leading desire of an object to be secured. Under the influence of this desire, all those conceptions, recurring by the principle of association, which appear fitted to accomplish this object, immediately become vivid and distinct, and are clearly retained in the mind. As other conceptions succeed, other objects are found which will forward the general design, and these also are retained, and thus the process continues till the object aimed at is accomplished, and by the pen or pencil retained in durable characters.
The action of mind to which the termimaginationis thus restricted differs in no respect from other acts of conception when the mind is under the influence of desire, except in thenature of the objects ofdesire. If it is the desire of the mind to establish a proposition by mathematical reasoning, the mind is engaged in the same process of conception as when it is engrossed with the desire to form some combination of taste. In both cases some object of desire stimulates the mind, and whatever conceptions appear fitted to accomplish this object immediately become vivid and distinct.
Thetermjudgment, as a mental faculty, signifies "that power of the mind by which it noticesrelations." It is often used to signify all the intellectual powers, among which it is the most important one. Thus we hear it said that, in certain cases, thefeelingsand thejudgmentare in opposition, or that theheartand thejudgmentare not in agreement.
It is also used often to signify any act of the mind when a comparison is made between two things, or between the truths asserted in any proposition and a truth already believed. The act calledmemoryis a conception attended with one specific act of judgment, by which a present state of mind is compared with a past, and the relation of resemblance perceived.
The nature of our ideas of relation are very different, according to the object or purpose for which the comparison is made. If objects are compared in reference totime, we learn some one of the relations of past, present, or future. No idea of time can be gained except by comparing one period of time with another, and thus noticing their relations. Alldatesare gained by comparing one point of time with some specified event, such as the birth of the Savior, or some particular period in the revolution of the earth around the sun.
If objects are compared in reference to thesuccessionof our conceptions or perceptions, we gain the ideas of such relations as are expressed by the termsfirstly,secondly, andthirdly. If objects are compared in reference to thedegreeof any quality, we gain an idea of such relations as are expressed by the termsbrighter,sweeter,harder,louder. If objects are compared in reference toproportion, we gain ideas of such relations as are expressed by the termsan eighth,a half. If objects are compared in reference to the relation of parts to a whole, we gain such ideas as are expressed by the termspart,whole,remainder.
The process of classifying objects and the use of language depend upon the power of judgment; for if we see an object possessing certain qualities, in order to apply the name we must compare and observe their resemblance to the qualities to which such a name has been applied in past experience, and this feeling of resemblance is an act of judgment. The application of a name, then, always implies the exercise of the power of judgment, by which a comparison is made between the present qualities observed in an object and the same qualities which affected the mind when the name has formerly been employed. It also implies the act of association, by which the perception of certain qualities recalls the idea of the sound or object with which they have been repeatedly conjoined.
The mental process calledreasoningis nothing but a connected succession of acts of judgment. It is a comparison of what is asserted in a given proposition with some truth which is believed, or which has been established by evidence, and then observing the agreement or disagreement. Thus the truth that "thingswill be in agreement with past experience unless there is some reason for the contrary," is a truth which every mind believes. Whenever, therefore, any event has been repeatedly an object of past experience, it is compared with this truth already believed, and found to be included under it, and therefore entitled to the same credit.
Thus, also, the truth that "things which equal the same thing equal one another," is one which every mind believes. When any object by examination is found to be included under that class of objects which are thus equal to the same thing, it is an act of reasoning when we infer that they are equal to one another.
Havingexamined the intellectual powers, we will now attend to the next general class, denominatedthe susceptibilities.
When the mind is in a state of emotion, this state is always either pleasurable or painful.Desirerelates to the attainment of some object which will be the cause of pleasurable emotions, or else to the avoidance of something which will cause painful emotions. This desire for pleasure and for the avoidance of pain is the mainspring of all mental activity; for when it is not in existence, neither the powers of the mind or of the body are called into exercise.
There are various sources of enjoyment or causes of pleasurable emotion to the mind of man, the most important of which will now be pointed out.
Thefirstcause of enjoyment at the commencement of existence is that ofsensation.[2]This, at first, is small in amount compared with what it becomes when association lends its aid to heighten sensitive enjoyment. The light of day, the brilliancy of color, the sweetness of perfume, the gratification of taste and touch, the magic influence of sound, and the pleasure resulting from muscular activity, are probably thechief sources of enjoyment to the infant mind. As life advances, all these modes of sensitive gratification become connected with others of an intellectual and moral nature, so that at mature years it is difficult to determine how much of the enjoyment we derive from the senses is the result of association, and how much is simply that of sensation.
Another source of happiness to the human mind is the simple exercise of its intellectual powers. This includes all the pleasures derived from the exercise of taste and the imagination; all the more profitless exercises of reverie and castle-building; all the activity of mind employed in contriving, inventing, and bringing to pass the various projects for securing good to ourselves and others; and all those charming illusions which so often give transient delight, but burst like bubbles in the grasp.
Another source of enjoyment is the exercise of physical and moral power. This love of power is one of the earliest principles which is developed in the human mind. The exercise of the muscles in producing changes in its own material frame or in surrounding objects is a source of constant pleasure to the infant mind. There are few who have reared a child through the period of infancy but can recollect the times that this new species of delight was manifested, as, with his hand raised before his eyes, he watched its various motions, and learned his own power to control them.
This love of power continually displays itself in the sports and pursuits of childhood. To project the pebble through the air; to drive the hoop; to turn the windmill; to conduct some light stream from its channel;to roll the rock from the mountain cliff—these and many others are the varied modes by which childhood exhibits its love of physical power.
But when man begins to learn the influence which mind can exert over mind, a new desire is awakened ofmoral power. All the different modes are then sought by which one mind can bend the will of others to yield to its controlling influence. It is this desire which is gratified when the conqueror of nations beholds millions of minds yielding to the slightest word of his command. It is this which inspires the orator, as he pours forth that eloquence which charms the delighted throng, and bends them to his will. It is this desire, which often becomes the master passion, to which is sacrificed all that is just, lovely, and benevolent.
Another cause of enjoyment is that of sympathy in the happiness of others. This susceptibility is a source of constant enjoyment when those around us are contented and happy. None can be ignorant of the change produced in passing from the society of a sprightly, cheerful, and happy group to a circle soured by discontent or overwhelmed with melancholy. In early childhood, the effect of this principle is clearly developed. Even the infant child is affected and disturbed with flowing tears, and steals away from the chamber of sorrow, while the sight of smiling faces and the sound of cheerful voices sends through his heart the glow of delight.
Another source of enjoyment is a feeling of conscious rectitude. Man is so constituted that, when he knowingly violates the principles of rectitude, a painful feeling is the inevitable consequence, while a habit ofconstant conformity to them brings a peaceful and happy state of mind.
Another source of happiness is the consciousness of being the cause of happiness to others. This is an enjoyment entirely distinct from that of sympathy in the happiness of others; for we may see happiness conferred by another and rejoice in it, but the pleasure of being ourselves the cause of this enjoyment is one altogether peculiar. It can readily be seen that the more benevolent a mind is, the more happiness it will derive from this source; while in exact proportion as the mind is selfishly engrossed by its own exclusive interests will this stream of enjoyment cease to flow.
Another source of happiness is the consciousness of inspiring certain emotions in other minds, such as esteem, respect, confidence, love, gratitude, reverence, and the like. The desire for this is one of the strongest passions, and its gratification often secures the most exquisite enjoyment. This happiness, ordinarily, is proportioned to the nobleness of the person who renders this regard.
Another source of enjoyment is the discovery of certain qualities in intelligent minds. The perception of the qualities of matter through the medium of the senses is a very inferior source of gratification compared with the discovery of certain qualities of mind. This is the source of the highest enjoyment of which the mind is capable. The emotions thus awakened are called esteem, veneration, love, gratitude, and the like.Love, in its most general sense, is used for the pleasurable emotion which is felt in the discovery of any quality that is agreeable, either in matter or mind.Thus we are said to love the beauties of nature, to love delicious fruit, and to love the society of friends. But in relation to intelligent beings, it signifies pleasurable emotion in view of certain qualities and actions, attended with the desire of good to the object loved, and also a desire for reciprocated affection. There are certain qualities and attributes of mind which may be pointed out as thecausesof affection.
The first isintellectual superiority. Our estimate of intellect is altogetherrelative. What in a child seems an astonishing display of it, would be considered puerility in a man. What excites admiration in a savage or in the unlettered, is regarded with little emotion in the man of education. There are various qualities of intellect which awaken admiration. Quick perceptions and ready invention are the peculiar attribute of some minds; others are endowed with great sagacity and wisdom in adapting the best means to accomplish the best ends; others possess an energy and force of purpose which enables them to encounter difficulties, sustain bodily fatigue, and even to face death without shrinking; others possess a power of forming new and varied combinations that gratify the taste; others seem to possess a readiness and versatility of mind which enables them to succeed in almost any object they undertake. The exhibition of any of these operations of intellect are causes of emotions of pleasure to other minds.
The next quality of mind which is a cause of affection is the power ofsympathy. There is nothing which so powerfully draws the mind toward another being as the assurance that all our pleasures will behis, and that "in all our afflictions he will be afflicted." It is probable that a being entirely destitute of this susceptibility, however he might excite the mind by displays of intellectual power, never could be regarded with the warm and tender emotions of affection. If we encountered a mind that we felt looked upon our happiness without one glimmering of pleasure, and who could gaze upon our sufferings without one shade of sympathizing woe, it is probable the mind would turn away with feelings of dissatisfaction or disgust.
Another quality of mind which becomes a cause of love is the power ofgivingandappreciating affection. There is nothing which is an object of more constant and fervent desire than the admiration and affection of other minds. To be an object of attention and of admiration to others has been the aim that has stimulated the efforts and nerved the arm of all the heroes and conquerors of the world. To gain the esteem and affection of other minds is what regulates the actions, the plans, and the hopes of all mankind. If, therefore, a mind should be destitute of this susceptibility, that which gives the chief interest would be withdrawn. If we should find, also, that the gift of our affections was of no value to another mind, this would deprive it of much that awakens interest and pleasure. It is the excessive indulgence of this desire for admiration which leads to ambition and pride—those principles which have filled the world with contention and deluged it with blood.
Another quality of mind which secures affection isbenevolence. This consists in such a love for the happiness as induces a willingness to make sacrifices ofpersonal ease or enjoyment to secure a greater amount of good to others. Every mind is so made that, if its own wishes are not interfered with, it is more agreeable to see others happy around than to see them miserable. There have been cases of such perversion of our nature that some have seemed to find pleasure in the simple act of inflicting pain upon others; but this seldom occurs until after a long course of self-indulgence and crime. All persons, if it cost no sacrifice, would prefer to make others happy.
But there is a great difference in the character of minds in this particular. Some, when they find that certain modes of personal enjoyment interfere with the interests and happiness of others, can find a pleasure in sacrificing their own lesser enjoyment to secure greater good for others. But others are so engrossed by exclusive interest in their own happiness that they will not give up the smallest amount of their own good to secure any amount of benefit to others.
All minds, whatever their own character may be, detest selfishness in others, and never can bestow any great affection where this is a prevailing trait.
These are the leading characteristics of mind which are causes of admiration and affection. There are other more specific exercises, such as modesty, humility, meekness, and the like.
But all these traits of character, which, in themselves considered, are causes of pleasure, in certain circumstances may, to a selfish mind, become causes of unmingled pain. If the displays of intellect or the exhibition of the amiable susceptibilities in another being are viewed by a selfish mind as the cause of disparagementand disadvantageous contrast to itself, they will be regarded only with painful emotions. They will awaken "envy, anger, wrath, malice, and all uncharitableness." This fact is fully illustrated in the history of the world and in the daily observation of life.
Thecauses of painto the human mind are in most cases owing to these very susceptibilities of enjoyment. The organization of the material frame and of the external world, while it is a source of multiplied and constant enjoyment, is often also the cause of the most intense and exquisite suffering. The strongest conception of suffering of which mind can form any conception is sensitive suffering. There are many minds whose constitution and circumstances are such that they can form but faint conceptions of any pain which results from the exercise of malignant passions, or from other sources of suffering. But every mind soon acquires a knowledge of what sensitive suffering must be, and can form the most vivid conceptions of it. Though few ever suffered the dislocation of joints, the laceration of the flesh, or the fracture of bones, still descriptions of such sufferings are readily apprehended and conceived of, and there is nothing from which the mind so involuntarily shrinks.
Another cause of suffering consists in the loss of present or expected enjoyment. There are many blessings which seem desirable to the mind that are never secured, and yet unhappiness is not caused by the want; but there is no happiness which is actually in possession of which the loss does not occasion pain. We may desire the esteem and affection of certain beings,and yet not become unhappy from the want of it; yet nothing sends such exquisite suffering through the mind as the conviction that some beloved object has ceased thus to respect and to love, or has been taken from us by death. Thus, also, if wealth, which is the means of purchasing a variety of blessings, be not secured, the heart can desire it without being made unhappy by the wish, yet the loss of wealth is attended with painful disappointment and regret. The possession of power, also, may be desired without uneasiness, but the loss of it seldom occurs without painful emotions.
Another cause of suffering is inactivity of body and mind. It has been shown that desire is the spring both of mental and of physical activity, and that this activity is one source of enjoyment. The loss of this species of enjoyment is followed by consequent inquietude and uneasiness.
Another cause of suffering is the existence of strong desire with the belief that it never can be gratified. Some desires exist in the mind without causing pain, but they may be excited to such a degree that the certainty that they never will be gratified may produce anguish almost intolerable.
Another source of pain is sympathy in the sufferings of others. These may be so realized as to affect the mind of the observer with even more pain than the sufferer experiences. It is probable that the tender mother, in witnessing the distresses of her child, experiences much more pain than the object of her sympathies.
Another cause of suffering is the violated sense ofjustice. In minds of high moral susceptibilities, suffering from this source may be most exquisite.
Another cause of suffering is the consciousness of guilt. The emotions that follow the commission of crime are denominated repentance and remorse; and it is probable that the human mind has never suffered greater agonies than have attended the existence of these emotions. There are cases on record when intense bodily suffering has been resorted to as a relief from such anguish by withdrawing the attention of the mind from those subjects that call forth such emotions.
Another cause of pain is the apprehension of future evil. This is often a source of long-continued and of distressing emotions, and the pain suffered in apprehension is often greater than would be experienced if the evils were realized.
Another source of suffering is the exercise of malignant passions, such as hatred, envy, and jealousy. These emotions never can exist in the mind without pain. The exhibition of wicked passions and actions in other minds may also be mentioned in connection with this. It is painful to behold a mind tossed with the furies of ungoverned passion, or yielding to the chain of selfishness and pride.
Another source of suffering is the consciousness of the existence of certain emotions in other minds toward ourselves. The belief that other intelligent beings look upon our character and conduct with displeasure, indignation, or contempt, inflicts the keenest suffering, and there is scarcely any thing mankind will not sacrifice to avoid these painful emotions.
Another source of painful emotions is the view of certain characteristics in other minds. While the discovery of certain traits in other minds afford a high enjoyment, the want of them, or the existence of their opposite, awaken disagreeable emotions, expressed by the terms pity, contempt, indignation, disgust, abhorrence, and the like.
There are other sources of pleasure and pain, which will be discussed more at large in succeeding chapters.
[2]Hereafter the terms sensation and perception will often be used synonymously in cases where it is not needful to recognize the distinction heretofore indicated.
[2]Hereafter the terms sensation and perception will often be used synonymously in cases where it is not needful to recognize the distinction heretofore indicated.
Amongthe susceptibilities, the emotions of taste have always been distinguished, and treated of as a peculiarly distinct class. Why is it that certain objects of sight, and certain sounds or combinations of sound, awaken emotions more than other sights and sounds? Why do the perceptions of the eye and ear so much more powerfully affect the mind than those of the other senses? These certainly are objects for interesting inquiry. In attempting the discussion of this subject, the following particulars need to be considered.
All pleasurable emotions are caused either byperceptionorconception, for we have no other ideas but of these two kinds. That they are not occasioned by perception alone must be evident from the fact that infants and children, who have the same perceptions as matured persons, do not experience the emotions of taste in view of the most perfect specimens of the fine arts. A combination of gaudy colors or a string of glittering beads will delight a child more than the most finished productions of a Raphael or a Phidias. That it is not conception alone which awakens such emotions is manifest from the fact that it is theperceptionof objects which are either sublime or beautiful that awakens the most vivid emotions of this kind. Of course, it is inevitable that emotions of taste are caused by perceptionand conceptionthrough their connection with some past co-existing emotions.
Perceptions and conceptions canrecall the emotionswhich have been connected with them, and emotions can also recall a conception of the objects with which they have been united. For example, if some dark wood had been the scene of terror and affright, either the perception or the conception of this wood would recall the emotions of fear which had coexisted with it. If, on some other occasion, a strong emotion of fear should be awakened, this would probably recall a conception of the wood with which it had formerly been united. It is no uncommon fact in our experience to have circumstances about us that recall unusually sad and mournful feelings, for which we are wholly unable to account. No doubt, at such times, some particular objects, or some particular combination of circumstances which were formerly united with painful emotions, again recur, and recall the emotions with which they were once connected, while the mind is wholly unable to remember the fact of their past coexistence. In like manner, pleasurable emotions may be awakened by certain objects of perception when the mind is equally unable to trace the cause.
Objects ofperceptionrecall the emotions connected with them much more vividly than objects of conception can do. Thus, if we revisit the scenes of our childhood, the places of the sorrows and the joys of early days, how much more vividly are the emotions recalled which were formerly connected with these scenes than anyconceptionof these objects could awaken.
Certain perceptions will be found to produce emotions similar to those awakened by the intellectual operations of mind. Thus the entrance of light produces an emotion similar to the discovery of some truth, and the emotion felt while in a state of doubt and uncertainty resembles that experienced when shrouded in darkness. Great care and anxiety produce a state of mind similar to what is felt when the body is pressed down by a heavy weight. The upward spring of an elastic body awakens feelings resembling those that attend the hearing of good news, and thus with many other perceptions. From this fact originates much of the figurative language in common use; such as when knowledge is called light, and ignorance darkness, and care is called a load, and joy is said to make the heart leap.
It has previously been shown that the discovery of certain operations and emotions of mind affords much more pleasure than attends mere perceptions of material objects. Those who have experienced the exciting animation felt at developments of splendid genius, and the pure delight resulting from the interchange of affection, can well realize that no sensitive gratification could ever be exchanged for them. Whatever objects, therefore, most vividly recall those emotions which are awakened when such qualities are apprehended will be most interesting to the mind.
Now it will appear that there are no modes by which one mind can learn the character and feelings of another but by means of the eye and ear. A person both deaf and blind could never, except to an exceedingly limited extent, learn either the intellectual operationsor the emotions of another mind. Of course, it is by means of certain forms, colors, motions, and sounds that we gain those ideas which are most interesting and animating to the soul. It is by the blush of modesty, the paleness of fear, the flush of indignation, thatcoloraids in giving an idea of the emotions of the mind. The pallid hue of disease, the sallow complexion of age, the pure and bright colors of childhood, and the delicate blendings of the youthful complexion, have much influence in conveying ideas of the qualities of mind in certain particulars. The color and flashing expressions of the eye also have much to do with our apprehensions of the workings of mind.
As it regardsmotionas aiding in imparting such ideas, it is by the curl of the lip that contempt is expressed, by the arching brow that curiosity and surprise are exhibited, by the scowling front that anger and discontent are displayed, and by various muscular movements of the countenance that the passions and emotions of the mind are portrayed. It is by the motions of the body and limbs also that strong emotions are exhibited, as in the clasped hand of supplication, the extended arms of affection, and the violent contortions of anger.
Formandoutlinealso have their influence. The sunken eye of grief, the hollow cheek of care and want, the bending form of sorrow, the erect position of dignity, the curvature of haughtiness and pride, are various modes of expressing the qualities and emotions of mind.
But it is by the variedsoundsof voice chiefly that intellect glances abroad, and the soul is poured forth atthe lips. The quick and animated sounds of cheerfulness, joy, and hope; the softer tones of meekness, gentleness, and love; the plaintive notes of sympathy, sorrow, and pain; the firm tone of magnanimity, fortitude, patience, and self-denial, all exhibit the pleasing and interesting emotions of the soul. Nor less expressive, though more painful, are the harsh sounds of anger, malice, envy, and discontent.
Not only are certain forms, colors, motions, and sounds the medium by which we gain a knowledge of the intellectual operations and emotions of other minds, but they are the means by which we discover and designate those material objects which are causes of comfort, utility, and enjoyment. Thus it is by the particular form and color that we distinguish the fruits and the food which minister to our support. By the same means we discriminate between noxious and useful plants and animals, and distinguish all those conveniences and contrivances which contribute to the comfort of man. Of course, certain forms and colors are connected in the mind with certain emotions of pleasure that have attended them as causes of comfort and enjoyment.
In what precedes, it appears that it is those emotions which are awakened by the apprehension of certain intellectual operations and emotions of intelligent minds which are most delightful; that all our ideas of such operations and emotions are gained by means of certain forms, colors, motions, and sounds; that we designate objects of convenience and enjoyment to ourselves by the same mode; that perceptions can recall the emotions which have been connected with them,even after the mind has forgotten the connection, and that perceptions recall associated emotions much more vividly than conceptions.
In consequence of these considerations, the inference seems justifiable that the emotions of beauty and sublimity are not owing either simply to theperceptionsproduced, nor to theconceptionsrecalled by the principle of association. But they are accounted for in a great degree by the fact that certain colors, forms, motions, and sounds have been so often connected with emotions awakened by the apprehension of qualities in other minds, or of emotions which arise in view of causes of enjoyment to ourselves, that theperceptionof these colors, sounds, forms, and motions recall such agreeable emotions, even when the mind can not trace the connection in past experience.
As an example of this, the emotion of pleasure has been so often connected with the clear blue of the sky and with the bright verdure of the foliage, that the sight of either of these colors recalls the emotions, though we may not be able to refer to any particular time when this previous connection existed. In like manner, the moaning sound of the wind in a storm, or the harsh growl which sometimes attends it, has so often been united with sorrowful or disagreeable emotions, that the sounds recall the emotions.
But there is another important fact in regard to the causes of the emotions of taste. It is found that the character of thecombinationof sounds, forms, colors, and motions has as much to do with the existence of such feelings as the nature of these objects of perception. The very same colors and forms, in certaincombination, are very displeasing, when in others they are beautiful. Thus, also, certain motions in certain circumstances are very beautiful or sublime, and in others very displeasing. The very same sounds, also, may be made either very disagreeable or very delightful, according to their combination.
To account for this, it is necessary to understand that objects which tend to awaken emotions of a directly opposite nature can not both operate on the mind without causing disagreeable feelings. If we are surrounded by objects of awe and solemnity, it is painful to notice objects that are mean or ludicrous. If we are under the influence of sprightly and humorous feelings, it is painful to encounter solemn and pensive scenes, with which, perhaps, at other times, we should be pleased. In order, therefore, to awaken emotions of beauty and sublimity, there must exist acongruityin the arrangement and composition of parts which will prevent the operation of causes that would awaken incongruous emotions.
But there is another principle which has a still more powerful operation in regard to the effect of combination and composition. We are always accustomed to view objects with some reference to theirnatureanduse. We always feel that every effect must have a cause, and that every contrivance has somedesignwhich it was made to accomplish.
There is no intellectual attribute of mind which is regarded with more admiration thanwisdom, which is always shown in selecting the best means for accomplishing a given end; and the more interesting or important is the object to be secured, the more is themind pleased with discovering the wisdom exhibited in adapting means to secure this end. Almost every construction of nature or of art is regarded by the mind as having some use and design. No mind, except one bereft of its powers, would ever employ itself in designing any thing which has no possible use, either in benefiting or pleasing the designer or others; and should any such object be found, it would cause only disgust, as exhibiting the fatuity of a mind which spent its powers in contriving so useless a thing.
There are many objects which meet the eye of man for which he in vain seeks the use and design; but such objects are never attended with the conviction that there is no possible use to which they can be applied; on the contrary, they more frequently provoke curiosity, and awaken desire to discover their nature and their use. There is a never-failing conviction attending all our discoveries of new objects in nature that there is some design or contrivance of which they form a link in the chain.
Whenever the object of any design is ascertained, immediately there commences an examination of the modes by which this object is to be effected. If every thing is found to harmonize—if a relation of fitness and propriety is discovered in every part, the mind is satisfied with the exhibition of wisdom which is thus discovered. But if some parts are found tending to counteract the general design of the contrivance, the object is displeasing. Every work of art, then, depends, for the pleasure it affords, not alone on the various forms, colors, sounds, and motions which are combined to affect the senses, but on the nature of thedesign intended, and on the skill which is shown in so composing and arranging the several parts that each shall duly aid in effecting this design. This is the particular in which the genius of the painter, the sculptor, the architect, the musician, and the poet is especially exhibited.
Another particular to be noticed in reference to this subject is the implanted principle of curiosity, or the desire which the mind feels to discover what isnew. After we have discovered the object for which a thing is contrived, and the fit adjustment of every part to this object, one cause of interest in it ceases. And objects which have been the subjects of repeated observation and inspection never yield so much interest as those which afford to the mind some fresh opportunity to discovernewindications of design, and of fitness in the means for accomplishing the design. The love of novelty, then, is a powerful principle in securing gratification to the mind. Of course, the genius of the artist is to be displayed, not only in arranging the several parts so as to accomplish a given design, but in the very effort to secure a design which is new, so that the mind will have a fresh object for exercising its powers in detecting the fitness of means for accomplishing a given end.
From the preceding, we recapitulate the following causes for the pleasurable emotions which are felt in view of certain objects of sight, and in certain combinations of sound: They recall emotions which, in past experience, have been connected with the conception of operations and emotions of other minds, or with material objects that were regarded as the causes ofpleasurable emotions to ourselves; they recall emotions that are congruous in their nature; they cause emotions of pleasure from the discovery of fitness in design and composition; and, finally, they awaken emotions of novelty.
Emotions of taste that are painful are caused by the presence of objects that recall painful emotions with which they have formerly been connected; by objects that recall incongruous emotions; by objects that exhibit a want of fitness and design; and by objects that are common, when the mind has been led to expect novelty.
Thecauseswhich produce emotions of taste have now been pointed out. An inquiry as towhichare the objects, motions, and sounds, and their various combinations, that, in our experience, have awakened such emotions, may lead to facts that will establish the position assumed.
Emotions of taste generally are divided into two classes, called emotions ofsublimityand emotions ofbeauty. Emotions of sublimity resemble those which exist in the mind at the display of great intellectual power, and at exhibitions of strong passion and emotions in another mind. Emotions of beauty resemble those which are experienced at the exhibition of the more gentle emotions of mind, such as pity, humility, meekness, and affection.
All sounds are sublime which in past experience have been associated with the strong emotions of fear and terror. Such sounds are heard in the roar of artillery, the howling of a storm, the roll of thunder, and the rumbling of an earthquake. Sounds are sublime, also, which convey an idea of great power and might. This is illustrated in the emotions felt at the uprooting of trees and the prostration of nature before a whirlwind; in the force of the rolling waves, as they dash against the cliffs; and in art, by the working of some ponderous and mighty engine, that astonishes with the immense resistance it can overcome.
Other sounds, also, are sublime which have often been associated with emotions of awe, solemnity, or deep melancholy. Such are the tolling of a heavy bell and the solemn notes of the organ.
There may be certain circumstances that render a sound, that otherwise would be very gentle and beautiful, more strongly sublime than even those sounds that are generally most terrific. Gray describes such a combination of circumstances in a letter to a friend. "Did you never observe," said he, "while rocking winds are piping loud, thatpause, as the gust is recollecting itself, and rising upon the ear in a shrill and plaintive note, like the swell of the Æolian harp? I do assure you there is nothing in the world so like thevoice of a spirit."
We have another example in Scripture: "And behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks beforethe Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind; and after the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was not in the earthquake; and after the earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire; and after the fire astill small voice. And it was so, when Elijah heard it, he wrapped his face in a mantle." In both these cases, the sudden silence and the still small voice, so contrasted with the tumult around, would awaken the most thrilling emotions of the sublime. In some cases it is the sense which these sounds awaken of the presence of some awful and powerful Being that causes such emotions.
There are a great variety of sounds that are called beautiful. Such are the sound of a distant waterfall, the murmur of a rivulet, the sighing of the wind, the tinkling of the sheepfold, the lowing of distant kine, and the note of the shepherd's pipe. But it must be remarked that it is always a combination of circumstances that make sounds either sublime or beautiful. If we know, by the source from which they originate, that they are caused by no display of power or danger, or if necessarily they have low and mean associations connected with them, the emotions of the sublime or beautiful, which would otherwise recur, are prevented. Thus the rumbling of a cart is sublime when it is believed to be thunder, and loses this character when its true cause is discovered. The sound of the lowing of kine in certain circumstances is very beautiful, and in others very vulgar and displeasing.
Music seems to owe its chief power over the mind to the fact that it can combine all kinds of sounds that have ever been associated with any emotions, either ofdignity, awe, and terror; or of joy, sprightliness, and mirth; or of tenderness, melancholy, and grief. Its power depends on the nature of the particular sounds, and also on the nature of their combination and succession in relation to time, and in relation to a certain sound which is called the fundamental or key note.
The art of a musical composer consists in the ability with which he succeeds in producing a certain class of emotions which he aims to awaken. The more finished productions of this art are never relished till long observation and experience enable the listener to judge of the nature of the design, and with how much success the composer has succeeded in effecting it. Music, when adapted to certain words, has its nature and design more clearly portrayed, and in such productions it is easier to judge of the success of the composer.
There are no colors which ordinarily excite so strong an emotion as to be called sublime. The deep black of mourning and the rich purple of royalty approach the nearest to this character. That colors acquire their power in awakening agreeable or disagreeable emotions simply from the emotions which have ordinarily existed in connection with them, appears from the fact that the associations of mankind are so exceedingly diverse on this subject. What is considered a dignified and solemn color in one nation is tawdry and vulgar in another. Thus, with us,yellowis common and tawdry, but among the Chinese it is a favorite color. Black, with us, has solemn and mournful associations,but in Spain and Venice it is an agreeable color. White, in this country, is beautiful, as the emblem of purity and innocence, but in China it is the sorrowful garb of mourning.
Forms that awaken emotions of sublimity are such as have been associated with emotions of danger, terror, awe, or solemnity. Such are military ensigns, cannon, the hearse, the monument of death, and various objects of this kind. Those forms which distinguish bodies that have great strength, or which are enduring in their nature, awaken the same class of emotions. Thus the Gothic castle, the outline of rocks and mountains, and the form of the oak, are examples. Bodies often appear sublime from the mere circumstance of size, when compared with objects of the same kind. Thus the pyramids of Egypt are an example where relative size, together with their imperishable materials, awakens emotions of sublimity. The ideas of beauty of form depend almost entirely on their fitness to the object for which they are designed, and on many casual associations with which they are connected.
All motion that awakens sublime ideas is such as conveys the notion of great force and power. Motions of this kind are generally in straight or angular lines. Such motions are seen in the working of machinery, and in the efforts of animal nature. Quick motion is more sublime than slow. Motions that awaken ideasof beauty are generally slow and curving. Such are the windings of the quiet rivulet, the gliding motion of birds through the air, the waving of trees, and the curling of vapor.
In regard to the beauty and sublimity of forms and color, it is equally true, as in reference to sound, that the alteration of circumstances will very materially alter the nature of the emotions connected with them. If they are so combined as to cause incongruous emotions, or if they do not harmonize with the general design of any composition, emotions of the sublime or beautiful are not awakened. For example, if the vivid green, which is agreeable in itself from the pleasing emotions which have been connected with it, is combined with a scene of melancholy and desolation, where the design of the artist is to awaken other than lively emotions, it appears incongruous and displeasing.
The art of the poet consists in the use of such language as awakens emotions of beauty and sublimity, either by recalling conceptions of various forms, colors, and motions in nature, which are beautiful and sublime, or the strong and powerful, or the soft and gentle emotions of mind.
Emotions of moral sublimity are such as are felt in witnessing exhibitions of the force of intellect or of strong feelings.
Emotions of moral beauty are those that are felt in witnessing the exhibition of the gentler and tender emotions of mind. These emotions are much more powerful and delightful than when they are more faintly recalled by those objects of perception which are called sublime and beautiful.
The taste is improved by cultivating a love for intellectual endowments and moral qualities. It is also cultivated by gaining an extensive knowledge of objects and scenes which, either in history, or in poetry, or in any compositions of the fine arts, have been associated with emotions. It is also cultivated by learning the rules of fitness and propriety, by studying works of taste, by general reading, by intercourse with persons of refinement and taste, and by a nice observation of the adaptation and fitness of things in the daily intercourse and pursuits of life.
The highest efforts of taste are exhibited in the works of artists who make such pursuits the express object of their profession.
But in ordinary life the cultivation of taste is chiefly exhibited in the style, furniture, and decoration of private dwellings, and in the dress and ornaments of the person. In reference to these, there is the same opportunity for gratifying the eye as there is in the compositions of the fine arts. On these subjects there are rules in regard to color, outline, and combination, and also rules of fitness and propriety, of which every person of taste sensibly feels the violation. In the construction of dwelling-houses, in the proportion of rooms, in the suitableness of colors, in the fitness of all circumstances to the spot of location, to the habits and circumstances of the proprietor, to ideas of convenience, and to various particulars which may be objects of regard, in all these respects the eye of taste ever is prepared to distinguish beauties or defects.
As it regards dress, every individual will necessarily exhibit, to a greater or less extent, the degree inwhich taste has been cultivated. A person of real refinement of taste will always have the dress consistent with the circumstances of fortune, the relative rank in life, the station and character, the hour of the day, the particular pursuit or profession, and the period of life.
If a person is dressed with a richness and elegance which fortune does not warrant, if the dress is either inferior or superior to that of others of the same rank and station, if it is unfitted to the hour or the pursuit, if youth puts on the grave dress of age, or age assumes the bright colors and ornaments of youth, in all these cases the eye of taste is offended.
In the adaptation of colors to complexions, and the style of dress to the particular form of the person; in avoiding the extremes of fashion, the excesses of ornament, and all approaches to immodesty—in all these respects a good taste can be displayed in dress, and thus charm us in every-day life. A person of cultivated taste, in all that relates to the little arrangements of domestic life, the ornaments of the exterior and interior of a dwelling, the pursuits of hours of relaxation and amusement, the modes of social intercourse, the nice perception of proprieties in habits, manners, modes of address, and the thousand little every-day incidents of life, will throw an undefined and nameless charm around, like the soft light of heaven, that, without dazzling, perpetually cheers.
There is a certain class of feelings calledemotions of the ludicrous, which are the causes of laughter.These are generally pleasurable in their nature, though there are times when the emotions which produce laughter are painful. Emotions of this kind are usually caused by the sudden union of certain ideas in our conceptions when the laws of association appear to be violated. Such ideas are called incongruous, because, according to the ordinary experience of our minds, they would not naturally have appeared together.
In order to awaken this emotion, it is not only necessary that the mind should discover ideas united which have not ordinarily been so in past experience, but those which are united in directoppositionto the laws of association. Thus, if there has been a union of certain qualities in an object which have uniformly tended to produce emotions of a dignified and solemn kind, and some particular is pointed out which is mean, little, or low, the unexpected incongruity occasions mirth.
In like manner, when an object in past experience has uniformly united ideas which awakened emotions of contempt, if some particular is pointed out in association with these which is grand or sublime, this incongruity occasions an emotion of the ludicrous. This is the foundation of the amusement produced by bombastic writings, where objects that are grand and sublime have low and mean conceptions connected with them, or where qualities that are insignificant or mean are connected with those which are grand and sublime.
The following example of the union of such incongruous ideas will illustrate: