Chapter 7

Balance, between state and federal powers, See 'Federal and State governments;' between judiciary and other branches of federal govt., 34et seq.; between state legislatures and the Senate,40; of the people against their representatives,40; of presidential electors against the people,40; between Executive and Congress,41; between Senate and House of Representatives, real,228.

Balances of the Constitution, ideal,52; present state of,53; at variance with inevitable tendency to exalt representative body,311.

Bank of the U. S.,22.

Bicameral system, utility of a,219et seq.

Bill of Rights, and the Constitution of the U. S.,7.

Bills, introduced on Mondays,66; early course of, in House,67; all committed,67; doubt in committing some,67,68; fate of committed,69; passed under suspension of Rules,111,112; of private members in House of Commons,120,121.

Bismarck, Count, stands for govt. in Germany,59,208.

"Bland Silver Bill,"185.

Bright, John,198.

British govt. by party,117et seq.

Buckle, on use of legislation,295.

Budget, controlled, not originated, by British House of Commons,137; preparation and submission of, by English Chancellor of Exchequer,140-142; both originated and controlled by Congress,148,191.

Burke, Edmund,209; on value of House of Commons,227.

Cabinet, discords in first,2; change in character of,45et seq.; real executive equality of, with President,46,257; diminishing power of, to control policy,45,47,262,269; parliamentary position of British,95; British, a single Standing Committee,117; irresponsibility of, in U. S., in matters of finance,164; an integral part of the Executive,257; limits to independence of,258; relations of, to President,258,259; ministerial, rather than political, officers in U. S.,261,264et seq.,291; duties of, supervised by Standing Committees,262; in the leading-strings of Congress,262,266; fixed terms of,261,264et seq.; represent whom?265,266; party relations of,269; easily evade many questions and commands of Congress,271,272; indistinct responsibility of,282; history of responsibility of British,286et seq.; status of, in American constitutional system,291.

Calhoun, J. C.,89,218.

Call of States for bills,66; of Standing Committees for reports,72,73.

Canning, George,209.

Caucus, failure of congressional nominating,247; legislative, disciplines parties in Congress,326,327; invention of, by Democrats,327,328; privacy and irresponsibility of legislative,328,329; methods and constraints of legislative,329,330; necessity for legislative,330.

Centralization, present tendency towards, in federal govt. and Congress,53,315,316; questions which seem to necessitate,54.

Chairman of Standing Committees, govt. by,102; elders of Congress,102; relations of, to each other,102,103; limits to leadership of each of the,205.

Chatham, Earl of,209,258.

Civil Rights Act,33, n.

Civil Service Reform, and usurpations of Senate,49,236et seq.; hindered by institutional causes in U. S.,285,290; history of, in Great Britain, 285 et seq.; history of, in U. S.,289,290; conditions precedent to,290.

Clay, Henry,89,218,252.

Clôturein French Assembly,126.

Cobden, Richard,198.

Coinage Act of 1873,185.

Commerce, federal power over,30,31; former control of appropriations for internal improvements by Committee on,167.

Commission, legislative, proposed by J. S. Mill,115,129,192; the most effective legislative,192.

Committee, "Executive," proposed for House of Representatives,114.

Committees, select,67.

Committees, Standing, government by,56; chairmen of, leaders of House,60; chairmen of, do not consult or coöperate,61; for every topic of legislation,61; served by rules of House,66,71; number and uses of,67,68; consider all bills,67; overlapping jurisdiction of,68; cannot reject bills,69; neglect of, to report,69,70; entire direction of legislation by,70,78; hasty consideration of reports of, by House,71; four specially licensed,71,72; average time given to each of the, to report,72; call of, for reports,72,73; hastening of business by the,74et seq.; control of debate by,75et seq.; arguments before the,81-85; division of power amongst the,92; bothparties represented on,99; appointed in House by Speaker,103; history of rules of appointment of,104; aided by Speaker,108; Roman magistrates and the,109; "little legislatures" made up of all sorts of men,113; contrasted with single Standing Committee of Parliament,116,117; of House of Commons,122; which control national income,136; which create demands upon the Treasury,167,168; on expenditures,175-177; multiplication of, by Congress,176, n.; approachability of the, by lobbyists,189,190; choice of, in the Senate,212, n.; supervision of the departments by the,231,262,271,272; may command, but cannot superintend,271; part of the mechanism of Congress,281; offset by legislative caucus,326.

Commons, House of, represented by Ministers of Crown,59,244; character of debate in the,94,95; Cabinet's place and functions in the, 117et seq.; private members' bills in the,120,121; committees of,122; functions and character of Speaker of,122; the, in session,123; compared with French Chamber,123,128,129; controls, does not originate, financial measures,137; opposition of, to civil service reform,285,289; cross-examination of Ministers in,300.

Conference Committees on appropriation bills,157,158,280.

Congress, the centre and source of power,11; early awkwardness of,21,44; made dominant and irresistible by doctrine of "implied powers,"23; check upon, by Judiciary,35,36; power of, over federal courts,38; check upon, by President,41; quick assumption of control by,44,45; enlarged powers of, created by efficiency of organization,47; prominence of Senate in contests with executive,47et seq.; proper central object of constitutional study,57; complex organization of,58; without authoritative leaders,59,92,205,212,315; embarrassments of new member in,61et seq.; work of, parceled out to Committees,67; delays of each new, in getting to work,72,73; uninteresting character of debate in,95,96; means of financial control by,147; supervision of expenditures by,175,179; difficulties of constituencies in controlling,186-189; cause for distrust of, 186 et seq.; lobbying in,189,190; failure of presidential nominating caucus of,247; does not breed administrators,251,252; and the Executive, party diversity between,267; defective means of, for controlling executive action, 270et seq.,302; and the Executive, absence of confidential coöperation between,278; exactions of, upon the departments,278,279; diligence of, in legislation,294,297; necessity for discussion of administration by,301et seq.; informing function of, to be magnified,303; grasps after new subjects of legislation,304; freedom of action possible to,304,305; inferior to the Press as a critical authority,306,319; embarrassments of, in making its authority open and respectable, 312et seq.; and Parliament succeeding Revolution settlement in Eng.,315; without adequate information,315; tendency towards concentration of federal powers in hands of,315,316; irresponsibility of,318; agreement and stability of majorities in,324et seq.; parties in, disciplined by caucus,326,327.

Conkling, Roscoe, resignation of, from Senate,237.

Constituencies, difficulties of, in controlling Congress,186-189.

Constitution, The, its wayward fortunes,1; difficulties attending adoption of,2; outward conformity to principles of, in former times,3; present attitude of criticism toward,5; its change of substance and persistency of form,7; growth of,7; elementary structure of,8; in operation and in the books,9,10; "literary theory" of,12; "implied powers" of,22et seq.; centre of all early political contests, 196et seq.; questions of interpretation of, not now urgent,202; practically amended without being constitutionally amended,242; modeled after the English Constitution,307et seq.; Bagehot on multiplicity of authorities in,309,310; forms of, hold Congress back from makingits power convenient and honest,312.

Consultation between President and Senate, not real,232et seq.; means of, between President and Senate,234.

Contingent Fund of Treasury Dept., fraudulent use of,178.

Convention, Constitutional, of 1787,268,284,307,309.

Convention, national nominating, real functions of a,245et seq.; minority representation in composition of a,246; conditions surrounding choice of a candidate by a,250,251; does not pick from Congress,251,252.

Cooley, Judge, on balance between state and federal govts.,17,18; on checks upon federal encroachment,33,34; on judicial control of the Executive,35; on the originality of the Constitution,55,56; incompleteness of constitutional view of,56,57.

"Courtesy" of the Senate,238.

Criticism, necessity for a new, of constitutional methods, 53et seq.; former methods of constitutional,57; Congress central object of constitutional,57; of legislation by Senate,219.

Cromwell, Oliver,207,208.

Cushman, Samuel,89.

Dale, Mr., on indifference of public opinion in U. S.,331.

Debate, time for, and conditions of, in House,75et seq.; importance of,78; on Ways and Means and Appropriations,78; absence of instinct of, in House,79; relegated to Standing Committees,81,82; in Standing Committees,81; value of, in Committees,82; kind of, necessary,85; physical limitations of, in House,86et seq.; in early Houses,89,90; uninteresting and uninstructive character of, in Congress,95,96,101,184,185,298; parliamentary, centres about Ministry,95; necessity for, under responsible Cabinet govt.,119; in French Assembly, 125et seq.; of appropriation bills,154,155,183,184; of all financial questions by Congress,183; in Senate,211,216et seq.; in Congress, directed at random,298; chief use of public, in representative bodies,299et seq.; of administration, cannot be too much of, in Congress,304.

Deficiency Bills,159.

Democracy, limited in U. S. by Senate,226.

Denmark, treaty with, in regard to St. Thomas, in Senate,50,51.

Departments, communications of, with Appropriation Committees concerning estimates,160-164; present methods of book-keeping in the,163; heads of, make interest with Appropriation Committees,163; Senate's share in control of the,231; and Congress, defective means of coöperation between,270,271; demoralizing relations of, with Congress,277,278; exactions of Congress upon,278,279; objects of suspicion because of their privacy,299,300.

Eaton, D. B., on civil service reform in Great Britain,285.

Education, federal aid to,29.

Election, Senate shielded by the method of its,224; of President, real method of,243et seq.; virtual, by nominating conventions,245.

Electors, presidential, balanced against people,40; agents of nominating conventions,245,250; history of action of,246,247,250.

Ellsworth, Oliver, on veto power,52.

Embargo, the,21.

English Constitution, likeness between the, and that of U. S.,7, 307et seq.; character of, when Constitution of U. S. was formed,307,308,310,311.

Estimates, in House of Commons,137; preparation of the federal,148,149; federal, go to Committee on Appropriations,149; communications and conferences between Appropriation Committees and the departments concerning,160-164; thoroughness of later,163.

Exchequer, Chancellor of, preparation and submission to Commons of budget by,140-142; represented by House Committee of Ways and Means,170; financial policy of, compared with policy of House Committee of Ways and Means,171-175.

Executive,242-293; relations of,with Senate,230et seq.; really chosen by representative, deliberative body,244; and legislative service divorced in U. S.,251-253; the President not all of the,257; elements constituting the, in U. S.,259; functions bestowed upon the Secretaries,260; and Congress, party diversity between,267; Roger Sherman upon real character of,268; and Congress, defective means of coöperation between,270et seq.; responsibility of, and civil service reform,285et seq.; suspected because not clearly visible through Congress,299,300; embarrassed by half-informed criticism,305.

Expenditure, questions of, disconnected from questions of supply,174,175; supervision of, by Congress,175-179.

Federal govt., the, early weakness and timidity of,18,19; growth in self-confidence and power of,19,20; first questions that engaged the attention of,20; brought to every man's door,25; supervision of elections by,27; highest point of aggression of,33; advantage of indirect taxation to,133; necessity for two chambers in,221,222; possible paralysis of, in emergencies,282; rapidly widening sphere of,316,317; weakness of our present,318.

Federal and state govts., balance between,13; object of balance between,14; early conditions of balance between,15; Hamilton on balance between,16,17; present inefficacy of balance between,17; balance between, destroyed by doctrine of "implied powers,"23; balance between, dependent on federal judiciary,24; balance between, prejudiced by internal improvements,28, and by federal power over commerce,30,31; balance between, last pictured in "reconstruction,"32,33.

Federalist, the, quoted,16,17.

Ferry, M. Jules,248.

Fillmore, President,259.

Finance, loose govt. practices concerning,130,131; comparatively unembarrassed character of American,135; necessity for responsibility in direction of,135; shifting character of federal,135,136; number of Committees controlling, in Congress,136; administration of, in England,137-146; administration of, in U. S.,146et seq.,280; Senate Committee on,169; confusion of public opinion in regard to action of Congress upon,280.

Financial, officials, accessibility of English, in the Commons,146,147; officials, separation of, from Congress in the U. S.,147; officials, mere witnesses in U. S.,164; officials, irresponsibility of, for estimates in U. S.,164; system of U. S., contrasted with that of Eng.,180; system of U. S., incoherency of,180,181; policy of Congress, shifting character of,181,182; legislation, prominent place of, in congressional business,183; questions, control of, by Committees in Senate,212, n.; questions, confusion of public opinion regarding action of Congress upon,280.

Fish, Secretary, and treaty with Denmark,51.

Foreign relations, principal concern of federal govt. during first quarter century,43; hand of Senate in,49et seq.,232et seq.; no real consultation between President and Senate concerning,232; Senate Committee on,234.

France, public accounts, how kept in,145; Ministry, how chosen in,244.

French Assembly, organization of,123; parties in,124; proceedings of,125et seq.; compared with House of Representatives and House of Commons,127-129.

French Revolution,20,43.

Froude, J. A., on political orators,215.

Gallatin, Albert,181.

George III.,187,308,309.

Gladstone, Wm. E.,59; on direct and indirect taxes,134;209,322.

Government, by chairmen of Standing Committees,102; by Standing Committees, contrasted with govt. by responsible Ministry, 116et seq.; conditions of perfect party,267,268; "by declamation,"318.

Grant, President, and treaty withDenmark,51; nominates Smythe,235.

Green, J. R., on Parliament and public opinion under Geo. III.,187,188; on temper and embarrassments of the Parliament succeeding the Revolution Settlement in England,313,314.

Grévy, President,248.

Hall of House of Representatives, size of,86et seq.

Hamilton, Alex., on balance between state and national govts.,16,17; influence of, upon early policy of govt.,21; advocacy of protective duties,22; announces doctrine of "implied powers,"22;181,259,306,307.

Hampden, John,208.

Henry, Patrick,209.

Hoar, G. F., Senator, on time for reporting given to Committees,72; on suspension of the Rules in House,111,112.

House of Commons,See'Commons, House of.'

House of Lords, Bagehot on the,220.

House of Representatives,See'Representatives, House of.'

Impeachment,275,276.

"Implied powers," enunciated by Hamilton,22; sustained national bank,22; McCulloch v. Maryland,23; a vigorous principle of constitutional growth,23; effect of, upon status of States,23,24; practical issue of doctrine of,25et seq.

Internal Improvements,28; moral effect of, upon state policy,29; history of policy of,165-167; sums appropriated for,167; character of opposition to,197.

Jackson, President,166,204; why chosen President,252;259,266.

James II.,213.

Jefferson, Thos., leads his party as President,41,204,252.

Johnson, President, contest of, with Senate,49.

Judiciary, power of, to control Executive,34,35; power of, to control Congress,35,36; change of party color in,37; power of Congress over,38,39.

Judiciary Act of 1789,39.

Kentucky, protest of, against Alien and Sedition Laws,21.

Leaders, absence of authoritative, in Congress,58,92,205,212,315; lacking in parties of U. S.,187; raised up by the constitutional struggles before the war,199et seq.; slavery and anti-slavery,201,202; no offices for political, in U. S.,203; training necessary for,255,256; political, authority of, in England,323.

Leadership, conditions of political, in U. S.,204et seq.,323; character of legislative,206et seq.; lack of, in Senate,212,213; the prize of,214; lack of, in U. S. makes parties conglomerate,324.


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