Chapter 17

319. Diog. ix. 1 (R. P. 29), no doubt from Apollodoros through some intermediate authority. Jacoby, pp. 227 sqq.

320. Bernays,Die Heraklitischen Briefe, pp. 13 sqq.

321. Bernays,op. cit.pp. 20 sqq.

322. Sotionap.Diog. ix. 5 (R. P. 29 c).

323. Diog. ix. 6 (R. P. 31).

324. See Patin,Heraklits Einheitslehre, pp. 3 sqq. Herakleitos said (fr. 68) that it was death to souls to become water; and we are told accordingly that he died of dropsy. He said (fr. 114) that the Ephesians should leave their city to their children, and (fr. 79) that Time was a child playing draughts. We are therefore told that he refused to take any part in public life, and went to play with the children in the temple of Artemis. He said (fr. 85) that corpses were more fit to be cast out than dung; and we are told that he covered himself with dung when attacked with dropsy. Lastly, he is said to have argued at great length with his doctors because of fr. 58. For these tales see Diog. ix. 3-5, and compare the stories about Empedokles discussed in Chap. V.§ 100.

325. The variety of titles enumerated in Diog. ix. 12 (R. P. 30 b) seems to show that none was authentically known. That of “Muses” comes from Plato,Soph.242 d 7. The others are mere “mottoes” (Schuster) prefixed by Stoic editors, and intended to emphasise their view that the subject of the work was ethical or political (Diog. ix. 15; R. P. 30 c).

326. Diog. ix. 5 (R. P. 30). Bywater has followed this hint in his arrangement of the fragments. The three sections are 1-90, 91-97, 98-130.

327. R. P. 30 a. The epithet ὁ σκοτεινός is of late date, but Timon of Phleious already called him αἰνικτής (fr. 43, Diels).

328. See the valuable observations of Diels in the Introduction to hisHerakleitos von Ephesos, pp. iv. sqq.

329. Cf. Diog. ix. 6 (R. P. 31).

330. In his edition, Diels has given up all attempt to arrange the fragments according to subject, and this makes his text unsuitable for our purpose. I think, too, that he overestimates the difficulty of an approximate arrangement, and makes too much of the view that the style of Herakleitos was “aphoristic.” That it was so, is an important and valuable remark; but it does not follow that Herakleitos wrote like Nietzsche. For a Greek, however prophetic in his tone, there must always be a distinction between an aphoristic and an incoherent style. See the excellent remarks of Lortzing inBerl. Phil. Wochenschr.1896, pp. 1 sqq.

331. Both Bywater and Diels accept Bergk’s λόγου for δόγματος and Miller’s εἶναι for εἰδέναι. Cf. Philo,leg. all.iii. c, quoted in Bywater’s note.

332. The λόγος is simply the discourse of Herakleitos himself; though, as he is a prophet, we may call it “the Word.” It can neither mean a discourse addressed to Herakleitos nor yet “reason.” (Cf. Zeller, p. 630, n. 1; Eng. trans. ii. p. 7, n. 2.) A difficulty has been raised about the words ἐόντας αἰεί. How could Herakleitos say that his discourse had always existed? The answer is that in Ionic ἐών means “true” when coupled with words like λόγος. Cf. Herod. i. 30, τῷ ἐόντι χρησάμενος λέγει; and even Aristoph.Frogs, 1052, οὐκ ὄντα λόγον. It is only by taking the words in this way that we can understand Aristotle’s hesitation as to the proper punctuation of the fragment (Rhet.Γ 5. 1407 b 15; R. P. 30 a). The Stoic interpretation given by Marcus Aurelius, iv. 46 (R. P. 32 b), must be rejected altogether. The word λόγος was never used like that till post-Aristotelian times.

333. I have departed from the punctuation of Bywater here, and supplied a fresh object to the verb as suggested by Gomperz (Arch.i. 100).

334. Cf. Herod, i. 8. The application is, no doubt, the same as that of the last two fragments. Personal inquiry is better than tradition.

335. See Chap. II. p. 107,n.224. The best attested reading is ἐποιήσατο, not ἐποίησεν, and ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ means “claimed as his own.” The words ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφάς have been doubted since the time of Schleiermacher, and Diels has now come to regard the whole fragment as spurious. This is because it was used to prove that Pythagoras wrote books (cf. Diels,Arch.iii. p. 451). As Mr. Bywater has pointed out, however, the fragment itself makes no such statement; it only says that he read books, which we may presume he did. I would further suggest that the old-fashioned συγγραφάς is rather too good for a forger, and that the omission of the very thing to be proved is remarkable. The last suggestion of a book by Pythagoras disappears with the reading ἐποιήσατο for ἐποίησεν. Of course a late writer who read of Pythagoras making extracts from books would assume that he put them into a book of his own, just as people did in his own days. For the rest, I understand ἱστορίη of science, which is contrasted with the κακοτεχνίη which Pythagoras derived from the συγγραφαί of men like Pherekydes of Syros.

336. The word κόσμος must mean “world” here, not merely “order;” for only the world could be identified with fire. This use of the word is Pythagorean, and there is no reason to doubt that Herakleitos may have known it.

337. It is important to notice that μέτρα is internal accusative with ἁπτόμενον, “with its measures kindling and its measures going out.”

338. On the word πρηστήρ, see below, p. 165,n.380.

339. The subject of fr. 23 is γῆ, as we see from Diog. ix. 9 (R. P. 36), πάλιν τε αὖ τὴν γὴν χεῖσθαι; and Aet. i. 3, 11 (Dox.p. 284 a 1; b 5), ἔπειτα ἀναχαλωμένην τὴν γῆν ὑπὸ τοῦ τυρὸς χύσει (Dübner: φύσει, libri) ὕδωρ ἀποτελεῖσθαι. Herakleitos might quite well say γῆ θάλασσα διαχέεται, and the context in Clement (Strom.v. p. 712) seems to imply this. The phrase μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον can only mean that the proportion of the measures remains constant. So practically Zeller (p. 690, n. 1),zu derselben Grösse.

340. With Diels I adopt the transposition (proposed by Tocco) of ἀέρος and γῆς.

341. I understand ἐπελθόν of the πυρὸς ἔφοδος, for which see below, p. 168. Diels has pointed out that καταλαμβάνειν is the old word for “to convict.” It is, literally, “to overtake,” just as αἱρεῖν is “to catch.”

342. In this fragment it is clear that οὖρος = τέρματα, and therefore means “boundary,” not “hill.” As αἴθριος Ζεύς means the bright blue sky, I do not think its οὖρος can be the South Pole, as Diels says. It is more likely the horizon. I am inclined to take the fragment as a protest against the Pythagorean theory of a southern hemisphere.

343. We learn from Diog. ix. 10 (quoted below, p.164) that Herakleitos explained why the sun was warmer and brighter than the moon, and this is doubtless a fragment of that passage. I now think the words ἕνεκα τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων are from Herakleitos. So Diels.

344. Hesiod said Day was the child of Night (Theog.124).

345. Reading ὅκωσπερ πῦρ for ὅκωσπερ with Diels.

346.Il.xviii. 107. I add the words οἰχήσεσθαι γὰρ πάντα from Simpl.in Cat.(88 b 30 schol. Br.). They seem to me at least to represent something that was in the original.

347. I cannot think it likely that Herakleitos said both παλίντονος and παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη, and I prefer Plutarch’s παλίντονος (R. P. 34 b) to the παλίντροπος of Hippolytos. Diels thinks that the polemic of Parmenides decides the question in favour of παλίντροπος; but see below, p. 184,n.415, and Chap. IV. p. 198,n.438.

348. This, I now think, is the medical rule αἱ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων,e.g.βοηθεῖν τῷ θερμῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν (Stewart on Arist.Eth.1104 b 16).

349. Fr. 51awas recovered by Bywater from Albertus Magnus. SeeJourn. Phil.ix. p. 230.

350. On fr. 55 see Diels inBerl. Sitzb.1901, p. 188.

351. I now read ἐπαιτέονται with Bernays and Diels.

352. On fr. 59 see Diels inBerl. Sitzb.1901, p. 188. The reading συνάψιες seems to be well attested and gives an excellent sense. It is not, however, correct to say that the optative could not be used in an imperative sense.

353. By “these things,” he probably meant all kinds of injustice.

354. Diels supposes that fr. 64 went on ὁκόσα δὲ τεθνηκότες ζωή. “Life, Sleep, Death is the threefold ladder in psychology, as in physics Fire, Water, Earth.”

355. I think now with Diels that the words οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει are probably genuine. They present no difficulty if we remember that λόγος means “measurement,” as in fr.23.

356. This fragment is interesting because of the great antiquity of the corruptions which it has suffered. According to Stephanus, who is followed by Bywater and Diels, we should read: Αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη, ξηρή (or rather ξηρά—the Ionic form would only appear when the word got into the text) being a mere gloss upon the somewhat unusual αὔη. When once ξηρή got into the text, αὔη became αὐγή, and we get the sentence: “the dry light is the wisest soul,” whence thesiccum lumenof Bacon. Now this reading is certainly as old as Plutarch, who, in his Life of Romulus (c. 28), takes αὐγή to mean lightning, as it sometimes does, and supposes the idea to be that the wise soul bursts through the prison of the body like dry lightning (whatever that may be) through a cloud. I do not think that Clement’s making the same mistake proves anything at all (Zeller, p. 705, n. 3; Eng. trans. i. p. 80, n. 2), except that he had read his Plutarch. Lastly, it is worth noticing that, though Plutarch must have written αὐγή, the MSS. vary between αὕτη and αὐτή. The next stage is the corruption of the corrupt αὐγή into οὗ γῆ. This yields the sentiment that “where the earth is dry, the soul is wisest,” and is as old as Philo (see Mr. Bywater’s notes).

357. I understand μεταπεσόντα here as meaning “moved” from one γραμμή or division of the draught-board to another.

358. Sext.Math.vii. 133, διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ ξυνῷ. It seems to me that these words must belong to Herakleitos, though Bywater omits them. On the other hand, the words τοῦ λόγου δὲ ὄντος ξυνοῦ (so, not δ’ ἐόντος, the best MSS.) seem clearly to belong to the Stoic interpreter whom Sextus is following, and who was anxious to connect this fragment with fr.2(ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει) in order to get the doctrine of the κοινὸς λόγος. The whole context in Sextus should be read.

359. The words λόγῳ τῳ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι, which Diels prints as part of this fragment, seem to me to belong to Marcus Aurelius and not to Herakleitos.

360. Adopting Heitz’s κακὸν for καὶ with Diels.

361. The word θυμός has its Homeric sense. The gratification of desire implies the exchange of dry soul-fire (fr. 74) for moisture (fr. 72). Aristotle understood θυμός here as anger (Eth. Nic.Β 2, 1105 a 8).

362. This seems to be a clear reference to the “three lives.” See Chap. II.§ 45, p.108.

363. Reading δοκέοντα with Schleiermacher (or δοκέοντ’ ὧν with Diels). I have omitted φυλάσσειν, as I do not know what it means, and none of the conjectures commends itself.

364. On the meaning of δαίμων here, see my edition of Aristotle’sEthics, pp. 1 sq. As Professor Gildersleeve puts it, the δαίμων is the individual form of τύχη, as κήρ is of θάνατος.

365. I have not ventured to include the words ἔνθα δ’ ἐόντι at the beginning, as the text seems to me too uncertain. See, however, Diels’s interesting note.

366. On the source used by Hippolytos in the first four chapters ofRef.i. see Diels,Dox.p. 145. We must carefully distinguishRef.i. andRef.ix. as sources of information about Herakleitos. The latter book is an attempt to show that the Monarchian heresy of Noetos was derived from Herakleitos instead of from the Gospel, and is a rich mine of Herakleitean fragments.

367. Arist.Met.Α, 3. 984 a 7 (R. P. 56 c): Theophr.ap.Simpl.Phys.23, 33 (R. P. 36 c).

368. For these double accounts seeDox.pp. 163 sqq. and Appendix,§ 15.

369. Diog. ix. 15 (R. P. 30 c). Schleiermacher rightly insisted upon this.

370. The word συνοικειοῦν is used of the Stoic method of interpretation by Philodemos (cf.Dox.547 b, n.), and Cicero (N.D.i. 41) renders it byaccommodare. Chrysippos in particular gave a great impulse to this sort of thing, as we may best learn from Galen,de Plac. Hippocr. et Plat.Book iii. Good examples are Aet. i. 13, 2; 28, 1; iv. 3, 12,—where distinctively Stoic doctrines are ascribed to Herakleitos. What the Stoics were capable of, we see from Kleanthes, fr. 55, Pearson. He proposed to read Ζεῦ ἀναδωδωναῖε inIl.xvi. 233, ὡς τὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἀναθυμιώμενον ἀέρα διὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν Ἀναδωδωναῖον ὄντα.

371. See Patin,Heraklits Einheitslehre(1886). To Patin undoubtedly belongs the credit of showing clearly that the unity of opposites was the central doctrine of Herakleitos. It is not always easy, however, to follow him when he comes to details.

372. Philo,Rer. Div. Her.43 (R. P. 34 c).

373. The source of his error was Hegel’s remarkable statement that there was no proposition of Herakleitos that he had not taken up into his own logic (Gesch. d. Phil.i. 328). The example which he cites is the statement that Being does not exist any more than not-Being, for which he refers to Arist.Met.Α, 4. This, however, is not there ascribed to Herakleitos at all, but to Leukippos or Demokritos, with whom it meant that space was as real as matter (§ 175). Aristotle does, indeed, tell us in theMetaphysicsthat “some” think Herakleitos says that the same thing can be and not be; but he adds that it does not follow that a man thinks what he says (Met.Γ 3. 1005 b 24). I take this to mean that, though Herakleitos did make this assertion in words, he did not mean by it what the same assertion would naturally have meant at a later date. Herakleitos was speaking only of nature; the logical meaning of the words never occurred to him. This is confirmed by Κ, 5. 1062 a 31, where we are told that by being questioned in a certain manner Herakleitos could be made to admit the principle of contradiction; as it was, he did not understand what he said. In other words, he was unconscious of its logical bearing.Aristotle was aware, then, that the theories of Herakleitos were not to be understood in a logical sense. On the other hand, this does not prevent him from saying that according to the view of Herakleitos, everything would be true (Met.Δ, 7. 1012 a 24). If we remember his constant attitude to earlier thinkers, this will not lead us to suspect either his good faith or his intelligence. (See Appendix,§ 2.)

Aristotle was aware, then, that the theories of Herakleitos were not to be understood in a logical sense. On the other hand, this does not prevent him from saying that according to the view of Herakleitos, everything would be true (Met.Δ, 7. 1012 a 24). If we remember his constant attitude to earlier thinkers, this will not lead us to suspect either his good faith or his intelligence. (See Appendix,§ 2.)

374. That the Fire of Herakleitos was something on the same level as the “Air” of Anaximenes and not a “symbol,” is clearly implied in such passages as Arist.Met.Α, 3. 984 a 5. In support of the view that something different from common fire is meant, Plato,Crat.413 b, is sometimes quoted; but a consideration of the context shows that the passage will not bear this interpretation. Plato is discussing the derivation of δίκαιον from δια-ιόν, and certainly δίκη was a prominent Herakleitean conception, and a good deal that is here said may be the authentic doctrine of the school. Sokrates goes on to complain that when he asks what this is which “goes through” everything, he gets very inconsistent answers. One says it is the sun. Another asks if there is no justice after sunset, and says it is simply fire. A third says it is not fire itself, but the heat which is in fire. A fourth identifies it with Mind. Now all we are entitled to infer from this is that different accounts were given in the Herakleitean school. These were a little less crude than the original doctrine of the master, but for all that not one of them implies anything immaterial or symbolical. The view that it was not fire itself, but Heat, which “passed through” all things, is related to the theory of Herakleitos as Hippo’s Moisture is related to the Water of Thales. It is quite likely, too, that some Herakleiteans attempted to fuse the system of Anaxagoras with their own, just as Diogenes of Apollonia tried to fuse it with that of Anaximenes. We shall see, indeed, that we still have a work in which this attempt is made (p. 167,n.383).

375. Plato,Tht.152 e 1;Crat.401 d 5, 402 a 8; Arist.Top.Α, 11. 104 b 22;de Caelo, Γ, 1. 298 b 30;Phys.Θ, 3. 253 b 2.

376. See above, Chap. I.§ 29.

377. See, however, the remark of Diels quoted R. P. 36 c.

378. Diog. ix. 8, σαφῶς δ’ οὐθὲν ἐκτίθεται.

379. This was written in 1890. In hisHerakleitos von Ephesos(1901) Diels takes it as I did, renderingGlutwind.

380. Cf. Herod. vii. 42, and Lucretius, vi. 424. Seneca (Quaest. Nat.ii. 56) calls itigneus turbo. The opinions of early philosophers on these phenomena are collected in Aetios, iii. 3. The πρηστήρ of Anaximander (Chap. I. p. 69,n.133) is a different thing altogether, but it is quite likely that Greek sailors named the meteorological phenomenon after the familiar bellows of the smith.

381. Aet. iii. 3, 9, πρηστῆρας δὲ κατὰ νεφῶν ἐμπρήσεις καὶ σβέσεις (sc. Ἡράκλειτος ἀποφαίνεται γίγνεσθαι). Diels (Herakleitos, p. v.) seems to regard the πρηστήρ as the form in which water ascends to heaven. But the Greeks were well aware that waterspouts burst and come down.

382. Arist.de An.Β, 2. 405 a 26, τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐξ ἧς τἆλλα συνίστησιν.

383. The presence of Herakleitean matter in this treatise was pointed out by Gesner, but Bernays was the first to make any considerable use of it in reconstructing the system. The older literature of the subject has been in the main superseded by Carl Fredrichs’Hippokratische Untersuchungen(1899), where also a satisfactory text of the sections which concern us is given for the first time. Fredrichs shows that (as I said already in the first edition) the work belongs to the period of eclecticism and reaction which I have briefly characterised in§ 184, and he points out that c 3, which was formerly supposed to be mainly Herakleitean, is really from some work which was strongly influenced by Empedokles and Anaxagoras. I think, however, that he goes wrong in attributing the section to a nameless “Physiker” of the school of Archelaos, or even to Archelaos himself; it is far more like what we should expect from the eclectic Herakleiteans whom Plato describes inCrat.413 c (see p. 161,n.374). He is certainly wrong in holding the doctrine of the balance of fire and water not to be Herakleitean, and there is no justification for separating the remark quoted in the text from its context because it happens to agree almost verbally with the beginning of c. 3. As we shall see, that passage too is of Herakleitean origin.

384. Περὶ διαίτης, i. 5. I should read thus: ἡμέρη καὶ εὐφρόνη ἐπὶ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον· ἥλιος, σελήνη ἐπὶ τὸ μήκιστον καὶ ἐλάχιστον· πυρὸς ἔφοδος καὶ ὕδατος. In any case, the meaning is the same, and the sentence occurs between χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀμειβόμενα and πάντα ταὐτὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ αὐτά, which are surely Herakleitean utterances.

385. Arist.de An.Α, 2. 405 a 25 (R. P. 38). Diels attributes to Herakleitos himself the words καὶ ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται, which are found in Areios Didymos after fr. 42. I can hardly believe, however, that thewordἀναθυμίασις is Herakleitean. He seems rather to have called the two exhalations καπνός and ἀήρ (cf. fr. 37).

386. Περὶ διαίτης, i. 5, χωρεῖ δὲ πάντα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἀμειβόμενα.

387. We seem to have a clear reference to this in Epicharmos, fr. 2, Diels (170 b, Kaibel): “Look now at men too. One grows and another passes away, and all are in change always. What changes in its substance (κατὰ φύσιν) and never abides in the same spot, will already be something different from what has passed away. So thou and I were different yesterday, and are now quite other people, and again we shall become others and never the same again, and so on in the same way.” This is put into the mouth of a debtor who does not wish to pay. See Bernays on the αὐξανόμενος λόγος (Ges. Abh.i. pp. 109 sqq.).

388. Sextus quotes “Ainesidemos according to Herakleitos.” Natorp holds (Forschungen, p. 78) that Ainesidemos really did combine Herakleiteanism with Skepticism. Diels, on the other hand (Dox.pp. 210, 211), insists that Ainesidemos only gave an account of the theories of Herakleitos. This controversy does not affect the use we make of the passage.

389. τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς, opposed to but parallel with τὸ περιέχον τὸν κόσμον.

390. The popular word is used for the sake of its paradoxical effect. Strictly speaking, they are all mortal from one point of view and immortal from another.

391. We need not hesitate to ascribe to Herakleitos the view that the dead become guardian demons of the living; it appears already in Hesiod,Works and Days, 121, and the Orphic communities had popularised it. Rohde,Psyche(pp. 442 sqq.), refused to admit that Herakleitos believed the soul survived after death. Strictly speaking, it is no doubt an inconsistency; but I believe, with Zeller and Diels, that it is one of a kind we may well admit. Many thinkers have spoken of a personal immortality, though there was really no room for it in their systems. It is worthy of note in this connexion that the first argument which Plato uses to establish the doctrine of immortality in thePhaedois just the Herakleitean parallelism of life and death with sleeping and waking.

392. These fragments are quoted by Plotinos, Iamblichos, and Noumenios in this very connexion (see R. P. 46 c), and it does not seem to me possible to hold, with Rohde, that they had no grounds for so interpreting them. They knew the context and we do not.

393. Plut.def. orac.415 d, ἔτη τριάκοντα ποιοῦσι τὴν γενεὰν καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον, ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ γεννῶντα παρέχει τὸν ἐξ αὑτοῦ γεγεννημένον ὁ γεννήσας. Philo, fr. Harris, p. 20, δυνατὸν ἐν τριακοστῷ ἔτει αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πάππον γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ. Censorinus,de die nat.17, 2,“hoc enim tempus (triaginta annos)geneanvocari Heraclitus auctor est, quiaorbis aetatisin eo sit spatio: orbem autem vocat aetatis, dum natura ab sementi humana ad sementim revertitur.”The wordsorbis aetatisseem to mean αἰῶνος κύκλος, “the circle of life.” If so, we may compare the Orphic κύκλος γενέσεως.

394. Diog. ix. 9 (R. P. 39 b).

395. See Kleanthes, fr. 29, Pearson, ὠκεανὸς δ’ ἐστὶ <καὶ γῆ> ἧς τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐπινέμεται (ὁ ἥλιος). Cf. Cic.N.D.iii. 37:“Quid enim? non eisdem vobis placet omnem ignem pastus indigere nec permanere ullo modo posse, nisi alitur: ali autem solem, lunam, reliqua astra aquis, alia dulcibus (from the earth), alia marinis? eamque causam Cleanthes adfert cur se sol referat nec longius progrediatur solstitiali orbi itemque brumali, ne longius discedat a cibo.”

396. For the Greek text of this passage, see below, p. 183,n.413. Fredrichs allows that it is from the same source as that quoted above (p.169), and, as that comes from Περὶ διαίτης, i. 3, he denies the Herakleitean origin of this too. He has not taken account of the fact that it gives the Stoic doctrine, which raises a presumption in favour of that being Herakleitean. If I could agree with Fredrichs’ theory, I should still say that the present passage was a Herakleitean interpolation in thePhysikerrather than that the other was an interpolation from thePhysikerin the Herakleitean section. As it is, I find no difficulty in believing that both passages give the Herakleitean doctrine, though it becomes mixed up with other theories in the sequel. See p. 167,n.383.

397. Aet. ii. 32, 3, Ἡράκλειτος ἐκ μυρίων ὀκτακισχιλίων ἐνιαυτῶν ἡλιακῶν (τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν εἶναι). Censorinus,de die nat.11, Heraclitus et Linus,Xdccc.

398. See Introd. § XII. p. 25,n.39.

399. For the Stoic doctrine, cf. Nemesios,de nat. hom.38 (R. P. 503). Mr. Adam allowed that no destruction of the world or conflagration marked the end of Plato’s year, but he declined to draw what seems to me the natural inference that the connexion between the two things belongs to a later age, and should not, therefore, be ascribed to Herakleitos in the absence of any evidence that he did so connect them. Nevertheless, his treatment of these questions in the second volume of his edition of theRepublic, pp. 302 sqq., must form the basis of all further discussion on the subject. It has certainly helped me to put the view which he rejects (p. 303, n. 9) in what I hope will be found a more convincing form.

400. This is certainly the general sense of the parallelism between the periods of the ἀνθρώπειον and the θεῖον γεννητόν, however we may understand the details. See Adam,Republic, vol. ii. pp. 288 sqq.

401. Arist.de Caelo, Α, 10. 279 b 14, οἱ δ’ ἐναλλὰξ ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως ὁτὲ δὲ ἄλλως ἔχειν φθειρόμενον, ... ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὀ Ἀκραγαντῖνος καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος. Aristotle points out that this really amounts only to saying that it is eternal and changes its form, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἐκ παιδὸς ἄνδρα γιγνόμενον καὶ ἐξ ἀνδρὸς παῖδα ὁτὲ μὲν φθείρεσθαι, ὁτὲ δ’ εἶναι οἴοιτο (280 a 14). The point of the reference to Empedokles will appear fromde Gen. Corr.Β, 6. 334 a 1 sqq. What Aristotle finds fault with in both theories is that they do not regard the substance of the heavens as something outside the upward and downward motion of the elements.

402. This is practically Lassalle’s view of the Great Year, except that he commits the anachronism of speaking of “atoms” of fire instead of “measures.”

403. Schleiermacher and Lassalle are notable exceptions. Zeller, Diels, and Gomperz are all positive that Herakleitos believed in the ἐκπύρωσις.

404. In his fifth edition (p. 699) Zeller seems to feel this last difficulty; for he now says: “It is a contradiction which he,and which probably Plato too(und den wahrscheinlich auch Plato) has not observed.” This seems to me still less arguable. Plato may or may not be mistaken; but he makes the perfectly definite statement that Herakleitos says ἀεί, while Empedokles says ἐν μέρει. The Ionian Muses are called συντονώτεραι and the Sicilian μαλακώτεραι just because the latter “lowered the pitch” (ἐχάλασαν) of the doctrine that this is always so (τὸ ἀεὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν).

405. See above, p. 177,n.401.

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