The nominative to a passive verb, is theobject, but not theagent, of the action.
A verb is intransitive when it has no object; as, "The waterscameupon me;" "Iamhe whowas, andis, andistocome."
As an exercise on what you have been studying, I will now put to you a few questions, all of which you ought to be able to answer before you proceed any farther.
With what two general divisions of grammar does the second lecture begin?—Of what does Etymology treat?—Of what does Syntax treat?—On what is based the true principle of classification?—How do you ascertain the part of speech to which a word belongs?—What is meant by itsmannerof meaning?—Name the ten parts of speech.—Which of these are considered the most important?—By what sign may a noun be distinguished?—How many kinds of nouns are there?—What belong to nouns?—What is gender?—How many genders have nouns?—What is person?—How many persons have nouns?—What is number?—How many numbers have nouns?—What is case?—How many cases have nouns?—Does case consist in theinflectionsof a noun?—How many kinds of verbs are there?—By what sign may a verb be known?—What belong to verbs?—What is synthesis?—What is analysis?—What is parsing?—Repeat the order of parsing the noun.—Repeat the order of parsing the verb.—What rule do you apply in parsing a noun in the possessive case?—What rule, in parsing a noun in the nominative case?—What rule applies in parsing a verb?—What is meant by government?—Explain rules 3, 4, and 12.—By what rule are the nominative and objective cases of nouns known?—By what sign can you distinguish a transitive from an intransitive verb?—Do transitive verbs ever express amoralaction?—Are intransitive and neuter verbs ever used as transitive?—Give some examples of transitive verbs withpersonalandverbalobjects.—What rule do you apply in parsing a noun in the objective case?—Explain rule 20.—In parsing a verb agreeing with a noun of multitude conveyingpluralityof idea, what rule do you apply?
Whether the learner be required to answer the following questions, or not, is, of course, leftdiscretionarywith the teacher. The author takes the liberty to suggest the expediency ofnot, generally, enforcing such a requisition,until the pupil goes through the book a second time.
Name some participial nouns.—What are abstract nouns?—What is the distinction between abstract nouns and adjectives?—What are natural nouns?—Artificial nouns?—What is the distinction betweenmaterialandimmaterialnouns?—Are nouns ever of the masculine and feminine gender?—Give examples.—When are nouns, naturally neuter, converted into the masculine or feminine gender?—Give examples.—Speak some nouns that are always in the singular number.—Some that are always plural.—Speak some that are in the same form in both numbers.—Nameallthe various ways of forming the plural number of nouns.—Of what number are the nounsnews, means, alms, andamends?—Name the plurals to the following compound nouns,handful, cupful, spoonful, brother-in-law, court-martial.
Perhaps no subject has, in this age, elicited more patient research, and critical investigation of original, constituent principles, formations, and combinations, than the English language. The legitimate province of philology, however, as I humbly conceive, has, in some instances, been made to yield to that of philosophy, so far as to divert the attention from the combinations of our language which refinement has introduced, to radical elements and associations which no way concern the progress of literature, or the essential use for which language was intended. Were this retrogressive mode of investigating and applying principles, to obtain, among philologists, the ascendency over that which accommodates the use of language to progressive refinement, it is easy to conceive the state of barbarism to which society would, in a short time, be reduced. Moreover, if what some call the philosophy of language, were to supersede, altogether, the province of philology as it applies to the present, progressive and refined state of English literature, the great object contemplated by the learned, in all ages, namely, the approximation of language, in common with every thing else, to that point of perfection at which it is the object of correct philology to arrive, would be frustrated.
The dubious and wildering track struck out by those innovators and visionaries who absurdly endeavor to teach modern English, by rejecting the authority and sanction of custom, and by conducting the learner back to the original combinations, and the detached, disjointed, and barbarous constructions of our progenitors, both prudence and reason, as well as a due regard for correct philology, impel me to shun. Those modest writers who, by bringing to their aid a little sophistry, much duplicity, and a wholesale traffic in the swelling phrases, "philosophy, reason, and common sense," attempt to overthrow the wisdom of former ages, and show that the result of all the labors of those distinguished philologists who had previously occupied the field of grammatical science, is nothing but error and folly, will doubtless meet the neglect and contempt justly merited by such consummate vanity and unblushing pedantry. Fortunately for those who employ our language as their vehicle of mental conference, custom will not yield to the speculative theories of the visionary. If it would, improvement in English literature would soon be at an end, and we should be tamely conducted back to the Vandalic age.
As the use of what is commonly called the philosophy of language, is evidently misapplied by those who make it the test ofgrammaticalcertainty, it may not be amiss to offer a few considerations with a view to expose the fallacy of so vague a criterion.
All reasoning and investigation which depend on the philosophy of language for an ultimate result, must be conducteda posteriori. Its office, according to the ordinary mode of treating the subject, is to trace language to its origin, not for the purpose of determining and fixing grammatical associations and dependances, such as the agreement, government, and mutual relations of words, but in order to analyze combinations with a view to develop the first principles of the language, and arrive at the primitive meaning of words. Now, it is presumed, that no one who has paid critical attention to the subject, will contend, that the original import of single words, has any relation to the syntactical dependances and connexions of words in general;—to gain a knowledge of which, is the leading object of the student in grammar. And, furthermore, I challenge those who have indulged in such useless vagaries, to show by what process, with their own systems, they can communicate a practical knowledge of grammar. I venture to predict, that, if they make the attempt, they will find their systems more splendid in theory, than useful in practice.
Again, it cannot rationally be contended, that the radical meaning has any efficiency in controlling the signification which, by the power of association, custom has assigned to many words;—a significationessentially differentfrom the original import. Were this the case, and were the language now to be taught and understood in compliance with the original import of words, it would have to undergo a thorough change; to be analyzed, divided, and sub-divided, almostad infinitum. Indeed, there is the same propriety in asserting that the Gothic, Danish, and Anglo-Saxon elements in our language, ought to be pronounced separately, to enable us to understand our vernacular tongue, that there is in contending, that their primitive meaning has an ascendency over the influence of the principle of association in changing, and the power of custom in determining, the import of words. Many of our words are derived from the Greek, Roman, French, Spanish, Italian, and German languages; and the only use we can make of their originals, is to render them subservient to the force of custom in cases in which general usage has not varied from the primitive signification. Moreover, let the advocates of a mere philosophical investigation of the language, extend their system as far as a radical analysis will warrant them, and, with Horne Tooke, not only consider adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections, as abbreviations of nouns and verbs, but, on their own responsibility, apply them, in teaching the language,in compliance with their radical import, and what would such a course avail them against the power of custom, and the influence of association and refinement? Let them show me one grammarian, produced by such a course of instruction, and they will exhibit a "philosophical" miracle. They might as well undertake to teach architecture, by having recourse to its origin, as represented by booths and tents. In addition to this, when we consider the great number of obsolete words, from which many now in use are derived, the original meaning of which cannot be ascertained, and, also, the multitude whose signification has been changed by the principle of association, it is preposterous to think, that a mere philosophical mode of investigating and teaching the language, is the one by which its significancy can be enforced, its correctness determined, its use comprehended, and its improvement extended. Before what commonly passes for a philosophical manner of developing the language can successfully be made the medium through which it can be comprehended, in all its present combinations, relations, and dependances, it must undergo a thorough retrogressive change, in all those combinations, relations, and dependances, even to the last letter of the alphabet. And before we can consent to this radical modification and retrograde ratio of the English language, we must agree to revive the customs, the habits, and the precise language of our progenitors, the Goths and Vandals. Were all the advocates for the introduction of such philosophical grammars into common schools, at once to enter on their pilgrimage, and recede into the native obscurity and barbarity of the ancient Britons, Picts, and Vandals, it is believed, that the cause of learning and refinement would not suffer greatly by their loss, and that the good sense of the present age, would not allow many of our best teachers to be of the party.
The last consideration which I shall give a philosophical manner of investigating and enforcing the English language, is, that by this mode of analyzing and reducing it to practice,it cannot, in thisage, be comprehendedas the medium of thought. Were this method to prevail, our present literal language would become a dead letter. Of what avail is language, if it can not be understood? And how can it be accommodated to the understanding, unless it receive the sanction of common consent? Even if we admit that such a manner of unfolding the principles of our language, is more rational and correct than the ordinary, practical method, I think it is clear that such a mode of investigation and development, does not meet the necessities and convenience of ordinary learners in school. To be consistent, that system which instructs by tracing a few of our words to their origin, must unfold the whole in the same manner. But the student in common schools and academies, cannot afford time to stem the tide of language up to its source, and there dive to the bottom of the fountain for knowledge. Such labor ought not to be required of him. His object is to become, not a philosophical antiquarian, but a practical grammarian. If I comprehend the design (if they have any) of our modern philosophical writers on this subject, it is to make grammarians by inculcating a few general principles, arising out of the genius of the language, and the nature of things, which the learner, by the exercise of hisreasoning powers, must reduce to practice. His own judgment,independent of grammar rules, is to be his guide in speaking and writing correctly. Hence, many of them exclude from their systems, all exercises in what is calledfalseSyntax. But these profound philological dictators appear to have overlooked the important consideration, that the great mass of mankind, and especially of boys and girls in common schools,cannever become philosophers;and, consequently, can never comprehend and reduce to practice their metaphysical and obscure systems of grammar. I wish to see children treated asreasoningbeings. But there should be a medium in all things. It is, therefore, absurd to instruct children as if they were already profound philosophers and logicians.
To demonstrate the utility, and enforce the necessity, of exercising the learner in correctingfalse Syntax, I need no other argument than the interesting and undeniable fact, that Mr. Murray's labors, in this department, have effected a complete revolution in the English language, in point of verbal accuracy. Who does not know, that the best writers of this day, are not guilty ofonegrammatical inaccuracy, where those authors who wrote before Mr. Murray flourished, are guilty offive? And what has produced this important change for the better? Ask the hundreds of thousands who have studied "Mr. Murray's exercises in FALSE SYNTAX." If, then, this view of the subject is correct, it follows, that the greater portion of our philosophical grammars, are far more worthy the attention of literary connoisseurs, than of the great mass of learners.
Knowing that a strong predilection for philosophical grammars, exists in the minds of some teachers of this science, I have thought proper, for the gratification of such, to intersperse through the pages of this work under the head of "PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES," an entire system of grammatical principles as deduced from what appears to me to be the most rational and consistent philosophical investigations. They who prefer this theory to that exhibited in the body of the work, are, of course, at liberty to adopt it.
In general, a philosophical theory of grammar will be found to accord with the practical theory embraced in the body of this work. Wherever such agreement exists, the system contained in these NOTES will be deficient, and this deficiency may be supplied by adopting the principles contained in the other parts of the work.
According to the method in which philosophical investigations of language have generally been conducted, all our words should be reduced to two classes; for it can be easily shown, that from the noun and verb, all the other parts of speech have sprung. Nay, more. They may even be reduced to one. Verbs do not, in reality,expressactions; but they are intrinsically the merenamesof actions. The idea of action or being communicated by them, as well as themeaningof words in general, is merelyinferential. The principle of reasoning assumed by the celebrated Horne Tooke, if carried to its full extent, would result, it is believed, in proving that we have but one part of speech.
Adnounsoradjectiveswere originally nouns.Sweet, red, white, are thenamesof qualities, as well assweetness, redness, whiteness. The former differ from the latter only in theirmannerof signification. To denote that the name of some quality or substance is to be used in connexion with some other name, or, that this quality is to beattributedto some other name, we sometimes affix to it theterminationen, ed, ory;which signifiesgive, add,orjoin. When we employ the words wooden, woollen, wealthy, grassy, the terminationsenandy, by their own intrinsic meaning, give notice that we intend togive,add, or join, the names of some other substances in which are found the properties or qualities ofwood, wool, wealth, orgrass.
Pronounsare a class of nouns, used instead of others to prevent their disagreeable repetition. Participles are certain forms of the verb. Articles, interjections, adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions, are contractions of abbreviations of nouns and verbs.An(a, one, orone) comes fromananad, to add, to heap.Theandthat, from the Anglo-Saxon verbthean, to get, assume.Lois the imperative oflook;fy, offian, to hate; andwelcomemeans, it iswellthat you arecome. Incomes from the Gothic nouninna, the interior of the body; andabout, fromboda, the first outward boundary.Throughorthoroughis the Teutonic nounthuruh, meaning passage, gate, door.Fromis the Anglo-Saxon nounfrum, beginning, source, author. He camefrom (beginning)Batavia.If(formerly writtengif, give, gin) is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verbgifan, to give. I will remainif(giveorgrant that fact) he will (remain.)Butcomes from the Saxon verbbeon-utan, to be-out. I informed no onebut (be-out, leave-out)my brother.
This brief view of the subject, is sufficient to elucidate the manner in which, according to Horne Tooke's principles, the ten parts of speech are reduced to one. But I am, by no means, disposed to concede, that this is thetrueprinciple of classification; nor that it is any morephilosophicalorrationalthan one which allows a more practical division and arrangement of words. What has been generally received as "philosophical grammar," appears to possess no stronger claims to that imposing appellation than our common, practical grammars. Query. Is not Mr. Murray's octavo grammar more worthy the dignified title of a "Philosophical Grammar," than Horne Tooke's "Diversions of Purley," or William S. Cardell's treatises on language? What constitutes aphilosophicaltreatise, on this, or on any other subject?Whereinis there a display of philosophy in a speculative, etymological performance, which attempts to develop and explain the elements and primitive meaning of words by tracing them to their origin,superiorto the philosophy employed in the development and illustration of the principles by which we are governed in applying those words to their legitimate purpose, namely, that of forming a correct and convenient medium by means of which we can communicate our thoughts? Does philosophy consist in ransacking the mouldy records of antiquity, in order toguessat the ancient construction and signification of single words? or have such investigations, in reality, any thing to do withgrammar?
Admitting that all the words of our language include, in theiroriginalsignification, the import of nouns or names, and yet, it does not follow, that theynowpossess no other powers, and, in their combinations and connexions in sentences, are employed for no other purpose, thanbarelytoname objects. Thefactof the case is, that words are variously combined and applied, to answer the distinct and diversified purposes ofnamingobjects,assertingtruths,pointing outandlimitingobjects,attributing qualitiesto objects,connectingobjects, and so on; and on thisfactis founded thetrue philosophical principle of the classification of words. Hence, an arrangement of words into classes according to this principle, followed by a development and illustration of the principles and rules that regulate us in the proper use and application of words in oral and written discourse, appears to approximate as near to a true definitionofphilosophical grammar, as any I am capable of giving.
Nouns, or the names of the objects of our perceptions, doubtless constituted the original class of words; (if I may be allowed to assume such a hypothesis as anoriginalclass of words;) but the ever-active principle of association, soon transformed nouns into verbs, by making them, when employed in a particular manner, expressive of affirmation. This same principle also operated in appropriating names to the purpose of attributing qualities to other names of objects; and in this way was constituted the class of words calledadjectivesorattributes. By the same principle were formed all the other classes.
In the following exposition of English grammar on scientific principles, I shall divide words into seven classes;NounsorNames, Verbs, Adjectives, Adnouns, orAttributes, Adverbs, Propositions, Pronouns, andConjunctionsorConnectives.
For an explanation of the noun, refer to the body of the work.
Plausible arguments may beadvanced, for rejectingneuterand passive verbs; but they have been found to be so convenient in practice, that the theory which recognises them, has stood the test of ages. If you tell the young learner, that, in the following expressions, The churchrestson its foundation; The booklieson the desk; The boysremain (are)idle, the nounschurch, book, andboys, are represented as acting, and, therefore, the verbsrests, lies, remain, andare, areactive, he will not believe you, because there is no action that is apparent to his senses. And should you proceed further, and, by a labored and metaphysical investigation and development of the laws of motion, attempt to prove to him that "every portion of matter is influenced by different, active principles, tending to produce change," and, therefore, every thing in universal nature isalwaysacting, it is not at all probable, that you could convince hisunderstanding, in opposition to the dearer testimony of his senses. Of what avail to learners is a theory which they cannot comprehend?
Among the various theorists and speculative writers on philosophical grammar, the ingenious Horne Tooke stands pre-eminent; but, unfortunately, his principal speculations on the verb, have never met the public eye. William S. Cardell has also rendered himself conspicuous in the philological field, by taking a bolder stand than any of his predecessors. His view of the verb is novel, and ingeniously supported. The following is the substance of his theory
A verb is a word which expressesaction;as, Manexists; Treesgrow; Watersflow; Mountainsstand; Iam.
All verbs are active, and have one object or more than one, expressed or implied. The pillarstands; that is, itkeeps itselfin an erect or standing posture; itupholdsorsustains itselfin that position. Theyare; i.e. theyairthemselves, orbreatheair; theyinspirit, vivify, orupholdthemselves by inhaling air.
Many verbs whose objects are seldom expressed, always have a persona or verbal one implied. The cloudsmove; i.e. movethemselvesalong. The troopsmarchedtwenty miles a day; i.e. marchedthemselves. The moonshines:—The moonshinesorshedsashining, sheen, lustre, orbrightness. The sparrowflies:—fliesortakesaflight. Talkers talk or speakwordsortalk; Walkers walkwalkingsorwalks; The rain rainsrain; Sitters sit or holdsittingsorsessions.
To prove that there is no such thing as a neuter verb, the following appear to be the strongest arguments adduced.
1. No portion of matter is ever in a state of perfect quiescence; but the component parts of every thing are at all times "influenced by different, active principles, tending to produce change." Hence, it follows, that no being or thing can be represented in aneuterornon-acting state.
This argument supposes the essential character of the verb to be identified with the primary laws of action, as unfolded by the principles of physical science. The correctness of this position may be doubted; but if it can be clearly demonstrated, that every particle of matter is always in motion, it does not, by any means, follow, that we cannotspeak ofthings in a state of quiescence. What isfalsein fact may becorrectin grammar.The point contested, is not whether things alwaysact,but whether, when we assert or affirm something respecting them, we alwaysrepresentthem as acting.
2. Verbs wereoriginallyused to express the motions or changes of things which produced obvious actions, and, by an easy transition, were afterward applied, in the same way, to things whose actions were not apparent. This assumption is untenable, and altogether gratuitous.
3. Verbs called neuter are used in the imperative mood; and, as this mood commands some one todosomething, any verb which adopts it, must be active. Thus, in the common place phrases, "Bethere quickly;Standout of my way;Sitorliefarther."
It is admitted that these verbs are here employed in anactivesense; but it is certain, that they are not used according to their proper,literalmeaning. When I tell a man,literally, tostand, sit, orlie, bymovinghe would disobey me; but when I say, "Standout of my way," I employ the neuter verbstand, instead of the active verbmoveorgo, and in a correspondent sense. My meaning is,Moveyourself out of my way; ortakeyourstandsomewhere else. This, however, does not prove thatstandis properly used. If we choose to overstep the bounds of custom, we can employ anywordin the language as an active-transitive verb.Be, sit, andlie, may be explained in the same manner.
4. Neuter verbs are used in connexion with adverbs which express the manner ofaction. They must, therefore, be considered active verbs. The childsleeps soundly; Hesits genteelly; Theylive contentedlyandhappilytogether.
The class of verbs that are never employed as active, is small. By using adverbs in connexion with verbs, we can fairly prove that some verbs arenotactive. It is incorrect to say, I amhappily; They werepeacefully; She remainsquietly; The fields appeargreenly. These verbs in their common acceptation, do not expressaction; for which reason we say, I amhappy; They arepeaceful; &c. But in the expressions, The child sleepssoundly; She sitsgracefully; They livehappilyandcontentedly; we employ the verbssleeps, sits, andlive, in an active sense. When no action is intended, we say, They livehappyandcontented.
If, on scientific principles, it can be proved that those verbs generally denominated neuter,originallyexpressed action, their present, accepted meaning will still oppose the theory, for the generality of mankind do not attach to them the idea ofaction.
Thus I have endeavored to present a brief but impartial abstract of themoderntheory of the verb, leaving it with the reader to estimate it according to its value.
To give a satisfactory definition of theverb, or such a one as shall be found scientifically correct and unexceptionable, has hitherto baffled the skill, and transcended the learning, of our philosophical writers. If its essential quality, as is generally supposed, is made to consist inexpressing affirmation, it remains still to be definedwhena verbexpressesaffirmation. In English, and in other languages, words appropriated to express affirmation, are often used without any such force; our idea of affirmation, in such instances, being the mereinference ofcustom.
In the sentence,—"Think, love, andhate, denote moral actions," the wordsthink, love, andhate, are nouns, because they are merenamesof actions. So, when I say, "John,write—is an irregular verb," the wordwriteis a noun; but when I say, "John,write—your copy,"writeis called a verb.
Why is this word considered a noun in one construction, and a verb in the other, when both constructions, until you pass beyond the word write, are exactly alike? If write does notexpressaction in the former sentence, neither does it in the latter, for, in both, it is introduced in the same manner. On scientific principles,writemust be considered a noun in the latter sentence, for it does notexpressaction, or make an affirmation; but it merelynamesthe action which I wish John to perform, and affirmation is theinferentialmeaning.
The verb in the infinitive, as well as in the imperative mood, is divested of its affirmative or verbal force. In both these moods, it is always presented in itsnoun-state.
If, after dinner, I say to a servant, "Wine,"he infers, that I wish him to bring me wine; but all this is not said. If I say,Bringsomewine, he, in like manner, understands, that I wish him to bring me wine; but all that is expressed, is thenameof the action, and of the object of the action. In fact, as much is done byinference, as by actual expression, in every branch of language, for thought is too quick to be wholly transmitted by words.
It is generally conceded, that thetermination of our verbs,est,eth, s, ed, and, also, of the other parts of speech, were originally separate words of distinct meaning; and that, although they have been contracted, and, by the refinement of language, have been made to coalesce with the words in connexion with which they are employed, yet, in their present character of terminations, they retain their primitive meaning and force. To denote that a verbal name was employed as a verb, the Saxons affixed to it a verbalizing adjunct; thus,the(to take, hold) was the noun-state of the verb; and when they used it as a verb, they added the terminationan; thus, thean. The termination added, was a sign thataffirmationwas intended. The same procedure has been adopted, and, in many instances, is still practised, in our language.An, originally affixed to our verbs, in the progress of refinement, was changed to en, and finally dropped. A few centuries ago, the plural number of our verbs was denoted by the termination,en; thus, theyweren, theyloven; but, as these terminations do not supersede the necessity of expressing thesubjectof affirmation, as is the case in the Latin and Greek verbs, they have been laid aside, as unnecessary excrescences. For the same reason, we might, without any disparagement to the language, dispense with the terminations of our verbs in the singular.
In support of the position, that these terminations were once separate words, we can trace many of them to their origin. To denote the feminine gender of some nouns, we affixess; as, heiress, instructress. Essis a contraction of the Hebrew nounessa, a female. Of our verbs, the terminationestis a contraction ofdoest, eth, ofdoeth,sofdoes. We say, thoudostordoestlove; or thoulovest; i.e.love-dost, orlove-doest. Some believe these terminations to be contractions ofhavest, haveth, has. We affixed, a contraction ofdede, to the present tense of verbs to denote that the action named isdede, did, doed, ordone.
Toanddofrom the Gothic nountaui, signifyingactoreffect, are, according to Horne Tooke, nearly alike in meaning andforce; and when the custom of affixing some more ancient verbalizingadjunct, began to be dropped, its place and meaning were generallysupplied by prefixing one of these. When I say, "I am goingto walk,"the verbal or affirmative force is conveyed by the use ofto, meaning the same asdo; andwalkis employed merely as a verbal name; that is, I assert that I shalldothe act which I name by the wordwalk, or the act ofwalking.
Perhaps such speculations as these will prove to be more curious than profitable. If it be made clearly to appear, that, on scientific principles, whenever the verbal name is unaccompanied by a verbalizing adjunct, it is in thenoun-state, and does not express affirmation, still this theory would be very inconvenient in practice.
I shall resume this subject in Lecture XI.
What has usually been the object of philosophical investigations of language? (page 32.)—Do the syntactical dependances and connexions of words depend on theiroriginalimport?—Is the power of association and custom efficient in changing the radical meaning of some words?—Have words intrinsically a signification of their own; or is their meaninginferential; i.e. such ascustomhas assigned to them? (page 38.)—On whatfactis based the true, philosophical principle of classification?—Define philosophical grammar.—Which is supposed to be the original part of speech?—How were the others formed from that?—How many parts of speech may be recognised in a scientific development and arrangement of the principles of our language?—Name them.—What testimony have we that many things do not act? (page 43.)—Repeat some of the arguments in favor of, and against, the principle which regards all verbs asactive.—In what moods are verbs used in theirnoun-state?(page 48.)—Give examples.—What is said of the terminationsest, eth, s,anden, and of the wordstoanddo?
You have already been informed, that verbs are the most important part of speech in our language; and to convince you of their importance, I now tell you, that you cannot express athought, or communicate anidea, without making use of a verb, either expressed or implied. Verbs express, not onlythe stateormanner of being, but, likewise, all the differentactionsandmovementsof all creatures and things, whether animate or inanimate. As yet I have given you only a partial description of this sort of words; but when you are better prepared to comprehend the subject, I will explain all their properties, and show you the proper manner of using them.
A word that is generally anoun, sometimes becomes averb; and a verb is frequently used as anoun. These changes depend on the sense which the word conveys; or, rather, on the office it performs in the sentence; that is themannerin which it is applied to things. For instance,gloryis generally a noun; as "Thegloryof God's throne." But if I say, Igloryin religion; or, Hegloriesin wickedness, the wordglorybecomes a verb. Theloveof man is inconstant. In this sentence,loveis anoun; in the next, it is averb: Theylovevirtue. Hewalksswiftly; Scavengerssweepthe streets; The shipsailswell. In these phrases, the wordswalks, sweep, andsails, are verbs; in the following they are nouns: Those are pleasantwalks; He takes a broadsweep; The ship lowered hersails.
Thus you see, it is impossible for you to become a grammarian without exercising your judgment. If you have sufficient resolution to do this, you will, in a short time, perfectly understand the nature and office of the different parts of speech, their various properties and relations, and the rules of syntax that apply to them; and, in a few weeks, be able to speak and write accurately. But you must not take things for granted, without examining their propriety and correctness. No. You are not a mereautomaton, orboy-machine; but a rational being. You ought, therefore, tothinkmethodically, toreasonsoundly, and toinvestigateevery principle critically. Don't be afraid tothink for yourself. You know not the high destiny that awaits you. You know not the height to which you may soar in the scale of intellectual existence. Go on, then, boldly, and with unyielding perseverance; and if you do not gain admittance into the temple of fame, strive, at all hazards, to drink of the fountain which gurgles from its base.
NOTE 1, TO RULE 12. A noun in the possessive case, should always be distinguished by the apostrophe, or mark of elision; as, Thenation'sglory.
That girls book is cleaner than those boys books.
Not correct, because the nounsgirlsandboysare both in the possessive case, and, therefore, require the apostrophe, by which they should be distinguished; thus, "girl's, boys'"according to the preceding NOTE. [Repeat the note.]
Thy ancestors virtue is not thine.
If the writer of this sentence meantoneancestor, he should have inserted the apostrophe afterr, thus, "ancestor's"; if more than one, afters, thus,"ancestors'virtue;" but, by neglecting to place the apostrophe, he has left his meaning ambiguous, and we cannot ascertain it. This, and a thousand other mistakes you will often meet with, demonstrate the truth of my declaration, namely, that "without the knowledge and application of grammar rules, you will often speak and write in such a manner as not to beunderstood."You may now turn back and re-examine the "illustration" of Rules 3, 4, and 12, on page 52, and then correct the following examples aboutfivetimes over.
A mothers tenderness and a fathers care, are natures gift's for mans advantage. Wisdoms precept's form the good mans interest and happiness. They suffer for conscience's sake. He is reading Cowpers poems. James bought Johnsons Dictionary.
RULE 4. A verb must agree with its nominative in number and person.
Those boys improves rapidly. The men labors in the field. Nothing delight some persons. Thou shuns the light. He dare not do it. They reads well.
I know you can correct these sentences without a rule, for they all have a harsh sound, which offends the ear. I wish you, however, to adopt the habit of correcting errors by applying rules; for, by-and-by, you will meet with errors in composition which you cannot correct, if you are ignorant of the application of grammar rules.
Now let us clearly understand this 4th Rule. Recollect, it applies to theverband not to the noun; therefore, in these examples the verb is ungrammatical. The nounboys, in the first sentence, is of the third personplural, and the verbimprovesis of the third personsingular; therefore, Rule 4th is violated, because the verb dues not agree with its nominative innumber. It should be, "boysimprove." The verb would then beplural, and agree with its nominative according to the Rule. In the fourth sentence, the verb does not agree inpersonwith its nominative.Thouis of thesecondperson, andshunsis of thethird. It should be, "thoushunnest," &c. You may correct the other sentences, and, likewise, the following exercises in
A variety of pleasing objects charm the eye. The number of inhabitants of the United States exceed nine millions. Nothing but vain and foolish pursuits delight some persons.
In vain our flocks and fields increase our store,When our abundance make us wish for more.
While ever and anon, there fallsHuge heaps of hoary, moulder'd walls.
An article is a word prefixed to nouns to limit their signification; as,aman,thewoman.
There are only two articles,aoran, andthe. Aoranis called the indefinite article.Theis called the definite article.
Theindefinite articlelimits the noun to one of a kind, but to no particular one; as,ahouse.
Thedefinite articlegenerally limits the noun to a particular object, or collection of objects; as,thehouse,themen.
The small claims of the article to a separate rank as a distinct part of speech, ought not to be admitted in a scientific classification of words.Aandthe, thisandthat, ten, few, andfourth, and many other words, are used to restrict, vary, or define the signification of the nouns to which they are joined. They might, therefore, with propriety, be ranked under the general head ofRestrictives, Indexes, orDefining Adjectives. But, as there is a marked distinction in their particular meaning and application, each class requires a separate explanation. Hence, no practical advantage would be gained, by rejecting their established classification, as articles, numerals, and demonstratives, and by giving themnewnames. The character and application ofaandthecan be learned as soon when they are styledarticles, as when they are denominatedspecifyingordefining adjectives.
The history of this part of speech is very brief. As there are but two articles,aoranandthe, you will know them wherever they occur.
A noun used without an article, or any other restrictive, is taken in itsgeneralsense; as,"Fruitis abundant;" "Goldis heavy;" "Manis born to trouble" Here we mean, fruit and goldin general;andall men, ormankind.
When we wish to limit the meaning of the noun tooneobject, but to noparticularone, we employaoran. If I say, "Give meapen;" "Bring meanapple;" you are at liberty to fetchanypen oranyapple you please.Aoran, then, isindefinite, because it leaves the meaning of the noun to which it is applied, as far as regards the person spoken to,vague, orindeterminate; that is,not definite. But when reference is made to aparticularobject, we employthe, as, "Give methepen;" "Bring metheapple, ortheapple." When such a requisition is made, you are not at liberty to bring any pen or apple you please, but you must fetch theparticularpen or apple to which you know me to refer.Theis, therefore, called thedefinitearticle.
"Astar appears." Here, the star referred to, may be known as aparticularstar,definite, and distinguished from all others, in the mind of thespeaker; but to thehearer, it is left, among the thousands that bedeck the vault of heaven,undistinguishedandindefinite. But when the star has previously been made the subject of discourse, it becomes, in the minds of both speaker and hearer adefiniteobject, and he says, "Thestar appears;" that is, thatparticularstar about which we were discoursing.
"Solomon builtatemple." Did he buildanytemple,undetermined which?No; it was aparticulartemple, pre-eminently distinguished from all others. Buthowdoes it become a definite object in the mind of thehearer? Certainly, not by the phrase, "atemple," which indicatesanytemple, leaving it altogetherundeterminedwhich; but supposing the person addressed was totally unacquainted with the fact asserted, and it becomes to him,in one respect only, a definite and particular temple, by means of the associated words, "Solomon built;" that is, by the use of these words in connexion with the others, the hearer gets the idea of a temple distinguished asthe one erected by Solomon. If the speaker were addressing one whom he supposed to be unacquainted with the fact related, he might make the temple referred to a still more definite object in the mind of the hearer by a farther explanation of it; thus, "Solomon builtatempleon mount Zion; and that wasthetempleto which the Jews resorted to worship."
"Thelunatic,thepoet, andthelover,"Are of imagination all compact."
"Thehorse is a noble animal;" "Thedog is a faithful creature;" "Thewind blows;" "Thewolves were howling inthewoods." In these examples, we do not refer to any particular lunatics, poets, lovers, horses, dogs, winds, wolves, and woods, but we refer to theseparticular classesof things, in contradistinction to other objects or classes. The phrase, "Neithertheone northeother," is an idiom of the language.