In 1677 Narbrough had been sent for the second time as commander-in-chief to the Mediterranean, to deal with the Barbary corsairs. To enable him to operate more effectively against Tripoli, arrangements were on foot to establish a base for him at Malta, and meanwhile he had been using the Venetian port of Zante. It was at this time that Charles II, in a last effort to throw off the yoke of Louis XIV, had married his eldest niece, the Princess Mary, to the French king's arch-enemy William of Orange, and relations between France and England were at the highest tension. Preparations were set on foot in the British dockyards for equipping a 'grand fleet' of eighty sail; on February 15 was issued a new and enlarged commission to Narbrough making him 'admiral of his majesty's fleet in the Straits'; Sicily, which the French had occupied, was hurriedly evacuated; Duquesne, who commanded the Toulon squadron, was expecting to be attacked at any moment, and Colbert gave him strict orders to keep out of the British admiral's way.[1]
It will be seen that it was in virtue of his new commission, and in expectation of encountering a superior French force, that Narbrough issued his orders, and they may be profitably compared with those of Lord Sandwich on the eve of the Second Dutch War as the typical Fighting Instructions for a small British fleet. No collision however occurred; for Louis could not face the threatened coalition between Spain, Holland, and England, and was forced to assent to a general peace, which was signed at Nymwegen in the following September.
[1] Corbett,England in the Mediterranean, ii. 97-104. The official correspondence will be found in Mr. Tanner'sCalendar of the Pepys MSS., vol. i., and in theLettres de Colbert, vol. iii.
[+Egerton MSS. 2543, f. 839+.]
_Sir John Narbrough, Knight, admiral of his majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean seas for this expedition.
Instructions for all commanders to place their ships for their better fighting and securing the whole fleet if a powerful enemy sets upon us_.
When I hoist my union flag at the mizen peak, I would have every commander in this fleet place himself in order of sailing and battle as prescribed, observing his starboard and larboard ship and leader, either sailing before or by the wind, and so continue sailing in order so long as the signal is abroad.
In case a powerful squadron of ships falls with our fleet, and will fight us, and we see it most convenient to fight before the wind, and the enemy follow us, I would have every commander place his ships in this order of sailing prescribed as followeth, and so continue sailing and fighting, doing his utmost to annoy the enemy, so long as shall be required for defence of himself and whole fleet.
Larboard side. Portsmouth frigate.Newcastle frigate.Samuel and Henry 30Advice 20Diamond.Friendship 12Lion 20Bonaventure. 11John and Joseph 10Pearl frigate.Return 10Benjamin and Elizabeth 14Concord 26Fountain 8Leopard 20Boneto sloop, Baltam^r.[1]Plymouth, Admiral.Spragge frigate, Batchelor.[1]St. Lucar Merchant 20Prosperous 30Sapphire frigateMary and Martha 30Delight 9Olive Branch 10Italian Merchant 30Tiger 30James galleyDragon 18Samuel and Mary 24Mediterranean 16James Merchant 20King-fisher frigate.Starboard side. Portland frigate.
In case the enemy be to leeward of us, and force us to fight by the wind, then I would have each ship in this fleet to follow each other in a line as afore prescribed, either wing leading the van as the occasion shall require.
In case I would have the van to tack first (in time of service) I will spread the union flag at the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and if I would have the rear of the fleet to tack first I will spread the union flag at the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, each commander being [ready] to take notice of the said signals, and to act accordingly, following each other as prescribed, and be careful to assist and relieve any that is in necessity.
In case of separation by foul weather, or by any inevitable accident, and the wind blows hard westerly, then Zante Road is the place appointed for rendezvous.
Given under my hand and on board his majesty's ship Plymouth, at an anchor in Zante Road.
This 4th of May, 1678.
[1] Neither Baltimore nor Batchelor nor any similar names of commissioned officers occur in Pepys's Navy List, 1660-88. Tanner,op. cit.
The next set of orders we have are those drawn up by George Legge, first Lord Dartmouth, for the fleet with which he was entrusted by James II, to prevent the landing of William of Orange in 1688. The only known copy of them is in theSloane MSS.3650. It is unfortunately not complete, the last few articles with the date and signature being missing, so that there is no direct evidence that it related to this fleet. There can however be no doubt about the matter. For it is followed by the battle order of a fleet in which both ships and captains correspond exactly with that which Dartmouth commanded in 1688. The only other fleet which he commanded was that which in 1683 proceeded to the Straits to carry out the evacuation of Tangier, and it was not large enough to require such a set of instructions.
We know moreover that in this year he did actually draw up some Fighting Instructions, shortly after September 24, the day his commission was signed, and that he submitted them to King James for approval. On October 14 Pepys, in the course of a long official letter to him from the admiralty, writes: 'His majesty, upon a very deliberate perusal of your two papers, one of the divisions of your fleet and the other touching your line of battle, does extremely approve the same, commanding me to tell you so.[1]
Lord Dartmouth's articles follow those which James had last drawn up in 1673 almost word for word, and the only alterations of any importance all refer to the handling of the line in action. There can be practically no doubt therefore that we here have the instructions which Pepys refers to, and that the new matter relating to the line of battle originated with Dartmouth, as the result of a considerable experience of naval warfare. After leaving Cambridge he joined, at the age of 17, the ship of his cousin, Sir Edward Spragge, and served with him as a volunteer and lieutenant throughout the Second Dutch War. In 1667, before he was 20, he commanded the Pembroke, and in 1671 the Fairfax, in Sir Robert Holmes's action with the Dutch Smyrna fleet, and in the battle of Solebay. In 1673 he commanded the Royal Catherine (84), and served throughout Rupert's campaign with distinction. Since then, as has been said, he had successfully conducted the evacuation of Tangier. If on this occasion he needed advice he had at hand some of the best, in the person of his flag officers, Sir Roger Strickland and Sir John Berry, two of the most seasoned old 'tarpaulins' in the service, and both in high estimation as naval experts with James.
The amendments introduced into these instructions, although not extensive, point to a continued development. We note first that James's Articles 3 and 4 are combined in Dartmouth's Article 3, so as to ensure the close-hauled line being formed before any attempt is made to divide the enemy's fleet. No such provision existed in the previous instructions. Another noteworthy change under the new article is that, whether by intention or not, any commander of a ship is given the initiative in weathering a part of the enemy's fleet if he sees an opportunity. If this was seriously intended it seems to point to a reaction to the school of Monck and Rupert, perhaps under Spragge's influence. Dartmouth's next new article, No. 5, for reforming line of battle as convenient, regardless of the prescribed order of battle, points in the same direction.
The only other change of importance is the note inserted in the sixth article, in which Dartmouth lays his finger on one of the weak points in James's method of attack from windward by bearing down all together, and suggests a means by which the danger of being raked as the ships come down may be minimised.
[1]Dartmouth MSS. (Historical MSS. Commission, XI. v. 160.)
LORD DARTMOUTH, Oct.1688.
[+Sloane MSS. 3650, ff. 7-11+.]
George, Lord Dartmouth, admiral of his majesty's fleet for the present expedition.
Instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in fighting.
1 and 2.[Same as in Duke of York's, 1673.]
3. If the enemy have the wind of his majesty's fleet, and come to fight them, the commanders of his majesty's ships shall endeavour to put themselves into one line as close upon a wind as they can lie, according to the order of battle given, until such time as they shall see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide the enemy's fleet, &c.[rest as in Article 3 of1673].
4. [Same as5of1673.] [1]
5. If the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, when other ships of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard or mizen topmast, every such ship is to bear up into his wake or grain upon pain of severe punishment. In this case, whether the line hath been broke or disordered by the shifting of the wind, or otherwise, each ship or division are not unreasonably to strive for their proper places in the first line of battle given, but they are to form a line, the best that may be with the admiral, and with all the expedition that can be, not regarding what place or division they fall into or between.
If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, &c. [rest as in 6 of 1673].
6. In case his majesty's fleet have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stands towards them and they towards the enemy, then the van of his majesty's fleet shall keep the wind, and when they are come at a convenient distance from the enemy's rear they shall stay until their own whole line is come up within the same distance from the enemy's van; and then the whole line is to tack, every ship in his own place, and to bear down upon them so nigh as they can without endangering the loss of the wind—[Note that they are not to bear down all at once, but to observe the working of the admiral and to bring to as often as he thinks fit, the better to bring his fleet to fight in good order; and at last only to lask away[2] when they come near within shot towards the enemy as much as may be, and not bringing their heads to bear against the enemy's broadsides]—and to stand along with them the same tacks on board, still keeping the enemy to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in their van. And in case the enemy tack in the rear first, he who is in the rear of his majesty's fleet is to tack first with as many ships or divisions as are those of the enemy's, and if all the enemy's ships tack, their whole line is to follow, standing along with the same tacks aboard as the enemy doth.
7 to 9. [Same as 8 to 10 of 1673.]
10. [Same as 11 of 1673, but with yellow flag instead of red.]
11. When the admiral would have the other divisions to make more sail, though himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall be put on the ensign staff for the vice-admiral, a blue for the rear, and for both a striped.
12. As soon as the fleet shall see the admiral engage or make a signal by putting out a red flag on the fore topmast-head, each division shall take the best advantage they can to engage the enemy, according to such order of battle as shall be given them, and no ship or division whatsoever is upon any pretence to lie by to fight or engage the enemy whereby to endanger parting the main body of the fleet till such time as the whole line be brought to fight by this signal.
13 to 18. [Same as 14 to 19 of 1673.]
18. The several commanders in the fleet are to take special care, upon pain of severe punishment, that they fire not over any of their own ships.
19. [Same as 20 of 1673.]
20. The fireships in their several divisions are to endeavour to keep the wind, and they with the small frigates to be as near the great ships as they can, attending the signal and acting accordingly.
21. [Same as 22 of 1673.][3]
[1] Article 4 of 1673 is omitted, being included in Article 3 above.
[2] To sail with a quartering wind. Morogues urged this precaution a century later (Tactique Navale, p. 209).
[3] The MS. ends abruptly in the middle of this article.
No one document probably possesses so much importance for the history of naval tactics as the instructions issued by Admiral Russell in 1691. Yet it is a remarkable thing that their tenour was unknown—indeed their existence was wholly unsuspected—until a copy of them was happily discovered in Holland by Sir William Laird Clowes. By him it was presented to the United Service Institution, and the thanks of the Society are due to him and the Institution that these instructions are now at last available for publication.
They form part of a complete printed set of Fleet Instructions, entitled 'Instructions made by the Right Honourable Edward Russell, admiral, in the year 1691, for the better ordering of the fleet in sailing by day and night, and in fighting.' Besides the Fighting Instructions we have a full set of signals both for day and night properly indexed, instructions for sailing in a fog, instructions to be observed by younger captains to the elder, instructions for masters, pilots, ketches, hoys, and smacks attending the fleet, and the usual instructions for the encouragement of captains and companies of fireships, small frigates and ketches. Now this is the precise form in which all fleet instructions were issued, with scarcely any alteration, up to the conclusion of the War of American Independence,[1] and the peculiar importance of this set of articles therefore is, that in them we have the first known example of those stereotyped Fighting Instructions to which, as all modern writers seem agreed, was due the alleged decadence of naval tactics in the eighteenth century.
This being so, they clearly demand the most careful consideration. 'The English,' says Captain Mahan in his latest discussion of the subject, 'in the period of reaction which succeeded the Dutch Wars produced their own caricature of systematised tactics,[2] and this may be taken as well representing the current judgment. But when we come to study minutely these orders of Russell, and to study them in the light of the last of the Duke of York's and the observations thereon in theAdmiralty Manuscript, as well as of the views of the great French admirals of the time, we may well doubt whether the judgment does not require modification. We may doubt, that is, whether Russell's orders, so far from being a caricature of what had gone before, were not rather a sagacious attempt to secure that increase of manoeuvring power and squadronal control which had been found essential to any real advance in tactics.
In the first place, after noting that these instructions begin logically with two articles for the formation of line ahead and abreast, we are struck by this disappearance of the Duke of York's article relating to 'dividing the enemy's fleet.' It is certainly to this disappearance that is mainly due the belief that the new instructions were retrograde. The somewhat hasty conclusion is generally drawn that the manoeuvre of 'breaking the line' had been introduced during the Dutch Wars, and forgotten immediately afterwards. But, as we have already seen, the Duke of York's article can hardly be construed as embodying the principle of concentration by 'breaking the line,' and 'containing.' As we know, it only applied to an attack from the leeward which the English, and indeed every power up to that time, did all they knew to avoid, and it cannot safely be assumed to mean anything more than a device for gaining the wind of part of the enemy when you cannot weather his whole fleet; while the 'containing' was intended to prevent the enemy's concentrating on the squadron that performed the manoeuvre. Now, although Russell's instructions lay down no rule for isolating and containing, they do provide three new and distinct articles by which the admiral can do so if he sees fit. Under the Duke of York's instructions, it will be remembered, it was left to the van commander to execute the manoeuvre of dividing the enemy's fleet as he saw his opportunity, and under those of Lord Dartmouth it was left apparently to 'any commander.' With all that can be said for leaving the greatest possible amount of initiative to individual officers, such a system can hardly be called satisfactory, and in any case so important a movement ought certainly to be as far as possible under the control of the commander-in-chief. But under the previous instructions he could not even initiate it by signal. The defect had already been seen, and it will be remembered that the additions and observations to this and the following articles which theAdmiralty Manuscriptcontains are all directed to remedying the omission. It is to exactly the same end that Russell's orders seem designed, and if, as we shall see to be most probable, they were really drawn up by Lord Torrington, we know that they were used in this way at Beachy Head. Whether the idea of concentration and containing was in the mind of their author we cannot tell for certain, but at any rate the new instructions provide signals by which the admiral can order such movements not only by any squadron, but even by any subdivision he pleases. The freedom of individual initiative it is true is gone, but this, as theAdmiralty MS. indicates, was done deliberately, not as a piece of reactionary pedantry, but as the result of experience in battle. In all other respects the tactical flexibility that was gained is obvious, and was fully displayed in the first engagements in which the instructions were used.
So far as we can judge, the current view at this time was that where fleets were equal, every known form of concentration was unadvisable upon an unshaken enemy. The methods of the Duke of York's school were regarded as having failed, and the result appears to have been to convince tacticians that with the means at their disposal a strict preservation of the line gave a sure advantage against an enemy who attempted an attack by concentration. Tactics, in fact, in accordance with a sound and inevitable law, having tended to become too recklessly offensive, were exhibiting a reaction to the defensive. If the enemy had succeeded in forming his line, it had come to be regarded as too hazardous to attempt to divide his fleet unless you had first forced a gap by driving ships out of the line. This idea we see reflected in the 6th paragraph of the Duke of York's twenty-second article (1673) and in Russell's new twenty-third article, enjoining ships to close up any gap that may have been caused by the next ahead or astern having been forced out of the line. Briefly stated, it may be said that the preoccupation of naval tactics was now not so much to break the enemy's line, as to prevent your own being broken.
But the matter did not end here. It was seen that when your own fleet was superior, concentration was still practicable in various ways, and particularly by doubling. Tacticians were now mainly absorbed in working out this form of attack and the methods of meeting it, and Russell's elaborate articles for handling squadrons and subdivisions independently may well have had this intention.
The new phase of tactical opinion is that which we find expounded in Père Hoste's famous work,L' Art des armées navales, ou Traité des évolutions navales, published in 1697 at the instigation of the Comte de Tourville. The author was a Jesuit, but claims that he is merely giving the result of his experience while serving with the great French admirals of that time, who had learned all they knew either as allies or enemies of the English. 'For twelve years,' he says in his apology for touching naval subjects, 'I have had the honour of serving with Monsieur le Maréchal d'Estrées, Monsieur le Duc de Mortemart, and Monsieur le Maréchal de Tourville in all the expeditions they made in command of naval fleets; and Monsieur le Maréchal de Tourville has been kind enough to communicate to me his lights, bidding me write on a matter which I think has never before been the subject of a treatise.'
The whole system of tactics that he develops is based, like Russell's, on the single line ahead and the independent action of squadrons. The passages in which he elaborates the central battle idea of concentration by doubling are as follows: 'The fleet which is the more numerous will try to extend on the enemy in such a manner as to leave its rearmost ships astern, which will immediately turn [se repliera] upon the enemy to double him, and put him between two fires.Remark I.—If the more numerous fleet has the wind it will be able more easily to turn its rear upon that of the enemy, and put him between two fires. But if the more numerous fleet is to leeward it ought none the less to leave its rear astern, because the wind may shift in the fight. Besides, the fleet that is to leeward can edge away insensibly in fighting to give its rearmost ships a chance of doubling on the enemy by hugging the wind.Remark II.—I know that many skilful people are persuaded that you ought to double the enemy ahead; because, if the van of the enemy is once in disorder it falls on the rest of the fleet and throws it infallibly into confusion.' And by the aid of diagrams he proceeds to show that this view is unsound, because the van can easily avoid the danger while the rear cannot. To support his view he instances the entire success with which at the battle of La Hogue, Russell, having the superior fleet, doubled on Tourville's rear.
'To prevent being doubled,' he proceeds, 'you must absolutely prevent the enemy from leaving ships astern of you, and to that end you may adopt several devices when you are much inferior in number.
'I. If we have the wind we may leave some of the enemy's leading ships alone, and cause our van to fall on their second division. In this manner their first division will be practically useless, and if it forces sail to tack upon us it will lose much time, and will put itself in danger of being isolated by the calm which generally befalls in this sort of action by reason of the great noise of the guns. We may also leave a great gap in the centre of our fleet, provided the necessary precautions be taken to prevent our van being cut off. By these means, however inferior we be in numbers, we may prevent the enemy leaving ships astern of us.Example.—Everyone did not disapprove the manner in which Admiral Herbert disposed his fleet when he engaged the French in the action of Bevesier [i.e.Beachy Head] in the year 1690. He had some ships fewer than ours, and he had determined to make his chief effort against our rear. That is why he ordered the Dutch leading division to fall on our second division. Then he opened his fleet in the centre, leaving a great gap opposite our centre. After which, having closed up the English to very short intervals, he opposed them to our rear, and held off somewhat with his own division so as to prevent the French profiting by the gap which he had left in his fleet to double the Dutch. This order rendered our first division nearly useless, because it had to make a very long board to tack on the enemy's van, and the wind having fallen, it was put to it to be in time to share the glory of the action.[3]
'II. If the less numerous fleet is to leeward, the gap may be left more in the centre and less in the van, but it is necessary to have a small detachment of men-of-war and fireships so as to prevent the enemy profiting by the gaps in the fleet to divide it.
'III. Others prefer to give as a general rule, that the flag officers of the less numerous fleet attack the flag officers of the enemy's fleet;[4] for by this means several of the enemy's ships remain useless in the intervals, and the enemy cannot double you.
'IV. Others prefer that the three squadrons of the less numerous fleet each attack a squadron of the more numerous fleet, taking care that each squadron ranges up to the enemy in such a manner as not to leave any of his ships astern, but rather leaving several vessels ahead.
'V. Finally, there are those who would have the less numerous fleet put so great an interval between the ships as to equalise their line with that of the enemy. But this last method is, without doubt, the least good, because it permits the enemy to employ the whole of its strength against the less numerous fleet. I agree, however, that this method might be preferred to others in certain circumstances; as when the enemy's ships are considerably less powerful than those of the less numerous fleet.'
Having thus explained the system of doubling, he proceeds to give the latest ideas of his chief on breaking the enemy's line, or, as it was then called, passing through his fleet. 'We find,' he says, 'that in the relations of the fights in the Channel between the English and the Dutch that their fleets passed through one another…. In this manner the two fleets passed through one another several times, which exposed them to be cut off, taken, and mutually to lose several ships.Remark.—This manoeuvre is as bold as it is delicate, and consummate technical skill is necessary for it to succeed as happily as it did with the Comte d'Estrées … in the battle of the Texel, in the year 1673, for he passed through the Zealand squadron, weathered it, broke it up, and put the enemy into so great a disorder that it settled the victory which was still in the balance.'[5]
After pointing out by diagrams various methods of parrying the manoeuvre, he proceeds: 'I do not see, then, that we need greatly fear the enemy's passing through us; and I do not even think that this manoeuvre ought ever to be performed except under one of the three following conditions: (1) If you are compelled to do it in order to avoid a greater evil; (2) If the enemy by leaving a great gap in the midst of his squadrons renders a part of his fleet useless; (3) If several of his ships are disabled….
'Sometimes you are compelled to pass through the enemy's fleet to rescue ships that the enemy has cut off, and in this case you must risk something, but you should observe several precautions: (1) You should close up to the utmost; (2) You should carry a press of sail without troubling to fight in passing through the enemy; (3) The ships that have passed ought to tack the moment they can to prevent the enemy standing off on the same tack as the fleet that passes through them.'
It is clear, then, that in the eyes of perhaps the finest fleet leader of his time, and one of the finest France ever had, a man who thoroughly understood the value of concentration, the method of securing it by breaking the line was dangerous and unsound. In this he thoroughly endorses the views contained in the 'Observations' of theAdmiralty MS.and the modifications of the standing order which they suggest. Indeed, Hoste's remarks on breaking the line are, in effect, little more than a logical elaboration of those ideas and suggestions. In the 'Observations' we have the monition not to attempt the manoeuvre 'unless an enemy press you on a lee shore.' We have the signal for a squadron breaking the enemy's line, but only in order to rejoin the main body, and we have the simple method of parrying the move by tacking with an equal number of ships. The fundamental principles of the problem in both the English and the French author are the same, and a comparison of the two enables us to assert, with no hesitation, that the manoeuvre of breaking the line was abandoned by the tacticians of that era, not from ignorance nor from lack of enterprise, but from a deliberate tactical conviction gained by experience in war. In judging the apparent want of enterprise which our own admirals began to display in action at this time, we should probably be careful to refrain from joining in the unmitigated contempt with which modern historians have so freely covered them. In the typical battle of Malaga, for instance, Rooke did nothing but carry out the principles which were the last word of Tourville's brilliant career. Nor must it be forgotten that, although Rodney executed the manoeuvre in 1782, and Hood provided a signal for its revival which Howe at first adopted, it was never in much favour in the British service, seeing that it was only adapted for an attack from to leeward. The manoeuvre of breaking the line which Howe eventually introduced was something wholly different both in form and intention from what Rodney executed and from what was understood by 'dividing the fleet' in the seventeenth century.[6] How far the system of doubling was approved by English admirals is doubtful. We have seen that an 'Observation' in theAdmiralty Manuscriptdistrusts it,[7] but I have been able to find no other expression of opinion on the point earlier than 1780, and that entirely condemns it. It occurs in a set of fleet instructions drawn up for submission to the admiralty by Admiral Sir Charles H. Knowles, Bart. As Knowles was a pupil andprotégéof Rodney's, we may assume he was in possession of the great tactician's ideas on the point; and in theseFighting and Sailing Instructionsthe following, article occurs: 'To double the enemy's line—that is, to send a few unengaged ships on one side to engage, while the rest are fighting on the other—is rendering those ships useless. Every ship which is between two, has not only her two broadsides opposed to theirs, but has likewise their shot which cross in her favour.'[8] No signal was provided for 'doubling' in Lord Howe's or the later signal books, though Nelson certainly executed the manoeuvre at the Nile. It survived however in the French service, and the English books provided a signal for preventing its execution by a numerically superior enemy. Sir Alexander Cochrane also revived it after Trafalgar.
Knowles's objection to the manoeuvre makes it easy to understand that, however well it suited the French tactics of long bowls or boarding, it was not well adapted to the English method of close action with the guns. With the French service it certainly continued in favour, and the whole of Hoste's rules were reproduced by the famous naval expert Sébastien-Francois Bigot, Vicomte de Morogues—in his elaborateTactique navale, ou traits des évolutions et des signaux, which appeared in 1763, and was republished at Amsterdam in 1779. Not only was he the highest French authority on naval science of his time, but a fine seaman as well, as he proved when in command of theMagnifiqueon the disastrous day at Quiberon.[9]
The remainder of the new instructions, though less important than the expansion of the Duke of York's third article, all tend in the same direction. So far from insisting on a rigid observance of the single line ahead in all circumstances, the new system seems to aim at securing flexibility, and the power of concentration by independent action of squadrons. This is to be specially noted in the new article, No. 30, in which signals are provided for particular squadrons and particular divisions forming line of battle abreast. It is true that the old rigid form of an attack from windward is retained, but, ineffective as the system proved, it was certainly not inspired, as is so often said, by a mediæval conception of naval battle as a series of single ship actions. From what has been already said, the well-considered tactical idea that underlay it is obvious. The injunction to range the length of the enemy's line van to van, and rear to rear, orvice versa, was aimed at avoiding being doubled at either end of the line; while the injunction to bear down together was obviously the quickest mode of bringing the whole fleet into action without giving the enemy a chance of weathering any part of it by 'gaining its wake.' That it was inadequate for this purpose is well known. It would only work when the two fleets were exactly parallel at the moment of bearing down—as was made apparent at the battle of Malaga, where the French from leeward almost succeeded in dividing Rooke's fleet as it bore down. Still the idea was sound enough. The trouble was that it did not make sufficient allowance for the unhandiness of ships of the line in those days, and their difficulty in taking up or preserving exact formations.
As to the authorship of the articles, it must be remembered that the mere fact that they were issued by Russell is not enough to attribute them to him. He had had practically no previous experience as a flag officer, and in all probability they followed more or less closely those used by Lord Torrington in the previous year. Torrington was first lord of the admiralty in 1689, and commander-in-chief of the main fleet in 1690. It was not till after his acquittal in December of that year that he was superseded by Russell. The instructions moreover seem generally to be designed in close accordance with all we know of Torrington's tactical practice, and it is scarcely doubtful that they are due to his ripe experience and not to Russell.
That the point cannot be settled with absolute certainty is to be the more lamented because henceforth this set of Fighting Instructions, and not those of Rooke in 1703, must be taken as the dominating factor of eighteenth-century tactics. Rooke's instructions, except for the modification of a few articles, are the same as Russell's, and consequently it has not been thought necessary to print them in full. For a similar reason it has been found convenient to print such slight changes as are known to have been made in the standing form after 1703 as notes to the corresponding articles of Russell's instructions.
[1] See Introductory Note to Rooke's Instructions of 1703, p. 197.
[2]Types of Naval Officers, p. 15.
[3] This plan of attack bears a strong resemblance to that which Nelson intended to adopt at Trafalgar. 'Nelson,' says Captain Mahan, 'doubtless had in mind the dispositions of Tourville and De Ruyter.'—Life of Nelson, ii. 351. Hoste, however, it would seem, though a devout admirer of both Tourville and De Ruyter, gives the credit to Lord Torrington. It was not introduced officially into the British tactical system until Lord Howe adopted it in 1792. It was retained in the subsequent Signal Books and Instructions.
[4] This proviso was added to the signal in the edition of 1799, and a corresponding explanatory instruction (No. 24) was provided. Seepost, p. 262.
[5] It should be remembered that neither the Dutch nor the English accounts of the action at all endorse this view of D'Estrées's behaviour. See also theAdmiralty MS., p. 153, note 1.
[6] Seepost, pp. 245-9.
[7]Ante, p.152, note 1.
[8] Printed in 1798. A MS. note says 'These instructions were written in 1780 and afterwards very much curtailed, though the general plan is the same.'
[9] Lacour Gayet,La marine militaire de la France sous LouisXV, 1902, pp. 214-5.
[+From a printed copy in the Library of the United ServiceInstitution+.]
Fighting Instructions.
I. When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle, one ship ahead of another (according to the method given to each captain), he will hoist a union flag at the mizen peak, and fire a gun; and every flagship in the fleet is to make the same signal.[1]
II. When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle, one ship abreast of another (according to the method given to each captain), he will hoist a union flag and a pennant at the mizen-peak, and fire a gun; and every flagship in the fleet is to do the same.
III. When the admiral would have the admiral of the white and his whole squadron to tack, and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will spread a white flag under the flag at the main top-mast-head, and fire a gun, which is to be answered by the flagships in the fleet; and when he would have the admiral of the blue do the same, he will spread a blue flag on that place.
IV. When the admiral would have the vice-admiral of the red, and his division, tack and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will spread a red flag from the cap at the fore topmast-head downward on the backstay. If he would have the vice-admiral of the white do the same, a white flag; if the vice-admiral of the blue, a blue flag at the same place.
V. When the admiral would have the rear-admiral of the red and his division tack and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will hoist a red flag at the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head; if the rear-admiral of the white, a white flag; if the rear-admiral of the blue, a blue flag at the same place, and under the flag a pennant of the same colour.
VI. If the admiral be to leeward of the fleet, or any part of the fleet, and he would have them bear down into his wake or grain, he will hoist a blue flag at the mizen peak.
VII. If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet, or any part of them, to leeward of him, that he may bring those ships into a line, he will bear up with a blue flag at the mizen peak under the union flag, which is the signal for the line of battle; and then those ships to leeward are to use their utmost endeavour to get into his wake or grain, according to their stations in the line of battle.
VIII. If the fleet be sailing before the wind, and the admiral would have the vice-admiral and the ships of the starboard quarter to clap by the wind, and come to the starboard tack, then he will hoist upon the mizen topmast-head a red flag. And in case he would have the rear-admiral and the ships of the larboard quarter to come to their larboard tack, then he will hoist up a blue flag at the same place.
IX. When the admiral would have the van of the fleet to tack first, he will put abroad the union flag at the flagstaff on the fore topmast-head, and fire a gun, if the red flag be not abroad; but if the red flag be abroad, then the fore topsails shall be lowered a little, and the union flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore topmast downwards, and every flagship in the fleet is to do the same.
X. When the admiral would have the rear-admiral of the fleet tack first, he will hoist the union flag on the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, and fire a gun, which is to be answered by every flagship in the fleet.
XI. When the admiral would have all the flagships in the fleet come into his wake or grain, he will hoist a red flag at the mizen peak, and fire a gun; and the flagships in the fleet are to make the same signal.
XII. When the admiral would have the admiral of the white and his squadron make more sail, though himself shorten sail, he will hoist a white flag on the ensign staff; if the admiral of the blue, or he that commands in the third post, a blue flag at the same place; and every flagship in the fleet is to make the same signal.
XIII. As soon as the admiral shall hoist a red flag on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, every ship in the fleet is to use their utmost endeavour to engage the enemy, in the order the admiral has prescribed unto them.[2]
XIV. When the admiral hoisteth a white flag at the mizen peak, then all the small frigates of his squadron that are not in the line of battle are to come under his stern.
XV. If the fleet is sailing by a wind in a line of battle, and the admiral would have them brace their headsails to the mast, he will hoist a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, and fire a gun; which the flagships in the fleet are to answer. Then the ships in the rear are to brace to first.
XVI. The fleet lying in a line of battle, with their headsails to the mast, and if the admiral would have them fill and stand on, he will hoist a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and fire a gun; which the flagships in the fleet are to answer. Then the ships in the van are to fill first, and to stand on. If it happen, when this signal is to be made, that the red flag is abroad on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, the admiral will spread the yellow flag under the red.
XVII. If the admiral see the enemy's fleet standing towards him, and he has the wind of them, the van of the fleet is make sail till they come the length of the enemy's rear, and our rear abreast of the enemy's van; then he that is in the rear of our fleet is to tack first, and every ship one after another, as fast as they can, throughout the line, that they may engage on the same tack with the enemy. But in case the enemy's fleet should tack in their rear, our fleet is to do the same with an equal number of ships; and whilst they are in fight with the enemy, to keep within half a cable's length one of another, or if the weather be bad, according to the direction of the commanders.
When the admiral would have the ship that leads the van of the fleet (or the headmost ship in the fleet) when they are in a line of battle, hoist, lower, set or haul up any of his sails, the admiral will spread a yellow flag under that at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun; which the flagships that have flags at the main topmast-head are to answer; and those flagships that have not, are to hoist the yellow flag on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun. Then the admiral will hoist, lower, set or haul up the sail he would have the ship that leads the van do.
XVIII. If the admiral and his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and they have stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the admiral's fleet is to steer with the van of the enemy's and there to engage them.
XIX. Every commander is to take care that his guns are not fired till he is sure he can reach the enemy upon a point-blank; and by no means to suffer his guns to be fired over by any of our own ships.
XX. None of the ships in the fleet shall pursue any small number of the enemy's ships till the main body be disabled or run.
XXI. If any of the ships in the fleet are in distress, and make the signal, which is a weft with the jack or ensign, the next ship to them is strictly required to relieve them.
XXII. If the admiral, or any flagship, should be in distress, and make the usual signal, the ships in the fleet are to endeavour to get up as close into a line, between him and the enemy, as they can; having always an eye to defend him, if the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition.
XXIII. In case any ship in the fleet should be forced to go out of the line to repair damages she has received in battle the next ships are to close up the line.
XXIV. If any flagship be disabled, the flag may go on board any ship of his own squadron or division.
XXV. If the enemy be put to the run, and the admiral thinks it convenient the whole fleet shall follow them, he will make all the sail he can himself after the enemy, and fire two guns out of his fore-chase; then every ship in the fleet is to use his best endeavour to come up with the enemy, and lay them on board.
XXVI. If the admiral would have any particular flagship, and his squadron, or division, give chase to the enemy, he will make the same signal that is appointed for that flagship's tacking with his squadron or division, and weathering the enemy.
XXVII. When the admiral would have them give over chase, he will hoist a white flag at the fore topmast-head and fire a gun.
XXVIII. In case any ship in the line of battle should be disabled in her masts, rigging or hull, the ship that leads ahead of her shall take her a-tow and the division she is in shall make good the line with her. But the commander of the ship so disabled is not on any pretence whatever to leave his station till he has acquainted his flag or the next flag officer with the condition of his ship, and received his directions therein. And in case any commander shall be wanting in his duty, his flag or the next flag officer to him is immediately to send for the said commander from his ship and appoint another in his room.
XXIX. If the admiral would have any flag in his division or squadron cut or slip in the daytime, he will make the same signals that are appointed for those flagships, and their division or squadron, to tack and weather the enemy, as is expressed in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth articles before going.
XXX. When the admiral would have the red squadron draw into a line of battle, abreast of one another, he will put abroad a flag striped red and white on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, with a pennant under it, and fire a gun. If he would have the white squadron, or those that have the second post in the fleet, to do the like, the signal shall be a flag striped red, white, and blue, with a pennant under it, at the aforesaid place. And if he would have the blue squadron to do the like he will put on the said place a Genoese ensign, together with a pennant. But when he would have either of the said squadrons to draw into a line of battle, ahead of one another, he will make the aforesaid signals, without a pennant; which signals are to be answered by the flagships only of the said squadrons, and to be kept out till I take in mine. And if the admiral would have any vice-admiral of the fleet and his division draw into a line of battle as aforesaid, he will make the same signals at the fore topmast-head that he makes for that squadron at the main topmast-head. And for any rear-admiral in the fleet and his division, the same signals at the mizen topmast-head; which signals are to be answered by the vice- or rear-admiral.
[1] The instructions under which Mathews fought his action off Toulon in 1744 add here the words 'and every ship is to observe and keep the same distance those ships do which are next the admiral, always taking it from the centre.' They were a MS. addition made by Mathews himself. See 'V. A——l L——k's Rejoinder to A——l M——ws's Replies' in a pamphlet entitledOriginal Letters and Papers between Adm——l M——ws and V. Adm——l L——k. London, 1744, p. 31. From an undated copy of Fighting Instructions in the Admiralty Library we know that this addition was subsequently incorporated into the standing form.
[2] The instructions of 1744, as quoted in the Mathews-Lestock controversy, add here the words 'and strictly to take care not to fire before the signal be given by the admiral.' This appears also to have been an addition made by Mathews in 1744. It was clumsily incorporated in the subsequent standing form thus: 'to engage the enemy and on no account to fire before the admiral shall make the signal, in the order the admiral has prescribed unto them.' See note to Article I.,supra.
These like Russell's are extracted from a complete printed set, also presented to the United Service Institution by Sir W. Laird Clowes, and entitled, 'Instructions for the directing and governing her majesty's fleet in sailing and fighting, by the Right Honourable Sir George Rooke, Knight, Vice-Admiral of England, and admiral and commander-in-chief of her majesty's fleet. In the year 1703.' They also contain all the other matter as in Russell's, while another copy has bound with it all the fleet articles of war under the hand of Prince George of Denmark, then lord high admiral.
As they were not issued till 1703, the second year of the war, in which Rooke did nothing but carry out a barren cruise in the Bay of Biscay, we may assume that the Cadiz expedition of 1702 proceeded under Russell's old instructions of the previous war. It was under Rooke's new instructions, however, that the battle of Malaga was fought in 1704. They were certainly in force in 1705, for a copy of them exists in the log book of the Britannia for that year (British Museum, Add. MSS. 28126, ff. 21-27). They were also used by Sir Clowdisley Shovell during his last command; as we know by a printed copy with certain manuscript additions of his own, relating to chasing and armed boats, which he issued to his junior flag officer, Sir John Norris, in the Mediterranean, on April 25, 1707 (British Museum, Add. MSS.28140). Nor is there any trace of their having been changed during the remainder of the war. At the battle of Malaga they were very strictly observed, and in the opinion of the time with an entirely satisfactory result; that is to say that, although Rooke's ships were foul and very short of ammunition, he was able to prevent Toulouse breaking his line and so to fight a defensive action, which saved Gibraltar from recapture, and discredited the French navy to such an extent that thenceforth it was entirely neglected by Louis XIV's government, and gave little more trouble to our fleets.
Though no copy of these Fighting Instructions has been found with a later date than 1707, we know that with very slight modifications they continued in use down to the peace of 1783. The evidence is to be found scattered in proceedings of courts-martial, in chance references in admirals despatches, and in signal books. For instance, in the 'Mathews and Lestock Tracts'(British Museum, 518, g), which deal with the courts-martial that followed the ill-fought action off Toulon in 1744, eight of the articles then in force are printed. All of them have the same numbering as the corresponding articles of 1703, six are identical in wording, and two, Numbers I. and XIII., have only the slight modifications which Admiral Mathews made, and which have been given above in notes to the similar articles in Russell's set. These modifications, as we have seen, were subsequently incorporated into the standing form, and appear in the undated copy of the complete Fighting Instructions in the Admiralty Library. Again, Article XIV. of 1703 is referred to in the Additional Fighting Instructions issued by Boscawen in 1759.[1] According to a MS. note by Sir C.H. Knowles they were re-issued in 1772 and 1778, and Keppel in 1778 was charged under Article XXXI. of 1703. Finally, there is in the Admiralty Library a manuscript signal book prepared by an officer, who was present at Rodney's great action of April 12, 1782. In this book, in which 1783 is the last date mentioned, there is inserted beside each signal the number of the article in the printed Fighting Instructions to which it related. In this way we are able to fix the purport of some twenty articles, and all of these correspond exactly both in intention and number with those of 1703.
[1] See below, p. 224.
[+From a printed copy in the Library of the United ServiceInstitution+.]
Articles I. to XVI.—[The same as Russell's of1691,except for slight modifications of wording and signals.][1]
Art. XVII.—If the admiral see the enemy's fleet standing towards him and he has the wind of them, the van of the fleet is to make sail till they come the length of the enemy's rear and our rear abreast of the enemy's van; then he that is in the rear of our fleet is to tack first, every ship one after another as fast as they can, throughout the line. And if the admiral would have the whole fleet tack together, the sooner to put them in a posture of engaging the enemy, then he will hoist the union flag on the flagstaff's[2] at the fore and mizen mast-heads and fire a gun; and all the flagships in the fleet are to do the same. But in case the enemy's fleet should tack in their rear, our fleet is to do the same with an equal number of ships, and whilst they are in fight with the enemy to keep within half a cable's length one of another, or if the weather be bad, according to the direction of the commander.
Art. XVIII.—[Same as the remainder of Russell's XVII.] When the admiral would have the ship that leads the van … by the flagships of the fleet.
Arts. XIX. to XXIII.—[Same as Russell's XVIII. to XXII.]
Art. XXIV.—[Replacing Russell's XXIII. and XXVIII.] No ship in the fleet shall leave his station upon any pretence whatsoever till he has acquainted his flag or the next flag officer to him with the condition of his ship and received his direction herein. But in case any ship shall do so, the next ships are to close up the line.[3] And if any commander shall be wanting in doing his duty, his flag or the next flag officer to him is immediately to send for the said, commander from his ship and appoint another in his room.[4]
Arts. XXV. to XXVII., XXIX. and XXX.—[Same as Russell's.]
Art. XXXI.—When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle one astern of the other with a large wind, and if he would have those lead who are to lead with their starboard tacks aboard by a wind, he will hoist a red and white flag at the mizen peak and fire a gun; and if he would have those lead who are to lead with their larboard tacks aboard by a wind, he will hoist a Genoese flag at the same place and fire a gun; which is to be answered by the flagships of the fleet.
Art. XXXII.—When the fleet is in the line of battle, the signals that are made by the admiral for any squadron or particular division are to be repeated by all the flags that are between the admiral and that squadron or division to whom the signal is made.
[1] The modifications consist mainly in adding a gun to several of the flag signals, and enjoining the flagships to repeat them.
[2] The undated admiralty copy (post1744) has 'flagstaves.'
[3] This manoeuvre was finely executed by Sir Clowdisley Shovell with the van squadron at the battle of Malaga.
[4] Burchett, the secretary of the navy, in hisNaval Historycensures Benbow for not having acted on this instruction in 1702 or rather on No. 28 of 1691.
I. ADMIRAL VERNON,circa1740
II. LORD ANSON,circa1747
Although, as we have seen, the 'Fighting Instructions' of 1691 continued in force with no material alteration till the end of the next century, it must not be assumed that no advance in tactics was made. From time to time important changes were introduced, but instead of a fresh set of 'Fighting Instructions' being drawn up according to the earlier practice, the new ideas were embodied in what were called 'Additional Fighting Instructions.' They did not supersede the old standing form, but were intended to be read with and be subsidiary to it. It is to these 'Additional Instructions,' therefore, that we have to look for the progress of tactics during the eighteenth century. By one of those strange chances, however, which are the despair of historians in almost every branch and period of their subject, these Additional Instructions have almost entirely disappeared. Although it is known in the usual way—that is, from chance references in despatches and at courts-martial—that many such sets of Additional Instructions were issued, only one complete set actually in force is known to exist. They are those signed by Admiral Boscawen on April 27, 1759, in Gibraltar Bay, and are printed below.
After his capture of Louisbourg in the previous year, Boscawen had been chosen for the command of the Mediterranean fleet, charged with the important duty of preventing the Toulon squadron getting round to Brest, and so effecting the concentration which the French had planned as the essential feature of their desperate plan of invasion. He sailed with the reinforcement he was taking out on April 14, and must therefore have issued these orders so soon as he reached his station. There is every reason to believe, however, that he was not their author; that they were, in fact, a common form which had been settled by Lord Anson at the admiralty. In the shape in which they have come down to us they are a set of eighteen printed articles, to which have been added in manuscript two comparatively unimportant articles relating to captured chases and the call for lieutenants. These may have been either mere 'expeditional' orders, as they were called, issued by Boscawen in virtue of his general authority as commander-in-chief on the station, or possibly recent official additions. More probably they were Boscawen's own, for, strictly speaking, they should not appear as 'Additional Fighting Instructions' at all. From the series of signal books and other sources we know there already existed a special set of 'Chasing Instructions,' and yet another set in which officers' calls and the like were dealt with, and both of Boscawen's articles were subsequently incorporated into these sets. The printed articles to which Boscawen attached them were certainly not new. Either wholly or in part they had been used by Byng in 1756, for at his court-martial he referred to the 'First article of the Additional Fighting Instructions as given to the fleet by me at the beginning of the expedition,' and this article is identical with No. 1 of Boscawen's set.
How much older the articles were, or, indeed, whether any were issued before the Seven Years' War, has never yet been determined. From the illogical order in which they succeed one another it would appear that they were the result of a gradual development, during which one or more orders were added from time to time by the incorporation of 'expeditional' orders of various admirals, as experience suggested their desirability. Thus Article I. provides, in the case of the enemy being inferior in number, for our superfluous ships to fall out of the line and form a reserve, but it is not till Article VIII. that we have a scientific rule laid down for the method in which the reserve is to employ itself. Still, whatever may have been the exact process by which these Additional Instructions grew up, evidence is in existence which enables us to trace the system to its source with exactitude, and there is no room for doubt that it originated in certain expeditional orders issued by Admiral Vernon when he was in command of the expedition against the Spanish Main in 1739-40. Amongst the 'Mathews and Lestock' pamphlets is one sometimes attributed to Lestock himself, but perhaps more probably inspired by him. It is dedicated to the first lord of the admiralty, and entitledA Narrative of the Proceedings of his majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean, 1741-4, including, amongst other matter relating to Mathews's action, 'some signals greatly wanted on the late occasion.' At p. 108 are some 'Additional signals made use of by our fleet in the West Indies,' meaning that of Admiral Vernon, which Lestock had recently left. These signals relate to sailing directions by day and by night, to 'seeing ships in the night' and to 'engaging an enemy in the night,' and immediately following them are two 'Additional Instructions to be added to the Fighting Instructions.' The inference is that these two 'Additional Instructions' were something quite new and local, since they were used by Vernon and not by Mathews. They are given below, and will be found to correspond closely to Articles I. and III. of the set used by Boscawen in the next war. Since, therefore, in all the literature and proceedings relating to Mathews and Lestock there is no reference to any 'Additional Instructions,' we may conclude with fair safety that these two articles used by Vernon in the West Indies were the origin and germ of the new system.
Nor is it a mere matter of inference only, for it is confirmed by a direct statement by the author of the pamphlet. At p. 74 he has this interesting passage which practically clears up the history of the whole matter. 'Men in the highest stations at sea will not deny but what our sailing and fighting instructions might be amended, and many added to them, which by every day's experience are found to be absolutely necessary. Though this truth is universally acknowledged and the necessity of the royal navy very urgent, yet since the institution of these signals nothing has been added to them excepting the chasing signals, excellent in their kind, by the Right Honourable Sir J—— N——.[1] Not but that every admiral has authority to make any additions or give such signals to the captains under his command as he shall judge proper, which are only expeditional. Upon many emergencies our signals at this juncture [i.e.in the action before Toulon] proved to be very barren. There was no such signal in the book, expressing an order when the admiral would have the ships to come to a closer engagement than when they begun. After what has been observed, it is unnecessary now to repeat the great necessity and occasion there was for it; and boats in many cases, besides their delay and hindrance, could not always perform that duty.
'Mr. V[ernon], that provident, great admiral, who never suffered any useful precaution to escape him, concerted some signals for so good a purpose, wisely foreseeing their use and necessity, giving them to the captains of the squadron under his command. And lest his vigilance should be some time or other surprised by an enemy, or the exigencies of his master's service should require him to attack or repulse by night, he appointed signals for the line of battle, engaging, chasing, leaving off chase, with many others altogether new, excellent and serviceable, which show his judgment, abilities, and zeal. The author takes the liberty to print them for the improvement of his brethren, who, if they take the pains to peruse them, will receive benefit and instruction.'
Here, then, we have indisputable evidence that the system which gave elasticity to the old rigid Fighting Instructions began with Admiral Vernon, who as a naval reformer is now only remembered as the inventor of grog. The high reputation he justly held as a seaman and commander amongst his contemporaries has long been buried under his undeserved failure at Cartagena; but trained in the flagships of Rooke and Shovell, and afterwards as a captain under Sir John Norris in the Baltic, there was no one till the day of his death in 1757, at the age of 73, who held so high a place as a naval authority, and from no one was a pregnant tactical reform more likely to come. The Lestock pamphlet, moreover, makes it clear that through all the time of his service—the dead time of tactics as we regard it now—tacticians so far from slumbering had been striving to release themselves from the bonds in which the old instructions tied them.
This is confirmed by two manuscript authorities which have fortunately survived, and which give us a clear insight into the new system as it was actually set on foot. The first is a MS. copy of some Additional Instructions in the Admiralty Library. They are less full and clearly earlier than those used by Boscawen in 1759, and are bound up with a printed copy of the regular Fighting Instructions already referred to, which contain in manuscript the additions made by Mathews during his Mediterranean command.[2] In so far as they differ from Boscawen's they will be found below as notes to his set.
The second is a highly interesting MS. copy of a signal book dated 1756, in which the above instructions are referred to. It is in the United Service Institution (Register No.234). At the end it contains a memorandum of a new article by which Hawke modified the established method of attack, and for the first time introduced the principle of each ship steering for her opposite in the enemy's line. It is printed below, and as will be seen was to be substituted for 'Articles V. and VI. of the Additional Fighting Instructions by Day' then in force, which correspond to Articles XV. and XVI. of Boscawen's set. It does not appear in the Boscawen set, and how soon it was regularly incorporated we do not know. No reference has been found to it till that by Rodney, in his despatch of April 1780 referred to below.
Of even higher interest for our purpose is another entry in the same place of an article also issued by Hawke for forming 'line of bearing.' Here again the older form of the Additional Fighting Instructions is referred to, and the new article is to be inserted after Article IV., which was for forming the line ahead or abreast. The important point however is that the new article is expressly attributed to Lord Anson. Now it is known that when Anson in April 1747 was cruising off Finisterre for De la Jonquière he kept his fleet continually exercising 'in forming line and in manoeuvres of battle till then absolutely unknown.'[3]
The 'line of bearing' or 'quarter line' must have been one of these, and we therefore reach two important conclusions: (1) that this great tactical advance was introduced by Anson during the War of the Austrian Succession, and (2) that the older set of Additional Fighting Instructions was then in existence. Another improvement probably assignable to this time was Article IV. (of Boscawen's set) for battle order in two separate lines. Articles V., VI., VII., for extended cruising formations certainly were then issued, for in his despatch after his defeat of De la Jonquière Anson says: 'At daybreak I made the signal for the fleet to spread in a line abreast, each ship keeping at the distance of a mile from the other [Article V.] that there might not remain the least probability for the enemy to pass by us undiscovered.'[4]
Then we have the notable Article XVIII., not in the earlier sets, enjoining captains to pursue any ship they force out of the line, regardless of the contrary order contained in Article XXI. of the regular Fighting Instructions. We have seen the point discussed already in the anonymous commentary on the Duke of York's final instructions, and it remained a bone of contention till the end. Men like Sir Charles H. Knowles were as strongly in favour of immediately following a beaten adversary as the anonymous commentator was in favour of maintaining the line. Knowles's idea was that it was folly to check the ardour of a ship's company at the moment of victory, and he tells us he tried to persuade Howe to discard the old instruction when he was drawing up his new ones.[5]
As to the further tactical progress which the Boscawen instructions disclose, and which nearly all appear closely related to the events of the War of the Austrian Succession, when Anson was supreme, we may particularly note Article I., for equalising the lines and using superfluous ships to form a reserve; Article III. for closer action; Article VIII. for the reserve to endeavour to 'Cross the T,' instead of doubling; and Articles IX. and X. for bringing a flying enemy to action.
With these internal inferences to corroborate the direct evidence of our documents the conclusion is clear—that during the War of the Austrian Succession the new system initiated by Vernon was developed by Anson as a consequence of Mathews's miserable action off Toulon in 1744, and that its first fruits were gathered in the brilliant successes of Hawke and Anson himself in 1747.
Though no complete set later than those used by Boscawen is known to exist, we may be certain from various indications that they continued to be issued as affording a means of giving elasticity to tactics, and that they were constantly issued in changing form. Thus Rodney, in his report after the action off Martinique in April 1780, says, 'I made the signal for every ship to bear down and steer for her opposite in the enemy's line, agreeable to the twenty-first article of the Additional Instructions.' Again in a MS. signal book in the Admiralty Library, which was used in Rodney's great action of April 12, 1782, and drawn up by an officer who was present, a similar article is referred to. But there it appears as No. XVII. of the Additional Instructions, and its effect is given in a form which closely resembles the original article of Hawke:—'When in a line of battle ahead and to windward of the enemy, to alter the course to lead down to them; whereupon every ship is to steer for the ship of the enemy, which from the disposition of the two squadrons it may be her lot to engage, notwithstanding the signal for the line ahead will be kept flying.' It is clear, therefore, that between 1780 and 1782 Rodney or the admiralty had issued a new set of 'Additional Instructions.' The amended article was obviously designed to prevent a recurrence of the mistake that spoiled the action of 1780. In the same volume is a signal which carries the idea further. It has been entered subsequently to the rest, having been issued by Lord Hood for the detached squadron he commanded in March 1783. There is no reference to a corresponding instruction, but it is 'for ships to steer for (independent of each other) and engage respectively the ships opposed to them.' In Lord Howe's second signal book, issued in 1790,[6] the signal reappears in MS. as 'each ship of the fleet to steer for, independently of each other, and engage respectively the ship opposed in situation to them in the enemy's line.' And in this case there is a reference to an 'Additional Instruction, No. 8,' indicating that Hood, who had meanwhile become first sea lord, had incorporated his idea into the regular 'Additional Fighting Instructions.'
Take, again, the case of the manoeuvre of 'breaking the line' in line ahead. This was first practised after its long abandonment by a sudden inspiration in Rodney's action of April 12, 1782. In the MS. signal book as used by Rodney in that year there is no corresponding signal or instruction. But it does contain one by Hood which he must have added soon after the battle. It is as follows:—