CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.LOUIS XI. AND SIXTUS IV. SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR.Philippe de Comminesreturned to Florence after a short, and, as we must suppose, fruitless residence in Rome. That he returned thither on July 25 is seen from a letter to the Milanese ambassador, who informs us that they had not failed in accordance with the admonition they had received to attend upon him and show him all honours.[268]His visit to the camp and his presence served, at all events, to strengthen the belief in the French king’s friendship. But the impressions which he received from this visit were not favourable, and are expressed in the opinion he gave of things. ‘The Florentines,’ he observes,[269]‘might consider it good fortune that they were not defeated on all sides, for as it was long since they had been engaged in war, they could not measure the danger in which they were. Lorenzo de’ Medici, who guided affairs in the city, was young, and influenced by young people. His opinion was held in high estimation. They had few leaders and a small number of troops. The enemy took all the places which he besieged, but not so quickly as is usual with us; for in a war of fortresses they are not so skilful either in siege or defence, while in the formation of a camp and the preservation of good order and all the requisites necessary for provisioning, and in all the arrangements of a campaign, they surpass us.’ To judge from the last words, the condition of the camp must haveimproved since the time when Gian Jacopo Trivulzio described it. On July 28 Commines obtained the royal warrant which empowered him, in conjunction with Lorenzo de’ Medici, ‘nostre très-chier et amé cousin,’ to conclude the alliance with the Duchess-regent of Milan, which made the investiture of Gian Galeazzo Sforza with Genoa and Savona one condition.[270]On the following day he showed Bona of Savoy and her private secretary the commission he had received. On August 18, Lorenzo and Commines concluded an alliance[271]with the Milanese ambassadors in Florence, Gian Angelo de’ Talenti and Filippo Sagramoro. Six days later Commines quitted Florence and repaired to Milan, where, in the king’s name, he invested the young Duke in the person of his mother with the two towns and their territory. In his Memoirs he only mentions this occurrence in a few words, but there are detailed accounts of how Bona of Savoy, representing her son, kissed the document of investiture and then gave the oath of fealty for him with her hand on the Gospels, to be a true vassal of the French king, to have friends and foes in common with him, and conform to his will in peace and war.Commines writes respecting his departure from Florence, ‘I was excellently lodged by the inhabitants and at their cost, and more liberally on the last day than even the first.’ That means that the Republic sent him silver-plate of fifty-five pounds weight, while the Signoria expressed their gratitude to the king for sending such a distinguished man, and expressed hopes of his favour, ‘surrounded as they were by cruel enemies, who had already caused them many losses, as they had been attacked unprepared.’ According to the Milanese ambassadors, the value of the presents offered to him was between four and five hundred ducats, to whichLorenzo added jewels worth about three hundred. ‘We are continually,’ writes Lorenzo de’ Medici to Louis XI., ‘at war with our opponents, who seek to defeat and humiliate us. The lord of Argenton will inform you by word of mouth what has happened, and in what state he leaves our affairs. I beg you all to believe what he says on my part, as if I myself spoke to you. To-day, as always, I think I shall need the assistance, favour, and protection of your Majesty, to whom I shall turn in confidence for all that concerns me, as to my true lord, protector, and patron, my hope and my refuge.’[272]During Commines’ Italian embassy Louis XI. had not been inactive. On August 16 he had published anordonnanceat Blois, by which, in regard to the Pope’s behaviour in the Pazzi affair, he declared that French money should not serve to promote such things, and had strictly forbidden all remittances of money to Rome for the fulfilment of expectations and other things. An assembly meeting at Orleans in September was to ratify this decree, but it restricted itself to leaving the king free either to call a Gallican national council at Lyons in the following year, or to persuade the Pope to summon an œcumenical council. Louis XI. considered it best to try the latter. He had his hands full at the time. His sister of Savoy died before Commines returned, and it was most important for him firmly to establish the Government in the duchy, and to get the duke, then twelve years old, into his power, in which he succeeded. He sought to make a diversion for the King of Naples in his own house, by enlisting his younger son Don Federigo in his interest through a marriage with his niece of Savoy; while on the other hand he kept alive the Angevin claims on Naples as a means of terrifying Ferrante. It wasunder such circumstances that the unfavourable news from Tuscany, which Philippe de Commines confirmed, hastened his determination to attempt to influence the Pope.From Plessis-les-Tours, Louis XI. had announced to Lorenzo de’ Medici on November 1 that an embassy consisting of six members, the chamberlain Guy d’Arpajon, viscount of Lautrec, the president of the Toulouse Parliament, Antoine de Morlhon, and others, would repair to Italy, in order to effect a union for the purpose of a war against the Turks. Soon afterwards the instructions for the treaty with Sixtus IV. were drawn up. The ambassadors were to represent to the Pope how the advance of the Turks in Greece and Bosnia, on the Hungarian and Polish frontiers, and in the Venetian possessions, threatened the whole of Christian Europe, and made indispensable their union against the common enemy, and the summoning of a general council to consult upon all spiritual and temporal affairs. Lyons would be the most suitable place for such an assembly, and this praiseworthy and sacred purpose was hindered by nothing so much as by the war which had broken out in Italy between the Pope and Naples on the one side, and on the other the league of Milan, Venice, and Florence. The king wished to fulfil his duties on both sides—the duty of a devoted and faithful son of the Church, and that of a warm friend of the Florentines, who had always shown themselves true and loyal adherents of France. The Pope, as vicegerent of Jesus Christ, the Prince of Peace, was called especially to mediate and restore peace. If he had laid city and Republic under an interdict with penalties and confiscations on account of what had happened in April in Florence, the king certainly did not wish to defend a crime against the Holy See and the Pope, nor interpose between his authority and his rights. But they must investigate the matter well, and see what had caused those events, and whence the attack had proceeded. The other side must be listened to. If the Florentines were in the wrong, the king would endeavour to bringthem to reason. If the wrong were on the side of the representative of the Holy See, the Holy Father must grant redress. The king could not believe that the attempt of Count Riario against the Florentines had taken place with the knowledge and consent of the Holy Father, for it was a breach of the general Italian league, a disturbance of peace, an aid to the enemies of Christendom, a summons to bloodshed, to which, in the king’s opinion, the Pope must have been averse. If matters had proceeded too far to allow of the conclusion of peace at once, a truce might at least be permitted, that the proposals might ripen which the council would bring up for consideration.[273]Sixtus IV. had had time to look carefully into the situation of affairs. The king’s proceeding did not find him unprepared. The Cardinal of Pavia had above all pointed out the necessity of no over-haste and the wisdom of letting the storm spend itself. The Cardinal of Mantua, who has been already mentioned, went as legate to the Emperor Frederick III. On January 10, 1479, the French ambassadors reached Florence, where they made a solemn entry, and were welcomed joyfully. On the 16th they continued their journey to Rome, after having consulted about everything with the Signoria and magistracy of war. Two days after them, ambassadors from the Emperor Frederick also arrived and repaired to Rome on the same errand. On January 27 the Pope received the ambassadors, who fulfilled their commissions, and then delivered in writing the demand for summoning a council. In his answer, Sixtus contested the right of the French king to give an opinion on a matter decided by the Pope, and held up to him the example of Charlemagne, from whom he boasted his descent. The Pope was not obliged to answer for his decisions. The fate of the Archbishop of Pisa had shown how little spiritual immunitieswere protected by temporal magistrates. A council would preserve the rights of the Church, but it could only be summoned by the Pope in agreement with the emperor and other kings; its assembly did not depend on the sovereign of France. Councils were generally summoned for three objects—for the extinction of heresies, the restoration of peace among Christian powers, and the reform of manners. There were no heresies now. And that mediations had sometimes more hindered than promoted peace had been shown by the Synod of Constance, while much that was annoying, and especially disadvantageous to the princes, would come to light. The summoning of the council would be a glorious thing, but for the reasons mentioned he must against his will decline it. If the renewal of the Pragmatic Sanction were threatened, it was really a question of the king’s honour and conscience. The summons to the French prelates was unlawful. If Lorenzo de’ Medici would acknowledge his sin before God and man, and endure with a penitent heart the punishment laid on him, all the rest would be easily adjusted.[274]For the rest, Sixtus IV. expressed himself willing to treat, and ordered for this purpose a commission of ten cardinals who should investigate the matter. Of the demand for Lorenzo’s banishment nothing more was said, but from the beginning it was plain how far asunder the two parties were. Matters did not proceed till, in the middle of March, a rumour spread in Rome that Louis XI. intended to summon the council at Lyons in a month’s time if the Pope did nothing for the restoration of peace. An English embassy had also arrived to support the demand of the friendly States. On April 4, Sixtus IV. ordered a suspension of the spiritual ban and a truce to hostilities for the time. Negotiations for peace were to be carried on at Naples. Not without difficulty had they obtained this concession, nor until the ambassadors of Florence, Milan, and Venice, supported bythe rest, had declared that, if no measures were taken, they would protest solemnly, appeal to the council and quit Rome. Venice had exerted herself most in this affair. After all representations to the king had been unavailing, the Republic had taken steps with the emperor and French king in order to bring Sixtus IV. to a better mind by threatening him with a council, and when the ambassadors of both those powers went to Rome, the Venetians sent thither Sebastian Venier, to support their petition.[275]So much was accomplished; but the demands of the Pope to the Florentines did not afford a prospect of quieting the strife. The Republic was to humiliate herself before the Holy Father, beg for forgiveness of her sins, celebrate a solemn service for the reconciliation of those killed in the Pazzi conspiracy and give alms for their souls, and destroy all libellous pictures painted to commemorate the events.[276]They were to expel Niccolo Vitelli from their territory; deliver to the Holy See the fortresses of Borgo San Sepolcro, Modigliana, and Castrocaro; pay compensation for the war, and engage never again to undertake an attack on the Papal territories. On the side of Florence the demand of a public service to acknowledge their guilt was refused, on the ground that such a revival of the memory of the sad event would prejudice the dignity of the state. The destruction of the paintings was agreed to, the expulsion of Vitelli refused, but it was promised that they would prevent him from attempting anything against the States of the Church. In respect to the places mentioned, it was answered that these had nothing to do with the questions on hand, and they could only treat for the restitution of such as had been garrisoned in the course of the war. Thus not even a basis for treaties was obtained.Affairs dragged on hopelessly. What passed meanwhileoutside Rome contributed still more to this state of hopelessness. Things could not remain thus. On May 18, a command was given to the ambassadors of the allied states to leave Rome, if the work of peace were not begun within a week. On the 31st the Pope summoned to him all the foreign plenipotentiaries who had a share in the negotiations. On the question addressed to the representatives of the three allied states, whether it were the intention of their governments to begin the campaign against the Turks immediately upon the conclusion of peace, the Venetian ambassador answered that his Republic had maintained for seventy years a cruel and exhausting war against an enemy that daily became more terrible. At length she had concluded a compact with them which was advantageous for Christianity, and this compact she should keep to the best of her power. He referred to the most fatal agreement, perhaps necessary under the oppressions that then prevailed, which Venice had concluded on January 25, 1479, with Mohammed II., and published three months later; by which, among other places, Skodra, which had been so long and valiantly defended, was lost with others in the Morea, and considerable sums besides accorded to the Grand Turk.[277]The deputies from Florence and Milan agreed to this declaration. But when the Pope announced that under such circumstances he would decline to treat, the Venetian ambassador made a protest and appealed to the council. The moment the French ambassador began speaking, Sixtus IV. dissolved the meeting. It was evident, that his one desire was to gain time. The three ambassadors then repeated their protest on leaving Rome, and summoned the prelates belonging to their territories to take leave of St. Peter’s Chair.[278]In this manner the winter and time of truce passed withoutbringing matters to any agreement. If the position of their opponents was in some degree more favourable than that of the Florentines and their allies, yet it was at the same time such that this agreement must have been most desirable to them. In the Papal Neapolitan army there prevailed a great dearth of provisions. Long processions of mules with flour and bread traversed the Patrimony and Siena, and their guards were not always able to repulse hostile attacks. When the troops went into winter quarters, the greatest disorder prevailed; and had not the weather been very mild, the evils would have been felt still more. As the Neapolitan troops were quite in rags, the king sent a number of articles of clothing, while he caused great quantities of corn to be bought up in Piombino and the port of Telamone. The Pope commissioned the Commandant of Sto. Spirito, the great Roman hospital, with the provisioning of the camp. Two hundred mules from the Papal court were continually passing through the territory of Viterbo, to bring provisions to Acquapendente and the district of Siena. It may be easily understood that the cost was immense; and Sixtus IV. was compelled to borrow money continually, and mortgage a number of places to the rich cardinals and others. The parts of the Florentine and Sienese territories adjoining the States of the Church suffered severely from the march of the troops and scarcity of provisions, though not immediately touched by war.[279]The announcement of the armistice being ended was not necessary to make the combatants take up arms; for though in the Chiana valley, and from Urbino, nothing was undertaken against the enemy on the part of the Duke of Calabria, everything was in preparation in the western districts of the Republic. The increasing annoyances here were connected with the insurrection of Genoa and the Milanese troubles. Roberto Sanseverino, compelled to quit Genoa, had repaired to France and put himself in communication withLouis XI. for the purpose of enlisting an Italian corps of mercenaries for the Burgundian war. At the end of January 1479, he had arrived at Asti, in order to effect enlistments there, but the Duchess-regent of Milan, rightly dreading the proximity of this restless man, forbad all her subjects to take service with him; a prohibition in which Venice, Florence, Mantua, Ferrara, Bologna, in short the whole league, joined. In vain did the king mediate with his sister-in-law. Roberto could not obtain what he desired, but he was all the more confirmed in the scheme, which seems to have been the real ground of his proceedings. At the beginning of February the report had already been spread that the Duke of Bari and Ludovico Sforza had appeared in the Lunigiana, in order thence to operate on the one side against Florence, on the other against Milan. It soon proved to be no empty rumour. In the neighbouring district of Parma, seditious proclamations of the two Sforza were soon spread; they wished, they said, to liberate their nephew, the young duke, from the servitude in which he was held. Among the Milanese mercenaries alarming movements were observed. At the end of February, the brothers, with Roberto, set up the flag of rebellion, and immediately afterwards the latter appeared with 400 foot and 500 to 600 horse, mostly people from the Genoese coasts, before the gates of Pisa.[280]The attack on the town failed, but he devastated all the more unsparingly the whole country round, while a Neapolitan corps advanced through the Cecina valley. Without the aid of the Lucchese, who were ill disposed towards Florence, it would have been impossible for Sanseverino to carry out his plans. The disinclination of the people in Lucca to their neighbours was, however, so great, that Piero Capponi, Neri’s energetic grandson, who was there as the Florentine plenipotentiary, had some trouble to hinder a formal alliance of the Republic with the enemies of Florence, and was in danger of his life when the mob, in defiance of the warning of more sensible people,stormed his house.[281]The Duke of Ferrara was obliged to come to the assistance of the threatened province with a portion of the troops encamped on the Poggio Imperiale; and as the Duke of Calabria meddled in the affair from the Riviera, it would have been a most dangerous diversion, if the fear of being cut off by the Milanese troops had not induced Roberto to withdraw about the middle of April.It was high time; for scarcely had the termination of the armistice been published when the hostile leaders stood in the Chiana valley with their armies reinforced. This time the Florentines showed no lack of sensible dispositions. From Poggio Imperiale to the frontiers, their corps were so stationed that it would be difficult for the enemy to break through. On the side towards Poggio, where the head-quarters were, stood the Marquis of Mantua, and Deifebo dell’ Anguillara; while from the Romagna, Roberto Malatesta was marching towards Perugia, where Carlo Fortebraccio was to support him. They relied much on the latter, on account of the old connections of his family with Perugia; but he fell ill on the road, at Cortona, where he died on June 17. Meanwhile his son Bernardino had taken his place, and the troops had crossed the Papal frontiers on June 9. The treaties with Perugia with a view to her joining the league did not affect their purpose. The enemy had had time to send a considerable number of troops, chiefly cavalry, under the command of Matteo da Capoa and the prefect of Rome, to Umbria. On June 27 they met Malatesta between Cortona and Perugia, in the neighbourhood of the lake of Trasimen, where Hannibal had destroyed the Roman army. The little town of La Magione reminds us of one of the most eventful occurrences in the history of Cæsar Borgia. Here they were entirely defeated. But this advantage led to nothing but a renewal of plundering and depredations from which thecountry suffered severely, from the gates of Perugia to the valley of the Tiber towards Città di Castello on the one side, and the Chiana and Arno valleys on the other.The miserable management of the war, which cost the Florentines more dearly than their enemies, because their territory, more than any other, was the theatre of war, avenged itself in another way. In the Florentine head-quarters nothing but discord prevailed, and the more incapable and irresolute the captain-general showed himself, the higher rose the insubordination of the officers. The old quarrel between the Sforzas and Braccios, which had once divided the Italian mercenaries into two camps, broke out here among the Florentine troops, which were composed of the two factions. During the skirmishes in Perugia, whither a considerable part of the hostile army had marched in order to avenge the repulse they had received, and hinder Malatesta’s further progress, the Florentine army advanced, and stormed and plundered the little Sienese town of Casole. Here the troops of the Duke of Ferrara and those of the Marquis of Mantua quarrelled so fiercely over the division of the booty, that the Florentine commissaries with difficulty separated and pacified them. On the other side, Roberto Malatesta and Costanzo Sforza were so much at enmity that it was not possible to leave one in the neighbourhood of the other. Thus a union of the hostile powers was not to be thought of. But now another and more serious complication arose. In Milan the crisis happened which had long been threatening. Roberto Sanseverino had, after quitting the territory of Pisa, kept himself till the summer in the Val di Taro, whence he continually annoyed Parma. He had then, believing he could not advance, and seeing that he was hindered by Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, turned to Liguria, where the Duke of Bari died after a short illness. When it was felt in Milan that they might at last give way to a feeling of security, the warlike Roberto, with Lodovico Sforza, who now bore the title of Bari, descended the inaccessible pass of the Apennines,Le Cento Croci, which was unguarded because it was held impracticable for great bodies of troops, into the valley of the Po, and on August 23 seized Tortona, where Lodovico had partisans. The greatest alarm arose in the capital. An army of 12,000 men was despatched to Tortona, whither the Marquis of Montferrat also hastened. It did not seem enough to oppose the formidable enemy. The Duke of Ferrara and the Marquis of Mantua were recalled from Tuscany with a part of the Milanese troops. On September 2, Ercole of Este arrived at Parma with 400 horse and 200 foot, whence on the following day he advanced to Piacenza. He had not yet crossed the Po when, at Voghera, the Marquis of Montferrat’s men fell in with those of Sanseverino, and inflicted severe losses on them. From Venice came the news that the Republic would send 1,000 horse and 2,000 foot to their assistance, but at the same moment, when the affairs of the Milanese Government seemed about to take a favourable turn, an unexpected mischance occurred. On September 6 a bonfire was lighted in the rebel camp, and joybells rang. In the ducal camp appeared a trumpeter of Sanseverino, with the information that peace was restored, and Lodovico Sforza, invited by the regent was on his way to Milan. The Duke of Ferrara had urged Bona of Savoy to reconcile herself with her two still remaining brothers-in-law. To her misfortune and that of the state, she had complied, in opposition to her trusty counsellors, who plainly foresaw the result of such a step. On September 7, Lodovico had arrived in Milan, and was joyfully received by a crowd of people. On the following day the duchess received him; he begged her pardon for the past, and promised allegiance. Immediately afterwards he was appointed governor-general of the duchy. The first thing which then happened was the arrest of Cecco Simonetta. The regent was obliged to put her signature to the decree which sent him, to whom more than to any one she owed the preservation of the state after her husband’s death, into a prison at Pavia, while themob plundered his and his friends’ houses in such a way that even window-shutters and iron bars were carried off.[282]The Tuscan war felt the reaction of these events, even before they were fully developed. Sigismondo d’Este had undertaken the supreme command for his brother, the duke. But the men were not only diminished in number, they were also careless in service. This was not unknown to the enemy, and he availed himself of it. The Duke of Calabria selected the most skilled among his captains, Matteo da Capoa, Giulio Acquaviva of Atri, Gentil Virginio and Giordano Orsini of Bracciano, &c., in order to attempt an attack on the Florentine side. From Chiusi they marched through the Arbia valley to Siena, and surprised Mont’Imperiale at the dawn of September 7, the day on which Lodovico Sforza entered Milan. The attempt succeeded perfectly. The confusion soon became so great that, notwithstanding the natural strength of the place, no one thought of serious opposition. Every obstacle was scattered in the shortest possible time. Most sought their safety in hasty flight. Of the combatants some were slaughtered, some captured; among the latter Galeotto Pico, Rodolfo Gonzaga, Niccolò da Correggio, and other captains, and about a hundred and fifty men-at-arms. Costanzo Sforza, pursued by Jacopo Appiano, lord of Piombino, on the road to San Gemignano, not only took his pursuer captive but saved the large banner of the Republic, and assembled in San Casciano as many as he could of the fugitives and those who had dispersed.It was a severe blow. Florence saw herself threatened by the enemy, who took the castles of the Elsa valley one after the other, and attacked Colle, the most important place in this province, with greatly superior forces. Roberto Malatesta was ordered to protect Arezzo and the Arno valley. Costanzo Sforza covered the capital on the Sienese side, and drew reinforcements to himself from all quarters. In Poggibonziand the lofty San Gemignano smaller corps were stationed. But all this only just sufficed to turn aside the most threatening part of the danger. Colle defended itself heroically, and did much injury to the Duke of Calabria, who conducted the siege in person, but the capitulation took place on November 14. Malatesta, who had quitted Umbria, where he expected the fall of Perugia, was displeased at the conduct of the war, the misfortunes of which he ascribed more to the constant interference of the Ten than to the captains or men, and employed the time of inaction which followed the taking of Colle to repair to Venice and withdraw from the Florentine service. The foreign affairs were not more consolatory. Little confidence was felt in Milan. Venice, whither Luigi Guicciardini went as ambassador, in order to represent the oppressed state of the Florentines and to entreat more powerful assistance, showed itself lukewarm, and was more disturbed by an attack of the Turks on Hungary than by the threatening of Florence by the Pope and Naples. If the season had been more favourable, the position might have become still worse. But even the enemy needed rest. The Duke of Calabria was in Siena; Urbino, aged and sick, in Viterbo. On November 24 a trumpeter of the former entered Florence with the offer of a truce. Two days afterwards it was proclaimed.

LOUIS XI. AND SIXTUS IV. SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR.

Philippe de Comminesreturned to Florence after a short, and, as we must suppose, fruitless residence in Rome. That he returned thither on July 25 is seen from a letter to the Milanese ambassador, who informs us that they had not failed in accordance with the admonition they had received to attend upon him and show him all honours.[268]His visit to the camp and his presence served, at all events, to strengthen the belief in the French king’s friendship. But the impressions which he received from this visit were not favourable, and are expressed in the opinion he gave of things. ‘The Florentines,’ he observes,[269]‘might consider it good fortune that they were not defeated on all sides, for as it was long since they had been engaged in war, they could not measure the danger in which they were. Lorenzo de’ Medici, who guided affairs in the city, was young, and influenced by young people. His opinion was held in high estimation. They had few leaders and a small number of troops. The enemy took all the places which he besieged, but not so quickly as is usual with us; for in a war of fortresses they are not so skilful either in siege or defence, while in the formation of a camp and the preservation of good order and all the requisites necessary for provisioning, and in all the arrangements of a campaign, they surpass us.’ To judge from the last words, the condition of the camp must haveimproved since the time when Gian Jacopo Trivulzio described it. On July 28 Commines obtained the royal warrant which empowered him, in conjunction with Lorenzo de’ Medici, ‘nostre très-chier et amé cousin,’ to conclude the alliance with the Duchess-regent of Milan, which made the investiture of Gian Galeazzo Sforza with Genoa and Savona one condition.[270]On the following day he showed Bona of Savoy and her private secretary the commission he had received. On August 18, Lorenzo and Commines concluded an alliance[271]with the Milanese ambassadors in Florence, Gian Angelo de’ Talenti and Filippo Sagramoro. Six days later Commines quitted Florence and repaired to Milan, where, in the king’s name, he invested the young Duke in the person of his mother with the two towns and their territory. In his Memoirs he only mentions this occurrence in a few words, but there are detailed accounts of how Bona of Savoy, representing her son, kissed the document of investiture and then gave the oath of fealty for him with her hand on the Gospels, to be a true vassal of the French king, to have friends and foes in common with him, and conform to his will in peace and war.

Commines writes respecting his departure from Florence, ‘I was excellently lodged by the inhabitants and at their cost, and more liberally on the last day than even the first.’ That means that the Republic sent him silver-plate of fifty-five pounds weight, while the Signoria expressed their gratitude to the king for sending such a distinguished man, and expressed hopes of his favour, ‘surrounded as they were by cruel enemies, who had already caused them many losses, as they had been attacked unprepared.’ According to the Milanese ambassadors, the value of the presents offered to him was between four and five hundred ducats, to whichLorenzo added jewels worth about three hundred. ‘We are continually,’ writes Lorenzo de’ Medici to Louis XI., ‘at war with our opponents, who seek to defeat and humiliate us. The lord of Argenton will inform you by word of mouth what has happened, and in what state he leaves our affairs. I beg you all to believe what he says on my part, as if I myself spoke to you. To-day, as always, I think I shall need the assistance, favour, and protection of your Majesty, to whom I shall turn in confidence for all that concerns me, as to my true lord, protector, and patron, my hope and my refuge.’[272]

During Commines’ Italian embassy Louis XI. had not been inactive. On August 16 he had published anordonnanceat Blois, by which, in regard to the Pope’s behaviour in the Pazzi affair, he declared that French money should not serve to promote such things, and had strictly forbidden all remittances of money to Rome for the fulfilment of expectations and other things. An assembly meeting at Orleans in September was to ratify this decree, but it restricted itself to leaving the king free either to call a Gallican national council at Lyons in the following year, or to persuade the Pope to summon an œcumenical council. Louis XI. considered it best to try the latter. He had his hands full at the time. His sister of Savoy died before Commines returned, and it was most important for him firmly to establish the Government in the duchy, and to get the duke, then twelve years old, into his power, in which he succeeded. He sought to make a diversion for the King of Naples in his own house, by enlisting his younger son Don Federigo in his interest through a marriage with his niece of Savoy; while on the other hand he kept alive the Angevin claims on Naples as a means of terrifying Ferrante. It wasunder such circumstances that the unfavourable news from Tuscany, which Philippe de Commines confirmed, hastened his determination to attempt to influence the Pope.

From Plessis-les-Tours, Louis XI. had announced to Lorenzo de’ Medici on November 1 that an embassy consisting of six members, the chamberlain Guy d’Arpajon, viscount of Lautrec, the president of the Toulouse Parliament, Antoine de Morlhon, and others, would repair to Italy, in order to effect a union for the purpose of a war against the Turks. Soon afterwards the instructions for the treaty with Sixtus IV. were drawn up. The ambassadors were to represent to the Pope how the advance of the Turks in Greece and Bosnia, on the Hungarian and Polish frontiers, and in the Venetian possessions, threatened the whole of Christian Europe, and made indispensable their union against the common enemy, and the summoning of a general council to consult upon all spiritual and temporal affairs. Lyons would be the most suitable place for such an assembly, and this praiseworthy and sacred purpose was hindered by nothing so much as by the war which had broken out in Italy between the Pope and Naples on the one side, and on the other the league of Milan, Venice, and Florence. The king wished to fulfil his duties on both sides—the duty of a devoted and faithful son of the Church, and that of a warm friend of the Florentines, who had always shown themselves true and loyal adherents of France. The Pope, as vicegerent of Jesus Christ, the Prince of Peace, was called especially to mediate and restore peace. If he had laid city and Republic under an interdict with penalties and confiscations on account of what had happened in April in Florence, the king certainly did not wish to defend a crime against the Holy See and the Pope, nor interpose between his authority and his rights. But they must investigate the matter well, and see what had caused those events, and whence the attack had proceeded. The other side must be listened to. If the Florentines were in the wrong, the king would endeavour to bringthem to reason. If the wrong were on the side of the representative of the Holy See, the Holy Father must grant redress. The king could not believe that the attempt of Count Riario against the Florentines had taken place with the knowledge and consent of the Holy Father, for it was a breach of the general Italian league, a disturbance of peace, an aid to the enemies of Christendom, a summons to bloodshed, to which, in the king’s opinion, the Pope must have been averse. If matters had proceeded too far to allow of the conclusion of peace at once, a truce might at least be permitted, that the proposals might ripen which the council would bring up for consideration.[273]

Sixtus IV. had had time to look carefully into the situation of affairs. The king’s proceeding did not find him unprepared. The Cardinal of Pavia had above all pointed out the necessity of no over-haste and the wisdom of letting the storm spend itself. The Cardinal of Mantua, who has been already mentioned, went as legate to the Emperor Frederick III. On January 10, 1479, the French ambassadors reached Florence, where they made a solemn entry, and were welcomed joyfully. On the 16th they continued their journey to Rome, after having consulted about everything with the Signoria and magistracy of war. Two days after them, ambassadors from the Emperor Frederick also arrived and repaired to Rome on the same errand. On January 27 the Pope received the ambassadors, who fulfilled their commissions, and then delivered in writing the demand for summoning a council. In his answer, Sixtus contested the right of the French king to give an opinion on a matter decided by the Pope, and held up to him the example of Charlemagne, from whom he boasted his descent. The Pope was not obliged to answer for his decisions. The fate of the Archbishop of Pisa had shown how little spiritual immunitieswere protected by temporal magistrates. A council would preserve the rights of the Church, but it could only be summoned by the Pope in agreement with the emperor and other kings; its assembly did not depend on the sovereign of France. Councils were generally summoned for three objects—for the extinction of heresies, the restoration of peace among Christian powers, and the reform of manners. There were no heresies now. And that mediations had sometimes more hindered than promoted peace had been shown by the Synod of Constance, while much that was annoying, and especially disadvantageous to the princes, would come to light. The summoning of the council would be a glorious thing, but for the reasons mentioned he must against his will decline it. If the renewal of the Pragmatic Sanction were threatened, it was really a question of the king’s honour and conscience. The summons to the French prelates was unlawful. If Lorenzo de’ Medici would acknowledge his sin before God and man, and endure with a penitent heart the punishment laid on him, all the rest would be easily adjusted.[274]

For the rest, Sixtus IV. expressed himself willing to treat, and ordered for this purpose a commission of ten cardinals who should investigate the matter. Of the demand for Lorenzo’s banishment nothing more was said, but from the beginning it was plain how far asunder the two parties were. Matters did not proceed till, in the middle of March, a rumour spread in Rome that Louis XI. intended to summon the council at Lyons in a month’s time if the Pope did nothing for the restoration of peace. An English embassy had also arrived to support the demand of the friendly States. On April 4, Sixtus IV. ordered a suspension of the spiritual ban and a truce to hostilities for the time. Negotiations for peace were to be carried on at Naples. Not without difficulty had they obtained this concession, nor until the ambassadors of Florence, Milan, and Venice, supported bythe rest, had declared that, if no measures were taken, they would protest solemnly, appeal to the council and quit Rome. Venice had exerted herself most in this affair. After all representations to the king had been unavailing, the Republic had taken steps with the emperor and French king in order to bring Sixtus IV. to a better mind by threatening him with a council, and when the ambassadors of both those powers went to Rome, the Venetians sent thither Sebastian Venier, to support their petition.[275]

So much was accomplished; but the demands of the Pope to the Florentines did not afford a prospect of quieting the strife. The Republic was to humiliate herself before the Holy Father, beg for forgiveness of her sins, celebrate a solemn service for the reconciliation of those killed in the Pazzi conspiracy and give alms for their souls, and destroy all libellous pictures painted to commemorate the events.[276]They were to expel Niccolo Vitelli from their territory; deliver to the Holy See the fortresses of Borgo San Sepolcro, Modigliana, and Castrocaro; pay compensation for the war, and engage never again to undertake an attack on the Papal territories. On the side of Florence the demand of a public service to acknowledge their guilt was refused, on the ground that such a revival of the memory of the sad event would prejudice the dignity of the state. The destruction of the paintings was agreed to, the expulsion of Vitelli refused, but it was promised that they would prevent him from attempting anything against the States of the Church. In respect to the places mentioned, it was answered that these had nothing to do with the questions on hand, and they could only treat for the restitution of such as had been garrisoned in the course of the war. Thus not even a basis for treaties was obtained.

Affairs dragged on hopelessly. What passed meanwhileoutside Rome contributed still more to this state of hopelessness. Things could not remain thus. On May 18, a command was given to the ambassadors of the allied states to leave Rome, if the work of peace were not begun within a week. On the 31st the Pope summoned to him all the foreign plenipotentiaries who had a share in the negotiations. On the question addressed to the representatives of the three allied states, whether it were the intention of their governments to begin the campaign against the Turks immediately upon the conclusion of peace, the Venetian ambassador answered that his Republic had maintained for seventy years a cruel and exhausting war against an enemy that daily became more terrible. At length she had concluded a compact with them which was advantageous for Christianity, and this compact she should keep to the best of her power. He referred to the most fatal agreement, perhaps necessary under the oppressions that then prevailed, which Venice had concluded on January 25, 1479, with Mohammed II., and published three months later; by which, among other places, Skodra, which had been so long and valiantly defended, was lost with others in the Morea, and considerable sums besides accorded to the Grand Turk.[277]The deputies from Florence and Milan agreed to this declaration. But when the Pope announced that under such circumstances he would decline to treat, the Venetian ambassador made a protest and appealed to the council. The moment the French ambassador began speaking, Sixtus IV. dissolved the meeting. It was evident, that his one desire was to gain time. The three ambassadors then repeated their protest on leaving Rome, and summoned the prelates belonging to their territories to take leave of St. Peter’s Chair.[278]

In this manner the winter and time of truce passed withoutbringing matters to any agreement. If the position of their opponents was in some degree more favourable than that of the Florentines and their allies, yet it was at the same time such that this agreement must have been most desirable to them. In the Papal Neapolitan army there prevailed a great dearth of provisions. Long processions of mules with flour and bread traversed the Patrimony and Siena, and their guards were not always able to repulse hostile attacks. When the troops went into winter quarters, the greatest disorder prevailed; and had not the weather been very mild, the evils would have been felt still more. As the Neapolitan troops were quite in rags, the king sent a number of articles of clothing, while he caused great quantities of corn to be bought up in Piombino and the port of Telamone. The Pope commissioned the Commandant of Sto. Spirito, the great Roman hospital, with the provisioning of the camp. Two hundred mules from the Papal court were continually passing through the territory of Viterbo, to bring provisions to Acquapendente and the district of Siena. It may be easily understood that the cost was immense; and Sixtus IV. was compelled to borrow money continually, and mortgage a number of places to the rich cardinals and others. The parts of the Florentine and Sienese territories adjoining the States of the Church suffered severely from the march of the troops and scarcity of provisions, though not immediately touched by war.[279]

The announcement of the armistice being ended was not necessary to make the combatants take up arms; for though in the Chiana valley, and from Urbino, nothing was undertaken against the enemy on the part of the Duke of Calabria, everything was in preparation in the western districts of the Republic. The increasing annoyances here were connected with the insurrection of Genoa and the Milanese troubles. Roberto Sanseverino, compelled to quit Genoa, had repaired to France and put himself in communication withLouis XI. for the purpose of enlisting an Italian corps of mercenaries for the Burgundian war. At the end of January 1479, he had arrived at Asti, in order to effect enlistments there, but the Duchess-regent of Milan, rightly dreading the proximity of this restless man, forbad all her subjects to take service with him; a prohibition in which Venice, Florence, Mantua, Ferrara, Bologna, in short the whole league, joined. In vain did the king mediate with his sister-in-law. Roberto could not obtain what he desired, but he was all the more confirmed in the scheme, which seems to have been the real ground of his proceedings. At the beginning of February the report had already been spread that the Duke of Bari and Ludovico Sforza had appeared in the Lunigiana, in order thence to operate on the one side against Florence, on the other against Milan. It soon proved to be no empty rumour. In the neighbouring district of Parma, seditious proclamations of the two Sforza were soon spread; they wished, they said, to liberate their nephew, the young duke, from the servitude in which he was held. Among the Milanese mercenaries alarming movements were observed. At the end of February, the brothers, with Roberto, set up the flag of rebellion, and immediately afterwards the latter appeared with 400 foot and 500 to 600 horse, mostly people from the Genoese coasts, before the gates of Pisa.[280]The attack on the town failed, but he devastated all the more unsparingly the whole country round, while a Neapolitan corps advanced through the Cecina valley. Without the aid of the Lucchese, who were ill disposed towards Florence, it would have been impossible for Sanseverino to carry out his plans. The disinclination of the people in Lucca to their neighbours was, however, so great, that Piero Capponi, Neri’s energetic grandson, who was there as the Florentine plenipotentiary, had some trouble to hinder a formal alliance of the Republic with the enemies of Florence, and was in danger of his life when the mob, in defiance of the warning of more sensible people,stormed his house.[281]The Duke of Ferrara was obliged to come to the assistance of the threatened province with a portion of the troops encamped on the Poggio Imperiale; and as the Duke of Calabria meddled in the affair from the Riviera, it would have been a most dangerous diversion, if the fear of being cut off by the Milanese troops had not induced Roberto to withdraw about the middle of April.

It was high time; for scarcely had the termination of the armistice been published when the hostile leaders stood in the Chiana valley with their armies reinforced. This time the Florentines showed no lack of sensible dispositions. From Poggio Imperiale to the frontiers, their corps were so stationed that it would be difficult for the enemy to break through. On the side towards Poggio, where the head-quarters were, stood the Marquis of Mantua, and Deifebo dell’ Anguillara; while from the Romagna, Roberto Malatesta was marching towards Perugia, where Carlo Fortebraccio was to support him. They relied much on the latter, on account of the old connections of his family with Perugia; but he fell ill on the road, at Cortona, where he died on June 17. Meanwhile his son Bernardino had taken his place, and the troops had crossed the Papal frontiers on June 9. The treaties with Perugia with a view to her joining the league did not affect their purpose. The enemy had had time to send a considerable number of troops, chiefly cavalry, under the command of Matteo da Capoa and the prefect of Rome, to Umbria. On June 27 they met Malatesta between Cortona and Perugia, in the neighbourhood of the lake of Trasimen, where Hannibal had destroyed the Roman army. The little town of La Magione reminds us of one of the most eventful occurrences in the history of Cæsar Borgia. Here they were entirely defeated. But this advantage led to nothing but a renewal of plundering and depredations from which thecountry suffered severely, from the gates of Perugia to the valley of the Tiber towards Città di Castello on the one side, and the Chiana and Arno valleys on the other.

The miserable management of the war, which cost the Florentines more dearly than their enemies, because their territory, more than any other, was the theatre of war, avenged itself in another way. In the Florentine head-quarters nothing but discord prevailed, and the more incapable and irresolute the captain-general showed himself, the higher rose the insubordination of the officers. The old quarrel between the Sforzas and Braccios, which had once divided the Italian mercenaries into two camps, broke out here among the Florentine troops, which were composed of the two factions. During the skirmishes in Perugia, whither a considerable part of the hostile army had marched in order to avenge the repulse they had received, and hinder Malatesta’s further progress, the Florentine army advanced, and stormed and plundered the little Sienese town of Casole. Here the troops of the Duke of Ferrara and those of the Marquis of Mantua quarrelled so fiercely over the division of the booty, that the Florentine commissaries with difficulty separated and pacified them. On the other side, Roberto Malatesta and Costanzo Sforza were so much at enmity that it was not possible to leave one in the neighbourhood of the other. Thus a union of the hostile powers was not to be thought of. But now another and more serious complication arose. In Milan the crisis happened which had long been threatening. Roberto Sanseverino had, after quitting the territory of Pisa, kept himself till the summer in the Val di Taro, whence he continually annoyed Parma. He had then, believing he could not advance, and seeing that he was hindered by Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, turned to Liguria, where the Duke of Bari died after a short illness. When it was felt in Milan that they might at last give way to a feeling of security, the warlike Roberto, with Lodovico Sforza, who now bore the title of Bari, descended the inaccessible pass of the Apennines,Le Cento Croci, which was unguarded because it was held impracticable for great bodies of troops, into the valley of the Po, and on August 23 seized Tortona, where Lodovico had partisans. The greatest alarm arose in the capital. An army of 12,000 men was despatched to Tortona, whither the Marquis of Montferrat also hastened. It did not seem enough to oppose the formidable enemy. The Duke of Ferrara and the Marquis of Mantua were recalled from Tuscany with a part of the Milanese troops. On September 2, Ercole of Este arrived at Parma with 400 horse and 200 foot, whence on the following day he advanced to Piacenza. He had not yet crossed the Po when, at Voghera, the Marquis of Montferrat’s men fell in with those of Sanseverino, and inflicted severe losses on them. From Venice came the news that the Republic would send 1,000 horse and 2,000 foot to their assistance, but at the same moment, when the affairs of the Milanese Government seemed about to take a favourable turn, an unexpected mischance occurred. On September 6 a bonfire was lighted in the rebel camp, and joybells rang. In the ducal camp appeared a trumpeter of Sanseverino, with the information that peace was restored, and Lodovico Sforza, invited by the regent was on his way to Milan. The Duke of Ferrara had urged Bona of Savoy to reconcile herself with her two still remaining brothers-in-law. To her misfortune and that of the state, she had complied, in opposition to her trusty counsellors, who plainly foresaw the result of such a step. On September 7, Lodovico had arrived in Milan, and was joyfully received by a crowd of people. On the following day the duchess received him; he begged her pardon for the past, and promised allegiance. Immediately afterwards he was appointed governor-general of the duchy. The first thing which then happened was the arrest of Cecco Simonetta. The regent was obliged to put her signature to the decree which sent him, to whom more than to any one she owed the preservation of the state after her husband’s death, into a prison at Pavia, while themob plundered his and his friends’ houses in such a way that even window-shutters and iron bars were carried off.[282]

The Tuscan war felt the reaction of these events, even before they were fully developed. Sigismondo d’Este had undertaken the supreme command for his brother, the duke. But the men were not only diminished in number, they were also careless in service. This was not unknown to the enemy, and he availed himself of it. The Duke of Calabria selected the most skilled among his captains, Matteo da Capoa, Giulio Acquaviva of Atri, Gentil Virginio and Giordano Orsini of Bracciano, &c., in order to attempt an attack on the Florentine side. From Chiusi they marched through the Arbia valley to Siena, and surprised Mont’Imperiale at the dawn of September 7, the day on which Lodovico Sforza entered Milan. The attempt succeeded perfectly. The confusion soon became so great that, notwithstanding the natural strength of the place, no one thought of serious opposition. Every obstacle was scattered in the shortest possible time. Most sought their safety in hasty flight. Of the combatants some were slaughtered, some captured; among the latter Galeotto Pico, Rodolfo Gonzaga, Niccolò da Correggio, and other captains, and about a hundred and fifty men-at-arms. Costanzo Sforza, pursued by Jacopo Appiano, lord of Piombino, on the road to San Gemignano, not only took his pursuer captive but saved the large banner of the Republic, and assembled in San Casciano as many as he could of the fugitives and those who had dispersed.

It was a severe blow. Florence saw herself threatened by the enemy, who took the castles of the Elsa valley one after the other, and attacked Colle, the most important place in this province, with greatly superior forces. Roberto Malatesta was ordered to protect Arezzo and the Arno valley. Costanzo Sforza covered the capital on the Sienese side, and drew reinforcements to himself from all quarters. In Poggibonziand the lofty San Gemignano smaller corps were stationed. But all this only just sufficed to turn aside the most threatening part of the danger. Colle defended itself heroically, and did much injury to the Duke of Calabria, who conducted the siege in person, but the capitulation took place on November 14. Malatesta, who had quitted Umbria, where he expected the fall of Perugia, was displeased at the conduct of the war, the misfortunes of which he ascribed more to the constant interference of the Ten than to the captains or men, and employed the time of inaction which followed the taking of Colle to repair to Venice and withdraw from the Florentine service. The foreign affairs were not more consolatory. Little confidence was felt in Milan. Venice, whither Luigi Guicciardini went as ambassador, in order to represent the oppressed state of the Florentines and to entreat more powerful assistance, showed itself lukewarm, and was more disturbed by an attack of the Turks on Hungary than by the threatening of Florence by the Pope and Naples. If the season had been more favourable, the position might have become still worse. But even the enemy needed rest. The Duke of Calabria was in Siena; Urbino, aged and sick, in Viterbo. On November 24 a trumpeter of the former entered Florence with the offer of a truce. Two days afterwards it was proclaimed.

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