FOOTNOTES:

The personality of God, as a living, self-conscious, and active Being, distinct from the created universe and superior to it, is dependent on the "spirituality" of His nature; and in so far as the latter is affected by the theory of Materialism, the evidence of the former must also be proportionally weakened. We find, accordingly, that many Materialists have exhibited a tendency towards a Pantheistic theory of nature, in which the material universe is conceived of as the "body," of which God is the "soul." Some Materialists, indeed, have stopped short of Pantheism; but this may have arisen from their being less consequent reasoners, or more timid thinkers, than others who were prepared to follow out their principles fearlessly to all their logical results; for, assuredly, if there be no evidence sufficient to show that the "mind" is distinct from the "body," it will require a very high kind of evidence to make it certain that "God" is distinct from "Nature."

4. The theory of Materialism comes into direct collision, at several points, with the doctrines of Revealed Religion.

The doctrine of Scripture in regard to the "human soul" is manifestly at variance with that theory. In the earliest pages of Genesis, we have an account of its creation, which, when compared with other statements and forms of expression occurring elsewhere, seems very clearly to imply that the "soul" is a distinct substantive being, possessing properties and powers peculiar to itself, and, although now united to the "body," yet capable of existing apart from it, and destined to an immortal existence hereafter.[178]That it is a distinct substantive being,connected with the body, but not dependent on it, at least in the sense of being incapable of existing apart from it, appears from various testimonies of the inspired Word. God is there pleased to call Himself "the Father of our spirits," and that, too, in contradistinction to "the fathers of our flesh." "We have had fathers of our 'flesh' which corrected us, and we gave them reverence; shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of 'spirits' and live?" He is called "the God of the 'spirits' of all flesh," and "the Lord who formeth the 'spirit' of man within him." The historical narrative, too, of man's creation, which declares that he was "made in the image of God," and that his "soul" was infused by an immediate Divine afflatus, seems to imply that there is another and a higher relation subsisting between God and the "soul" than any that subsists between God and "matter." In other passages, the soul is expressly represented as distinct and different from the body:—"Fear not them which can kill the 'body,' but are not able to kill the 'soul.'" "Into thy hands I commit my 'spirit,'" said our Lord, just as his proto-martyr Stephen said, "Lord Jesus, receive my 'spirit.'" There are other passages still which affirm the separate existence of disembodied spirits: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and 'the spirit,' shall return unto God who gave it." "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have." Nay,spiritual life, such as clearly presupposes the continuance of conscious existence, without interruption and without end, is said to be imparted by Christ to his people:—"I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live again, and whosoever liveth and believeth in meshall never die."—"Whoso believeth in me ... is passed from death unto life."[179]Life is said to bealready imparted, such a life as shall survive death, and continue without interruption and without end; and surely this is utterly inconsistent with that theory of Materialism which affirms, either the annihilation of the "soul" at death, or even the cessation of its conscious existence during the interval between death and the resurrection.

The revealed doctrine of "angels," or spiritual intelligences existing in other parts of the universe, is also opposed to the theory of Materialism. According to the common belief, the "soul" of man is thenexusbetween two worlds or states of being,—the world of "matter" and the world of "mind." In man the elements of both worlds are united; by his body he is connected with the world of matter, by his soul with the world of mind. Death, which dissolves the union between the two, consigns the one to the dust, and introduces the other into the world of spirits. On this view, there is no difficulty in rising to the conception of higher spiritual intelligences; and the variety and gradation that are observable in all the works of God on earth may impart to that sublime conception such a measure of verisimilitude as to make it easily credible on the authority of Revelation. But the theory of Materialism, especially as advocated by Dr. Priestley, plainly excludes the existence of any order of "spiritual beings" other than the uncreated Mind; for if that only is to be termed "spirit" which possesses omniscience and the power of producing anything at pleasure, it is clear that the highest angels and seraphims are no more "spirits" than the souls of men.

Such being the relation which subsists between the theory of Materialism, and some of the most important doctrines of Natural and Revealed Religion, it is not wonderful that a serious consideration of the latter should lead reflective men to abjure the former, or that their aversion to it should increase in proportion as their views of Divine truth are extended and enlarged. Not a few have yielded, in early youth, to thecharm of speculative inquiry, and fondly embraced the idea of "unisubstancisme," who have lived to exchange it for a more Scriptural faith. For just in proportion as men are brought under the influence of serious views of God, of the soul, and of an eternal world, in the same proportion will they become alienated, and even averse, from a theory which confounds "spirit" with "matter," obscures their conceptions of God and of the world of spirits, and degrades men to the level of the beasts that perish. This effect of new, or, at least, more vivid views of "things unseen and eternal" was instructively exemplified in the case of the late Robert Hall. Like many an ardent speculatist, he had embraced in early life the system of Materialism; and even after he had entered on the work of the ministry, he could write to a professedly Christian congregation in the following terms: "I am, and have been for a long time, a Materialist, though I have never drawn your attention to this subject in my preaching, because I have always considered it myself, and wished you to consider it, as amere metaphysical speculation. My opinion, however, on this head, is, that the nature of man is simple and uniform, that the thinking powers and faculties are the result of a certain organization of matter,—and that after death he ceases to be conscious until the resurrection."[180]But speculative inquiry was soon to give place to spiritual faith. The death of his revered and pious father brought his mind into realizing contact with an unseen and eternal world; and, in the words of his biographer, distinguished alike for profound science and deep practical piety, "The death of Mr. Hall's father tended greatly to bring his mind to the state of serious thought with which he entered on the pastoral office. Meditating with the deepest veneration upon the unusual excellences of a parent now forever lost to him, he was led to investigate, with renewedearnestness, the truth as well as the value of those high and sacred principles from which his eminent piety and admirable consistency so evidently flowed. He called to mind, too, several occasions on which his father, partly by the force of reason, partly by that of tender expostulation, had exhorted him to abandon the vague and dangerous speculations to which he was prone. Some important changes in Mr. Hall's sentiments resulted from an inquiry conducted under such solemn impressions, and among these may be mentioned his renunciation of Materialism, which, he often declared, heburied in his father's grave."

FOOTNOTES:[145]M. Ad. Franck, "Rapport a l'Academie," Preface, p.XXI.[146]M. Comte, "Cours,"I.44, 89, 141;IV.675;V.45, 303.M. Crousse, "Des Principes," pp. 16, 20, 84, 88.M. Cabanis, "Rapports du Phisique et du Moral de l'Homme," 3 vols.M. Broussais, "Traité de Physiologie appliquée a la Pathologie," 1828.[147]"Systême de la Nature,"I.2, 10, 86, 101, andpassim. This eloquent text-book of the Atheism of the last century is dissected and refuted byM. Bergierin his "Examen du Materialisme," 2 vols. Paris, 1771.[148]M. Comte, "Cours,"I.44, 141.M. Crousse, "Des Principes," pp. 84, 86.Atkitson and Martineau, "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development."[149]Dr. Priestley, "Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colors."Mr. Dugald Stewart, "Philosoph. Essays," p. 187.[150]Dr. Priestley, "Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit;" "Free Discussion of the Doctrine of Materialism;" "Correspondence between Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price."[151]Dr. John Mason Good, "Life of Lucretius," prefixed to his poetical version of "The Nature of Things,"I.XXXVIII.[152]The "fictions of Clairvoyance" may be studied at large in "The Principles of Nature and her Divine Revelations," byAnd. J. Davis, the Poughkeepsie Seer, 2 vols.; and in "The Celestial Telegraph," byM. Cahagnet. An attempt has been made to popularize the doctrine by introducing it into the light literature of the Continent. See "Memoirs of a Physician, Joseph Balsamo," byAlexander Dumas,I.15, 21, 82;II.50, 62, 70. Whether the cases reported by Dr. Gregory deserve to be ranked as facts or fictions is a question which we need not wait to solve, before we reject the "Revelations" of Davis.[153]Dr. Priestley, "Disquisitions," p. 2.[154]"Systême de la Nature,"I.97, 108.[155]Dr. Priestley, "Disquisitions," pp. 27, 38, 60.[156]Mr. Atkinson, "Laws of Man's Nature," p. 17.[157]Dr. Spurzheim, "Philosophical Principles of Phrenology," pp.VI., 86, 100.Professor Dod, "Princeton Theological Essays,"II.376.[158]Dr. Gregory, "Letters on Animal Magnetism," p. 57.[159]Bishop Butler, "Analogy," p.I.c. 1, p. 170.[160]Dr. John Playfair, "Works,"I., Preface,XXIX.[161]C. M. Burnett, M. D., "Philosophy," &c. London, 1850.[162]Bishop Berkeley, "Words,"I.80.[163]Lord Brougham, "Discourse of Natural Theology," p. 238.[164]Stewart, "Elements of Philosophy,"I.5.[165]Locke's"Essay," b.II.c. 23, § 15. Ibid., b.IV.c. 3, § 6.[166]Locke, "Letter to Bishop of Worcester," Works,IV.31.[167]Thomas Carlyle, "Essays,"I.77, 214.[168]C. Bonnet, "Palingenesie Philosophique," 4 vols.,I.7, 47, 52.[169]Dr. Priestley, "Disquisitions," pp. 37, 38.[170]Dr. Thomas Brown, "Lectures," No.XCVI.[171]Atkinson, "Letters," p. 17.[172]Dr. Sam. Clarke's"Third Defence," in reply to Collins, pp. 5, 8, 17.[173]Dr. Sam. Clarke, "First Defence," pp. 11, 16; "Second Defence," pp. 4, 10.[174]Dr. Clarke's"Letter to Mr. Dodwell," pp. 34, 69, 72.Andrew Baxter, "On the Soul,"I.227, 233.[175]Matthew 10: 28.[176]Luke 16: 22; Phil. 1: 23.[177]Dr. Priestley, "Disquisitions," p. 103; "Free Discussion," pp. 66, 237.[178]Flavel, "Pneumatologia; or, Treatise of the Soul,"I.290.Sir M. Hale, "Primitive Origination of Mankind," p. 309.[179]CompareHeb. 12: 9; Num. 16: 22; 27: 16; Zech. 12: 1; Luke 23: 43, 46; Acts 7: 59; Eccles. 12: 7; 2 Cor. 5: 8; James 2: 26; Luke 24: 39; John 10: 25; John 5: 24.[180]Dr. Olinthus Gregory, "Life of Hall," Works,VI.26.

[145]M. Ad. Franck, "Rapport a l'Academie," Preface, p.XXI.

[146]M. Comte, "Cours,"I.44, 89, 141;IV.675;V.45, 303.M. Crousse, "Des Principes," pp. 16, 20, 84, 88.M. Cabanis, "Rapports du Phisique et du Moral de l'Homme," 3 vols.M. Broussais, "Traité de Physiologie appliquée a la Pathologie," 1828.

[147]"Systême de la Nature,"I.2, 10, 86, 101, andpassim. This eloquent text-book of the Atheism of the last century is dissected and refuted byM. Bergierin his "Examen du Materialisme," 2 vols. Paris, 1771.

[148]M. Comte, "Cours,"I.44, 141.M. Crousse, "Des Principes," pp. 84, 86.Atkitson and Martineau, "Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development."

[149]Dr. Priestley, "Discoveries relating to Vision, Light, and Colors."Mr. Dugald Stewart, "Philosoph. Essays," p. 187.

[150]Dr. Priestley, "Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit;" "Free Discussion of the Doctrine of Materialism;" "Correspondence between Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price."

[151]Dr. John Mason Good, "Life of Lucretius," prefixed to his poetical version of "The Nature of Things,"I.XXXVIII.

[152]The "fictions of Clairvoyance" may be studied at large in "The Principles of Nature and her Divine Revelations," byAnd. J. Davis, the Poughkeepsie Seer, 2 vols.; and in "The Celestial Telegraph," byM. Cahagnet. An attempt has been made to popularize the doctrine by introducing it into the light literature of the Continent. See "Memoirs of a Physician, Joseph Balsamo," byAlexander Dumas,I.15, 21, 82;II.50, 62, 70. Whether the cases reported by Dr. Gregory deserve to be ranked as facts or fictions is a question which we need not wait to solve, before we reject the "Revelations" of Davis.

[153]Dr. Priestley, "Disquisitions," p. 2.

[154]"Systême de la Nature,"I.97, 108.

[155]Dr. Priestley, "Disquisitions," pp. 27, 38, 60.

[156]Mr. Atkinson, "Laws of Man's Nature," p. 17.

[157]Dr. Spurzheim, "Philosophical Principles of Phrenology," pp.VI., 86, 100.Professor Dod, "Princeton Theological Essays,"II.376.

[158]Dr. Gregory, "Letters on Animal Magnetism," p. 57.

[159]Bishop Butler, "Analogy," p.I.c. 1, p. 170.

[160]Dr. John Playfair, "Works,"I., Preface,XXIX.

[161]C. M. Burnett, M. D., "Philosophy," &c. London, 1850.

[162]Bishop Berkeley, "Words,"I.80.

[163]Lord Brougham, "Discourse of Natural Theology," p. 238.

[164]Stewart, "Elements of Philosophy,"I.5.

[165]Locke's"Essay," b.II.c. 23, § 15. Ibid., b.IV.c. 3, § 6.

[166]Locke, "Letter to Bishop of Worcester," Works,IV.31.

[167]Thomas Carlyle, "Essays,"I.77, 214.

[168]C. Bonnet, "Palingenesie Philosophique," 4 vols.,I.7, 47, 52.

[169]Dr. Priestley, "Disquisitions," pp. 37, 38.

[170]Dr. Thomas Brown, "Lectures," No.XCVI.

[171]Atkinson, "Letters," p. 17.

[172]Dr. Sam. Clarke's"Third Defence," in reply to Collins, pp. 5, 8, 17.

[173]Dr. Sam. Clarke, "First Defence," pp. 11, 16; "Second Defence," pp. 4, 10.

[174]Dr. Clarke's"Letter to Mr. Dodwell," pp. 34, 69, 72.Andrew Baxter, "On the Soul,"I.227, 233.

[175]Matthew 10: 28.

[176]Luke 16: 22; Phil. 1: 23.

[177]Dr. Priestley, "Disquisitions," p. 103; "Free Discussion," pp. 66, 237.

[178]Flavel, "Pneumatologia; or, Treatise of the Soul,"I.290.Sir M. Hale, "Primitive Origination of Mankind," p. 309.

[179]CompareHeb. 12: 9; Num. 16: 22; 27: 16; Zech. 12: 1; Luke 23: 43, 46; Acts 7: 59; Eccles. 12: 7; 2 Cor. 5: 8; James 2: 26; Luke 24: 39; John 10: 25; John 5: 24.

[180]Dr. Olinthus Gregory, "Life of Hall," Works,VI.26.

The theory of "natural laws" has been applied to disprove or supersede the doctrine of Creation, by means of the principle of Development. It has been further applied tothe government, as well as to thecreation, of the world; and in this connection, it has been urged as a reason for disbelieving the doctrine of God's specialProvidence, and employed to discredit the efficacy ofPrayer.

When thus applied, it is often associated with the recognition of the Divine existence, and cannot, therefore, be ranked among systems avowedly Atheistic. But from the earliest times, it has been the belief of seriously reflecting men, that a system which professedly recognizes the Divine Being as the Creator of the world, but practically excludes Him from the government of its affairs, howevertheoreticallydifferent from Atheism, is substantially the same with it.[181]It was against this Epicurean Atheism that Howe contended in his "Living Temple;" an Atheism which acknowledged gods, but "accounted that they were such as between whom and man there could be no conversation,—ontheirpart by providence, onman'sby religion." And it was against the same Epicurean Atheism that Cudworth contended in his "Intellectual System of the Universe," when he grappled with the objections which hadbeen urged against the doctrine of Providence and the practice of prayer.[182]

It is not wonderful that either Atheists or Pantheists should discard the doctrine of Providence, or deny the efficacy of Prayer. On their principles, there is no room for the recognition of a supreme intelligent Power governing the world, or of a Will capable of controlling the course of human affairs.[183]But while neither Atheism nor Pantheism could be expected to recognize a presiding Providence, since they equally exclude a personal God, it may well seem strange that any system of Theism, whether natural or revealed, should omit or oppose this fundamental truth. For the doctrine of Providence may be established,inductively, by the very same kind of evidence to which every Theist has recourse in proving the existence and perfections of the Divine Being; and, His existence and perfections being proved, the doctrine of Providence may be inferred,deductively, from His character, and from the relations which He sustains towards His creatures, since it cannot be supposed that He who brought them into being, as the products of His own wisdom, goodness, and power, and endowed them with all their various properties for some great and noble end, will ever cease to care for them, or deem them unworthy of His regard. Yet, strong as is the proof arising from these and similar sources, there have occasionally appeared in all ages, and especially at a certain stage in the progress of philosophical speculation, men who admitted, and even maintained, the existence of the Supreme Being, while they denied, nevertheless, the doctrine of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer.

In certain stages of philosophic inquiry, there is a naturaltendency, we think, or at least a strong temptation, to substitute the laws of Nature in the place of God, or to conceive of him as somehow removed to a greater distance from us by means of these laws. Every one must be conscious, to some extent, of this tendency in his own personal experience; he must have felt that when he first began to apprehend any one of the great laws of Nature, and still more when he advanced far enough to see that every department of the physical world is subject to them, so as to exhibit a constant order, an all-pervading harmony, his views of God and Providence became less impressive in proportion as the domain of "law" was extended, and that he was in imminent danger of sinking, if not intotheoretical, at least intopracticalAtheism. "It is a fact," says Dr. Channing, "that Science has not made Natureas expressive of Godin the first instance or, to the beginner in religion, as it was in earlier times. Science reveals a rigid, immutableorder; and this to common minds looks much like self-subsistence, and does not manifest intelligence, which is full of life, variety, and progressive operation. Men in the days of their ignorance saw an immediate Divinity accomplishing an immediate purpose, or expressing an immediate feeling, in every sudden, striking change of Nature, ... and Nature, thus interpreted, became the sign of a present, deeply-interested Deity."[184]That the scientific study of Nature, and especially of certain departments of physical inquiry, has often had the effect of deadening our sense of a present and presiding Deity, of obscuring or perplexing our views of the connection of God with His works, and of virtually removing Him from all efficient control over the creatures of His hands, is attested, not only by the published speculations of some, but also by the inward consciousness of many more, who have never avowed infidel sentimentsto others, nor even, at least articulately, to themselves. It may be useful, therefore, to inquire somewhat particularly, whether, and how far, the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second causes" should affect our views of the Providence which God exercises over us, or of the Prayers which we address to Him.

The existence of "natural laws," and the operation of "second causes," are often explicitly recognized, and always obviously implied, in Scripture. Revelation is not designed to explain the nature or the action of either; but it assumes the reality of both.[185]It is plainly implied in the veryfirstchapter of Genesis, that, at the era of creation, God gavea definite constitution, implying peculiar properties and powers, to all the various classes of objects which were then called into being. He created light, with its peculiar properties; He created water, with its peculiar properties. He created everything "after its kind." The distinction between one created thing and another, such as light and water, and the distinction also between "genera" and "species," especially in the case of plants, trees, fish, fowl, cattle, and reptiles, are very strongly marked in the sacred narrative: and this distinction implies the existence of certain properties peculiar to each of these objects or classes,—properties not common to them all, but distinctive and characteristic, which made them to be, severally, what they are, and which amount to adistinct definite constitution. These properties, account for them as we may, areessential to their existence as distinct objects in nature, and cannot be separated from them as long as the objects themselves exist. Light has certain properties, and so has water, and so has every distinct order of vegetable or animal life, which make them to be what they severally are, and which cannot be severed from them otherwise than by the destruction of their very nature. These properties are known to us by theireffects; and hence the substances or beings to which they respectively belong are regarded by us ascauses; and their operation as causes is regulated by certain "laws," imposed upon them by the same Omnipotent Will which called them into being and endowed them with all their peculiar properties and powers. The operation of these "natural causes," and the existence of certain "established laws" by which they are regulated, are explicitly recognized or obviously assumed in Scripture.[186]"Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth; they continue this dayaccording to thine ordinances, for all arethy servants."

The established constitution and settled order of Nature, as well as the "laws," "decrees," or "ordinances" by which it is regulated, are thus explicitly recognized in Scripture itself; and there are several reasons why this fact should be deliberately considered. First, because it seems to have been assumed by our opponents, that the discovery of "natural laws," and the admission of "second causes," must necessarily be adverse, and may ultimately prove fatal, to the cause of Religion; or, in other words, that Faith must recede just in proportion as Science advances; whereas the Bible speaks both of natural objects, possessing peculiar properties and powers, and also of natural laws, as God's "ordinances" both in the heavens and the earth, but speaks nevertheless of a presiding Providence orgoverning Will, without ever supposing that the two are incompatible or mutually exclusive. Secondly, because some of the less intelligent members of the Christian community itself seem to be influenced, to a certain extent, by the very same error which we ascribe to our opponents; and evince a very groundless jealousy of Science, as if they feared that the progress of physical research might have the effect of weakening the grounds on which they believe in the care of Providence and the efficacy of Prayer; whereas the Bible gives no countenance to any jealousies or fears of this kind, but affirms God's providential government and encourages man's believing prayer, at the very time when it founds upon and appeals to the established constitution and course of Nature.[187]And thirdly, because a right apprehension of the properties and powers belonging to created beings, and of the laws to which they are severally subject, will be found to conduce largely to a clear and comprehensive view of the relation which God sustains to His works. His Providence, as it is declared and exemplified in Scripture, hasa necessary reference to the natural constitution of things; and hence the Westminster Confession, in the spirit of the highest philosophy, and with admirable discrimination and accuracy, affirms that "God, the Creator of all things, doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern, all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy Providence;" that "by the same Providence, He ordereth all things to fall outaccording to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently;" and that "God in His ordinary Providence maketh use of means, yet is free to work without, above, and against them at His pleasure."[188]

"Natural laws" and "second causes" are thus established by experience, and explicitly recognized in Scripture. It isnecessary, however, especially with reference to certain modern speculations, to discriminate between the two; and to show that while they are closely related and equally legitimate objects of philosophical inquiry, they are nevertheless radically different, as well as easily distinguishable, from each other. It is the favorite doctrine of the Positive school in France that the knowledge of "causes" is utterly interdicted to man, and that the only science to which he should aspire consists exclusively in the knowledge of "phenomena," and their coördination under "general laws." M. Comte explicitly avows this doctrine, and Mr. Mill and Mr. Lewes give it their implied sanction.[189]According to their theory, all Science is limited to "the laws of the coexistence and succession of phenomena," and "causes" are not only unknown, but incapable of being known. And to such an extent is this doctrine carried that M. Comte anticipates the possible ultimate reduction ofall"phenomena" tooneall-comprehensive, all-pervading "law," as the highest perfection of Science and the decisive extinction of Religion; while Mr. Mill, doubtful of this being possible, thinks it conceivable, at least, that there may be worlds, different from our own, in which events occurwithout causesof any kind, and even without anyfixed law.

In regard to this theory it might well be asked, how it comes to pass that human language, which is the natural exponent of human thought, should contain, in every one of its multifarious dialects, so many expressions which denote or imply "causation," if it be true that all knowledge of causes is utterly inaccessible to the human faculties? Nay, why is it that the axiom of causation needs only to be announced to command the immediate assent of the whole human race?

It will be found, we believe, that even in the case of thosewho contend for this theory, the instinctive and spontaneous belief in "causation" is not extinguished nor even impaired; but that they seek merelyto substitute "laws" for "causes," or rather to representthe laws of natureas the onlyefficient causesof all natural phenomena. They thus identify or confound two things which it is of the utmost consequence to discriminate and keep distinct. There is an ambiguity, however, in the common usage of the term "law," which may seem to give a plausible appearance to their theory, or at least to vail over and conceal its radical fallacy. It denotes sometimes the mere statement ofa general fact, or the result of a comprehensive generalization, founded on the observation and comparison of many particular facts; it denotes at other timesthe force or power, whatever that may be, which produces any given set of phenomena. The "law" of gravitation, for example, is often used to denote nothing more than thegeneral fact, ascertained by experience, that all bodies near the surface of the earth tend to its centre with a velocity proportioned directly to their mass, and inversely to the square of their distance; and when it is employed inthissense, it determines nothing as to the "cause" which is in operation,—it affirms merely a fact, or a fact reduced to a formula, and confirmed by universal experience. But it is often transferred, at least mentally and almost perhaps unconsciously, to denote some "power" which is instinctively supposed to be in operation when any change is observed,—a "power" which may be conceived of, either as apropertyinherent in mind or in matter, or as aforce, such as the Divine volition, acting upon itab extra; and it is only in the latter of these two senses, as denoting a "cause," properly so called, and not a mere fact or law, that it can be applied to account for any phenomenon. In like manner, the "laws of motion" are merely the generalized results of our experience and observation relative to the direction, velocity, and other phenomena of moving bodies; but "motion," although it isregulated, is not produced, by these laws; it depends on a "cause," whatever that may be, which is not only distinguishable, but different from them all. Yet when we speak of the "laws of motion," we may imperceptibly include, in our conception of them, thatforceorpowerwhich impels the body, as well as the merelaworrulewhich regulates its movements. It were a mere unprofitable dispute about words, did we entertain and discuss the question, whether the import of the term "law" might not be so extended as to include under itpowers,properties, andcauses, as well as therulesandconditionsof their operation: for, even were this question answered in the affirmative, there would still be room for a real distinction between the two, and there could be no reason for saying that the knowledge of "causes," as distinguished from "laws," is wholly inaccessible to the human faculties. There is thus a real and important distinction between "laws" considered simply as general facts, and "causes" considered as efficient agents; and the two cannot be reduced to the same category, otherwise than by giving such an extension to the term "law" as shall make it comprehensive ofcausation; and even then, the distinction remains between the mere formulas of Science and the actual forces of Nature. "The laws of Nature," says the sagacious Dr. Reid, "are therulesaccording to which the effects are produced, but there must be acausewhich operates according to these rules. The rules of navigation never navigated a ship; the rules of architecture never built a house."[190]

It might be shown, were it needful for our present purpose, that the object of Science isthreefold: first, to ascertain particular facts;secondly, to reduce these facts under general laws; and,thirdly, to investigate the "causes" by which bothfactsandlawsmay be accounted for. The exclusion of anyone of the three would be fatal to Philosophy as well as Religion; and it is prohibited by the "natural laws" of the human mind, which has the capacity not only of observing particular facts, but of comparing and contrasting them so as to deduce from them a knowledge of general laws, and which is also imbued with an instinctive and spontaneous tendency to ascribe every change that is observed to some "power" or "cause" capable of producing such an effect. It might further be shown, that in every instance a "cause," properly so called, is asubstanceorbeingpossessing certain properties or powers,—properties which may be called, if you will, the "laws" of that substance, but which necessarily include the idea ofcausationorefficiency; that in the case of mere physical agency, there must be a plurality of substances so related as that the one shall act on the other in certain conditions which are indispensable to their mutual action; and that these requirements leave ample room for those manifold adjustments and adaptations on which the argument from "design," in favor of the Perfections and Providence of God, is founded. The mere recognition of "general laws," considered simply as the "coördination of facts," and especially as exclusive of the idea of causation or efficiency, can never satisfy the demands of reason, nor exhaust the legitimate functions of Science. For, in the expressive words of Sir John Herschell, "It is high time that philosophers, both physical and others, should come to some nearer agreement than seems to prevail, as to the meaning they intend to convey in speaking of causes and causation. On the one hand, we are told that the grand object of physical inquiry is to explain the nature of phenomena by referring them to theircauses; on the other, that the inquiry into 'causes' is altogether vain and futile, and that Science has no concern but with the discovery of 'laws.' Which of these is the truth? Or are both views of the matter trueon a different interpretation of the terms? Whichever view we may take, or whicheverinterpretation we may adopt, there is one thing certain,—the extreme inconvenience of such a state of language. This can only be reformed by a careful analysis of the widest of all human generalizations, disentangling from one another the innumerable shades of meaning which have got confounded together in its progress, and establishing among them a rational classification and nomenclature.... A 'law' may be arule of action, but it is notaction. The great First Agent may lay down a rule of action for himself, and that rule may become known to man by observation of its uniformity; but, constituted as our minds are, and having that conscious knowledge ofcausationwhich is forced upon us by the reality of the distinction betweenintendinga thing, anddoingit, we can never substitute the 'rule' for the 'act.'"[191]

But while the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second causes" are equally admitted, and yet duly discriminated, large room is still left for diversities of opinion or of statement in regard tothe precise relation which God sustains to His works, and especially in regard tothe nature and method of His agency in connection with the use of "second causes." Hence have arisen the various theories which have appeared successively in the history of Philosophy, and which have had for their avowed object the explanation of theconnection between God and Nature, or the conciliation of Theology with Science.[192]Hence, first of all, the theory of "occasional causes," as taught by Father Malebranche, with the laudable, but, as we think, mistaken, design of vindicating the Divine agency in Providence by virtually superseding every other power in Nature;—a theory which represents physical agencies as the mereoccasions, and God as the solecauseof all changes, which teaches that a healthy eye, with the presenceof light, is not the cause of vision, but the occasion only of that Divine interposition by which alone we are enabled to see, and that a man's desire or volition to walk is not the cause of his walking, but the occasion merely of that Divine interposition which alone puts the proper muscles in motion. Hence, secondly, the theory of "preëstablished harmony" as taught by Leibnitz;—a theory which was mainly designed to explain the relation subsisting between the soul and the body, but which involves principles bearing on the general doctrine of cause and effect, and applicable to the relation subsisting between God and His works. This theory teaches that mind and body, although closely united, have no real influence on each other, that each of them acts by its own properties and powers, and that their respective operations exactly correspond to each other by virtue of a "preëstablished harmony" between the two, just as one clock may be so adjusted as to keep time with another, although each has its own moving power, and neither receives any part of its motions from the other. This theory, therefore, denies everything like causal action between mind and matter; and when it is extended, as it may legitimately be, to the relation between God and the world, it would seem to imply the coequal existence and independence of both, and the impossibility of any causal relation between the two. The manifest defects of these theories have given rise to athird, which, in one of its forms, has been generally adopted by Divines,—the theory of "instrumental causes."

This theory has assumed two distinct and very different forms. In the first, all natural effects are ascribed to powersimpartedto created beings, andinherentin them; that is, to powers which are supposed to have been conferred at the era of Creation, and to be still sustained by God's will in Providence, subject, however, to be suspended or revoked according to His pleasure. In the second, which resembles in some respects the doctrine of "occasional causes," all natural effectsare ascribed to powers notimparted, butimpressed, not belonging to the natural agent, but communicated by impulseab extra; and God's will is represented as the only efficient cause in Nature. In both forms of the theory, the agency of God and the instrumentality of natural means are, in a certain sense, acknowledged; but in theformer, second causes are apt to be regarded as if they were self-existent and independent of God; in thelatter, second causes are apt to be virtually annulled, and all events to be regarded as the immediate effects of Divine volition. Both extremes are dangerous. For, on the one hand, the operation of second causes cannot be regarded as necessary and independent, without severing the tie which connects the created universe with the will of the Supreme; and, on the other hand, the operation of second causes cannot be excluded or denied, without virtually making God's willthe only efficient cause, and thereby charging directly and immediately on Him, not only all the physical changes which occur in Nature, but also all the volitions and actions of His creatures. In order to guard against these opposite and equally dangerous extremes, we must hold the real existence and actual operation of "second causes;" while we are careful, at the same time, to show both that whatever powers belong to any created being were originally conferred by God, and also that they are still preserved and perpetuated by Him, subject to his control, and liable to be suspended or revoked, according to the pleasure of His will. We would thus haveone First, andMANY SECOND CAUSES; the formersupreme, the lattersubordinate; really distinct, but not equally independent, since "second causes" are, from their very nature, subject to the dominion and control of that Omniscient Mind which called them into being, and which knows how to overrule them all for the accomplishment of His great designs.

We are aware that some are unwilling to acknowledge theefficiencyof any "second causes," and seek to resolve all events,even such as are brought about by the volitions of men, into the will of God, as the only Agent in Nature. Others, again, admitting the existence of created spirits, and their operation as real causes, are unwilling to acknowledge any active powers inmatter, and are anxious to show thatmind, andmind only, can be an efficient cause. We see no reason for this extreme jealousy of "second causes" either in the mental or the material world. In the mental world, they cannot be denied, as distinct, although subordinate and dependent, agencies, without virtually making God's willthe only causein Nature, and thereby representing Him as thecause of sin, if sin, indeed, could exist on that supposition, or without destroying the distinct individuality and personal responsibility of man. Man must be regarded as a distinct, though dependent,agent, and, as such, a real, though subordinate,cause; otherwise every action, whether good or evil, must be ascribed directly and immediately to the efficiency of the Divine will, andto that alone. And in the material world, "second causes" can as little be dispensed with; for every theory, even the most meagre, must acknowledge the existence ofsomepower or property in matter, were it only the passive power orvis inertiæon which all the laws of motion depend. And ifthiscan be admitted as a power inherent in matter and inseparable from it, we cannot see why the existence ofotherpowers, not incompatible with this, should be deemed a whit more derogatory to the dominion and providence of God. In a certain sense, indeed, God's will may be said to be the First, the Supreme Cause of all, since nothing can happen without His permission or appointment: but, in this sense, the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second causes" are by no means excluded; they are only held to have been originated at first, and ever afterwards sustained by the Divine Will, the latter beingsupreme, the formersubordinate. It may also be said, in acertain sense, that Mind only is active:[193]for all the properties and powers of matter are the results of the Divine volition, and their mode of action is regulated and determined by "laws" which God has imposed; but it were unphilosophical, as well as unscriptural, to infer from this that He is the only Agent in the Universe; it is enough to say that He created the system of Nature, and that He still upholds and governs it by His Providence.

It must be evident that the speculations to which we have referred have a close connection with the argument, founded on natural evidence, for the being, perfections, and providence of God. That argument, in so far as it depends on the mutual adaptations between natural objects and the nice adjustments of natural laws, might be seriously impaired by supposing that there is really only one cause in Nature; whereas the ascription of certain properties and powers to created beings, whether mental or material, can have no effect in diminishing its force, since the evidence depends not so much on the phenomena ofphysical, as on those ofmoralcausation.

On the whole, we conclude that the existence of "natural laws" and the operation of "second causes" are recognized alike by the sacred writers and by sound philosophy; and that neither the one nor the other ought to be regarded as adverse to any doctrine which, as Christian Theists, we are concerned to defend.

"The Constitution of Man considered in Relation to External Objects,"[194]—such is the title of a popular, and, in some respects, instructive work, which has obtained, partly through the aid of an endowment, extensive circulation among the reading class of artisans and tradesmen. Written in a lucid style, and illustrated by numerous facts in Natural History and Philosophy, it is skilfully adapted to the capacities and tastes of common readers, and it is not wonderful that it should have exerted considerable influence on the public mind. The character of that influence, and its tendency to induce a religious or irreligious frame of spirit, has been made a matter of controversial discussion. On the one hand, Mr. Combe tells us that "'The Constitution of Man' not only admits the existence of God, but is throughout devoted to the object of expounding and proving that He exercises a real, practical, and intelligible government of this world, rewarding virtue with physical and moral well-being, and punishing vice with want and suffering." On the other hand, it is manifest, beyond the possibility of doubt or denial, that if his professed Theism has subjected him to the charge of being an inconsequent thinker in some of the organs of avowed Atheism,[195]his favorite arguments in support of "government by natural law" have been applied by himself, and eagerly welcomed by others, as conclusive objections to the doctrine of a special Providence and the efficacy of Prayer.

We do not object to the limitation of his inquiry to the onepoint of the relation subsisting between "the Constitution of Man and External Objects,"—that is a perfectly legitimate, and might be a highly instructive field of investigation; but we do object to his utter forgetfulness of that limitation in the progress of his work, and to his attempt to introduce a variety of other topics which are manifestly alien from his professed design. If he meant to discuss merely the relation between the constitution of man and external objects, he had nothing whatever to do with the far higher and more comprehensive doctrine respecting the relation between the constitution of man and the government of God, and, least of all, with therevealeddoctrines of a special Providence, of a fall into a state of sin, of death as its wages, and of "spiritual influences" by which the ruin occasioned by the fall may be redressed; and yet these topics, foreign as they are to the professed design of his work, are all introduced, and treated, too, in a way that is fitted, if not designed, to shake the confidence of his readers in what have hitherto been regarded as important articles of the Christian faith. It has received this significant testimony, "'Combe's Constitution of Man' would be worth a hundred New Testaments on the banks of the Ganges."[196]

There aretwo points, especially, on which he comes more directly into collision with our present argument:

1. He speaks as if God governed the universeonlyby "natural laws," so as to exclude any other dispensation of Providence.

2. He speaks as if the "physical and organic" laws of Nature possessed the same authority and imposed the same obligation as the "moral" laws of Conscience and Revelation; and as if the breach or neglect of the former werepunishablein the same sense, and for the same reason, as the transgression of the latter.

Next to the omission of all reference to a future state, and the total exclusion of the connection which subsists between the temporal and the eternal under the Divine government, we hold thesetwoto be the capital defects of his treatise; and it may be useful, in the present state of public opinion, to offer a few remarks upon each of them.

In regard to thefirst, we need not repeat what we have already explicitly declared, that God does govern the worldin partby means of "natural laws" and "second causes;" but, not content with this concession, Mr. Combe speaks as if He governed the worldonlyby these means, to the exclusion of everything like a "special Providence," or "Divine influences." It is not so much in his dogmatic statements as in his illustrative examples that the real tendency of his theory becomes apparent. Thus he speaks of "the most pious and benevolent missionaries sailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but, embarking in an unsound ship, they are drowned by their disobeying a physical law, without their destruction being averted by their morality;" and, on the other hand, of "the greatest monsters of iniquity" embarking in a staunch and strong ship, and escaping drowning "in circumstances exactly similar to those which would send the missionaries to the bottom." Thus, again, he speaks of plague, fever, and ague, as resulting from the neglect of "organic laws," and as resulting from it so necessarily that they could be averted neither by Providence nor by Prayer; and he illustrates his views by the mental distress of the wife of Ebenezer Erskine, and the recorded experience of Mrs. Hannah More.[197]It cannot be doubted, we think, that in all these cases he speaks as if God governed the worldonlyby natural laws; and that he does not recognize any special Providence or any answer to Prayer, but resolves all events into the operation of these "laws."

Now, there are evidentlytwosuppositions that may be entertained on this subject: either, that God ordersallevents to fall out according to "natural laws" and by means of "second causes;" or, that while Hegenerallymakes use of means in the ordinary course of His Providence, He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing directly and immediately, when He sees cause, for the accomplishment of His sovereign will. These two suppositions seem to exhaust the only possible alternatives in a question of this kind; and, strange as it may at first sight appear to be, it is nevertheless true that neither the one nor the other is necessarily adverse to the doctrine for which we now contend. Even on the first supposition,—that God ordersallevents to fall out according to "natural laws" and by means of "second causes,"—there might still be room, not, indeed, for miraculous interposition, but for the exercise of a special Providence and even for an answer to prayer; for it should never be forgotten that, among the "second causes" created and governed by the Supreme Will, there are other agencies besides those that are purely physical,—there are intelligent beings, belonging both to the visible and invisible worlds, who may be employed, for ought we know to the contrary, as "ministers in fulfilling His will," and whose agency may, without any miraculous interference with the established order of Nature, bring about important practical results, just as man's own agency is admitted to have the power of arranging, modifying, and directing the elements of Nature, while it has no power to suspend or reverse any "natural law." And if God is ordinarily pleased to make use of means, why should it be thought incredible that He may make use of the ministry of intelligent beings, whether they be men or angels, for the accomplishment of His designs? But on the second supposition,—that while He generally makes use of means in the ordinary course of His Providence, He reserves the liberty and the power of interposing directly andimmediately when He sees cause,—the doctrine of a special Providence, including every interposition, natural or supernatural, is at once established; and we cannot see how Mr. Combe, as a professed believer in Revelation, which must of course be regarded as a supernatural effect of "Divine influence," can consistently deny God's direct and immediate agency in Providence, since he is compelled to admit it at least ontwogreat occasions, namely, the Creation of the world, and the promulgation of His revealed will.

In regard, again, to the second capital defect or error of his system, it may be conclusively shown that he confounds, or fails at least duly to discriminate, two things which are radically different, when he speaks as if the "physical and organic laws" of Nature had the sameauthority, and imposed the same obligations, as the "moral laws" of Conscience and Revelation, and as if the breach or neglect of the former werepunishable, in the same sense, and for the same reason, as the transgression of the latter.

The declared object of his treatise is twofold: first, to illustrate the relation subsisting between the "natural laws" and the "constitution of man;" and, secondly, to prove theindependent operationof these laws, asa key to the explanation of the Divine government. In illustrating the relation between the "natural laws" and the "constitution of man," he attempts to show that the natural laws require obedience not less than the moral, and that they inflict punishment on disobedience: "The peculiarity of the new doctrine is that these (the physical, organic, and moral laws) operate independently of each other; that each requires obedience to itself; that each, in its own specific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience; and that human beings are happy in proportion to the extent to which they place themselves in accordance withallof these Divine institutions." In regard to these "natural laws,"—including the physical, the organic, the intellectual, and themoral,—fourpositions are laid down: first, that they are independent of each other; secondly, that obedience or disobedience to each of them is followed by reward or punishment; thirdly, that they are universal and invariable; and, fourthly, that they are in harmony with the "constitution of man."[198]

Now, in this theory of "natural laws," especially as it is applied to the doctrines of Providence and Prayer, there seem to bethreeradical defects:

1. Mr. Combe speaks ofobedienceanddisobedienceto the "physical and organic" laws, as if theycouldbe obeyed or disobeyed in the same sense and in the same way as the "moral" laws, and as if they imposed an obligation on man which it would be sinful to disregard. He has not duly considered that the moral law differs from the physical and organic laws of Nature in two important respects: first, that while the formermay, the lattercannot, be broken or violated by man; and secondly, that while the former does impose an imperative obligation which is felt by every conscience, the latter have either no relation to the conscience at all, or, if they have, it is collateral and indirect only, and arises not from the mere existence of such laws, but from the felt obligation of amoral law belonging to our own nature, which prescribesprudenceas a duty with reference to our personal conduct in the circumstances in which we are placed.

That the "physical and organic" laws cannot be broken or violated in the same sense in which the "moral law" may be transgressed, is evident from the simple consideration that the violation of a natural law, were it possible,would be not a sin, but a miracle! And that these laws impose no real obligation on the conscience is further manifest, because we hold it to be perfectly lawful to counteract, so far as we can, the operationof one physical or organic law by employing the agency of another, as in the appliances of Mechanics, the experiments of Chemistry, and the art of Navigation. When the aëronaut inflates his balloon with a gas specifically lighter than atmospheric air, or the ship-builder constructs vessels of wood or iron, so that when filled with air they shall be lighter than water, and float with their cargo on its surface, each is attempting to counteract the law of gravitation by the application of certain other related laws: but no one ever dreams of theirdisobeyingGod in thus availing themselves of one physical agent to counterpoise another. The "moral law," however, cannot be treated in the same way, and that simply because it is generically different.

It is true, thatindirectlythe laws of Nature, when known, may and ought to regulate our practical conduct; not, however, by virtue of any obligation imposedby themon our conscience, but solely by virtue of that law ofmoral prudencewhich springs from conscience itself, and which teaches us that weoughtso to act with reference to outward objects as to secure, so far as we can, our own safety and happiness, and the welfare of our fellow-men. But there can be no greater blunder than to confoundthe laws of natural objectswiththe law of human conduct; and into this deplorable blunder Mr. Combe has allowed himself to fall. Throughout the whole of his statements respecting the "natural laws," there are two things included under one name, which are perfectly distinct and separate from each other. In the first place, there are the laws which belong to the constitution of natural objects, and which regulate their mutual action on one another: in the second place, there are, in the words of a late sagacious layman, "ruleswhich the intellect of man is able to deduce for the regulation of his own conduct, by means of his knowledge of those laws which govern the phenomena of Nature. These last are perfectly distinct from the former; and it is a monstrous confusion of ideas tomix them up together.... The true state of the case is this,—it is for our interest to study these natural arrangements, and to accommodate our conduct to them, as far as we know them; and in doing so, weobey, not those laws of Nature, physical and organic, but the laws ofprudence and good sense, arising from a due use of our moral and intellectual faculties."[199]Another acute writer,[200]who states the substance of the argument in very few words, has shown that the theory of "natural laws," as taught by Mr. Combe, is true in one sense and false in another: "It istrue, first, that the Creator has bestowed constitutions on physical objects; in other words, the constitutions which physical objects possess weregiventhem, given during His pleasure; secondly, that the constitutions of physical objects aredefinite,—that is, they are distinct, individual, and incapable of transmutationby natural causes; thirdly, that no power but the power of the Creator can vary their constitutions. But it isnot true, first, that any mode of action of a physical object is otherwise inherent in it, than as it is the will of God that that object shouldnowpresent that mode of action. Nor is it true, secondly, that it is beyond the power of God to vary, when He pleases, either temporarily or permanently, the constitution of physical objects." He further shows that, on Mr. Combe's principle of "natural laws" being all equally Divine institutions which must beobeyed, "human obedience is a very complicated and perplexing affair, so complicated and so perplexing as to involve positive contradictions;" that "the very same act is required by one law, and forbidden by another, both laws being equally Divine;" and that "we sometimes cannot obey both the 'organic' and the 'moral' laws." He concludes that "physical laws ought not to be confounded with laws of human conduct;" that "these we always must obey,and those we may often, without deserving blame, boldly disregard;" and that "by commingling distinct classes of 'natural laws,' Mr. Combe introduces into his system dangerous error and gross absurdity."

2. Another radical defect in this theory of "natural laws" consists in its representing the consequences of our ignorance or neglect of them aspunishmentsin the same sense in which moral delinquencies are said to be followed by penal inflictions. There is something here which is totally at variance with the instinctive feelings and moral convictions of mankind. Mr. Combe affirms that each of the three great classes of "natural laws" requiresobedienceto itself, and that each, in its own specific way, rewards obedience and punishes disobedience. And he gives, as one example, the case of the most pious and benevolent missionaries sailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, but embarking in an unsound ship, and being drownedby disobeying a "natural law;"as another, the case of "a child or an aged person, stumbling into the fire, through mere lack of physical strength to keep out of it;" as another, the case of "an ignorant child, groping about for something to eat and drink, and stumbling on a phial of laudanum, drinking it and dying;" and as another, the case of "a slater slipping from the roof of a high building, in consequence of a stone of the ridge having given way as he walked upright along it."[201]In all these cases, the accident or misfortune which befalls the individual is represented as thepunishmentconnected with the neglect or transgression of a "natural law," just as remorse, shame, conviction, and condemnation may be the punishment for a moral offence. In other words, a child who ignorantly drinks laudanum ispunished with death, in the same sense, and for the same reason, that the murderer is punished with death for shedding the blood of a fellow-creature; and the poor slaterwho misses his foot, and falls, most unwillingly, from a roof or parapet, ispunished with death, just as a man would be who threw himself overwith the intentionof committing suicide! Surely there is some grave error here,—an error opposed to the surest dictates of our moral nature, and one that cannot be glossed over by any apologue, however ingeniously constructed, to show the evil effects which would follow from a suspension of the general laws of Nature. For, in the words of Mr. Scott, it is only where "the law is previously known"—and not only so, but where the "circumstances which determine the effect might be foreseen"—that "the pleasures or pains annexed to actions can properly be termedrewards and punishments;" for "these have reference to the state of mind of the party who is to be rewarded or punished; it is the intention or disposition of the mind, and not the mere act of the body, that is ever considered as obedience or disobedience, or thought worthy, in a moral sense, of either reward or punishment." And as the theory is thus subversive of all our ideas of moral retribution, so it demands of man a kind of obedience which it isimpossiblefor him to render, sinceallthe laws of Nature, andallthe states of particular things at a given time, cannot possibly be known by the ignorant many, nor even by the philosophic few. The philosopher, not less than the peasant, may perish through the explosion of a steam engine, or the unsoundness of a ship, or the casual ignition of his dwelling; and that, too, without blame or punishment being involved in either case. On Mr. Combe's theory, it would seem to be necessary that every one should be a man of science, if he would avoidsinandpunishment; and yet, unfortunately, the ablest man of science is not exempt, in the present state of his knowledge, from the same calamities which befall his less enlightened, but not less virtuous, neighbors.

These views are strikingly confirmed by the remarks of a writer in "The Reasoner," who blames Mr. Combe for complicating his argument unnecessarily and uselessly with some of the truths of Theism, and who thinks that the doctrine of "natural laws" can only be consistently maintained on the ground of Atheism. "If the system of Nature," he says, "be viewed by itself, without any reference to a Divine Author or all-perfect Creator,—merely as an isolated system of facts,—no comparison could be made, no reconciliation would be necessary, and the system of Nature would be regarded as the result of some unknown cause, a combination of good and evil, and no more to be censured or wondered at for being what it is, than any single substance or fact in Nature excites censure or surprise on account of its peculiar constitution.... The assumption of a Supernatural Being as the author and director of the laws of Nature appears to me to be attended with several mischievous results. First, you make every infringement of the laws of Nature an offence against the supposed Divine Legislator, which, to a pious and conscientious mind, must give rise to distressing remorse.... Again, under this view, the penalties incurred will often be very unjust, oppressive, and cruel; as where persons are placed in circumstances that compel them to violate the laws of Nature, as when they are obliged to pursue some unwholesome employment which injures their health and shortens their lives; or where the penalty is incurred by an accident, as when a person breaks a leg or an arm, or is killed by a fall; or where a person is materially or fatally injured in endeavoring to save another person from injury or death. In such cases as these, to represent the unavoidable pain or death incurred or undergone for an act of beneficence, as a punishment inflicted for a transgression of the laws of God the Divine Legislator, is to violate all our notions of justice and right, to say nothing of goodness or mercy, and to represent the Divine Being as grossly unjust and cruelly vindictive.... Again, if all suffering, however unavoidably incurred, is to be regarded as a punishment fromthe Divine Legislator, to attempt to alleviate or remove the suffering thus incurred would be to fly in the face of the Divine authority, by endeavoring to set aside the punishment it had inflicted; just as it would be an opposition to the authority of human laws to rescue a prisoner from custody, or deliver a culprit from punishment."[202]

3. We deem it another radical defect in Mr. Combe's theory of "natural laws," that he represents thedistinct existence and independent action of these lawsas "the key to the Divine government," as the one principle which explains all apparent irregularities, and accounts satisfactorily for the casualties and calamities of human life. We cannot doubt, indeed, either the wisdom or the benevolence of that constitution of things under which we live, nor dispute the value and importance of those laws according to which the world is ordinarily governed. We admit that the suspension of any one of these laws, except perhaps on some signal occasion of miraculous interposition, would go far to unsettle and derange the existing economy. But "natural laws"—whether viewed individually or collectively, and whether considered as acting independently of each other, or as mutually related and interdependent—cannot afford of themselves any key to the Divine government, or any solution of the difficulties of Providence. We must rise to a far higher platform if we would survey the whole scheme of the Divine administration: we must consider, not merelythe independent operationof the several classes of "natural laws," but also theirmutual relations, as distinct but connected parts of one vast system, in which the "physical and organic" laws are made subordinate and subservient to the "moral," under the superintendence of that Supreme Intelligence which makes the things that are "seen and temporal" to minister to those things which are "unseen and eternal;" we must carefullydiscriminate, as Bishop Butler has done, between the mere "natural government" which is common to man with the inferior and irresponsible creation, and the higher "moral government" which is peculiar to intelligent and accountable agents; and we must seek to know how far—the reality of both being admitted—the former is auxiliary or subservient to the latter, and whether, on the whole, the system is fitted to generate that frame of mind, and to inculcate those lessons of truth, which are appropriate to the condition of man, as a subject of moral discipline in a state of probation and trial. Nothing short of this will suffice for the explanation of the Divine government, or for the satisfaction of the human mind. It is felt to be a mere insult to the understandings, and a bitter mockery to the feelings, of men, to talk only of "natural laws," or even of their "independent action" in such a case, to tell a weeping mother that her child died, and died too as the transgressor of a wise and salutary "natural law" which establishes a certain relation between opium and the nervous system: for, grant that the law is wise and salutary, grant that evil would result from its abolition, grant even that it acts independently of any other law, physical or moral, still the profounder question remains, whether such an event as the death of a tender child, through the operation of a law of which that child was necessarily ignorant, can properly be regarded as a punishment inflicted by Divine justice? and whether a theory of this kind can afford "a key to the government of God?"

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