Such are some of the radical and incurable defects of Mr. Combe's theory of "natural laws." We ascribe it to him simply because he has been the most recent and the most popular expounder of it. But it is not original, nor in any sense peculiar to him alone. He acknowledges his obligations in this respect to a manuscript work of Dr. Spurzheim, entitled, "A Sketch of the Natural Laws of Man;" and he refers, somewhat incidentally, to Volney's "Law of Nature,"published originally as a Catechism, and afterwards reprinted under the title, "La Loi Naturelle;ou, Principes Physiques de la Morale." The same theory, in substance, had been broached in the "Systême de la Nature," andthereit was applied in support of the atheistic conclusions of that remarkable treatise. But it may be said to have beenmethodizedby Volney; and in his treatise it is exhibited in a form adapted to popular instruction.[203]There is a striking resemblance between his speculations and those of Mr. Combe. He, too, acknowledges the existence of God; but virtually supersedes His Providence by the substitution of "natural laws." The "law of Nature" is defined as "the constant order by whichGodgoverns the world," and is represented as the most universal "rule of action." That law is supposed to be a command or a prohibition to act in certain cases, accompanied with the natural sanction ofreward and punishment. After giving several examples of "natural laws," which are all merelygeneral factsor the generalized results of experience, he describes man's relation to these laws almost in the words of Mr. Combe. "Since all these, and similar facts," he says, "are unchangeable, constant, and regular, there result for man as many true laws to which he must conform, with the express clause of apenalty attached to their infraction, or of a benefit attached to their observance; so that if a man shall pretend to see well in the dark, if he acts in opposition to the course of the seasons or the action of the elements, if he pretends to live under water without being drowned, or to touch fire without being burned, or to deprive himself of air without being suffocated, or to drink poison without being destroyed, he receives for each of these infractions of the 'natural laws' a corporealpunishment, and one that is proportioned to his offence; while,on the contrary, if he observes and obeys every one of these laws, in their exact and regular relations to him, he will preserve his existence, and make it as happy as it can be."
This code of "natural laws" is then described by Volney as possessing no fewer thantenpeculiar characteristics, which give it a decided preëminence over every other moral system, whether human or Divine,—as beingprimitive, immediate, universal, invariable, evident, reasonable, just, peaceful, beneficial, and alonesufficient. But it is so only when viewed in connection with the miserably low and meagre system of morals with which it is avowedly associated. For when morals are described as a mere physical science, founded on man's organization, his interests and passions,—when the treatise, according to itssecondtitle, is professedly an attempt to expound thephysical principles of morals,—and when, in pursuance of this plan, all the principles of Ethics are rigorously reduced toone, namely, the principle of self-preservation, which is enforced, as a duty, by the only sanctions of pleasure and pain,—it is not wonderful that,for such an end, the "natural laws" might be held sufficient: but it is wonderful that any mind capable of a moment's reflection should not have perceived that, in such a system, the cardinal idea ofDeityis altogether omitted, or left unaccounted for, in the case of Man, and that no attempt is made to explain or to account for anything that is properlymoralin the government of God.
On a review of these speculations, it is important to bear in mind that the existence of natural laws is not necessarily exclusive of a superintending Providence. Their operation, on the contrary, may afford some of the strongest proofs of its reality. For, whether considered as a scheme ofprovisionor as a system ofgovernment, Divine Providence rests on a strong body of natural evidence. In the one aspect, it upholds and preserves all things; in the other, it controls and overrulesall things for the accomplishment of the Divine will. Considered as a scheme of government, it is eithernaturalormoral. To the former, all created beings without exception are subject; to the latter, only some orders of being,—such, namely, as are intelligent, voluntary, and responsible agents. In the case of man, constituted as he is, the Physical, Organic, Intellectual, and Moral laws are all combined; and he is subject, therefore, both to anaturalgovernment, which is common to him with all other material and organized beings, and also to amoralgovernment, which is peculiar to himself as a free and accountable agent. Thenaturalgovernment of God extends to all his creatures, and includes man considered simply as one of them; and its reality is proved, first, by thelawsto which all created things are subject, and which they have no power to alter or resist; secondly, by thefinal causesor beneficial ends which are obviously contemplated in the arrangements of Nature, and the great purposes which are actually served by them; and, thirdly, by thenecessary dependenceof all created things on the will of Him to whom they owe alike the commencement and the continuance of their being. But the natural government of God, which extends toallHis creatures, does not exhaust or complete the doctrine of His Providence: it includes also a scheme ofmoralgovernment, adapted to the nature, and designed for the regulation, of His intelligent, voluntary, and responsible subjects. And the reality of a moral government may be proved,first, by themoral faculty, which is a constituent part of human nature, and which makes man "a law to himself;"secondly, by theessential natureof virtuous and vicious dispositions, as being inherently pleasant or painful;thirdly, by thenatural consequencesof our actions, which indicate a sure connection between moral and physical evil; and,fourthly, by themoral atmospherein which we are placed, as being members of a community in which the distinction between right and wrong is universallyacknowledged, and applied in the way of approbation or censure. By such proofs, the Providence of God may be shown to be a scheme both ofnaturalandmoralgovernment,—two aspects of the same system which areequally real, yetwidely different. But the distinction between the two, although founded on a real and radical difference, is not such as to imply that they have no relation to each other, or no mutual influence, as distinct but connected parts of the same comprehensive scheme. They are not isolated, but interpenetrating; they come into contact at many points, andthe natural is made subordinate and subservient to the moral. For there is a beautiful gradation in the order of the established laws of Nature. The physical laws are made subordinate and subservient to the organic; both the physical and organic are subservient to the intellectual; the physical, organic, and intellectual are subservient to the moral; and the intellectual and moral are subservient to our preparation for the spiritual and eternal. In the words of Bishop Butler, "The natural and moral constitution and government of the world areso connectedas to make up together butone scheme; and it is highly probable that the first is formed and carried on merely insubserviency to the latter, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for minds."[204]
Every instance of pleasure or pain arising from the voluntary actions of men, is a proof that a relation of some kind has been established between all the distinct, but independent, provinces of Nature; and the invariable connection between moral and physical evil shows how the lower are made subservient to the higher departments of the Divine government. Apart from a scheme of moral discipline, there is no reason discernible,à priori, why pain should be the accompaniment or consequent of one mode of action rather than another; and therelations which have been established, in the natural constitution of things, between sin and misery, affords a strong proof not only of therealityof a moral government, but of thesubordinationof physical and organic agencies to its great designs.
This relation between thenaturaland themoralgovernment of God is admirably illustrated by Bishop Warburton: "The application ofnatural eventstomoral government, in the common course of Providence, connects the character of Lord and Governor of the intellectual world with that of Creator and Preserver of the material.... The doctrine of thepreëstablished harmony,—the direction of natural events to moral government,—obviates all irreligious suspicions, and not only satisfies us that there is butonegovernor of both systems, but that both systems are conducted byonescheme of Providence. To form the constitution of Nature in such a manner that, without controlling or suspending its laws, it should continue, throughout a long succession of ages, to produce its physical revolutions as they best contribute to the preservation and order of its own system, just at those precise periods of time when their effects, whether salutary or hurtful to many, may serve as instruments for the government of the moral world: for example, that a foreign enemy, amidst our intestine broils, should desolate all the flourishing works of rural industry,—that warring elements, in the suited order ofnaturalgovernment, should depopulate and tear in pieces a highly-viced city, just in those very moments whenmoralgovernment required a warning and example to be held out to a careless world,—is giving us the noblest as well as the most astonishing idea of God's goodness and justice.... When He made the world, the free determinations of the human will, and the necessary effects of laws physical, were so fitted and accommodated to one another, that a sincere repentance in themoralworld should be sure to avert an impending desolation in thenatural, not by any present alteration or suspension of its establishedlaws, but by originally adjusting all their operations to all the foreseen circumstances of moral agency."[205]
Viewed in this light, the course of Providence is wonderfully adapted to the constitution of human nature, since it affords as muchcertaintyin regard to some things as is sufficient to lay a foundation for forethought, prudence, and diligence in the use of means, and yet leaves so much remaininguncertaintyin regard to other things as should impress us with a sense of constantdependenceon Him "in whom we live, and move, and have our being." The constitution of Nature and the course of Providence in the present state seem mainly intended to teach thesetwolessons,—first, ofdiligencein the use of means, and, secondly, ofdependenceon a Higher Power: for there is sufficientregularityin the course of events to encourage human industry in every department of labor; and yet there is as muchuncertainty, arising from the endless complication of causes and the limited range of human knowledge, as should impress us with a sense of our utter helplessness. The wisdom of God in the government of the world may be equally manifested in theregular orderwhich He has established, and which, within certain limits, man may be able to ascertain and reckon on as a ground of hopeful activity; and in theapparent casualtyandinscrutable mysteryof many things which can neither be divined by human wisdom, nor controlled by human power. It matters not whether the remaining uncertainty is supposed to arise from some classes of events not being subject to regular laws, or from our ignorance of these laws, and the variety of their manifold combinations. In either case, it is certain that, in our actual experience, and, so far as we can judge, in the experience of every creature not possessed of omniscient knowledge, these two elements are and must be combined,—such a measure ofcertaintyas should encourageindustry in the use of means, and such a measure of remaininguncertaintyas should keep them mindful that they are not, and never can be, independent of God.
The doctrine of Providence lays a firm foundation for the duty of Prayer. In the case of all intelligent, moral, and responsible beings, the mere existence of a Divine government to which they are subject, would seem to imply an obligation to own and acknowledge it; and this obligation is best fulfilled by the exercise of prayer, which is a practical testimony alike to man'sdependenceand to God'sdominion.
Prayer, in its widest sense, includes the whole homage which man is capable of rendering to God as the sole object of religious worship; and it implies the recognition of all His supreme perfections and prerogatives as the Creator and Governor of the world. It is usually described[206]as consisting, first, in "adoration,"—in which we express our sense of His rightful supremacy and absolute perfection, and do homage to Him for what He is in himself; secondly, in "thanksgiving,"—in which we express our sense of gratitude for all His kindness and care, and do homage to Him for the benefits which He has bestowed; thirdly, in "confession,"—in which we express our sense of sin in having transgressed His law, and do homage to Him as our moral Governor and Judge; and, fourthly, in "petition,"—in which we express our sense of dependence alike on His providence and grace, and do homage to Him as the "Father of lights, from whom cometh down every goodand perfect gift." Of these, thethree firstare so evidently reasonable and becoming, so necessarily involved in the simplest idea which we can form of our relations to God and of the obligations which result from them, that few, if any, of those who admit the existence and providence of the Supreme Being, will deny that the sentiments themselves are appropriate to our condition, however they may doubt the necessity or the duty of giving formal utterance to them in the language of religious worship. But in regard to thefourth, which, if it be not the most sublime or elevated, is yet the most urgent motive to the exercise of devotion, many difficulties have been raised and many objections urged, which do not apply, at least in the same measure, to the other parts of Prayer, and which, in so far as they prevail with reflecting minds, would soon lead to the practical neglect ofallreligious worship. The practice of offering up "petitions" either for ourselves or others, with the view of thereby obtaining any benefit, whether of a temporal or spiritual kind, has been denounced, and even ridiculed, as an unphilosophical attempt to alter the established course of Nature, or the preordained sequences of events. The supposition of its "efficacy" has been represented as a flagrant instance of superstitious ignorance, worthy only of the dark ages, and even as a presumptuous blasphemy, derogatory to the unchangeable character of the Supreme. Some have held, indeed, that while prayer can have no real efficacy either in averting evil or procuring good, it may nevertheless be both legitimate and useful, by reason of the wholesomereflex influencewhich it is fitted to exert on the mind of the worshipper; and they have recommended the continuance of the practice on this ground, as if men, once convinced of its utter inefficacy,wouldorcouldcontinue, with any fervency, to offer up their requests to God, merely for the sake of impressing their own minds through the medium of a sort of conscious hypocrisy! We are told that David Hume, "after hearing a sermon preached by Dr. Leechman, in which he dwelt on the power of prayer to render the wishes it expressed more ardent and passionate, remarked with great justice, that 'we can make use of no expression, or even thought, in prayers and entreaties, which does not imply that these prayers have an influence.'" This intermediate ground, therefore, is plainly untenable, and we are shut up to one or other of two alternatives: either thereisan "efficacy" in prayer as a means of averting evil and procuring good, such as may warrant, and should encourage, us in offering up our requests unto God; or, thereis nosuch efficacy in it, and no reason why it should be observed by any of God's intelligent creatures, whether on earth or in heaven.
The principles which are applicable to the decision of this important question may be best explained, after adverting briefly to some of the particular objections which have been urged against the "efficacy of prayer." Several of these objections evidently proceed on an erroneous view of the nature and object of prayer. When it is said, for example, that God, being omniscient, does not need to be informed either of the wants or the wishes of any of His creatures, the objection involves a great and important truth,—a truth which was explicitly recognized by our Lord when He said, "Your heavenly Father knoweth what things ye have need of before ye ask Him;" but that truth is grievously misapplied when it is directed to prove that prayer is either superfluous or ineffectual, since the objection virtually assumes that the object of prayer isto inform God of what He did not know before, and that His omniscience is of itself sufficient to show that prayer from men or angels must needs be unavailing. When it is said,again, that God being immutable, His will cannot be affected or altered by the "petitions" of His creatures, this objection, like the former one, involves a great and important truth,—a truth which is also explicitly recognized in Scripture when it is said that "He is without variableness or the leastshadow of turning;" but this truth, too, is grievously misapplied when it is directed to prove that there can be no efficacy in prayer, since it might as well be said that the Divine dispensations must be invariably the same whatever may be the conduct of His creaturesin other respects, as that they must be the same whether men do or do not pray; or, that His procedure as a Moral Governor has no reference whatever either to the character or conduct of his subjects. But, in the words of Dr. Price, "God's unchangeableness, when considered in relation to the exertion of His attributes in the government of the world, consists, not in always acting in the same manner however cases and circumstances alter, but in always doing what is right, and varying His conduct according to the various actions, characters and dispositions of beings. If, then, prayer makes an alteration in the case of the suppliant, as being the discharge of an indispensable duty, what would in truth inferchangeablenessin Him would be, not His regarding and answering it, but Hisnotdoing this."[207]When it is said,again, that there can be no "efficacy in prayer," because there is an established constitution and regular course of Nature, by which all events, whether prosperous or adverse, are invariably determined, and which cannot be altered or modified withouta miracle, this objection, like each of the two former, involves an important truth,—a truth which is also explicitly recognized in Scripture when it speaks of "the ordinances of the heavens and the earth," and of the peculiar laws and properties of all created things; but this truth is also grievously misapplied when it is directed to prove that God's will has no efficient control over natural events, or that He has no agencies at His disposal by which he can accomplish the desires of them that seek Him. In all these objections there is an apparent truth, but there is also a latent error; and the false conclusion is founded on an erroneous supposition in regard to the nature and object of prayer.
For this reason, we shall endeavor to separate the truth from the error, and to lay down a few positions which may be established both by reason and Scripture, and which will be sufficient to show that the doctrine which affirms the efficacy of prayer is not only credible, but true.
1. Prayer, in the restricted sense in which we now speak of it, as denoting "petition" or "supplication," consists in offering up "the desires of the heart to God for things agreeable to His will." It is not a mere formal, outward homage, such as might be rendered by words, or ceremonies; it is a spiritual service, in which the mind and heart of man come into immediate converse with God Himself. It is offered to Him personally, as to the invisible but ever-present "Searcher of hearts," who "hears thedesireof the humble," and whose "ear is attentive to the voice of their supplications." This implies the recognition of His omnipresence and omniscience, but these perfections of His nature do not supersede the expression of our desires in prayer, just because prayer is designed, not to increase His knowledge, but to declare our sense of dependence on His will, and to procure His grace to help us in every time of need. Our petitions, too, are always bounded within certain limits, and subject to at least one indispensable condition; they are offered only "for things agreeable to His will;" and when our own will is thus, in the very act of prayer, expressly subordinated to that which is alone unerring and supreme, we acknowledge at once His rightful sovereignty and our dutiful subjection, and we are not justly chargeable with the presumption of dictating to God the course of procedure which He should pursue towards us. We are protected, too, against the evils which our ownerrors in prayermight otherwise entail on us, for "we know not what things to pray for as we ought;" and we have an infallible security that, in the best and highest sense,—that which is most in accordance with our real welfare,—our prayersmustbeanswered, since our wills are resolved into His will; and His will, being omnipotent, cannot be resisted or frustrated in any of its designs. Our assurance of the certain efficacy of our prayers is so much the greater, in proportion as we have reason to believe that the things for which we pray are agreeable to His will; and hence we are more confident in asking spiritual than temporal gifts; for the former we know to be always agreeable to His will and conducive to our own welfare, while the latter may, or may not, be good for us in our present circumstances, and must be left at the sovereign disposal of Him who knows what is in man, and what is best for each of His children.
2. Considering the relation in which we stand to God as His creatures and subjects, it is natural, fit, and proper thatweshould make known our requests to Him, and supplicate the aids both of His providence and grace; and if it beour dutyto pray, it is reasonable to believe that God will have some respect to our prayers in His methods of dealing with us; in other words, that, as a righteous moral governor, he will make a difference between the godly and the ungodly, the men who do, and the men who do not, pray.
In this position it is assumed that there are certain relations, natural or revealed, subsisting betwixt us and God, in virtue of which it is our duty to acknowledge His dominion and our dependence, by supplicating the aids of His providence and grace. That such relations do subsist between God and man, is evinced alike by the light of Nature and of Revelation; and they cannot be discerned or realized without immediately suggesting the idea of certain corresponding obligations and duties. Every one whose conscience has not been utterly seared must instinctively feel the force of that appeal, "If I be a Father, where is mine honor? and if I be a Master, where is my fear?" For, considering God in the very simplest aspect of His character as the Creator and Governor of the world,He stands related to us as the Author and Preserver of our being, as our rightful Proprietor and constant Benefactor, as our supreme Lawgiver, Governor, and Judge; and thesenatural relations, apart altogether from thesupernaturalwhich are revealed in Scripture, are sufficient to lay a solid groundwork for "the duty of prayer" in the case of every intelligent being who is capable of knowing God, and acknowledging his dependence on the Divine will. In such a case, prayer is felt to be a natural, fit, and becoming expression of what is known to be true, and whatought, as a matter of duty, to be practically avowed. Now, this is the grand design of prayer; and in its real design, when that is rightly apprehended, it finds its noblest vindication. The object of prayer is, neither toinformGod, as if he were not omniscient, nor to alter His eternal purposes, as if He were not unchangeable, nor to unsettle the established course of Nature, as if He were not "a God of order;" but simply to acknowledge Hisdominionand ourdependence, and to obtain from Him, in the way of His own appointment, the blessings of which we stand in need.
It is not unreasonable to believe that God, as the Governor of the world, will have some regard to the dispositions and actions of His responsible creatures, as a reason for dealing differently with those who own, and those who disown, His supremacy; and that He may require the use of certain means, such as the exercise of prayer, with the view of our obtaining from Him, in a way the most beneficial to ourselves, the blessings, whether temporal or spiritual, of which we stand in need. For if we really be the creatures of God, and, as such, dependent on His providential bounty, and subject to His righteous government, it is self-evidently natural and right that we should, as intelligent and responsible beings, acknowledge His supreme dominion and our absolute dependence by supplicating the aids both of His providence and grace. This isour duty, considering the relations which He sustains towards us; andif it be fit and proper that we should pray to God, if it be, in our circumstances, a duty which we owe to Him, then it is most reasonable to believe that it is equally fit and proper in God to have some respect to our prayers, and to deal with us differently according as we either observe or neglect this religious duty.
Prayer may be regarded in one or other of two distinct aspects: either asa duty, the observance or neglect of which must be followed, under a system of moral government, with different results; or simply asa means, the use of which is productive of certain effects which are made to depend on this special instrumentality. And in either view, its "efficacy" may be affirmed on the same grounds on which we are wont to vindicate the use ofall other means, and to enforce the observance ofall other duties, in connection with the system of the Divine government.
3. The efficacy of prayer, so far from being inconsistent with, is founded on, the immutability of the Divine purposes and the faithfulness of the Divine promises. God's purposes are justly held, in all other cases, to include themeansas well as theends; and they are often fulfilled through the instrumentality of "second causes." His purpose to provide for the wants of man and beast has reference not merely to the harvest which is the result, but also to the agricultural labor by which, instrumentally, the harvest is prepared. May not "prayer" be alsoa meansordained by God in the original constitution of the world, a means towards certain ends which are made dependent on its use? If it be such a means, then its "efficacy" is established, in the only sense in which we are concerned to contend for it; while it is shown to beno more inconsistentwith the immutability of the Divine purposes, than any other system ofmeans or instrumentsthat may be employed as subordinate agencies in the government of the world. This important view is strikingly illustrated in Scripture.For some of thepurposesof God, which might have been undiscoverable in the mere light of Nature, are there explicitly declared; nay, they are thrown into the form of expresspromises, to which the Divine faithfulness is solemnly pledged; and yet the exercise of prayer, so far from being superseded by these promises, is rather stimulated and encouraged by them; and the believer pleads with increased fervor and confidence when he simply convertsGod's promises into his own petitions. He feels that in doing so he is taking God at his word; and that his own prayer, in so far as it is warranted by His promise, cannot be ineffectual any more than God's faithfulness can fail.
Thus Daniel "understood by books the number of the years whereof the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah the prophet, that He would accomplishseventyyears in the desolation of Jerusalem." He knew the Lord's promise, and that the time for its fulfilment was at hand; yet so far from regarding either the immutability of the Divinepurpose, or even the infallible certainty of the Divinepromise, as a reason for neglecting prayer, as if that exercise were superfluous or vain, he was stimulated and encouraged to pray just because "he knew the word of the Lord."—"And I set my face," he says, "unto the Lord God, to seek by prayer and supplications, with fasting, sackcloth, and ashes;" and I prayed unto the Lord my God, and said, "O Lord! hear; O Lord! forgive; O Lord! hearken and do; defer not, for thine own sake, O my God!"[208]Thus,again, when the Lord gave certain great and precious promises to His ancient people, assuring them that "He would sprinkle clean water upon them, and give them a new heart and a right spirit," it is added, "I will yet for this be inquired of by the house of Israel to do it for them."[209]Thus,again, when the Saviour himself gave to His disciples that promise, which isemphatically called "the promise of the Father," assuring them that they should be "baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence," and directing them to "wait at Jerusalem until they should be endued with power from above," the apostles, so far from regarding that "promise" as superseding the exercise of "prayer," betook themselves immediately to an upper room, and "all continued with one accord in prayer and supplication;" and, at the appointed time, God's promise was fulfilled, and their prayer answered, when "they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance." These examples are abundantly sufficient to show that prayer, so far from being inconsistent with, is founded on, the immutability of the Divinepurposes, and the faithfulness of the Divinepromises.
4. Our next position is, thatthe methodin which God answers the prayers of His people may be, in many respects, mysterious or even inscrutable; but no objection to "the efficacy of prayer," which is founded on our ignorance of His infinite resources, can have any weight, especially when there areseveral hypothetical solutions, any one of which is sufficient to neutralize its force.
An omnipresent, omniscient, and almighty Being, presiding over the affairs of His own world, as the author, upholder, and governor of all things, may well be conceived to have infinite resources at His command,—such as we can never fully estimate,—by which he can give effect to prayer in ways that may be to us inscrutable. But our ignorance of themodeis no reason for doubting therealityof His interposition in answer to prayer; and even if we were unable to decide on the comparative merits of the various explanations of it which have been proposed, the mere fact that there are several solutions, at once conceivable and credible, any one of which may be sufficient, as a hypothetical explanation, to neutralize every adverse presumption, should be held tantamount to a proof that no valid or conclusive objection can be urged against it. Dr. Chalmers has frequently illustrated the legitimate and important uses of "hypothetical solutions" in Theology; and has conclusively shown that even where they leave us at a loss to determine which of various methods of solving a difficulty is the truest or the best, they yet serve a great purpose, if they merely neutralize an objection, by showing that the difficulty in questionmightbe satisfactorily accounted for, were our knowledge more extensive or more precise.[210]Now, with regard to "the efficacy of prayer," there arefourdistinct solutions, or ratherfourdifferent methods of disposing of the difficulty, any one of which is sufficient to vindicate the claims of the doctrine on our faith. We shall not discuss the respective merits of these various solutions in detail, but shall merely state them, with the view of showing that there are several methods of accounting for "the efficacy of prayer" in perfect consistency with the established order of Nature.
The first is the theory of those who hold that thereis the same relation between prayer and the answer to prayeras betweencause and effect in any other sequence of Nature. Prayer is supposed to be the cause, and the answer the effect; and this by an invariable law, established in the original constitution, and manifested in the uniform course, of the world. To this solution Dr. Chalmers seems to refer when he says, that "the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer but introducesa new sequenceto the notice of the mind," that "it may add another law of Nature to those which have been formerly observed," and that "the general truth may be preserved, that the same result always follows in the same circumstances, although it should be discovered that prayer is one of those influential circumstances by which the result is liable to be modified."[211]Now, if it be meant merely to affirm that, in the administrationof His providential government, God has respect to the prayers of men as a consideration which affects their relation to Him and His treatment of them, and that this rule is as invariable as any other law of Nature, the principle that is involved in this solution may be admitted as sound and valid; but if it be further meant, that prayer and the answer to prayer arein all respectssimilar to any other instance of cause and effect, it must be remembered that the answer is not the effect of the prayer, at least directly and immediately, but the effect of the Divine will; and then the question suggested by Dr. M'Cosh—whethercausalitycan properly be ascribed to our prayers with reference to the Divine will?—would claim our serious consideration. But in the former sense, as implying nothing more than that, in the original constitution and the ordinary course of Providence, the same effect is given to our prayers as toany other moral cause or condition, it seems to be exempt from all reasonable objection, and to afford a sufficient explanation of the difficulty.
The second "hypothetical solution" is that of those who hold that while God, in answering the prayers of men, does not ordinarily disturb the known or discoverable sequences of the natural world, yet His interference may be alike real and efficacious though it should take place at a point in the series of natural causes far removed beyond the limits of our experience and observation; and thus "the answer to prayer may be effectually given without any infringement on the known regularities of Nature." Dr. Chalmers adverts to this second solution in replying to an objection which might possibly be raised against the first, namely, that "we see no evidence of the constancy of visible nature giving way to that invisible agency, the interposition of which it is the express object of prayer to obtain;" and he suggests that, in the vast scale of natural sequences, which constitute one connected chain, the responsive touch from the finger of the Almighty may be given"either at a higher or a lower place in the progression," and that if it be supposed to be "given far enough back," it might originate a new sequence, but without doing violence to any ascertained law, since it occurs beyond the reach of our experience and observation. This solution we hold to be not so much an effective argument in favor of the efficacy of prayer, as a conclusive answer to a particular objection against it. It is sufficient to show that, with our very limited knowledge, we act presumptuously in deciding against the possibility of an answer to prayer such asmayleave the established course of Nature unaltered; but there is no necessity, and no reason, for supposing that the responsive touchcan onlybe given at a point to which our knowledge does not extend, or that, were our knowledge extended, we would have less difficulty in admitting itthere, than in holding it to be possible at any lower term in the scale of sequences.
The third "hypothetical solution" is that of those who hold that a Divine answer to prayer may be conveyed throughthe ministry of angels, or the agency of intelligent, voluntary, and active beings, employed by God, in subordination to His Providence, for the accomplishment of His great designs. The existence of such an order, or rather hierarchy, of created intelligences is clearly revealed in Scripture; and it is rendered credible, or even probable, bythe analogy of Nature, since we observe on earth a regular gradation of animal life from the insect up to man, and we have no reason to suppose that the gradation is suddenly arrested just at the point where the animal and the spiritual are combined. But not only their existence, theiractive agencyalso, as "ministers fulfilling His will," as "ministering spirits sent forth to minister to them who shall be heirs of salvation," is explicitly and frequently declared as well as exemplified in Scripture; and this, too, would be, on the supposition of their existence, in strict accordance withthe analogy of Nature, which shows that the lower orders of beingare placed under the care and control of the higher. Mr. Boyle, accordingly, makes frequent reference, in his Theological treatises, tothe ministry of angels, as subordinate agents, through whose instrumentality many of the designs of Providence may be carried into effect; and President Edwards enlarges on the same theme.[212]
The fourth "hypothetical solution" is that of those who hold that God has so arranged His Providence from the beginning as to provide for particular events as well as for general results, and especially to provide an answer to the prayers of His intelligent creatures. This solution is more general than any of thethreeformer, and may even be comprehensive of them all. It regards prayer as an element which was taken into account at the original constitution of the world, and for which an answer was provided, as the result of natural laws or of angelic agency, employed for this express end by the omniscient foreknowledge and wisdom of God. It is the solution that has obtained the sanction of some of the highest names in Science and Theology.
"I begin," says Euler, "with considering an objection which almost all the Philosophical Systems have started against prayer. Religion prescribes this as our duty, with an assurance that God will hear and answer our vows and prayers, provided they are conformable to the precepts which He hath given us. Philosophy, on the other hand, instructs us that all events take place in strict conformity to the course of Nature, established from the beginning, and that our prayers can effect no change whatever, unless we pretend to expect that God should be continually working miracles in compliance with our prayers. This objection has the greater weight, that Religion itself teaches the doctrine of God's having established the course of all events, and that nothing can come to pass butwhat God foresaw from all eternity. Is it credible, say the objectors, that God should think of altering this settled course, in compliance with any prayers which men might address to Him? But I remark,first, that when God established the course of the universe, and arranged all the events that must come to pass in it, He paid attention toall the circumstanceswhich should accompany each event, and, particularly, tothe dispositions, desires, and prayersof every intelligent being; and that the arrangement of all events was disposedin perfect harmonywith all these circumstances. When, therefore, a man addresses to God a prayer worthy to be heard, that prayer was already heard from all eternity, and the Father of mercies arranged the world expressly in favor of that prayer, so that the accomplishment should be a consequence of the natural course of events. It is thus that God answers the prayers of men without working a miracle."[213]
"It is not impossible," says Dr. Wollaston, "that such laws of Nature, and such a series of causes and effects, may be originally designed that not only general provisions may be made for the several species of beings, but evenparticular cases, at least many of them, may also be provided for, without innovations or alterations in the course of Nature. It is true this amounts to a prodigious scheme, in which all things to come are, as it were, comprehended under one view, estimated and laid together: but when I consider what a mass of wonders the universe is in other regards, what a Being God is, incomprehensibly great and perfect, that He cannot be ignorant of anything, no not of the future wants and deportments of particular men, and that all things which derive from Him, as their First Cause, must do this so as to be consistent with one another, and in such a manner as to make one compact system, befitting so great an Author; when I consider this, I cannotdeny such an adjustment of things to be within His power. The order of events, proceeding from the settlement of Nature, may be as compatible with the due and reasonable success ofmy endeavors and prayers(as inconsiderable a part of the world as I am) as with any other thing or phenomena how great soever.... And thus theprayerswhich good men offer to the all-knowing God, and theneglectsof others, may find fitting effects, alreadyforecastedin the course of Nature, which possibly may be extended to thelaborsof men and theirbehaviorin general."[214]
"If ever there was a future event," says Dr. Gordon, "which might have been reckoned on with absolute certainty, and one, therefore, in the accomplishment of which it might appear thatprayercould have no room or efficacy, it was just the restoration of the Jewish captives to the land and city of their fathers. And yet, so far from supposing that there was no place for prayer to occupy, among the various means that were employed to bring about that event, it was just his firm belief in the nearness and certainty of it that set Daniel upon fervent and persevering supplications for its accomplishment.... With regard to the rank which Daniel's prayer occupied among the various means or agencies that were to be employed in bringing about the object of it, he had good reason to believe that it was neither without a definite place, nor in itself devoid of efficacy.... He had been honored to vindicate the power and assert the supremacy of the Lord God of Israel; by the wisdom of his counsels and the weight of his personal character, he had paved the way for that decision in favor of the people of God to which the King of Persia was soon to be brought; and the whole business of his active and most laborious life was made to bear on the interests and the liberation of his afflicted brethren. And if God had thus assigned tothe outward actionsof His servant an important place in carrying into effect His thoughts of peace towards his penitent people, is it conceivable that He had no place in that scheme forthe holy and spiritualefforts of the same servant? or that the aspirations of a sanctified spirit, the travailing of a soul intent upon the accomplishment of the Divine will and the manifestation of the Divine glory, should be less efficient or less essential in the execution of the Divine counsels, than the outward and ordinary agency of human actions? The whole tenor and the most explicit declarations of Scripture stand opposed to such a supposition; nor can I understand how a devout mind should have any difficulty in conceiving that it must be so. The agency ofprayeris, indeed, a less obvious and palpable thing than that outward coöperation whereby mankind are rendered subservient to the accomplishment of the Divine purposes. But is it not an agency of an unspeakably loftier character? Is it not the coöperation of an immortal spirit, bearing the impress of the Divine image, and at the moment acting in unison with the Divine will? Is it not befitting the character of God to set upon that coöperation a special mark of His holy approbation, by assigning to it a more elevated place among the secondary causes which He is pleased to employ? And must there not be provision made, therefore, in the general principles of His administration, for fulfilling the special promise of His word, 'The Lord is nigh to all that call upon Him, to all that call upon him in truth.'"[215]
"We should blush," says Bishop Warburton, "to be thought so uninstructed in the nature ofprayer, as to fancy that it can work any temporary change in the dispositions of the Deity, who is 'the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.' Yet we are not ashamed to maintain that God,in the chain of causes and effects, which not only sustains each system, but connects themall with one another, hath so wonderfully contrived, that the temporary endeavors of pious men shall procure good and avert evil, by means of that 'preëstablished harmony' which He hath willed to exist betweenmoral actionsandnatural events."