THE QUESTION OF TYPES.
The following letter appeared in theTimes(London) of April 4, 1885:
“Sir,—May I request the favor of space in theTimesin which to comment upon the opinions recently expressed by Sir Edward Reed and other writers respecting the designs of theAdmiralclass of ships in the Royal Navy, and the four central-citadel ships which were laid down subsequently to theInflexible?“Having been closely associated with Mr. Barnaby in the designing of all these ships, with the exception of theAjaxandAgamemnon, I can speak with full knowledge of both the history and intentions of the designs.“Moreover, my share of the responsibility for the professional work involved in those designs remains, although my official connection with the constructive department of the Admiralty was severed years ago. It need hardly be added that the remarks which follow simply embody my own opinions, and that I write neither as an apologist for Mr. Barnaby nor as a champion of the ship-building policy of the Admiralty.“The sweeping condemnation which has been pronounced against the most recent English battle-ships is based upon the consideration of one feature only in their fighting efficiency,viz., the extent of the armor protection of their sides in the region of the water-line. There has been no discussion in the letters to which I have referred of the comparative speeds, armaments, or other qualities of the French and English ships. But the fact that the French ships are armor-belted from end to end, while the English ships have no vertical armor on considerable portions of the length at the region of the water-line, is considered by Sir Edward Reed so serious a matter that he says, ‘The French armored ships must in all reason be expected to dispose of these English ships in a very few minutes by simply destroying their unarmored parts.’“From this opinion I most strongly dissent, for reasons which are stated below; and I venture to assert that if attention is directed simply to the possible effects of gun-fire, while the possibly greater risks incidental to attacks with the ram and torpedo are altogether neglected, then there is ample justification for the belief that the English ships of recent design can do battle on at least equal terms with their contemporaries in the French or any other navy.“In all recent armored ships, if the wholesale and extremely rapid destruction of the unarmored portions of the ships which Sir Edward Reed contemplates actually took place, very considerable risks would undoubtedly result; but in my judgment these risks are not sensibly affected by the different distribution of the armor on the ships of the two great navies. And, further, there is every reason for doubting whether such wholesale destruction of the unarmored parts could be effected with the appliances which are now available, not merely in ‘a few minutes,’ but in a very considerable time, and under the most favorable conditions for the attack. Nor must it be forgotten that armor, even of the greatest thickness, applied to the sides or decks of ships is not impenetrable to the attack of guns already afloat, while themitraille, which is driven back into a ship when armor is penetrated, is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile can be, and attacks directly the vital parts which the armor is intended to protect.“In support of these assertions I must ask permission to introduce certain detailed statements which appear to be absolutely necessary to a discussion of the subject, but which shall be made as brief and untechnical as possible.“It appears that the points raised by the discussion may be grouped under two heads. First, does the shortening of the belt in the English ships introduce such serious dangers if they have to do battle with the French ships? Secondly, what should be considered the principal uses of armor-plating in modern war-ships? The second question may be considered to include the first; but it will be convenient to take the questions in the order in which they have been placed, as, after all, the greatest immediate interest centres in the comparison between existing ships.“At the outset it is important to remark that in the most recent designs of armored ships for all navies, increase in speed, armament, and thickness of armor has been associated with a decrease in the area of the broadside protected by armor. Further, it has been considered important in most cases to distribute the armored positions of the heavy guns in the ships in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by one or two lucky shots which may happen when the heavy guns are concentrated in a single citadel or battery. This distribution of the heavy guns also gives greater efficiency to the auxiliary armament of lighter guns, and enables these heavy guns to be placed at a considerably greater height above water than was usual in former days, so that the chances of the guns being prevented from being fought in heavy weather are diminished, and their power as compared with the lower guns in earlier ships is increased, especially when firing with depression.“The days of the ‘completely protected iron-clad,’ with the broadside armored throughout the length from the upper deck down to five or six feet below the water-line, have long gone by. The ‘central battery and belt’ system has also been practically dropped, whether the battery contained broadside guns or formed a citadel protecting the bases of the turrets. In short, on modern battle-ships there now remains only a narrow belt of armor, rising from five or six feet below the load-line to two or three feet above it. This narrow strip of armor in the French ships extends from end to end, and is associated with a protective deck worked at the height of the top of the belt, and forming a strong roof to the hold spaces beneath. In the English ships of theAdmiralclass the belt of armor extends somewhat less than half the total length, protecting one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty feet of the central portion of the ship (in which are situate the engines and boilers), and protecting also the communications from the barbette towers to the magazines. At the extremities of the belt strong armored bulkheads are built across the ships. The protected deck is fitted at the upper edge of the belt over the central portion. Before and abaft the bulkheads, where there is no side armor, the protection consists of a strong steel deck, situated from four to five feet below water, and extending to the bow and stern respectively. Upon this under-water deck are placed coal-bunkers, chain-lockers, fresh-water tanks, store-rooms, etc., the spaces between it and the deck next above being subdivided into a large number of water-tight compartments or cells by means of longitudinal and transverse bulkheads. A water-tight top or roof to these compartments is formed by plating over the main deck-beams with thin steel at the same height above water as the top of the armor-belt. In this manner the unarmored ends above the protective deck are not merely packed to a large extent with water-excluding substances when the vessel is fully laden, but they are minutely subdivided into separate compartments, which can only be thrown into communication with one another by means of very extensive injuries to the partitions.“In all the modern French ships, as well as in theAdmiralclass, a light steel superstructure of considerable height is built above the level of the belt-deck; the living quarters of the crew and the stations of the auxiliary armament are contained within this light erection, which also surrounds the armored communications from the barbette towers to the magazines. In this manner a ship with a small height of armored freeboard is converted into a high-sided ship for all purposes of ordinary navigation, sea-worthiness, and habitability; while spaces are provided in which a more or less considerable number oflight guns can be fought concurrently with the heavy guns placed in the armor-protected stations. The radical difference, therefore, between the French ships and theAdmiralclass, independently of other considerations than the armor protection of the water-line, consists in the omission of the side armor at the extremities, and the use instead of the side armor of the strong under-water deck with cellular subdivision and other arrangements for adding to the protection and securing the buoyancy of the spaces at the ends, into which water may find access through the thin sides if they are shot through and seriously damaged in action. If the completely belted French ship has to fight a vessel of theAdmiralclass, the latter has obviously the greater chance of damage to the narrow strips of the sides lying above the under-water deck before and abaft the ends of the belt. If the action takes place in smooth water, when the ships are neither rolling nor pitching, but are simply in motion, the chances of hitting these narrow strips in the water-line region might not be very great; but it must be admitted that even the lightest guns would penetrate the thin sides of the English ships and admit more or less considerable quantities of water into the ends. If, on the other hand, the fight takes place in a sea-way, with the ships lolling and pitching, then the relative importance of penetration of these narrow’ strips of the ends of the English ships becomes much less, because the belt armor of the French ships will be brought out of water for a considerable length of the bow and the stern by a very moderate angle of pitching, or by the passage of a comparatively low wave, and because rolling motion of the ships will alternately immerse or emerge the belt armor, even at the midships part, where it has its greatest thickness. In fact, as I have more than once said publicly, it is clearly an error to limit criticism to the longitudinal extent of the belt armor in modern ships, and to exclude consideration of the vertical extent of the armor above and below the load-line. Apart from any discussion of the question from the artillerist’s point of view, or any attempt to determine the probability or otherwise of the wholesale destruction of the unarmored portions of modern battle ships by shell-fire from large guns, or by the projectiles from rapid-firing and machine guns, it is perfectly obvious to any one who will examine into the matter that the risk of damage to the light superstructures situated above the belt must be greater than the corresponding risk of damage to the narrow strips of side area exposed at the unarmored ends of theAdmiralclass, between the level of the belt-deck and the water-line.“Sir Spencer Robinson, after his inspection of the models shown him at the Admiralty, recognizes the fact that in the French belted ships (of which theAmiral Duperréis an example), if the light sides above the belt-deck are destroyed or very seriously riddled in action, the ship would be capsized in a very moderate sea-way. He further emphasizes the statement that the ships of theAdmiralclass in the English navy, if similarly treated, would also capsize under the same conditions, and he appears to be surprised at the admission having been made. The fact is that there has never been any assertion that theAdmiralclass would be safe against capsizing independently of assistance given to the armor-belted portions by the unarmored structure situated above. On the contrary, from the first, in the design of these ships, it was recognized that their stability, in the sense of their power to resist being capsized, if inclined to even moderate angles of inclination, was not guaranteed by the armor-belts. In this respect they were in identically the same position as all other armored ships with shallow water-line belts and isolated armored batteries placed high above water.“What has been said respecting theAdmiralclass is this: If the unarmored ends above the protective deck were completely thrown open to the sea, then the initial stability (that is to say, the stiffness of the ships or their power to resist small inclinations from the upright) would still be guaranteed by the central armored portions. So fully did we appreciate the fact that the life of the ship in action (as determined by her power to resist large inclinations) depends greatly upon the assistance given by the unarmored superstructures to the armor-belted parts, that we were careful to make the structural arrangements of the superstructures above the belts such that they could bear a very considerable amount of riddling and damage from shot and shell without ceasing to contribute in the most important degree to the buoyancy and stability.“There are double cellular sides between the belt and upper decks; the main bulkheads are carried up high above water; hatches and openings are trunked up and protected by coffer-dams. In short, every possible precaution is taken to subdivide into compartments, and thus limit the spaces to which water can find access when the outer sides are penetrated or shattered, as well as to facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the sides.“Now, without in the least intending to discredit the work of the French designers, I have to state that no corresponding or equal precautions have been taken in the portions of their ships lying above the belt-decks. And the absence of these features in the French ships is a great relative advantage to the English ships. Of course there is nothing to hinder the French from imitating our practice, but they are content to take the risks involved in a simpler construction, and in so doing they show their practical disbelief in the doctrine of armor-protected stability. I am aware that some eminent authorities do not concur with this view, and maintain that stability and buoyancy should be guaranteed by armor. To this point I will revert hereafter, but for the present I am content to say that, as between the French ships and theAdmiralclass, the most serious risks of damage by gun-fire in action are of the same kind, and, practically, are not affected by the shortening of the armor-belts in the English ships.“Next I would refer to the differences which are undoubtedly involved in shortening the belts of the English ships. In the first place, by dispensing with the side armor towards the extremities a very considerable saving is effected in the weight and the cost of the armor fitted to the ships. Mr. Barnaby has recently given an illustration of this, where a ship, in other respects unchanged, has to be increased from 10,000 to 11,000 tons in displacement in order to carry the shallow armor-belt to the ends. In theCollingwoodherself quite as large a proportionate increase of size would be involved in having a thick armor-belt from stem to stern. This saving in weight and cost of armor might, of course, be purchased too dearly, if dispensing with the armor involved possibly fatal risks to the ship. However the result may be attained, there is universal agreement that a ship-of-war should have her buoyancy, stability, and trim guaranteed as far as possible against the effects of damage in action. Now, in theAdmiralclass this matter was very carefully investigated before the design was approved. In order to prevent derangement of the trim of the vessels by penetration of the light sides above the protective deck at one end, arrangements were made in the design by means of which water can be introduced into the spaces occupied by coal-bunkers, etc., before the ships go into action.“The extent to which water may be introduced is a matter over which the captain would necessarily have control. But even if the whole of the unoccupied spaces were filled with water, the increase in draught would not exceed fourteen to eighteen inches, and the loss in speed would not exceed half a knot. If only the coal-bunkers were flooded as a preliminary to action, the chance of any serious disturbance of trim, and consequent loss of manœuvring power or speed by damage to the light sides above the protective deck and near the water, would be very small, and the ‘sinkage’ of the vessel would be decreased considerably. But taking the extreme case, with the ends completely filled and a sinkage of fourteen to eighteen inches, a ship of theAdmiralclass would go into action with practically her full speed available, and with her ends so protected by under-water deck and the water admitted above that deck that damage to the thin sides by shot or shell penetrating at or near the water-line would not produce changes of trim or alterations of draught to any greater extent than would be produced if the armor-belt had been carried to the stem and stern. Nor would the admission of water into the ends render the vessel unstable.“It has been urged that the sinkage due to filling the tank ends with water is a disadvantage, because it brings the upper edge of the belt armor in theAdmiralclass about fourteen to eighteen inches nearer the water than the upper edge of the belts of the French ships. If the greatest danger of the ships was to be measured by the smallness of their ‘reserve’ of ‘armor-protected buoyancy’ (that is to say, by the buoyancy of the part of the ship lying above her fighting water-line and below the belt-deck), then theAdmiralclass would not compare favorably with the fully belted French ships. But I have already explained that this is not the true measure of the greatest danger arising from the effects of gun-fire, and that it would be a mistake to assume that in either the French or the English ships the armor-belted portions of the vessels guarantee their safety when damaged in action.“As between theAdmiralclass and the central-citadel ships of theInflexibletype there is a difference in this respect which has been much commented upon. When the ends of the citadel ships are filled with water, the armored wall of the citadel still remains several feet above water; whereas, in theAdmiralclass, the top of the belt under similar conditions is very near the water-level. All that need be said on this point is that, notwithstanding the greater height of the armored wall above water, the citadel ships have practically no greater guarantee of safety against capsizing by means of armor-protected stability than theAdmiralclass. In both classes the armored portions require the assistance of the unarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall effectually guarantee their security when damaged in action. And, as has been stated above, this condition is true of all armor-clads with narrow armor-belts.“One other objection to the shortened belts yet remains to be considered.“It is urged that when the thin ends are broken through or damaged by shot or shell, jagged or protruding holes will be formed in the plating near the water-line, and then if the ships are driven at speed, the water will flow into the holes in large quantities, and produce serious changes of trim and loss of speed. In support of this contention, reference is made to the published reports of experiments made with theInflexible’smodel about eight years ago. It is impossible to discuss the matter fully, and I must therefore content myself with a statement of my opinion, formed after a careful personal observation of these model experiments. First, it cannot be shown from the experiments that the presence of a shallow belt of armor reaching two to three feet above the still-water line would make any sensible difference in the dangers arising from the circumstances described. Holes in the thin sides above this belt would admit water in large quantities on the belt-deck when the vessel was under way, and if it could flow along that deck changes of trim and other disagreeable consequences would result. Secondly, it is certain that the numerous bulkheads and partitions, coffer-dams, etc., built above the belt-deck level in theAdmiralclass for the very purpose of limiting the flow of entering water would greatly decrease any tendency to check the speed or change the trim. Whether the belt be short or long, it is evident that gaping holes low down in the light sides will make it prudent for a captain to slow down somewhat if he wishes to keep the water out as much as possible. But between such prudence and the danger of disaster there is a wide gulf.“Summing up the foregoing statements, I desire to record my opinion, based upon complete personal knowledge of every detail in the calculations and designs for theAdmiralclass, that the disposition of the belt armor (in association with the protective decks and cellular sides, water-tight subdivision, etc., existing in the unarmored portions of the vessels situated above the protective decks) is such that the buoyancy, stability, trim, speed, and manœuvring capabilities are well guaranteed against extensive damage from shot and shell fire in action. And, further, that in these particulars theAdmiralclass are capable of meeting, at least on equal terms, their contemporary ships in the French navy.“I must add that I am not here instituting any comparison between the ‘fighting efficiencies’ of the ships of the two fleets; nor have I space in this letter to do so. Opinions have differed, and will probably always differ, as to the relative importance of the different qualities which go to make up fighting efficiency. There is no simple formula admitting of general application which enables the comparative fighting values of war-ships to be appraised. As the conditions of naval warfare change and war material is developed, so the balance of qualities in ship-designing has to be readjusted, and estimates of the fighting powers of existing ships have to be revised. And, further, different designers, working simultaneously, distribute the displacement, which is their sum total of capital to work upon, according to their own judgments of what is wisest and best for the particularconditions which the ships built from those designs have to fulfil. The designer who has the larger displacement to work upon has the better opportunity of producing a more powerful ship; but it by no means follows that he will secure so good a combination of qualities as a rival obtains on a smaller displacement. And hence I cannot but dissent from the doctrine that displacement tonnage is to be accepted as a fair measure of relative fighting efficiency, or that recent English ships are necessarily unable to fight recent French ships because they are of smaller displacement.“In the preceding remarks I have been careful to confine myself chiefly to the naval architect’s side of the subject, as it would clearly be out of place for me to say much respecting the artillerist’s side. But, having had the great advantage of knowing the views of some of the most experienced gun-makers and gunnery officers, and having studied carefully what has been written on the subject, I would venture to say a few words.“First, there seems, as was previously remarked, every reason for doubting, in the actual conditions of naval gunnery, whether it would be possible, not merely in a few minutes, but in a considerable time, to produce the wholesale destruction of the unarmored parts of modern war-ships which has been assumed in the condemnation of theAdmiralclass. If theCollingwood, or one of her successors, were simply treated as a moving target in a sea-way for theAmiral Duperréor one of her consorts, this would be a most improbable result. But, remembering that theCollingwoodwould herself be delivering heavy blows in return for those received, the chances of her disablement would necessarily be decreased. Secondly, it does not seem at all evident that the introduction of rapid-fire guns has such an important influence on the question of shortened belts as some writers have supposed. So far as machine guns are concerned, I well remember at the board meeting which decided to approve the building of theCollingwoodthe possible effects of machine-gun fire were discussed at some length, both in reference to the adoption of the barbette system and to the system of hull protection. The rapid-firing gun which has since been introduced is now a formidable weapon; but it may be questioned whether its effects upon the unarmored portions of modern war-ships would be so serious as those resulting from the shell-fire of heavier guns, and therefore it cannot with certainty be concluded that it would be advantageous to make arrangements for keeping out the projectiles from the rapid-firing guns now in use at the ends of theAdmiralclass. More especially is this true when it is considered that already rapid-fire guns of much larger calibre and greater power than the 6-pounder and 9-pounder are being made. To these guns three inches of steel would be practically no better defence than the existing thin sides, and the real defence lies in the strong protective deck. Shell-fire from heavier guns will probably be found the best form of attack against the unarmored or lightly armored portions of battle-ships, especially now that the use of steel shells with thin walls and large bursting charges is being so rapidly developed.“I would again say that on this side of the subject I do not profess to speak with authority, and it is undoubted that great differences of opinion prevail; but it must not be forgotten that the Board of Admiralty, by its recent decision announced in the House of Commons, has reaffirmed the opinion that from the artillerist’s point of view the existing disposition of the armor in theAdmiralclass is satisfactory. This has been done after the attention of the Board and the public has been most strongly directed to the supposed dangers incidental to the rapid destruction of the light superstructures lying above the under-water decks of theAdmiralclass. It would be folly to suppose that in such a matter any merely personal considerations would prevent the Board from authorizing a change which was proved to be necessary or advantageous. With respect to the possibility of making experiments which should determine the points at issue, I would only say that considerable difficulties must necessarily arise in endeavoring to represent the conditions of an actual fight; but in view of the diametrically opposite views which have been expressed as to the effect of gun-fire upon cellular structures, it would certainly be advantageous if some scheme of the kind could be arranged.“There still remains to be considered the question of the uses of armor in future war-ships. This letter has already extended to too great a length to permit of any attempt ata full discussion. It will be admitted by all who are interested in the questions of naval design that an inquiry into the matter is urgently needed, even if it leads only to a temporary solution of the problem, in view of the present means of offence and defence.“Armor, by which term I understand not merely vertical armor, but oblique or horizontal armor, is regarded in different ways by different authorities. For example, I understand Sir Edward Reed to maintain that side-armor should be fitted in the form of a water-line belt, extending over a very considerable portion of the length, and that such armor, in association with a strong protective deck, and armored erections for gun-stations, etc., should secure the buoyancy, trim, and stability of the vessel. At the other extreme we have the view expressed in the design of the grand Italian vessels of theItaliaclass. In them the hull-armor is only used for the purpose of assisting the cellular hull subdivisions in protecting buoyancy, stability, and trim, taking the form of a thick protective deck, which is wholly under water, and above which comes a minutely subdivided region, which Signor Brin and his colleagues consider sufficient defence against gun-fire.“In these Italian vessels the only thick armor is used to protect the gun-stations, the pilot-tower, and the communications from those important parts to the magazines and spaces below the protective deck. The strong deck, besides forming a base of the cellular subdivision, is of course a defence to the vital parts of the ship lying below it.“Between these two types of ships come theAdmiralclass of the English navy and the belted vessels of the French navy, whose resemblances and differences have been described above.“In addition, there are not a few authorities who maintain that the development of the swift torpedo-cruiser, or the swift protected cruiser, makes the continued use of armor at least questionable, seeing that to attempt to protect ships by thick armor either on decks or sides, and to secure high speeds and heavy armaments, involves the construction of large and expensive vessels, which are necessarily exposed to enormous risks in action from forms of under-water attack, against which their armor is no defence. In view of such differences of opinion, and of the heated controversies which have arisen therefrom, the time seems certainly to have arrived when some competent body should be assembled by the Admiralty for the purpose of considering the designs of our war-ships, and enabling our constructors to proceed with greater assurance than they can at present. Questions affecting the efficiency of the Royal Navy clearly ought not to be decided except in the most calm and dispassionate manner. The work done by the Committee on Designs for Ships of War fourteen years ago was valuable, and has had important results. What is now wanted, I venture to think, is a still wider inquiry into the condition of the navy, and one of the branches of that inquiry which will require the most careful treatment is embraced in the question, ‘What are the uses of armor in modern war-ships?’“My own opinion, reached after very careful study of the subject, is that very serious limitations have to be accepted in the disposition and general efficiency of the armaments, if the principle of protecting the stability at considerable angles of inclination by means of thick armor is accepted, the size and cost of the ships being kept within reasonable limits. There is no difficulty, of course, apart from considerations of size and cost, in fulfilling the condition of armor-protected stability; but it may be doubted whether the results could prove satisfactory, especially when the risks from under-water attacks, as well as from gun-fire, are borne in mind, and the fact is recognized that even the thickest armor carried or contemplated is not proof against existing guns. No vessel can fight without running risks. It is by no means certain, however, that the greater risks to be faced are those arising from damage to the sides in the region of the water-line and consequent loss of stability. So far as I have been able to judge, it appears possible to produce a better fighting-machine for a given cost by abandoning the idea of protecting stability, buoyancy, and trim entirely by thick armor, and by the acceptance of the principle that unarmored but specially constructed superstructures shall be trusted as contributories to the flotation and stability. Thick vertical side armor, even over a portion of the length, appears to be by no means a necessary condition to an effective guarantee of the life and manageability of a ship when damaged in action; and it seems extremely probable that in future the great distinctionbetween battle-ships and protected ships will not be found in the nature of their hull protection in the region of the water-line, but in the use of thick armor over the stations of the heavy guns in battle-ships.“The decisions as to future designs of our battle-ships is a momentous one. It can only be reached by the consideration of the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative proposals. It cannot be dissociated from considerations of cost for a single ship.“On all grounds, therefore, it is to be hoped that a full and impartial inquiry will be authorized without delay; for it may be assumed that, however opinions differ, there is the common desire to secure for the British navy the best types of ships and a sufficient number to insure our maritime supremacy.I am, sir, your obedient servant,“W. H. White.“Elswick Works,March 26th.”
“Sir,—May I request the favor of space in theTimesin which to comment upon the opinions recently expressed by Sir Edward Reed and other writers respecting the designs of theAdmiralclass of ships in the Royal Navy, and the four central-citadel ships which were laid down subsequently to theInflexible?
“Having been closely associated with Mr. Barnaby in the designing of all these ships, with the exception of theAjaxandAgamemnon, I can speak with full knowledge of both the history and intentions of the designs.
“Moreover, my share of the responsibility for the professional work involved in those designs remains, although my official connection with the constructive department of the Admiralty was severed years ago. It need hardly be added that the remarks which follow simply embody my own opinions, and that I write neither as an apologist for Mr. Barnaby nor as a champion of the ship-building policy of the Admiralty.
“The sweeping condemnation which has been pronounced against the most recent English battle-ships is based upon the consideration of one feature only in their fighting efficiency,viz., the extent of the armor protection of their sides in the region of the water-line. There has been no discussion in the letters to which I have referred of the comparative speeds, armaments, or other qualities of the French and English ships. But the fact that the French ships are armor-belted from end to end, while the English ships have no vertical armor on considerable portions of the length at the region of the water-line, is considered by Sir Edward Reed so serious a matter that he says, ‘The French armored ships must in all reason be expected to dispose of these English ships in a very few minutes by simply destroying their unarmored parts.’
“From this opinion I most strongly dissent, for reasons which are stated below; and I venture to assert that if attention is directed simply to the possible effects of gun-fire, while the possibly greater risks incidental to attacks with the ram and torpedo are altogether neglected, then there is ample justification for the belief that the English ships of recent design can do battle on at least equal terms with their contemporaries in the French or any other navy.
“In all recent armored ships, if the wholesale and extremely rapid destruction of the unarmored portions of the ships which Sir Edward Reed contemplates actually took place, very considerable risks would undoubtedly result; but in my judgment these risks are not sensibly affected by the different distribution of the armor on the ships of the two great navies. And, further, there is every reason for doubting whether such wholesale destruction of the unarmored parts could be effected with the appliances which are now available, not merely in ‘a few minutes,’ but in a very considerable time, and under the most favorable conditions for the attack. Nor must it be forgotten that armor, even of the greatest thickness, applied to the sides or decks of ships is not impenetrable to the attack of guns already afloat, while themitraille, which is driven back into a ship when armor is penetrated, is probably as destructive as any kind of projectile can be, and attacks directly the vital parts which the armor is intended to protect.
“In support of these assertions I must ask permission to introduce certain detailed statements which appear to be absolutely necessary to a discussion of the subject, but which shall be made as brief and untechnical as possible.
“It appears that the points raised by the discussion may be grouped under two heads. First, does the shortening of the belt in the English ships introduce such serious dangers if they have to do battle with the French ships? Secondly, what should be considered the principal uses of armor-plating in modern war-ships? The second question may be considered to include the first; but it will be convenient to take the questions in the order in which they have been placed, as, after all, the greatest immediate interest centres in the comparison between existing ships.
“At the outset it is important to remark that in the most recent designs of armored ships for all navies, increase in speed, armament, and thickness of armor has been associated with a decrease in the area of the broadside protected by armor. Further, it has been considered important in most cases to distribute the armored positions of the heavy guns in the ships in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by one or two lucky shots which may happen when the heavy guns are concentrated in a single citadel or battery. This distribution of the heavy guns also gives greater efficiency to the auxiliary armament of lighter guns, and enables these heavy guns to be placed at a considerably greater height above water than was usual in former days, so that the chances of the guns being prevented from being fought in heavy weather are diminished, and their power as compared with the lower guns in earlier ships is increased, especially when firing with depression.
“The days of the ‘completely protected iron-clad,’ with the broadside armored throughout the length from the upper deck down to five or six feet below the water-line, have long gone by. The ‘central battery and belt’ system has also been practically dropped, whether the battery contained broadside guns or formed a citadel protecting the bases of the turrets. In short, on modern battle-ships there now remains only a narrow belt of armor, rising from five or six feet below the load-line to two or three feet above it. This narrow strip of armor in the French ships extends from end to end, and is associated with a protective deck worked at the height of the top of the belt, and forming a strong roof to the hold spaces beneath. In the English ships of theAdmiralclass the belt of armor extends somewhat less than half the total length, protecting one hundred and forty to one hundred and fifty feet of the central portion of the ship (in which are situate the engines and boilers), and protecting also the communications from the barbette towers to the magazines. At the extremities of the belt strong armored bulkheads are built across the ships. The protected deck is fitted at the upper edge of the belt over the central portion. Before and abaft the bulkheads, where there is no side armor, the protection consists of a strong steel deck, situated from four to five feet below water, and extending to the bow and stern respectively. Upon this under-water deck are placed coal-bunkers, chain-lockers, fresh-water tanks, store-rooms, etc., the spaces between it and the deck next above being subdivided into a large number of water-tight compartments or cells by means of longitudinal and transverse bulkheads. A water-tight top or roof to these compartments is formed by plating over the main deck-beams with thin steel at the same height above water as the top of the armor-belt. In this manner the unarmored ends above the protective deck are not merely packed to a large extent with water-excluding substances when the vessel is fully laden, but they are minutely subdivided into separate compartments, which can only be thrown into communication with one another by means of very extensive injuries to the partitions.
“In all the modern French ships, as well as in theAdmiralclass, a light steel superstructure of considerable height is built above the level of the belt-deck; the living quarters of the crew and the stations of the auxiliary armament are contained within this light erection, which also surrounds the armored communications from the barbette towers to the magazines. In this manner a ship with a small height of armored freeboard is converted into a high-sided ship for all purposes of ordinary navigation, sea-worthiness, and habitability; while spaces are provided in which a more or less considerable number oflight guns can be fought concurrently with the heavy guns placed in the armor-protected stations. The radical difference, therefore, between the French ships and theAdmiralclass, independently of other considerations than the armor protection of the water-line, consists in the omission of the side armor at the extremities, and the use instead of the side armor of the strong under-water deck with cellular subdivision and other arrangements for adding to the protection and securing the buoyancy of the spaces at the ends, into which water may find access through the thin sides if they are shot through and seriously damaged in action. If the completely belted French ship has to fight a vessel of theAdmiralclass, the latter has obviously the greater chance of damage to the narrow strips of the sides lying above the under-water deck before and abaft the ends of the belt. If the action takes place in smooth water, when the ships are neither rolling nor pitching, but are simply in motion, the chances of hitting these narrow strips in the water-line region might not be very great; but it must be admitted that even the lightest guns would penetrate the thin sides of the English ships and admit more or less considerable quantities of water into the ends. If, on the other hand, the fight takes place in a sea-way, with the ships lolling and pitching, then the relative importance of penetration of these narrow’ strips of the ends of the English ships becomes much less, because the belt armor of the French ships will be brought out of water for a considerable length of the bow and the stern by a very moderate angle of pitching, or by the passage of a comparatively low wave, and because rolling motion of the ships will alternately immerse or emerge the belt armor, even at the midships part, where it has its greatest thickness. In fact, as I have more than once said publicly, it is clearly an error to limit criticism to the longitudinal extent of the belt armor in modern ships, and to exclude consideration of the vertical extent of the armor above and below the load-line. Apart from any discussion of the question from the artillerist’s point of view, or any attempt to determine the probability or otherwise of the wholesale destruction of the unarmored portions of modern battle ships by shell-fire from large guns, or by the projectiles from rapid-firing and machine guns, it is perfectly obvious to any one who will examine into the matter that the risk of damage to the light superstructures situated above the belt must be greater than the corresponding risk of damage to the narrow strips of side area exposed at the unarmored ends of theAdmiralclass, between the level of the belt-deck and the water-line.
“Sir Spencer Robinson, after his inspection of the models shown him at the Admiralty, recognizes the fact that in the French belted ships (of which theAmiral Duperréis an example), if the light sides above the belt-deck are destroyed or very seriously riddled in action, the ship would be capsized in a very moderate sea-way. He further emphasizes the statement that the ships of theAdmiralclass in the English navy, if similarly treated, would also capsize under the same conditions, and he appears to be surprised at the admission having been made. The fact is that there has never been any assertion that theAdmiralclass would be safe against capsizing independently of assistance given to the armor-belted portions by the unarmored structure situated above. On the contrary, from the first, in the design of these ships, it was recognized that their stability, in the sense of their power to resist being capsized, if inclined to even moderate angles of inclination, was not guaranteed by the armor-belts. In this respect they were in identically the same position as all other armored ships with shallow water-line belts and isolated armored batteries placed high above water.
“What has been said respecting theAdmiralclass is this: If the unarmored ends above the protective deck were completely thrown open to the sea, then the initial stability (that is to say, the stiffness of the ships or their power to resist small inclinations from the upright) would still be guaranteed by the central armored portions. So fully did we appreciate the fact that the life of the ship in action (as determined by her power to resist large inclinations) depends greatly upon the assistance given by the unarmored superstructures to the armor-belted parts, that we were careful to make the structural arrangements of the superstructures above the belts such that they could bear a very considerable amount of riddling and damage from shot and shell without ceasing to contribute in the most important degree to the buoyancy and stability.
“There are double cellular sides between the belt and upper decks; the main bulkheads are carried up high above water; hatches and openings are trunked up and protected by coffer-dams. In short, every possible precaution is taken to subdivide into compartments, and thus limit the spaces to which water can find access when the outer sides are penetrated or shattered, as well as to facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the sides.
“Now, without in the least intending to discredit the work of the French designers, I have to state that no corresponding or equal precautions have been taken in the portions of their ships lying above the belt-decks. And the absence of these features in the French ships is a great relative advantage to the English ships. Of course there is nothing to hinder the French from imitating our practice, but they are content to take the risks involved in a simpler construction, and in so doing they show their practical disbelief in the doctrine of armor-protected stability. I am aware that some eminent authorities do not concur with this view, and maintain that stability and buoyancy should be guaranteed by armor. To this point I will revert hereafter, but for the present I am content to say that, as between the French ships and theAdmiralclass, the most serious risks of damage by gun-fire in action are of the same kind, and, practically, are not affected by the shortening of the armor-belts in the English ships.
“Next I would refer to the differences which are undoubtedly involved in shortening the belts of the English ships. In the first place, by dispensing with the side armor towards the extremities a very considerable saving is effected in the weight and the cost of the armor fitted to the ships. Mr. Barnaby has recently given an illustration of this, where a ship, in other respects unchanged, has to be increased from 10,000 to 11,000 tons in displacement in order to carry the shallow armor-belt to the ends. In theCollingwoodherself quite as large a proportionate increase of size would be involved in having a thick armor-belt from stem to stern. This saving in weight and cost of armor might, of course, be purchased too dearly, if dispensing with the armor involved possibly fatal risks to the ship. However the result may be attained, there is universal agreement that a ship-of-war should have her buoyancy, stability, and trim guaranteed as far as possible against the effects of damage in action. Now, in theAdmiralclass this matter was very carefully investigated before the design was approved. In order to prevent derangement of the trim of the vessels by penetration of the light sides above the protective deck at one end, arrangements were made in the design by means of which water can be introduced into the spaces occupied by coal-bunkers, etc., before the ships go into action.
“The extent to which water may be introduced is a matter over which the captain would necessarily have control. But even if the whole of the unoccupied spaces were filled with water, the increase in draught would not exceed fourteen to eighteen inches, and the loss in speed would not exceed half a knot. If only the coal-bunkers were flooded as a preliminary to action, the chance of any serious disturbance of trim, and consequent loss of manœuvring power or speed by damage to the light sides above the protective deck and near the water, would be very small, and the ‘sinkage’ of the vessel would be decreased considerably. But taking the extreme case, with the ends completely filled and a sinkage of fourteen to eighteen inches, a ship of theAdmiralclass would go into action with practically her full speed available, and with her ends so protected by under-water deck and the water admitted above that deck that damage to the thin sides by shot or shell penetrating at or near the water-line would not produce changes of trim or alterations of draught to any greater extent than would be produced if the armor-belt had been carried to the stem and stern. Nor would the admission of water into the ends render the vessel unstable.
“It has been urged that the sinkage due to filling the tank ends with water is a disadvantage, because it brings the upper edge of the belt armor in theAdmiralclass about fourteen to eighteen inches nearer the water than the upper edge of the belts of the French ships. If the greatest danger of the ships was to be measured by the smallness of their ‘reserve’ of ‘armor-protected buoyancy’ (that is to say, by the buoyancy of the part of the ship lying above her fighting water-line and below the belt-deck), then theAdmiralclass would not compare favorably with the fully belted French ships. But I have already explained that this is not the true measure of the greatest danger arising from the effects of gun-fire, and that it would be a mistake to assume that in either the French or the English ships the armor-belted portions of the vessels guarantee their safety when damaged in action.
“As between theAdmiralclass and the central-citadel ships of theInflexibletype there is a difference in this respect which has been much commented upon. When the ends of the citadel ships are filled with water, the armored wall of the citadel still remains several feet above water; whereas, in theAdmiralclass, the top of the belt under similar conditions is very near the water-level. All that need be said on this point is that, notwithstanding the greater height of the armored wall above water, the citadel ships have practically no greater guarantee of safety against capsizing by means of armor-protected stability than theAdmiralclass. In both classes the armored portions require the assistance of the unarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall effectually guarantee their security when damaged in action. And, as has been stated above, this condition is true of all armor-clads with narrow armor-belts.
“One other objection to the shortened belts yet remains to be considered.
“It is urged that when the thin ends are broken through or damaged by shot or shell, jagged or protruding holes will be formed in the plating near the water-line, and then if the ships are driven at speed, the water will flow into the holes in large quantities, and produce serious changes of trim and loss of speed. In support of this contention, reference is made to the published reports of experiments made with theInflexible’smodel about eight years ago. It is impossible to discuss the matter fully, and I must therefore content myself with a statement of my opinion, formed after a careful personal observation of these model experiments. First, it cannot be shown from the experiments that the presence of a shallow belt of armor reaching two to three feet above the still-water line would make any sensible difference in the dangers arising from the circumstances described. Holes in the thin sides above this belt would admit water in large quantities on the belt-deck when the vessel was under way, and if it could flow along that deck changes of trim and other disagreeable consequences would result. Secondly, it is certain that the numerous bulkheads and partitions, coffer-dams, etc., built above the belt-deck level in theAdmiralclass for the very purpose of limiting the flow of entering water would greatly decrease any tendency to check the speed or change the trim. Whether the belt be short or long, it is evident that gaping holes low down in the light sides will make it prudent for a captain to slow down somewhat if he wishes to keep the water out as much as possible. But between such prudence and the danger of disaster there is a wide gulf.
“Summing up the foregoing statements, I desire to record my opinion, based upon complete personal knowledge of every detail in the calculations and designs for theAdmiralclass, that the disposition of the belt armor (in association with the protective decks and cellular sides, water-tight subdivision, etc., existing in the unarmored portions of the vessels situated above the protective decks) is such that the buoyancy, stability, trim, speed, and manœuvring capabilities are well guaranteed against extensive damage from shot and shell fire in action. And, further, that in these particulars theAdmiralclass are capable of meeting, at least on equal terms, their contemporary ships in the French navy.
“I must add that I am not here instituting any comparison between the ‘fighting efficiencies’ of the ships of the two fleets; nor have I space in this letter to do so. Opinions have differed, and will probably always differ, as to the relative importance of the different qualities which go to make up fighting efficiency. There is no simple formula admitting of general application which enables the comparative fighting values of war-ships to be appraised. As the conditions of naval warfare change and war material is developed, so the balance of qualities in ship-designing has to be readjusted, and estimates of the fighting powers of existing ships have to be revised. And, further, different designers, working simultaneously, distribute the displacement, which is their sum total of capital to work upon, according to their own judgments of what is wisest and best for the particularconditions which the ships built from those designs have to fulfil. The designer who has the larger displacement to work upon has the better opportunity of producing a more powerful ship; but it by no means follows that he will secure so good a combination of qualities as a rival obtains on a smaller displacement. And hence I cannot but dissent from the doctrine that displacement tonnage is to be accepted as a fair measure of relative fighting efficiency, or that recent English ships are necessarily unable to fight recent French ships because they are of smaller displacement.
“In the preceding remarks I have been careful to confine myself chiefly to the naval architect’s side of the subject, as it would clearly be out of place for me to say much respecting the artillerist’s side. But, having had the great advantage of knowing the views of some of the most experienced gun-makers and gunnery officers, and having studied carefully what has been written on the subject, I would venture to say a few words.
“First, there seems, as was previously remarked, every reason for doubting, in the actual conditions of naval gunnery, whether it would be possible, not merely in a few minutes, but in a considerable time, to produce the wholesale destruction of the unarmored parts of modern war-ships which has been assumed in the condemnation of theAdmiralclass. If theCollingwood, or one of her successors, were simply treated as a moving target in a sea-way for theAmiral Duperréor one of her consorts, this would be a most improbable result. But, remembering that theCollingwoodwould herself be delivering heavy blows in return for those received, the chances of her disablement would necessarily be decreased. Secondly, it does not seem at all evident that the introduction of rapid-fire guns has such an important influence on the question of shortened belts as some writers have supposed. So far as machine guns are concerned, I well remember at the board meeting which decided to approve the building of theCollingwoodthe possible effects of machine-gun fire were discussed at some length, both in reference to the adoption of the barbette system and to the system of hull protection. The rapid-firing gun which has since been introduced is now a formidable weapon; but it may be questioned whether its effects upon the unarmored portions of modern war-ships would be so serious as those resulting from the shell-fire of heavier guns, and therefore it cannot with certainty be concluded that it would be advantageous to make arrangements for keeping out the projectiles from the rapid-firing guns now in use at the ends of theAdmiralclass. More especially is this true when it is considered that already rapid-fire guns of much larger calibre and greater power than the 6-pounder and 9-pounder are being made. To these guns three inches of steel would be practically no better defence than the existing thin sides, and the real defence lies in the strong protective deck. Shell-fire from heavier guns will probably be found the best form of attack against the unarmored or lightly armored portions of battle-ships, especially now that the use of steel shells with thin walls and large bursting charges is being so rapidly developed.
“I would again say that on this side of the subject I do not profess to speak with authority, and it is undoubted that great differences of opinion prevail; but it must not be forgotten that the Board of Admiralty, by its recent decision announced in the House of Commons, has reaffirmed the opinion that from the artillerist’s point of view the existing disposition of the armor in theAdmiralclass is satisfactory. This has been done after the attention of the Board and the public has been most strongly directed to the supposed dangers incidental to the rapid destruction of the light superstructures lying above the under-water decks of theAdmiralclass. It would be folly to suppose that in such a matter any merely personal considerations would prevent the Board from authorizing a change which was proved to be necessary or advantageous. With respect to the possibility of making experiments which should determine the points at issue, I would only say that considerable difficulties must necessarily arise in endeavoring to represent the conditions of an actual fight; but in view of the diametrically opposite views which have been expressed as to the effect of gun-fire upon cellular structures, it would certainly be advantageous if some scheme of the kind could be arranged.
“There still remains to be considered the question of the uses of armor in future war-ships. This letter has already extended to too great a length to permit of any attempt ata full discussion. It will be admitted by all who are interested in the questions of naval design that an inquiry into the matter is urgently needed, even if it leads only to a temporary solution of the problem, in view of the present means of offence and defence.
“Armor, by which term I understand not merely vertical armor, but oblique or horizontal armor, is regarded in different ways by different authorities. For example, I understand Sir Edward Reed to maintain that side-armor should be fitted in the form of a water-line belt, extending over a very considerable portion of the length, and that such armor, in association with a strong protective deck, and armored erections for gun-stations, etc., should secure the buoyancy, trim, and stability of the vessel. At the other extreme we have the view expressed in the design of the grand Italian vessels of theItaliaclass. In them the hull-armor is only used for the purpose of assisting the cellular hull subdivisions in protecting buoyancy, stability, and trim, taking the form of a thick protective deck, which is wholly under water, and above which comes a minutely subdivided region, which Signor Brin and his colleagues consider sufficient defence against gun-fire.
“In these Italian vessels the only thick armor is used to protect the gun-stations, the pilot-tower, and the communications from those important parts to the magazines and spaces below the protective deck. The strong deck, besides forming a base of the cellular subdivision, is of course a defence to the vital parts of the ship lying below it.
“Between these two types of ships come theAdmiralclass of the English navy and the belted vessels of the French navy, whose resemblances and differences have been described above.
“In addition, there are not a few authorities who maintain that the development of the swift torpedo-cruiser, or the swift protected cruiser, makes the continued use of armor at least questionable, seeing that to attempt to protect ships by thick armor either on decks or sides, and to secure high speeds and heavy armaments, involves the construction of large and expensive vessels, which are necessarily exposed to enormous risks in action from forms of under-water attack, against which their armor is no defence. In view of such differences of opinion, and of the heated controversies which have arisen therefrom, the time seems certainly to have arrived when some competent body should be assembled by the Admiralty for the purpose of considering the designs of our war-ships, and enabling our constructors to proceed with greater assurance than they can at present. Questions affecting the efficiency of the Royal Navy clearly ought not to be decided except in the most calm and dispassionate manner. The work done by the Committee on Designs for Ships of War fourteen years ago was valuable, and has had important results. What is now wanted, I venture to think, is a still wider inquiry into the condition of the navy, and one of the branches of that inquiry which will require the most careful treatment is embraced in the question, ‘What are the uses of armor in modern war-ships?’
“My own opinion, reached after very careful study of the subject, is that very serious limitations have to be accepted in the disposition and general efficiency of the armaments, if the principle of protecting the stability at considerable angles of inclination by means of thick armor is accepted, the size and cost of the ships being kept within reasonable limits. There is no difficulty, of course, apart from considerations of size and cost, in fulfilling the condition of armor-protected stability; but it may be doubted whether the results could prove satisfactory, especially when the risks from under-water attacks, as well as from gun-fire, are borne in mind, and the fact is recognized that even the thickest armor carried or contemplated is not proof against existing guns. No vessel can fight without running risks. It is by no means certain, however, that the greater risks to be faced are those arising from damage to the sides in the region of the water-line and consequent loss of stability. So far as I have been able to judge, it appears possible to produce a better fighting-machine for a given cost by abandoning the idea of protecting stability, buoyancy, and trim entirely by thick armor, and by the acceptance of the principle that unarmored but specially constructed superstructures shall be trusted as contributories to the flotation and stability. Thick vertical side armor, even over a portion of the length, appears to be by no means a necessary condition to an effective guarantee of the life and manageability of a ship when damaged in action; and it seems extremely probable that in future the great distinctionbetween battle-ships and protected ships will not be found in the nature of their hull protection in the region of the water-line, but in the use of thick armor over the stations of the heavy guns in battle-ships.
“The decisions as to future designs of our battle-ships is a momentous one. It can only be reached by the consideration of the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative proposals. It cannot be dissociated from considerations of cost for a single ship.
“On all grounds, therefore, it is to be hoped that a full and impartial inquiry will be authorized without delay; for it may be assumed that, however opinions differ, there is the common desire to secure for the British navy the best types of ships and a sufficient number to insure our maritime supremacy.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,“W. H. White.
“Elswick Works,March 26th.”
The following reply by Sir Edward Reed appeared in theTimesof April 8, 1885, the omitted portions being personal allusions which have very little bearing upon the discussion, and which are of no interest to a professional reader outside of England:
“It is not Mr. White’s fault but his misfortune that he is compelled to admit the perfect correctness of the main charge which I have brought against these six ships,viz., that they have been so constructed, and have been so stripped of armor protection, that their armor, even when intact and untouched, is wholly insufficient to prevent them from capsizing in battle. Mr. White expends a good deal of labor in attempting to show that their unarmored parts would have a better chance of keeping the ships upright and afloat than I credit them with, which is a secondary, although an important, question; but he frankly admits that these six ships of theAdmiraltype are, and are admitted to be, so built that their ‘stability in the sense of the power to resist being capsized if inclined to even moderate angles of inclination is not guaranteed by their armor-belts.’“I have no doubt it would suit the purposes of all those who are or who have been responsible for those ships if I were to allow myself to be drawn, in connection with this question, away from the essential points just adverted to into a controversy upon the efforts made by the Admiralty to give to these ships, which have been denied a reasonable amount of armor protection, such relief from the grave dangers thus incurred as thin sheet compartments, coffer-dams, coals, patent fuel, stores, etc., can afford. (Cork is what was at first relied upon in this connection, but we hear no more of it now.) But I do not intend to be drawn aside from my demand for properly armored ships of the first class by any references to these devices, and for a very simple reason,viz., all such devices, whether their value be great or small, are in no sense special to armored ships; on the contrary they are common to all ships, and are more especially applied to ships which are unable to carry armor. The application of these devices to ships stripped of armor does not make them armored ships, any more than it makes a simple cruiser or other ordinary unarmored vessel an armored ship; and what I desire, and what I confidently rely upon the country demanding before long, is the construction of a few line-of-battle ships made reasonably safe by armor, in lieu of the present ships, which, while called armored ships, in reality depend upon their thin unarmored parts for their ability to keep upright and afloat. Besides, I do not believe in these devices for ships intended for close fighting. I even believe them likely, in not a few cases, to add to their danger rather than to their safety. If, for example, a raking shot or shell should let the sea into the compartments on one side of the ship, while those on the other side remain intact and buoyant, this very buoyancy upon the uninjured side of the ship would help to capsize her.“Mr. White says that no vessel can fight without running risks, and thinks that thick, vertical side-armor, even over a portion of the ship’s length, is not a necessary guarantee of the life of a ship. Well, sir, we are all at liberty to think, or not think, what we please,so far as our sense and judgment will allow us; but Mr. White, like all other depreciators of side-armor, fails utterly to show us what else there is which can be relied upon to keep shell out of a ship, or what can be done to prevent shell that burst inside a ship from spreading destruction all around. He refers us to no experiments to show that the thin plate divisions and coffer-dams, and like devices, will prove of any avail for the purpose proposed. In the absence of any such experiments, he tells us, as others have told us, that Signor Brin and colleagues in the Italian Admiralty consider ‘a minutely subdivided region’ at and below the water-line ‘sufficient defence against gun-fire.’ But I do not think Signor Brin believes anything of the kind; what he believes is that the Italian government cannot afford to build a fleet of properly armored line-of-battle ships for hard and close fighting, and that, looking at their limited resources, a few excessively fast ships, with armor here and there to protect particular parts, and with ample capabilities of retreat to a safe distance, will best serve their purpose. I do not say that he is wrong, and I certainly admire the skill which he has displayed in carrying out his well-defined object. But that object is totally different from ours, and our naval habits, our traditions, our national spirit, the very blood that flows in our veins, prevent such an object from ever becoming ours.“Mr. White all through his letter, in common with some of his late colleagues at the Admiralty, thinks and speaks as if naval warfare were henceforth to be chiefly a matter of dodging, getting chance shots, and keeping out of the enemy’s way; and this may be more or less true of contests between unarmored vessels. But why is not the line-of-battle shipCollingwoodto be supposed to steam straight up to the enemy, I should like to know? and if she does, what is to prevent the enemy from pouring a raking fire through her bow, and ripping up at once, even with a single shell, every compartment between the stem and the transverse armored bulkhead?“It distresses me beyond measure to see our ships constructed so as to impose upon them the most terrible penalties whenever their commanders dare, as dare they ever have, and dare they ever will, to close with their foe and try conclusions with him. Why, sir, it has been my painful duty over and over again to hear foreign officers entreat me to use all my influence against the adoption in their navy of ships with so little armored surface as ours. On one occasion theCollingwoodherself was imposed upon them as a model to be imitated, and I was besought to give them a safer and better ship. ‘How could I ever steam up to my enemy with any confidence,’ said one of the officers concerned, ‘with such a ship as that under my feet?’“Mr. White coolly tells us that theCollingwood, with five hundred tons of water logging her ends to a depth of seven or eight feet, will not be much worse off than a ship whose armored deck stands two and a half or three feet above the water’s surface, and his reason is that even above this latter deck the water would flow in when the ship was driving ahead with an injured bow. Well, sir, I will only say that sailors of experience see a very great difference between the two cases, and I can but regard such theorizings as very unfortunate basis for the designs of her Majesty’s ships.“I have said that Mr. White’s assumptions as to the immunity of the above-water compartments and coffer-dams from wide-spread injury by shell-fire rest upon no experimental data; I go on to say that such data as we have to my mind point very much the other way. TheHuascarwas not an unarmored vessel, and such shell as penetrated her had first to pass through some thin armor and wood backing; yet after theCochraneandBlanco Encalodahad defeated her she presented internally abundant evidence of the general destruction which shell-fire produces. An officer of theCochrane, who was the first person sent on board by the captors, in a letter to me written soon afterwards, said: ‘It requires seeing to believe the destruction done.... We had to climb over heaps, table-high, ofdébrisand dead and wounded.... We fired forty-five Palliser shell, and the engineers who were on board say that every shell, or nearly so, must have struck, and that every one that struck burst on board, doing awful destruction.’“Speaking of the injury which theCochranereceived from a single shell of theHuascar, he said: ‘It passed through the upper works at commander’s cabin, breaking fore andaft bulkhead of cabins, breaking skylight above ward-room, thwartship bulkhead of wood, passed on, cut in two a 5-inch iron pillar, through a store-room, struck armor-plate, glanced off, passing through plating of embrasure closet at corner, finishing at after gun-port, and went overboard. This shell passed in at starboard part of stern and terminated at after battery port on port side, which is finished with the wide angle-iron, carrying out a part of the angle-iron in its flight.’“This was a shell of moderate size, from a moderate gun, but it is obvious that it would have made short work of penetrating those very thin sheets of steel which constitute the compartments, coffer-dams, etc., upon the resistance of which, to my extreme surprise, those responsible for the power and safety of our fleets seem so ready to place their main dependence.“For resistance to rams and torpedoes, and for the limitation of the injuries to be effected by them, as much cellular subdivision as possible should be supplied; but, as against shot and shell, subdivision by their sheet-steel is no guarantee whatever of safety in any ship, least of all in line-of-battle ships, which must be prepared for fighting at close quarters.“I must now ask for space to remark upon a few minor points in Mr. White’s letter. He seems to consider that the scant armor of theAdmiralclass is somehow associated with the placing of the large, partly protected guns of these ships in separate positions, ‘in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by one or two lucky shots, which may happen when the heavy guns are concentrated on a single citadel or battery.’ Suffice it to reply that in the proposed new designs of the Admiralty ships now before Parliament, which have almost equally scant partial belts of armor, the guns are nevertheless concentrated in a single battery.“Again, Mr. White says the Admiralty have declined to adopt my advice to protect theAdmiralclass in certain unarmored parts with 3-inch plating, and declares that such plating would practically be no better defence against rapid-fire guns than existing thin sides; but has he forgotten the fact that my suggestion has been adopted in the new designs for the protection of the battery of 6-inch guns, although it is perversely withheld from those parts of the ship in which it might assist in some degree in prolonging the ship’s ability to float and to resist capsizing forces?“Mr. White makes one very singular statement. He takes exception to my claiming for theInflexibletype of ship, on account of their armored citadel, a much better chance of retaining stability in battle than theAdmiraltype possesses, because, he says, ‘in both classes the armored portions require the assistance of the unarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall effectually guarantee their security when damaged in action.’ The fair inference to be drawn from this would be that where the principle long ago laid down by me, and supported by Mr. Barnaby in the words previously quoted, is once departed from, the danger must in all cases be so great as to exclude all distinctions of more or less risk. Mr. White can hardly mean this; but if he does not, then on what grounds are we told that a ship which has no armor at all left above water at an inclination say of six or eight degrees is no worse off than a ship which at those angles and at still greater ones has a water-tight citadel over one hundred feet long to help hold her up?“I am not at all disposed to enter into a discussion as to the relative stabilities of the English and French ships under various conditions. The French ships have armored belts two and a half to three feet above water from end to end. That fact, other things being presumed equal, gives them an immense advantage over our ships, which in battle trim have belts scarcely more than a foot wide above water, and for less than half their length. It is quite possible that the French constructors may have given their ships less initial stability than ours; from such information as I possess I believe they have; but in so far as the ship below the armor-deck, and the action of shot and shell upon that part of her, are concerned, whatever stability they start with in battle they will retain until their armor ispierced; whereas our ships may have a large proportion of theirs taken from them without their armor being pierced, and their armored decks are then less than half the height of those of the French ships above water.“I will add that I doubt if the French ships are dealt fairly by at Whitehall. I lately heard a good deal of the extreme taper of their armor-belts at the bow, and theAmiral Duperréwas always quoted in instance of this. It is true that this ship’s armor does taper from fifty-five centimetres amidships to twenty-five centimetres at the stem, but she stands almost alone among recent important ships in this respect, as the following figures will show:Name of Ship.Thickness of Armor Amidship.Thickness of Armor at Bows.Centimetres.Centimetres.Amiral Baudin5540Formidable5540Hoche4540Magenta4540Marceau4540Caiman5035Fulminant3325Furieuse5032Indomptable5037Requin5040Terrible5037“A friend writes me: ‘Comparing theAmiral Duperréwith theAmiral Baudin,Dévastation,Formidable, andFoudroyant, which are ships of about her size, the following peculiarities are observable: TheDuperréis about three feet narrower than the other ships mentioned, and has fully fifteen inches less metacentric height. She is also slightly deeper in proportion to her breadth than the other ships.’“As narrowness, small metacentric height, and excessive depth all tend to reduce stability, it would appear that the Admiralty office has, as I supposed, been careful to select a vessel not unfavorable to their purpose. But however this may be, it is no business of mine to defend the French ships in the details of their stability, nor even to defend them at all; and, as a matter of fact, the French Admiralty, although stopping far short of ours, has in my opinion gone much too far in the direction of reducing the armored stability at considerable angles of inclination. But their falling into one error is no justification for our falling into a much greater one, and deliberately repeating it in every ship we lay down. In this connection I will only add that the experiments performed at our Admiralty on models must be viewed with great distrust for a reason not yet named. They deal only, so far as I am acquainted with them, with models set oscillating or rolling by waves or otherwise. But the danger thus dealt with is a secondary one; the primary one is that due to ‘list’ or prolonged inclination to one side. What sort of protection against the danger of capsizing from this cause can be possessed by a ship the entire armor on each side of which becomes immersed even in smooth water when the ship is inclined a couple of degrees only, and which then has no side left to immerse, save such as single shells can blow into holes ten by four feet?“It is to be observed that although Mr. White does not venture to join the only other apologist for these deficiently armored ships in stating that India-rubber umbrella shot-stoppers are to be employed for their preservation in battle, he does go so far as to tell us that the spaces into which water would enter when the unarmored parts have been penetrated have been subdivided ‘to facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the sides,’ and I know independently that a good deal of reliance is placed at the Admiralty upon the presumed ability to stop such holes as they are made. But the whole thing is a delusion. The officer of theCochrane, before quoted, said, ‘I wish to state that shot-plugsare out of the question after or at such a fight. They are entirely useless. Not a hole was either round, square, or oval, but different shapes—ragged, jagged, and torn, the inside parts and half-inch plating being torn in ribbons; some of the holes inside are as large as four by three feet, and of all shapes. There are many shot-plugs on board here, all sizes, conical shapes and long, but they are of no use whatever.’“Mr. White’s letter invites many other comments, but I have said enough to show that it in no way changes my view of the question of armor-plated line-of-battle ships. In so far as it advocates a further abandonment of armor and a further resort to doubtful devices in lieu thereof, it is already answered by anticipation by the Admiralty itself. Until I wrote my recent letters to you, our Admiralty thought as Mr. White still thinks, and tended as he still tends. In the case of all our recent cruisers but two they had abolished side-armor altogether. To my public appeal for armor-belted cruisers they have, however, responded, and are about to order six of such ships. So far, so good. We ought to be grateful for this concession to a most reasonable demand. I wish these cruisers were to be faster, much faster, but in Admiralty matters the country must be thankful for small mercies.“It only remains for me to note with satisfaction one or two of the points upon which Mr. White is in agreement with myself. He admits that it ‘would certainly be advantageous’ to carry out those experiments which I regard the Admiralty as afraid to make,viz., experiments to test the effect of gun-fire upon the subdivided but unarmored parts of ships.“It may be taken for what it is worth, but I declare that the abandonment of armor has not at all been forced upon us by unavoidable circumstances, nor is it from any intrinsic necessity that we go on refusing to provide our ships with torpedo defence. On not immoderate dimensions, at not immoderate cost, ships might be built, still practically invulnerable to gun, ram, and torpedo alike, ships which could dispose of theAdmiralclass of ships more quickly and certainly than she could dispose of the feeblest antagonist that she is likely to encounter. But in order to produce such ships we must revive the now abandoned principle that armor, and armor alone can save from destruction those ships whose business it is to drive our future enemies from the European seas and lock them up in their own ports.”
“It is not Mr. White’s fault but his misfortune that he is compelled to admit the perfect correctness of the main charge which I have brought against these six ships,viz., that they have been so constructed, and have been so stripped of armor protection, that their armor, even when intact and untouched, is wholly insufficient to prevent them from capsizing in battle. Mr. White expends a good deal of labor in attempting to show that their unarmored parts would have a better chance of keeping the ships upright and afloat than I credit them with, which is a secondary, although an important, question; but he frankly admits that these six ships of theAdmiraltype are, and are admitted to be, so built that their ‘stability in the sense of the power to resist being capsized if inclined to even moderate angles of inclination is not guaranteed by their armor-belts.’
“I have no doubt it would suit the purposes of all those who are or who have been responsible for those ships if I were to allow myself to be drawn, in connection with this question, away from the essential points just adverted to into a controversy upon the efforts made by the Admiralty to give to these ships, which have been denied a reasonable amount of armor protection, such relief from the grave dangers thus incurred as thin sheet compartments, coffer-dams, coals, patent fuel, stores, etc., can afford. (Cork is what was at first relied upon in this connection, but we hear no more of it now.) But I do not intend to be drawn aside from my demand for properly armored ships of the first class by any references to these devices, and for a very simple reason,viz., all such devices, whether their value be great or small, are in no sense special to armored ships; on the contrary they are common to all ships, and are more especially applied to ships which are unable to carry armor. The application of these devices to ships stripped of armor does not make them armored ships, any more than it makes a simple cruiser or other ordinary unarmored vessel an armored ship; and what I desire, and what I confidently rely upon the country demanding before long, is the construction of a few line-of-battle ships made reasonably safe by armor, in lieu of the present ships, which, while called armored ships, in reality depend upon their thin unarmored parts for their ability to keep upright and afloat. Besides, I do not believe in these devices for ships intended for close fighting. I even believe them likely, in not a few cases, to add to their danger rather than to their safety. If, for example, a raking shot or shell should let the sea into the compartments on one side of the ship, while those on the other side remain intact and buoyant, this very buoyancy upon the uninjured side of the ship would help to capsize her.
“Mr. White says that no vessel can fight without running risks, and thinks that thick, vertical side-armor, even over a portion of the ship’s length, is not a necessary guarantee of the life of a ship. Well, sir, we are all at liberty to think, or not think, what we please,so far as our sense and judgment will allow us; but Mr. White, like all other depreciators of side-armor, fails utterly to show us what else there is which can be relied upon to keep shell out of a ship, or what can be done to prevent shell that burst inside a ship from spreading destruction all around. He refers us to no experiments to show that the thin plate divisions and coffer-dams, and like devices, will prove of any avail for the purpose proposed. In the absence of any such experiments, he tells us, as others have told us, that Signor Brin and colleagues in the Italian Admiralty consider ‘a minutely subdivided region’ at and below the water-line ‘sufficient defence against gun-fire.’ But I do not think Signor Brin believes anything of the kind; what he believes is that the Italian government cannot afford to build a fleet of properly armored line-of-battle ships for hard and close fighting, and that, looking at their limited resources, a few excessively fast ships, with armor here and there to protect particular parts, and with ample capabilities of retreat to a safe distance, will best serve their purpose. I do not say that he is wrong, and I certainly admire the skill which he has displayed in carrying out his well-defined object. But that object is totally different from ours, and our naval habits, our traditions, our national spirit, the very blood that flows in our veins, prevent such an object from ever becoming ours.
“Mr. White all through his letter, in common with some of his late colleagues at the Admiralty, thinks and speaks as if naval warfare were henceforth to be chiefly a matter of dodging, getting chance shots, and keeping out of the enemy’s way; and this may be more or less true of contests between unarmored vessels. But why is not the line-of-battle shipCollingwoodto be supposed to steam straight up to the enemy, I should like to know? and if she does, what is to prevent the enemy from pouring a raking fire through her bow, and ripping up at once, even with a single shell, every compartment between the stem and the transverse armored bulkhead?
“It distresses me beyond measure to see our ships constructed so as to impose upon them the most terrible penalties whenever their commanders dare, as dare they ever have, and dare they ever will, to close with their foe and try conclusions with him. Why, sir, it has been my painful duty over and over again to hear foreign officers entreat me to use all my influence against the adoption in their navy of ships with so little armored surface as ours. On one occasion theCollingwoodherself was imposed upon them as a model to be imitated, and I was besought to give them a safer and better ship. ‘How could I ever steam up to my enemy with any confidence,’ said one of the officers concerned, ‘with such a ship as that under my feet?’
“Mr. White coolly tells us that theCollingwood, with five hundred tons of water logging her ends to a depth of seven or eight feet, will not be much worse off than a ship whose armored deck stands two and a half or three feet above the water’s surface, and his reason is that even above this latter deck the water would flow in when the ship was driving ahead with an injured bow. Well, sir, I will only say that sailors of experience see a very great difference between the two cases, and I can but regard such theorizings as very unfortunate basis for the designs of her Majesty’s ships.
“I have said that Mr. White’s assumptions as to the immunity of the above-water compartments and coffer-dams from wide-spread injury by shell-fire rest upon no experimental data; I go on to say that such data as we have to my mind point very much the other way. TheHuascarwas not an unarmored vessel, and such shell as penetrated her had first to pass through some thin armor and wood backing; yet after theCochraneandBlanco Encalodahad defeated her she presented internally abundant evidence of the general destruction which shell-fire produces. An officer of theCochrane, who was the first person sent on board by the captors, in a letter to me written soon afterwards, said: ‘It requires seeing to believe the destruction done.... We had to climb over heaps, table-high, ofdébrisand dead and wounded.... We fired forty-five Palliser shell, and the engineers who were on board say that every shell, or nearly so, must have struck, and that every one that struck burst on board, doing awful destruction.’
“Speaking of the injury which theCochranereceived from a single shell of theHuascar, he said: ‘It passed through the upper works at commander’s cabin, breaking fore andaft bulkhead of cabins, breaking skylight above ward-room, thwartship bulkhead of wood, passed on, cut in two a 5-inch iron pillar, through a store-room, struck armor-plate, glanced off, passing through plating of embrasure closet at corner, finishing at after gun-port, and went overboard. This shell passed in at starboard part of stern and terminated at after battery port on port side, which is finished with the wide angle-iron, carrying out a part of the angle-iron in its flight.’
“This was a shell of moderate size, from a moderate gun, but it is obvious that it would have made short work of penetrating those very thin sheets of steel which constitute the compartments, coffer-dams, etc., upon the resistance of which, to my extreme surprise, those responsible for the power and safety of our fleets seem so ready to place their main dependence.
“For resistance to rams and torpedoes, and for the limitation of the injuries to be effected by them, as much cellular subdivision as possible should be supplied; but, as against shot and shell, subdivision by their sheet-steel is no guarantee whatever of safety in any ship, least of all in line-of-battle ships, which must be prepared for fighting at close quarters.
“I must now ask for space to remark upon a few minor points in Mr. White’s letter. He seems to consider that the scant armor of theAdmiralclass is somehow associated with the placing of the large, partly protected guns of these ships in separate positions, ‘in order to reduce the risks of complete disablement of the principal armament by one or two lucky shots, which may happen when the heavy guns are concentrated on a single citadel or battery.’ Suffice it to reply that in the proposed new designs of the Admiralty ships now before Parliament, which have almost equally scant partial belts of armor, the guns are nevertheless concentrated in a single battery.
“Again, Mr. White says the Admiralty have declined to adopt my advice to protect theAdmiralclass in certain unarmored parts with 3-inch plating, and declares that such plating would practically be no better defence against rapid-fire guns than existing thin sides; but has he forgotten the fact that my suggestion has been adopted in the new designs for the protection of the battery of 6-inch guns, although it is perversely withheld from those parts of the ship in which it might assist in some degree in prolonging the ship’s ability to float and to resist capsizing forces?
“Mr. White makes one very singular statement. He takes exception to my claiming for theInflexibletype of ship, on account of their armored citadel, a much better chance of retaining stability in battle than theAdmiraltype possesses, because, he says, ‘in both classes the armored portions require the assistance of the unarmored to secure such a range and amount of stability as shall effectually guarantee their security when damaged in action.’ The fair inference to be drawn from this would be that where the principle long ago laid down by me, and supported by Mr. Barnaby in the words previously quoted, is once departed from, the danger must in all cases be so great as to exclude all distinctions of more or less risk. Mr. White can hardly mean this; but if he does not, then on what grounds are we told that a ship which has no armor at all left above water at an inclination say of six or eight degrees is no worse off than a ship which at those angles and at still greater ones has a water-tight citadel over one hundred feet long to help hold her up?
“I am not at all disposed to enter into a discussion as to the relative stabilities of the English and French ships under various conditions. The French ships have armored belts two and a half to three feet above water from end to end. That fact, other things being presumed equal, gives them an immense advantage over our ships, which in battle trim have belts scarcely more than a foot wide above water, and for less than half their length. It is quite possible that the French constructors may have given their ships less initial stability than ours; from such information as I possess I believe they have; but in so far as the ship below the armor-deck, and the action of shot and shell upon that part of her, are concerned, whatever stability they start with in battle they will retain until their armor ispierced; whereas our ships may have a large proportion of theirs taken from them without their armor being pierced, and their armored decks are then less than half the height of those of the French ships above water.
“I will add that I doubt if the French ships are dealt fairly by at Whitehall. I lately heard a good deal of the extreme taper of their armor-belts at the bow, and theAmiral Duperréwas always quoted in instance of this. It is true that this ship’s armor does taper from fifty-five centimetres amidships to twenty-five centimetres at the stem, but she stands almost alone among recent important ships in this respect, as the following figures will show:
“A friend writes me: ‘Comparing theAmiral Duperréwith theAmiral Baudin,Dévastation,Formidable, andFoudroyant, which are ships of about her size, the following peculiarities are observable: TheDuperréis about three feet narrower than the other ships mentioned, and has fully fifteen inches less metacentric height. She is also slightly deeper in proportion to her breadth than the other ships.’
“As narrowness, small metacentric height, and excessive depth all tend to reduce stability, it would appear that the Admiralty office has, as I supposed, been careful to select a vessel not unfavorable to their purpose. But however this may be, it is no business of mine to defend the French ships in the details of their stability, nor even to defend them at all; and, as a matter of fact, the French Admiralty, although stopping far short of ours, has in my opinion gone much too far in the direction of reducing the armored stability at considerable angles of inclination. But their falling into one error is no justification for our falling into a much greater one, and deliberately repeating it in every ship we lay down. In this connection I will only add that the experiments performed at our Admiralty on models must be viewed with great distrust for a reason not yet named. They deal only, so far as I am acquainted with them, with models set oscillating or rolling by waves or otherwise. But the danger thus dealt with is a secondary one; the primary one is that due to ‘list’ or prolonged inclination to one side. What sort of protection against the danger of capsizing from this cause can be possessed by a ship the entire armor on each side of which becomes immersed even in smooth water when the ship is inclined a couple of degrees only, and which then has no side left to immerse, save such as single shells can blow into holes ten by four feet?
“It is to be observed that although Mr. White does not venture to join the only other apologist for these deficiently armored ships in stating that India-rubber umbrella shot-stoppers are to be employed for their preservation in battle, he does go so far as to tell us that the spaces into which water would enter when the unarmored parts have been penetrated have been subdivided ‘to facilitate the work of stopping temporarily shot-holes in the sides,’ and I know independently that a good deal of reliance is placed at the Admiralty upon the presumed ability to stop such holes as they are made. But the whole thing is a delusion. The officer of theCochrane, before quoted, said, ‘I wish to state that shot-plugsare out of the question after or at such a fight. They are entirely useless. Not a hole was either round, square, or oval, but different shapes—ragged, jagged, and torn, the inside parts and half-inch plating being torn in ribbons; some of the holes inside are as large as four by three feet, and of all shapes. There are many shot-plugs on board here, all sizes, conical shapes and long, but they are of no use whatever.’
“Mr. White’s letter invites many other comments, but I have said enough to show that it in no way changes my view of the question of armor-plated line-of-battle ships. In so far as it advocates a further abandonment of armor and a further resort to doubtful devices in lieu thereof, it is already answered by anticipation by the Admiralty itself. Until I wrote my recent letters to you, our Admiralty thought as Mr. White still thinks, and tended as he still tends. In the case of all our recent cruisers but two they had abolished side-armor altogether. To my public appeal for armor-belted cruisers they have, however, responded, and are about to order six of such ships. So far, so good. We ought to be grateful for this concession to a most reasonable demand. I wish these cruisers were to be faster, much faster, but in Admiralty matters the country must be thankful for small mercies.
“It only remains for me to note with satisfaction one or two of the points upon which Mr. White is in agreement with myself. He admits that it ‘would certainly be advantageous’ to carry out those experiments which I regard the Admiralty as afraid to make,viz., experiments to test the effect of gun-fire upon the subdivided but unarmored parts of ships.
“It may be taken for what it is worth, but I declare that the abandonment of armor has not at all been forced upon us by unavoidable circumstances, nor is it from any intrinsic necessity that we go on refusing to provide our ships with torpedo defence. On not immoderate dimensions, at not immoderate cost, ships might be built, still practically invulnerable to gun, ram, and torpedo alike, ships which could dispose of theAdmiralclass of ships more quickly and certainly than she could dispose of the feeblest antagonist that she is likely to encounter. But in order to produce such ships we must revive the now abandoned principle that armor, and armor alone can save from destruction those ships whose business it is to drive our future enemies from the European seas and lock them up in their own ports.”
The Committee on Designs of 1872, previously alluded to, contained sixteen members, of whom six were naval officers. Two of those members, Admiral George Elliot, R.N., and Rear-admiral A. P. Ryder, R.N., dissented so far from their colleagues that they could not sign the report, and accordingly they submitted a very able minority report embodying their views.
The first of the “general principles” laid down in their report is as follows: