FOOTNOTES:[5]This is not absolutely certain, but appears to be proved by the statements of eyewitnesses of the campaign. De Fezensac, for example, says that the 3rd Corps had not yet exhausted its supplies when it entered Moscow.[6]Uvarov had 32 squadrons in all.
FOOTNOTES:
[5]This is not absolutely certain, but appears to be proved by the statements of eyewitnesses of the campaign. De Fezensac, for example, says that the 3rd Corps had not yet exhausted its supplies when it entered Moscow.
[5]This is not absolutely certain, but appears to be proved by the statements of eyewitnesses of the campaign. De Fezensac, for example, says that the 3rd Corps had not yet exhausted its supplies when it entered Moscow.
[6]Uvarov had 32 squadrons in all.
[6]Uvarov had 32 squadrons in all.
CHAPTER VIII
THE OCCUPATION AND DESTRUCTION OF MOSCOW
Themorning of the 8th of September found the army of Napoleon bivouacked among the dead and wounded on the field of Borodino. Only the Guard was really ready for further combat. The corps of Davout and Ney were terribly cut up; the 17th, 30th and 106th Regiments were nearly destroyed. The cavalry, which had to compensate for Napoleon’s comparative weakness in infantry, had suffered fearfully. Nearly all its corps and divisional commanders were killed or wounded; several regiments were almost annihilated. The four corps of the reserves counted some 19,000 men on September 2nd; on the 20th they could muster little more than 10,000. Thousands of horses had been killed, and there was no present possibility of being able to replace them, while the wounded animals were mostly doomed to perish from lack of forage and proper care. The cavalry of the Guard alone was in a state for serious combat.
The fate of the wounded was horrible. Means of every kind for tending them were lacking, and fortunate were those whose end was hastened by the incurable nature of their hurts, or thirst and starvation. Days elapsed before all had received so much as first aid; and this was but the commencement of their miseries. The great monastery of Kolotskoï became the principal hospital, and in its buildings the victims of Borodino were huddled literally in heaps, without beds even of straw, withoutfood or fire, and without a tenth of the medical aid that was needed. Some of the wounded officers were able to buy food, at enormous prices, from the convoys which passed these dens of horror; but for the unhappy rank and file, who possessed little or no money, there was no hope. Sanitation there was none, and the unfortunate beings died in thousands, amid filth, pestilence and neglect. François says that in one hospital a dead officer was found who, in the agonies of starvation,had devoured his own arm to the bone. It is a painful task even to touch upon these sickening details, but to fail to do so is to neglect the primary duty of an historian.
Besides the enormous diminution of the effective strength, the state of the ammunition-trains was by no means reassuring. There is reason to believe that the artillery had fired 90,000 rounds during the 5th and 7th; the infantry must have expended millions of cartridges. It is certain that, immediately after Borodino, Napoleon was anxiously pressing for fresh supplies of ammunition; and it is doubtful if he could have delivered another pitched battle before they arrived.
Worse than all, the spirit of the troops was grievously depressed. The gaiety which commonly characterises Frenchmen, even in untoward circumstances, had vanished. Gloomy silence reigned during the march and in the bivouacs. The negative results of the great battle had completed the discouragement of the troops. The French soldiers, at any rate, were too intelligent not to have some inkling of the disasters that might too probably lie before them.
On the whole Kutuzov might perhaps have remained longer on the field of battle. It is, however, probable that his withdrawal to Mozhaïsk was wise. He had dealt a tremendous blow at the efficiency and morale of Napoleon’s army, but in doing so his own forces had been fearfully shattered. Had he remained in positionthe circumstance might have decided Napoleon to use the almost untouched Guards, and so at the last moment wring a victory from frowning Fortune.
When the sun dissipated the autumn fog which had enwrapped the field, the Russian position was seen to be guarded only by the hoveringpulksof Platov’s Cossacks. Against them Murat moved such of his exhausted horsemen as could be rallied; and before the advance of regular squadrons the riders withdrew. Behind them, however, were supports of infantry—the four Chasseur regiments of the 2nd Corps. They gave back very slowly, and did not reach Mozhaïsk until 4 p.m. By that time a large number of the Russian wounded had already been evacuated. The town, however, was still choked with disabled men, many of whom were in a state to be moved, and to cover this operation Kutuzov directed Platov to hold it as long as possible. The Russian main body was in position behind it.
Napoleon, as soon as he was assured that the Russians had really retired, ordered Murat to press their retreat. The King had the four reserve cavalry corps and the light horse of Ney and Davout as before,—a total now of not more than 14,000 lances and sabres—but Compan’s shattered division was replaced by that of Dufour (viceFriant wounded). The Emperor apparently at first believed that Kutuzov was in full retreat, and the head-quarters baggage was directed on Mozhaïsk; but Murat, as aforesaid, made little or no headway against Platov; and the head-quarters could not be transferred. Desultory skirmishing and cannonading went on until nightfall, when Platov was still in possession of Mozhaïsk.
The firm front shown by Platov must have convinced Napoleon that the spirit of the Russians was unbroken. He spent a part of the day in going over the battle-field, examining the positions and reviewing the troops according to his custom. In the afternoon he went forward to join Murat, and on the way received another unpleasantreminder of the unabated courage of his foes, some foragers being driven in by Cossacks, and an alarm caused. On this day, however, a much needed reinforcement arrived in the form of Pino’s Italian division.
At about 10 a.m. on the 9th Platov was fiercely attacked by Murat, expelled, and driven along the Moscow road. Murat’s pursuit was checked by a reinforcement of twelve battalions and a heavy battery sent back by Kutuzov, but Mozhaïsk was lost, and Napoleon transferred his head-quarters thither. Some thousands of the most seriously injured of the Russian wounded were still there; and there were hideous scenes as they were cast out of the houses for those of the French army, who, in carriages and waggons, or dragging themselves along on foot, streamed in piteous procession in rear of the leading troops. The Russian main body retired deliberately to Semlino (or Shelkovka) about 12 miles east of Mozhaïsk.
Napoleon himself remained for three days at Mozhaïsk recovering from his cold, and transacting arrears of business. Already on August 27th he had sent orders to Victor to bring the 9th Corps from the Niemen up to Smolensk; and from Mozhaïsk fresh directions were despatched for him. From Mozhaïsk also was sent the bulletin announcing the battle of Borodino. As his cold rendered him speechless Napoleon wrote it with his own hand; and, being at best an execrable writer, the result may be imagined. The French losses are stated in it at 10,000. This would, according to Napoleon’s usual standard, indicate from 40,000 to 50,000 casualties.
Meanwhile the Russian army was still steadily retiring on the high-road to Moscow, and Murat deliberately following. Eugène, as before, marched on the north by a track running roughly parallel with the main road by the towns of Rusa and Zvenigorod, while Poniatowski formed the right flank guard on the south. Junot remained at Borodino and Kolotskoï to guard the hospitals. In support of Murat marched Mortier with the divisionsof Roguet and Claparède; and behind him Davout and Ney in the order named.
Kutuzov was displeased with Platov for abandoning Mozhaïsk prematurely, as he considered, and superseded him in the command of the rear-guard by Miloradovich. On the 10th the Russian main body made another deliberate march of about 8 miles, while Miloradovich stood to fight at Krymskoië, some 3 miles short of Kutuzov’s evening position. His force consisted of six weak regiments of Chasseurs, four line regiments, Uvarov’s nearly intact cavalry division, and some Cossacks. He occupied a low, partly wooded ridge; his left was covered by a marsh, his right by woods, while in the centre the high-road approached the ridge by a narrow gully which was commanded by the Russian guns. Clausewitz, however, who was present, does not consider that the position was particularly advantageous. The twenty defending battalions can hardly have mustered over 6000 bayonets. Murat came up towards 5 p.m., and developed a fierce attack by Dufour’s division upon the right of the position, defended by three Chasseur regiments under Colonel Potemkin. After a hard struggle Potemkin was forced back from the summit of the ridge, but he held firm, supported by three regiments sent to his support by Miloradovich. Uvarov’s horsemen succeeded in keeping Murat’s broken regiments at bay; and the Russians fought on doggedly until darkness put an end to the contest. The Russian loss is stated, probably with some exaggeration, at 2000. As Martinien’s lists show 71 officers killed and wounded between the 8th and 10th, the French can scarcely have lost less than 1200.
On the 11th the main Russian army marched 16 miles to Viazema (Viazma on modern maps). Miloradovich retired to Kubinskoi, 8 miles from Krymskoië, unpursued by Murat. Eugène and Poniatowski were nearly level with Murat on the north and south, Mortier and Davout some distance behind, and Ney only a short way pastMozhaïsk. On the 12th Kutuzov retrograded to Momonovo, a bare ten miles from Moscow, while Miloradovich withdrew to Malo Viazema, 12 miles to the westward, leisurely followed by Murat. On the same day Napoleon left Mozhaïsk for the front.
hills
MOSCOW FROM THE SPARROW HILLSThis is practically the scene which Napoleon contemplated in 1812
The question of the fate of Moscow was now imminent. It is at least possible that Kutuzov would have risked another battle had there been a fair prospect of success. But it cannot be said that this was the case. All the way from Mozhaïsk the militia had been steadily joining, but even so the army mustered less than 90,000 men, and of these only 65,000 were regulars, as against over 90,000 still under Napoleon’s hand. Many of the militia were as yet unequipped with fire-arms, and all were raw and without training. Kutuzov could expect no further reinforcements of regulars for weeks, whereas Napoleon would be joined within ten days by Laborde’s division as well as by somerégiments de marche. The defective state of his ammunition Kutuzov did not know. The spirit of the Russian troops was indeed excellent, but against it was the greatest military genius of modern times, backed by an army wearied indeed, and in part much disheartened, but not yet demoralised, and including 20,000 untouched and undiscouraged veterans.
On June 10th Count Feodor Vasilievich Rostopchin, a former favourite and confidant of the ill-fated Emperor Paul, and a fanatical opponent of the French alliance, had been appointed Governor-General of Moscow. Whether he was the right man for his position must be questioned. It does not appear that anything was done to organise and arm the inhabitants or fortify the city. Nevertheless Rostopchin was furious at the idea of abandoning Moscow. According to Wilson he never forgave Kutuzov for keeping him in ignorance of the critical state of affairs.
As a fact he must have known that the evacuation of the city was to be expected; and he appears to havebeen steadily clearing it as far as possible of its inhabitants. This was the more practicable because in the summer Moscow was considerably less populated than in the winter, the nobles and their large households of serfs and retainers being absent on their estates. Otherwise the Governor, who was not a soldier, seems to have considered a good many rather wild plans of resistance. It would have been perfectly feasible to defend Moscow with the 90,000 troops of Kutuzov, but its destruction would thereby have been rendered inevitable. As regards Rostopchin’s project of arming the inhabitants, it is certain that such muskets as were available were obsolete and of bad quality. For the rest, 200,000 human beings cannot abandon their homes in a day, and since the French found the city nearly deserted it is obvious that the exodus of the Muscovites had long been in progress.
On the 13th the Russians fell back to Fili, and took up a position on the east side of Moscow, chosen by Bennigsen, who eulogises it in his memoirs, saying that its only defect was that it was rather long. On arriving Barclay proceeded to inspect it, while Kutuzov, who could ill support the fatigue of the campaign, rested. Dokhturov, who apparently had a touch of the courtier about him, proceeded to serve him a meal, but the little picnic was quickly interrupted by Colonel Löwenstern asking for Dokhturov, with whom Barclay wished to confer.
“As usual!” said Barclay as he sent off Löwenstern. “There they all are, dancing attendance on the Prince, and not troubling about whatthey(the French) may do. Fetch Dokhturov here, even if his mouth is still full.”
Kutuzov apparently rather enjoyed Dokhturov’s disappointment on being thus interrupted. “You must not keep General Barclay waiting,” he remarked. “I shall manage very well by myself,” and therewith proceeded with his meal, while poor Dokhturov was obligedto go. Barclay and he studied the position and came to the conclusion that it was too weak.
A council of war was called for four o’clock in the afternoon. Bennigsen, still busy examining the position, kept the other generals waiting until six. There were present Kutuzov, Barclay, Bennigsen, Dokhturov, Konovnitzin, Raievski, Uvarov, Ostermann-Tolstoï, Yermólov, Toll, and, later on, Platov. Bennigsen opened the discussion by asking whether it was better to give battle or to abandon the capital. Kutuzov interrupted him, pointing out that the question was not of Moscow, but the salvation of all Russia, and that this clearly depended upon the preservation of the army.
Barclay strongly supported Kutuzov, and he was followed by Raievski, Konovnitzin, and Ostermann-Tolstoï. Barclay appears otherwise to have had no great confidence in the ability of the Russian troops, diluted with militia, to manœuvre. When fighting generals such as Raievski and Konovnitzin ranged themselves with him the question was practically decided. According to Bennigsen he was supported by Dokhturov and Platov; but his claim to have had the votes of Konovnitzin and Yermólov is elsewhere contradicted. To his suggestion that battle should be delivered Ostermann-Tolstoï replied with a blunt question as to whether he was ready to answer for victory. Bennigsen evaded this embarrassing query; but Kutuzov, who had perhaps already made up his mind, ended the discussion by deciding upon retreat. As to its direction Barclay appears to have considered that it should be to the eastward on Vladimir and Nizhnii Novgorod; but Toll, thinking more of the question of supplies, suggested a retirement towards Kaluga. A direct retreat on the latter place would have exposed the army to one of Napoleon’s dreaded flanking attacks. Strategically Barclay’s suggestion was sound enough, if perhaps over-cautious. Clausewitz points outthat Napoleon’s offensive power was exhausted, and that he could scarcely have pursued.
Kutuzov decided that the line of the retreat should be by Kolomna on Riazan, thus intermediate between that suggested by Barclay and that proposed by Toll. By taking it no opening was afforded for a flank attack; and it would be easy to manœuvre on either wing should occasion arise. The commissariat of the army would be assured since it would have at its back the fertile “Black Soil” provinces; and it would furthermore be in easy communication with the manufactories of arms at Tula and elsewhere. Orders were therefore issued for the retreat of the army by the Kolomna road. Bennigsen was extremely discontented, and showed his displeasure by leaving the council. He attributed it to Barclay, and their relations, already strained, became more hostile than ever.
There can be no doubt that Kutuzov and Barclay were correct in their resolution to retreat, but it was no light thing to make it. Kutuzov was greatly agitated; he passed a sleepless night, and more than once tears were seen to roll down his cheeks. No Englishman can perhaps fully understand what it meant to a Russian to leave “White-Walled Moscow,” the mother of the Russian land, to the mercy of an enemy.
Barclay, though now in bad health, took executive command of the evacuation. At 2 a.m. on the 14th the army began its passage through the city. The troops, in the deepest dejection, tramped through the streets with furled standards and silent bands, many of them, officers and men, sobbing with rage and despair. The foreign commandant of the Kremlin garrison regiment began the evacuation with band playing, according to the usages of war, and there was a violent outcry among the retreating soldiery. They indignantly shouted that he was rejoicing, and the music had to cease.
moscow
NAPOLEON’S FIRST VIEW OF MOSCOWThe Emperor is standing on the Sparrow Hills, from which an imposing view of the old Russian capital is obtained.From the painting by Verestchagin.
Barclay stationed his staff-officers along the line ofretreat to enforce order. Knowing the especial weakness of the Russian soldiers, he issued strict orders that anyone found in a beer-shop or intoxicated was to be summarily punished. He worked himself to death in directing the march, and was on horseback for eighteen hours. He complained bitterly of the inefficiency of the staff, which, as usual, did little or nothing to facilitate the march. There was frequently disorder among the retiring columns. None the less it must be said that the operation was remarkably successful. By 9 o’clock in the evening, after eighteen hours of incessant toil, 90,000 fighting men, more than 600 guns and thousands of vehicles, had been passed through the great city and were on the Kolomna road. Kutuzov himself traversed Moscow in the morning. An eyewitness states that he saw him near the Kolomna gate sitting in his carriage quite alone, resting his head on his hands, silent and sad, while before him troops, guns, and waggons poured in an endless stream. The head of the army halted for the night at Panki, a village about ten miles from the city, where Kutuzov established his head-quarters.
Meanwhile, early on the 13th, Napoleon halted his army, fearing that Kutuzov was manœuvring to attack his right flank. That he could conceive such an eventuality shows how completely, and not for the first time in the campaign, his cavalry had failed to keep touch with the enemy. At 10 a.m., however, he became convinced that the Russian army was still in his front, and resumed his march. At 1 p.m. on the 14th Murat’s vanguard crowned the Sparrow Hills, about a mile and a half west of Moscow, and saw before them in the plain the Russian rear-guard, and beyond it the widespreading city—the goal which they had toiled so strenuously to attain.
The Russian army was still pouring through the streets, and Miloradovich sent an officer to Murat to propose a short armistice, adding that if it were not granted he should defend the city step by step, and fireit as he fell back. After a while a sort of informal suspension of arms until 7 p.m. was made between Miloradovich and Sebastiani, now commanding the 2nd Cavalry Corps. The Russians evacuated the Dorogomilov suburb at 3 p.m., and Murat quietly followed. At about the same time Napoleon reached the Sparrow Hills. He is said to have gazed long and eagerly upon the goal of his wishes, now spread out before his greedy eyes; but he may well have muttered the words attributed to him: “It is full time!”
The Emperor approved of the informal truce concluded by Murat. The peaceful occupation of Moscow was an end bought cheaply enough at the price of the quiet withdrawal of the Russian rear-guard. Mortier was to be Governor, General Durosnel Military Commandant, and M. Lesseps, who had formerly been French Consul-General at St. Petersburg, Intendant of the province of Moscow. Orders were issued to prevent the ingress of plunderers. Eugène and Poniatowski were ordered to halt some miles short of the city. Mortier was directed to occupy the Kremlin, and to maintain order by severe methods. As the day wore on the 1st and 3rd Corps and the old Guard closed up on Murat. It is a characteristically French touch that the men had decked themselves out in their parade uniforms to take part in the triumphal entry.
As Miloradovich evacuated quarter after quarter of the city Murat advanced, dreading surprise, and taking great precautions against it. The streets were deserted; silence reigned everywhere. Near the Kremlin a tumultuous gathering of citizens and stragglers opened a scattering fire. They were dispersed by cannon shots, and Murat moved on, only to find silence and apparent desertion. Miloradovich marched through the city and established himself for the night some 4 miles from the Kolomna gate. Winzingerode’s detachment, which had been falling back before Eugène, was on the St. Petersburgroad, and another cavalry detachment was escorting the public treasure and the archives of Moscow to Vladimir.
When at last it became evident that Moscow was indeed deserted by most of its native inhabitants, a deputation of foreign residents was collected to be presented to Napoleon. His mortification was extreme. He quartered himself in the Dorogomilov suburb, and, between his anxiety and the dirt and vermin of an ill-kept abode, spent a restless night.
Mortier had duly occupied the Kremlin with Roguet’s division, sending Claparède to support Murat. The silence of the city impressed even the reckless soldiery of Napoleon. Sergeant Bourgogne naïvely expresses it by remarking how disappointed they were to see not even a pretty girl listening to the regimental bands. With darkness disorder broke forth everywhere. It was impossible to prevent ill-fed and ill-clad men from pillaging when all that they needed, not to speak of wealth, which appeared to their ignorance inconceivable, lay ready to hand. In the evening fires were already breaking out. In the morning of the 15th Napoleon, escorted by the Old Guard, took up his residence in the Imperial Palace in the Kremlin.
It should here be said that theKreml, or citadel, commonly known in Western Europe as the “Kremlin,” was the original fortress or walled town of Moskva, fortified in 1147 by Prince Yurí Dolgorúki (Long-handed George), the son of the famous Great Prince Vladimir Monomakh. Around it grew up in the course of ages various suburbs, and these were in their turn walled. As the streets were wide, and there were many very large buildings—palaces, monasteries, and the like—often standing in spacious gardens or enclosures, the city covered an enormous area. It had the characteristics in general of a vast country suburb rather than of a city.
A volume might be written concerning the burning ofMoscow. The catastrophe has been described in the works of numerous eyewitnesses, and lengthy reference to the event itself hardly falls within the compass of this work. Three points must, however, be dealt with: the causes of the conflagration; its extent; and its effects upon the fortunes of Napoleon.
As regards the origin of the fire it may be regarded as certain that it was not the outcome of Russian patriotic frenzy. The whole evidence is to the contrary; and the fury and grief of the Russians at the destruction of their holy city were obviously genuine. It was equally not due to the deliberate action of the invaders, who had every motive for preserving the city for their own convenience. It remains to be considered whether it was the act of Rostopchin or due to mere accident, assisted by a fortuitous combination of circumstances.
Public opinion at the time attributed the conflagration to Rostopchin. Two of his own residences were destroyed, and a few weeks later he deliberately fired his country mansion at Voronovo in order to prevent its seizure by the French. Sir Robert Wilson, who had means of knowing, says that Rostopchin’s design was notorious, and that in order to prevent him from carrying it into execution Kutuzov repeatedly announced his intention of delivering battle before Moscow. Buturlin, the contemporary Russian historian, also attributes the fire to the Governor.
Rostopchin’s own testimony cannot unfortunately be trusted. He, at the time, admitted the responsibility of having burned Moscow. Nevertheless later, as a voluntary exile abroad, he repudiated it. All that can be said is that either he was really responsible, or that if not he claimed the credit in the belief that the burning of Moscow would be regarded as an heroic action, and only disowned complicity when he found that it was generally considered atrocious.
The French believed that the fire was caused byRostopchin’s incendiaries, and hundreds or thousands of the Muscovites remaining in the city were hanged, bayoneted, or shot as such. The French, however, as all their history goes to show, have an unhappy tendency to lose their heads at a crisis, and it is certain that during the burning of Moscow they were wellnigh insane with panic. For the rest, they were utterly ignorant of their victims’ language.
Certain facts appear to emerge from the confusion as proved:—
(1) The city was by no means entirely deserted by the more respectable classes. Tutulmin, the director of the foundling hospital, remained at his post; and a certain number of merchants and gentlemen, some of Francophil leanings, did not leave. The foreign colony—chiefly French—also remained.(2) The lowest of the lower classes naturally remained; and the disreputable elements probably preferred to take their chance of making their profit out of the invaders. The criminals in the prisons had also been released.(3) Whatever may have been the case as regards the mass of ordinary private dwellings, the palaces and mansions, of which Moscow was full, as well as most of the many warehouses and shops, were abandoned, as a seaman might say, “all standing.”(4) The fire was beginning as the Russian rear-guard left the city.(5) Plundering on the part of the invaders commenced almost immediately after their entry.(6) The wind changed its direction more than once.(7) The French captured and utilised a vast quantity of gunpowder.(8) Several thousand Russian wounded were left in the city.
(1) The city was by no means entirely deserted by the more respectable classes. Tutulmin, the director of the foundling hospital, remained at his post; and a certain number of merchants and gentlemen, some of Francophil leanings, did not leave. The foreign colony—chiefly French—also remained.
(2) The lowest of the lower classes naturally remained; and the disreputable elements probably preferred to take their chance of making their profit out of the invaders. The criminals in the prisons had also been released.
(3) Whatever may have been the case as regards the mass of ordinary private dwellings, the palaces and mansions, of which Moscow was full, as well as most of the many warehouses and shops, were abandoned, as a seaman might say, “all standing.”
(4) The fire was beginning as the Russian rear-guard left the city.
(5) Plundering on the part of the invaders commenced almost immediately after their entry.
(6) The wind changed its direction more than once.
(7) The French captured and utilised a vast quantity of gunpowder.
(8) Several thousand Russian wounded were left in the city.
The obvious deduction from (1) and (3) is that Moscow was hurriedly evacuated, and this is further supported bythe evidence of (7) and (8). Had there been any settled plan of destruction one does not see why the powder-magazines were not fired, and the buildings of most importance to the invaders ruined. Nothing of this description was attempted, and the ammunition was for the most part saved by the French, to their great advantage. For the rest, with a mob of soldiery, together with a mixed horde of camp-followers of all nations, beggars, criminals, and prostitutes, plundering indiscriminately, there was every opportunity for wanton destruction. The frequent changes of the wind helped to spread the conflagration, and it was further assisted by the fact that the great majority of the private dwellings were wooden constructions.
On the whole, regarding the question solely from the standpoint of the established facts, it seems at least possible that the conflagration of Moscow, like most events of the kind recorded in history, was accidental in its origin.
It is probable that four-fifths of Moscow vanished in the conflagration, but it is doubtful if the material injury inflicted upon the invaders was very serious. In the city itself some 500 secular buildings of stone and brick survived, besides many churches and convents. The Kremlin was little injured. It is also clear that there were available great stores of food and other supplies. Forage alone was lacking. De Fezensac, who now commanded the 4th Regiment of Ney’s corps, which was generally encamped outside the city, speaks of trouble in obtaining supplies, and of poor and coarse fare, but not of actual want. In Moscow itself there appears to have been a superfluity of food, though flour was less abundant than other less necessary supplies. Clothing and materials for manufacturing it were seized in quantities, and no doubt the whole army could have been refitted had organised attempts been made to that end.
It was the possession of Moscow which exercised adisastrous influence upon the fortunes of Napoleon. Having failed to crush the Russian field-army, and thereby force Alexander to make peace, he had now become obsessed with the idea that the occupation of Moscow would bring about the desired consummation of his hopes. There was, indeed, hardly ever the slightest chance of their fulfilment, but Napoleon could not bring himself to admit this, and lingered among the ruins for week after week.
It is certain that fires were already commencing as the Russians evacuated the city; but the first serious outbreak appears to have occurred at a Government spirit store. It was extinguished, but soon afterwards the great bazaar in which, as at Constantinople and other Oriental cities, the bulk of the retail trade of Moscow was concentrated, was found to be on fire. Both spirit stores and shops would be natural marks for plunderers. The wind rose, drifted inflammable wreckage across the city, and scattered it among the wood-built suburbs, through which the conflagration spread with terrifying rapidity. The stories that the fire engines had disappeared, and that the ropes of the wells had been cut, may be taken for what they are worth. It is obvious that little organised endeavour to control the conflagration of a vast and largely wood-built city was, or could be, made. The Guards in the central quarters soon abandoned all efforts to fight the flames in order to devote themselves to plunder, and the officers of the corps encamped outside, convinced that it was vitally necessary to fill their nearly empty store-waggons, permitted, or connived at, the entry of their own men to take part in the sack.
Napoleon himself remained in the Kremlin until the 16th, when a change in the wind brought the conflagration from the suburbs to the inner quarters of the city, and rendered residence in the Imperial Palace dangerous, more especially since the larger part of the capturedpowder-magazines were within the citadel. The Emperor left by the river gate—the land fronts of the walled enclosure being practically encircled by the flames—and proceeded along the quays, eventually reaching the Imperial palace of Petrovski, some 2 miles on the Petersburg road.
With Napoleon’s departure pillage became universal. Some officers endeavoured to induce their men to take food and clothing, but apparently with little success, and that vast quantities of food were saved was due to the fact that the half-famished troops naturally turned to it. Murder and outrage went hand in hand with pillage. Many inhabitants were massacred by the soldiery, maddened with licence and intoxicating liquor; many others perished in the flames of their homes, or in attempting to escape from them. The miscellaneous horde of female camp-followers behaved as badly as the men. Paymaster Duverger relates how he knocked down a ruffianlycantinièrewho was robbing a sick and helpless Russian lady. There is unhappily evidence that many of the officers set a disgraceful example. Some pillaged openly; others made a levy upon the plunder of their men. The Guards had the best opportunities and gained an unenviable pre-eminence in misconduct. Drunkenness was everywhere rife. The men of the 1st Corps were almost as bad as the Guards, and probably this carnival of licence was the event which contributed most to the destruction of their discipline early in the retreat. It is worthy of note that Ney’s corps, which took little direct share in the sack, was the one which kept the best order amid the horrors of the retreat. Marshal Lefebvre was furious at the disorder in the Old Guard, and issued a severe order on the subject.
fire
NAPOLEON WATCHING THE BURNING OF MOSCOWFrom the picture by Verestchagin
On the 19th the conflagration began to die away, partly owing to the equinoctial rains, and on the 20th Napoleon returned to the Kremlin. Useless efforts were made to induce the inhabitants to return to the ruinedcity, and the peasants to bring their produce to market. For payment Napoleon had provided a supply of forged Russian paper rúbles; but opportunities for uttering them were not forthcoming, though some were distributed to the surviving inhabitants and to charitable institutions. A few merchants and tradesmen accepted office under the French, but after the destruction of Moscow the Russians who entertained any feeling towards the invaders but that of bitter hatred were few indeed.
On evacuating Moscow the Russian army made two leisurely marches on the Kolomna road to where it crossed the Moskva, about 20 miles from the capital. Kutuzov appears at first to have intended to continue his march to Kolomna; but a conference with the Intendant-General Lanskoï convinced him that there would be difficulty in diverting the line of supply, and he decided to manœuvre towards Kaluga. On the 17th, therefore, leaving Raievski’s corps to cover the rear, he turned westward, and marched along the Pakhra, a rivulet which here joins the Moskva, until he reached the Moscow-Kaluga road. On the 21st he took up a position behind the Pakhra, with an advance-guard, composed of the 8th Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, under Miloradovich at Desna, only some 10 miles from Moscow. At the same time Dorokhov, with the hussars of Yelisabetgrad, the Dragoons of the Guard, and three regiments of Cossacks, was detached towards Mozhaïsk. This last movement was perhaps premature, since it gave Napoleon early warning of an intention to operate against his communications.
During the night of the 15th the glare of a vast conflagration had reddened the sky to the north-west. All through the next four days the bivouacs of the Russians were illuminated by the flames of their burning “Mother City,” while by day dense banks of smoke lay upon the horizon, and charred fragments were frequently borne by the fierce gales among their marching files. Theeffect upon the soldiers may perhaps better be imagined than described. Whether the destruction of Moscow were deliberate or accidental in its origin, it kindled in the Russian army a flame of vengeful desire that endured until it marched triumphantly into Paris in 1814.
Murat, with his advanced guard, strengthened by Claparède’s division, and supported by Poniatowski, was following the Russians. At the Pakhra he lost touch, and not until the 23rd was the true direction of Kutuzov’s march ascertained and followed up, Raievski retiring on the main army. Napoleon apparently did not believe that Kutuzov’s whole force was to the south of Moscow—at all events he adopted a dangerous half-measure, which might have resulted in disaster. Murat was to press the Russians’ right, while a column under Bessières marched from Moscow against their front. Bessières’ force comprised the infantry division of Friederichs (viceDesaix), now increased by the 33rd Léger, a brigade of light cavalry, Colbert’s Lancers, and the 3rd Cavalry Corps detached from Murat. Its strength cannot have exceeded 11,000 men, while Murat certainly had not more than 25,000. Barclay and Bennigsen urged an attack, and it is clear that Murat must have been destroyed, or forced to retreat in haste. The cautious Kutuzov, however, inferred that Bessières was merely Napoleon’s advance-guard—as a fact the Emperor did on the 28th issue orders for a general advance on the Pakhra. As Kutuzov envisaged the situation, he would have the wholeGrande Armée, enormously superior in regular troops, upon his own weakened forces. The superior condition of his cavalry and artillery could scarcely be relied upon to give him more than a doubtful success. On the other hand, every day would bring the winter nearer and ensure the steady increase of the Russian numbers. He accordingly decided to retire towards Kaluga. The 4th Corps was detailed to strengthen Raievski, and Miloradovich took command of the rear-guard. On the 27th there was a brisk encounter of cavalry on the Pakhra. On the 29th another engagement took place at Czerikovo. Poniatowski’s infantry were checked; General Ferrier was wounded and taken, and the advantage was, on the whole, with Miloradovich, who retired very slowly, contesting every mile of country.
On October 2nd the main Russian army reached Tarutino on the Nara, some 50 miles from Moscow, and took up a position, to protect which entrenchments were immediately commenced. Next day Sebastiani, always unlucky, experienced a slight check near Voronovo, but when Murat’s main column began to arrive Miloradovich retreated to Spas Kuplia, 10 miles north of Tarutino. The 4th and 7th Corps were drawn back towards the main army, covered by the 8th and most of the cavalry. Early on the 4th Murat and Poniatowski surprised the Russians. Spas Kuplia was carried and the 8th Corps driven back behind the Chernishnia rivulet, half-way to Tarutino. Konovnitzin, with whom was Sir Robert Wilson, was nearly captured, but he rode out of the danger-zone, his night-cap, in which he had been surprised, showing under his cocked hat, puffing coolly at his pipe all the time. So Löwenstern describes the scene. The 8th Corps rallied and held firm upon the Chernishnia until night, and eventually retired across the Nara to Tarutino. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Cavalry Divisions (the first two now amalgamated) and some Cossacks remained in observation of the French north of the Nara. Murat’s offensive power had exhausted itself, and he halted, disposing the bulk of his force along the Chernishnia, with his advance troops at the village of Vinkovo.
Meanwhile the presence of Dorokhov south-east of Moscow had caused Napoleon to send some twenty miles on the road to Mozhaïsk, Broussier’s infantry division, the light cavalry of the 4th Corps, and the Dragoons and Chasseurs of the Guard. This for the moment relieved the road to Mozhaïsk, but the whole route to Smolenskwas infested by Cossacks; and Napoleon was obliged to issue an order that no body of troops less than 1500 strong was to be risked along it. Kutuzov’s withdrawal to Tarutino seems for a short time to have improved matters near Moscow. Murat, with the reserve cavalry, the bulk of the light horse of the 1st and 3rd Corps, the 5th Corps, Dufour’s and Claparède’s divisions, remained on the Chernishnia. Broussier was stationed about 9 miles west of Moscow; Friederichs on the Pakhra; the Guard Cavalry returned to Moscow. Foraging detachments were despatched over the surrounding country to gather in food and fodder—with poor results—and in this manner a fortnight passed away.
CHAPTER IX
THE FRENCH SOJOURN IN MOSCOW
Foralmost a month after Napoleon’s return to Moscow on September 20th, the main French army lay almost inactive about the city. The Emperor’s anxieties on the score of supplies had been to some extent relieved by the quantities of food and ammunition captured. He says himself in a letter to Lariboissière, the Chief of Artillery, that he has taken 300,000 pounds of powder, and an equal amount of sulphur and saltpetre, besides an immense number of cannon-balls and 2,000,000 cartridges. It can scarcely be imagined that, however much the habit of lying had become ingrained in him, he would wilfully mislead the man whom, most of all, it was necessary to furnish with correct information.
A number of cannon were captured, but all practically useless. The Kremlin, in fact, was and is a museum of ancient weapons, mostly preserved as trophies of Russia’s victories over her enemies. Among them now are hundreds of the guns of the NapoleonicGrande Arméeof 1812. The cannon had no carriages, but about twenty of them were mounted by the French artillerymen on the walls of the ancient citadel. The captures of ammunition were of extreme value. Napoleon exultantly declared that he could fight four battles of the magnitude of Borodino.
Forage, however, was seriously deficient. The cavalry and artillery of the Guard, which received supplies in advance of the other corps, remained in fair condition,but that of the rest of the army rapidly deteriorated. The horses died in great numbers. At the beginning of October De Chambray estimates that already 4000 troopers were dismounted. The misery in the advance-guard was great; breadstuffs could hardly be obtained, and the men lived chiefly upon horse-flesh.
In Moscow matters were by no means satisfactory. The troops had indeed shelter and food; but these advantages were dearly bought at the price of a fatal relaxation in discipline. The privileged Guards were bad offenders, and Napoleon himself had at last to complain of their misconduct. The 1st Corps was little better. The 3rd and 4th Corps were mostly outside the city. They lived chiefly from hand to mouth as before, and though a considerable amount of flour had been warehoused at Moscow Napoleon would not permit it to be issued, even when Berthier reported Pino’s division as being completely destitute. No issue was made of clothing material until October 17th, nor were any preparations made for rough-shoeing the horses. In the general relaxation of discipline little was done by the men themselves. In the face of proven facts such as these the statements as to Napoleon’s unerring and all-pervading foresight and activity, made even by respectable witnesses such as Rapp and Fain, make somewhat foolish reading.
In a sense, indeed, Napoleon did provide for much—that is, he issued orders which had they been at all applicable to the situation might have effected a great deal. Such an order was that for the provision of hand-mills for the troops. The need for them had been apparent during the advance, and had they been provided earlier they would doubtless have been invaluable. As it was the first convoy of them only came to hand during the retreat, when they were useless.
kremlin
THE KREMLIN, MOSCOWOn the extreme left is the Great Red Staircase—the State entrance to the Palace. Next is the Uspanski Sabor, or Cathedral of the Assumption, in which the Tzars are crowned. Behind it appears the Bell Tower of Ivan Velikii
Others of the Imperial orders were simply incapable of execution. One of them, for example, gives directions for exploring the country for two or three leagues oneach side of the highway so as to find parallel roads passing by villages and cultivated tracts. It would have been extremely difficult to find such roads in fertile and well-peopled Germany, and to expect to discover them in Russia was merely absurd. As a fact, had they existed, the country was laid waste for a breadth of forty or fifty miles by the destructive passage of two great armies. The only criticisms that can be made in reading this order is that Napoleon’s intellect was either failing or so affected by pride and over-confidence as to be fatally debilitated.
Yet in spite of his fatal optimism Napoleon was growing uneasy. On his return to Moscow he induced Tutulmin, the director of the Foundling Hospital, to be the bearer of a letter to Alexander. It was a diplomatic document after Napoleon’s fashion, compounded of blandishments and threats; a characteristic touch is the careful detailing of the war material which has been captured. The Tzar would not deign to reply. Napoleon waited for a fortnight and then sent General Lauriston to endeavour to open negotiations with Kutuzov.
However, gloomy as the prospect might appear to intelligent observers, the bulk of the army was at rest, and, save in the vital matter of horses, increasing in strength. During the latter half of September there entered Moscow Laborde’s division, the 1st battalion of Hesse-Darmstadt Guards, three battalions of the 33rd Léger, and severalrégiments de marche—in all some 10,000 infantry and over 4000 cavalry. In the first half of October there arrived nearly 17,000 men—régiments de marche, mostly infantry, and the battalions which had been left in garrison at Orsha, Dorogobuzh, Viasma, and elsewhere. The muster rolls were also swelled by a certain number of convalescents. The fighting strength of the 5th and 8th Corps, which were harassed by constant skirmishing, remained stationary or declined; and the number of mounted horsemen steadily dwindled. Butin the 1st and 3rd Corps there was a steady increase in the numbers of the infantry and artillery. Reinforcements of artillery also arrived; there were, indeed, more guns in Moscow than the enfeebled teams could draw.
The movements of the French main army during this period of comparative quiescence were not very important. Eugène early in October pushed an advance-guard to Dmitrov, some miles north of Moscow, while Ney moved to Boghorodsk, about 25 miles eastward on the road to Vladimir. The Russian cavalry screen, under Winzingerode, gave back before the advance of the French columns, and there was little fighting. Ney ordered the construction of barracks for winter quarters at Boghorodsk, but De Fezensac pessimistically remarks that the sham deceived nobody. Ney and Eugène were soon recalled to Moscow, and the entire army, except Murat’s advance-guard, was concentrated there on the 15th.
Meanwhile Murat, isolated on the Chernishnia at a distance of nearly 50 miles from the main army, and with a vastly superior army in his front, was in a position of great danger. The peril was aggravated by the scantiness of supplies and by the lack of forage, which was steadily killing the over-worked horses. Skirmishing was continually taking place, with general ill fortune to the invaders. Foraging parties had to be pushed farther and farther afield, and needed larger and larger escorts to protect them against the enterprising regular and irregular cavalry of the Russians. On one occasion a foraging party of Dragoons of the Guard, under Major Marthod, accompanied by a detachment of the 33rd Léger, was attacked and cut up. On October 9th Colonel Kudachev with two regiments of Cossacks made a successful attack upon a large foraging party, and carried off 200 prisoners. Similar skirmishes were continually occurring. On October 10th Dorokhov, who had been reinforced by five battalions and some more cavalryand artillery, stormed Vereia, killing or capturing its garrison of 500 Westphalians, and thus establishing himself dangerously near the Moscow-Smolensk road.
It has been seen that on October 4th Kutuzov had begun to entrench himself at Tarutino. Bennigsen criticises the position severely. The Nara in its front was everywhere fordable, and on the left there were some unoccupied heights which might be seized by an assailant. However, as matters went, there was little fear of an immediate attack, and the Russians were so strong in cavalry that they could obtain early warning of any move of the French from Moscow.
Soon after reaching Tarutino Barclay left the army. He had been deeply wounded by the rancorous attacks made upon him by the ultra Russians, and his relations with Bennigsen were very strained. Kutuzov had treated him with great respect, and after Borodino had given him the chief command of both Russian armies. But when a supreme commander is present at the head-quarters of an army difficulties are certain to arise. In 1864 the presence of General Grant with Meade’s army of the Potomac did not make for unity of command, though both officers were men of the finest character. Barclay soon found his position intolerable, and resigned. He was bitterly hurt, and told Clausewitz, who had just been appointed to a post on Wittgenstein’s staff, that he might thank heaven that he was well out of it. It is impossible not to sympathise with him, and at the same time not difficult to see that his departure made for unity of command. Whether Kutuzov was the right man for the post of commander-in-chief is another question. Barclay was abominably ill-treated and insulted by the populace on his way to St. Petersburg, but Alexander never lost confidence in him, and he emerged from his retirement in 1813 to take command of the Russian armies in Germany. His departure occasioned a show at least of regret among the officers of the army,many of whom perhaps felt conscience-stricken at the memory of ill-conditioned murmuring and mutiny. Most of the generals came to bid him farewell; and Yermólov, who had been his worst and most treacherous enemy, actually wept—an episode to which allusion has elsewhere been made.
On the 24th of September, at a mansion on the road to Vladimir, Bagration died. It is probable that travelling on the bad Russian roads had brought on gangrene. On his death-bed he was visited by Wilson, who was returning from his visit to Alexander. The Tzar, very wisely, had judged it best to overlook the insubordination of the generals, and had sent by Wilson the strongest assurances of his determination to continue the resistance. He would, he said, sooner let his beard grow to the waist and eat potatoes in Siberia, than permit any negotiations so long as an armed Frenchman remained in Russia. The language may perhaps be thought a little high-flown, but it possesses dignity in that it was the expression of the firm resolution of the united Russian nation. To the dying soldier Wilson repeated the brave words of the Tzar. Bagration pressed his hand convulsively. “Dear general,” he said, “you have made me die happy, for now Russia will assuredly not be dishonoured.Accipio solatium mortis.” So passes from the scene the fine Georgian soldier whose life had been spent in faithful service to his adopted country. Wilson eulogises his good qualities, the kindness and graciousness which his fiery temper perhaps at times concealed, his generosity and chivalrous courage. Wilson was his devoted admirer—the two had much in common. But in sober fact Bagration, whatever his faults, had ever proved himself a worthy descendant of the warrior-kings of the Bagratid line; and having adopted Russia, the steady protector of the Caucasian Christians, as his country, he had served her faithfully to the end. It is difficult not to feel a sense of decline in passing fromBarclay, the simple, devoted servant of his country, and Bagration, the chivalrous descendant of kings, to the caution and cunning of the pleasure-loving old aristocrat Kutuzov, and the hardly disguised self-seeking of the soldier of fortune Bennigsen.
Kutuzov, from the field of Borodino, had sent a first brief and hasty despatch stating that he had held his own and captured some guns. As has been seen, the statement was only true in a general sense, since the Russian troops had certainly been driven back a short distance. This report was perhaps hurriedly penned in the exultation of finding that he had fought the terrible conqueror for a long day without real ill-success. A second despatch told the truth or something near it, describing the battle as a drawn one—which it tactically was—estimating Napoleon’s loss as probably the greater, and insisting upon the necessity of retreating in order to reorganise after the tremendous losses. A third despatch attributed the chief merit of the balanced success of the day to Barclay and Bennigsen. Alexander did not publish the second despatch—whether wisely or not it is difficult for an Englishman to judge. Kutuzov was promoted Field Marshal, and received a grant of 100,000 rúbles. Barclay was decorated with the order of St. George (2nd Class), and Bennigsen with that of St. Vladimir (1st Class). Bagration, who wore all the Orders of Russia, received a grant of 50,000 rúbles. Miloradovich, Dokhturov, Ostermann, and Raievski received the order of St. Alexander Nevski. Each soldier was awarded a gratuity of 5 rúbles—which, it may be hoped, was paid in silver, not in the depreciated paper currency.
When in the midst of announcements of victory and of rewards the news arrived that Moscow had been abandoned, the discouragement was naturally great. In the army itself Kutuzov certainly felt very dubious of success. At St. Petersburg the state archives were sent into the interior, and the fleet was sent to winter inEngland. The Empress Dowager, the Grand Duke Constantine, and the Grand Chancellor Rumiantzev, were strongly in favour of peace; but neither domestic nor political pressure, nor public alarm, appear to have shaken for a moment the stern resolution of the commonly yielding, sensitive, and dreamy Tzar.
Alexander’s reply to the fall of Moscow was a proclamation to his people calling upon them to rise superior to the loss, and to overwhelm the invaders, whose position was painted in colours perhaps darker than the reality. Preparations for continuing the war were energetically pushed forward. Count Lieven was despatched as ambassador to London, and with an assurance of Alexander’s immovable determination to continue the struggle at all hazards. For the present he asked nothing but munitions of war. Later, when he had saved Russia, he intended to do his best to free Europe from French domination, when he hoped that Britain would not be sparing of her wealth. At this moment, be it remembered, Napoleon was encamped among the ruins of the sacred capital of Russia.
Meanwhile at Tarutino the reorganisation of the Russian army was being energetically proceeded with. The man immediately responsible for it, who justly received the major part of the credit, was Konovnitzin, who has already been repeatedly met with in his country’s battles. Konovnitzin was a strong adherent and admirer of Barclay, and seems to have possessed his chief’s virtues of modesty and devotion to duty.
Borodino and the subsequent actions had grievously shattered all the regiments, and some had been practically destroyed. These were either dissolved or sent back into the interior to reform; the combined Grenadier battalions were broken up and distributed; and the militia and new recruits then drafted in. The experienced Russian generals did not make the mistake committed by the leaders of the Spanish uprising in 1808-1809 and swampthe battalions with raw levies. Only the picked men who had received some training were sparingly introduced among the war-seasoned soldiers. Even so Kutuzov was very distrustful of his infantry.
Horsemen cannot be trained so easily as foot-soldiers, and the Russian cavalry could not be greatly increased in strength. Such reinforcements as it received must have consisted of small drafts and rejoining convalescents. It included the same regiments as had fought at Borodino, but all were in a greatly reduced condition. The men, however, were in high heart and the horses in excellent condition. The artillery was also in admirable order.
Alexander had made an appeal to the loyalty of the Don Cossacks, which was seconded by the great personal influence of Platov. By the middle of October there were present in the Moscow theatre of war some fifty regiments of irregular horsemen.
Reorganisation and steady reinforcement had their effect. The numerical strength of the Russian army at Tarutino began to rise at once, and its efficiency steadily increased. The number of battalions had fallen to 147 by October 18th, but they had all been brought up to an average strength of over 500 bayonets, except those of the Guard, which, having no depôts at hand, were rather weaker. By October 23 the strength of the Russian Grand Army, including its detachments, had risen to 105,000 regulars, including 12,000 cavalry, and nearly 20,000 Cossacks, with an artillery train of some 650 guns excellently appointed and horsed.
Kutuzov made certain changes in the organisation. The entire regular cavalry was massed in four unequal “Corps,” one of which consisted of Cuirassiers. Lieutenant-General Prince Golitzin I received the command of the Cuirassier Corps, and the 1st and 3rd were given to Major-Generals Baron Müller Zakomelski and Vassilchikov respectively. Baron Korff continued to command the 2nd, which was increased to 8 regimentsof Dragoons, and 1 or 2 of light cavalry. The various army corps still retained their old leaders, except the 3rd, which was now commanded by Strogonov.
At the same time some changes were made in the higher commands. Miloradovich practically took the place of Bagration—by no means unworthily—while General Tormazov was called from the west to succeed Barclay.
Strategically the army was organised by Kutuzov into an advanced guard, under Miloradovich, aCorps de Bataille, under Tormazov, six Flying Columns, and six Cossack detachments. The advanced guard included the 2nd and 4th Army Corps, the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry “Corps,” and 4 regiments of Cossacks. TheCorps de Batailleconsisted of the 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Army Corps, and Golitzin’s and Müller-Zakomelski’s cavalry. The Flying Columns were: (1) Platov’s, comprising 13 regiments of Cossacks, 1 of light infantry, and a horse battery; (2) Winzingerode’s, of 1 regiment of Hussars, 1 of Dragoons, 7 of Cossacks, and a battery, observing Moscow on the north; (3) Dorokhov’s, observing Mozhaïsk, ultimately increased by detachments to 5 battalions, 16 squadrons, a battery, and some Cossacks; (4) Orlov-Denisov’s, consisting of 6 regiments of Cossacks and 6 guns; (5) Karpov’s, comprising 7 regiments of Cossacks; and (6) that of Major-General Count Ozharovski, composed of 4 regiments of Cossacks, 1 of Hussars, a regiment of light infantry, and 6 guns. The Cossack detachments which infested the Moscow-Smolensk road, were those of Colonel Kaisarov (3 regiments), Colonel Prince Kudachev (2 regiments), Colonel Yefremov (2 regiments), Lieutenant-Colonel Davidov (2 regiments), Captain Seslavin (1 regiment), and Captain Figner (1 regiment).
The Russian army at Tarutino experienced little or no privation. Supplies of food were plentiful. Forage after a time grew scarce in the immediate neighbourhood, and it was necessary to send to some distance to obtain it,but the horses remained in excellent condition. Löwenstern says that the army had never fared better; it was even possible to obtain luxuries from the merchants who visited the camp. Dry fuel alone was lacking. To obtain it the villages within the Russian lines were almost entirely demolished.
While making a show of preparations for the fortification and provisioning of Moscow the French Emperor, on October 4, sent his aide-de-camp, General Lauriston, who had been Ambassador at St. Petersburg before the war, on a mission to Kutuzov. Lauriston’s real object was to ascertain the chances of peace. It was certain that his mission could have no success. Apart from the firm resolve of the Tzar the generals at Tarutino were bitterly determined, and kept a close watch upon their commander-in-chief. Kutuzov consented to receive Lauriston; and thereupon his subordinates requested Wilson to inform him that if he conferred privately with Lauriston he would be deposed from the command. Kutuzov himself, not very confident of the ability of his army to beat Napoleon’s, persisted in his determination to receive Lauriston, but consented to do so publicly in the first instance. He then had a private conversation with the French general, of which he afterwards gave an account to Count Langeron. He ultimately consented to pass on a letter brought by Lauriston to St. Petersburg; but declared that he had no power to conclude an armistice.
The successes of Schwarzenberg and St. Cyr appeared to make the French line of communications fairly safe, and the calling up of Victor’s 9th Corps to Smolensk was an additional measure of security. The 9th Corps crossed the frontier on September 3. It was increased by the addition of four German regiments to a strength of 33,500 men. Victor left Coutard’s German brigade at Vilna, and with the rest of the corps marched for Smolensk, where he arrived on September 27. Napoleon had appointed Comte Baraguay d’Hilliers Governor-General of the province of Smolensk, but he could do little to collect supplies and keep the roads clear. The country was infested by small parties of Cossacks and of armed peasantry on the one hand, and on the other by numbers of stragglers, disbanded troops and marauders belonging to the invading army.
Until the arrival of the 9th Corps troops were entirely lacking wherewith to suppress the disorder, and it will soon be seen that Victor could make but a brief stay at Smolensk. Baraguay d’Hilliers, worried and distracted by Napoleon’s angry complaints, gave his master the facts of the situation in two letters, which enable us to appreciate the precise state of things in rear of theGrande Armée.
The armed peasants and Cossack detachments checked foraging operations and cut off detachments. At Smolensk, indeed, there was a strong garrison. A provisional administration had been organised, on paper, under the superintendence of M. de Villeblanche; but the town was ruined and nearly deserted. General Charpentier could organise strong foraging parties, but had no artisans to construct barracks and bakeries, or to manufacture clothing and equipment. From Smolensk to Gzhatsk there was hardly any protection for the road. Baraguay d’Hilliers declared that, after providing for the necessary garrisons of the posts, he could dispose of only 600 men, in three detachments, for police and foraging operations on a line of some 200 miles! As to establishing markets as Napoleon ordered, he frankly exposed the utter absurdity of the idea. For removing wounded and forwarding supplies there were not a fifth of the vehicles required.
victor
MARSHAL VICTOR, DUKE OF BELLUNOCommander of the 9th French Army CorpsFrom the painting by Gros at Versailles
Detachments on the march to Moscow straggled for many miles north and south of the high-road in order to forage, and it was impossible to keep them in hand. One officer, in charge of a convoy, reported that his escortsmelted away one after another; and he entered Moscow alone! The marauders committed nameless atrocities, which amply explain and to some extent justify the terrible retaliations of the peasants during the retreat. It is an ungrateful task to allude to these horrors, but one hideous incident given by Löwenstern must be mentioned, if only to afford a proper impression of what a state of warfare in Napoleonic days implied.
Among the Russian leaders of irregulars Captain Figner early acquired a terrible reputation for blood-thirsty cruelty towards his French and Polish foes, to whom he gave no quarter in battle, and whom, when captured, he massacred without pity. His savagery was strongly reprobated in the Russian army, except in the case of a number of fierce spirits whom the sufferings of their country had maddened. Even the wild irregulars looked askance at Figner; and for the execution of his savage orders he could not always rely upon them.
Figner himself declared that he acted from conscientious motives. While on one of his expeditions he surprised a marauding party—evidently consisting of Frenchmen and Poles—in a village which they had sacked. In the church they had penned a number of women and girls, and outraged and tortured them with horrible barbarity, crucifying them about the building—partly in order the more easily to gratify their brutal lust, partly no doubt from sheer love of cruelty. Into this hideous orgy burst Figner and his Cossacks. Most of the ravishers were captured. The unhappy victims—such of them as survived—were rescued; and there and then, before the desecrated altar, the Russian leader swore a solemn oath never to spare a Frenchman. He shut his prisoners up in the church and fired it over them; and thereafter, until he was killed in the following year, Frenchmen were to him but as vermin to be exterminated. It is futile to comment upon the moral ethics of his determination. It is only evident that in Russia, as in Spain,the brutality and lust of the French conquerors sowed the seeds of a terrible harvest of vengeance.
In spite of the disorder in Napoleon’s rear there is no doubt that the French numbers rose steadily during the halt. Presumably the stragglers therefore—or such of them as survived the Cossacks and armed peasants—drifted in eventually. But it is hardly necessary to point out that such a method—or lack of method—of marching was the worst possible preparation for a retreat in which strict discipline and careful order would be before everything necessary.
What Napoleon’s own plans were is extremely doubtful. The troops generally anticipated that they would winter in Moscow—but this of course implies nothing. Count Daru certainly suggested doing so, positively stating that to his knowledge the supplies were sufficient and shelter ample. But on the other hand the lines of communication were already seriously threatened, and though the army in Moscow might have been preserved it must have lost most of its horses, and Napoleon would have been cut off from France for several months.
The Emperor is credited by Fain with the intention of advancing upon St. Petersburg. This project was a most extraordinary one, and it passes human comprehension how Napoleon could have imagined it. It is useless to give it in detail. The essential part is that the army is to march upon Velikii Luki, about 90 miles north-east of Polotsk, and 300 from Moscow, through a fertile country (it is actually quite the reverse), and thus threaten St. Petersburg—200 miles farther on, over barren and sparsely-peopled country. The time allowed for accomplishing the movement appears to be about fifteen days! Farther comment is surely unnecessary.
Clausewitz considers that Napoleon must always have intended to retreat by the direct road to Smolensk, the only one in any sense guarded and furnished with magazines. On the Kaluga road, he says, the army would havestarved within a week. He therefore infers that in marching upon Kaluga, as he eventually did, Napoleon merely intended to manœuvre or push Kutuzov out of the way.
The facts, of course,—which Clausewitz may not at the time have known accurately—were that the country along the Smolensk-Viasma-Moscow road was absolutely devastated, that forage could not be obtained upon it, while farther south matters were better; and that east of Smolensk there were practically no magazines.
Jomini is of opinion that Napoleon would have done best to retreat upon Vitebsk. The country, however, was poor and thinly peopled, and the roads were very bad; the only advantage of the plan was that the army would have gained a considerable start of Kutuzov.
Finally, there was the design of retiring by Kaluga on Smolensk. The roads were bad, but probably better than those on the north, since there were upon them some considerable towns. The country was tolerably fertile and—for Russia—fairly well peopled; there were, besides, magazines at Kaluga and elsewhere which might be captured. Further, there was the opportunity of destroying the factories of arms and ammunition at Tula.
How long Napoleon would have remained at Moscow is doubtful. His orders during October for the evacuation of the hospitals show that he meditated departure; but he still waited, hoping against hope that the stubborn Tzar would at length give way, until on October 18th came the news that Kutuzov had taken the offensive.
Kutuzov himself appears not to have had very much confidence in the solidity and ability to manœuvre of his army. Murat’s position, however, was such as to tempt even a cautious commander; and Kutuzov gave way to the energetic representations of Bennigsen and Toll. An attack was fixed for October 17th, but bad staff arrangements compelled it to be postponed until the 18th.Bennigsen gives no reasons. Bogdanovich and Löwenstern both blame Yermólov. Löwenstern says that recalling the horses from their distant foraging grounds caused great delay and that Yermólov did not inform General Baron Löwenstern, the artillery commander, in time.
The Nara, flowing from the west, turns sharply to the southward some 5 miles north of Tarutino; and soon after is joined on the left by the Chernishnia rivulet. Close to Tarutino it again turns abruptly eastward. The road from Kaluga runs northward through Tarutino for nearly 5 miles to Vinkovo, a village about 2 miles from the mouth of the Chernishnia, and then proceeds for 5 miles to Spas-Kuplia, where it passes between two woods.
Murat’s line stretched from the confluence of the Chernishnia with the Nara to the hamlet of Teterinka, some 5 miles to the westward, and about 4 south of Spas-Kuplia. Vinkovo, which lay south of the Chernishnia, was occupied by Claparède’s Poles, supported by the 3rd Cavalry Corps, under General St. Germain, and a division of the 1st. To the left rear of Vinkovo lay Dufour’s division, with the rest of Nansouty’s cavalry corps on its left. Still farther to the south of the Chernishnia stood Poniatowski’s corps, with Sebastiani’s cavalry on the extreme left. Latour-Maubourg was watching the Nara on the right rear. Murat’s whole strength hardly exceeded 25,000 men; he was encumbered rather than supported by about 180 miserably horsed guns; and his 9000 or 10,000 cavalry were in a wretched state.
vinkovo
PLAN OF BATTLE OF VINKOVO, OCTOBER 18TH, 1812General position at moment when Murat’s retreat began
The Russian plan contemplated a demonstration by part of the bulk of the army against Murat’s extended front, while Bennigsen, with a force composed of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps, Müller Zakomelski’s cavalry, and 10 regiments of Cossacks under Orlov-Denisov, turned his left. Miloradovich was to move towardsVinkovo with Korff’s and Vassilchikov’s cavalry, while behind him the rest of the army debouched from Tarutino.
Orlov-Denisov and Müller Zakomelski fell, about 7 a.m. on the 18th, upon Sebastiani’s bivouacs, while Baggohufwudt attacked the 5th Corps in front. His advance had been revealed by the growing light and some premature shots, and the Poles were able to form and oppose a vigorous resistance. One of the first shots from their artillery killed Baggohufwudt, and his fall rather dashed some of his young troops, especially when the remains of the French Carabiniers, led by Murat himself, gallantly charged the 48th Russian Chasseurs. The Russian cavalry on the right, however, swept away Sebastiani, capturing most of his baggage and artillery, and pushed on towards Spas-Kuplia, which they occupied, thus cutting Murat’s line of retreat. The position would have been critical had the Russian horsemen been supported by infantry. The whole of the French line gave back in haste, but the Russian 2nd Corps, imposed upon by Murat’s bold charge, and shaken by the fall of its leader, followed very cautiously. Ostermann-Tolstoï failed to advance with the necessary speed; and Bennigsen thought himself obliged to hold back the 3rd Corps until the arrival of the 4th. The result was that the entire French army, in great disorder, indeed, and suffering considerably from the Russian artillery fire, succeeded in effecting its retreat. Orlov-Denisov and Müller Zakomelski were obliged to abandon Spas-Kuplia as infantry came up; and the line of retreat was clear. Meanwhile Kutuzov was executing his part of the programme very slowly or not at all. Only Miloradovich’s cavalry, supported by five infantry regiments, crossed the Chernishnia and pressed the rear of the retreating columns towards and through Spas-Kuplia, where the pursuit ceased. Murat retreated to Voronovo, where he rallied his shaken troops, while the Russian main body tranquilly returned to Tarutino. Miloradovich with thenow formally constituted advance-guard was stationed at Vinkovo.