The French returns, which are manifestly incomplete, show a loss of 2795 men, of whom 1151 were prisoners or missing. The bulk of the diminution was in the 5th Corps and Sebastiani’s cavalry; Claparède and Dufour were scarcely engaged. Two generals were killed and two wounded. The Russians claim to have lost only 502 killed and wounded. They captured 37 guns, a standard, and a mass of baggage.
Bennigsen was exasperated at Kutuzov’s tardy and slight support, though his own conduct had not been too energetic, and the breach between them widened. It was already great, Kutuzov relying upon the retiring and hard-working Konovnitzin far more than on Bennigsen.
The Russian success at Vinkovo, incomplete as it was, none the less dealt a heavy blow to the already shakenmoraleof the Napoleonic army.
As the period of Napoleon’s evacuation of Moscow has now been reached, it appears necessary to survey the positions occupied by the various sections of the opposing forces.
Dealing first with the invaders—
The Imperial Guard, Grand Head-quarters, the Cavalry Reserve, and the bulk of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Army Corps were encamped, under Napoleon’s personal command, in the environs of Moscow. About Mozhaïsk was the 8th Corps, under Junot, the total combatant strength of this, the original Grand or Central Army, including engineers, gendarmerie, etc., being nearly 125,000 men.
At Viasma was a column of drafts under General Evers, which with the garrisons at Gzhatsk and elsewhere may be estimated at about 5000 men.
About Smolensk there were the 129th and Illyrian regiments from Ney’s corps, three 3rd battalions of the Vistula Legion, and some of the Hesse-Darmstadt Guardsbelonging to the Imperial Guard, a Mecklenburg regiment and a battalion of the 33rd Léger (1st Corps); a Polish cavalry regiment (5th Corps); and about 8000 men inrégiments de marche—say 16,000 in all, including 1500 cavalry under General Baraguay d’Hilliers.
In the neighbourhood of Smolensk also was cantoned the 9th Corps, under Victor, some 26,000 strong.
At Vitebsk and in its neighbourhood were a battalion of the 9th Corps and a few drafts—say 1000 men.
Between Smolensk and Orsha there were in garrison perhaps 3000 men—drafts, convalescents, engineers, and Polish levies.
At Mohilev were 1 infantry and 1 cavalry regiment of Dombrowski’s division, about 1500 men. The rest of the division, about 5500 men with 20 guns, was spread to the south-westward.
At Minsk and Borisov and scattered about the neighbourhood there were 2 weak French battalions, some depôt troops of various nations, a weak Württemberg infantry regiment, and 4 battalions and 4 squadrons of untrustworthy Lithuanian levies—less than 6000 in all, under General Bronikowski. At Slonim General Konopka was organising the new Lithuanian Lancer Regiment of the Guard, which with a few other levies may be estimated at 1000 men.
Between Minsk and Kovno there were various depôts,régiments de marche, and a number of Polish and Lithuanian levies, totalling perhaps 14,000 men, and Coutard’s brigade of the 9th Corps, 2500 strong.
In Kurland and before Riga Macdonald’s 10th Corps now numbered perhaps 26,000 men.
In and about Polotsk lay the 2nd Corps, the remains of the infantry of the 6th, and Doumerc’s Cuirassier Division—about 30,000 combatants—under Marshal St. Cyr.
Schwarzenberg had at Wengrow, Bielostok, and elsewhere about 37,000 men, comprising 22,000 Austrians,nearly 10,000 Saxons, and about 5000 Poles. Marching to join him were 5000 Austrians, and a French division (Durutte) of the 11th Corps, 13,000 strong.
At Königsberg and in the neighbourhood was Loison’s division of the 11th Corps, 13,000 men, French, German, and Neapolitans.
In addition there were in Poland and Prussia, in garrison or moving up to the front, about 21,000 men of various arms.
The total force of the Napoleonic army, therefore, on Russian soil or about to move across the frontier was, in the middle of October, some 351,000 men.
In Germany, for the most part along the line of the Oder, was the rest of the 11th Corps, under Marshal Augereau. It consisted of two provisional divisions under Generals Heudelet and Lagrange, a Neapolitan division in Danzig under General d’Estrées, Cavaignac’s cavalry brigade, and some detached troops, amounting, with artillery, to about 40,000 men; besides perhaps 27,000 drafts. Of these troops, 67,000 in all, about 55,000 were on the Vistula at the close of the campaign. Adding these to the 351,000 troops already beyond that river the total of Napoleonic troops still bearing on Russia was 406,000. As the aggregate employed during the campaign has been elsewhere estimated at 674,000, it results that 268,000 men had already disappeared from the fighting line. Some, no doubt, had returned home invalided, some had been taken by the Russians; a certain number had no doubt fallen into good hands in the country and ultimately recovered from their injuries. But by far the larger number were already dead.
To these 406,000 actual and prospective enemies Russia opposed the following forces:—
At and near Tarutino and around Moscow, under Field-Marshal Prince Golénischev-Kutuzov, were 105,000 regulars and 20,000 irregulars. Under Wittgenstein, near Polotsk, were 40,000 regulars, irregulars, andmilitia. Marching to reinforce Wittgenstein was Count Steingell with 10,000 men, almost all regulars. At Riga, under Essen I, there were perhaps 15,000 troops.
Admiral Chichagov had under his general command about 70,000 men in all, including General Lüder’s division coming from Serbia. Ertel at Mozyr now had about 14,000, while Bobruisk was garrisoned by 6000. Finally, in small regular detachments, drafts of recruits and militia, and Cossacks, there were perhaps 30,000 men on the march to reinforce the various armies. The Russian total therefore was nearly 310,000 men.
CHAPTER X
THE FIRST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
Thebattle of Vinkovo put an abrupt end to any hopes which Napoleon may yet have cherished as to a speedy conclusion of peace. It is fairly obvious, however, that he had already made up his mind that Moscow must be abandoned. On October 14th orders were reiterated to evacuate the hospitals at Mozhaïsk and elsewhere by the 20th. Junot was also directed to destroy arms which could not be carried away. Evers’ column of reinforcement, which had already passed Viasma, was turned back to that town; and otherrégiments de marchewere ordered to remain at, or return to, Smolensk.
The condition of the army needs careful consideration. Montholon, who may be regarded as speaking for his master, says that it was strengthened and revivified by its long rest, that it had twenty days’ supply of food, that it was abundantly provided with ammunition.
It is to be observed that this categoricalapologiadoes not mention the vitally important matters of discipline, clothing, and horses. Of these something will presently be said. The points noted by Montholon may be discussed one by one.
In the first place a distinction must be drawn between the troops in and about Moscow and those belonging to Murat’s advance-guard.
Of the former, it may be said that they were, as regards the men, in fair physical condition. Even here, however, a distinction must be made. The Guards and the 1stCorps had been lying inactive for four weeks. They had had the benefit of the best that Moscow could afford; and certainly should have been in first-rate condition. But, on the other hand, they had been living freely, upon food not always as nourishing as attractive to rough men, and upon the wines and spirits which abounded in the palaces and warehouses, and were probably hardly prepared for new and terrible hardships. The 3rd and 4th Corps had been generally encamped outside Moscow, had obtained little by pillage, and had been uselessly fatigued and over-worked by constant foraging and outpost work. Yet it is possible that these unpampered men were really better prepared for what lay before them than the Guards and Davout’s corps.
As to the question of food supplies it is difficult to express an opinion. It is certain that food was not lacking, and probably the troops might have carried with them twenty days’ rations had discipline been good and transport abundant. As it is, it is clear that the army was short of supplies within ten days of its departure from Moscow.
There is no reason to doubt Napoleon’s statement that the supply of ammunition was abundant.
Napoleon having, according to his custom, dealt entirely with material matters, it may be well to follow in his footsteps before considering things moral. The evidence of survivors is all to the effect that the troops were badly and inadequately clothed. Except in so far as some of them were supplied from the pillage of Moscow the men had only the worn and tattered uniforms which had served them all through the advance. The footgear was much worn, and the underclothing in a deplorable condition. Bourgogne, a sergeant in the Young Guard—one of a favoured corps, therefore—speaks of wearing a shirt until it rotted upon him. Only on the 17th of October were leather and linen issued, and it was then too late to make up the material.
church
THE CHURCH OF VASILII BLAGORENNYI AT MOSCOWBuilt by the famous Tzar Ivan the Terrible in the latter half of the 16th century
Whatever might be the state of the army’s supplies it lacked transport for them. The horses were dying steadily from fatigue, sickness and, above all, lack of food. The state of the cavalry has been noticed, and the artillery and trains were naturally in equally bad condition. Napoleon refused to abandon any of his vast and wretchedly horsed artillery in order to lighten the dead weight which encumbered the march. It would have been wiser to leave behind a part of the enormous mass of ammunition and to fill up the artillery waggons with food or forage. The commander of the artillery of the Young Guard did do something of the kind, with good results, but for the most part the dread of Napoleon effectually hindered such common-sense action. The draft horses, in bad condition, and overloaded in any case, without considering non-military and unnecessary further additions, began to die at the very beginning of the retreat, and the artillery and trains were lost piecemeal. Much of what food and forage the army took with it was lost early, owing to the failure of the transport.
One fact is curious and inexplicable. It might have been thought that the most strenuous exertions would have been put forth to provide the individual soldiers with plenty of breadstuffs, when the deficiency of the transport was well known. There is evidence that food was left in Moscow. De Fezensac states that he made a present of the flour which he could not carry away to some Muscovites whom he had fed during his stay in the city. The incident does honour to his humanity. Yet one wonders why he did not distribute it among his soldiers, who were ere long dying of want. It is clear that little food was carried by the soldiers themselves, and the reason for this is probably connected with the lowmoraleof the army.
A long course of excess of every kind had weakened such sense of honour as the bulk of the men possessed, and the scattered barracking necessitated by the destructionof the greater part of the city rendered the maintenance of order very difficult. So far as can be judged, constant drill was by no means a feature of the Napoleonic army, and inspections of kits were apparently often perfunctory. It is, at any rate, certain that they were so during the sojourn in Moscow. Haversacks and knapsacks, instead of being stored with necessaries, too often contained plunder. The officers either made no determined attempt to check the evil, or their efforts were without avail. It is probable that the former discreditable condition of affairs actually obtained. Brigandage was rife in the Napoleonic armies, and numbers of officers had their private vehicles laden with plunder. Generals were often no better. Napoleon himself added to the encumbrances of the army two convoys of spoils, one of gold and silver bullion, the presence of which may be justified, the other of objects of purely sentimental value, for which excuse can hardly be made. It was but another example of the paltry spirit which impelled Napoleon to desecrate the tomb of Frederick the Great. It is difficult to blame subordinate officers when their ruler and their generals set so evil an example, still less is it possible to find fault with the ignorant soldiery. Be this as it may, lack of discipline, fostered by a low sense of honour among the officers, and greed of plunder, was not the least of the causes of the destruction of theGrande Armée.
Finally, the pernicious practice of permitting the troops to march in disorder was soon to be productive of fatal consequences. Officers and men had grown so accustomed to it that its extent was probably not at first realised, and it soon became impossible to check it. The results were terrible. The worse element among the suffering troops had every opportunity for disbanding, and the Russian irregulars, who could achieve little against closed bodies of infantry, were able to commit immense havoc.
Over and above all this the army was encumbered by a disproportionate throng of non-combatants. Besidesthe ordinary camp-followers, male and female, it has already been observed that there were with the army a number of persons—partly women—who should not have been permitted to accompany it. There were sick and wounded to the number of at least several thousands at the outset. The French colony at Moscow mostly fled with the army. Also a number of Russian prostitutes, and even a good many women and girls of better stamp—including some of the upper classes—accompanied men who had formed connections with them.
The precise state of feeling in the army cannot be ascertained. There is no doubt that the struggle at Borodino had badly affected itsmorale, and the French troops at least with their quick intelligence must have looked forward to the future with dread. On the other hand, their natural light-heartedness and their belief in Napoleon probably sustained their spirits. The foreign element was, doubtless, even less hopeful. That the more reflective among the officers were filled with misgiving is indubitable; and there was much discouragement among the generals, many of whom, besides, were war-weary and yearned for rest.
Thus, disorganised, with discipline shattered, ill clothed, ill supplied, deficient in transport but laden with useless plunder, encumbered with sick, wounded, and helpless non-combatants, and with demoralisation latent everywhere, theGrande Arméeset out from Napoleon’s Farthest to fight its way home. It is perhaps difficult to see things in their true light, every effort at so doing being naturally affected by knowledge of succeeding events. But the conclusion can hardly be avoided that the fate of theGrande Arméewas already sealed, and that the shadow of impending disaster lay darkly upon its disorderly columns.
The numbers of the Napoleonic host on leaving Moscow can only be approximately computed. The dates of the muster-rolls collected by De Chambray vary so muchthat they can only be taken as a general guide. There are also errors in the published tables, the 8th Corps having 4916 infantry and artillery instead of 1916. De Chambray also, with all his merits, has the failing, natural enough indeed, and entirely excusable, of rather under-rating French numbers. An example of this may be seen in his estimate of Napoleon’s strength at Borodino.
On the whole, working upon the muster-rolls collected by De Chambray, the marching-out strength of Napoleon’s army from Moscow would appear to have been approximately as follows:—
The precise number of guns is not very certain, and to compute it is a somewhat unnecessary task. But, including the spare pieces in the reserve parks, and allowing for losses and reinforcements, the total must have been in the neighbourhood of 600. There were over 2000 artillery vehicles, for the most part heavily laden and very inadequately horsed.
The trains, already enormous, were now still further augmented by quantities of carts and carriages of every kind taken in Moscow, and requisitioned to transport food, wounded, refugees, and plunder. The bulk of the troops had made additions to their worn uniforms in the shapeof garments of all kinds, often female ones, ransacked from the shops and warehouses. The effect must at the time have appeared fantastic and comical; but the humour of the sight was soon to be quenched in horror.
It has been seen that on the 14th orders had been issued which foreshadowed the evacuation of Moscow; and on the 16th Napoleon wrote to Maret at Vilna, setting forth his intentions. He would march against and defeat Kutuzov, take Kaluga, and then act according to circumstances. He would probably eventually go into winter quarters between Minsk and Smolensk, as Moscow did not afford a satisfactory military position. The Emperor made a final attempt to induce Kutuzov to open negotiations, but, of course, without result. He was in one of his worst moods, raging at his want of success, and the savage side of his nature displayed itself in all its nakedness in the disgraceful orders to blow up the Kremlin and its sacred and historic buildings.
From Moscow two roads led to Kaluga. The western one went by the towns of Fominskoië, Borovsk and Maloyaroslavetz, that to the east by Voronovo and Tarutino. The eastern road is the more direct of the two, and is roughly the chord of the shallow arc of a circle described by the other. From Borovsk a cross-road leads by Vereia to Gzhatsk. From Maloyaroslavetz a fairly good highway goes eastward and south-eastward by Medyn to Yukhnov, and thence by Ielnia to Smolensk. The two Moscow-Kaluga roads are farthest apart between Tarutino and Borovsk, the latter place being some 20 miles distant from the former and slightly to the north-east of it. Maloyaroslavetz is about 11 miles south of Borovsk, and some 22 by road from Tarutino. It is thus evident that it was a point of great strategic importance.
The positions of the opposing armies were as follows: On the French side Murat’s force was near Voronovo, some 18 miles north of Tarutino. At Fominskoië, 15 or 16miles west of Voronovo, was Broussier’s division of the 4th Corps, which had been sent thither a few days earlier. Junot, with the 8th Corps, was about Mozhaïsk. The rest of theGrande Arméewas in and around Moscow.
Marshal Kutuzov was encamped with hisCorps de Batailleabout Tarutino, while Miloradovich with the advance-guard was pushed forward to observe Murat. Platov’s Flying Corps and other light detachments were in the vicinity of Tarutino; Dorokhov was at Vereia; and Winzingerode’s cavalry observed Moscow, as before, on the north and east.
Marshal Mortier was left by Napoleon to complete the evacuation of Moscow and to execute the abominable order to destroy the Kremlin. He had under his command Laborde’s division of the Young Guard, Charrier’s brigade of dismounted troopers, a brigade of light cavalry, and some artillery and sappers—about 9000 men in all. He was to hold the Kremlin for a few days and to give out that Napoleon would soon return, while clearing the ruins of such wounded, non-combatants and refugees.
The rest of the Guard, the 1st, 3rd and 4th Corps, began to evacuate Moscow in the night of October 18-19. There was great confusion, owing to the crowding of the trains into the Moscow-Kaluga road, and the march was slow. Recklessness and the breakdown of discipline were everywhere apparent. When the 3rd Corps reached its rendezvous at the monastery of Semenovski it was found to be in flames, and it is astounding to read that quantities of provisions were burned in it. It is useless to seek for excuse for the commission of such an act; it was simple insanity.
The army advanced along the eastern road directly upon Tarutino. Eugène opened the march, and behind him came the 1st and 3rd Corps and the Guard. The advance by the western road appeared to threaten a frontal attack on the position of Tarutino, but on reachingthe Pakhra, the Emperor diverted the columns on to the western route. Murat’s force was broken up. The King himself with the relics of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps was directed upon Fominskoië; Poniatowski’s corps on Vereia, to recover that place from Dorokhov. Ney was to take Murat’s place at Voronovo, the Vistula Legion, the remains of the 4th Cavalry Corps and the cavalry of the 1st Corps being also placed at his disposal. He had in all about 16,000 men and over 100 guns—sufficient under his resolute leadership to hold Miloradovich in check. There was also the possibility that his presence at Voronovo would induce Kutuzov to believe that the whole French army was advancing by the eastern road; and in any case it would divert attention from the flank movement by the western one.
The diversion of the advance to the western road was a well-conceived manœuvre, and had it been carried out with greater rapidity it might have achieved brilliant results. The distance to Maloyaroslavetz by the French line of march is about 72 miles, which the leading troops covered by the evening of the 23rd. As the roads were poor and the cross-tracks unspeakable, and there was besides some rain to make them worse, the army cannot be said to have done badly. But its march, encumbered as it was by interminable trains of artillery and baggage, was not speedy enough for the emergency. The attention of the Russian staff, indeed, appears to have been riveted upon the eastern road, for it was not until the 22nd that Kutuzov learned that there were French troops at Fominskoië. Considering that it was probably merely a powerful screen for foraging operations, Kutuzov directed Dokhturov, with the 6th Corps and the light cavalry of the Imperial Guard, to attack and drive it back. Miloradovich was ordered to demonstrate against the force in his front so as to prevent it detaching succours to the division at Fominskoië. This was on the evening of the 22nd. Eugène’s corps, with Delzons’ division leading,was between Fominskoië and Borovsk; Davout and the Guard were about Fominskoië. At midnight on the 23rd Ney started from Voronovo for Borovsk in pouring rain which simply obliterated the tracks and seriously impeded the march. He was also harassed by detachments of Cossacks. Poniatowski arrived at Vereia early on the 23rd and, after some fighting, drove out Dorokhov, who retired by cross-roads towards Maloyaroslavetz. Late on the same day Delzons occupied Maloyaroslavetz with his advanced guard of two battalions.
Dokhturov, accompanied by Yermólov and by Sir Robert Wilson, left Tarutino early on the 23rd. The 6th Corps, owing to its terrible losses at Borodino, was only 10 regiments strong, even with the addition of one or two from corps which had suffered less. One of them, moreover, was detached to Ozharovski’s column. Dokhturov had, therefore, only 18 battalions, 7 batteries and the 3 regiments of the light cavalry of the Guard—about 12,000 men in all, with 84 guns. By the afternoon he had arrived at a point 5 or 6 miles from the western road, between Fominskoië and Borovsk, and there received information that 12,000 French troops were in his front. He consulted with his subordinates and with Wilson, and it was decided, rightly, to halt and await events, since if this body were isolated it would probably remain on the defensive. If, on the other hand, it continued to advance it was probably the head of a formidable force—perhaps the entire French army. Very soon intelligence came from Seslavin that Moscow was evacuated and the French army marching across from the eastern road to Fominskoië; and immediately afterwards a report from Dorokhov announced that a Cossack post at Borovsk had been expelled by Delzons. Dokhturov promptly took his decision. He could no longer hope to intercept the French at Borovsk, so must make a dash for Maloyaroslavetz, and there bar the road. He sent off word to Tarutino of his intelligence and intentions, andstarted his force for the vital point, arriving there in the night of the 23rd-24th.
Napoleon himself reached Borovsk on the 23rd. Thence he despatched orders to Baraguay d’Hilliers to move out from Smolensk towards Ielnia. He evidently expected to carry out his manœuvre without hindrance. In a letter to Eugène, dated at 7.30 p.m., he appears to have discovered the presence of Dokhturov, but to have anticipated an attack on the flank of his columns rather than an attempt to bar his way. As he dictated this despatch all the Russian commanders in touch with him had full information of his manœuvre, Kutuzov had been warned, and Dokhturov was marching hard for Maloyaroslavetz!
At 1 a.m. Mortier in Moscow ordered the firing of the mines which had been laid under the buildings in the Kremlin and elsewhere. They were charged with 183,000 pounds of powder, and great damage was wrought, but by no means the complete destruction intended by Napoleon. Mortier, who hated the ignominious task which he had been set by his master, is said, doubtless with truth, to have been by no means sorry at the comparatively small results of the Emperor’s vandalism.
Winzingerode, who was already in the suburbs with his troops, pressed forward rather inconsiderately to reoccupy the Kremlin, riding himself in advance without an escort, attended only by a single aide-de-camp. The result was that he was taken prisoner, though he made a dishonourable, if not entirely inexcusable, attempt to escape by waving his handkerchief and pretending to have come on a parley. Mortier quite rightly declined to listen, and detained him. The evacuation was then completed. The Marshal made the most strenuous efforts to save all the invalids and to alleviate their sufferings as far as possible, but so great was the deficiency of transport that many hundreds had to be left behind. Eighteen guns, doubtless rendered unserviceable, were also abandoned. The gigantic convoy, guarded by Mortier’s small force, moved not by the main road to Smolensk, but by cross roads on Vereia.
At Tarutino Kutuzov during the 23rd received the intelligence sent by Miloradovich and Dokhturov. The hour is a little doubtful, but he cannot have received Dokhturov’s report until late in the day, and it was not possible to march at once owing to the absence of a large part of the artillery horses, which, as before the action of Vinkovo, had been led far away to obtain forage. The blame freely lavished upon Kutuzov for dilatoriness seems to be without foundation; there was no unnecessary delay. To set forth to encounter Napoleon without the artillery would have been unwise to the verge of insanity. As a fact, supposing the final information to have reached the camp about 4 p.m., six or seven hours was not too long in which to call in the parties and make preparations for the march. Platov was sent off at once with 15 regiments of Cossacks to observe and harass the march of Napoleon’s column, and at 11 p.m. the rest of the army started for Maloyaroslavetz. The distance, allowing for deviations, was about 25 miles, mostly over an execrable byway rendered almost impassable by the pouring rain. Nevertheless, the Russians pushed doggedly forward, and by 11 a.m. on the 24th the head of the column was within reach of Maloyaroslavetz. Seeing that Ney, who on this same night was moving across from the eastern road, did not reach Borovsk until the evening of the 26th, having occupied three days in covering about 36 miles, the greatest credit is due to the Russian army.
Dokhturov with his force reached Maloyaroslavetz in the night of the 23rd-24th. Either now or soon after daylight on the 24th he was joined by Dorokhov from Vereia. His troops must have been nearly dead beat, but he managed to spread them round the town so as to hold the outlets of all the roads which led out of it. He,of course, did not know that there were only two battalions holding the town; but Buturlin’s blame of him for not carrying it is unreasonable. His men had been marching for nearly an entire day and night, and it was indispensably necessary to allow them some rest.
Maloyaroslavetz, an ordinary Russian country town built almost entirely of wood, lay on the southern bank of the small river Luzha, at the point where it was crossed by a bridge carrying the Moscow-Kaluga road. The river, like most streams in the region, flows in a deeply sunk channel. Below the bridge there were, according to Wilson, fords, but the Russians did not need them, and the French knew nothing of them. In any case, neither side attempted to use them. The country was very broken and also wooded, and the banks of the river, especially the southern one, were very steep. There were a few isolated buildings near the stream, while the town proper lay some hundreds of yards farther on, spreading over the top of the rise on to a plateau with a slight descent to the southward. The only good artillery position on the Russian side was eastward of the town, but though from it the opposite bank of the Luzha, down which the enemy must come, could be commanded, the ground was so broken and wooded that the bridge could nowhere be seen, and it was never apparently seriously injured.
Early on the 24th some fugitive inhabitants made their way to Dokhturov, and informed him that there were as yet only two battalions of French troops in the town. Accordingly soon after daylight, his men having by this obtained a little rest, he sent forward the 6th and 33rd Chasseur Regiments to carry the town. They expelled the garrison from nearly the whole of the place, but the buildings near the bridge formed a sort oftête du pont, which the French held desperately. Dokhturov supported the attack by two more Chasseur regiments, but the resistance was stubborn, and the Russianscould not advance against the deadly fire kept up upon them. Delzons could at first only reinforce the gallant garrison by fragments and driblets, for when his main body endeavoured to defile down the northern bank Dokhturov rapidly brought a line of batteries into action east of the town and effectually checked them. About an hour later some batteries of the 4th Corps, which were toiling along the miry road, were ranged by the Viceroy opposite the Russian artillery, and thus covered Delzons’ division crossed the bridge and recaptured the town.
Dokhturov thereupon restored the fight with three line regiments, which rallied the Chasseurs and stormed through the streets of Maloyaroslavetz, driving the 13th Division back towards the bridge. Baron Delzons was killed in the midst of the struggle, and as his brother and aide-de-camp endeavoured to carry his body to the rear he also was struck down. Baron Guilleminot, Eugène’s chief-of-staff, took the command, rallied the division and, supported by part of Broussier’s, which was beginning to arrive, again stormed the now burning town, only to be forced out again as Dokhturov sent in fresh reinforcements. Once more the Russian charge was checked at the bridge; and Broussier and Guilleminot, with their united divisions, again drove the 6th Corps through the blazing town, but could not debouch from it in the face of the Russian artillery fire.
The main armies were approaching the scene of action. Davout’s corps was advancing from Borovsk to the support of Eugène; the main Russian army was nearing the field from Tarutino. Raievski’s corps marched at the head of the long column, and behind him came in succession the 8th, 3rd, 5th, 2nd and 4th Corps, and Korff’s, Golitizin’s and Vassilchikov’s cavalry. The aged commander-in-chief travelled during the night in his carriage. When about 3 or 4 miles from Maloyaroslavetz he halted and ordered Colonel Löwenstern to see Dokhturov to report. The whole of the 6th Corps was now engagedand forced on the defensive by Broussier and Guilleminot; and of this Löwenstern informed the commander-in-chief. Kutuzov sent Raievski forward at once to the assistance of Dokhturov, ordered the other corps to march upon the field with all speed, and himself mounted his horse and hurried to the front to range his oncoming troops in line of battle.
plan
PLAN OF BATTLE OF MALOYAROSLAVETZ, OCTOBER 24TH, 1812
Raievski’s leading division, personally led by the corps commander and by Konovnitzin, reached the front about 12.30 p.m., gathered up Dokhturov’s weary divisions, and the united force stormed Maloyaroslavetz for the sixth time, driving Broussier and Guilleminot into the bridge-head for shelter, until Pino’s Italians sustained and rallied them. The three divisions beat back the oncoming Russians and once more gained possession of the awful heap of blood-stained ruins that now represented the town. The conflict was horrible beyond description; the opposing soldiery fought to the death amid conflagration and ruin; the wounded were suffocated, trodden underfoot, burned alive in the blazing houses, or hideously mangled by the opposing guns and artillery waggons as they forged their way backward and forward through the chaos.
To repel the three French and Italian divisions Dokhturov was now obliged to send in Raievski’s second division. Once more the Russian infantry poured into the ruins of Maloyaroslavetz, driving their opponents before them and thrusting them down the slope towards the bridge. But the head of Davout’s corps was at length arriving, and Eugène accordingly sent in his last reserve, the Royal Guard of Italy. Its six battalions finally turned the scale against the Russian 6th and 7th Corps, which, still fighting furiously, were driven back upon and through the ruins of the town. Davout’s corps artillery forced the batteries on the east to retire; the entire artillery of the 4th Corps was pushed to the front over the dead and dying to support the infantry, whileCompans’ and Gérard’s divisions crossed a temporary bridge and took up positions, the former on Eugène’s left, the latter to his right.
The French were masters of the blood-stained ruins of Maloyaroslavetz, and that was all. While the battle was raging Kutuzov had stationed his whole army just south of the town and commenced to entrench himself. He relieved the 6th Corps by the 8th and the 3rd Division, and directed Borozdin and Raievski once more to assault the dreadful ruins of Maloyaroslavetz. Borozdin’s leading troops entered it, but were driven out again, and, realising that the French hold was now too firm to be shaken, the Russians finally withdrew; but their immense artillery commanded every exit, and their skirmishers were everywhere close up to those of their opponents. The 7th and 8th Corps and the 3rd Division were in front line; the 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th with the rest of the 3rd in second and third, while the powerful cavalry covered both flanks as far as the Luzha.
So far as a single event can be fixed upon as the decisive point of Napoleon’s career that event is undoubtedly the battle of Maloyaroslavetz. Dokhturov’s swift decision, splendidly seconded by the desperate fighting of the 6th and 7th Corps, had definitely ended all hope of carrying out the retreat with success. It may be doubted whether, even by marching by way of Kaluga, the army would have succeeded in retaining much discipline and cohesion; but, at any rate, it would have been the only chance, and now the attempt had failed. Napoleon knew it. He established his head-quarters in a peasant’s hut at Gorodnia, about 5 miles north of Maloyaroslavetz, and to him in the evening he called Murat, Berthier and Bessières. He was seated at a table on which was spread a map of the country, and began to detail the situation to the generals. Suddenly the full extent of his imminent ruin seemed to burst upon him, and, dropping his head upon his hands and his elbows upon the table, he remained for more than an hour staring at the map, the comrades of his sixteen years of victory waiting for him to speak, silent and mournful. Rising at last he dismissed them without further comment, apparently resolved on a final desperate throw of the dice. He sent word to Davout to relieve Eugène’s weary troops at the front, and that he would himself bring up the Guard in support. Ney, who had now reached Fominskoië, was ordered to bring Ledru’s and Razout’s divisions to a point between Borovsk and Maloyaroslavetz, leaving Claparède and Scheler to guard the vast assemblage of trains at the former place.
Meanwhile Kutuzov had also been deliberating. He had announced his intention of standing to fight on the ground which he held; but as the hours wore away his resolution failed him. He is not perhaps to be blamed; it was no light thing to meet Napoleon—never so dangerous as when he appeared completely baffled. He knew that the quality of his army, diluted with raw militia-men and recruits of a few weeks’ training, left much to be desired; another battle like that of Borodino would completely cripple it. At any rate, he decided not to accept battle where he stood, but to fall back to another position about 3 miles in rear. This appears to have been strong enough; but it left uncovered the road from Maloyaroslavetz to Medyn, which Napoleon might have used for his retreat. The anger in the Russian army was great. Wilson was furious, and practically accuses Kutuzov of treachery. This is, of course, absurd. The Russian commander-in-chief and the English commissioner were on very bad terms, the latter being apparently rather tactless and too urgent in his efforts to induce the former to take the offensive. There is no question that Kutuzov was too old for his post; but, after all, he was the responsible chief of the Russian armies, and he knew, what Wilson did not, the internal condition of his own. Wild enthusiasm, assisted only bypikes, hardly constitutes a very firm stay against veteran and well-armed warriors led by a great military genius. Nevertheless, it is certain that Wilson and the bellicose Russian corps commanders were correct. The position behind Maloyaroslavetz was a better one than that which had been held with such desperate obstinacy at Borodino, and to defend it Kutuzov, after deducting the losses on the previous day, had 100,000 regulars and 15,000 irregulars with over 600 guns. Against these Napoleon could bring only the Guard (less Claparède’s division), the 1st and 4th Corps, the bulk of the 3rd and the remains of the reserve cavalry. Mortier was on the march from Moscow to Vereia, Junot near Mozhaïsk, Poniatowski moving westward from Vereia. Allowing for these detachments Napoleon could place in line of battle by the 27th little more than 80,000 men, including the Head-quarters Guard. He would have 12,000 cavalry, mostly in very bad condition, and about 450 badly horsed guns as against at least 620 excellently appointed Russian pieces. This, however, Kutuzov did not accurately know, while he did know that Napoleon was in his front with the bulk of his army. He pointed out that any reverse would be fatal, since behind the present position was a very difficult defile. To Wilson’s heated expostulations he replied angrily that he did not intend to win victories of which only England would reap the benefit! This outbreak may be charitably attributed to ill-temper at Wilson’s worrying of him. The withdrawal was carried out. There was considerable disorder during the passage of the artillery through the defile, but the movement was successfully accomplished, well protected by Miloradovich’s skilful handling of the rear-guard.
war
THE COUNCIL OF WAR AFTER THE BATTLE OF MALOYAROSLAVETZNapoleon in the peasant’s hut at Gorodnia remained for over an hour gazing at his map before making the fatal decision to retreat by the devastated route to Smolensk
Davout in the morning was able to debouch unopposed from Maloyaroslavetz, but his advance was soon checked by the sight of the Russian army, now established in its new position. Meanwhile, Napoleon had started from Gorodnia. He was attended by his usualescort of three or four squadrons. The cavalry of the Guard was some distance behind when, on the road to Maloyaroslavetz, a mass of Cossacks poured out of the woods on the left and raced at the escort. They were riding in good order, says Rapp, so that it was at first thought that they were regulars. They were, in fact, Platov’s own corps, the Ataman having crossed the Luzha early that morning to raid Napoleon’s line of communications. He was now aiming for a park of 40 guns of the Guard near Gorodnia. Rapp seized Napoleon’s bridle and turned his horse, and the escort formed in haste, Rapp thrusting himself before the Emperor to shield him from the lances of the wild moss-troopers. His chivalrous devotion had wellnigh cost him dear, for his horse was killed, but the staff and escort rescued him, and, the cavalry of the Guard coming up, the Cossacks dispersed. They seized the artillery park, however, but the horses being at a distance watering, only 11 guns could be carried off. The bold attempt spread alarm through the army, which was almost all called under arms to resist an expected attack.
Napoleon, probably greatly exasperated, returned to Gorodnia until the way should be safe. At ten o’clock he again started, examined the battle-field and then returned to Gorodnia, having practically wasted a whole day—this when every hour was precious. This may have been because he was still undecided as to what he should do. At his quarters he held a final and stormy council. Murat, bold to the last, advocated advance, and offered to clear a way if the Guard cavalry were added to the remnant of his horsemen. Bessières, however, opposed him, observing that the transport was already failing and that the advance could not be rapid enough to be effective. Davout advised that the Medyn-Smolensk road should be adopted as the main line of retreat, but this was sufficient to provoke the opposition of Murat, who insisted that it was not safe from Russian flankattacks. The end was that Napoleon decided to fall back by the main road to Smolensk, and ordered the whole army to move on to it by way of Mozhaïsk. The road by Medyn, Yukhnov and Ielnia is about 40 miles shorter than the route adopted; the country which it traversed was not yet entirely devastated, and it is strange that Napoleon did not take it, braving the chance of a flank attack by the cautious, and by no means confident, Russian commander-in-chief. It is possible that, whichever route the army might take, it would have been prevented from foraging by the Cossacks. Perhaps also Napoleon hoped to give Kutuzov the impression that he was retreating upon Vitebsk—as, in fact, he at first did.
Kutuzov was, indeed, so little confident that on the 26th he retreated towards Kaluga. His decision has been violently criticised, and not without much show of reason. The only reply is that what we know very well to-day was not so plain to Kutuzov in 1812. He did not believe that his army was a match for Napoleon’s, and that the correct policy was to “play hide and seek” with the invaders, as Clausewitz expresses it, and so wear them out. Having come to this conclusion, Kutuzov proceeded to carry out his design regardless of opposition. He was perhaps wrong, but it cannot be pronounced on the evidence which lay before him at the time that he was. Had Napoleon followed, his army would but have been weakened; had he turned westward the Russians would still have been on his flank. Wherever he went his line of march would be infested by Cossacks. Kutuzov was undoubtedly too cautious; he might have risked more, but he might equally have exposed himself to the counter-strokes of his mighty antagonist, now driven to desperation, and have lost everything. His operations were conducted on the basal idea that Napoleon was not to be beaten by open force, but by steady evasion and constant harassing. From this point of view his retirement was natural. His really serious blunder was committed two days later, and was the direct outcome of Napoleon’s retreat by Mozhaïsk.
On the 26th, while Kutuzov’s exasperated generals were ordering the retrograde march on Kaluga, Napoleon was commencing the fatal movement which was the beginning of his downfall. The 8th Corps about Mozhaïsk naturally formed the advance-guard; Ney was directed on Mozhaïsk from Borovsk, while the Guard moved back to that place. Mortier was to reach Vereia by the evening, and next day would be rejoined by Roguet’s and Claparède’s divisions. Eugène was to follow in the track of the Guard, while Davout with the 1st Corps and the relics of the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Corps covered the rear. Poniatowski was to move by cross-roads to Gzhatsk to cover the left flank. Finally, Evers, who had moved some way southward towards Yukhnov, was to return to Viasma, and there await the army.
While the French army lay about Maloyaroslavetz it had received repeated proofs of the activity and audacity of the Russian light troops. All the columns had in their turn been alarmed and harassed. On the 25th a body of Cossacks executed ahourra(alarm) upon Borovsk. On the same day Colonel Ilovaïski IX with three regiments of them surprised the advance-guard of the 5th Corps, consisting of a regiment of infantry and two of cavalry under General Tyskiewicz near Kreminskoië, between Vereia and Medyn. Tyskiewicz was captured, and of his force of about 1300 men, 500 were killed, wounded and captured. Ilovaïski also took 5 guns.
In the actual battle of Maloyaroslavetz the forces engaged were nearly equal in number. On the French side there were successively sent into line the 4th Corps and the 3rd and 5th Divisions of the 1st—about 35,000 men in all. The Russians successively engaged about the same numbers—Dokhturov’s force, Dorokhov’s detachment, the 7th Corps, the 3rd and 27th Divisions,and some regiments of Cossacks. The Russians admitted a loss of 4412 killed and wounded and 2753 missing. Very many of the latter, it is to be feared, perished in the burning town, and the actual total cannot be reckoned at less than 6000, quite five-sixths of which fell upon the 20,000 infantry of the 6th and 7th Corps. A heavy loss was that of General Dorokhov, who, being somewhat deaf, miscalculated the distance of musketry fire and was mortally wounded in consequence. Martinien’s lists show something over 300 officers killed and wounded on the French side, and the total of casualties, therefore, would also be about 6000—the vast majority falling upon the 4th Corps. Of its four infantry division commanders, Delzons was killed, and Broussier and Pino were wounded. Two generals of brigade were killed and three wounded. The losses in the various Cossack alarms were probably slight on both sides. The Russians, as aforesaid, captured 11 guns.
CHAPTER XI
THE OPERATIONS IN NAPOLEON’S REAR DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER
Theresult of the operations on the Düna and in Volhynia had been that by the end of August, Wittgenstein was standing on the defensive at Sivokhino faced by a considerably superior force under St. Cyr, while in Volhynia Tormazov had been driven to cover behind the Styr. He also was opposed by forces considerably larger than his own, but Admiral Chichagov was now advancing fast from Moldavia, and within a few weeks the scale would be turned heavily against the invaders. On August 28th the Tzar and the Crown Prince of Sweden met at Abo. The result was the treaty of Abo, which freed Count Steingell’s Russian army of Finland for service against Napoleon. Reinforcements to the number of about 15,000 men, of whom 10,000 were St. Petersburg militia, were ordered to join Wittgenstein.
To co-ordinate the movements of the widely scattered forces which from Finland to Moldavia were converging upon the theatre of war an elaborate plan of operations was worked out by Alexander and his council. It was far too detailed, required an impossible exactness of co-operation from the commanders, and assumed as complete the processes of reinforcement which had often hardly commenced. In its main lines it was as follows:—
st.cyr
MARSHAL GOUVION ST. CYRCommander of the 6th (Bavarian) Army Corps and victor of first battle of Polotsk, Aug. 18th, 1812From the picture by H. Vernet at Versailles
Chichagov was to concentrate at Ostrog, in Volhynia, and reach Pinsk by September 20th. He was to march upon and capture Minsk and then occupy the line ofthe Berezina in conjunction with Wittgenstein, while Tormazov held in check or drove back Schwarzenberg.
Wittgenstein, reinforced by 19,000 militia and 9000 regulars, was to cross the Düna, supported by Steingell, attack St. Cyr in the rear and, having beaten him, was to push on to co-operate with Chichagov.
Steingell, with 14,000 men of the army of Finland, was to go to Riga. The Riga garrison, 20,000 strong (it was actually much less), was to attack and contain Macdonald, while under cover of this demonstration Steingell advanced on Polotsk to co-operate with Wittgenstein. Then, while the latter moved on to effect a junction with Chichagov, Steingell was to pursue St. Cyr towards Vilna.
General Ertel’s force at Mozyr was to move northward and join Chichagov in the neighbourhood of Minsk.
The main object of the operations is clearly to bar Napoleon’s homeward march from Moscow by a competent force. But the orders were too minute in some respects and vague in others. They spoke of such events as the defeat of Schwarzenberg by Tormazov as if they were certain to materialise, were clogged with superfluous regulations of detail, and took little account of the practical difficulties of organising and moving troops in a country like Russia. The strategy in broad outline was executed; no more could have been expected.
The efforts and intrigues of Andréossy, Napoleon’s Ambassador at Constantinople, failed to induce the Turks to repudiate the Treaty of Peace concluded at Bukharest; and thus Admiral Chichagov was, after long delays, enabled to start his army for the north. He had under his personal command five divisions of all arms commanded respectively by General Count Langeron, Lieutenant-Generals Voïnov, Essen III and Sabaniev, and Major-General Bulatov. In all there were 50 battalions, 56 squadrons, 17 batteries and 11 regiments of Cossacks. The troops generally were of excellent quality and largely veterans, but the units were weak.The total of regulars was perhaps 34,000, with 204 guns; there were also between 3000 and 4000 Cossacks. A division of about 6000 men and 12 guns under Major-General Lüders, which had been supporting the famous Serb chief, Black George, was following from the west.
The original idea had been that the Army of the Danube should invade the French possessions in Illyria; but this was soon abandoned. Chichagov was much disappointed, but to penetrate through wild and rugged Balkania would have certainly meant the destruction of his army.
Chichagov had been placed in charge of the Russian army of the Danube and of the peace negotiations with Turkey by the express command of Alexander, who was angry at the slowness of his predecessor Kutuzov. The Admiral was also a strong advocate of the policy of arming the Serbs against Napoleon and invading Illyria. The Tzar considered him an able and energetic man, and he certainly should have known, for Chichagov had been for some time Minister of Marine. Wilson, who visited him at Bukharest, was much impressed with his ability, and regretted that he had not been placed earlier in command.
Wilson remarked that the Admiral’s ability might not necessarily be equal to independent command, but, as a fact, Chichagov did quite as well as any of the other Russian generals. His lack of experience made him occasionally too slow; but his comments upon the plans submitted to him show that he really possessed very sound military judgment. Above all, he was of a remarkably independent temper, and did not shrink from expressing his opinions. He criticised the elaborate Imperial plan of operations with vigour and acumen, telling the Tzar bluntly that he should act as if the orders were more definite than they actually were, and would answer for his deviations from them!
Chichagov’s position in his own army was not too pleasant. The military officers were sulky at beingcommanded by a seaman; his second-in-command, the Frenchman Langeron, was bitterly hostile, and in his memoirs loses no opportunity of attacking him. Even Langeron, however, admits his remarkable probity and scorn of personal profit—very rare virtues in a Russian of that period—and once or twice, despite himself, has to remark upon his chief’s energy.
Chichagov left Bukharest on August 3rd, and on the 9th concentrated his army at Fokshani. The weather was very wet, and the result was the flooding of the rivers Putna and Sereth beyond Fokshani, which destroyed the existing bridges and retarded their re-establishment, so that it was not until the 17th that the Army of the Danube was able to resume its march. The battle of Gorodeczna had been fought; Tormazov was in full retreat for the Styr, and soon his anxious messages began to reach the Admiral, who, in reply, hastened up to the rescue at a pace, considering the difficulties, perhaps never equalled in war. The weather was hot; the roads were almost non-existent; the army, after the bad fashion of Russian forces, was encumbered with immense trains; nevertheless the speed of its march was remarkable. From the Sereth to Jassy, from Jassy to Choczim and Kamenetz-Podolski, thence for the Styr by Staroï-Konstantinov and Zaslavl, it took its way, marching rapidly but methodically, halting for one day in every six in order to rest and close up its straggling columns. Every effort was made to hasten the march, especially after passing the Dniester; weakened infantrymen were carried in waggons, while the cavalry and artillery pressed forward with all speed. On September 14th, as Miloradovich was withdrawing his rear-guard from Moscow, Chichagov in person entered Ostrog; and on the same day Voïnov’s division reached Krymniki-on-Styr to the support of Tormazov. Langeron was at Dubno, one march behind Voïnov, Essen and Sabaniev at Ostrog, while Bulatov had not yet passed Zaslavl. From Fokshani to the Styr is a distanceof over 450 miles, which had been traversed by the leading divisions in 29 days, including 5 of rest—a sustained average of over 15 miles a day and an actual marching average of 19! The army reached the Styr in excellent order, ready to take the offensive immediately.
At Dubno Chichagov was joined by two infantry regiments from the Crimea. The united Russian armies now amounted to about 67,000 men, including 18,000 cavalry and Cossacks, with over 300 pieces of artillery.
Schwarzenberg had about 42,000 troops under his command, but some thousands of them were raw Polish levies, and he possessed only 102 guns wherewith to oppose the immense park of his opponents. The marshy and malarious country was causing much sickness among his troops. Very likely also he was withheld by orders from Vienna, and the disaffection among his subordinates must have counted for much. But, in fact, he had not troops sufficient to force the passage of the Styr against an army not very inferior to his own in numbers, and much stronger in artillery. On September 15th, just as Chichagov was closing up to the front, he wrote to Berthier and explained his difficulties. On the 17th he made a demonstration along the river and became convinced that the Army of the Danube had now joined Tormazov.
Chichagov, having relieved Tormazov from fear of being overwhelmed, could now allow his troops to move more leisurely. For some days, therefore, his divisions were merely quietly ranged along the Styr; and the river was bridged. Schwarzenberg, realising that he was about to be attacked, drew back his detachments and prepared to retreat as soon as the Russians moved forward. Early on the 20th Lambert crossed the Styr and surprised 14 squadrons of German and Polish cavalry, capturing 300 prisoners. On the 22nd the general advance of the Russians began.
It is rather characteristic of the Imperial orders that they provided for no subordination of one general toanother in the combined operations which they contemplated. In the present instance no trouble arose, as Chichagov and Tormazov agreed well together; and when on the 24th orders arrived from Kutuzov for Tormazov to march to reinforce the main army the latter quietly disregarded it. A few days later came another order, this time directing Chichagov to go, and Tormazov to remain to check Schwarzenberg. The Admiral declined to abandon his comrade, and comments sarcastically upon these contradictory directions. In any case, neither Chichagov nor Tormazov could have reached Tarutino in time. At the end of September the Imperial instructions were brought by the Tzar’s aide-de-camp, Colonel Chernishev. Chichagov observes that their object was clearly to range a strong force along the line of the Berezina; and, having despatched his outspoken reply to his master, proceeded to attain the end in his own way. At the same time Tormazov was called by Kutuzov to succeed Bagration, leaving Chichagov in supreme command.
On the 22nd the Russian armies crossed the Styr, Schwarzenberg’s outposts falling back before them. Schwarzenberg retired upon Luboml, a little east of the Bug on the Lublin-Kovel road, where he concentrated on the 28th. By the evening of the 29th Chichagov and Tormazov had collected most of their forces in his front; but in the night he evacuated his position and retreated towards Brest-Litovsk, sending at the same time Siegenthal’s division to Pruzhani. Chichagov pursued him with the bulk of his forces, only detaching Voïnov to follow Siegenthal. On October 9th Chichagov reached Brest-Litovsk and called in his detachments to give battle; but Schwarzenberg wisely decamped in the night and retreated on Warsaw. He took up a position at Wengrow, about 42 miles east of Praga, and awaited events, while Siegenthal fell back to Bielostok. Chichagov, having driven Napoleon’s extreme right wing across the Bug,halted at Brest-Litovsk with his main body in order to prepare to carry out the instructions brought by Chernishev.
The losses in these operations were not very heavy. There had been a good deal of skirmishing, but no general action; and it is unlikely that Schwarzenberg’s army lost more than 3000 to 4000 men. The diminution in the Russian forces must have been even less.
Chichagov now, according to various critics on both sides, committed a great blunder. He remained halted for 18 days at Brest-Litovsk. But, as Bogdanovich has justly pointed out, he was about to advance through a country which, never rich, had been devastated by the passage across it of several armies. He had to divide his army for its new operations, leaving a competent force to observe Schwarzenberg, and to collect supplies sufficient to feed his own corps. Besides, the Army of the Danube had been marching and fighting for more than two months, and may well have needed time wherein to repose and refit.
During the halt at Brest-Litovsk General Sacken joined the army from the south, bringing with him about 4000 depôt troops, who appear to have been drafted into the weaker units.
While the Admiral himself remained at Brest, preparing for the march to the Berezina, he sent out detachments to overrun Warsaw and sweep the country towards Minsk. The detachments sent towards Warsaw were supported by Essen III’s division, which, on October 18th, came in contact at Biala with Reynier and was driven back, with a loss of several hundred men and a gun, upon Brest-Litovsk. On the other hand, General Chaplitz on the 20th destroyed the new Lithuanian regiment of Napoleon’s Guard at Slonim, only about 120 men escaping out of 600. Chaplitz’s detachment was supported by Cherbatov’s (formerly Markov’s) division. Eastward of Slonim there were very few invading troops to cover the long line of communications, threatened on the south by Russian forces at Bobruisk and Mozyr. The garrison of Bobruisk was not strong enough to make effective sorties, but the force at Mozyr had been gradually increased to about 12,000 men and over 30 guns. To guard against the menace of this force and to observe Bobruisk, Dombrowski’s infantry division and three regiments of cavalry had been left by Poniatowski in August. Dombrowski’s whole force, even after the junction of some Lithuanian levies, can never have exceeded 9000 men, and was barely sufficient, after garrisoning Mohilev, to observe Bobruisk, much less to oppose any effectual resistance to Ertel. On September 11th a column from Mozyr forced an Austrian detachment to abandon Pinsk, while a second, under Ertel himself, defeated Dombrowski’s Lithuanians on the 15th and threw some reinforcements into Bobruisk. Then, however, he retired to Mozyr.
From Riga on August 7th Essen again made a sortie and captured Schlock, which was then retaken by the Prussians. On the 23rd Essen decided to make a general attack upon the Prussians, who lay observing the city, extended from Schlock to Thomsdorf on the Düna, a distance of 42 miles. A column under Lewis was to make the real attack upon Eckau, while a detachment under Major-General Veliaminov demonstrated towards Mitau, and Rear-Admiral von Müller with a flotilla of sloops attacked Schlock. The Prussian posts at Dahlenkirchen on the Düna were driven back, with some loss, by Lewis, but Veliaminov’s demonstration had no results, though von Müller captured Schlock. On the 26th Grawert, having collected his scattered detachments, drove Lewis back into Riga; and Schlock and Dahlenkirchen were reoccupied. The losses in these actions, combined with sickness, considerably weakened the garrison. On the other hand, they proved that the Prussians were not strong enough even to blockade the place. Macdonaldsent a brigade of Grandjean’s division to reinforce them, and prepared to bring up the rest of it at need.
After this both sides lay inactive until September 18th, when there was some more indecisive skirmishing about Schlock. The Prussians were now commanded by Lieutenant-General Yorck, Grawert being invalided. Between the 20th and 22nd, Count Steingell’s corps from Finland, which had landed at Revel on the 10th, entered Riga. It had sustained some losses by shipwreck, and part of the troops were detained by contrary winds, so that Steingell had with him only a little over 10,000 men and 18 guns. Nevertheless, the force in Riga was now over 20,000 strong, and an attempt could be made to execute the Tzar’s orders.
On the 26th accordingly Steingell with his own troops and a division under Lewis moved out upon Dahlenkirchen. It was easily occupied, and on the 27th Steingell advanced upon Eckau, where Yorck had collected several regiments. His superiority in artillery enabled him to hold Steingell in check until the arrival of Lewis, when he retired behind the Aa, abandoning Bausk.
While Steingell was pushing back Yorck, Essen directed a column of 2000 men and 6 guns upon Mitau from Riga, while a flotilla came up the Aa. Essen’s hope was to destroy the siege train, which, however, was not there. He ordered Steingell to support the advance with 3000 men and 6 guns, under Colonel Ekeln. On the 28th Yorck, being not yet joined by Hunerbein’s brigade (Grandjean’s division), ordered General Kleist to abandon Mitau and come to reinforce him. This Kleist did, and on the 29th the Russians occupied the place without opposition. But meanwhile Yorck, reinforced by Kleist and Hunerbein, took the offensive against Steingell’s weakened force and began to drive it back. There was some not very vigorous fighting along the Aa, as the result of which the Prussians gained a foothold on the farther bank.
Hunerbein, coming from the right, had retaken Bausk, and on the 30th Yorck made a general advance, driving Steingell back all along the line. The fighting was not at all severe, Steingell merely gave way deliberately before the advance of Yorck’s now superior columns. On the other hand, Yorck was probably not anxious to do more than his strict military duty required. Steingell retired towards Riga with no serious loss and re-entered the lines on the 2nd of October, Essen at the same time evacuating Mitau. The losses on neither side were heavy.
The result of the action was that Macdonald decided to come himself to the support of Yorck. Leaving a Polish regiment in Dünaburg he marched for Mitau with the rest of Grandjean’s division, but when he arrived the Russians had retreated into Riga. The Marshal increased Hunerbein’s brigade to 8 battalions, rearranged the positions of the troops, and sent Grandjean with one brigade back to Illuxt, near Dünaburg. To draw closer to Riga with his feeble forces was evidently impossible, and week after week wore itself away without any fighting except some occasional skirmishing at the outposts.
After his victory at Polotsk, on August 18th, St. Cyr had been unable to follow in pursuit of Wittgenstein owing to his weakness in cavalry fit for the purpose. Wittgenstein therefore was able to withdraw unmolested behind the Drissa. On the 22nd Wrede made a strong reconnaissance towards Sivokhino, but the Bavarians were repulsed by a detachment under Colonel Vlastov with a loss of about 300 killed and wounded and 150 prisoners.
Both sides now settled down into cantonments. Both had suffered very severely and neither was in a state to resume hostilities. Wittgenstein entrenched his position at Sivokhino, and his cavalry were able to circumscribe the French foraging operations on the right bank of the Düna. Wittgenstein also fortified his advanced base of Sebezh. Meanwhile, St. Cyr threw up entrenchmentsround Polotsk. The troops were distributed around the town, and, being largely in quarters or in barracks and tolerably well supplied, were soon in good condition. The effectives were increased by drafts and convalescents, but it is doubtful whether there was any great rise in the numbers owing to the diminution occasioned by constant petty skirmishing. The Bavarians were apparently unable to recover from the blighting effects of the sickness planted in their midst by their terrible hardships in July, and, though they were at rest and better supplied than they had hitherto been, their numbers continued to diminish. Maret and Hogendorp did their best to forward supplies from Vilna, but bread was often scarce and already, on October 7th, St. Cyr was writing to express his anxiety at the difficulty of procuring forage. The numerical strength of St. Cyr’s force by the middle of October appears to have been about 30,000 men—2nd Corps 21,000; Doumerc about 2200; 6th Corps perhaps 7000 or 8000.
Meanwhile, Marshal Victor, having crossed the Niemen on September 4th, reached Smolensk on the 27th. On October 6th Napoleon gave him his instructions. Besides his corps and the Saxon and Westphalian brigades of Löw and Coutard he was given control of Dombrowski’s division. He was informed that he was to act as the general reserve of theGrande Armée, and would move to support either Schwarzenberg, St. Cyr, or Napoleon, according to circumstances. Napoleon greatly underestimated the pressure on his flanks. He says in the despatch that Chichagov is only 20,000 strong, that his junction with Tormazov will only raise his force to 40,000, and that Schwarzenberg can easily deal with him. As a fact, both Schwarzenberg and St. Cyr were opposed by greatly superior numbers. Even when the former had been joined by his reinforcements he was still outnumbered by Chichagov, who might be further strengthened by Ertel from Mozyr. On the north Wittgenstein andSteingell had 50,000 men against St. Cyr’s 30,000. To afford adequate support to the wings Victor would have needed 80,000 men.
A few words must here be said upon the diplomatic situation. Prussia, trodden into the dust by Napoleon’s iron heel, was in the last stages of destitution, while Austria, though sorely humiliated, was still independent, far less wasted, and, in addition, was more or less afraid of a revival of Prussia. These circumstances are reflected in the despatches of the Prime Ministers, the Prussian, Hardenberg, being eager to take vigorous steps and inclined to believe in the rumours of French defeats; while Metternich is pessimistic and obviously playing for his own—or Austria’s—hand. He seems after the fall of Moscow to have considered that Napoleon might win, and accordingly a reinforcement of about 5000 men was despatched to Schwarzenberg. Otherwise there were signs that Napoleon’s vassals were beginning to falter at the never-ending drain of human life. Bavaria and Württemberg sent drafts to refill the wasted ranks of their contingents; but the King of Württemberg spoke of his uneasiness at receiving no news. The Grand Duke of Baden professed himself unable to add to his treaty contingent. In his growing anxiety Napoleon actually went to the length of politely asking the King of Prussia to replace two weakened cavalry regiments. He also directed that every reinforcement despatched was to be stated in all newspapers at double its strength, so as to impose upon the Russians should the tidings reach them!