“11 September:“In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.“The joint preparations for refutation (Wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.” (1780-PS)
“11 September:
“In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.
“The joint preparations for refutation (Wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.” (1780-PS)
This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by Section L, Jodl’s section of the OKW (C-2). Seven copies of this captured document were prepared and distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe, and the Foreign Office. In this study anticipated violations of International Law in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and counter-propaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda agencies. This document is presented in a tabular form, in which possible incidents are listed in the left-hand column. In the second column are given specific examples of the incidents; in the third and fourth columns the position to be taken toward these incidents under International Law and under the laws of warfare is set forth; the fifth column, which is blank, is reserved for the explanation to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. The first 10 hypothetical incidents, for which justification must be found, and which are listed in column b of the table are as follows:
“1a. In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed.“2. Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed;“3. The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.“4. On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.“5. Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.“6. Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions.“7. For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, foodstuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want.“8. Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.“9. Churches are used for military accommodation.“10. In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft.” (C-2)
“1a. In an air-raid on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed.
“2. Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed;
“3. The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.
“4. On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.
“5. Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.
“6. Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions.
“7. For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, foodstuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want.
“8. Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.
“9. Churches are used for military accommodation.
“10. In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft.” (C-2)
From Nurnberg, on 10 September, Hitler issued an order bringing theReichsarbeitsdienst, the German labor service, under the OKW. This top secret order, of which 25 copies were made, provides as follows:
“1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.“2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.“3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.“(signed) ADOLF HITLER.”(388-PS, Item 20)
“1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.
“2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.
“3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.
“(signed) ADOLF HITLER.”
(388-PS, Item 20)
Four days later, on 14 September, Keitel issued detailed instructions for the employment of specific RAD units. This order isItem 21in the Schmundt file. A further order issued by Jodl on 16 September specified RAD units which would receive military training. This isItem 24in the Schmundt file. (388-PS)
Two entries in Jodl’s diary give further indications of the problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September, just two weeks before the anticipated X-day. The entries for 15 and 16 September read as follows:
“15 September:“In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.“16 September:“General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or 22nd in Godesberg.“With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in theevening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the VGAD along the Czech border.“In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September.” (1780-PS)
“15 September:
“In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.
“16 September:
“General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or 22nd in Godesberg.
“With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in theevening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the VGAD along the Czech border.
“In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September.” (1780-PS)
The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available which General Jodl referred to appears asItem 22in the Schmundt file. In this order Keitel told the railroads to be ready by 28 September but to continue work on the western fortifications even after 20 September in the interest of camouflage. The first and fourth paragraphs of this order provide:
“The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.”* * * * * *“However, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20 September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work of the Lines.” (388-PS, Item 22)
“The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.”
* * * * * *
“However, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20 September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work of the Lines.” (388-PS, Item 22)
The penultimate stage of the aggression began on 18 September. From that day until the 28th a series of orders were issued advancing preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt file (388-PS). On the 18th the commitment schedule for the five participating armies—the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th—was set forth (388-PS, Item 26). Hitler approved the secret mobilization of five divisions in the west to protect the German rear during Case Green (388-PS, Item 31). Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe about the time of day for the attack. Conference notes initialed by Jodl and dated 27 September reveal the difference in views. These notes areItem 54in the Schmundt file. The first three paragraphs read:
“COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY.“As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.“The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615. It also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.“Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions.These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.” (388-PS, Item 54)
“COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY.
“As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.
“The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615. It also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.
“Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions.These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.” (388-PS, Item 54)
A satisfactory solution appears to have been arrived at. The last two paragraphs read:
“Thus it is proposed:“Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.“The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.(J)” (388-PS, Item 54)
“Thus it is proposed:
“Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.
“The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.
(J)” (388-PS, Item 54)
On the same day, 27 September, Keitel sent a most secret memorandum to Hess and the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This memorandum isItem 32in the Schmundt file. It directs the Party officials and organizations to comply with the demands of the Army during the secret mobilization in such matters as turning over equipment and facilities. The first four paragraphs of this message read:
“As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.“Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.“The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.“OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.” (388-PS, Item 32)
“As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words.
“Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.
“The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.
“OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan.” (388-PS, Item 32)
Two additional entries from Jodl’s diary reveal the extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried forward their preparations for attack even during the period of the negotiations whichculminated in the Munich Agreement. The entries for 26 and 27 September read:
“26 September:“Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.“In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions. “Question by Foreign office whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.“1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.“It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.“A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.“The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commander in chief who is to have priority.“The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.“2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportspalast.“27 September:“1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.” (1780-PS)
“26 September:
“Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.
“In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions. “Question by Foreign office whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.
“1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.
“It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.
“A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.
“The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commander in chief who is to have priority.
“The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.
“2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportspalast.
“27 September:
“1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.” (1780-PS)
The order referred to by General Jodl in the last entry was also recorded by the faithful Schmundt. It appears asItem 33of the file. It is the order which brought the Nazi armies to the jumping-off point for unprovoked aggression:
“MOST SECRET“MEMORANDUM“At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.“The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against ‘Gruen’ on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.” (388-PS, Item 33)
“MOST SECRET
“MEMORANDUM
“At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points.
“The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions,) must be ready to begin the action against ‘Gruen’ on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.” (388-PS, Item 33)
There follows a pencil note by Schmundt:
“This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt.” (388-PS, Item 33)
“This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt.” (388-PS, Item 33)
H.The Campaign Within Czechoslovakia.
The military preparations for aggression against Czechoslovakia had not been carried out in vacuo. They had been preceded by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to promote civil disobedience to the Czechoslovak State. Using the techniques they had already developed in other ventures, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years used money, propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia. In this program the Nazis focussed their attention on the persons of German descent living in the Sudetenland, a mountainous area bounding Bohemia and Moravia on the north, west, and south.
The Czechoslovak government’s official report for the prosecution and trial of German major war criminals, entitled “German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia,” shows the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue. (998-PS;3061-PS)
Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of the NSDAP. In the years following the First World War a German National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained close contact with Hitler’s NSDAP, was active in the Sudetenland. In 1932, ring-leaders of theSudeten Volksport, an organization corresponding to the Nazi SA, openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler’s program, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a Greater Germany. Soon thereafter they were charged with planning armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced for conspiracy against the Czech Republic. Late in 1933 the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation, and several of its chiefs escaped across the frontier. For a year thereafter Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground. (998-PS;3061-PS)
On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of theNazi conspirators, Konrad Henlein, an instructor of gymnastics, established the “German Home Front” (Deutsche Heimatfront), which the following spring became the Sudeten German Party (Sudeten-deutsche Partei—SDP). Profiting from the experience of the Czech National Socialist Party, Henlein denied any connection with the German Nazis. He rejected pan-Germanism, and professed his respect for individual liberties and his loyalty to “honest democracy” and to the Czech state. His party, none-the-less, was built on the basis of the NaziFuehrerprinzip, and he became its Fuehrer. By 1937, when the power of Hitler’s Germany had become manifest, Henlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive note, demanding, without definition, “complete Sudeten autonomy“. The SDP laid proposals before the Czech Parliament which would, in substance, have created a state within a state. (998-PS;3061-PS)
After the annexation of Austria in March 1938 the Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model, intensified their activity. Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda started in the Henlein press; the campaign against “bolshevism” was intensified; terrorism in the Henlein-dominated communities increased. A storm troop organization, patterned and trained on the principles of the Nazi SS, was established, known as the FS (Freiwilliger Selbstschutz, or Voluntary Vigilantes). On 24 April 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy Vary, Henlein came into the open with his “Karlsbad Program”. In this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted the right of the Sudeten-Germans to profess “German political philosophy”, which, it was clear, meant National Socialism. (998-PS;3061-PS)
As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every technique of the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in the Czech official report, these included:
(1)Espionage.Military espionage was conducted by the SDP, the FS, and by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech defenses were mapped, and information on Czech troop movements was furnished to the German authorities.
(2)Nazification of German Organizations in Czechoslovakia.The Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social and cultural centers gradually underwent “Gleichschaltung”, i.e., “purification”, by the SDP. Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were sport societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men, and choral societies. The Henleinistswere particularly interested in penetrating as many business institutions as possible and in bringing over to their side the directors of banks, the owners or directors of factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish ownership or direction they attempted to secure the cooperation of the clerical and technical staffs of the institution.
(3)German Direction and Leadership.The Henleinists maintained permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany at which Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity were camouflaged by being held in conjunction withSaenger Feste(choral festivals), gymnastic shows and assemblies, and commercial gatherings such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty of the Henleinists to supply them.
(4)Propaganda.Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press. Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a “nest of Bolshevism” and spread the false report of “Russian troops and airplanes” centered in Prague. Under direction from the Reich the Henleinists maintained whispering propaganda in the Sudetenland, which contributed to the mounting tension and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein press more or less openly espoused Nazi ideology to the German population.
(5)Murder and Terrorism.The Nazi conspirators provided the Henleinists, and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to provoke incidents and to maintain a state of permanent unrest. Gendarmes, customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A boycott was established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen. The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population, and the Nazi Gestapo crossed into border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens across the border to Germany. In several cases political foes of the Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor Theodor Lessing in 1933 and the engineer Formis in 1935. Both men were anti-Nazis who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. (998-PS;3061-PS)
Some time afterwards, when there was no longer need for pretense and deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank statement of the mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. This statement was made in a lecture by Konrad Henleinquoted on page 29 of “Four Fighting Years”, a publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this lecture, delivered by Henlein on 4 March 1941 in the Auditorium of the University of Vienna under the auspices of theWiener Verwaltungsakadamie, he discussed the “fight for the liberation of the Sudetens” in the following terms:
“National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten-Germans. Our struggle was of a different character from that in Germany. Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Fuehrer, whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the leader of the national group in its final struggle. When * * * in autumn, 1933, the leaders of the NSDAP asked me to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten-Germans, I had a difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten-Germans and in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to the outside world? For us Sudeten-Germans only the second alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the alliance against the German Reich.” (2863-PS)
“National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten-Germans. Our struggle was of a different character from that in Germany. Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Fuehrer, whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the leader of the national group in its final struggle. When * * * in autumn, 1933, the leaders of the NSDAP asked me to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten-Germans, I had a difficult problem to solve. Should the National Socialist Party continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten-Germans and in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to the outside world? For us Sudeten-Germans only the second alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the alliance against the German Reich.” (2863-PS)
I.Evidence Implicating Nazi Conspirators in Czechoslovak Agitation.
The foregoing account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia is the outline of this conspiracy as it had been pieced together by the Czechoslovak government early in the summer of 1945. Since then captured documents and other information made available since the defeat of Germany have clearly and conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto could only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the Sudetenland agitation.
A telegram sent from the German Legation in Prague on 16 March 1938 to the Foreign Office in Berlin, presumably written by the German Minister, Eisenlohr, proves conclusively that the Henlein movement was an instrument of the Nazi conspirators (3060-PS). The Henlein party, it appears from this telegram, was directed from Berlin and from the German Legation in Prague. It could have no policy of its own; even the speeches of its leaders had to be coordinated with the German authorities. This telegram reads as follows:
“Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with Frank separately and received following promises;“1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied with implicitly.“2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly with my approval. The editorial staff of “Zeit” (Time) is to be improved.“3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten-German interests. The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and ‘territorial autonomy’ are no longer to be stressed.“4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or desired before Henlein issues important statements on his program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the Mission.“5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.“6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will come to Prague at any time if requested.“I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) and request them to support this uniform direction of the Sudeten German Party.” (3060-PS)
“Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with Frank separately and received following promises;
“1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied with implicitly.
“2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly with my approval. The editorial staff of “Zeit” (Time) is to be improved.
“3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten-German interests. The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and ‘territorial autonomy’ are no longer to be stressed.
“4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or desired before Henlein issues important statements on his program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the Mission.
“5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.
“6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and will come to Prague at any time if requested.
“I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) and request them to support this uniform direction of the Sudeten German Party.” (3060-PS)
The dressing-down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had the desired effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Henlein addressed a humble letter to Ribbentrop, asking an early personal conversation (2789-PS). This letter,dated 17 March 1938, and captured in the German Foreign Office files, states:
“Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:“In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our Fuehrer.“I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten-Germans herewith.“We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.“The new situation requires a reexamination of the Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk.“In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for 4 weeks.“I would appreciate if the Minister, Dr. Eisenlohr, and one of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the requested talks.“Heil Hitler,“Loyally yours,“/s/ Konrad Henlein.”(2789-PS)
“Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:
“In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our Fuehrer.
“I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten-Germans herewith.
“We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.
“The new situation requires a reexamination of the Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk.
“In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for 4 weeks.
“I would appreciate if the Minister, Dr. Eisenlohr, and one of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the requested talks.
“Heil Hitler,
“Loyally yours,
“/s/ Konrad Henlein.”
(2789-PS)
This letter makes it clear that Henlein was quite aware that the seizure of Austria made possible the adoption of a new policy toward Czechoslovakia. It also reveals that he was already in close enough contact with Ribbentrop and the German minister in Prague to feel free to suggest “early personal” talks.
Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein’s suggestion. The conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office in Berlin on 29 March 1938. The previous day Henlein had conferred with Hitler himself. The captured German Foreign Office notes of the conference on 29 March read as follows:
“The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret; he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday afternoon that there were two questions which were of outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten German Party * * *”* * * * * *“The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten German party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extension and gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung). The Reich Cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the Government in Prague or toward London and Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the Sudeten-Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, would maintain quiet and discipline, and would avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in this connection were satisfactory.“Following these general explanations of the Reich Minister the demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak Government as contained in the enclosure were discussed and approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the Reichminister and the Head of the Central Office for Racial Germans (mit dem Leiter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle), as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German Minister in Prague would be to support the demands of the Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians without exerting any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party.“In conclusion there was a discussion whether it would be useful if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear appropriate.“Berlin, 29 March 1938.“R [Initial]”(2788-PS)
“The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret; he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday afternoon that there were two questions which were of outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten German Party * * *”
* * * * * *
“The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten German party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extension and gradual specification of the demands to be made. It must be emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the Sudeten German Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung). The Reich Cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the Government in Prague or toward London and Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the Sudeten-Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, would maintain quiet and discipline, and would avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in this connection were satisfactory.
“Following these general explanations of the Reich Minister the demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak Government as contained in the enclosure were discussed and approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the Reichminister and the Head of the Central Office for Racial Germans (mit dem Leiter der Volksdeutschen Mittelstelle), as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local representative of the Foreign Minister. The task of the German Minister in Prague would be to support the demands of the Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians without exerting any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the Party.
“In conclusion there was a discussion whether it would be useful if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The Foreign Minister decided that the Party should have the discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear appropriate.
“Berlin, 29 March 1938.
“R [Initial]”
(2788-PS)
Not the least interesting aspect of this secret meeting is the list of those who attended. Konrad Henlein, his principal deputy, Karl Hermann Frank, and two others represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor Haushofer and SS ObergruppenfuehrerLorenz represented theVolksdeutsche Mittelstelle, the Central Office for Racial Germans. The Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of eight. These eight included Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting and did most of the talking, von Mackensen, Weiszacker, and Minister Eisenlohr from the German Legation at Prague. (2788-PS)
In May Henlein came to Berlin for more conversations with the Nazi conspirators. At this time the plans for Case Green, the attack on Czechoslovakia, were already on paper, and it may be assumed that Henlein was briefed on the role he was to play during the summer months. The entry for 22 May 1938 in General Jodl’s diary reads as follows:
“22 May: Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein” (see enclosure). (1780-PS)
“22 May: Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein” (see enclosure). (1780-PS)
The enclosure, unfortunately, is missing.
It will be recalled that in his speech in Vienna, Henlein had admitted that he had been selected by the Nazi conspirators in the fall of 1933 to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans (2863-PS). The foregoing documents show conclusively the nature of Henlein’s mission. They demonstrate that Henlein’s policy, his propaganda, even his speeches were controlled by Berlin. Furthermore, from the year 1935 the Sudeten German Party had been secretly subsidized by the German Foreign Office. A secret memorandum, captured in the German Foreign Office files, signed by Woermann and dated Berlin, 19 August 1938, was occasioned by the request of the Henlein Party for additional funds. This memorandum reads:
“MEMORANDUM“The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of a monthly payment of 15,000 Marks; 12,000 Marks of this are transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement, and 3000 Marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the party (Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially because due to the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including the financing of travels of Sudeten-German deputies and agents) have grown considerably heavier. Under these conditions theBureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of 3000 Marks if it is to do everything required. Therefore, Mr. Buerger has applied to this office for an increase of this amount, from 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly. In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the Foreign Office, this desire deserves the strongest support.“Herewith submitted to the Dep: Pers(onnel) with a request for approval. It is requested to increase the payments with retroactive effect from 1 August.*“Berlin, 19 August 1938/s/ Woermann*“Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle(Central Office for Racial Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept. [handwritten marginal note].” (3059-PS;also 3061-PS)
“MEMORANDUM
“The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of a monthly payment of 15,000 Marks; 12,000 Marks of this are transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement, and 3000 Marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the party (Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially because due to the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for trips to Prague, London, and Paris (including the financing of travels of Sudeten-German deputies and agents) have grown considerably heavier. Under these conditions theBureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of 3000 Marks if it is to do everything required. Therefore, Mr. Buerger has applied to this office for an increase of this amount, from 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly. In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the Foreign Office, this desire deserves the strongest support.
“Herewith submitted to the Dep: Pers(onnel) with a request for approval. It is requested to increase the payments with retroactive effect from 1 August.*
“Berlin, 19 August 1938
/s/ Woermann
*“Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle(Central Office for Racial Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept. [handwritten marginal note].” (3059-PS;also 3061-PS)
As the military preparations to attack Czechoslovakia moved forward in the late summer and early fall of 1938, the Nazi command made good use of Henlein and his followers. About the first of August the Air Attache at the German Legation in Prague, Major Moericke, acting on instructions from Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten-German leader in Freudenthal. With his assistance, and in the company of the local leader of the FS (the Henlein equivalent of the SS), he reconnoitered the surrounding countryside to select possible airfield sites for German use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform of the Czech army—a fact which, the attache noted, served as excellent camouflage.
The Air Attache’s report reads in part as follows:
“The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten-German Glider Pilots in Freudenthal and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted men. My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.“At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.’s private car for the trip.“As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with this—without actually saying so.“As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said ‘Aha, so you’re looking for airfields!’ I answered that we supposed that, in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications and that I had the intention of looking over the country from that point of view.” (1536-PS)
“The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten-German Glider Pilots in Freudenthal and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted men. My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.
“At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.’s private car for the trip.
“As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage I was entirely in agreement with this—without actually saying so.
“As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said ‘Aha, so you’re looking for airfields!’ I answered that we supposed that, in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications and that I had the intention of looking over the country from that point of view.” (1536-PS)
In the latter part of the Air Attache’s report reference is made to the presence of reliable agents and informers (V-Leute) apparently drawn from the ranks of the Henlein Party in this area. It was indicated that these agents were in touch with theAbwehrstelle, the intelligence office in Breslau. (1536-PS)
In September, when the propaganda campaign was reaching its height, the Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on the Sudeten demands for autonomy. They attempted to use the Slovaks as well. On 19 September the Foreign Office in Berlin sent the following telegram to the German Legation in Prague:
“Please inform deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their demands for autonomy tomorrow.“(signed) ALTENBURG”(2858-PS)
“Please inform deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their demands for autonomy tomorrow.
“(signed) ALTENBURG”
(2858-PS)
Kundt was Henlein’s representative in Prague.
As the harassed Czech government sought to stem the disorder in the Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to threatening diplomatic tactics in a deliberate effort to increase the tension between the two countries. Four telegrams from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the Legation in Prague, dispatched between the 16th and 24th of September 1938, are self-explanatory. The first telegram is dated 16 September:
“Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of Sudeten-Germans since the Fuehrer’s speech of 12 September. I request you to ascertain the number of Sudeten-Germans arrested since 12 September as extensively as possible. The number of those arrested there is estimated conservatively at 400 by the Gestapo. Cable report.“Woermann.”(2855-PS)
“Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of Sudeten-Germans since the Fuehrer’s speech of 12 September. I request you to ascertain the number of Sudeten-Germans arrested since 12 September as extensively as possible. The number of those arrested there is estimated conservatively at 400 by the Gestapo. Cable report.
“Woermann.”
(2855-PS)
The second telegram is dated 17 September. The first two paragraphs read:
“I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the following:“The Reich Government has decided that:“(a) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent,Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as Sudeten-Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning of the week.“(b) If any Sudeten-Germans should be executed pursuant to a death sentence on the basis of martial law, an equal number of Czechs will be shot in Germany.” (2854-PS)
“I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the following:
“The Reich Government has decided that:
“(a) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent,Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany as Sudeten-Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the beginning of the week.
“(b) If any Sudeten-Germans should be executed pursuant to a death sentence on the basis of martial law, an equal number of Czechs will be shot in Germany.” (2854-PS)
The third telegram was sent on 24 September:
“According to information received here Czechs have arrested 2 German frontier-policemen, seven customs-officials and 30 railway-officials. As countermeasure all the Czech staff in Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please approach Government there and wire result.“(signed) WOERMANN”(2853-PS)
“According to information received here Czechs have arrested 2 German frontier-policemen, seven customs-officials and 30 railway-officials. As countermeasure all the Czech staff in Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please approach Government there and wire result.
“(signed) WOERMANN”
(2853-PS)
On the same day the fourth telegram was dispatched. The last paragraph read:
“Confidential:“Yielding of the Czech hostages arrested here for the prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by military courts against Sudeten-Germans is, of course, out of question.“WOERMANN”(2856-PS)
“Confidential:
“Yielding of the Czech hostages arrested here for the prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by military courts against Sudeten-Germans is, of course, out of question.
“WOERMANN”
(2856-PS)
In the latter half of September Henlein devoted himself and his followers wholeheartedly to preparation for the coming German attack. About 15 September, after Hitler’s provocative Nurnberg speech in which he accused “this Benes” of “torturing” and planning the “extermination” of the Sudeten-Germans, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, one of his principal deputies, fled to Germany to avoid arrest by the Czech government. In Germany Henlein broadcast over the powerfulReichssenderradio station his determination to lead the Sudeten-Germans “home to the Reich” and denounced “the Hussite Bolshevik criminals of Prague”. From his headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, outside Bayreuth, he kept in close touch with the leading Nazi conspirators, including Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along the border and began the organization of the Sudeten German Free Corps, an auxiliary military organization. These events are set forth in the Czechoslovak official report. (998-PS;3061-PS)
Henlein’s activities were carried on with the advice and assistance of the Nazi leaders. Lt. Col. Koechling was assigned to Henleinin an advisory capacity to assist with the Sudeten German Free Corps. In a conference with Hitler on the night of 17 September Koechling received far-reaching military powers. At this conference the purpose of the Free Corps was frankly stated: the “maintenance of disorder and clashes”.Item 25, of the Schmundt file (388-PS), a telegram labeled Most Secret reads as follows:
“Last night conference took place between Fuehrer and Oberstleutnant Koechling. Duration of conference 7 minutes. Lt. Col. Koechling remains directly responsible to OKW. He will be assigned to Konrad Henlein in an advisory capacity. He received far-reaching military plenary powers from the Fuehrer. The Sudeten German Free Corps remains responsible to Konrad Henlein alone. Purpose: Protection of the Sudeten-Germans and maintenance of disturbances and clashes. The Free Corps will be established in Germany. Armament only with Austrian weapons. Activities of Free Corps to begin as soon as possible.” (388-PS, Item 25)
“Last night conference took place between Fuehrer and Oberstleutnant Koechling. Duration of conference 7 minutes. Lt. Col. Koechling remains directly responsible to OKW. He will be assigned to Konrad Henlein in an advisory capacity. He received far-reaching military plenary powers from the Fuehrer. The Sudeten German Free Corps remains responsible to Konrad Henlein alone. Purpose: Protection of the Sudeten-Germans and maintenance of disturbances and clashes. The Free Corps will be established in Germany. Armament only with Austrian weapons. Activities of Free Corps to begin as soon as possible.” (388-PS, Item 25)
General Jodl’s diary gives a further insight into the position of the Henlein Free Corps. At this time the Free Corps was engaged in active skirmishing along the Czech border, furnishing incidents and provocation in the desired manner. Jodl’s entries for 19 and 20 September 1938 state:
“19 September:“Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.“20 September:“England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border.) By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.“Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.” (1780-PS)
“19 September:
“Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.
“20 September:
“England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border.) By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.
“Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.” (1780-PS)
A report from Henlein’s staff, which was filed in Hitler’s headquarters, boasted of the offensive operations of the Free Corps in the following terms: