“Since 19 Sept.—in more than 300 missions—the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit ofattackand with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualifiedself-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities: more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG’s and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and wounded suffered by theenemy.” (388-PS, Item 30)
“Since 19 Sept.—in more than 300 missions—the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit ofattackand with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualifiedself-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities: more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG’s and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and wounded suffered by theenemy.” (388-PS, Item 30)
In this document the word “attack” was subsequently crossed out, and the word “defense” substituted. Similarly “the enemy” was changed to read “the Czech terrorists”.
In his headquarters in the castle at Dondorf, Henlein was in close touch with Admiral Canaris of the Intelligence Division of the OKW and with the SS and SA. The liaison officer between the SS and Henlein was Oberfuehrer Gottlob Berger, who in later years became prominent in the SS command. An affidavit executed by Berger reads as follows:
“I, GOTTLOB BERGER, under oath and being previously sworn, make the following statement:“1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of Oberfuehrer in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS Liaison Officer with Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Free Corps at their headquarters in the castle of Dondorf outside Bayreuth. In this position I was responsible for all liaison between the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was delegated to select from the Sudeten-Germans those who appeared to be eligible for membership in the SS or VT (Verfuegungs Truppe). In addition to myself, Liaison Officers stationed with Henlein included an Obergruppenfuehrer from the NSKK, whose name I have forgotten, and Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner, from the SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of the OKWAbwehr, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two days and conferred with Henlein.“2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein’s headquarters I became familiar with the composition and activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed under Henlein’s direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria; one in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area; and possibly a fourth group in Silesia. These groups were supposedly composed of refugees from the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into Germany, but they actually contained Germans with previous service in the SA and NSKK (Nazi Motor Corps) as well. These Germans formed the skeleton of the Free Corps. On paper the Free Corps had a strength of 40,000 men. I do not know its actual strength, but I believe it to be considerably smaller than the paperfigure. The Corps was armed with Manlicher-Schoenauer rifles from Army depots in Austria. It was my understanding that about 18,000 rifles were issued to men under Henlein’s command. In addition, small numbers of machine guns[1], hand grenades, and 2 captured antitank guns were placed at Henlein’s disposal. Part of the equipment furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks, cooking utensils, and blankets, were supplied by the SA.“3. In the days preceding the conclusion of the four-power pact at Munich I heard of numerous occasions on which the Henlein Free Corps was engaged in skirmishes with Czech patrols along the border of the Sudetenland. These operations were under the direction of Henlein, who went forward from his Headquarters repeatedly in order to take direct command of his men.“The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same.“(Signed) Gottlob Berger”(3036-PS)
“I, GOTTLOB BERGER, under oath and being previously sworn, make the following statement:
“1. In the fall of 1938 I held the rank and title of Oberfuehrer in the SS. In mid-September I was assigned as SS Liaison Officer with Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Free Corps at their headquarters in the castle of Dondorf outside Bayreuth. In this position I was responsible for all liaison between the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Henlein and, in particular, I was delegated to select from the Sudeten-Germans those who appeared to be eligible for membership in the SS or VT (Verfuegungs Truppe). In addition to myself, Liaison Officers stationed with Henlein included an Obergruppenfuehrer from the NSKK, whose name I have forgotten, and Obergruppenfuehrer Max Juettner, from the SA. In addition, Admiral Canaris, who was head of the OKWAbwehr, appeared at Dondorf nearly every two days and conferred with Henlein.
“2. In the course of my official duties at Henlein’s headquarters I became familiar with the composition and activities of the Free Corps. Three groups were being formed under Henlein’s direction: One in the Eisenstein area, Bavaria; one in the Bayreuth area; one in the Dresden area; and possibly a fourth group in Silesia. These groups were supposedly composed of refugees from the Sudetenland who had crossed the border into Germany, but they actually contained Germans with previous service in the SA and NSKK (Nazi Motor Corps) as well. These Germans formed the skeleton of the Free Corps. On paper the Free Corps had a strength of 40,000 men. I do not know its actual strength, but I believe it to be considerably smaller than the paperfigure. The Corps was armed with Manlicher-Schoenauer rifles from Army depots in Austria. It was my understanding that about 18,000 rifles were issued to men under Henlein’s command. In addition, small numbers of machine guns[1], hand grenades, and 2 captured antitank guns were placed at Henlein’s disposal. Part of the equipment furnished to Henlein, mostly haversacks, cooking utensils, and blankets, were supplied by the SA.
“3. In the days preceding the conclusion of the four-power pact at Munich I heard of numerous occasions on which the Henlein Free Corps was engaged in skirmishes with Czech patrols along the border of the Sudetenland. These operations were under the direction of Henlein, who went forward from his Headquarters repeatedly in order to take direct command of his men.
“The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same.
“(Signed) Gottlob Berger”
(3036-PS)
[1]“(Rifles and machine guns were of doubtful serviceability due to inferior ammunition).”
[1]
“(Rifles and machine guns were of doubtful serviceability due to inferior ammunition).”
Henlein and his Free Corps were also acting in collaboration with the SD, (Sicherheitsdienst) Himmler’s intelligence organization. An affidavit executed by Alfred Helmut Naujocks, a member of the SD, reads as follows:
“I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:“1. In September 1938 I was working in Amt III of the SD. (The department which was then called Amt III later became Amt VI). In the course of my work I traveled between Berlin, Hof and Munich.“2. While in Hof, which is on the Czech border, I paid repeated visits to the SD Service Department, that is, Intelligence Office, which has been established there. This Service Department had the task of collecting all political intelligence emanating from the Czechoslovak border districts and passing it on to Berlin. Continuous day and night teleprinter communications had been established from Hof direct to Amt III of the SD in Berlin. To the best of my recollection the head of the Hof office was Daufeldt. The head of Amt III in Berlin at this time was Jost and his assistant was Filbert.“3. The bulk of the intelligence we collected came from Henlein Free Corps, which had its headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, outside Bayreuth; the distance between Hof and Bayreuth is not very great, and we had daily access to all intelligence received by the Free Corps. There was a continuous liaison maintained with Czech territory by runners. Exploitation of this Intelligence was carried out every day in Berlin and was placed before Heydrich and Himmler.“4. I remember that the Free Corps made continuous complaints that they had not received sufficient supply of arms. Negotiations by letter and teleprint message went on for a number of days with Berlin until it became quite a nuisance. After that arms were supplied from the army, but I believe it was only a small quantity.“5. Hof was the center for all intelligence collected by the SD on the Czechoslovak question. The SD had agents all along the border in every town. The names of these agents were reported to Hof, and two motor cars toured the border every day to collect the intelligence which had been unearthed. In addition, I remember that two or three companies of the SS-Totenkopf units were stationed in the neighborhood of Asch.“The facts stated above are true: this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same at Nurnberg, Germany this 20th day of November 1945.“(signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks.”(3029-PS)
“I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
“1. In September 1938 I was working in Amt III of the SD. (The department which was then called Amt III later became Amt VI). In the course of my work I traveled between Berlin, Hof and Munich.
“2. While in Hof, which is on the Czech border, I paid repeated visits to the SD Service Department, that is, Intelligence Office, which has been established there. This Service Department had the task of collecting all political intelligence emanating from the Czechoslovak border districts and passing it on to Berlin. Continuous day and night teleprinter communications had been established from Hof direct to Amt III of the SD in Berlin. To the best of my recollection the head of the Hof office was Daufeldt. The head of Amt III in Berlin at this time was Jost and his assistant was Filbert.
“3. The bulk of the intelligence we collected came from Henlein Free Corps, which had its headquarters in a castle at Dondorf, outside Bayreuth; the distance between Hof and Bayreuth is not very great, and we had daily access to all intelligence received by the Free Corps. There was a continuous liaison maintained with Czech territory by runners. Exploitation of this Intelligence was carried out every day in Berlin and was placed before Heydrich and Himmler.
“4. I remember that the Free Corps made continuous complaints that they had not received sufficient supply of arms. Negotiations by letter and teleprint message went on for a number of days with Berlin until it became quite a nuisance. After that arms were supplied from the army, but I believe it was only a small quantity.
“5. Hof was the center for all intelligence collected by the SD on the Czechoslovak question. The SD had agents all along the border in every town. The names of these agents were reported to Hof, and two motor cars toured the border every day to collect the intelligence which had been unearthed. In addition, I remember that two or three companies of the SS-Totenkopf units were stationed in the neighborhood of Asch.
“The facts stated above are true: this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over this statement I have signed and executed the same at Nurnberg, Germany this 20th day of November 1945.
“(signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks.”
(3029-PS)
Offensive operations along the Czechoslovak border were not confined to skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two SSTotenkopfbattalions were operating across the border in Czech territory near Asch.Item 36in the Schmundt file (388-PS), an OKW most secret order signed by Jodl and dated 28 September, states:
“Those SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch Promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Czech frontier.” (388-PS, Item 36)
“Those SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch Promontory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Czech frontier.” (388-PS, Item 36)
According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl’s diary these SS Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on direct orders from Hitler. (1780-PS)
As the time for X-day approached, the disposition of the Free Corps became a matter of dispute. On 26 September Himmlerissued an order to the Chief of Staff of the Sudeten German Free Corps directing that the Free Corps come under control of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the event of German invasion of Czechoslovakia (388-PS, Item 37). On 28 September Keitel directed that as soon as the German Army crosses the Czech border the Free Corps will take orders from the OKH. In this most secret order of the OKW Keitel discloses that Henlein’s men are already operating in Czechoslovak territory:
“For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuehrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.“Those units remaining forward of the frontier should—in their own interests—get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.“As soon as the army crosses the Czech border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.” (388-PS, Item 34)
“For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuehrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.
“Those units remaining forward of the frontier should—in their own interests—get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.
“As soon as the army crosses the Czech border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later.” (388-PS, Item 34)
On 30 September, when it became clear that the Munich settlement would result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, Keitel ordered that the Free Corps Henlein in its present composition be placed under command of Himmler:
“1.Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:“The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police.“It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (388-PS, Item 38)
“1.Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:
“The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police.
“It is therefore at the immediate disposal of OKH as field unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (388-PS, Item 38)
J.Occupation of the Sudetenland under the Terms of the Munich Agreement.
Under the threat of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact about to be launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded a pact with Germany and Italy at Munich on the night of 29 September 1938. This treaty provided for the cession of theSudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce. (TC-23)
On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the Sudetenland.
During the conclusion of the Munich Pact theWehrmachthad been fully deployed for attack, awaiting only the word of Hitler to begin the assault. With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued. On 30 September Keitel promulgated Directive #1 on “Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia” (388-PS, Item 39). This directive contained a timetable for the occupation of sectors of former Czech territory between 1 and 10 October and specified the tasks of the German armed forces. The fourth and fifth paragraphs provided:
“2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:“The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over. “The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation ‘Gruen’.” (388-PS, Item 39)
“2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks:
“The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West. Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over. “The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation ‘Gruen’.” (388-PS, Item 39)
It contained one further provision about the Henlein forces:
“Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.” (388-PS, Item 39)
“Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October.” (388-PS, Item 39)
The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW directives giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland and showing the scope of the preparations of the OKW. Directives specifying the occupational area of the army and the units under its command; arranging for communications facilities, exchange facilities, supply, and propaganda; and giving instructions to the civil departments of the government were issued over Keitel’s signature on 30 September (388-PS, Items 40, 41, 42). By 10 October von Brauchitsch was able to report to Hitler that German troops had reached the demarcation line and that the order for the occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The OKW requested Hitler’s permission to rescind Case Green, to withdraw troops from the occupied area and to relieve the OKH of executive powers in the Sudeten-German area as of 15 October. (388-PS, Items 46, 47, 49)
On 18 October, in a formal letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch, Hitler announced that the civil authorities would take over responsibility for the Sudeten-German territory on 21 October and that the OKH would be relieved of executive powers as of that date (388-PS, Item 51). On the same date additional demobilization of the forces in theSudetenland was ordered by Hitler and Keitel. Three days later the OKW requested Hitler’s consent to the reversion of the RAD from the control of the armed forces. (388-PS, Items 52, 53)
As the German forces entered the Sudetenland Henlein’sSudetendeutsche Parteiwas merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The two men who had fled to Hitler’s protection in mid-September, Henlein and Karl Hermann Frank, were appointed Gauleiter and Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of theSudetengau. In the parts of the Czechoslovak Republic that were still free theSudetendeutsche Parteiconstituted itself as theNational-Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in der Tschechoslovakei(NSDAP in Czechoslovakia) under the direction of Kundt, another of Henlein’s deputies. These events are set forth in the Czechoslovak official report. (998-PS;3061-PS)
The stage was now prepared for the next move of the Nazi conspirators.
K.Planning for the Conquest of the Remainder of Czechoslovakia.
With the occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion of the German-speaking Czechs within the Greater Reich it might have been expected that the Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus far in the Nazi program of aggression the conspirators had used as a pretext for their conquests the union of theVolksdeutsche, the people of German descent, with the Reich. Now, after Munich, substantially all theVolksdeutschein Czechoslovakia had been returned to German rule. On 26 September, at the Sportspalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke these words:
“And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be solved and which will be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve, and which I will satisfy, God willing.”* * * * * *“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience.“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities peacefully and withoutoppression, I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And that as far as I am concerned I will guarantee. We don’t want any Czechs at all.” (2358-PS)
“And now we are confronted with the last problem which must be solved and which will be solved. It is the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve, and which I will satisfy, God willing.”
* * * * * *
“I have little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience.
“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their other minorities peacefully and withoutoppression, I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And that as far as I am concerned I will guarantee. We don’t want any Czechs at all.” (2358-PS)
Yet no more than two weeks later Hitler and Keitel were preparing estimates of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak resistance in Bohemia and Moravia.Item 48of the Schmundt file is a top secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler’s headquarters on 11 October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had propounded to the OKW. These were the questions:
“Question 1: What reinforcements are necessary in the present situation to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?“Question 2: How much time is required for the regrouping or moving up of new forces?“Question 3: How much time will be required for the same purpose if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return measures?“Question 4: How much time would be required to achieve the state of readiness of October 1st?” (388-PS, Item 48)
“Question 1: What reinforcements are necessary in the present situation to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia?
“Question 2: How much time is required for the regrouping or moving up of new forces?
“Question 3: How much time will be required for the same purpose if it is executed after the intended demobilization and return measures?
“Question 4: How much time would be required to achieve the state of readiness of October 1st?” (388-PS, Item 48)
Whereupon, in the same telegram, Keitel reported to Hitler the considered answers of the OKH and the Luftwaffe.
On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia was signed by Hitler and initialed by Keitel. In this Top Secret Order, of which 10 copies were made, the Nazi conspirators, only three weeks after the winning of the Sudetenland, were already looking forward to new conquests:
“The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later Directive.“Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities:“1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.“2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.“3. The occupation of the Memelland.”* * * * * *“It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.“The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than thosefor ‘Gruen’; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organization, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time ‘Grenzsicherung West’ (the measures of frontier defense in the West) can be carried out.“The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:“a. Army“The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attack army.“b. Air Force“The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force.“For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peace-time bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can only be determined from the development of the military situation in Czechoslovakia. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared.” (C-136)
“The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid down by me in a later Directive.
“Until this Directive comes into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities:
“1. The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protection against surprise air attacks.
“2. The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
“3. The occupation of the Memelland.”
* * * * * *
“It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.
“The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than thosefor ‘Gruen’; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The organization, order of battle and state of readiness of the units earmarked for that purpose are in peace-time to be so arranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such, that at the same time ‘Grenzsicherung West’ (the measures of frontier defense in the West) can be carried out.
“The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:
“a. Army
“The units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked for a surprise type of attack. Their number will be determined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and decisive success must be assured. The assembly and preparations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the attack army.
“b. Air Force
“The quick advance of the German Army is to be assured by an early elimination of the Czech Air Force.
“For this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peace-time bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still stronger forces may be required can only be determined from the development of the military situation in Czechoslovakia. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must be prepared.” (C-136)
This order was signed by Hitler and authenticated by Keitel. It was distributed to the OKH, to Goering’s Luftwaffe, and to Raeder at Navy headquarters.
Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Keitel issued an appendix to the original order stating that by command of the Fuehrer preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to continue. Distribution of this Top Secret order was the same as for the 21 October order. The order provides:
“2.COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38.“Reference ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia’ the Fuehrer has given the following additional order:“The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on theassumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.“To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.“The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time Armed Forcesonly, without reinforcements from mobilization. The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjustment within the units.“Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for previous organization should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if any, of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to the troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Fuehrer.“The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives.“For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.“Chief of the Supreme Commandof the Armed Forces.“KEITEL”(C-138)
“2.COROLLARY TO DIRECTIVE OF 21.10.38.
“Reference ‘Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia’ the Fuehrer has given the following additional order:
“The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on theassumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected.
“To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is merely an action of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.
“The action must therefore be carried out by the peace time Armed Forcesonly, without reinforcements from mobilization. The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be effected by adjustment within the units.
“Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not previously form up systematically on the frontier. The transport necessary for previous organization should be limited to the minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Necessary movements, if any, of single units and particularly of motorized forces, to the troop-training areas situated near the frontier, must have the approval of the Fuehrer.
“The Air Force should take action in accordance with the similar general directives.
“For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for the newly occupied territory and only for a short period.
“Chief of the Supreme Commandof the Armed Forces.“KEITEL”(C-138)
“Chief of the Supreme Commandof the Armed Forces.“KEITEL”(C-138)
“Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.
“KEITEL”
(C-138)
This particular copy of the order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel, was the one sent to the OKM, the German naval headquarters. It bears the initials of Fricke, head of the Operational Division of the Naval War Staff, of Schniewind, Chief of Staff of the Naval War Staff, and of Raeder.
As theWehrmachtmoved forward with plans for what it clearly considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its part. In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations with the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in Berlin on 21 January 1939, Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech government a “quick reduction” in the size of the Czech army. The captured German Foreign Office notes of this discussion bear the following footnote, in Ribbentrop’s handwriting:
“I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in the Czech army would be decisive in our judgment.” (2795-PS)
“I mentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction in the Czech army would be decisive in our judgment.” (2795-PS)
L.Extension of Fifth Column Activity
As in the case of Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did not intend to rely on theWehrmachtalone to accomplish their calculated objective of “liquidating” Czechoslovakia. With the German minority separated from Czechoslovakia, they could no longer use the cry, “home to the Reich.” One sizeable minority, the Slovaks, remained within the Czechoslovak State. The Czechoslovak Government had made every effort to conciliate Slovak extremists in the months after the cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted to Slovakia, with an autonomous cabinet and parliament at Bratislava. Nonetheless, despite these concessions, it was in Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators found men ready to take their money and do their bidding. The following picture of Nazi operations in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak official report. (998-PS;3061-PS)
Nazi propaganda and “research” groups had long been interested in maintaining close connections with the Slovak autonomist opposition. When Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of the puppet state of Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason in 1929, the evidence established that he had already established connections with Nazi groups within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi aides were in close contact with Slovak traitors living in exile and were attempting to establish more profitable contacts in the semi-fascist Slovak Catholic Peoples Party of Monsignor Andrew Hlinka. Out of sympathy with the predominantly anti-clerical government in Prague, some Catholic elements in Slovakia proved willing to cooperate with the Nazis. In February and July 1938 the leaders of the Henlein movement conferred with top men of Father Hlinka’s party and agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance in pressing their respective claims to autonomy. This understanding proved useful in the September agitation when, at the proper moment, the Foreign Office in Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague to tell the Slovaks to start their demands for autonomy. (See2858-PS.)
By this time, mid-summer 1938, the Nazis were in direct contact with figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents among the higher staff of Father Hlinka’s party. These agents undertook to render impossible any understanding between the Slovak autonomists and the Slovak parties in the government at Prague. Franz Karmasin, later to becomeVolksgruppenfuehrer, had been appointed Nazi leader in Slovakia and professed to be serving the cause of Slovak autonomy while on the Nazi pay roll. On 22 November the Nazis indiscreetly wiredKarmasin to collect his money at the German Legation in person. The telegram, sent from the German Legation at Prague to Bratislava (Pressburg), reads as follows:
“Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin that he would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is being kept for him at the treasury of the embassy.“HENCKE” (2859-PS)
“Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin that he would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum which is being kept for him at the treasury of the embassy.
“HENCKE” (2859-PS)
Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause. A captured memorandum of the German Foreign Office, dated Berlin, 29 November 1939—eight months after the conquest of Czechoslovakia—throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the German Foreign Office:
“On the question of payments to KARMASIN“Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks for the VDA (Peoples’ League for Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from then on 15,000 Marks monthly.“Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle) has deposited 300,000 Marks for Karmasin with the German Mission in Bratislava (Pressburg) on which he could fall back in an emergency.“Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the payments will continue.“Therefore it appears that Karmasin has been provided with sufficient money; thus one could await whether he would put up new demands himself.“Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister.“/s/ WOERMANN” (2794-PS)
“On the question of payments to KARMASIN
“Karmasin receives 30,000 Marks for the VDA (Peoples’ League for Germans Abroad) until 1 April 1940; from then on 15,000 Marks monthly.
“Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle) has deposited 300,000 Marks for Karmasin with the German Mission in Bratislava (Pressburg) on which he could fall back in an emergency.
“Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impossible to determine what amounts had been involved, and whether the payments will continue.
“Therefore it appears that Karmasin has been provided with sufficient money; thus one could await whether he would put up new demands himself.
“Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister.
“/s/ WOERMANN” (2794-PS)
This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign Office in the subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More important, it shows that the Germans still considered it necessary to supply their under-cover representatives in Pressburg with substantial funds even after the declaration of the so-called independent State of Slovakia.
Some time in the winter of 1938-1939 Goering conferred with Durcansky and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extremist group, who were accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told Goering of their desire for what they called “independence,” with strong political, economic, and military ties to Germany. They promised that the Jewish problem would be solved as it had been in Germany and that the Communist Party would be prohibited. The notes of the meeting report that Goering considered that theSlovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, although his motives were scarcely altruistic. The undated minutes of this conversation between Goering and Durcansky, captured among the files of the German Foreign Office, are jotted down in somewhat telegraphic style:
“To begin with DURKANSKY (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration. Contents: Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude, that through the Fuehrer autonomy has become possible for the SLOVAKS. The SLOVAKSneverwant to belong to HUNGARY. The SLOVAKS wantfull independencewith strongest political, economic and military ties to Germany. BRATISLAVA to be capital. The execution of the plan only possible if the army and police are SLOVAK.“An independent SLOVAKIA to be proclaimed at the meeting of the first SLOVAK Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority would favour a separation from PRAGUE. Jews will vote for Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the MARCH, where a large SLOVAK population lives.“TheJewish problemwill be solved similarly to that in Germany. The Communist party to be prohibited.“TheGermansin SLOVAKIA do not want to belong to Hungary but wish to stay in SLOVAKIA.“TheGerman influencewith the SLOVAK Government considerable; the appointment of a German Minister (member of the cabinet) has been promised.“At present negotiations with HUNGARY are being conducted by the SLOVAKS. The CZECHS are more yielding towards the Hungarians than the SLOVAKS.“The Fieldmarshall considers; that the SLOVAK negotiations towards independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East.” (2801-PS)
“To begin with DURKANSKY (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration. Contents: Friendship for the Fuehrer; gratitude, that through the Fuehrer autonomy has become possible for the SLOVAKS. The SLOVAKSneverwant to belong to HUNGARY. The SLOVAKS wantfull independencewith strongest political, economic and military ties to Germany. BRATISLAVA to be capital. The execution of the plan only possible if the army and police are SLOVAK.
“An independent SLOVAKIA to be proclaimed at the meeting of the first SLOVAK Diet. In the case of a plebiscite the majority would favour a separation from PRAGUE. Jews will vote for Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the MARCH, where a large SLOVAK population lives.
“TheJewish problemwill be solved similarly to that in Germany. The Communist party to be prohibited.
“TheGermansin SLOVAKIA do not want to belong to Hungary but wish to stay in SLOVAKIA.
“TheGerman influencewith the SLOVAK Government considerable; the appointment of a German Minister (member of the cabinet) has been promised.
“At present negotiations with HUNGARY are being conducted by the SLOVAKS. The CZECHS are more yielding towards the Hungarians than the SLOVAKS.
“The Fieldmarshall considers; that the SLOVAK negotiations towards independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.
“Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air Force for use against the East.” (2801-PS)
In mid-February 1939 a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It consisted of Tuca, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans had been in contact, and Karmasin, the paid representative of the Nazi conspirators in Slovakia. They conferred with Hitler and Ribbentrop in the Reichs Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday, 12 February 1939. The captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting read as follows:
“After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with ‘My Fuehrer’ and he voices the opinion that he, though only a modestman himself, might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as economic point of view.” (2790-PS)
“After a brief welcome Tuca thanks the Fuehrer for granting this meeting. He addresses the Fuehrer with ‘My Fuehrer’ and he voices the opinion that he, though only a modestman himself, might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation. The Czech courts and prison gave him the right to make such a statement. He states that the Fuehrer had not only opened the Slovak question but that he had been also the first one to acknowledge the dignity of the Slovak nation. The Slovakian people will gladly fight under the leadership of the Fuehrer for the maintenance of European civilization. Obviously future association with the Czechs had become an impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as economic point of view.” (2790-PS)
It is noteworthy that Tuca addressed Hitler as “My Fuehrer”. During this meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were successful in planting the idea of insurrection with the Slovak delegation. The final sentence of this document, spoken by Tuca, is conclusive:
“I entrust the fate of my people to your care.” (2790-PS)
“I entrust the fate of my people to your care.” (2790-PS)
It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939 the Nazis had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service, many of them drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka’s party. Flattered by the personal attention of such men as Hitler and Ribbentrop, and subsidized by German representatives, these Slovaks proved willing tools in the hands of the Nazi conspirators.
In addition to the Slovaks, the Nazi conspirators made use of the few Germans still remaining within the mutilated Czech republic. Kundt, Henlein’s deputy who had been appointed leader of this German minority, created as many artificial “focal points of German culture” as possible. Germans from the districts handed over to Germany were ordered from Berlin to continue their studies at the German University in Prague and to make it a center of aggressive Naziism. With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate campaign of Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private institutions was carried out, and the Henleinists gave full cooperation with Gestapo agents from the Reich who appeared on Czech soil. The Nazi “political activity” was designed to undermine and to weaken Czech resistance to the commands from Germany. In the face of continued threats and duress on both diplomatic and propaganda levels, the Czech government was unable to take adequate measures against these trespasses on its sovereignty. (998-PS;3061-PS)
In early March, with the date for the invasion of Czechoslovakia already close at hand, fifth column activity moved into its final phase. In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein’s equivalent of the SS, were in touch with the Nazi conspirators in the Reich and laid the groundwork for the events of 14 and 15 March.An article by SS-Gruppenfuehrer Karl Hermann Frank, published inBoehmen und Maehren, the official periodical of the Reichs Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, March 1941, page 79, reveals with considerable frankness the functions which the FS and SS served and the pride the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these organizations:
“The SS on March 15, 1939“A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable without political troops. To these are allotted the special task of being the advance guard of the political will and the guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state. Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes (Freiwilliger Selbstschutz), called ‘FS’ for short. This troop was trained essentially in accordance with the principles of the SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time. The troop was likewise assigned here the special task of protecting the homeland, actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand.“After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS were transferred essentially to the German student organizations as compact troop formations in Prague and Brunn, aside from the isolated German communities which remained in the second republic. This was also natural because many active students from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the FS. The student organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other Germans, during the crisis of March 1939 * * *”* * * * * *“In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement of the planned entry of German troops in various localities, German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices, men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent foolish destruction * * *. How significant the many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German agencies, follows from the fact thatmany of the men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the Reichsfuehrer SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS.“Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here placed themselves at once at their further disposition and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators. * * *” (2826-PS)
“The SS on March 15, 1939
“A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable without political troops. To these are allotted the special task of being the advance guard of the political will and the guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German folk-groups, which have their home in some other people’s state. Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly also organized its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes (Freiwilliger Selbstschutz), called ‘FS’ for short. This troop was trained essentially in accordance with the principles of the SS, so far as these could be used in this region at that time. The troop was likewise assigned here the special task of protecting the homeland, actively, if necessary. It stood up well in its first test in this connection, wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it had to assume the protection of the homeland, arms in hand.
“After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau, the tasks of the FS were transferred essentially to the German student organizations as compact troop formations in Prague and Brunn, aside from the isolated German communities which remained in the second republic. This was also natural because many active students from the Sudeten Gau were already members of the FS. The student organizations then had to endure this test, in common with other Germans, during the crisis of March 1939 * * *”
* * * * * *
“In the early morning hours of March 15, after the announcement of the planned entry of German troops in various localities, German men had to act in some localities in order to assure a quiet course of events, either by assumption of the police authority, as for instance in Brunn, or by corresponding instruction of the police president, etc. In some Czech offices, men had likewise, in the early hours of the morning, begun to burn valuable archives and the material of political files. It was also necessary to take measures here in order to prevent foolish destruction * * *. How significant the many-sided and comprehensive measures were considered by the competent German agencies, follows from the fact thatmany of the men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part even through the Reichsfuehrer SS himself or through SS Group Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these men were thereby designated as accomplished in the interest of the SS.
“Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had marched in with the first columns of the German Army and had assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the men here placed themselves at once at their further disposition and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators. * * *” (2826-PS)
The background of the German intrigue in Slovakia is outlined in two British diplomatic despatches (D-571,D-572) and excerpts from despatches sent by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Berlin to the French Foreign Office between 13 and 18 March 1939, and published in the French Yellow Book. (2943-PS)
In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that day the Czechoslovakian government dismissed those members of the Slovak Cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with Prague, among them Prime Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within 24 hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czech government as an excuse for intervention. On the following day, 11 March, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is related in the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British government:
“Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came at about 10 P. M. on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor (the Prime Minister) showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague.” (D-571)
“Herr Buerckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart and five German generals came at about 10 P. M. on the evening of Saturday, the 11th March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress at Bratislava, and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor (the Prime Minister) showed hesitation, Herr Buerckel took him on one side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle the question of Czecho-Slovakia definitely. Slovakia ought, therefore, to proclaim her independence because Herr Hitler would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor thanked Herr Buerckel for this information, but said that he must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague.” (D-571)
Events were now moving rapidly. Durcansky, one of the dismissed ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where the facilities of the German broadcasting station were placed at his disposal. Arms and ammunition were brought from GermanOffices in Engerau, across the Danube, into Slovakia where they were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guard to create incidents and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for military action. The situation at Engerau is described in an affidavit of Alfred Helmut Naujocks:
“I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows—“1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the winter of 1939 I was stationed in Berlin, working in Amt VI, Chief Sector South East. Early in March, four or five days before Slovakia declared its independence, Heydrich, who was chief of the SD, ordered me to report to Nebe, the chief of the Reich Criminal Police. Nebe had been told by Heydrich to accelerate the production of explosives which his department was manufacturing for the use of certain Slovak groups. These explosives were small tins weighing approximately 500 grams.“2. As soon as forty or fifty of these explosives had been finished, I carried them by automobile to a small village called Engerau, just across the border from Pressburg in Slovakia. The Security Police had a Service Department in this village for the handling of SD activities. I turned over the explosives to this office and found there a group of Slovaks, including Karmasin, Mach, Tuka and Durcansky. In fact, three of these people then present later became ministers in the new Slovak government. I was informed that the explosives were to be turned over to the Hlinka Guards across the border in Slovakia and were to be used in incidents designed to create the proper atmosphere for a revolution.“3. I stayed in Engerau for a day and a half and then returned to Berlin.“4. One or two weeks later I met in Berlin the same Slovak delegation, including Mach, Tuka, Durcansky and Karmasin, which I had seen in Engerau. They had flown to Berlin for a conference with Goering. Heydrich asked me to look after them and to report to him what developed during the conference with Goering. I reported this conference in detail to Heydrich. It dealt principally with the organization of the new Slovak state. My principal recollection of the conference is that the Slovaks hardly got a word in because Goering was talking all the time.“The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made byme voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG, Germany this 20th day of November 1945.“(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks“ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS”(3030-PS)
“I, ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows—
“1. From 1934 to 1941 I was a member of the SD. In the winter of 1939 I was stationed in Berlin, working in Amt VI, Chief Sector South East. Early in March, four or five days before Slovakia declared its independence, Heydrich, who was chief of the SD, ordered me to report to Nebe, the chief of the Reich Criminal Police. Nebe had been told by Heydrich to accelerate the production of explosives which his department was manufacturing for the use of certain Slovak groups. These explosives were small tins weighing approximately 500 grams.
“2. As soon as forty or fifty of these explosives had been finished, I carried them by automobile to a small village called Engerau, just across the border from Pressburg in Slovakia. The Security Police had a Service Department in this village for the handling of SD activities. I turned over the explosives to this office and found there a group of Slovaks, including Karmasin, Mach, Tuka and Durcansky. In fact, three of these people then present later became ministers in the new Slovak government. I was informed that the explosives were to be turned over to the Hlinka Guards across the border in Slovakia and were to be used in incidents designed to create the proper atmosphere for a revolution.
“3. I stayed in Engerau for a day and a half and then returned to Berlin.
“4. One or two weeks later I met in Berlin the same Slovak delegation, including Mach, Tuka, Durcansky and Karmasin, which I had seen in Engerau. They had flown to Berlin for a conference with Goering. Heydrich asked me to look after them and to report to him what developed during the conference with Goering. I reported this conference in detail to Heydrich. It dealt principally with the organization of the new Slovak state. My principal recollection of the conference is that the Slovaks hardly got a word in because Goering was talking all the time.
“The facts stated above are true; this declaration is made byme voluntarily and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at NURNBERG, Germany this 20th day of November 1945.
“(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks“ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS”(3030-PS)
“(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks“ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS”(3030-PS)
“(Signed) Alfred Helmut Naujocks
“ALFRED HELMUT NAUJOCKS”
(3030-PS)
At this time the German press and radio launched a violent campaign against the Czechoslovak government. And, significantly, an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the dismissed prime minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna. (998-PS;3061-PS;2943-PS)
M.Occupation of Czechoslovakia Under Threat of Military Force.
At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations for what the Nazi leaders liked to call the “liquidation” of Czechoslovakia were progressing with a gratifying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and propaganda machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close coordination. As during Case Green of the preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited Hungary to participate in the attack. It appears from a letter Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, which was captured in the German Foreign Office files, that Horthy was flattered by the invitation: