“The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines.” (444-PS)
“The preparatory measures of Supreme Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines.” (444-PS)
It then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy regarding relations with other countries and says regarding the U.S.S.R.:
“* * * 5.Russia“Political discussions have been initiated with the aim ofclarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.“Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the Army’s operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by me.” (444-PS)
“* * * 5.Russia
“Political discussions have been initiated with the aim ofclarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.
“Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the Army’s operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by me.” (444-PS)
On 5 December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at that time General Halder, reported to the Fuehrer concerning the progress of the plans for the coming operation against the U.S.S.R. A report of this conference with Hitler is set forth in a folder containing many documents, all labelled annexes and all bearing onFall Barbarossa(1799-PS). This folder was discovered with the War Diary of theWehrmacht Fuehrungsstaband was apparently an inclosure to that Diary. Annex No. 1, dated 5 December 1940, indicates the state which planning for this aggression had reached six and a half months before it occurred:
“Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940.“The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.”* * * * * *“The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds the following: The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration.“The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.”* * * * * *“It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient.” (1799-PS)
“Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940.
“The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.”
* * * * * *
“The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds the following: The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration.
“The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.”
* * * * * *
“It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient.” (1799-PS)
B.Plan Barbarossa.
By 18 December 1940 the general outline of the army’s operational plans having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strategical directive to the High Commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces forBarbarossa—Directive No. 21—was issued (446-PS). This directive marks the first time the plan to invade the U.S.S.R. was specifically referred to in an order, although the order was classified Top Secret. It also marked the first use of the code wordBarbarossato denote the operation against the Soviet Union. One of the most significant passages in that directive is the opening sentence:
“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign even before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa).” (446-PS)
“The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign even before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa).” (446-PS)
The directive continues:
“Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed not later than 15 May 1941.”* * * * * *“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.” (446-PS)
“Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed not later than 15 May 1941.”
* * * * * *
“Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.” (446-PS)
The directive then outlined the broad strategy on which the intended invasion was to proceed and the parts which the Army, Navy, and Air Forces were to play therein, and called for oral reports to Hitler by the Commanders-in-Chief. The directive concluded as follows:
“V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-Chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.“The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.” (446-PS)
“V. I am expecting the reports of the Commanders-in-Chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.
“The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.” (446-PS)
The directive is signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one illegible signature.
It is perfectly clear both from the contents of the order itself as well as from its history, which has been outlined, that this directive was no mere staff planning exercise. It was an order to prepare for an act of aggression which was intended to occur and which actually did occur. The various services which received the order understood it as an order to prepare for action and did not view it as a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed planning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to implement the general scheme set forth in the basic directive.
C.Military Planning and Preparation for the Implementation of Barbarossa.
The Naval War Diary for 30 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with that part of Directive No. 21 (446-PS) which ordered progress in preparation to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary contains a substantial amount of technical information concerning the Navy’s part in the coming campaign and the manner in which it was preparing itself to play that part (C-35). The following passage shows that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early date:
“30 January 19417. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the “Barbarossa” case to be submitted to the High Command of the Armed Forces”. (C-35)
“30 January 1941
7. Talk by Ia about the plans and preparations for the “Barbarossa” case to be submitted to the High Command of the Armed Forces”. (C-35)
”Ia” is, in this case, the abbreviation for a deputy head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff.) Then follows a list of the Navy’s objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter, many tasks for the Navy are listed, one of which is sufficiently typical to give an idea of all:
“II.Objectives of War Against Russia.* * * * * *d.To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:“1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.” (C-35)
“II.Objectives of War Against Russia.
* * * * * *
d.To harass the Russian fleet by surprise blows as:
“1. Lightning-like commitments at the outbreak of the war of air force units against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Ice Sea.” (C-35)
This document indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was being carried out to implementBarbarossaalmost six months before the operation actually got underway. It is but another piece in the mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt that the invasion of the Soviet Union was undeniably a premeditated attack.
Similarly, the Naval War Diary for the month of February contains at least several references to the planning and preparation for the coming campaign (C-33). The entry for 19 February 1941 is typical:
“In regard to the impending operation ‘Barbarossa’ for which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.” (C-33)
“In regard to the impending operation ‘Barbarossa’ for which all S-Boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer of some can only be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations.” (C-33)
On 3 February 1941 the Fuehrer held a conference to assess the progress thus far made in the planning forBarbarossa. The conference also discussed the plans forSonnenblume, which wasthe code name for the North African Operation. Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Keitel; the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Jodl; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch; the Chief of the Army General Staff, Halder; as well as several others including, Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s Adjutant (872-PS). During the course of this conference, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave a long report about enemy strength as compared with German strength, and about the general overall operational plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various intervals by comments from the Fuehrer. An extract from this report, although written in a semishorthand form, is at least sufficiently clear to disclose that elaborate timetables had already been set up for the deployment of troops, as well as for industrial operations:
“The intended time periodwas discussed with a plan.1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel)2nd “ “ “transfer now, Front—Germany—East from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila [the code word for the operation for the occupation of unoccupied France] can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code word for the occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa and Gibraltar.]“In industrythe full capacity timetable is in force. No more camouflage.“From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seeloewe [Seeloewe was the code word for the planned operation against England] can no longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognizable.“The full capacity timetable remains. 8 Marita [Marita was the code word for the action against Greece] divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.“C-in-C Armyrequested that he no longer have to employ5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.“FuehrerWhen Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.” (872-PS)
“The intended time periodwas discussed with a plan.
1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel)2nd “ “ “
1st Deployment Staffel (Aufmarschstaffel)
2nd “ “ “
transfer now, Front—Germany—East from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila [the code word for the operation for the occupation of unoccupied France] can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. Three deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained. [Felix is the code word for the occupation of Canary Islands, North Africa and Gibraltar.]
“In industrythe full capacity timetable is in force. No more camouflage.
“From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seeloewe [Seeloewe was the code word for the planned operation against England] can no longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognizable.
“The full capacity timetable remains. 8 Marita [Marita was the code word for the action against Greece] divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.
“C-in-C Armyrequested that he no longer have to employ5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.
“FuehrerWhen Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.” (872-PS)
This much, when read with the conference conclusions, is sufficient to show that the Army as well as the Navy regardedBarbarossaas an action directive and were far along with their preparations even as early as February 1941—almost five months prior to 22 June, the date when the attack was actually launched. The conference report summarized the conclusions of the conference, insofar as they affectedBarbarossa, as follows:
“Conclusions:“1.Barbarossa“a.The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that themain aimis to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.“b.The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.“c.Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw.“d.It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila (auxiliary measure).“e.The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary measure Marita.” (872-PS)
“Conclusions:
“1.Barbarossa
“a.The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that themain aimis to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.“b.The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.“c.Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw.“d.It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila (auxiliary measure).“e.The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary measure Marita.” (872-PS)
“a.The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that themain aimis to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.
“b.The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.
“c.Agreements with neighbouring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldaw.
“d.It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila (auxiliary measure).
“e.The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary measure Marita.” (872-PS)
As the plans for the invasion became more detailed, involved, and complete, more and more agencies outside the Armed Forces had to be brought into the picture, let in on the secret, and assigned their respective parts. For example, early in March, 1941, Keitel drafted a letter to be sent to Reich Minister Todt, then Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions and head of the organization Todt. In this letter Keitel explained the principles on which the camouflage for the operation was based and requested that the organization Todt follow the same line (874-PS). This letter illustrates the elaborate deceit with which the Nazi conspirators sought to hide the preparations for their treacherous attack:
“Top Secret“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.“Hq. of the Fuehrer 9 March 41DRAFT“Honorable Reich Minister! (TODT)“For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the success of the operations.“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at continuing preparations for the attack against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary maneuvre to divert from plans which are being pursued for an attack against England. In order to insure success for these measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are being also followed on the part of the Organization Todt.“K. J. W.”[Initials ofKeitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (874-PS)
“Top Secret
“The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
“Hq. of the Fuehrer 9 March 41
DRAFT
“Honorable Reich Minister! (TODT)
“For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the success of the operations.
“The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at continuing preparations for the attack against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary maneuvre to divert from plans which are being pursued for an attack against England. In order to insure success for these measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are being also followed on the part of the Organization Todt.
“K. J. W.”[Initials ofKeitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (874-PS)
“K. J. W.”[Initials ofKeitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (874-PS)
“K. J. W.”
[Initials of
Keitel, Jodl and Warlimont] (874-PS)
On 13 March 1941 Keitel signed an operational supplement to Fuehrer Order #21 (446-PS), which was issued in the form of “Directives for Special Areas” (447-PS). This detailed operational order, which was issued more than three months in advance of the attack, indicates how complete were the plans on practically every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed “Area of Operations and Executive Power” and outlines who was to be in control of what and where. It states that while the campaign is in progress, the Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive power in territory through which the army is advancing. During this period, however, the Reichsfuehrer SS is entrusted with “special tasks.” This assignment is discussed in paragraph 2b:
“* * *b.In the area of operations, theReichsfuehrer SSis, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted withspecial tasksfor the preparation of thepolitical administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) andin agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (447-PS)
“* * *b.In the area of operations, theReichsfuehrer SSis, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted withspecial tasksfor the preparation of thepolitical administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) andin agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.” (447-PS)
The order then states that, in time, political administration will be set up under Commissioners of the Reich. The relationship of these officials to the army is discussed in paragraphs 2c and 3:
“c.As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to belimited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its ownpoliticaladministration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, intoNorth(Baltic countries),Center(White Russia)and South(Ukraine). In these territoriesthe political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reichwho receive their orders from the Fuehrer.“3. For the execution of allmilitary taskswithin the areas under political administration in the rear of the area of operations,commanding officerswho are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.“The commanding officer is thesupreme representative of the Armed Forcesin the respective areas and the bearer of themilitary sovereign rights. He hasthe tasks of a Territorial Commanderand the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks.“a.Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.“b.Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4). (447-PS)
“c.As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to belimited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its ownpoliticaladministration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, intoNorth(Baltic countries),Center(White Russia)and South(Ukraine). In these territoriesthe political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reichwho receive their orders from the Fuehrer.
“3. For the execution of allmilitary taskswithin the areas under political administration in the rear of the area of operations,commanding officerswho are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.
“The commanding officer is thesupreme representative of the Armed Forcesin the respective areas and the bearer of themilitary sovereign rights. He hasthe tasks of a Territorial Commanderand the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks.
“a.Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.
“b.Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4). (447-PS)
The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administration of economy in the conquered territory. This provision is also contained in Section I, paragraph 4:
“4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction ofthe administration of economyin the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rue Amt’ with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt.” (447-PS)
“4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction ofthe administration of economyin the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the ‘Wi Rue Amt’ with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi/Rue/Amt.” (447-PS)
The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and communication traffic. Section III of the order deals with therelations with certain other countries and states, in part, as follows:
“III.Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.” (447-PS)
“III.Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.
9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.” (447-PS)
The document closes with a section regarding Sweden:
“IV.Directives regarding Sweden.12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.“The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces“signed: KEITEL”(447-PS)
“IV.Directives regarding Sweden.
12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.
“The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces
“signed: KEITEL”
(447-PS)
As was hinted in the original Barbarossa Order, Directive No. 21 (446-PS), the plan originally contemplated that the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves involved in a campaign in the Balkans and were forced to delay Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found in a document (C-170) which has been identified by Raeder as a compilation of official extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files and contains file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry. This item dated 3 April 1941 reads as follows:
“Balkan Operations delayed ‘Barbarossa’ at first for about five weeks.All measures which can be construed asoffensive actionsare to be stopped according to Fuehrer order.” (C-170)
“Balkan Operations delayed ‘Barbarossa’ at first for about five weeks.All measures which can be construed asoffensive actionsare to be stopped according to Fuehrer order.” (C-170)
By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straightened out to permit the Fuehrer definitely to set D-Day as 22 June—more than seven weeks away. A “Top Secret” report of a conference with the Chief of the SectionLandsverteidigungof theWehrmachtfuhrungsstabon 30 April 1941 states, in the first two paragraphs:
“1.Timetable Barbarossa:The Fuehrer has decided:Action Barbarossabegins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.“2.Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa: Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength.Sector Middle: Great German superiority.Sector South: Russian superiority.” (873-PS)
“1.Timetable Barbarossa:
The Fuehrer has decided:
Action Barbarossabegins on 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the appointed areas.
“2.Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa: Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength.
Sector Middle: Great German superiority.
Sector South: Russian superiority.” (873-PS)
Early in June, approximately three weeks before D-Day, preparations for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High Command to issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This timetable (C-39) was prepared in 21 copies. The copy reproduced here was the third copy, which was given to the High Command of the Navy. Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal and reads as follows:
“Top Military Secret“Supreme Command of the Armed ForcesNr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L (I op)“Fuehrer’s Headquarters(no date)“Top Secret (Chefsache)Only through officer“21 copies3rd copy Ob. d. m.I op.00845/41Received 6 JuneEnclosures:—“The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a foundation for further preparations for ‘Barbarossa’. If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.“Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forcessigned: Keitel”(C-39)
“Top Military Secret
“Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Nr. 44842/41 Top Military Secret WFST/Abt.L (I op)
“Fuehrer’s Headquarters
(no date)
“Top Secret (Chefsache)
Only through officer
“21 copies3rd copy Ob. d. m.I op.00845/41Received 6 JuneEnclosures:—
“21 copies3rd copy Ob. d. m.I op.00845/41Received 6 JuneEnclosures:—
“21 copies
3rd copy Ob. d. m.
I op.00845/41
Received 6 June
Enclosures:—
“The Fuehrer has authorized the appended timetable as a foundation for further preparations for ‘Barbarossa’. If alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.
“Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
signed: Keitel”
(C-39)
The document then proceeds to outline the state of preparations as of 1 June 1941. The outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under six headings: General; Negotiations with Friendly States; Army; Navy; Air Force, and Camouflage. The remainder of the document is in tabular form with sixcolumns headed from left to right at the top of each page—Date; Serial No.; Army; Navy; OKW; Remarks. The item appearing under date 21 June and Serial No. 29, provides in the columns for Army, Navy, and Air Forces that, “Till 1300 hours latest time at which operation can be cancelled (spaetester Anhaltetermin)” (C-39). Under the column headed OKW appears the note: “Cancelled by code word ‘Altona’ or further confirmation of start of attack by code word: ‘Dortmund’ ” (C-39). In the Remarks column appears the statement that: “Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point of main effort (Schwerpunkt), concentration of armour and artillery must be reckoned with” (C-39). The entry for 22 June, under serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the columns for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW and provides as follows:
“Invasion Day“H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330 hours”. (C-39)
“Invasion Day
“H-hour for the start of the invasion by the Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces. 0330 hours”. (C-39)
In the Remarks column it is stated that:
“Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to weather on the part of the Air Force.” (C-39)
“Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting owing to weather on the part of the Air Force.” (C-39)
The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted and give great detail concerning the disposition and missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.
On 9 June 1941 the order of the Fuehrer went out for final reports on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941—8 days before “D-Day” (C-78). This order, signed by Hitler’s Adjutant, Schmundt, reads as follows:
“TOP SECRETOnly by Officer“Office of Wehrmacht Adjutant“at Berchtesgaden9th June 1941“To the FuehrerBr. B. No. 7 Top Secret“Top Secret“Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’“1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have ordered reports on ‘Barbarossa’ by the Commanders of Army Groups, armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.“2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.“3.Time Table.“a.11.00 hrs.“Silver Fox”“b.12.00 hrs-14.00 hrs.Army Group South“c.14.00 hrs-15.30 hrs.Lunch party for all participants in conference“d.From 15.30 hrs.Baltic, Army Group North, Army Group “Center” in this order.Participants see enclosed list of participants.(list of names, etc. follows)“(signed) SchmundtColonel of the General Staff and ChiefWehrmacht Adjutant to the Fuehrer”.(C-78)
“TOP SECRET
Only by Officer
“Office of Wehrmacht Adjutant
“at Berchtesgaden
9th June 1941
“To the Fuehrer
Br. B. No. 7 Top Secret
“Top Secret
“Re: Conference ‘Barbarossa’
“1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces have ordered reports on ‘Barbarossa’ by the Commanders of Army Groups, armies, and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank.
“2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.
Participants see enclosed list of participants.
(list of names, etc. follows)
“(signed) Schmundt
Colonel of the General Staff and Chief
Wehrmacht Adjutant to the Fuehrer”.
(C-78)
There is attached a list of participants and the order in which they will report. The list includes a large number of the members of the High Command and General Staff Group as of that date. Among those to participate were Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.
The foregoing documents are sufficient to establish the premeditation and calculation which marked the military preparations for the invasion of the U.S.S.R. Starting almost a full year before the launching of the attack, the Nazi conspirators planned and prepared every military detail of their aggression against the Soviet Union with all that thoroughness and meticulousness which has come to be associated with the German character. The leading roles were performed in this preparation by the military figures—Goering, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.
D.Plans for the Economic Exploitation and Spoliation of the U.S.S.R.
Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from a purely military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed planning was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators to insure that their aggression would prove economically profitable. The motives which led the conspirators to plan and launch attack were both political and economic. The economic basis may be simply summarized as the greed of the Nazi conspirators for the raw material, food, and other supplies which their neighbor possessed and which they conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of their war machine. To the Nazi conspirators a need was translated as a right, and they early began planningand preparing with typical care and detail to insure that every bit of the plunder which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression would be exploited to their utmost benefit.
As early as August 1940 General Thomas, Chief of theWi Rue Amt, received a hint from Goering about a possible attack on the U.S.S.R., which prompted him to begin considering the Soviet war economy. In November 1940—8 months before the attack—Thomas was categorically informed by Goering of the planned operation in the East, and preliminary preparations were commenced for the economic plundering of the territories to be occupied in the course of such operation (2353-PS). Goering played the overall leading role in this activity by virtue of his position at the head of the Four Year Plan. Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early planning in these terms:
“* * * In November, 1940, the Chief of theWi Ruetogether with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.“By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rue at the end of 1940.“The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first of all the following tasks:“1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its location, its capacity and its associate industries.“2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers and their dependency one on the other.“3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the Soviet Union.“4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum (crude oil).“5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in the Soviet Union.“These points were concentrated in one big compilation ‘War Economy of the Soviet Union’ and illustrated with detailed maps, etc.”“Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy Organization.“For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia,was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier General Schubert. The work was carried out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office, resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories (Ausland) with the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the territory.” (2353-PS)
“* * * In November, 1940, the Chief of theWi Ruetogether with Secretaries of state Koerner, Neumann, Backe and General von Hanneken were informed by the Reichmarshal of the action planned in the East.
“By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations for the action in the East were commenced by the office of Wi Rue at the end of 1940.
“The preliminary preparations for the action in the East included first of all the following tasks:
“1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian Armament industry, its location, its capacity and its associate industries.
“2. Investigation of the capacity of the different big armament centers and their dependency one on the other.
“3. Determine the power and transport system for the industry of the Soviet Union.
“4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum (crude oil).
“5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than armament industries in the Soviet Union.
“These points were concentrated in one big compilation ‘War Economy of the Soviet Union’ and illustrated with detailed maps, etc.”
“Furthermore a card index was made, containing all the important factories in Soviet-Russia, and a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for the use of the German War Economy Organization.
“For the processing of these problems a task staff, Russia,was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and later on in charge of Brigadier General Schubert. The work was carried out according to the directives from the Chief of the Office, resp. the group of depts. for foreign territories (Ausland) with the cooperation of all departments, economy offices and any other persons, possessing information on Russia. Through these intensive preparative activities an excellent collection of material was made, which proved of the utmost value later on for carrying out the operations and for administering the territory.” (2353-PS)
By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had proceeded to a point where a broader plan of organization was needed. General Thomas held a conference, with his subordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for such a plan. A memorandum of this conference classified Top Secret and dated 1 March 1941, reads as follows:
“The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be drafted for the Reich Marshal.“Essential Points:“1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich Marshal.Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the four-year plan.“2. The organization must include everything concerning war economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already a special mission of State Secretary Backe.“3. Clear statement thatthe organization is to be independent of the military or civil administration. Close cooperation, but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.“4. Scope of activities to be divided in two steps:a.Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to secure the removal of important goods.b.Administration of the occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically complimentary districts.“5. In view of the extended field of activity, the termwar economyinspection is to be used preferably, instead of armament inspection.“6. In view of the great field of activity, the organization must be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly numerous.The main mission of the organizationwill consist ofseizing raw materials and taking over allimportant concerns. For the latter mission reliable persons from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can only be performed by the aid of their experiences, (for example, lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum).“After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization within one week.“Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building is essential. An officer must still be appointed for Wi and Rue, with whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.“Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to report to the Office Chief at the end of next week.“(signed:) Hamann”.(1317-PS)
“The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be drafted for the Reich Marshal.
“Essential Points:
“1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich Marshal.Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of the four-year plan.
“2. The organization must include everything concerning war economy, excepting only food, which is said to be made already a special mission of State Secretary Backe.
“3. Clear statement thatthe organization is to be independent of the military or civil administration. Close cooperation, but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.
“4. Scope of activities to be divided in two steps:
a.Accompanying the advancing troops directly behind the front lines, in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to secure the removal of important goods.
b.Administration of the occupied industrial districts and exploitation of economically complimentary districts.
“5. In view of the extended field of activity, the termwar economyinspection is to be used preferably, instead of armament inspection.
“6. In view of the great field of activity, the organization must be generously equipped and personnel must be correspondingly numerous.The main mission of the organizationwill consist ofseizing raw materials and taking over allimportant concerns. For the latter mission reliable persons from German concerns will be interposed suitably from the beginning, since successful operation from the beginning can only be performed by the aid of their experiences, (for example, lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum).
“After the discussion of further details, Lt. Col. Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an organization within one week.
“Close cooperation with the individual sections in the building is essential. An officer must still be appointed for Wi and Rue, with whom the operational staff can remain in constant contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lt. Col. Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.
“Major General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin the second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are to report to the Office Chief at the end of next week.
“(signed:) Hamann”.
(1317-PS)
Hamann, who signed the report is listed among those attending as a Captain, was apparently the junior officer present. Presumably it fell naturally to his lot to prepare the minutes of the meeting.
The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas was organizing at the direction of Goering was clearly recognized by Keitel in his operational order of 13 March 1941 (447-PS). The order stated that the Fuehrer had entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and political administration to the Reichsmarshal (Goering) who in turn had delegated his authority to the Chief of theWi Rue Amt(Thomas). (447-PS)
The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the meeting on 28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April 1941 a conference was held with various branches of the Armed Forces to explain the organizational set-up of Economic StaffOldenburg. (Oldenburgwas the code name given to this economic counterpart ofBarbarossa.) Section I of the report of this conference (1157-PS) deals with the general organization of Economic StaffOldenburgas it had developed. The report begins:
“Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours on 29th April 1941I.Welcome“Purpose of meeting: introduction to the organizational structure of the economic sector of the action.“Barbarossa—Oldenburg“As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand ofalleconomic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the overall direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas under political administration.“The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic general staff, working under the director of the industrial armament office (Chef Wi Rue Amt).“Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is theEconomic Staff Oldenburg for special dutiesunder the command of Major General (Generalleutnant) Schubert.“His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided are:5economic inspectorates23economic commands12sub-offices, which are distributed among important places within the area of the economic commands.“These offices are used in themilitary rear area; the idea is that in the territory of each Army Group an economic inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.“A distinction must be made between the military rear area on the one hand and the battle area proper and the rear area of the army on the other hand. In the last economic matters are dealt with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the Army Headquarters Commands, i.e. the liaison officer of the industrial armament office within the supreme command of the armed forces at the army headquarters commands. For the battle area he has attached to him: technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and means of production.“In the territory between the battle and the military rear area, the rear area of the Army, group IV Econs at the various field commands are placed at the disposal of theliaison officer of the industrial armaments office in order to support the army headquarters commands specialists responsible for supplying the troops from the country’s resources and for preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation.“While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the locality.“The new feature inherent in the organization under the command of the Economic StaffOldenburgis that it does not only deal with military industry, but comprises theentireeconomic field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, etc.“This also corresponds with the internal organization of the individual offices which, from the Economic StaffOldenburgdown to the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision into three large groups, i.e.“Group Hdealing with troop requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization.“Group Lwhich concerns itself with all questions of feed and agriculture, and“Group Wwhich is in charge of the entire field of trade and industry, including raw materials and suppliers; further questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, commerce and exchange of commodities and manpower allocation.“Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General v. Hanneken.” (1157-PS)
“Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000 hours on 29th April 1941
I.
Welcome
“Purpose of meeting: introduction to the organizational structure of the economic sector of the action.
“Barbarossa—Oldenburg
“As already known, the Fuehrer, contrary to previous procedure, has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in one hand ofalleconomic operations and has entrusted the Reich Marshal with the overall direction of the economic administration in the area of operations and in the areas under political administration.
“The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an economic general staff, working under the director of the industrial armament office (Chef Wi Rue Amt).
“Under the Reich Marshal and the economic general staff, the supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself is theEconomic Staff Oldenburg for special dutiesunder the command of Major General (Generalleutnant) Schubert.
“His subordinate authorities, geographically subdivided are:
5economic inspectorates23economic commands12sub-offices, which are distributed among important places within the area of the economic commands.
5economic inspectorates
economic inspectorates
23economic commands
economic commands
12sub-offices, which are distributed among important places within the area of the economic commands.
sub-offices, which are distributed among important places within the area of the economic commands.
“These offices are used in themilitary rear area; the idea is that in the territory of each Army Group an economic inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.
“A distinction must be made between the military rear area on the one hand and the battle area proper and the rear area of the army on the other hand. In the last economic matters are dealt with by the IV Econ (IV Wi) of the Army Headquarters Commands, i.e. the liaison officer of the industrial armament office within the supreme command of the armed forces at the army headquarters commands. For the battle area he has attached to him: technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery troops for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in particular tractors and means of production.
“In the territory between the battle and the military rear area, the rear area of the Army, group IV Econs at the various field commands are placed at the disposal of theliaison officer of the industrial armaments office in order to support the army headquarters commands specialists responsible for supplying the troops from the country’s resources and for preparing the subsequent general economic exploitation.
“While these units move with the troops, economic inspectorates, economic commands and their sub-offices remain established in the locality.
“The new feature inherent in the organization under the command of the Economic StaffOldenburgis that it does not only deal with military industry, but comprises theentireeconomic field. Consequently, all offices are no longer to be designated as offices of the military industries or armaments, but quite generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands, etc.
“This also corresponds with the internal organization of the individual offices which, from the Economic StaffOldenburgdown to the economic commands, requires a standard subdivision into three large groups, i.e.
“Group Hdealing with troop requirements, armaments, industrial transport organization.
“Group Lwhich concerns itself with all questions of feed and agriculture, and
“Group Wwhich is in charge of the entire field of trade and industry, including raw materials and suppliers; further questions of forestry, finance and banking, enemy property, commerce and exchange of commodities and manpower allocation.
“Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling within the field of activities of Group W are dealt with by General v. Hanneken.” (1157-PS)
The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions, personnel and staffing problems, and similar details.
These documents portray the calculated method with which the Nazi conspirators prepared months in advance to rob and loot their intended victim. They show that the conspirators not only planned to stage an attack on a neighbor they had pledged to security, but that they also intended to strip that neighbor of its food, its factories, and all its means of livelihood. The Nazi conspirators made these plans for plunder being fully aware that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and starvation for millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. (The storyof how this plot was executed forms a part of the case to be presented by the Soviet prosecuting staff.)
E.Preparation for the Political Phase of the Aggression.
As has already been indicated, and as will be later more fully developed, there were both economic and political motives for the action of the Nazi conspirators in invading the Soviet Union. The economic aspects have been discussed. Equally elaborate planning was engaged in by the Nazi conspirators to insure the effectuation of the political aim of their aggression. That political aim may be described as the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a powerful political factor in Europe, and the acquisition ofLebensraum. For the accomplishment of these purposes the Nazi conspirators selected as their agent Rosenberg.
As early as 2 April 1941 Rosenberg, or a member of his staff, prepared a memorandum on the U.S.S.R. (1017-PS). This memorandum speculates on the possibility of a disagreement with the U.S.S.R. which would result in a quick occupation of an important part of that country. The memorandum then considers what the political goal of such occupation should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal. This memorandum begins: