Chapter 17

MBZ 04 16/5 1302—Major Schmundt Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer—Most Secretto message 1155 7, 17, 10, 24, 4, 14, 3, 18, 28, 8, armored and mountain.

MBZ 04 16/5 1302—

Major Schmundt Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer—

Most Secretto message 1155 7, 17, 10, 24, 4, 14, 3, 18, 28, 8, armored and mountain.

Zeitzler Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.

[ITEM 4] [Telegram]MBZ 05 17/5 1505

TO MAJOR SCHMUNDT, ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT TO THE FUEHRER—MOST SECRETIN ANSWER TO OBERST LEUTNANT ZEITZLER AND WITH REGARD TO MAP OF FORTIFICATIONS:FORTIFIED CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS TO CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN FORTIFICATIONS. NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS VARIES FROM ONE TO NINE PER KILOMETER. POSITIONS CONSTRUCTED CONSIST OF LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AND AN OCCASIONAL STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATION IN BETWEEN. NUMBER OF MG EMPLACEMENTS VARIES FROM TWO TO NINE PER KILOMETER. BLOCK CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF LIGHT, SOMETIMES MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AT MAIN ROADS AND THOROUGHFARES. DEFENSIVE POTENTIALITIES: STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL KNOWN CALIBRES. LIGHT MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., MEDIUM MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENT BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 21.00 CM., SOMETIMES AGAINST THE LARGEST CALIBRES.

TO MAJOR SCHMUNDT, ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT TO THE FUEHRER—MOST SECRET

IN ANSWER TO OBERST LEUTNANT ZEITZLER AND WITH REGARD TO MAP OF FORTIFICATIONS:

FORTIFIED CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS TO CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN FORTIFICATIONS. NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS VARIES FROM ONE TO NINE PER KILOMETER. POSITIONS CONSTRUCTED CONSIST OF LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AND AN OCCASIONAL STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATION IN BETWEEN. NUMBER OF MG EMPLACEMENTS VARIES FROM TWO TO NINE PER KILOMETER. BLOCK CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF LIGHT, SOMETIMES MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AT MAIN ROADS AND THOROUGHFARES. DEFENSIVE POTENTIALITIES: STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL KNOWN CALIBRES. LIGHT MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., MEDIUM MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENT BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 21.00 CM., SOMETIMES AGAINST THE LARGEST CALIBRES.

ZEITZLER OBERSTLEUTNANT ON THE GENERAL STAFF

[ITEM 5] [Covering letter, with draft for Gruen attached]MOST SECRETBerlin, 20 May 1938Tirpitzufer 72.76Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed ForcesL Ia No. 38/38 S.O. OnlyS.O. Onlyaccess only through OfficerSchm [initialled by Schmundt]My Fuehrer!

Effective 1 October 1938 (beginning of the new mobilization year for the army) new strategic directives must be issued, whose political bases and stipulations you, my Fuehrer, yourself intend to make.

For themeantime, however, it is necessary that the "Gruen" section of the strategic directives be replaced by a new version that takes into account the situation which has arisen as a result of the incorporation of Austria into the Reich and the newly-suspected intentions of the Czech General Staff.

A draft of this kind is attached. It has not yet been discussed with the Commanders in Chief. I intend to do this only after this draft in its fundamental ideas has been approved by you my Fuehrer, so that it can then be resubmitted to be signed.

Heil, my Fuehrer[signed] Keitel

L Ia to No. 38/38 S.O. Onlywritten by an officerMOST SECRETS.O. Onlyaccess only through officerBerlin, 20 May 1938DRAFT for THE NEW DIRECTIVE "GRUEN"3 Copies1st Copy(Provisional)-[pencil note]

1.Political Prerequisites:It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia without provocation, in the near future through military action. Therefore inevitable political developmentswithinCzechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in Europe create an especially favorable opportunity and one which may never come again.

2.Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action:An invasion without suitable obvious cause and without sufficient political justification cannot be considered with reference to the possible consequences of such an action in the present situation.

Rather will the action be initiated either:

a.after a period of increasing diplomatic clashes and tension, which is coupled with military preparations and is made use of to push the war-guilt onto the enemy. Even such a period of tension preceding the war however will terminate in sudden military action on our part, which must come with all possible surprise as to time and extent, or

b.by lightning-swift action as a result of a serious incident, through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way and for which at least part of the world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

"b" is militarily and politically the more favorable.

3.Conclusions for the Preparations of "Fall Gruen"; which must take into account the possibilities mentioned in 2aand 2b.

a.ForArmed Warit is essential to create—already in the first 4 days—a military situation which plainly proves to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation, and gives the nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to immediate intervention against Czechoslovakia. In such a case the intervention of Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia can be expected, especially if France, due to Italy's clearly pro-German attitude fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by her intervention against Germany.

It is very probable that attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved as a result of the ground operations during the first few days, a European crisis will certainly arise.

b.ThePropaganda Warmust, on one hand, intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and reduce her power of resistance, on the other hand, give instructions to the national minorities for supporting the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking.

c.TheEconomic Warhas the task of employing all means at the disposal of economy to hasten the final collapse of Czechoslovakia.

The opening of the Economic and Propaganda war can precede the Armed war. I myself will determine the date.

Z[initialled at end by Zeitzler]

[Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this draft are set forth with minor changes under ITEM 11.]

[ITEM 6] [Typescript]Questions on "Gruen"

1. Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

2. Strength of mobile divisions.

3. Composition of 2nd Armored Division in the case of mobilization.

4. Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) to be used for independent thrust.

5. When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

6. What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are available for combating fortifications such as fortresses?

MOST SECRETL IaBerlin, 23 MayQuestionnaire of 23 May

1.Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

Strength of a peacetime division 14,000 menStrength of a division made ready to march 14,000 men

(but composition is different from that of a peacetime division, i.e. some men are left out and others included).

2.Strength of mobile divisions.

Strength of a mobile division 17,000 men

3.Composition of the 2nd Armored Division in the case of Mobilization.In the case of mobilization the 2nd Armored Division is composed of 1 rifle brigade, one tank brigade and divisional troops.

The rifle brigade has one Infantry regiment motorized of 2 battalions and one motorcycle rifle battalion.

The tank brigade has two tank regiments of two battalions.

The Divisional Troops will include 1 Artillery Regiment motorized of 2 light Battalions, 1 Reconnaissance Battalion motorized, 1 Anti-Tank Battalion, 1 Engineer Battalion motorized, and 1 Signal Battalion motorized.

Altogether the 2nd Armored Division (mobile) has 807 light Machine guns, 250 heavy Machine guns, 18 light mortars, 12 heavy mortars, 8 light Infantry howitzers, 48 Anti-Tank guns, 122 2 cm. guns, 16 37 cm. guns, 16 7.5 cm. guns and 24 light field howitzers.

4.Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) for independent thrust.In the case of mobilization, C-in-C Army is in command of the motorized units. C-in-C Army must therefore be questioned as regards any new employment.

Altogether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions (rapid march readiness is intended) 4 motorized divisions and the light division (for the moment not yet intended for rapid march readiness; presumably from 1 October).

5.When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?Mobilization of the infantry guns (= 15 cm. mortars) planned only for the fall, as ammunition for them will only then be available. For training purposes nearly all corps except the 3 corps have the heavy infantry guns at the moment without live ammunition, however.

6.What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are available for combatting fortifications such as fortresses?Only 21 cm. howitzers. Altogether 23 (of which 8 are in East Prussia) with 16,000 rounds (of which 4,000 in East Prussia).

[In Schmundt writing]: In general, single experimental artillery piece (guns).

Z[Initialled by Zeitzler]

[On next page the questions are put again, plus the following additional questions:]

7. What do the individual types of Czechoslovakian permanent frontier fortifications look like? Profile?

8. Is cooperation between infantry and bombers assured for attacks against enemy strong points etc.?

9. Can the construction of fortifications in the West, in the form of MG strong points and road blocks, be hastened by the employment of work columns of the Inspector of Road Construction?

10. What progress has been made in the howitzer (Moerser) programme? What progress has been made in the conversion of heavy naval guns?

[Next three pages contain the first 6 questions above and answers to them in a teleprint message, beginning: "I am answering several questions which the Fuehrer put to me during conferences. I request that you report the answers to the Fuehrer."]

[ITEM 8] [Telegram]

1. INFORM GENERAL KEITEL: THE FUEHRER IS GOING INTO "GRUEN" IN DETAIL. BASIC IDEAS NOT CHANGED. SURPRISE ELEMENT TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. CONFERENCE WITH PARTICIPANTS WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER RETURN, AT THE LATEST. CONFERENCE HERE NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. RETURN PROBABLY BEGINNING NEXT WEEK.

2. INFORM COLONEL GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH AND GENERAL KEITEL:

A. THE FUEHRER, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CONSIDERATIONS ON 1, HIMSELF SUGGESTED THE HOLDING OF MANEUVERS TO PRACTISE TAKING FORTIFICATIONS BY SURPRISE ATTACK. I THEN REPORTED THAT C-IN-C ARMY WAS PLANNING A CORRESPONDING TRAINING EXERCISE FOR SEPTEMBER. THE FUEHRER THINKS THAT MOMENT TOO LATE. HE HIMSELF WILL DISCUSS THIS WITH C-IN-C ARMY.

B. THE FUEHRER REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF PRESSING FORWARD GREATLY THE FORTIFICATION WORK IN THE WEST.

(NOTE FOR K. KPT. V PUTTKAMER: PLEASE DESTROY TEXT OF 1 AND 2 AFTER USE)

[ITEM 9] [Telegram]REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL SIGNAL SERVICEMOST SECRET

CANARIS REPORTS ON EVENTS OF THE NIGHT: NO SPECIAL OCCURRENCES. THE MOBILIZATION MEASURES ORDERED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUE. THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN DRAFTED: CLASSES 1913 AND 1914 COMPLETE AND SPECIALISTS ONLY FROM CLASSES 1894 TO 1911 LEAVING OUT CLASSES 04, 06, 09. I SHALL KEEP YOU FURTHER CONTINUALLY INFORMED. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT THE FUEHRER INFORM HIS C'S-IN-C OF HIS INTENTIONS SOON. HAVE YOU ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

[ITEM 10] [Handwritten notes][ILLEGIBLE]

[ITEM 11] [Covering letter, with directive for Gruen attached]Supreme Commander of the Armed ForcesOKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L IBerlin, 30 May 1938Copy of the 4th CopyS.O. OnlyAccess only through Officer3 Copies, 1st CopyWritten by an Officer

By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937 (Ob.d.W. No. 55/37 g.kdos Chefsache L Ia) ("Two-Front-War with main effort in the South-East—strategic concentration 'Gruen'") is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 38 at the latest.

Alterations in the other parts of the directive must be expected during the next few weeks.

By order

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces1 Appendixsgd. KeitelTo: C-in-C Army—Copy 1C-in-C Navy—Copy 2C-in-C Air Force—Copy 3OWK Section L—Copy 4-5Certified a true copyZeitzlerOberstleutnant on the General Staff

MOST SECRET

Appendix to: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L Ia dated 30.5.38.

Copy of the 4th CopyS.O. OnlyAccess only through OfficerWritten by an Officer3 Copies, 1st Copy

II. Two front war with main effort in the South East(strategic concentration "Gruen")

1.Political Prerequisites.It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.

An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action.

The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.

2.Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action.The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:

a.suitable obvious cause and, with it

b.sufficient political justification,

c.action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him prepared to the least possible degree.

From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part—which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent—before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.

3.Conclusions for the Preparation of "Fall Gruen".

a.For theArmed Warit is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France—due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy—fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, a European crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.

b.ThePropaganda Warmust on the one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.

4.Tasks of the Armed Forces.Armed Forces Preparations are to be made on the following basis:

a.The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.

b.For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched.

c.The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at thesame timeas the penetration by the Air Force *before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization.*

* For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with the OKW and submitted to me for approval.*

5.Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces.

a.Army.The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns—the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time—must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of * frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing a battle,* of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motorized and armored units using to the full the first successes of the Assault columns and the effects of the Air Force operations. The rear cover provided for theWestmust be limited in numbers and quality to the extent which suits the present state of fortifications. Whether the units assigned this will be transported to the Western frontier immediately or held back for the time being will be decided in my special order. Preparations must however, be made to enable security detachments to be brought up to the Western frontier even during the strategic concentration "Gruen". Independent of this, a first security garrison must be improvized from the engineers at present employed in constructing fortifications and from formations of the Labor Corps. Theremaining frontiers, as well as East Prussia, are to be weakly protected. But, always depending on the political situation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the bulk of the active forces of East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into account.

[*—* Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in Item 5]

b.Air Force.While leaving a minimum of defensive forces in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over at the same time as it is crossed by the first section of the army. (see 5a) Themost important taskof the Air Force is the destruction of the Czechoslovakian Air Force and their supply bases within the shortest possible time, in order to eliminate the possibility of its employment as well as that of Russian and French air forces, should the occasion arise, against the strategic concentration and penetration of the German army and against the German "Lebensraum." Next to this the crippling of enemy mobilization, of the direction of the government and Armed Forces, as well as the delaying of the strategic concentration of the Czech Army by attacks on communication installations, mobilization and government centers can be of considerable importance to the initial success of the army. At points in the frontier area where stronger sections of the Czechoslovakian Army *or the depth of the defensive system* might make the success of the sudden breakthrough of the German Land-attack questionable, the employment of adequate bomber forces must be assured. Czechoslovakian industrial installations are to be spared as far as the course of operations permits. Retaliatory attacks against the population will be carried out only with my permission. Centers of air defense are to be created throughout Berlin, the central German industrial area and the Ruhr area *and gradually prepared even now in an inconspicuous fashion.*

c.Navy.The Navy will assist the army operations by employing the Danube-flotilla. For this purpose the flotilla will be under the orders of C-in-C Army. As regards the conduct of naval warfare at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. These measures must be confined to the absolutely necessary extent. Their inconspicuousness must be guaranteed. It is of decisive importance that all actions, which might influence the political attitude of the European Great Powers unfavorably, be avoided.

6.Tasks of the War Economy.In the war economy it is essential that in the field of the armament industry a maximum deployment of forces is made possible through increased supplies. In the course of operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the total war—economic strength—by rapidly reconnoitring and restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations—insofar as military operations permit—can be of decisive importance to us.

7. *All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.*

signed ADOLF HITLERCertified copysigned ZeitzlerOberstleutnant on the General Staff

[*—* Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in Item 5]

[ITEM 12] [Typescript] Berlin, 9 June 1938L I a H

SHORT SURVEY OF ARMAMENT OF THE CZECH ARMY

1.SMALL ARMS

Armed uniformly with Mauser Rifle, Model 24, calibre 7.92 mm (similar to German Rifle 98). Also grenade launcher for rifle grenades is attached to the rifle.

2.MACHINE GUNS

Light MG Z.B. 26, weight 9 Kg, 20 round magazine.Heavy MG, temporarily the MG "Schwarzlose" which has been improved in range. Super-heavy MG, 20 mm MG, Oerlikon system has been introduced (especially for active air defence), other models are being tested.

Light MG Z.B. 26, weight 9 Kg, 20 round magazine.

Heavy MG, temporarily the MG "Schwarzlose" which has been improved in range. Super-heavy MG, 20 mm MG, Oerlikon system has been introduced (especially for active air defence), other models are being tested.

3.MORTARS

8.1 cm Stokes-Brandt, range 3000 m.9cm light Skoda mortar, model 17, range 1200 m.14cm medium mortar, model 18, range 2500 m.26cm heavy mortar, model 17, range 2700 m.

8.1 cm Stokes-Brandt, range 3000 m.

9cm light Skoda mortar, model 17, range 1200 m.

14cm medium mortar, model 18, range 2500 m.

26cm heavy mortar, model 17, range 2700 m.

4.INFANTRY GUNS FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI-TANK DEFENSE

Several models are being tested, some of them twin barrel guns.Calibre 37—40 mm and/or 66—70 mm.

Several models are being tested, some of them twin barrel guns.

Calibre 37—40 mm and/or 66—70 mm.

5.ARTILLERY PIECES

a.Light and Mountain Artillery:

8cm field gun, model 17, range 10 km8cm field gun, model 30, range 13.5 km (can also be used as an AA gun)10cm light field howitzer, model 14/19, range 10 km.7.5 Mountain gun, model 15, range 7 km.10cm Mountain howitzer, model 16/19, range 10 km.

8cm field gun, model 17, range 10 km

8cm field gun, model 30, range 13.5 km (can also be used as an AA gun)

10cm light field howitzer, model 14/19, range 10 km.

7.5 Mountain gun, model 15, range 7 km.

10cm Mountain howitzer, model 16/19, range 10 km.

b.Heavy Artillery:

10.5cm gun, model 35, range 18 km.15cm howitzer, model 14/16, range 8 km.15cm howitzer, model 25, range 12 km.15cm gun, model 15/16, range 20 km.24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km.21cm howitzer (Moerser) gun, model 18, range 10 km.30.5cm howitzer (Moerser) gun, model 16, range 12.4 km.Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers.

10.5cm gun, model 35, range 18 km.

15cm howitzer, model 14/16, range 8 km.

15cm howitzer, model 25, range 12 km.

15cm gun, model 15/16, range 20 km.

24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km.

21cm howitzer (Moerser) gun, model 18, range 10 km.

30.5cm howitzer (Moerser) gun, model 16, range 12.4 km.

Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers.

c.A A Artillery:

9cm AA-gun, model 12/20 (stationary), range 12 km.8.35cm AA-gun, model 22/24 horizontal range 18 km, vertical range 12 km.7.65cm AA-gun, model 35, horizontal range 16 km, vertical range 11 km.6.6cm AA-gun, model is being tested.

9cm AA-gun, model 12/20 (stationary), range 12 km.

8.35cm AA-gun, model 22/24 horizontal range 18 km, vertical range 12 km.

7.65cm AA-gun, model 35, horizontal range 16 km, vertical range 11 km.

6.6cm AA-gun, model is being tested.

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]

[ITEM 13] [Typescript]L I aBerlin, 9 June 1938MOST SECRETFUEHRER'S QUESTIONS ON 9 JUNE 1938Berlin, 9 June 19382 copies1st copyMOST SECRET

Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army?

Answer:

Arming and equipping of the Army with new means of war is progressing, thanks to the excellent production capacity of the Czech armament industry.

The armament was built up from the weapons of the old Austrian Army. It is slowly and steadily being modernized.

In Detail:

Artillery: Light field artillery. At present the old armament from the Austrian Army predominates. Mountain Artillery: the same. Medium artillery. New armament predominates. Heavy artillery, old armament predominates.

Infantry Weapons: The following are available: a uniform new infantry rifle; a uniform new light MG; a uniform old improved heavy MG.

Equipment of heavy infantry weapons (AT-guns, Infantry Howitzers, Mortars) and tanks is modern, but still incomplete.

A new modern AA-gun has been introduced, but is not yet available in sufficient numbers.

Reserves of weapons and ammunition seem to be guaranteed.

Summary: The Czech Army must be considered up to date as far as armament and equipment are concerned.

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]

L I aBerlin, 9 June 1938MOST SECRET2 copies1st copy

Question 2: How many battalions, etc., are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements?

Answer:

Up to now the following have been employed on fortifications:

The 36th Infantry Battalion

The 10th Infantry Howitzer Company

The 12th Anti-Tank Company

The 10th Battery

The 30th 1/3 Engineer Battalions

In addition:

The 78th German Labor Service Battalion, and later the 190th German Labor Corps Battalion.

In addition, the Commander of Army Group 2 (General Adam) has the authority to draw still further troops from his 4th Corps for the construction of emplacements if he deems it necessary.

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler][Pencilled notes by Schmundt:]Number of troopsProduction possibilities

L I aBerlin, 9 June 1938MOST SECRET2 copies1st copy

Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still occupied in unreduced strength?

Answer:

The troops have been withdrawn to some extent from the fortifications and are housed in local billets. The fortifications themselves are guarded. The barriers at the frontiers are opened.

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]

L I aBerlin, 9 June 1938MOST SECRET2 copies1st copy

Question 4: Frontier protection in the West?

Answer:

In the West as at the other frontiers, the first frontier protection is undertaken by the VGAD, then the Frontier Guard.

This protection by the Frontier Guard is directly at the frontier. At the same time as the Frontier Guard at the frontier, the fortification installations, which lie further back, receive security garrisons (reserve personnel).

Strength of the Frontier Guard on the Western Frontier:

15,200 men with 1,250 light MG's.For further details on the frontier guard see appendix.

15,200 men with 1,250 light MG's.

For further details on the frontier guard see appendix.

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]

[ITEM 14] [Typescript]L I aBerlin, 18 June 1938S.O. OnlyAccess only through Officer1.DRAFT FOR THE NEW DIRECTIVE(1st copy)In three parts.MOST SECRET4 copies1st copyWritten by an officer.S.O. OnlyAccess only through OfficerPart 1GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1. There is no danger of a preventive war by foreign states against Germany.

Germany has not committed herself to any military alliances which would automatically force Germany into a warlike conflict of foreign powers.

The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim.

Thereby, friends, interested parties and enemies can be called upon to take part in this scheme and other powers can remain indifferent even though they could not be previously placed with absolute certainty in one of these categories.

However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene.

2. The preparations of the Armed Forces must cover:

a.thorough preparation of the action against Czechoslovakia ("Fall Gruen"). See Part 2.b.Maintenance of the previous "Fall Rot" (strategic concentration with the main effort against the West.) See Part 2.c.Special preparations, mainly in the form of studies and deliberations within the Supreme Commands. See Part 3.d.Preparatory measures, in case German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power. See number 3.

a.thorough preparation of the action against Czechoslovakia ("Fall Gruen"). See Part 2.

b.Maintenance of the previous "Fall Rot" (strategic concentration with the main effort against the West.) See Part 2.

c.Special preparations, mainly in the form of studies and deliberations within the Supreme Commands. See Part 3.

d.Preparatory measures, in case German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power. See number 3.

3. If in the midst of peace, German territory is suddenly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power, armed resistance will be offeredwithout any special order.

Therefore, the branches of the Armed Forces must empower their competent Commanders on the frontier or on the coast to take on their own authority, all measures necessary to repulse the enemy attack should such a case occur. (See Reich Defense Law (RVG) para. 2).

In no event, however, may the German Reich frontier be crossed by troops or aircraft, nor any foreign territory violated, without my order.

It will not be considered a violation of German territory (see 1st sentence of this number) if single sentries or patrols cross the frontier unintentionally and accidentally or through the over-eagerness of a subordinate commander, or if aircraft fly over the frontier due to faulty navigation, or warships sail in our German territorial waters with obviously no hostile intentions.

4. This directive concerns the uniformpreparationfor war and the general strategic considerations applying to theoutbreakof the war. It will be augmented as necessitated by the various strategic concentrations by regulations dealing with matters of Special Administration and War Economy.

The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be issued by me from time to time.

K [Initialled by Keitel]Z [Initialled by Zeitzler]

MOST SECRET4 copies1st copyWritten by an officerS.O. OnlyAccess only through officerPart 2STRATEGIC CONCENTRATIONS

1.Action against Czecho-Slovakia("Fall Gruen")

The directive, issued as OKW Nr 42/38 Most Secret S.O. only L I dated 30 May 1938, remains in force. Regulations dealing with special matters, Administration and War Economy relative to "Fall Gruen" are still to be issued.

2.Two Front War with the main effort in the West("Fall Rot")

Since even a war against us started by the Western Nationsmust, in view of the situation today, begin with the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia, the preparation of strategic concentration for a war with the main effort by the Army and Air Force against the West, is no longer of primary importance.

The preparations made to date for the event ("Rot"), however, remain in effect. They contribute, as far as the Army is concerned, towards camouflaging and screening the other strategic concentration and serve, in the case of the Luftwaffe, as a preparation for the shifting of the main effort from the East to the West, which may, under certain circumstances, suddenly become necessary. They also serve as preliminary work for future possibilities of war in the West.

It is left to C in C Army to decide how far the Army strategic concentration "Rot", prepared by OKH for the beginning of the new mobilization year 38/39, will be issued to subordinates.

The tasks which arise for theNavyin "Fall Rot" will be the same as those should "Fall Gruen" be extended to include the Western European nations. The naval preparations are therefore to be continued with the previous objective.

JK [Initialled by Keitel and Jodl]

Written by an officer2. DRAFTMOST SECRETBerlin, 7 July 382 copies1st copyS.O. OnlyAccess only through officerPart 3CONSIDERATIONS

I.In connection with "Gruen".

How the political situation will develop during the execution or after the conclusion of "Gruen" cannot be predicted. Therefore the Armed Forces will confine themselves to the preparation of the measures given in Part I, Number 3, to "Fall Gruen" and "Fall Rot". However, it seems expedient to make at least theoretical considerations and calculations for several possible eventualities, to avoid being mentally unprepared. These considerations would have to cover:

a.What would have to be done if other nations intervened against us during the execution of "Gruen"—contrary to our expectations.

b.What should be done after the conclusion of "Gruen".

Toa. If, during the execution of "Gruen", France intervenes against us, the measures provided in "Fall Gruen" come into force. The primary essential in this connection is to hold the Western fortifications, until the execution of the action "Gruen" permits forces to be freed. Should France be supported by England, in this it will have small effect at first on the land-war. It is the duty of the Air Force, the Navy, and the OKW (War Economy Staff, Defense, Armed Forces Communications), however, to carry out far-sighted deliberations in their sphere.

Among the Eastern powers, Russia is the most likely to intervene. This, in the beginning at any rate, will probably consist of reinforcement of the Czech Air Force and Armament. However, the decision must not be neglected concerning what measures are to be taken if Russia were to come to the point of starting a Naval and Air war against us or even wish to penetrate into East Prussia, through the border states.

In the case of a penetration by Poland, we must hold the Eastern fortifications and East Prussia, using the Frontier Guard and other formations, until the conclusion of the action "Gruen" once more gives us freedom of movement.

Tob. If the action "Gruen" takes place still during this Mobilization year, we must be in the position after the conclusion of "Gruen" to put a provisional strategic concentration quickly into force.

In connection with the latter, further to what was said in part 1, number 3, it is of primary importance to safeguard the German frontiers, including the new addition by the Armed Forces, and still have the bulk of the Field Forces and the Air Force at our disposal. It would have to be possible to put such a future strategic concentration, "Frontier Protection," into force separately for the various frontiers.

II.Independent of "Fall Gruen"

Germany will not refrain from occupying the Memel-territory by a lightning blow in the case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict occurring. The deliberations on this eventuality must cancel the directive issued 18 March 1938 (OKW Nr 472/38 g. Kdos L Ia).

III.General

The branches of the Armed Forces are still allowed to deliberate further on the matter contained in Section I) and II). These however, may be carried out only as theoretical studies within the Supreme Commands without the participation of subordinate authorities.

ZK [Initialled by Keitel and Zeitzler]

[Item 15][Six pages of mobilization schedules, not translated]

[ITEM 16] [Covering memorandum, with report attached]Berlin, 22 July 1938Supreme Command of the Armed ForcesNo. 1233/38 Most Secret L Ia2 Copies1st CopyMOST SECRETTo: Major Schmundt or deputy

I enclose a conference report. Your attention is requested (e.g. the remark of Chief OKW).

Chief of the Supreme Commandof the Armed ForcesBy order[Signed] ZeitzlerSubmitted to the Fuehrer on 1.8.Schm [pencil note by Schmundt][Stamp]

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