To: Camp Commandants of Concentration Camps Da., Sah., Bn., Man., Flo., Neu., Au. Gr.-Ros., Natz., Nie., Stu., Arb., Rav., PW Camp Lublin.Copy to: Chief of Office D II here.
To: Camp Commandants of Concentration Camps Da., Sah., Bn., Man., Flo., Neu., Au. Gr.-Ros., Natz., Nie., Stu., Arb., Rav., PW Camp Lublin.
Copy to: Chief of Office D II here.
The Reich Fuehrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered, that the Polish and Lithuanian priests are to work fully, i.e., may be summoned for all work. The German, Dutch, Norwegian Clergymen, etc. are to be employed in future as previously only in the medicinal herb gardens.
The execution of this order is to be reported here.
By direction
(signed) LiebenhenschellSS-Obersturmbannfuehrer
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1165-PS
SECRETConcentration Camp Gross RosenOffice of the CommandantGro.Ro./Az.: KL.14f I/10.41/Su/WaGeh.Tgb.Nr. 117/41Gross Rosen, 23 October 1941Subject: Execution of Russian PWs
Reference: Oral conference with SS Major General Mueller, Gestapo, BerlinAnnexes:—1—To: Major General Mueller Berlin, Prinz-Albrechtstrasse
Reference: Oral conference with SS Major General Mueller, Gestapo, Berlin
Annexes:—1—
To: Major General Mueller Berlin, Prinz-Albrechtstrasse
The commandant's office of the concentration camp Gross Rosen submits in the annex a list of the Russian PWs who were executed on 22 October 1941 from 1700-1800 and who were subsequently cremated. The inspector of the concentration camp Oranienburg was separately notified from this station.
The Camp Commandant of the Concentration Camp Gross Rosen
The Camp Commandant of the Concentration Camp Gross Rosen
[initials illegible]SS Lt Colonel
LISTGross Rosen
List of the PWs who are to report on 22 October 1941 for transportation from the "S" Camp.
Neuhammer, 22 October 1941True copysigned: THIELE
The Chief of the SIPO and the SD B Nr 2009 B/41g - IV A I cBerlin, 9 November 1941SECRETSPECIAL DELIVERY
Subject: Transportation of the Russian PWs, destined for execution, into the concentration campsPrevious correspondence: NoneAnnexes: * * * Annexes
Subject: Transportation of the Russian PWs, destined for execution, into the concentration camps
Previous correspondence: None
Annexes: * * * Annexes
The commandants of the concentration camps are complaining that 5 to 10% of the Soviet Russians destined for execution are arriving in the camps dead or half dead. Therefore the impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such prisoners in this way.
It was particularly noted that, when marching, for example from the railroad station to the camp, a rather large number of PWs collapsed on the way from exhaustion, either dead or half dead, and had to be picked up by a truck following the convoy.
It cannot be prevented that the German people take notice of these occurrences.
Even if the transportation to the camps is generally taken care of by the Wehrmacht, the population will still attribute this situation to the SS.
In order to prevent, if possible, similar occurrences in the future, I therefore order that, effective from today on, Soviet Russians, declared definitely suspect and obviously marked by death (for example with typhus) and who therefore would not be able to withstand the exertions of even a short march on foot, shall in the future, as a matter of basic principle, be excluded from the transport into the concentration camps for execution.
I request that the leaders of the Einsatzkommandos be correspondingly informed of this decision without delay.
Distribution:All offices of the State PoliceTo the CO of the SIPO and the SD MetzTo the CO of the SIPO and the SD StrassburgFor the information of:The Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German policeThe Chief of the SIPO and the SDThe Chiefs of Departments I to VIIGruppenleiter IVD SS Lt Col Dr WeinmannThe higher SS and Police Chiefs—except in the HagueThe Inspectors of the SIPO and the SDThe Commanders in Chief of the SIPO and the SD—exceptin Metz and StrassburgThe Commanders of the SIPO and the SDThe Inspectors of the concentration campsAll commandants of the concentration campsFor:signed: MUELLERCertified:signed: L. WOLFERTOffice Girl
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1166-PS
TOP SECRETOranienburg, 15 August 1944SS—Economic—Administration DepartmentSection D—Concentration Camps—DIV—189—8.44—Ru./Schm.Diary No. 199/44 Secret
Subject: Report of the number of prisoners and Survey of prisoners clothing type "G" and "Z" and the supply of "G" available.Reference: Telephone call by SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Waschkau on 15.8.44.To: Chief of Section B, SS-Gruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant-General of the Waffen-SS LoernerBerlin—Lichterfelde/West Unter den Eichen 126-135
Subject: Report of the number of prisoners and Survey of prisoners clothing type "G" and "Z" and the supply of "G" available.
Reference: Telephone call by SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Waschkau on 15.8.44.
To: Chief of Section B, SS-Gruppenfuehrer and Lieutenant-General of the Waffen-SS Loerner
Berlin—Lichterfelde/West Unter den Eichen 126-135
With reference to the above-mentioned telephone call, I am sending herewith a report on the actual number of prisoners for 1.8.1944 and of the new arrivals already announced, as well as the clothing report for 15.8.44.
(1) The actual number on 1.8.44, consisted of:a.male prisoners 379 167b.female prisoners 145 119In addition, there are the following new arrivals:
Most of the prisoners are already on the way and will be received into the Concentration Camps within the next few days.
(2) Survey of clothing for male prisoners in the possession of the prisoners or the Concentration Camp.
(3) Survey of the clothing for female prisoners in the possession of the prisoners or the Concentration Camp.
(4) Owing to a total at the time of 524,286 prisoners and to the new batch of 612,000[3]prisoners already announced and on the way, it is impossible for me to undertake to clothe completely all the unexpected new arrivals, in spite of the latest assignment of special allotments of yarn and textiles for the Hungary program through the Reich Ministry of Economics.
I would also like to mention that the civilian clothing previously received from the Hungary program has all been distributed and precious little can be expected from other useful articles received from the Poland action (Warsaw).
The civilian clothing already distributed, particularly under-clothes and shoes, have to be replaced very soon owing to their inferior quality. Their durability, in comparison with new articles is very limited.
Further it must be kept in mind that the employment of prisoners in special measures [Sondermassnahmen] A and B is a great strain on clothes and footwear and the expected durability must be decreased.
For the above-mentioned reasons, I would ask you, Gruppenfuehrer, to be so kind as to request that Reich Ministry of Economics to take the necessary steps so that further special allotments of yarn and leather may be assigned to meet the exceedingly great need for prisoners' clothing. Mention might also be made to the Reich Ministry of Economics that, up to the present, enormous quantities of rags of unusable civilian clothes, from the various actions, have been sent for disposal from Auschwitz and other camps to the Reich Ministry of Economics, and more are to follow.
Head of Administration[initial illegible]SS Sturmbannfuehrer[Burger]
[3]including approx. 387,000 men and 225,000 women.
[3]including approx. 387,000 men and 225,000 women.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1168-PS
Memorandum from SCHACHT to HITLER, [Identified by SCHACHT on 16 October 1945]
Memorandum from SCHACHT to HITLER, [Identified by SCHACHT on 16 October 1945]
May 3, 1935Financing of Armament
The following explanations are based upon the thought, that the accomplishment of the armament program with speed and in quantity is the problem of German politics, that everything else therefore should be subordinated to this purpose, as long as the main purpose is not imperilled by neglecting all other questions. Even after March 16, 1935 the difficulty remains, that one cannot undertake the open propagandistic treatment of the German people for support of armament without endangering our position internationally (without loss to our foreign trade). The already nearly impossible financing of the armament program is rendered hereby exceptionally difficult.
Another supposition must be also emphasized. The printing press can be used only for the financing of armament to such a degree, as permitted by maintaining of the money value. Every inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials and increases the domestic prices, is therefore like a snail biting its own tail. The circumstance that our armament had to be camouflaged completely till March 16, 1935 and even since this date the camouflage had to be continued to a larger extent, making it necessary to use the printing press (bank note press) already at the beginning of the whole armament program, while it would have been natural, to start it (the printing press) at the final point of financing. In the portfolio of the Reichsbank are segregated notes (for this purpose: armament) of 3,775 millions and 866 millions, altogether 4,641 millions, out of which the armament notes amount to RM 2,374 millions (Status of April 30, 1935). The Reichsbank has invested the amount of marks under its jurisdiction, but belonging to foreigners in * * * notes of armament. Our armaments are also financed partly with the credits of our political opponents. Furthermore 500 million Reichsmarks were used for financing of armament, which originated out of Reichsanleihe [Federal loans] placed with savings banks. In the regular budget the following amounts were provided. For the budget period 1933/34 RM 750 millions, for the budget period 1934/35 RM 1,100 millions, and for the budget period 1935/36 RM 2,500 millions.
The amount of deficits of the budget since 1928 increases after the budget 1935/36 to 5-6 millions RM. This total deficit is already financed at the present time by short term credits of the money market. It therefore reduces in advance the possibilities of utilization of the public market for the armament. The Minister of Finance correctly points out at the defense of the budget: As a permanent yearly deficit * * * is an impossibility; as we cannot figure with security with increased tax revenues in amount balancing the deficit and any other previous debits, as on the other hand a balanced budget is the only secure basis for the impending great task of military policy, for all these reasons we have to put in motion a fundamental and conscious budget policy which solves the problem of armament financing by organic and planned reduction of other expenditures not only from the point of receipt, but also from the point of expenditure, e.g., by saving.
How urgent this question is, can be deducted from the following, that a large amount of task has been started by the state and party and which is now in process, all of which are not covered by the budget, but from contributions and credits, which have to be raised by industry in addition to the regular taxes. The existing of various budgets side by side, which serve more or less public tasks, is the greatest impediment for gaining a clear view over the possibilities of financing the armaments. A whole number of ministries and various branches of the party have their own budgets, and for this reason have possibilities of incomes and expenses, though based on the sovereignty of finance of the state, but not subject to the control of the Minister of Finance and therefore also not subject to the control of the cabinet. Just as on the sphere of politics the much too far reaching delegation of legislative powers to individuals brought about various states within the states, exactly in the same way the condition of various branches of state and party, working side by side and against each other, has a devastating effect on the possibility of financing. If on this territory concentration and unified control is not introduced very soon, the solution of the already impossible task of armament financing is endangered.
We have the following tasks:
(1) A deputy is entrusted finding all sources and revenues, which have its origin in contributions to the Federal government, to the state and party and in profits of public and party enterprises.
(2) Furthermore experts, entrusted by the Fuehrer, have to examine, how these amounts were used and which of these amounts can in the future be withdrawn from their previous purpose.
(3) The same experts have to examine the investments of all public and party organizations, to which extent this property can be used for the purpose of armament financing.
(4) The federal ministry of finances is to be entrusted to examine the possibilities of increased revenues by way of new taxes or increasing of existing taxes.
The up-to-date financing of armaments by the Reichsbank under existing political conditions was a necessity and the political success proved the correctness of this action. The other possibilities of armament financing have to be started now under any circumstances. For this purpose all absolutely non-essential expenditures for other purposes have not to take place and the total financial strength of Germany, limited as it is, has to be concentrated for the one purpose of armament financing. Whether the problem of financing, as outlined in program, succeeds, remains to be seen, but without such concentration it will fail with absolute certainty.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1183-PS
COPYThe Commissioner for the Four Year PlanDepartment ArbeitseinsatzBerlin SW 11, Saarlandstr. 96, 29 Jan 1942V a 552/27Express Letter!To:—
The Government of the Government-GeneralMain Labor Division,Cracow:The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories,Labor and Social Division,Oslovia the bureau of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories.The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories,The Hague;The Military Administrator for Belgium and Northern France,Economic Division, Group VII (Arbeitseinsatz),Brussels.The Military Administrator in France,Administrative Staff, Economic Division,Paris;The Plenipotentiary for Economics in SerbiaCommand Officer,Semlin near Belgrade;The Chief of the Civilian Administration inLuxemburg;The Chief of the Civilian Administration in Lorraine,Metz;andThe Chief of the Civilian Administration in Alsace,Straszburg.
The Government of the Government-General
Main Labor Division,Cracow:
Main Labor Division,Cracow:
The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories,
Labor and Social Division,Oslovia the bureau of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories.
Labor and Social Division,Oslo
via the bureau of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Norwegian territories.
The Reich Commissioner for the occupied Dutch territories,The Hague;
The Military Administrator for Belgium and Northern France,
Economic Division, Group VII (Arbeitseinsatz),Brussels.
Economic Division, Group VII (Arbeitseinsatz),Brussels.
The Military Administrator in France,
Administrative Staff, Economic Division,Paris;
Administrative Staff, Economic Division,Paris;
The Plenipotentiary for Economics in Serbia
Command Officer,Semlin near Belgrade;
Command Officer,Semlin near Belgrade;
The Chief of the Civilian Administration inLuxemburg;
The Chief of the Civilian Administration in Lorraine,Metz;
andThe Chief of the Civilian Administration in Alsace,Straszburg.
Subject: Increased mobilization of man-power for the German Reich from the occupied territories and preparations for mobilization by force.
Subject: Increased mobilization of man-power for the German Reich from the occupied territories and preparations for mobilization by force.
On the one hand, the labor shortage which was rendered more acute by the draft for the Wehrmacht, and on the other hand, the increased scope of the armament problem in the German Reich, render it necessary that man-power for service in the Reich be recruited from the occupied territories to a much greater extent than heretofore, in order to relieve the shortage of labor. Therefore, any and all methods must be adopted which make possible the transportation, without exception and delay, for employment in the German Reich, of man-power in the occupied territories which is unemployed or which can be released for use in Germany after most careful screening.
To the High Command of the Armed ForcesWi Rue Amt Berlin W 35[Page 2]
This mobilization shall first of all, as heretofore, be carried out on a voluntary basis. For this reason, the recruiting effort for employment in the German Reich must be strengthened considerably. But if satisfactory results are to be obtained, the German authorities, who are functioning in the occupied territories, must be able to exert any pressure necessary to support the voluntary recruiting of labor for employment in Germany. Accordingly, to the extent that may be necessary, the regulations in force in the occupied territories in regard to shift in employment and withdrawal of support upon refusal to work, must be tightened. Supplementary regulations concerning shift in employment must above all ensure that older personnel who are freed must be exchanged for younger personnel to make up for it, so that the latter may be made available for the Reich. A far-reaching decrease in the amount of relief granted by Public Welfare must also be effected in order to induce laborers to accept employment in the Reich. Unemployment relief must be set so low that the amount in comparison with the average wages in the Reich and the possibilities there for sending remittances home may serve as an inducement to accept employment in the Reich. When refusal to accept work in the Reich is not justified, the compensation must be reduced to an amount barely enough for subsistence, or even be cancelled. In this connection, partial withdrawal of ration cards and assignment to particularly heavy obligatory labor may be considered.
However, all misgivings must give way before the necessity of supplying the deficit in man-power caused by excessive draft calls into the Armed Forces, in order to avoid detriment to the armament industry. For this purpose the forcible mobilization of workers from the occupied territories cannot be disregarded, in case the voluntary recruiting is unsuccessful. The mere possibility of mobilization by force will, in many cases, make recruiting easier.
[Page 3]
Therefore, I ask you immediately to take any measures in your district which will promote the employment of workers in the German Reich on a voluntary basis. I herewith request you to prepare for publication regulations applying to forced mobilization of laborers from your territory for Germany, so that they may be decreed at once, in case recruiting on a voluntary basis will not have the desired result, that is relief of the man-power shortage in the Reich. I request you to inform me of the measures taken by you.
Copy for cognizance. Signed: Dr. MansfeldAttested by: [signature illegible]employee
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1188-PS
20 May 1941Decree of the FuehrerConcerning the Economy in the Newly OccupiedEastern Territories
(1) In the newly occupied eastern territories Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering as the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan shall issue all orders concerning matters within his jurisdiction which are essential to the highest utilization of existing stocks, to the highest increase of the industrial capacity, and to the further building up of all economic resources that can be utilized for the German war economy.
(2) In order to accomplish his task, he may also give orders to Wehrmacht agencies.
(3) This decree becomes effective to-day. It may only be published after special authorization.
Fuehrer's HeadquartersThe Fuehrer,The Chief of the German High CommandThe Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Remarks
Reichsleiter Rosenberg wants to see no limitations applied to the principle that civil agencies of the newly occupied eastern territories should get orders and directives from nobody else but him. He therefore desires that within these territories he should also be authorized to give orders concerning measures with regard to the Four Year Plan. He is willing, however, to follow those directives which the Reich Marshall, in his capacity as a delegate for the Four Year Plan, has given personally. Rosenberg, therefore, suggested that the delegate for the Four Year Plan should use the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories as his Plenipotentiary General for carrying out his tasks in the newly occupied eastern territories. The latter should then receive orders from him (Goering) for that purpose. The Reich Marshall turned down such an arrangement.
In the event that Reichsleiter Rosenberg's suggestion is disapproved by the Fuehrer, Rosenberg at least wants to be able to coordinate measures taken by him as the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories with those measures taken by the delegate of the Four Year Plan. In order to make sure of that he desires to insert after the word "jurisdiction" [Befugnisse] in Paragraph 1 the words "via the Reich Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories".
Reichsleiter Rosenberg, furthermore, has misgivings relative to the publication of this decree, since it left no doubt that Germany was only interested in the occupied eastern territories for purposes of extreme economic exploitation. If that became known in these territories the political reaction there will be disastrous.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1189-PS
in the field 4/11/1941Wi Stab Ost Fue/Ia, Az.B.NR. 6730/41Special Instructions No. 44Feeding of Civilian Population in the occupied Eastern Territories
Weekly Maximum in Gramsa.For population which does no work worth mentioning.
d.Children under 14 years old and Jews:Half of the maximum according to a.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1193-PS
SECRETThe Reich Marshall of the Greater German ReichDeputy for the Four Year PlanThe State SecretaryBerlin W 8, Leipziger Str. 3, 14 November 1941V.P. 19008/2 Secret.
In the annexes I submit, in three copies, a note on the result of a conference which was held on 7 November 1941 by the Reich Marshall and which concerned the
Employment of Soviet Russians
Meanwhile the Reich Marshall has ordered (cf. V of the note) that the utilization of those Russians who are not under the armed forces (prisoners of war and free workers) should be centrally directed in the Reich, including the protectorate and the General Government, as well as in the Reich Commissariats by his agency Arbeitseinsatz. To perform its functions, it will avail itself of the general administration of the Arbeitseinsatz, and in the occupied Eastern territories of the organization for the Arbeitseinsatz which is at the disposal of the Economic Staff East, respectively the Reich commissar, general commissar, etc.
The Reich Marshall has made the agency Arbeitseinsatz responsible for a rapid and appropriate solution of all problems which are connected with the utilization of the Russians in the civilian domain. He requests that the responsible agencies should acknowledge the importance of this matter by fullest cooperation and should help in eliminating the existing difficulties to the best of their abilities.
The Reich Marshall expects to receive on 15 December 1941 the first report of the agency Arbeitseinsatz as to what extent the directives issued by him on 7 November have been set into practice.
Signed: KoernerAuthenticated: SchwingleMinistry Registrar
Conference of 7 November 1941 about theEmployment of Soviet Russians
The Reich Marshall gave the following directives for the Arbeitseinsatz of the Soviet Russians:
I.The stronger labor reserves in the zone of the interior are also decisive for the war.
The Russian workers have proved their productive capacity during the development of the huge Russian industry. Therefore it must be made available to the Reich from now on. Objections against this order of the Fuehrer are of the secondary nature. The disadvantages which can be created by the Arbeitseinsatz have to be reduced to a minimum: the task especially of counter-intelligence and security police.
II.The Russian in the zone of operations.
He is to be employed particularly in building roads and railroads, in clearing work, clearing of mines, and in building airports. The German construction battalions have to be dissolved to a great extent (Example: Air Forces!); the German skilled workers belong to the war industry; it is not their task to shovel and to break stones, the Russian is there for that.
III.The Russian in the territories of the Reich Commissar and of the General Government.
The same principles apply as in II. Furthermore, stronger utilization in agriculture; if machines are lacking, human hands have to produce what the Reich has to request from the agricultural sector in the East. Furthermore, sufficient native labor has to be provided for the ruthless exploitation of Russian coal mines.
IV.The Russian in the Reich territory including the Protectorate.
The number of the employed depends on the requirement. By determining the requirement, it is to be considered that workers of other states who produce little and eat much are to be shipped out of the Reich and that in the future the German woman should come less into the foreground in the labor process. Beside the Russian prisoners of war, free Russian workers should also be used.
A.The Russian prisoner of war.
1. Theselectionhas to take place already in the collecting camps, beyond the Reich border. The profession and physical condition are decisive. At the same time screening as to nationality and according to the requirements of the security police and counter-intelligence must take place.
2. Thetransportationhas to be organized just as the selection and not improvised. The prisoners are to be forwarded rapidly. Their feeding should be orderly and their guarding unconditionally secured.
3.Officersare to be excluded from the work as much as possible,commissarsas a matter of principle.
4. The Russian belongs in first line to the followingwork places(in order of priorities):