Cuba's Friends in Congress—Senator Proctor's Address to His Colleagues—A Notable Exhibition of Patriotism—An Appropriation for the National Defense—Relief for the Survivors and Victims of the Maine—The Recognition of Cuban Independence.
From the date of the first attempt of the people of Cuba to secure their independence from Spain, they have had advocates in the American Congress who have worked with voice and vote in their behalf. After the commencement of the revolution in 1895 these champions gradually increased in numbers and influence, until at the time of Mr. McKinley's inauguration they included in their ranks many of the leaders in both houses.
In February, 1898, several Senators and Representatives went to Cuba for the purpose of studying the conditions on the island, and to gain a personal knowledge of the results of Spain's policy of rule or ruin.
Senator Proctor was one of this committee, and after their return to the United States, in a speech to his colleagues, he made the strongest argument in favor of intervention in behalf of Cuba that was ever made in the Senate of the United States. He had carefully prepared his address, and he delivered it as an official report of what he had observed on the island. He gave no opinion of what action should be taken by the government. He said the settlement "may well be left to an American President and the American people." But while he did not make a recommendation in so many words, he left the impression with all who heard him that he favored a declaration by our government of the independence of Cuba. He declared that he was opposed to annexation, and, while many Cubans advocated the establishment of a protectorate by the United States, he could not make up his mind that this would be the best way out of the difficulty. He told his associates that he believed the Cubans capable of governing themselves, and reinforced this statement by the assertion that the Cuban population would never be satisfied with any government under Spanish rule. The senator's remarkable speech undoubtedly had a powerful effect, both in influencing congressional action, and in swaying public opinion. As an able and responsible member of Congress and an ex-secretary of war, his words would carry weight under any circumstances, but apart from these considerations, the speech was notable because of its evident fidelity to facts, and its restraint from everything resembling sensationalism.
There was never a more notable exhibiton of harmony and patriotism in any legislative body in the world than occurred in the House of Representatives when Congressman Cannon presented a bill appropriating $50,000,000 for the national defense and placing this amount in President McKinley's hands, to be expended at his discretion.
Party lines were swept away, and with a unanimous voice Congress voted its confidence in the administration. Many members who were paired with absent colleagues took the responsibility of breaking their pairs, an unprecedented thing in legislative annals, in order that they might go on record in support of this vast appropriation to maintain the dignity and honor of their country. Speaker Reed, who as the presiding officer, seldom voted, except in case of a tie, had his name called and voted in his capacity as representative. The scene of enthusiasm which greeted the announcement of the vote—yeas, 311; nays, none—has seldom been paralleled in the House. The bill passed the Senate without a dissenting vote, and, on March 9, the President signed the measure, thus making it a law.
On March 21, the House unanimously passed the bill for the relief of the survivors and victims of the Maine disaster. The bill reimbursed the surviving officers and men for the losses they sustained to an amount not to exceed a year's sea pay, and directed the payment of a sum equal to a year's pay to the legal heirs of those who perished.
When the President sent to Congress the report of the Naval Board of Examiners the feeling of that body at once found open expression in resolutions proposing a declaration of war, recognition of the independence of Cuba, armed intervention, and other decisive and warlike steps against Spain. Every group of senators talked of Cuba. Constant and continual conferences were held, and all recognized the seriousness of the occasion. On the House side it was apparent that the majority could no longer be controlled by what was known as the conservative element, led by the speaker. Groups of members in a state of excitement were to be seen on every hand. It was generally acknowledged that a serious condition had arisen, that a crisis was at hand.
On April 11 the long expected message was received. In it the President asked Congress to authorize him to take measures to secure a termination of hostilities in Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable form of government, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as might be necessary. The message was received in silence. The most notable criticism made was the entire absence of any reference to Cuban independence. The admission in the message that the President had proposed an armistice to Spain until October provoked vigorous comment. But conservative members were highly pleased with the position taken by the President, and many still hoped that war might be prevented.
However, this did not prevent the purchase of a number of armed cruisers from foreign powers, which were transferred to the United States flag. The ships of several passenger and mail lines were also purchased, or leased as auxiliary cruisers, and were at once remanned and put in commission. The most notable examples were the two American built ships, St. Patil and St. Louis of the American line. The new purchases were fitted for their new uses at once, and the preparations for war went on without delay.
Congress, taking its cue from the President, united upon the following resolutions which were signed by the President on April 20:
Joint resolutions for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba demanding that the government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.
Whereas, The abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with 260 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; therefore, be it resolved;
First—That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.
Second—That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and Cuban waters.
Third—That the President of the United States be, and hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.
Fourth—That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people.
The Spanish government was deluded by the belief that in the event of war our country would not be able to present a united front, and that sectional animosities would weaken our strength. The action of Congress from the time of the first rumors of war to the end of the session snowed how little ground there was for this belief. The representatives of the people from all sections of our broad land gave President McKinley loyal support in every undertaking, and the South vied with the North, the East with the West, in expressions of devotion to our nation and our flag.
PRESIDENT McKINLEY ACTS.
The Message to Congress—Loss of American Trade—TerribleIncrease in the Death Rate—American Aid for the Starving—ThePresident's Proposition to Spain—Grounds for Intervention—TheDestruction of the Maine—The Addenda.
With the press and public of the entire country at a fever heat of indignation, and the evident determination on the part of a large majority of the members of the Congress of the United States to bring matters to a crisis, it was evident to all that the time for action had arrived.
The President yielded to the popular demand, and on April 11 he sent to Congress the following message:
To the Congress of the United States:
Obedient to that precept of the Constitution which commands the President to give from time to time to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, it becomes my duty now to address your body with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years has raged in the neighboring island of Cuba. I do so because of the intimate connection of the Cuban question with the state of our own Union, and the grave relation the course of which it is now incumbent upon the nation to adopt, must needs bear to the traditional policy of our Government if it is to accord with the precepts laid down by the founders of the Republic and religiously observed by succeeding administrations to the present day.
The present revolution is but the successor of other similar insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which during its progress has subjected the United States to great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance and disturbance among our citizens, and by the exercise of cruel, barbarous and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people.
Since the present revolution began, in February, 1895, this country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequaled in the history of the island, and rarely paralleled as to the number of the combatants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution of modern times, where a dependent people striving to be free have been oppressed by the power of the sovereign State. Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed, its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins, and its people perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves constrained in the observance of that strict neutrality which our laws enjoin, and which the law of nations commands, to police our waters and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlawful act in aid of the Cubans.
Our trade has suffered, the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our people have been so seriously tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens, which has inevitably found its expression from time to time in the National Legislature, so that issues wholly external to our own body politic stand in the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement that becomes's self-contained commonwealth, whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all foreign entanglements. All this must needs awaken, and has indeed aroused, the utmost concern on the part of this government, as well during my predecessor's term as in my own.
In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban war became so onerous that my predecessor made an effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of this government in any way that might tend to an honorable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed, through the refusal of the Spanish Government then in power to consider any form of mediation, or, indeed, any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The resistance of the insurgents was in no wise diminished.
The efforts of Spain were increased, both by the despatch of fresh levies to Cuba and by the addition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman phase, happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilized Christian peoples. The policy of devastation and concentration by the Captain-General's bando of October, 1896, in the province of Pinar del Rio was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the power of the Spanish arms was able to reach by occupation or by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwelling in the open agricultural interior, were driven into the garrison towns or isolated places held by the troops. The raising and moving of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired, mills destroyed, and, in short, everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support was commanded by one or the other of the contending parties and executed by all the powers at their disposal.
By the time the present administration took office a year ago, reconcentration—so-called—had been made effective over the better part of the four central and western provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio. The agricultural population, to the estimated number of 300,000, or more, was herded within the towns and their immediate vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad, and exposed to the most unsanitary conditions. As the scarcity of food increased with the devastation of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want became misery and starvation.
Month by month the death rate increased in an alarming ratio. By March, 1897, according to conservative estimate from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados, from starvation and the diseases thereto incident, exceeded 50 per centum of their total number. No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering from the general dearth, could give no aid.
In this state of affairs my administration found itself confronted with the grave problem of its duty. My message of last December reviewed the situation, and narrated the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and opening the way to some form of honorable settlement. The assassination of the Prime Minister, Canovas, led to a change of government in Spain. The former administration, pledged to subjugation without concession, gave place to that of a more liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of reform involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Puerto Rico.
The overtures of this government made through its new Envoy, General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective amelioration of the condition of the island, although not accepted to the extent of admitted mediation in any shape, were met by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase, would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that more humane methods should henceforth prevail in the conduct of hostilities.
While these negotiations were in progress, the increasing destitution of the unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed earnest attention. The success which had attended the limited measure of relief extended to the suffering American citizens among them by the judicious expenditure through the Consular agencies of the money appropriated expressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the 24th of December last I caused to be issued an appeal to the American people inviting contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, followed this on the 8th of January by a similar public announcement of the formation of a Central Cuban Relief Committee, with headquarters in New York city, composed of three members representing the National Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the community.
Coincidentally with these declarations, the new Government of Spain continued to complete the policy already begun by its predecessor of testifying friendly regard for this nation by releasing American citizens held under one charge or another connected with the insurrection, so that, by the end of November, not a single person entitled in any way to our national protection remained in a Spanish prison.
The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation or extermination a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies in the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of both—a condition which in effect ended the Ten Years' War by the truce of Zanjon. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as we are, deeply and intimately by its very existence.
Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty in a spirit of true friendliness, no less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring about an immediate termination of the war. To this end I submitted on the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation and correspondence through the United States Minister at Madrid, propositions to the Spanish Government looking to an armistice until October 1, for the negotiation of peace with the good offices of the President.
In addition I asked the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration so as to permit the people to return to their farms and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities so as to afford full relief.
The reply of the Spanish Cabinet was received on the night of the 31st ultimo. It offers as the means to bring about peace in Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the Insular Parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to reach a final result, it being, however, understood that the powers reserved by the Constitution to the central government are not lessened or diminished. As the Cuban Parliament does not meet until the 4th of May nest, the Spanish Government would not object, for its part, to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the insurgents from the General-in-Chief, to whom it would pertain in such a case to determine the duration and conditions of the armistice.
The propositions submitted by General Woodford and the reply of the Spanish Government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of which are before me, and are substantially in the language above given.
There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, or as the active ally of one party or the other.
As to the first, it is not to be forgotten that during the last few months the relation of the United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention in many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate pacific result just and honorable to all interests concerned. The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest, unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by differences between us and Spain and unstained by the blood of American citizens.
The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral, to stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents where neighboring States have interfered to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual settlement.
The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows:
First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable to or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.
Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.
Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.
Fourth. Aid which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace and entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us, and with which our people have such trade and business relations; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined; where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless altogether to prevent, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.
These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already transmitted to Congress the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry on the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana during the night of the 15th of February. The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation.
The Naval Court of Inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Government, was unanimous in its conclusions that the destruction of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion—that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be fixed.
In any event the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that, is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish Government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace and rightfully there.
Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic correspondence, a despatch from our Minister to Spain, of the 26th ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs assured him positively that Spain would do all that the highest honor and justice required in the matter of the Maine. The reply above referred to of the 31st ultimo also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the note of the Spanish Minister at Washington of the 10th instant as follows:
As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views between the report of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the fact be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose decision Spain accepts in advance. To this I have made no reply.
In view of these facts and these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.
And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island, I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens. The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors.
Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by theConstitution and the law, I await your action.
Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me. This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another justification for our contemplated action.
(Signed,) WILLIAM McKINLEY.
Executive Mansion, April 11, 1898.
Growth of the White Squadron in a Single Decade—Progress of OurNavy a Gratifying Ode after It Was Fairly Started—How the UnitedStates Stands in Comparison with the Other Nations of the World—List of Ships in the American Navy—List of Ships in the Navy ofSpain at the Beginning of the War—Interest of All CountriesCentered on the Result of Our Naval Battles—Modern Guns andProjectiles—The Armies of the Two Combatants—Coast Defenses ofthe United States.
Three elements enter into the fighting efficiency of nations at war: the strength of their navies, the strength of their armies and the condition of their coast defences. For the first time in many years general attention of the people of the United States was centered upon these conditions when the outbreak of hostilities began to threaten. Inasmuch as it was an admitted fact that most of the fighting would be done at sea, or at least that the efficiency of our fleets would be the most important factor, most of the attention was directed to a study of the navy.
The constructions of what we call the new navy of the United States, "the white squadron," which has placed us sixth in the rank of the naval powers of the world, instead of so far down that we were scarcely to be counted at all, has all been done in less than twelve years. It may be that to stand sixth in rank is not yet high enough, but the progress of a single decade certainly is remarkable.
After the Civil War, when hostilities on our own coast and complications abroad seemed to be at an end, the care of the navy was abandoned and ships were sold with scarcely a protest, almost as entirely as had been done eighty years before, at the end of the Revolution. There was even less reason for this policy, because in 1785 the country was poor and needed the money the ships brought, while in the twenty years following the Civil War there was no such excuse of national poverty. By 1885 there was no United States navy at all worthy the name, for the wooden vessels on the list, with their obsolete guns, were of no value whatever in the event of hostilities with a foreign power that had kept up its equipment with rifled guns and ironclads.
The movement to repair the decay began when, in 1881, Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt appointed the first advisory board, presided over by Rear-Admiral John Bodgers, "to determine the requirements of a new navy." This board reported that the United States should have twenty-one battleships, seventy unarmored cruisers of various sizes and types, twenty torpedo boats, five rams and five torpedo gunboats, all to be built of steel. The report was received by Congress and the country with the attention it merited, but to get the work started was another matter.
The economists had been praising the policy of idleness in naval construction, claiming first that we were at peace and did not need to spend money on expensive vessels and, next, that naval construction was in an experimental stage and that we should let the European nations go to the expense of the experiments, as they were doing, and when some result had been reached, take advantage of it, instead of wasting our own money in work that would have to be thrown away in a few years.
When the country became convinced that a navy was needed, it was found that we could not follow out that pleasant little theory. Our naval authorities could not obtain the facts and the experience they wanted from other nations, and our shipyards could not build even one of the armored ships. We could not roll even the thinnest of modern armor-plates, and could not make a gun that was worth mounting on a modern vessel if we had it.
The shipyard of John Roach did the first work on the new navy, and during Secretary Chandler's term of office built the Chicago, the Boston, the Atlanta and the Dolphin. Instead of battleships, the first of the fleet were third-rate cruisers. Armor-plate was bought in a foreign market, and we actually went abroad for the plans of one our largest cruisers—the Charleston.
In 1885 the navy department came under the administration of Secretary William C. Whitney, and it was beginning with his years of service that the greatest progress was made. While our shipyards were learning to build ships, the gunmakers and the makers of armor-plate were learning their craft too, so that progress was along parallel lines. In 1886 the sum of $2,128,000 was appropriated for modern rifled guns. The first contract for armor-plate was signed in 1887. Since that time the plants for construction have been completed and armor-plate equal to the best in the world turned out from them. Ten years of apprenticeship have taught us how to build whatever we need to carry on naval warfare.
By 1894 the United States had risen to the sixth among the naval powers of the world, the first ten and their relative strength expressed in percentage of that of Great Britain being as follows:
Great Britain 100 United States 17France 68 Spain 11Italy 48 China 6Russia 38 Austria 5Germany 21 Turkey 3
Since that time the relative position of the leaders has not materially changed, although some estimates are to the effect that Russia and Italy have changed places and that Spain has gained slightly on the United States. Of the ones at the foot of the procession all have dropped below the station assigned them, by the advance of Japan, which has come from outside the file of the first ten and is now eighth, ranking between Spain and China. The estimates are based on a calculation of all the elements that enter into the efficiency of the navies, such as tonnage, speed, armor, caliber and range of armament, number of enlisted men and their efficiency. Such calculations cannot be absolute, for they cannot measure at all times the accuracy of the gunnery of a certain vessel. The human equation enters so prominently into warfare that mathematical calculations must be at all times incomplete. Americans will be slow to believe, however, that they are at any disadvantage in this detail, whatever their material equipment may be.
The following table shows the strength of the navy of the United States. In that part of the table marked "first rate" the four ships placed first are first-class battle ships, the Brooklyn and New York are armored cruisers, the Columbia, Olympia and Minneapolis protected cruisers, the Texas a second-class battle ship and the Puritan a double-turret monitor. Among the second-raters all but the Miantonomah, Amphitrite, Monadnock and Terror (monitors) are protected cruisers. The newly bought boats, New Orleans and Albany, belong in this class. The third-raters are a heterogeneous lot, consisting of cruisers, gunboats, old monitors and unprotected cruisers. Of the fourth raters, Vesuvius is a dynamite ship, the Yankee and Michigan are cruisers, the Petrel, Bancroft and Pinta are gunboats and the Fern is a transport. The remaining classes of the table are homogeneous. The government has recently purchased numerous tugs and yachts not accounted for in the table:
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull(tons) main battery horsepower
Iowa 11,340 18 12,105 SteelIndiana 10,288 16 9,738 SteelMassachusetts 10,288 16 10,403 SteelOregon 10,288 16 11,111 SteelBrooklyn 9,215 20 18,769 SteelNew York 8,200 18 17,401 SteelColumbia 7,375 11 18,509 SteelMinneapolis 7,375 11 20,862 SteelTexas 6,315 8 8,610 SteelPuritan 6,060 10 3,700 IronOlympia 5,870 14 17,313 Steel
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull(tons) main battery horsepower
Chicago 4,500 18 9,000 SteelBaltimore 4,413 10 10,064 SteelPhiladelphia 4,324 12 8,815 SteelMonterey 4,084 4 5,244 SteelNewark 4,098 12 8,869 SteelSan Francisco 4,098 12 9,913 SteelCharleston 3,730 8 6,666 SteelMiantonomah 3,990 4 1,426 IronAmphitrite 3,990 6 1,600 IronMonadnock 3,990 6 3,000 IronTerror 3,990 4 1,600 IronLancaster 3,250 12 1,000 WoodCincinnati 3,213 11 10,000 SteelRaleigh 3,213 11 10,000 SteelAtlanta 3,000 8 4,030 SteelBoston 3,000 8 4,030 Steel
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull(tons) main battery horsepower
Hartford 2,790 13 2,000 WoodKatahdin 2,155 4 5,068 SteelAjax 2,100 2 340 IronCanonicus 2,100 2 340 IronMahopac 2,100 2 340 IronManhattan 2,100 2 340 IronWyandotte 2,100 2 340 IronDetroit 2,089 10 5,227 SteelMontgomery 2,089 10 5,580 SteelMarblehead 2,089 10 5,451 SteelMarion 1,900 8 1,100 WoodMohican 1,900 10 1,100 WoodComanche 1,873 2 340 IronCatskill 1,875 2 340 IronJason 1,875 2 340 IronLehigh 1,875 2 340 IronMontauk 1,875 2 340 IronNahant 1,875 2 340 IronNantucket 1,875 2 340 IronPassaic 1,875 2 340 IronBennington 1,710 6 3,436 SteelConcord 1,710 6 3,405 SteelYorktown 1,710 6 3,392 SteelDolphin 1,486 2 2,253 SteelWilmington 1,392 8 1,894 SteelHelena 1,392 8 1,988 SteelAdams 1,375 6 800 WoodAlliance 1,375 6 800 WoodEssex 1,375 6 800 WoodEnterprise 1,375 4 800 WoodNashville 1,371 8 2,536 SteelMonocacy 1,370 6 850 IronThetis 1,250 0 530 WoodCastine 1,177 8 2,199 SteelMachias 1,177 8 2,046 SteelAlert 1,020 3 500 IronRanger 1,020 6 500 IronAnnapolis 1,000 6 1,227 CompVicksburg 1,000 6 1,118 CompWheeling 1,000 6 1,081 CompMarietta 1,000 6 1,054 CompNewport 1,000 6 1,008 Comp
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull(tons) main battery horsepower
Vesuvius 929 3 3,795 SteelYantic 900 4 310 WoodPetrel 892 4 1,095 SteelFern 840 0 0 WoodBancroft 839 4 1,213 SteelMichigan 685 4 365 IronPinta 550 2 310 Iron
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull (tons) main battery horsepower
1-Gushing 105 3 1,720 Steel 2-Ericsson 120 3 1,800 Steel 3-Foote 142 3 2,000 Steel 4-Rodgers 142 3 2,000 Steel 5-Winslow 142 3 2,000 Steel 6-Porter 0 3 0 Steel 7-Du Pont 0 3 0 Steel 8-Rowan 182 3 3,200 Steel 9-Dahlgren 146 2 4,200 Steel 10-T. A. M. Craven 146 2 4,200 Steel 11-Farragut 273 2 5,600 Steel 12-Davis 132 3 1,750 Steel 13_Fox 132 3 1,750 Steel 14-Morris 103 3 1,750 Steel 15-Talbot 46 1/2 2 850 Steel 16-Gwin 46 1/2 2 850 Steel 17-Mackenzie 65 2 850 Steel 18-McKee 65 2 850 Steel 19-Stringham 340 2 7,200 Steel 20-Goldsborough 247 1/2 2 0 Steel 21-Bailey 235 2 5,600 Steel Stiletto 31 2 359 Wood
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull(tons) main battery horsepower
Fortune 450 0 340 IronIwana. 192 0 300 SteelLeyden 450 0 340 IronNarkeeta 192 0 300 SteelNina 357 0 388 IronRocket 187 0 147 WoodStandish 450 1 340 IronTraffic 280 0 0 WoodTriton 212 0 300 SteelWaneta 192 0 300 SteelUnadilla 345 0 500 SteelSamoset 225 0 450 Steel
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull(tons) main battery horsepower
Monongahela 2,100 4 0 WoodConstellation 1,186 8 0 WoodJamestown 1,150 0 0 WoodPortsmouth 1,125 12 0 WoodSaratoga 1,025 0 0 WoodSt. Mary's. 1,025 0 0 Wood
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull(tons) main battery horsepower
Franklin 5,170 4 1,050 WoodWabash 4,650 0 950 WoodVermont 4,150 0 0 WoodIndependence 3,270 .6 0 WoodRichmond 2,700 .2 692 Wood
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull(tons) main battery horsepower
New Hampshire 4,150 .6 0 WoodPensacola 3,000 0 680 WoodOmaha. 2,400 0 953 WoodConstitution 2,200 4 0 WoodIroquois 1,575 0 1,202 WoodNipsic 1,375 4 839 WoodSt. Louis 830 0 0 WoodDale. 675 0 0 WoodMinnesota 4,700 9 1,000 Wood
NAME Displacement Guns in indicated Hull(tons) main battery horsepower
Kearsarge 11,525 22 10,000 SteelKentucky 11,525 22 10,000 SteelIllinois 11,525 18 10,000 SteelAlabama 11,525 18 10,000 SteelWisconsin 11,525 18 10,000 SteelPrinceton 1,000 6 800 CompPlunger 168 2 1,200 SteelTug No. 6 225 0 450 SteelTug No. 7 225 0 450 SteelTraining ship. 1,175 6 0 Comp
Spain's navy is decidedly weak when compared with that of the United States. A mere glance at the two tables will be sufficient to show the difference. Spain's list of unarmored cruisers is long, but four of our battle ships or swift, modern, armored cruisers could blow the lot out of the water. In torpedo boats we compare favorably with Spain. In one respect Spain is stronger, that is in her six speedy torpedo boat destroyers. This table accounts for every war ship Spain has, to say nothing of the few antique merchantmen of the Spanish liner company which can be turned into cruisers.
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Pelayo 9,900 22 17.0 SteelVitoria (inefficient)7,250 0 11.0 Iron
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Numancia 7,250 10 11.0 Iron
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Carlos V 9,235 28 20.0 SteelCisneros 7,000 24 20.0 SteelCataluna 7,000 24 20.0 SteelPrincess Asturias 7,000 24 20.0 SteelAlmirante Oquendo 7,000 30 20.0 SteelMaria Teresa 7,000 30 20.0 SteelVizcaya 7,000 30 20.0 SteelCristobal Colon 6,840 40 20.0 Steel
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Alfonso XII 5,000 19 20.0 SteelLepanto 4,826 25 20.0 Steel
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Reina Christina 3,520 21 17.5 SteelAragon 3,342 24 17.5 SteelCartilla 3,342 22 17.5 SteelNavarra 3,342 16 17.5 SteelAlfonso XII 3,090 23 17.5 SteelReina Mercedes 3,090 21 17.5 SteelVelasco 1,152 7 14.3 SteelC. de Venadito 1,130 13 14.0 SteelUlloa 1,130 12 14.0 SteelAustria 1,130 12 14.0 SteelIsabel 1,130 15 14.0 SteelIsabel II 1,130 16 14.0 SteelIsla de Cuba 1,030 12 16.0 SteelIsla de Luzon 1,030 12 16.0 SteelEnsenada 1,030 13 15.0 SteelQuiros 315 0 0 IronVillabolas 315 0 0 Iron—— 935 5 0 Wood
TORPEDO BOATS. [Footnote: Armed with two and four torpedo tubes, six quick fire and two machine guns.]
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Alvaro de Bezan 830 0 20.0 SteelMaria Molina 830 0 20.0 SteelDestructor 458 0 20.0 SteelFilipinas 750 0 20.0 SteelGalicia 571 0 20.0 SteelMarques Vitoria 830 0 20.0 SteelMarques Molina 571 0 20.0 SteelPinzon 571 0 20.0 SteelNueva Espana 630 0 20.0 SteelRapido 570 0 20.0 SteelTemerario 590 0 20.0 SteelYanez Pinzon 571 0 20.0 Steel
GUNBOATS. [Footnote: There are eighteen others of smaller size, which with the above were built for service in Cuban waters, and are now there.]
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Hernon Cortes 300 1 12.0 SteelPizarro 300 2 12.0 SteelNunez Balboa 300 1 12.5 SteelDiego Velasquez 200 3 12.0 SteelPonce de Leon 200 3 12.0 SteelAlvarado 100 2 12.0 SteelSandoval 100 2 12.0 Steel
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Audaz 400 6 30.0 SteelFuror 380 6 28.0 SteelTerror 380 6 28.0 SteelOsada 380 6 28.0 SteelPluton 380 6 28.0 SteelProsperina 380 6 28.0 Steel
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Ariete 0 0 26.1 SteelRayo 0 0 25.5 SteelAzor 0 0 24.0 SteelHalcon 0 0 24.0 SteelHabana 0 0 21.3 SteelBarcelo 0 0 19.5 SteelOrion 0 0 21.5 SteelRetamosa 0 0 20.5 SteelOrdonez 0 0 20.1 SteelEjercito 0 0 19.1 SteelPollux 0 0 19.5 SteelCastor 0 0 19.0 SteelAire 0 0 8.0 Steel
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
General Concha 520 0 0 SteelElcano 524 0 0 SteelGeneral Lego 524 0 0 SteelMagellanes 524 0 0 Steel
(Battle ship.)
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
—— 10,000 0 0 Steel
(Armored cruisers.)
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
—— 10,500 0 0 SteelPedro d'Aragon 6,840 0 0 Steel
(Protected cruisers.)
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Reina Regente 5,372 0 0 SteelRio de la Plata 1,775 0 0 Steel
(Torpedo boats.)
Five of Ariete type and one of 750 tons.
NAME. Tonnage. Guns in Speed in Hull.Batteries. knots/hour.
Magellanes 6,932 0 17.0 SteelBuenos Aires 5,195 0 14.0 SteelMontevideo 5,096 0 14.5 SteelAlfonso XII 5,063 0 15.0 SteelLeon XIII 4,687 0 15.0 SteelSatrustegui 4,638 0 15.0 SteelAlfonso XIII 4,381 0 16.0 SteelMaria Cristina 4,381 0 16.0 SteelLuzon 4,252 0 13.0 SteelMindanao 4,195 0 13.5 SteelIsla de Panay 3,636 0 13.5 SteelCataluna 3,488 0 14.0 SteelCity of Cadiz 3,084 0 13.5 Steel
The puzzle that was troubling every naval authority as well as every statesman in the civilized world, at the outbreak of the war between the United States and Spain, was what would be the results of a conflict at sea between the floating fortresses which now serve as battle-ships. Since navies reached their modern form there had been no war in which the test of the battle-ship was complete. Lessons might be learned and opinions formed and prophesies made from the action of battle-ships in the war between China and Japan, the war between Chili and Peru, and from the disasters which had overtaken the Maine in the harbor of Havana and the Victoria in her collision with the Camperdown, as well as the wreck of the Reina Regente and others. But in all these, combine the information as one might, there was insufficient testimony to prove what would happen if two powers of nearly equal strength were to meet for a fight to a finish.
Whatever was uncertain, it was known at least that there would be no more sea fights like those of the last century and the first half of this, when three-deck frigates and seventy-four-gun men-of-war were lashed together, while their crews fought with small arms and cutlasses for hours. Those were the days when "hearts of oak" and "the wooden walls of England" made what romance there was in naval warfare, and the ships of the young United States won respect on every sea. In the fights of those days the vessels would float till they were shot to pieces, and with the stimulus of close fighting the men were ready to brave any odds in boarding an enemy's craft. It was well understood that the changed conditions would make very different battles between the fighting machines of to-day.
That a naval battle between modern fleets, armed with modern guns, would be a terribly destructive one both to the ships and to the lives of those who manned them, was conceded by all naval authorities. The destructiveness would come not only from the tremendous power and effectiveness of the guns, but also from the fact that the shell had replaced the solid shot in all calibers down to the one-pounder, so that to the penetrating effect of the projectile was added its explosive power and the scattering of its fragments in a destructive and death-dealing circle many feet in diameter.
The modern armor-piercing shell, made of hardened steel, and with its conical point carefully fashioned for the greatest penetrating power, has all the armor-piercing effectiveness of a solid shot of the same shape, while its explosiveness makes it infinitely more destructive. For the modern shell does not explode when it first strikes the side or armor of an enemy's ship, but after it has pierced the side or armor and has exhausted its penetrative effect. The percussion fuse is in the base of the shell, and is exploded by a plunger driven against it by the force of the impact of the shell on striking. The time between the impact of the shell and its explosion is sufficient for it to have done its full penetrative work.
It first must be understood that all modern guns on ships-of-war are breech-loading and rifled, and that the smooth bore exists only as a relic, or to be brought out in an emergency for coast defense, when modern guns are not available. From the thirteen-inch down to the four-inch, the guns are designated by their caliber, the diameter of their bore, and the shot they throw, while from that to the one-pounder they take their name from the weight of the shot. Everything below the one-pounder is in the machine-gun class.
The base of rapid-fire work is the bringing together in one cartridge of the primer, powder, and shell. When the limit of weight of cartridge, easily handled by one man, is reached, the limit of rapid-fire action is also reached; and, although the quick-moving breech mechanisms have been applied abroad to guns of as large as eight-inch caliber, such guns would rank as quick, rather than rapid firing, and would require powder and shot to be loaded separately.
On the modern battleships the function of the great guns is the penetration of the enemy's armor, either at the waterline belt or on the turrets and gun positions, while that of the rapid-firers is the destruction of the unarmored parts or the disabling of the guns not armor protected. The six, three, and one-pounders direct their rain of shots at the turret portholes, gun shields, or unprotected parts of the ship, having also an eye to torpedo-boats, while from the fighting tops, the Gatlings rain a thousand shots a minute on any of the crew in exposed positions. With such a storm of large and small projectiles it would seem to be rather a question of who would be left alive rather than who would be killed.
The guns in use in the United States navy are the 13-inch, 12-inch, 10-inch, 8-inch, 6-inch, 5-inch, 4-inch, 6-pounders, 3-pounders, 1-pounder, Hotchkiss 37 mm. revolver cannon, and the machine guns. In the following table is given the length and weight of these guns, as well as of the shell they carry:
Length Powder weightof gun, charge, of shell,GUNS. feet. pounds. pounds.
One-pounder 5.1 .3 1Three-pounder 7.3 1.7 3Six-pounder 8.9 3.0 6Fourteen-pounder 11.6 8.0 14Four-inch 13.7 14.0 33Five-inch 17.4 30.0 50Six-inch 21.3 50.0 100Eight-inch 28.7 115.0 250Ten-inch 31.2 240.0 500Twelve-inch 36.8 425.0 850Thirteen-inch 40.0 550.0 1,100
The 14-pounder, although not included in the navy armament, is given for the purpose of comparison, since it is with guns of this caliber that some of the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers are armed. The largest gun as yet mounted on our largest torpedo-boats is the 6-pounder, while a single 1-pounder is the gun armament of the ordinary torpedo-boat. The Hotchkiss revolver cannon is not given in the table because its caliber, etc., is the same as that of the 1-pounder, and, in fact, the latter has superseded it in the latest armaments, so that it is now found only on the older ships of the modern fleet. The machine guns are not given because their effective work is practically the same. The Gatling is of 45-caliber, and uses the government ammunition for the Springfield rifle.
A look over the table shows some general principles in the matter of powder and shell used. The powder charge is about half the weight of the shell, while the length of the shell is a little over three times its diameter.
To attain its extreme range a gun must be given an elevation of about fifteen degrees. The greatest elevation given any of the guns on shipboard is about six degrees. This limit is made by two factors—the size of the portholes or opening in the turrets for the larger guns, and the danger of driving the gun backward and downward through the deck by any greater elevation. The practical range of the great guns of a ship, the ten, twelve, and thirteen-inch, is not, therefore, believed to be over five or six miles, and even at that range the chances of hitting a given object would be very small. A city could, of course, be bombarded with, effect at such a range, since a shell would do tremendous damage wherever it might strike, but a city to which a ship could approach no nearer than say seven miles would be safe from bombardment.
The muzzle velocities given the shells from the guns of the navy are something tremendous, while the muzzle energy is simply appalling. The shell from the thirteen-inch gun leaves the muzzle at a velocity of 2,100 feet a second, and with an energy of 33,627-foot tons, or the power required to lift one ton one foot. From this velocity the range is to 1,800 feet a second in the one-pounder, although from the three-pounder at 2,050 feet it averages about the same as the thirteen-inch. The five-inch rapid-fire gun has the greatest muzzle velocity at 2,250 feet. The muzzle energy is, of course, small in the smaller guns, being only twenty-five-foot tons in the one-pounder and 500 tons in the fourteen-pounder.
The power of penetration has already been given in a general way, but the power of penetration of steel is much greater. At its muzzle velocity the thirteen-inch shell will penetrate 26.66 inches of steel, the twelve-inch, 24.16 inches; the ten-inch, 20 inches, and the five-inch, 9 inches. The one-pound shell bursts in piercing one-fourth and nine-sixteenths-inch plates, scattering its fragments behind the target.
It may be interesting to note that the cost of one discharge of a thirteen-inch gun is $800, and that when a battleship like the Massachusetts lets loose her entire battery, both main and secondary, the cost of a single discharge is $6,000.