II.OF GALL.OF THE FACULTIES.

II.OF GALL.OF THE FACULTIES.

Gall’s philosophy consists wholly in the substitution ofmultiplicityforunity. In place of one general and single brain,[46]he substitutes a number of small brains: instead of one general sole understanding, he substitutes several individual understandings.[47]These pretendedindividual understandingsare thefaculties.

Now, Gall admits the existence of twenty-seven of these faculties, each one of them (since each one is a peculiar understanding) endowed with its perceptive faculty, its memory, its judgment, its imagination; &c.[48]

Hence, there are twenty-seven perceptive faculties, twenty-seven memories, twenty-seven judgments, twenty-seven imaginations, &c.

For, if we are to follow Gall, each attribute is not less distinct than each faculty. The memory, the judgment, imagination, &c. of one faculty are not the memory, judgment, or imagination of another faculty.

“The sense of numbers,” says he, “possesses a judgment for the relations of numbers; the sense of the arts, a judgment for works of art; but where the fundamental faculty is wanting, the judgment relative to objects of that faculty must necessarily be wanting likewise.”[49]

He says further: “It is impossible for an individual to possess imagination and judgment for any object with the fundamental faculty for which he has not been gifted by nature.”[50]

Thus, beyond all doubt: there are twenty-seven faculties; and as there are twenty-seven faculties, there must be twenty-seven memories, judgments, imaginations, &c.

In one word, there is no such thing as a general understanding; but there are twenty-seven special understandings, with three or four times twenty-seven distinct attributesof each. Such is the entire psycology of Gall.

To proceed. Gall’s twenty-seven faculties are: the instinct of propagation, love of offspring, self-defence, the carnivorous instinct, the sense of property, friendship, cunning, pride, vanity, circumspection, memory for things, memory for words, sense of locality, sense of persons, sense of language, of relations of colours, relations of sounds, relations of numbers, of mechanics, of comparative sagacity, the metaphysical genius, sarcasm, poetic talent, benevolence, imitation, religion, firmness.

Gall says that these faculties are innate,[51]and this assertion certainly will not be contested.

Locke, who so vigorously opposed the doctrine of innate ideas, never decried theinnatenessof our faculties. He always regarded them as natural, that is to say,innate.[52]

Condillac himself, who charges Locke with having considered the faculties of the soul asinnate, in making these charges confounds thefaculties of the soulwith theoperations of the soul.[53]

Now, that which is perfectly true as to theoperations of the soul, is by no means so as regards herfaculties. All the faculties of the soul are innate and contemporary, for they are nothing more thanmodesof the soul; indeed,they are the soul itself, viewed under different aspects. But the operations of the soul succeed each other, and beget each other. There can be no memory without previous perception; there can be no judgment without recollection. In order that there may be a will, there must have been a judgment, &c.

After saying that the faculties are innate, Gall says also that they areindependent.[54]

And if, by the wordindependent, he means distinct, there is nothing less contestible. But if, by this wordindependent, he understood (as indeed he does understand) that each faculty is a real understanding, the question is altered and the difficulty begins.

For, if each individual faculty is a proper understanding, it follows that there are as many understandings as there are faculties, and the understanding ceases to beone, andthemeis no longerone. I am well aware that this is exactly what Gall means; he says it, and reiterates it throughout his work. He says it, but does not prove it. And how should he prove it? Can we prove any thing against our consciousness?

“I remark here, in the first place,” says Descartes, “that there is a great difference between the mind and the body, in that the body is, by its nature, always divisible, and the mind wholly indivisible. For, in fact, when I contemplate it—that is, when I contemplate my own self—and consider myself as a thing that thinks, I cannot discover in myself any parts, but I clearly know and conceive that I am a thing absolutely one and complete.”[55]

Gall reverses the common philosophy, and it is worthy of remark, that the whole of his philosophy, which he thinks so novel,[56]is, tothe very letter, nothing more nor less than this very inversion. According to common philosophy, there is one general understanding—a unit; and there are faculties which are but modes of this understanding. Gall asserts that there are as many kinds of peculiar intelligences as there are faculties, and that the understanding in general is nothing more than a mode or attribute of each faculty. He says so expressly.

His words are: “The intellectual faculty and all its subdivisions, such as perception, recollection, memory, judgment, and imagination, are not fundamental faculties, but merely their general attributes.”[57]

Gall first inverts the common philosophy, and then contends for the existence of all the consequences of that common philosophy.

He suppresses theme, but insists that there is a soul. He abolishes the freewill, and yet contends that there is such a thing as morals. He makes of the idea of God an idea that is merely relative and conditional, but yet asserts that there may be such a thing as religion.

I say he abolishes theme; for themeis the soul. The soul is the understanding, general and one; but if there be no understanding as general, there can be no soul.

According to Gall, there is nothing real and positive except thefaculties.

And these faculties alone are possessed of organs. “None of my predecessors,” says he, “had any knowledge of those forces which alone are the functions of special cerebral organs.”[58]

By the contrary reasoning, neither the will, nor the reason, nor the understanding, arepossessed of any organs, for they are nothing but forces; they are nothing but nouns collective—words.

“These observations may suffice,” says Gall, “to convince the reader that there cannot exist any special organ of the will, or the freewill.”[59]He adds: “It is equally impossible that there should be any peculiar organ of the reason.”[60]

Finally he says: “From all that I have now said it follows, that the idea of an organ of the intellect or understanding is quite as inadmissible as the idea of an organ of the instinct.”[61]

Hence there can be nought but the faculties; and, according to Gall, these faculties are so distinct, that he attributes to each particular one a separate organ.[62]He divides the understanding into little understandings.

Descartes expressed himself in the following words: “We do not conceive of any body, except as divisible; whereas the human mind cannot conceive of itself except as indivisible; for in fact we are incapable of conceiving of half a soul.”[63]Gall, however, settles that point. He makes half souls. He retrenches or adds as many faculties as suits his plan. These faculties are separated by material limits. He goes so far as to say that such or such a faculty acts with greater or less facility upon such or such another faculty, according as one happens to be situated nearer to or farther off from the other.

“As the organ of the arts,” says he, “is located far from that of the sense of colour, the circumstance explains why historical painters have rarely been colourists.”[64]

Thus, we find that the faculties alone arepossessed offorces. These forces alone are endowed with organs; and these organs, by which they are kept separate from each other, separate them to distances sufficiently great to hinder, in certain cases, one given faculty from exercising any influence over another. Therefore, there is no such thing as unity; there is no unit faculty, no unit understanding; there is nome; and if there be nome, there can be no soul.

In the same way he abolishes thefreewill. Will, liberty, reason, in his view,[65]are nothing butresults, as I have already stated.

“To the end,” says he, “that man may not be confined merely to the ability to wish—in order that he may actually will—the concurrence of several superior faculties is requisite. The motives must be weighed, compared, andjudged; the decision resulting from this operation is denominated will.”[66]

“Reason,” he further adds, “supposes a concerted action of the superior faculties. It is the judgment pronounced by the superior intellectual faculties.”[67]

Hence, the will is nothing but adecision; reason is nothing but ajudgment. The facultiesconcert together. What a singular philosophy, which always substitutes the fictions of language for the facts of the conscious sense, and which is satisfied with those fictions!

Freewill is either a power, a force, or it is nothing. He resolves that it is merely aresult. Gall therefore abolishes the freewill.

Indeed, he makes of the idea of God nothing but a relative and conditional idea, for he supposesthat this idea comes from a particular organ; and he supposes that that organ may possibly, in some case, be wanting.

“It cannot be doubted,” says Gall, “that the human race are endowed with an organ by means of which it recognises and admires the Author of the universe.”[68]

“God exists,” adds he, “for there is an organ to know and adore him.”[69]

But he continues: “Climate and other circumstances may obstruct the development of the cerebral part, by means of which the Creator designed to reveal himself to his creature man.”[70]

Again: “If there were a people whose organization should be altogether defective in this respect, they would be as little susceptible as any other kinds of animal, of the religious idea or sentiment.”[71]

Further: “There is no God for beings whose organization does not bear the original stamp of determinate faculties.”[72]

What! If I happen not to possess a little peculiar organ, (for it may be wanting,) can I not feel that God exists! And how can I be an intelligence, knowing myself, and yet not knowing that God is? I do not more strongly feel that I am, than that God is. “This idea,” (the idea of God) says Descartes, “is born and produced along with me, just as is the idea of myself.”[73]

My understanding, which perceives itself and feels itself to be an effect, necessarily perceives the intelligent Cause which produced it. “It is a very evident thing,” says Descartes again, “that there must be at least as much reality in a cause as in the effect it produces; and since I am a thing that thinks,whatsoever be in fact the cause of my being, I am compelled to confess, thatit alsois something that thinks.”[74]

Hitherto I have considered Gall’s philosophy only under its speculative points of view; what would it be, if considered in a practical relation?

In one of his happy moments, Diderot wrote the following very remarkable phrase: “The ruin of liberty overthrows all order and all government, confounds vice and virtue together, sanctions every monstrous infamy, extinguishes all shame and all remorse, and degrades and deforms without recovery the whole human race.”[75]

Nothing astonishes a phrenologist.

“Let us imagine,” says Gall, “a woman in whom the love of offspring is but little developed, ... if, unfortunately, the organ of murderbe very much developed in her, need we be surprised if her hand....”[76]&c.

Organization explains every thing.

“These last named facts show us,” says Gall, “that this detestable inclination (the inclination to commit murder) has its source in a vice of the organization.”[77]

“Let those haughty men,” says he again, “who cause nations to be slaughtered by thousands, know that they do not act of their own accord, but that Nature herself has filled their hearts with rage and destructiveness.”[78]

No, indeed! This is not what they must know; for, thanks be to God, it is not true. What they ought to know, what they ought to be told, is, that although Providence has left to man the power to do evil, he has also endowed him with the power to do good. That which man ought to know, that whichshould be instilled into his mind and heart is, that he has a free power, and that this power ought not to be misdirected; and that he who in his own nature misdirects it, no matter under what form of philosophy he takes refuge, is a being who degrades his nature.

Under the title offundamental faculties, Gall confounds all things together—the passions, the instinct, the intellectual faculties. These faculties, which are at the basis of his whole philosophy, he knows not even how to denominate them. He calls them instincts,[79]inclinations, senses, memories, &c. There is a memory or sense of things, a memory or sense of persons, &c. He confounds the instinct that leads certain animals to live inelevated regions with pride, which is a moral sentiment in man;[80]the carnivorous instinct with courage;[81]he believes that conscience, (which is the soul judging itself,) is nothing but a modification of a particular sense, the sense of benevolence, &c.[82]

The hesitation of his mind is visible every where.

“I leave it to the reader,” says he, “to decide whether the fundamental faculty to which this penchant relates, should be denominated sense of elevation, self-esteem,” &c.[83]

“To speak correctly,” continues he, “firmness is neither a penchant nor a faculty; it is a mode-of-being, which gives to a man a distinctive quality, which is called character.”[84]

Finally, he writes the following paragraph, perhaps the most singular one that he ever wrote, for it shows in the clearest manner how little confidence he had in his own psycology.

“If we are materialists because we do not admit the existence of a unit-faculty of the soul, but recognise several primitive faculties, we ask whether the ordinary division of the faculties of the soul into understanding, will, attention, memory, judgment, imagination, andaffections and passions, expresses nothing more than a primitive unit-faculty? If it be asserted that all these faculties are merely modifications of a sole and same faculty, what can hinder us from making the same assertion as to the faculties whose existence we do admit.”[85]

To be sure, nothing prevents you. Or rather every thing constrains you to do so. There is therefore one sole faculty, of which all the other faculties are but moods. You return then to the common philosophy, and consequently you no longer possess a peculiar philosophy.

The problem proposed by Gall is at the same time physiological, psycological, and anatomical.

In our first article an account has been given of Gall’sphysiology, and it has been shown to be generally disproved by directexperiment. In the present one hispsycologyhas been examined, and it is confuted by the consciousness (le sens intime). It only remains for us now to examine hisanatomy.

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