CHAPTER XIII.DAILY DUTIES.
From principles to practice.
330.As in our study of the Stoic philosophy we turn aside from the supreme problems of the universe, such as gather round the questions of the divine purpose, the existence of evil, and unfettered choice, our way becomes easier. Our new problems, dealing with the constitution of the human soul, and the ideals of human life in the state and in the individual, are perhaps not simpler in themselves, but they are of narrower range, and in finding our way over the first rough ground we learn to tread with some assurance, so that we now feel ourselves, as it were, on a downward path. For all that, the problems of the universal law and the perfect man must still be compared to mountain tops, if not to the highest peaks of all. But from this point on we steadily descend towards the plains, to that common and practical life by which the worth of philosophy is tested. We no longer gaze on the same bright sunlight or breathe the same invigorating air; philosophy enters a region of mists and shadows, and even learns to adapt her language to new neighbours. But her meaning is the same as before, and the pathway to the heights is not closed behind her.
The daily round.
331.The region we have now reached is that of ‘daily duties,’ by which phrase we propose to translate here the Greek καθήκοντα and the Latinofficia[1]. This word is defined by Zeno as meaning ‘that which it comesin one’s way to do[2],’ and its quiet sound at once brings it into contrast with the proud claims of Virtue. The contrast is in fact great. Virtue, displaying itself in Right Action, is only possible for reasoning beings, that is, for gods and men; and within our view it is only attained, if at all, by the wise man. But daily duty is common to the wise and the unwise[3]; it not only extends to children, but also to the unreasoning animals[4]and to plants[5]. Virtue always contemplates the Universal law; for daily duty it is sufficient to follow the individual nature[6]. Virtue cannot even be understood except by the trained philosopher, whilst the principles of daily duty may be explained to the simple. To use a comparison from mathematics, daily duty is the projection of virtue upon the plane of ordinary life. Between the two there always remains an assured correspondence. Each Right Action which Virtue achieves is at the same time the performance of a daily duty, and that in the most complete manner[7]; each daily duty performed by the unwise is a step by which he may in the end climb to Wisdom[8].
First laws of nature.
332.The subject of ‘daily duties’ was treated both by Zeno[9]and by Cleanthes[10], and is implied in the theory of Stoic ethics as a whole; it has also a special relation to the doctrine of advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless the Stoics do not directly say that daily duty consists in the seeking of advantages, but that it is based upon primary ends which nature sets up (πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν,principia naturae)[11]. This phrase indicates the source of this part of the Stoic philosophy; it marks teaching common to the Peripatetic school and the Academy, and accepted by Zeno from his teacher Polemo[12]. We are not informed how Zeno and Cleanthes elaborated thissubject; and when we find it taken up in earnest, the spirit of the Academy is firmly established. Thus the Stoic demand for certain knowledge is here set aside; and we are told that the standard of daily duty is ‘that which when done can reasonably be defended[13]’; which definition closely corresponds with the definition of the supreme good by Diogenes of Babylon ‘to take a reasonable course in the choice of things according to nature[14].’ Thus strong will and assured conviction are no longer required; the door is thrown open for convention, opportunism, and respectability. The daring moral theories and bold paradoxes of the founders of Stoicism tend to disappear from sight, and are replaced by shrewd good sense and worldly wisdom: in short, by the doctrine of ‘making the best of both worlds.’ The subject was therefore congenial to Panaetius, who was both a practical statesman and an admirer of Plato and Aristotle; and it was from this standpoint that Stoicism so rapidly won its way with the Roman nobility of the last century of the republic. Panaetius’ book περὶ καθηκόντων was the basis of Cicero’s workde Officiis, which is the only systematic treatise which we possess on Stoic ethics, and therefore generally the most convenient source of information. As however this work leans very strongly towards Peripatetic views, it will frequently be necessary to refer to other authorities, amongst which Cicero’sde Finibusbest represents the older Stoics, and Seneca and Epictetus the Stoics of the Roman principate.
From the animals to man.
333.It is no departure from the fundamental principles of Stoicism when we learn that the ‘first lessons of nature’ are those which are imprinted upon every animal at its birth[15]; Zeno himself had sought for the natural law of marriage by a like method[16]. The first naturallesson is that each animal seeks, not indeed pleasure as the Epicureans hold, but its own preservation and the maintenance of its life in its completeness[17]. At a later stage is imparted the desire of sexual union for procreation’s sake, and with it some kind of affection for each one’s offspring[18]. But nature’s best lessons are reserved for man; as to look into the future, and regard life as a whole[19]; to interest himself in his fellows, to attend public festivities, and to procure the amenities of a civilized life for himself and those dependent upon him[20]; in spare hours, to acquire information on points of historical or philosophical interest[21]; in riper life to claim freedom, and to refuse to submit to any arbitrary commands[22]; and finally, to perceive in all things harmony and beauty, and to avoid any disturbance of it by wilful action[23]. ‘Such,’ says Cicero, ‘is the picture of a beautiful life; and could we see it with our eyes (as Plato says), great would be our desire to possess Wisdom for a bride[24].’
Wavering as to the standard.
334.In this general sketch we miss a clear ethical standard. The first lessons of nature may easily be perverted, so far as they are common to men and animals, for they point towards the acts of eating, drinking, and sexual union, all of which are associated by the ordinary man with pleasure in a vicious sense. Hence arises a danger (from which many Stoics do not keep clear), that we may fall into the terrible error of the Epicureans, and hold that pleasure itself is a first law of nature[25]. It is therefore necessary to lay it downthat man should aim specially at those results which are characteristic of human nature, that is at the development of powers which he does not share with the lower animals. So far the Academy and the Porch might travel together. But the only, higher capacities recognised by the Stoics are reason and the political sense, which is an aspect of the universal reason; such matters as antiquarian interests and the appreciation of beauty could only be introduced under Academic influence. The last, however, as we shall see, is to become with Panaetius the predominant consideration[26].
The four virtues.
335.From the enunciation of general principles we pass on to the separate virtues. Virtue in the strict sense can only be possessed by the wise man; he therefore alone can practise the virtues; nevertheless we may use this and like terms in a secondary sense to describe those adumbrations or reflections of virtue which fall within the reach of the ordinary man[27]. The classification of the virtues varies. Panaetius divided virtue into two parts, theoretical and practical, and Seneca follows him on this point[28]. It was perhaps Chrysippus who distinguished between virtues that are ‘arts’ (τέχναι) and which are based on theoretical principles, and those which are ‘acquirements’ (δυνάμεις), being attained by practice[29]. But generally speaking the division of Virtue into the four cardinal virtues of Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness is accepted as sufficient; by subdivision the number of virtues may be increased to any extent; and in scholastic classifications of virtue we find lists which have multiplicity for their direct aim[30].
Wisdom.
336.Wisdom (φρόνησις,prudentia) is considered by Zeno not only as the first of the virtues, but as the foundation of all; so that Courage is wisdom in suffering, Justice is wisdom in distribution, and Soberness is wisdom in enjoyment[31]. His successors treated Science (ἐπιστήμη,scientia) as the parent virtue[32], thus placing Wisdom side by side with the other cardinal virtues, yet losing the point of Zeno’s genealogy. The writers of the later periods desired to recognise separately contemplative wisdom, and therefore introduced as a subdivision of the first cardinal virtue ‘Speculation’ (σοφία,sapientia)[33]. But the Stoics generally held that all wisdom must justify itself by practical results. The study of the so-called ‘liberal arts’ has a value for children, for it prepares the way for virtuous training[34]. Logic is needed to protect us against fallacious reasoning[35], and physics that we may rightly understand the universe and its providential government, upon which the conception of duty depends[36]; in this sense we may speak of logic and physics as virtues, that is, as subdivisions of the virtue of wisdom[37]. The study of physics is also admirable because it elevates the soul[38]. Geometry, law, and astrology are useful in the several professions[39]. But study when carried to excess, as by antiquarians,bookworms, and other learned time-wasters, is nothing but folly[40].
Justice.
337.The second cardinal virtue is Justice (δικαιοσύνη,iustitia), of which Chrysippus drew a striking allegorical picture. ‘She is of virgin form, to show that she is incorruptible and does not give way to bad men; ... of firm and fierce aspect, ... inspiring fear in the wicked, confidence in the good; her eyes are keen-sighted, her bearing is at once sad and awe-inspiring[41].’ Cicero distinguishes Justice in the narrower sense from ‘Beneficence.’ Justice proper is a political virtue, and consists in respect for the rights and property of individuals. By nature indeed all things are common; but since they have become private property by occupation, conquest, law, contract, and so forth, individuals may keep their own, provided they do not forget that they have always the duty of contributing to the common good[42], and that even slaves have reasonable claims upon them[43]. Beneficence needs the guidance of principle, and must be determined by considerations of person and occasion. The claims of persons upon us depend on propinquity; country, parents, wife and children must be first considered, then other relatives, then fellow-citizens, lastly men in general[44]. The consideration of the degrees of propinquity (σχέσεις) was a favourite subject with Epictetus, and a useful defence against those who maintained that the Stoic sage was lacking in natural affection[45]. The virtue of Justice appealed specially to the statesman in both its applications, and is dealt with fully by Panaetius, and by Cicero after him.
Courage.
338.The third cardinal virtue is Courage (ἀνδρεία,fortitudo), which retains the tradition of the ‘strength and force’ of Socrates. This again, according to Cicero, has two parts, one passive, which consists in despising fortune and its buffets, and is in harmony with the picture of the wise man as usually drawn; the other part, which we may call Greatness of Soul (μεγαλοψυχία,magnitudo animi) is shown in the undertaking of great enterprises. The virtue of Courage is characteristically Stoic, and may be considered, like its counterpart Wisdom, as the foundation and source of all the virtues; the knowledge of good and evil can only be attained by the soul that is duly strung to vigorous resolution[46]. The Stoics of the principate perhaps insist most of all on this virtue, which alone makes men independent of all that it lies with Fortune to give and to take away. The man of courage will therefore detach himself from fortune’s gifts; he will treat them as household furniture lent to him which may be at any moment recalled[47].
Death not to be feared.
339.Courage appears in its highest development in the face of tyranny and death. It is the tyrant’s boast that he has men in his power: but the brave man is an exception. His rank and his property may be taken away; he may be subjected to the torture; his life may be forfeited; but the soul, that is the man himself, is beyond the tyrant’s reach[48]. To pain he answers ‘if I can bear it, it will be light; if I cannot bear it, it cannot be long[49].’ Amidst all the extremities of fire and rack men have been found who never groaned, never begged for mercy, never answered a question, and indeedlaughed heartily[50]. Of death the Stoic has no fear; not only is it no evil, but it is to be welcomed as part of the course of nature[51]; it is the best of friends, for it offers a release from all troubles, and in particular from the oppression of the tyrant[52]. We do not indeed deny that normally life is an advantage, that nature’s first lesson is self-preservation, and that death in itself is a thing terrible to contemplate[53]; but life is not the more desirable for its length[54]; and when old age begins to shatter the powers of the mind, and to degrade the man to the life of a vegetable, nature is calling him to quit his mortal body[55]. At no period is life worth purchasing at the cost of the loss of honour, without which it loses its savour[56]. The philosopher therefore will not merely see with calm confidence the approach of death; he will go forward to meet it of his own free will, if only he is assured that reasonable choice points that way.
Reasonable departure.
340.The doctrine of ‘reasonable departure’ (εὔλογος ἐξαγωγή,rationalis e vita excessus) plays a prominent part in the Stoic ethics. It cannot rightly be described as the recommendation of suicide; for the Stoics do not permit a man to pass sentence of death upon himself, but only to cooperate in carrying out the decree of a higher power. The doctrine is intended in the first instance to justify death gloriously met in fighting for one’s country or one’s friends; next when intolerable pain or incurable disease plainly indicates thewill of the deity[57]; in the development of Roman history a third reason was found in the loss of political freedom[58]. These reasons are not added to, but only systematized, when we are told that it is an ‘ordinary duty’ to quit life when a man’s natural advantages (τὰ κατὰ φύσιν) are outweighed by the corresponding disadvantages[59]; for amongst ‘natural advantages’ are included in this connexion all those considerations of which an honourable man will rightly take account; and the calculation may equally lead him to the conclusion that, in spite of old age and suffering, and though he has never attained to true wisdom, his simple duty is to wait quietly in life[60].
Its dangers.
341.The practice of ‘reasonable departure’ was largely recommended to the Stoics by the examples of Socrates (whose death they regarded as voluntary[61]) and of Cato[62]; and it was at first no small matter of pride to them to find that these examples found imitators, and that their system thus showed its power over the greatest of the terrors that beset humanity. But under the Roman principate ‘free departure’ soon became so common that it was a reproach rather than a glory to its advocates, a social disease pointing to morbidity of soul rather than to healthy resolution[63]. Hencethe philosophers turned from recommendation to reproof. ‘A brave and wise man must not flee from life, but quit it,’ says Seneca[64]; ‘nothing is more disgraceful than to long for death’[65]. ‘Friends,’ says Epictetus, ‘wait for God; when he shall give you the signal, then go to him[66].’
Courage is active.
342.The ‘free departure’ is the most striking illustration of passive courage, but even before it was abused Cicero at least had perceived the attraction which this attitude of soul possesses, and its opposition to the spirit of active enterprise which he calls Greatness of Soul, and which he advocates perhaps more on Academic than on Stoic lines. Still the Stoics had already defined Courage as ‘virtue fighting in the front rank in defence of justice[67].’ A good man must indeed regard power and wealth as things indifferent; but he is to be blamed if he makes this an excuse for avoiding public life, and leaving to others magistracies at home or commands in the wars[68]. In the old world the love of glory and praise on the one hand, angry feeling against enemies on the other, has led men to seek these positions; but now they should seek them at home that they may have a wide field for the exercise of their virtues[69], and in the wars in order that all war may be brought to an end[70]. By the older Stoics this Greatheartedness was advocated by precept and example: Zeno had said that the wise man should take part in public life[71], and his hearers Persaeus and Philonides had taken service under Antigonus Gonatas[72], and Sphaerus with Cleomenes III, king of Sparta[73]. We shall see later how large was the part played in Roman political life by men who were Stoics or inclined to Stoicism, in an age in which there was a strong current of fashion in favour of a quiet life. We must therefore recognise in Courage, fully as much as in Wisdom or Justice, a political as well as a private virtue.
Soberness.
343.The fourth cardinal virtue is Soberness (σωφροσύνη,temperantia). Of this there are various definitions, and amongst them that it is the principle which regulates our natural appetites so that they are neither in excess nor in defect[74]. From Cicero’s point of view Soberness embraces all the virtues, for it is in the due regulation of the impulses that virtue consists. The standard to be attained is a healthy state of the soul; and this is to be judged, upon the analogy of the body, by the canon of that which is beautiful, symmetrical, and becoming (πρέπον,decorum)[75]. ‘Just as bodily beauty is symmetry established between the limbs mutually, and also between each and the whole body, so beauty of the soul is symmetry between the reasoning power and its parts, and mutually between each of those parts[76].’ Although this is in principle a doctrine accepted by the whole Stoic school, yet in its application we may easily find an entirely new departure, that is, if the appeal is made to an artistic standard which depends upon the taste of the individual. The door is then thrown open to an abandonment of the Cynico-Stoic theory of life according to reason, and to the acceptance of the standard of good feeling, which may easily be so stretched as to include existing prejudices and conventions. This danger is realized in Cicero’s treatment of the virtue of ‘decorum,’ which in its distinctive sense is defined as having the element of ‘gentlemanliness’ in itself[77]. It begins with respect for the feelings and opinions of others[78]; it avoids all rough games and obscene jests[79]; it makes choiceof a profession adapted to the natural character of the individual[80]; it observes, as the actor does, the proprieties of youth and age, rich and poor, citizen and foreigner[81]; it prescribes dignity as fitting for men, gracefulness for women[82]. In particular decorum is displayed in modesty (verecundia). This is shown by keeping out of sight those parts of the body which nature, though she could not dispense with them, has concealed and covered; in attending to their functions with the utmost secrecy; and in referring both to these parts of the body and to their uses by words that do not properly describe them[83].
Cynism or ‘decorum’?
344.Cicero’s treatment of ‘decorum’ is so full of good sense that hisde Officiiswas the most widely-known textbook of Greco-Roman ethics in medieval schools, and has retained its importance in the classical public schools of the present day. But its logical justification on Stoic principles is far from easy. We are therefore not surprised to find that, just as Zeno and the main body of his followers had proclaimed in advance that such doctrine was false in principle and ridiculous in detail, so conversely the followers of Panaetius found it necessary expressly to repudiate the teaching of a large number of Stoics[84]. We have in fact here a sharp conflict between the cultured and Platonizing Stoics on the one side, and the general feeling of the school on the other. Cicero elsewhere treats it as an accepted Stoic doctrine that ‘the wise man will blurt things straight out[85]’; and the theory of ‘gentlemanlyprofessions’ can never have appealed to any large social circle. In the period of the principate we find the theory of ‘decorum,’ as a whole, abandoned. Seneca, personally as sensitive as Cicero himself, recognises the absurdity of wasting time in hinting at a plain meaning[86], nor does he limit his choice of illustration even when addressing a lady of high social position[87]. We must look then in some other direction than thede Officiisfor a duly proportioned exposition of the Stoic virtue of Soberness.
The appetites.
345.Reverting to the definitions of this virtue, we find, amongst those that are generally accepted, first, that it is ‘the science of things that are to be sought or avoided or neither[88]’; secondly, that it is ‘concerned with the human appetites[89].’ Now the term ‘appetite’ or ‘impulse’ (ὁρμή,appetitus) includes in the Stoic philosophy all those first movements of the soul which draw us on towards some object, and which are adumbrations of right conduct requiring revision and control by reason. But it seems clear that Soberness has little to do with those higher impulses that are characteristic of man, such as the love of knowledge or of society, since other virtues are concerned with these. It remains that Soberness is the virtue which is concerned with the appetites common to men and the lower animals, which we may shortly call the ‘lower appetites’; they are, as we have already stated, the desires of eating, drinking, and sexual union. It is just in this sphere that Pleasure arises, in the sense in which it is condemned by the Cynics and popular moralists[90]. We may therefore shortly define Soberness as a right disposition of soul in relation to Pleasure. Its peculiar characteristic is that it is in the main a negative virtue, displaying itself in abstinence from indulgence[91].
Two views of Pleasure.
346.In order then rightly to understand the virtue of Soberness, we need a clear idea of the attitude of the Stoics towards Pleasure. Zeno, as we have seen, whilst definitely placing Pleasure in the category of things indifferent, had nevertheless allowed it to be understood that it might be an advantage (προηγμένον), and the seeking after it natural (κατὰ φύσιν)[92]; and this is stated to have been the express teaching of Hecato, Apollodorus, and Chrysippus[93]. To other Stoics this appeared to be a disastrous concession to Epicurean views. Cleanthes, who had scornfully described the ideal of Epicurus by the picture of Pleasure enthroned as queen, with the Virtues submissively attending as her handmaidens[94], interpreted the word ‘indifferent’ more strictly; he refused to admit that pleasure was ‘natural’ or possessed any worth[95]. In this view he was supported by a great many Stoics, and practically by Archedemus, when he said that pleasure was natural but valueless, like the hairs under the armpit[96]. Hence followed the acceptable conclusion that no sensible man would pay much attention to so trivial a matter[97]. Thus the one word‘indifferent’ came to include two views which were substantially opposed, the one inclining to the Academic standpoint, and the other to Cynism.
Pleasure an aftergrowth, or an evil.
347.From this contradiction an escape was sought by making a distinction. In one sense pleasure is an affection of the body, namely a tickling (titillatio) of organs of sense, most readily illustrated in the eating of dainties. This kind of pleasure, even if it is not an advantage naturally sought, yet has some likeness to one; though it is not directly to be aimed at, yet it may be welcomed when nature grants it to us as an extra[98]. This new view practically coincides with that of Aristotle, who calls pleasure an ‘aftergrowth’ (ἐπιγέννημα,accessio), which of itself follows on virtuous action, and is attached to it as the scent to a flower[99]. But much more commonly, in ethical discussions, ‘pleasure’ denotes the excitement which is more strictly termed ‘hilarity’ (ἔπαρσις,sublatio animi), and is the unhealthy condition of the soul when it is unduly attracted to an object of choice[100]. For this mischief Cicero suggests the Latin termlaetitia, which is perhaps not altogether adequate[101]. This ‘pleasure’ may be unreservedly condemned as not merely indifferent, but actually contrary to nature[102]; whilst the virtuous and natural disposition is that of the man who not only contemplates toiland pain with calm mind, but actually welcomes them as possible stepping-stones towards his own true advantage[103].
Active soberness.
348.Although the prevailing tendency in Stoic teaching is to consider Soberness as a negative virtue, and as opposed to the perturbation of Hilarity, there is not wanting some recognition of its positive side. For Soberness also demands that there shall be a healthy activity of the soul in matters such as eating, drinking, and the relations of sex; abstinence is not in itself an end, and if pursued out of season is both a folly and a fault. But this point of view is not adequately treated by any Stoic writer. Panaetius in discussing daily duties omitted to consider the proper care of the body, as was afterwards noticed by Antipater of Tyre; and Cicero gets little further than a general recommendation of common sense and self-restraint in all the circumstances of life[104]. The Romans of the principate were disposed to leave the matter to the physician, suggesting only that food should suffice to allay hunger, drink to put an end to thirst, and clothing to keep away cold[105]; but it is probable that popular moral discourses stopped short of this, and favoured some amount of endurance as a discipline for the soul[106].
Sober love.
349.With regard to the relations of sex, the Socratic tradition was favourable to a more positive treatment. Accordingly the Stoics (not without some feeling that they are adopting a paradoxical position) assert that love (ἔρως,amor) is an essential, both for the maintenance of the State[107]and for the character of the good man. Zenohad laid it down that ‘the wise man will love[108].’ We must, however, make a sharp distinction between love as the desire of sexual union, and the higher Love (ἐρωτικὴ ἀρετή) which is defined anew as ‘an effort to make friends suggested by a beautiful object[109].’ Upon this impulse, which is natural in the widest sense, is based friendship in the young, and the more lasting tie between husband and wife. By imposing self-restraint on the man, and inviting the woman to share the lessons of philosophy, the Stoics introduced a new relation between husband and wife based upon equality and comradeship[110]. A notable precedent was furnished by the Cynic community, when the witty and learned Hipparchia joined Crates in the life of the beggar-preacher[111]; and Roman Stoicism supplies us with numerous instances of the same companionship[112]. Under such conditions marriage is no longer a matter of free choice; it is a civic duty incumbent on the young Stoic. The Stoics of the Roman principate well perceived the danger that threatened the society in which they lived through the growing practice of celibacy[113].
Of marriage.
350.The Stoic attitude towards marriage is well illustrated by the following extract from a discourse by Antipater of Tarsus:
‘A youth of good family and noble soul, who has a sense of social duty, will feel that no life and no household is complete without wife and child. He will also bear in mind his duty towards the State, for how can that be maintained unless, as the fathers decay and fall away like the leaves of a fine tree, the sons marry in the flower of their age, and leave behind them fresh shoots to adorn the city, thereby providing for its protection against its enemies? He will look upon marriage also as a duty towards the gods; for if the family dies out, who will perform the accustomed sacrifices?Besides this he who knows nothing of wife and child has not tasted the truest joys of affection. For other friendships are like platefuls of beans or other like mixtures of juxtaposition, but the union of man and wife is like the mixing of wine and water, or any other case of penetration (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων); for they are united not only by the ties of substance and soul and the dearest bond of children, but also in body. Other alliances are for occasion, this is bound up with the whole purpose of life, so that the parents on each side gladly allow that the wife should be first in her husband’s affection, and the husband in his wife’s.But in these days of dissolution and anarchy all things change for the worse and marriage is thought a hard thing; and men call the celibate life divine because it gives opportunity for licentiousness and varied pleasures, and they bar the door against a wife as against an enemy. Others have their fancy taken by beauty or dowry, and no longer look for a wife who is piously brought up and obedient and a good manager; nor do they trouble to instruct their wives in these matters. But if a man would attend to the warnings of philosophers, of all burdens a lawful wife would be the lightest and sweetest. Such a man would have four eyes instead of two, and four hands instead of two, to supply all his needs: and if he desired leisure to write books or take part in politics, he could hand over the whole business of housekeeping to his partner[114].’
‘A youth of good family and noble soul, who has a sense of social duty, will feel that no life and no household is complete without wife and child. He will also bear in mind his duty towards the State, for how can that be maintained unless, as the fathers decay and fall away like the leaves of a fine tree, the sons marry in the flower of their age, and leave behind them fresh shoots to adorn the city, thereby providing for its protection against its enemies? He will look upon marriage also as a duty towards the gods; for if the family dies out, who will perform the accustomed sacrifices?
Besides this he who knows nothing of wife and child has not tasted the truest joys of affection. For other friendships are like platefuls of beans or other like mixtures of juxtaposition, but the union of man and wife is like the mixing of wine and water, or any other case of penetration (κρᾶσις δι’ ὅλων); for they are united not only by the ties of substance and soul and the dearest bond of children, but also in body. Other alliances are for occasion, this is bound up with the whole purpose of life, so that the parents on each side gladly allow that the wife should be first in her husband’s affection, and the husband in his wife’s.
But in these days of dissolution and anarchy all things change for the worse and marriage is thought a hard thing; and men call the celibate life divine because it gives opportunity for licentiousness and varied pleasures, and they bar the door against a wife as against an enemy. Others have their fancy taken by beauty or dowry, and no longer look for a wife who is piously brought up and obedient and a good manager; nor do they trouble to instruct their wives in these matters. But if a man would attend to the warnings of philosophers, of all burdens a lawful wife would be the lightest and sweetest. Such a man would have four eyes instead of two, and four hands instead of two, to supply all his needs: and if he desired leisure to write books or take part in politics, he could hand over the whole business of housekeeping to his partner[114].’