FOOTNOTES

The aim of virtue.

321.The advocates of Stoicism maintain that the theory of ‘advantages’ is essential to their system, because without it virtue has no meaning, and practical life no guide[123]; whereas as soon as this theory is established, we can assign to virtue the permanent and distinctive character, that it aims at securing ‘advantages’ and avoiding ‘disadvantages[124].’ Now we are able to enlarge, though we do not alter, our definition of the supreme good; the ‘consistent life,’ the ‘life consistent with nature,’ is the ‘life which is accompanied by a true knowledge of the things that happen by nature’; to which words we now add ‘choosing those things which are in accordance with nature, and avoiding those things which are against nature[125].’ Nevertheless, virtue consists wholly in the aiming at the mark, and not at all in the hitting it. As the true sportsman finds all his pleasure in throwing his quoit according to the rules of the game, and in aiming his arrow at the centre of the target, but cares not in the least (so it would seem) whether he succeeds[126]; so the wise man, even though (by those circumstances which he cannot control, and which in this connexion we call ‘the play of fortune’) he gain no ‘advantage’ at all, but suffer dishonour, captivity, mutilation, and death, still possesses the supreme good, still is as completely happy as though he enjoyed all things. This is the Stoic doctrine of the ‘sufficiency of virtue,’ expressed in the language of paradox, but nevertheless the central point of their whole ethical system; and its force is reallyintensified by the doctrine of ‘advantages,’ which to a superficial critic appears to relax it.

Sufficiency of virtue.

322.The doctrine of the sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια,sufficientia) of virtue was consistently taught by the Stoics of all periods, though in ever-varying phraseology. Zeno adopted the Cynic phrase ‘virtue is sufficient for happiness,’ or in other words ‘virtue needs but herself for a happy life[127].’ Chrysippus maintains that there are only three logical views as to the supreme good, that it is virtue or pleasure or both[128], and for himself he chooses the first. Happiness therefore is not made greater if advantages are added to virtue; or rather, virtue does not permit addition (accessio)[129]. In the transition period Antipater of Tarsus is said to have faltered, and to have attributed a little importance, though very little, to external advantages[130]; but, as we have seen above[131], his definition of the supreme good is in full accord with the general teaching of the school. Panaetius and Posidonius held to the orthodox doctrine both in word and deed, if we may trust the direct statements of Cicero[132]; nevertheless they were so anxious to assimilate their expressions to those of ordinary life, that the conclusion could easily be drawn that in their hearts they too attached importance to external goods[133]. One authority indeed states that they heldhealth, strength, and estate to be ‘needful’ for happiness, thus abandoning the sufficiency of virtue[134]; but in the absence of direct quotation we shall hardly be willing to accept this statement as implying anything different from the distinction of Chrysippus, viz. that ‘the wise manneedsnothing, buthas usefor everything[135].’ But any faltering shown by the transition writers was more than made good by the zeal of the teachers under the principate. Seneca enforces the paradox in a score of phrases; in the form of a proverb ‘virtue is its own reward[136]’; in rhetorical exuberance ‘virtue can defy death, ill fortune, and tyranny[137]’; it is ‘independent even of the deity[138]’; and ‘no circumstances can increase or impair its perfection[139].’ Epictetus often dwells on the same theme[140], and the whole work of Marcus Aurelius is a meditation upon it[141]. Nor is the dogma merely scholastic; the teachers of the Roman period lay special emphasis on the practical importance of upholding the ideal of virtue, as alike single and complete in itself[142].

Virtue and the virtues.

323.But virtue, though single in its essence, is manifold in its applications; though it can only be possessed as a whole, it is attained by stages. By this amplification of the Stoic doctrine the way is prepared for thatadaptation of ethical doctrine to varieties of circumstance which will be the special subject of our next chapter. By the side of virtue stand ‘the virtues,’ sometimes conceived as virtue herself endowed with various qualities[143], more often as virtue at work in different spheres of action. In this way virtue assumes in turn the shape of each one of the four virtues as commonly understood, namely Wisdom, Justice, Courage, and Soberness[144]; we may, if we please, reckon with a smaller or greater number[145]; yet we must always remember that the virtues are so knit together, that he who truly possesses one, possesses all[146]. Virtue again is displayed in single acts, each of which (whatever its sphere) is a ‘right action’ (κατόρθωμα,recte factum)[147]. In proportion as virtue is displayed in its various qualities and spheres, and in successive right actions, it gains itself a larger field; it cannot be said to increase, but it is in a way spread out and broadened[148].

How virtue is won.

324.Virtue, as it is displayed in individual men, has also a history. This follows clearly from Stoic principles, since virtue is an aspect of reason, and children are not possessed of reason[149]. Virtue therefore comes by training, not by birth[150]; by art, not by nature[151]. In the period that precedes the attainment of virtue, there exist states of the soul which are the semblances and the forerunners of virtue; and he who is on his way towards wisdom, and whom we call ‘the probationer’ (προκόπτων,proficiens[152]), by learning and practice comes daily nearer to his goal, till in the crowning moment he wins it as a whole; for virtue is no sum of lesserdispositions reached by a gradual addition of item to item, but a thing complete in itself[153]. Can virtue thus won be lost at a later time? Virtue, it may seem, is not really such, unless it is indestructible; and the Cynics and the earlier Stoics taught accordingly that virtue cannot be lost[154], that it is a ‘possession for ever.’ In this point, as in so many others, Chrysippus yielded to criticism, and admitted that virtue might be lost through intoxication or indigestion[155], to which causes might well be added the failure of the reason through insanity or old age[156]. But in spite of these difficulties the general feeling of the Stoic school held firmly to the doctrine that virtue once acquired is acquired for ever[157].

Wise men.

325.Virtue and vice are not mere theories of the philosopher; they exist and can be studied in human shape, in the wise and foolish men of myth, history, and society. The lesson of virtue in particular can best be learnt by considering virtuous men[158]. Here the Stoics followed closely the teaching of their predecessors the Cynics[159]. As the best of models they accepted Hercules, the man rightly deemed agod[160], who travelled over all the world, purging it of every lawlessness, and bringing with him justice, holiness, and peace[161]. Next comes Ulysses, who like Hercules was untiring in his labours, triumphant over pain, and a conqueror throughout all the world[162]; an example to all men of endurance and vigour[163]. To barbarians Cyrus, king of Persia, was a like example to prove that suffering is a good[164]. Many such are counted amongst the philosophers; first Heraclitus, not for his insight into nature, but for his control over his passions[165]; then Socrates, who in life and death was equally a model as a man and as a citizen[166]. Diogenes the Cynic is worthy of special honour, for he was so filled with love for mankind and obedience to God, that he willingly undertook a life of labour and bodily suffering, and thus won himself the true freedom[167], and became truly happy, truly divine[168]. Zeno the most temperate of philosophers[169], and Cleanthes[170]the most enduring, were men of like type within the Stoic school itself.

Wise Romans.

326.To the list of wise men recognised by the Greeks the Romans were proud to add other names from their own history, thereby associating their philosophic principles with patriotic pride. From their mythology Aeneas was selected, the man who crushes his desires that he may loyally cooperate with the destiny of his people; from the times of the republic Scipio Africanus minor and his gentle companion Laelius[171]; whilst in Publius Rutilius Rufus a Roman could be found who, like Socrates, would not when on his trial consent to any other defence than a plain statement of the facts, in which he neither exaggerated his own merits nor made any plea for mercy[172]. But amongst all Romans Cato of Utica was pre-eminent[173]. If Cicero, as a contemporary and a colleague in political life, was little liable to illusions as to his character and success, his testimony to Cato’s sincerity is all the more valuable[174]; nor can we believe that Cato’s voluntary death would so soon and so greatly have stirred Roman feeling, had it not come as the climax of a life worthily spent[175]. The period of the principate brought to the front both men and women whose fearless lives and quiet self-approved deaths proved them to be worthy successors to the heroes of the past; and at the same time we notice a disposition to find some at least of the elements of the heroic character in simple uneducated folk, as in the soldier, the athlete, and the gladiator, so that these too serve in their degree as models for those that seek wisdom[176].

Wise men are few.

327.The founders of Stoicism never doubted that wise men had existed and did exist; they looked forward to a time not far distant when there should be a Cosmopolisin which every citizen should be wise. This robust belief was not maintained by their successors. According to Chrysippus, only one or two wise men have ever existed[177]; and he expressly denies that he himself or any of his acquaintance are amongst the number[178]. The Stoics of the transition period avoided the topic as troublesome[179]; and their opponents naturally pressed it on them all the more. Zeno had said ‘It is reasonable to honour the gods: it is not reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore the gods exist.’ This was now parodied: ‘It is reasonable to honour wise men: it is not reasonable to honour the non-existent: therefore wise men exist.’ If this argument was unsatisfactory, as we are told[180], to the Stoics, because they had not yet discovered their wise man anywhere, we are not surprised to find that sometimes they refer him to the golden age[181], at other times convert him into an ideal[182]. The Stoics under the Roman principate re-affirmed vigorously the existence of the wise man[183]. Seneca however admits that his appearance is as rare as that of the phoenix[184], and altogether disclaims any such character for himself individually[185]. Epictetus is far more true to the spirit of the old doctrine, when he not only abstains from any morbid depreciation of his own character, but also urges his pupils never to give up the hope of reaching perfection[186].

The glory of virtue.

328.Thus the Stoics founded their moral ideal on the triple basis of the good citizen, the healthily-disposed soul, and the examples of wise men. In impressing this part of their system on their pupils, they made little use of definitions or syllogisms, but all the more they resorted to rhetorical description. As in their physics the Logos became almost a person, so here the picture of Virtue is drawn, as by Prodicus in the old allegory of the choice of Hercules, drawing men to her not by the pleasures she offers but by her majesty and beauty[187]. Cleanthes in particular heaps epithets of praise on virtue[188]; more usually it is sufficient to insist that virtue is good, praiseworthy, and expedient. That ‘the wise man is a king[189]’ almost ceases to be a paradox, since the soul is rightly compared to a kingdom; that he is rich, handsome, free, and invincible can equally be argued on Stoic principles[190]. To carry such statements further seems to savour of pedantry, to ridicule them at any stage is easy. Yet the statement that seems the boldest of all, that ‘the wise man is happy even on the rack[191],’ was many a time verified by the experience of individual Stoics[192]. That the wise man is a god, though subject to the limitations of mortality, is maintained without hesitation[193].

Stoic ethics.

329.The Stoic morality differs not only in form and in its reasoned basis, but in substance, both from the popular morality of the time and the ideals of rival philosophical schools. The Stoic heroes differ from those of Homer by a world-age; they possess what the Romans calledhumanitas, powers of reasoning and of sympathizing unknown to an age of warriors. The Epicurean sage was not, as popular criticism and that of many Stoics unjustly described him, a man of gross tastes and reckless selfishness; but he was essentially easy-going and a quietist, little inclined to risk his peace of mind by meddling with the troubles of others. To the Cynics the Stoics owed much in their principles, to the Academics (as we shall see) much in their application of them; they stood between the two, more reasonable and judicious than the former, firmer in principle than the latter, possessed of a breadth of outlook which neither of these schools could claim.

FOOTNOTES[1]e.g. Zeller,Stoicsetc. pp. 16, 17; SteinPsych.ii p. 141.[2]See Alex. Aph.de fato, chs. 35 and 37 (Arnim ii 1003 and 1005).[3]See above, §75.[4]λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον Alex. Aph. 35, p. 207, 8 B; cf. Diog. L. vii 88.[5]‘Chrysippus sic incipit: ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν ... κανόνα εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων’ Marcianus i p. 11, 25 (Arnim iii 314); ‘lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria’ Cic.Leg.i 6, 18.[6]‘Socrates cum rogaretur cuiatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit. totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur’ Cic.Tusc. disp.v 37, 108; [Διογένης] ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη “κοσμοπολίτης” ἔφη Diog. L. vi 63; so Epict.Disc.i 9, 1.[7]Arnim i 262; ‘patriam meam esse mundum sciam’ Sen.Dial.vii 20, 5.[8]‘membra sumus corporis magni; natura nos cognatos edidit’Ep.95, 52.[9]‘quaecunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. quod argumenti satis est, nullam dissimilitudinem esse in genere’ Cic.Leg.i 10, 29 and 30.[10]ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι ἡμῖν δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα διὰ τὴν ἀνομοιότητα Diog. L. vii 129; ‘quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis’ Cic.Fin.iii 20, 67. The honour of being the first to recognise the principle of consideration for our dumb partners belongs to the Hindus.[11]‘nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus ad virtutem pervenire non possit’ Cic.Leg.i 10, 31; ‘if the mind-element is common to us all, so likewise is that reason which makes us rational; and therefore too that reason which bids us do or leave undone; and therefore the world-law; therefore we are fellow-citizens and share a common citizenship’ M. Aurel.To himselfiv 4.[12]Plut.Sto. rep.4, i.[13]‘duas respublicas animo conplectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam, qua di atque homines continentur; ... alteram, cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi’ Sen.Dial.viii 4, 1. So too Epictetus: ‘What is a man? a part of a state, of that first which consists of gods and men; then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image of the universal state’Disc.ii 5, 26.[14]ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἔφη [ὁ Ζήνων] τὸν Ἔρωτα θεὸν εἶναι, συνεργὸν ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν Athen. xiii 12 (Arnim i 263); ‘salva autem esse societas nisi custodia et amore partium non potest’ Sen.Dial.iv 31, 7.[15]‘eius [societatis humanae] vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate’ Cic.Off.i 16, 50.[16]φύσει τε τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει, ὡς καὶ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος Diog. L. vii 128; ‘ius esse natura [Stoici censent]’ Cic.Fin.iii 21, 71.[17]‘non tum denique lex incipit esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est’ Cic.Leg.ii 5, 10.[18]ἱερὰ θεῶν μὴ οἱκοδομεῖν Plut.Sto. rep.6, 1; ἀπαγορεύει ἀγάλματα τεκταίνειν Theod.Aff.iii 74 (Arnim i 264).[19]Plut.Sto. rep.6, 1.[20]Diog. L. vii 33.[21]Plutarch, in quoting this argument, makes the telling rejoinder that upon the same principle Zeno need not have published an answer to Plato’s Republic;Sto. rep.8, 1.[22]Diog. L. vii 32. This particular condemnation was not uncongenial to the Stoics of the principate, and may partly account for the decay of literature in imperial Rome. But Chrysippus had meanwhile supplied the needed qualification that these studies are useful as a training preliminary to virtue; see Diog. L. vii 129, and cf. §336.[23]Diog. L. vii 33. Probably usury was also condemned by Zeno, as it was by Seneca: ‘quid computationes et venale tempus et sanguinolentae centesimae?’ Sen.Ben.vii 10, 4.[24]Diog. L. vii 131.[25]‘More continent than Zeno’ became a proverb at Athens;ib.27.[26]ib.121.[27]ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τὰ τοῦ Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες Origencont. Celsum, vii 63 (Arnim iii 729).[28]This principle is stated by Chrysippus: πρὸς τὰ θηρία φησὶ δεῖν ἀποβλέπειν Plut.Sto. rep.22, 1.[29]The essential equality of the sexes in Stoic theory is illustrated in the development of Roman law: ‘led by their theory of natural law, the [Roman] jurisconsults had evidently ... assumed the equality of the sexes as a principle of their code of equity’ Maine,Ancient Law, p. 154. Cf. on the whole subject Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, bk v ch. 13: e.g. ‘to the common Greek sentiment exclusive personal appropriation [of women] and the resulting inequality in ownership was as yet very far from seeming so much of a law of nature, or meeting with such unconditional acceptance as ... in modern times’ (vol. iii p. 119).[30]See §431.[31]‘What then, are not women common by nature? So I say also. Is not the theatre common to the citizens? When then they have taken their seats, come (if you think proper) and eject one of them!’ Epict.Disc.ii 4, 8.[32]καὶ μητράσι [Χρύσιππος] λέγει συνέρχεσθαι καὶ θυγατράσι καὶ υἱοῖς Diog. L. vii 188. A Church Father has caught the point better; εἶπον ὅτι τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν Origencont. Cels.iv 45 (Arnim iii 743). For the Persian view see Diog. L. Prol. 8.[33]Arnim i 256.[34]Origen, as above.[35]See below, §478.[36]See above, §254.[37]Arnim i 253.[38]ib.i 254.[39]Diog. L. vii 121.[40]Arnim iii 748.[41]Arnim iii 752. For the same view in earlier times see Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, i p. 403.[42]i 45, 108.[43]‘ille divinus animus egressurus hominem, quo receptaculum suum conferatur, ignis illud exurat an terra contegat, an ferae distrahant, non magis ad se iudicat pertinere quam secundas ad editum infantem’ Sen.Ep.92, 34; ‘But you will be cast out unburied ... If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly’ Epict.Disc.iv 7, 31.[44]For a plain statement to this effect we have to look to Philo: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως δοῦλος οὐδείςSept. et fest. di.p. 283 M (Arnim iii 352).[45]‘est genus iniustae servitutis, cum hi sunt alterius, qui sui possunt esse’ Cic.Rep.iii 25, 37.[46]‘servus, ut placet Chrysippo, perpetuus mercennarius est’ Sen.Ben.iii 22, 1; ‘non male praecipiunt, qui [servis] ita iubent uti, ut mercennariis: operam exigendam, iusta praebenda’ Cic.Off.i 13, 41.[47]‘potest [servus] dare beneficium domino, si a domino iniuriam accipere’ Sen.Ben.iii 22, 3.[48]‘quod si natura hominis sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices et rusticos et mulieres doceri, ut sapiant: populumque [sapientium] ex omni lingua et condicione et sexu et aetate conflari. senserunt hoc adeo Stoici, qui et servis et mulieribus philosophandum esse dixerunt’ Lact.Div. inst.iii 25 (Arnim iii 253).[49]See above, §110.[50]Schmekel,Phil. d. mittleren Stoa, pp. 63, 69.[51]‘eorum nullum ipsum per se separatum probo; anteponoque singulis illud, quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus. sed si unum ac simplex probandum sit, regium probem atque inprimis laudem’ Cic.Rep.i 35, 54; ‘optimus civitatis status sub rege iusto est’ Sen.Ben.ii 20, 2.[52]‘memineram persaepe te cum Panaetio disserere solitum coram Polybio ... optimum longe statum civitatis esse eum, quem maiores nostri nobis reliquissent’ Cic.Rep.i 21, 34.[53]See below, ch. xvi.[54]Arnim iii 354.[55]Diog. L. vii 121.[56]τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται καθηκόντως, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα Stob. ii 7, 3 b.[57]‘virtus nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens’ Sen.Ep.113, 2; ‘virtus est adfectio animi constans conveniensque’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 15, 34.[58]In numerous variations: for the present it is sufficient to quote Cicero’s phrase ‘convenienter naturae vivere’Fin.iii 9, 31, etc., and from Seneca ‘virtus secundum naturam est; vitia inimica et infesta sunt’Ep.50, 8. Cf. also ‘we ought to go to be instructed, in order that we may maintain our minds in harmony with the things that happen’ Epict.Disc.i 12, 17.[59]‘[virtus] habebit illud in animo vetus praeceptum: deum sequere’ Sen.Dial.vii 15, 5.[60]‘ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 15, 34.[61]‘virtutis definitio est—habitus consentiens vitae’ Comm.in Lucan.ii 380 (Arnim iii 199).[62]‘perfecta virtus aequalitas [est] ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi’ Sen.Ep.31, 8.[63]‘ante omnia hoc cura, ut constes tibi’ib.35, 4.[64]‘virtus convenientia constat: omnia opera eius cum ipsa concordant et congruunt’ib.74, 30.[65]‘[stultitia] semper incipit vivere: quam foeda [est] hominum levitas cottidie nova vitae fundamenta ponentium, novas spes in exitu incohantium! quid est turpius quam senex vivere incipiens?’ib.13, 16 and 17.[66]‘Zeno is erat qui ... id appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum’ Cic.Ac.i 10, 36. So Seneca: ‘quid est sapientia? semper idem velle atque idem nolle’ Sen.Ep.20, 5.[67]See above, §81.[68]Whether by Zeno (Diog. L. vii 87), or by Cleanthes (Stob. ii 7, 6 a: Arnim i 552) is a matter of no importance.[69]See above, §108. The emphasis on individual nature is sometimes still greater; ἡ ἀρετὴ τελειότης ἐστὶ τῆς ἑκάστου φύσεως Galenplac. Hipp. et Plat.v 5, p. 468 K (from Chrysippus).[70]Diog. L. vii 87 and 88.[71]Stob. ii 7, 6 a. See also above, §258.[72]Stob. ii 7, 6 a.[73]See below, §320.[74]Παναίτιος τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως ἀφορμὰς τέλος ἀπεφήνατο Clem. Al.Strom.ii 21, 129.[75]‘sic est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus; ea tamen conservata, propriam naturam sequamur’Off.i 31, 110.[76]‘vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent’Fin.iv 6, 14.[77]‘huc et illud accedit, ut perfecta virtus sit aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi, quod non potest esse nisi rerum scientia contingit et ars, per quam humana ac divina noscantur; hoc est summum bonum’ Sen.Ep.31, 8.[78]See above, §98.[79]‘non pareo deo, sed adsentior. ex animo illum, non quia necesse est, sequor’ Sen.Ep.96, 2.[80]‘deo parere libertas est’Dial.vii 15, 7.[81]Epict.Disc.iv 1, 89 and 90.[82]ib.ii 10, 5.[83]ib.iii 7, 7.[84]‘Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam sapiens, nisi si quid impedierit’ Sen.Dial.viii 3, 2; πολιτεύσεσθαί φασι τὸν σοφόν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος Diog. L. vii 121.[85]See §306, note 26.[86]Cic.Off.i 4, 12.[87]τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναί φασι ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὑτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον Stob. ii 7, 5 b 1.[88][ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη] πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι Xen.Mem.iii 9, 5; see also above, §§48,52.[89]διδακτήν τε εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Ποσειδώνιος Diog. L. vii 91.[90]‘They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Show them their errors, and you will see how they desist from their errors’ Epict.Disc.i 18, 3 and 4.[91]See above, §177, note 28.[92]‘If you would be a good reader, read; if a writer, write. Generally, if you would make anything a habit, do it; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it’ Epict.Disc.ii 18, 2 and 4; ‘nihil est quod non humana mens vincat, et in familiaritatem adducat adsidua meditatio’ Sen.Dial.iv 12, 3.[93]ὧν κατορθοῦσιν [ἄνθρωποι], ἡ ὀρθὴ κρίσις ἐξηγεῖται μετὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐτονίας Chrys. ap. Galenplac. H. et Plat.iv 6, p. 403 K (Arnim iii 473).[94]‘virtutem convenies ... pro muris stantem, pulverulentam, coloratam, callosas habentem manus’ Sen.Dial.vii 7, 3.[95]‘Saturnalia Athenis agitabamus hilare prorsum et modeste, non (ut dicitur) “remittentes animum,” nam “remittere” inquit Musonius “animum quasi amittere est”’ Gellius,N. A.xviii 2, 1.[96]‘iustum ac tenacem propositi virum | non civium ardor prava iubentium, | non vultus instantis tyranni | mente quatit solida’ Hor.C.iii 3, 1-4.[97]‘hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci εὐθυμίαν vocant; ego tranquillitatem voco’ Sen.Dial.ix 2, 3.[98]Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 10, 23.[99]‘ut enim corporis temperatio, cum ea congruunt inter se ex quibus constamus, sanitas, sic animi dicitur, cum eius iudicia opinionesque concordant, eaque animi est virtus’ib.13, 30.[100]‘roga bonam mentem, bonam valetudinem animi, deinde tunc corporis’ Sen.Ep.10, 4; ‘orandum est, ut sit mens sana in corpore sano’ Juv.Sat.x 356.[101]‘beata est vita conveniens naturae suae, quae non aliter contingere potest, quam si primum sana mens est et in perpetua possessione sanitatis suae, deinde fortis et vehemens, tum pulcherrima ac patiens, apta temporibus, corporis sui pertinentiumque ad id curiosa non anxie’ Sen.Dial.vii 3, 3.[102]‘actio recta non erit, nisi fuerit recta voluntas’ Sen.Ep.95, 57; ‘gratus potest esse homo voluntate’Ben.ii 31, 1; ‘sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est, etiam sine effectu’ Cic.Fin.iii 9, 32; ‘The being of the good is a certain kind of will (προαίρεσις); the being of the bad is a certain kind of will. What then are externals? Material for the will’ Epict.Disc.i 29, 1 and 2.[103]See below, §383.[104]Arnim i 250.[105]Diog. L. vii 33.[106]‘placet Stoicis, suo quamque rem nomine appellare. sic enim disserunt, nihil esse obscenum, nihil turpe dictu’ Cic.Fam.ix 22, 1. See further below, §344.[107]‘postea tuus ille Poenulus, causam non obtinens repugnante natura, verba versare coepit et primum rebus iis, quas non bonas dicimus, concessit ut haberentur † aestimabiles, et ad naturam accommodatae’Fin.iv 20, 56; ‘the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by the admission of προηγμένα’ Zeller,Stoics, p. 290. The true note is struck by Rendall,Introd.p. xlv: ‘the course of Stoic ethics is, in fact, the progressive enlargement and clarification of the Cynic ideal of conduct, under the stress of that larger conception of “nature” which was inherent in Stoic monism. The full content and interpretation of the formula was only gradually realised. Its deeper implications unfolded themselves through life even more than through thought, and find their fullest exposition in the pages of the Roman Stoics.’[108]Stob. ii 7, 5 a.[109]‘aestimatio, quae ἀξία dicitur’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 34. Posidonius seems to have practically substituted ἀξίαν ἔχοντα for προηγμένα, but in strict usage the latter term is narrower, and includes only such things as have measurable worth.[110]‘inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen quo differrent esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum’ib.15, 50; τῶν δὲ ἀξίαν ἐχόντων τὰ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀξίαν, τὰ δὲ βραχεῖαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπαξίαν ἐχόντων ἃ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν, ἃ δὲ βραχεῖαν Stob. ii 7, 7 g; ‘quae essent sumenda ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris’ Cic.Ac.i 10, 37.[111]Stob. ii 7, 7.[112]Arnim iii 122.[113]Plut.Sto. rep.23, 6.[114]‘cetera autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat [Zeno], alia naturae esse contraria. his ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat’ Cic.Ac.i 10, 36.[115]τὸ προηγμένον συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει Stob. ii 7, 7 g.[116]‘[hoc] Zeno προηγμένον nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis. “ut enim,” inquit, “nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id enim est προηγμένον), sed eos qui in aliquo honore sint, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum”’ Cic.Fin.iii 15, 51.[117]‘quae pluris, ea praeposita appellabat; reiecta autem, quae minoris’Ac.i 10, 37; ‘quae appellemus vel promota et remota, vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta’Fin.iii 16, 52.[118]‘quis porro sapientum, nostrorum dico, quibus unum est bonum virtus, negat etiam haec, quae indifferentia vocamus, habere in se aliquid pretii et alia aliis esse potiora? quibusdam ex iis tribuitur aliquid honoris, quibusdam multum’ Sen.Dial.vii 22, 4.[119]‘itaque commoda vocentur, et ut nostra lingua loquar, producta’Ep.74, 17.[120]See above, §82.[121]‘bonum appello quidquid secundum naturam est; quod contra, malum; nec ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis’ Cic.Fin.v 29, 89; cf. Arnim iii 137.[122]‘sunt animi bona, sunt corporis, sunt fortunae; illa animi bona a stulto ac malo submoventur’ Sen.Ben.v 13, 1.[123]‘deinceps explicatur differentia rerum; quam si non ullam esse diceremus, et confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone; neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur; cum inter res eas quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum delectum haberi oporteret’ Cic.Fin.iii 15, 50.[124]‘virtutis hoc proprium [est], earum rerum quae secundum naturam sint, habere delectum’ib.4, 12.[125]‘relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum quae natura eveniant, selegentem quae secundum naturam, et si quae contra naturam sunt, reicientem; id est, convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere’ib.9, 31 (after Posidonius).[126]‘ut si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum, ut rectus assistat; qui ita talis erit iactus, ut cadat rectus, praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem; qui aliter, contra. neque tamen illa praepositio ad eum quem dixi finem pertinebit: sic ea, quae sunt praeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim naturamque nihil pertinent’ib.16, 54; compare also 6, 22; ‘non est turpe non consequi, dummodo sequaris’ Sen.Ben.v 5, 3.[127]αὐτάρκη τε εἶναι αὐτὴν [τὴν ἀρετὴν] πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν Diog. L. vii 127; ‘a Zenone hoc magnifice tanquam ex oraculo editur: virtus ad bene vivendum se ipsa contenta est’ Cic.Fin.v 27, 79; cf. Pearson,Fragments, p. 19.[128]‘testatur saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de finibus bonorum; aut enim honestatem esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque’ Cic.Ac.ii 45, 138.[129]‘crescere bonorum finem non putamus’ Cic.Fin.iii 14, 48; ‘honestum nullam accessionem recipit’ Sen.Ep.66, 9; ‘summum bonum nec infringitur nec augetur; in suo modo permanet, utcunque se fortuna gessit. utrum maiorem an minorem circulum scribas, ad spatium eius pertinet, non ad formam’ib.74, 26 and 27.[130]See above, §110.[131]See above, §313.[132]‘cum [Panaetius] sit is, qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod honestum sit’ Cic.Off.iii 3, 12; ‘solebat narrare Pompeius se, cum Rhodum venisset decedens ex Syria, audire voluisse Posidonium; sed cum audivisset eum graviter esse aegrum, quod vehementer eius artus laborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum visere ... itaque eum graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum, nisi quod honestum esset, cubantem disputavisse: cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur, saepe dixisse: “nihil agis, dolor: quamvis sis molestus, nunquam te esse confitebor malum”’Tusc. disp.ii 25, 61; cf. Sen.Ep.87, 35.[133]See above, §114.[134]Diog. L. vii 128.[135]‘sapientem nulla re egere, et tamen multis ei rebus opus esse’ Sen.Ep.9, 14.[136]‘[virtus] ipsa pretium sui’Dial.vii 9, 4; ‘recte factorum verus fructus [est] fecisse’Clem.i 1, 1; ‘virtutum omnium pretium in ipsis est’Ep.81, 20.[137]‘sapienti non nocetur a paupertate, non a dolore, non ab aliis tempestatibus vitae; ipse semper in actu est; in effectu tunc maximus, cum illi fortuna se obposuit’ib.85, 37.[138]‘virtutem nemo unquam deo acceptam rettulit ... iudicium hoc omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse sapientiam’ Cic.N. D.iii 36, 86 and 88; ‘aequum mi animum ipse parabo’ Hor.Ep.i 18, 112; ‘monstro, quod ipse tibi possis dare’ Juv.Sat.x 363.[139]See note 129.[140]‘Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is good and just? Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and happy?’ Epict.Disc.iii 24, 51 and 52.[141]‘What does not make the man himself worse, does not make his life worse either, nor injure him, without or within’To himselfiv 8.[142]‘nec summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se viderit dissimile meliori’ Sen.Dial.vii 15, 1; ‘No man is able to make progress when he is wavering between opposite things; but if you have preferred this (one thing) to all things, if you choose to attend to this only, to work out this only, give up everything else’ Epict.Disc.iv 2, 4.[143]Chrysippus wrote a book περὶ τοῦ ποιὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς; see Arnim iii 256.[144]See below, §§335-350.[145]Diog. L. vii 92.[146]τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν Diog. L. vii 125; ‘quicquid honeste fit, una virtus facit, sed ex consilii sententia’ Sen.Ep.67, 10; ‘virtutibus inter se concordia [est]’Clem.i 5, 3.[147]‘videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus; id autem est perfectum officium’ Cic.Fin.iii 18, 59; ‘rectum, quod κατόρθωμα dicebas’ib.iv 6, 15.[148]‘quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere; attamen utrumque eorum fundi quodammodo et quasi dilatari putant’ib.iii 15, 48.[149]See above, §153, note 66.[150]‘scit [sapiens] neminem nasci sapientem sed fieri’ Sen.Dial.iv 10, 6.[151]‘non dat natura virtutem; ars est bonum fieri’Ep.90, 44.[152]Zeno probably took over the term προκοπή from the Peripatetics, see Diog. L. vii 127; its implications he adapted to Stoic principles. See Plut.prof. virt.12.[153]‘hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 34.[154]Stob. ii 7, 11 g; Diog. L. vii 127.[155]τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος ἀποβλητήν ... διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίανib.[156]See above, §289.[157]‘semel traditi nobis boni perpetua possessio est; non dediscitur virtus. contraria enim mala in alieno haerent, ideo depelli et exturbari possunt’ Sen.Ep.50, 8. Just in the same spirit we say that a new language or (say) the art of swimming, if once learnt, is learnt ‘for good.’[158]‘aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus est, ac semper ante oculos habendus, ut sic tanquam illo spectante vivamus, et omnia tanquam illo vidente faciamus’ Sen.Ep.11, 8, quoting however from Epicurus.[159]‘Heracles was the model whom [Antisthenes] and the other Cynics held up for imitation, the patron saint, so to speak, of the school. Antisthenes wrote a dialogue entitled “Heracles” and, with this for guidance, his followers delighted to tell again the story of the hero’s laborious and militant life, identifying, by ingenious allegories, the foul monsters which he vanquished with the vices and lusts that beset the souls of men’ Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, ii p. 151; ‘the more generous Cynics aver that the great Heracles also, as he became the author of other blessings, so also left to mankind the chief pattern of this (Cynic) life’ Julian,Or.vi p. 187, 3 (Mayor on Juv.Sat.x 361). So also in Buddhism: ‘besides the ideal King, the personification of Power and Justice, another ideal has played an important part in the formation of early Buddhist ideas regarding their master. It was the ideal of a perfectly Wise Man, the personification of Wisdom, the Buddha’ Rhys Davids,Hibbert Lectures, p. 141.[160]‘Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio caelestium collocavit’ Cic.Off.iii 5, 25.[161]‘Hercules nihil sibi vicit: orbem terrarum transiit non concupiscendo sed vindicando, quid vinceret; malorum hostis, bonorum vindex, terrarum marisque pacator’ Sen.Ben.i 13, 3. See also the brilliant descriptions in Epict.Disc.iii 24.[162]‘Ulixen et Herculem ... Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrarum’ Sen.Dial.ii 2, 1. Yet there is something to be said on the other side: ‘Ulysses felt a desire for his wife, and wept as he sat on a rock.... If Ulysses did weep and lament, he was not a good man’ Epict.Disc.iii 24, 18.[163]So Horace, quite in the Stoic spirit: ‘rursus quid virtus et quid patientia possit, | utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen’ Hor.Ep.i 2, 17 and 18.[164]Diog. L. vi 1, 2.[165]‘By acting thus Heraclitus and those like him were deservedly divine, and were so called’ Epict.Manual15.[166]‘praeclara est aequabilitas in omni vita, et idem semper vultus eademque frons, ut de Socrate accepimus’ Cic.Off.i 26, 90; ‘Socrates ... violated nothing which was becoming to a good man, neither in making his defence nor by fixing a penalty on himself; nor even in the former part of his life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier’ Epict.Disc.iii 24, 61.[167]See above, §17.[168]‘si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de deorum immortalium statu’ Sen.Dial.ix 8, 5; ‘By acting thus Diogenes ... was deservedly divine, and was so called’ Epict.Manual15.[169]See above, §306, note 25.[170]δεύτερος Ἡρακλῆς ὁ Κλεάνθης ἐκαλεῖτο Diog. L. vii 170; ‘Learn how those live who are genuine philosophers: how Socrates lived, who had a wife and children; how Diogenes lived, and how Cleanthes, who attended to the school and drew water’ Epict.Disc.iii 26, 23.[171]‘aut Cato ille sit aut Scipio aut Laelius’ Sen.Ep.25, 6; ‘elige remissioris animi virum Laelium’ib.11, 10.[172]‘nam cum esset ille vir [P. Rutilius Rufus] exemplum, ut scitis, innocentiae, cumque illo nemo neque integrior esset in civitate neque sanctior, non modo supplex iudicibus esse noluit, sed ne ornatius quidem aut liberius causam dici suam, quam simplex ratio veritatis ferebat’ Cic.de Or.i 53, 229; cf. Sen.Dial.i 3, 4 and 7; and see further, §430.[173]‘Catonem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortales dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus saeculis’ Sen.Dial.ii 2, 1.[174]‘ego te [Cato] verissime dixerim peccare nihil’ Cic.Mur.29, 60.[175]‘Catonis nobile letum’ Hor.C.i 12, 35 and 36; and see below, §430.[176]‘nobis quoque militandum est’ Sen.Ep.51, 6; ‘This is the true athlete. Great is the combat, divine is the work’ Epict.Disc.ii 18, 28. See also below, §402.[177]Euseb.pr. ev.vi 8, 13; Alex. Aph.de fato28, p. 199, 16 B.[178]Plut.Sto. rep.31, 5.[179]‘qui sapiens sit aut fuerit, ne ipsi quidem solent dicere’ Cic.Ac.ii 47, 145. Thus Panaetius made no reference to the wise man; whilst Posidonius only defended his possible existence in the future (Schmekel, pp. 213, 278).[180]Sext.math.ix 133.[181]See above, §214.[182]Even if Cicero is not the creator of the conception of an ‘ideal character,’ nowhere else can we find its meaning so clearly expressed. So of the wise man; ‘iste vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere fortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, inquam, quem efficere volumus, quem quaerimus certe, et confidere sibi debet, et suae vitae et actae et consequenti, et bene de se iudicare’Fin.iii 8, 29.[183]‘non est quod dicas hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inveniri’ Sen.Dial.ii 7, 1.[184]‘ille alter [sapiens primae notae] fortasse tanquam phoenix semel anno quingentesimo nascitur’Ep.42, 1, cf. Alex. Aphr. p. 34, n. 2; ‘scit [sapiens] paucissimos omni aevo sapientes evadere’ Sen.Dial.iv 10, 6.[185]See above, §126.[186]‘Socrates in this way became perfect, in all things improving himself, attending to nothing except to reason. But you, though you are not yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates’ Epict.Manual50. Epictetus did not however ignore failures: ‘we [Stoics] say one thing, but we do another; we talk of the things which are beautiful, but we do what is base’Disc.iii 7, 18.[187]See above, §42.[188]See above, §98.[189]This is again a Socratic paradox: βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν Xen.Mem.iii 9, 10.[190]Cic.Fin.iii 22, 75 and 76.[191]‘eorum, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit, uti in omnibus tormentis conservetur beata vita sapienti’ib.iii 13, 42; Arnim iii 585, 586; ‘shew me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Shew him; I desire, by the gods, to see a Stoic’ Epict.Disc.ii 19, 24.[192]See below, §§431,439.[193]‘bonus tempore tantum a deo differt’ Sen.Dial.i 1, 5; ‘sapiens excepta mortalitate similis deo’ib.ii 8, 2; and see above, §274.

[1]e.g. Zeller,Stoicsetc. pp. 16, 17; SteinPsych.ii p. 141.

[2]See Alex. Aph.de fato, chs. 35 and 37 (Arnim ii 1003 and 1005).

[3]See above, §75.

[4]λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον Alex. Aph. 35, p. 207, 8 B; cf. Diog. L. vii 88.

[5]‘Chrysippus sic incipit: ὁ νόμος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν ... κανόνα εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων’ Marcianus i p. 11, 25 (Arnim iii 314); ‘lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria’ Cic.Leg.i 6, 18.

[6]‘Socrates cum rogaretur cuiatem se esse diceret, Mundanum, inquit. totius enim mundi se incolam et civem arbitrabatur’ Cic.Tusc. disp.v 37, 108; [Διογένης] ἐρωτηθεὶς πόθεν εἴη “κοσμοπολίτης” ἔφη Diog. L. vi 63; so Epict.Disc.i 9, 1.

[7]Arnim i 262; ‘patriam meam esse mundum sciam’ Sen.Dial.vii 20, 5.

[8]‘membra sumus corporis magni; natura nos cognatos edidit’Ep.95, 52.

[9]‘quaecunque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. quod argumenti satis est, nullam dissimilitudinem esse in genere’ Cic.Leg.i 10, 29 and 30.

[10]ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς μηδὲν εἶναι ἡμῖν δίκαιον πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα διὰ τὴν ἀνομοιότητα Diog. L. vii 129; ‘quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis’ Cic.Fin.iii 20, 67. The honour of being the first to recognise the principle of consideration for our dumb partners belongs to the Hindus.

[11]‘nec est quisquam gentis ullius, qui ducem naturam nactus ad virtutem pervenire non possit’ Cic.Leg.i 10, 31; ‘if the mind-element is common to us all, so likewise is that reason which makes us rational; and therefore too that reason which bids us do or leave undone; and therefore the world-law; therefore we are fellow-citizens and share a common citizenship’ M. Aurel.To himselfiv 4.

[12]Plut.Sto. rep.4, i.

[13]‘duas respublicas animo conplectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam, qua di atque homines continentur; ... alteram, cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi’ Sen.Dial.viii 4, 1. So too Epictetus: ‘What is a man? a part of a state, of that first which consists of gods and men; then of that which is called next to it, which is a small image of the universal state’Disc.ii 5, 26.

[14]ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ἔφη [ὁ Ζήνων] τὸν Ἔρωτα θεὸν εἶναι, συνεργὸν ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν Athen. xiii 12 (Arnim i 263); ‘salva autem esse societas nisi custodia et amore partium non potest’ Sen.Dial.iv 31, 7.

[15]‘eius [societatis humanae] vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate’ Cic.Off.i 16, 50.

[16]φύσει τε τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει, ὡς καὶ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος Diog. L. vii 128; ‘ius esse natura [Stoici censent]’ Cic.Fin.iii 21, 71.

[17]‘non tum denique lex incipit esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est’ Cic.Leg.ii 5, 10.

[18]ἱερὰ θεῶν μὴ οἱκοδομεῖν Plut.Sto. rep.6, 1; ἀπαγορεύει ἀγάλματα τεκταίνειν Theod.Aff.iii 74 (Arnim i 264).

[19]Plut.Sto. rep.6, 1.

[20]Diog. L. vii 33.

[21]Plutarch, in quoting this argument, makes the telling rejoinder that upon the same principle Zeno need not have published an answer to Plato’s Republic;Sto. rep.8, 1.

[22]Diog. L. vii 32. This particular condemnation was not uncongenial to the Stoics of the principate, and may partly account for the decay of literature in imperial Rome. But Chrysippus had meanwhile supplied the needed qualification that these studies are useful as a training preliminary to virtue; see Diog. L. vii 129, and cf. §336.

[23]Diog. L. vii 33. Probably usury was also condemned by Zeno, as it was by Seneca: ‘quid computationes et venale tempus et sanguinolentae centesimae?’ Sen.Ben.vii 10, 4.

[24]Diog. L. vii 131.

[25]‘More continent than Zeno’ became a proverb at Athens;ib.27.

[26]ib.121.

[27]ἐκκλίνουσι τὸ μοιχεύειν οἱ τὰ τοῦ Ζήνωνος φιλοσοφοῦντες Origencont. Celsum, vii 63 (Arnim iii 729).

[28]This principle is stated by Chrysippus: πρὸς τὰ θηρία φησὶ δεῖν ἀποβλέπειν Plut.Sto. rep.22, 1.

[29]The essential equality of the sexes in Stoic theory is illustrated in the development of Roman law: ‘led by their theory of natural law, the [Roman] jurisconsults had evidently ... assumed the equality of the sexes as a principle of their code of equity’ Maine,Ancient Law, p. 154. Cf. on the whole subject Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, bk v ch. 13: e.g. ‘to the common Greek sentiment exclusive personal appropriation [of women] and the resulting inequality in ownership was as yet very far from seeming so much of a law of nature, or meeting with such unconditional acceptance as ... in modern times’ (vol. iii p. 119).

[30]See §431.

[31]‘What then, are not women common by nature? So I say also. Is not the theatre common to the citizens? When then they have taken their seats, come (if you think proper) and eject one of them!’ Epict.Disc.ii 4, 8.

[32]καὶ μητράσι [Χρύσιππος] λέγει συνέρχεσθαι καὶ θυγατράσι καὶ υἱοῖς Diog. L. vii 188. A Church Father has caught the point better; εἶπον ὅτι τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορόν ἐστι, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν Origencont. Cels.iv 45 (Arnim iii 743). For the Persian view see Diog. L. Prol. 8.

[33]Arnim i 256.

[34]Origen, as above.

[35]See below, §478.

[36]See above, §254.

[37]Arnim i 253.

[38]ib.i 254.

[39]Diog. L. vii 121.

[40]Arnim iii 748.

[41]Arnim iii 752. For the same view in earlier times see Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, i p. 403.

[42]i 45, 108.

[43]‘ille divinus animus egressurus hominem, quo receptaculum suum conferatur, ignis illud exurat an terra contegat, an ferae distrahant, non magis ad se iudicat pertinere quam secundas ad editum infantem’ Sen.Ep.92, 34; ‘But you will be cast out unburied ... If the corpse is I, I shall be cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more properly’ Epict.Disc.iv 7, 31.

[44]For a plain statement to this effect we have to look to Philo: ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως δοῦλος οὐδείςSept. et fest. di.p. 283 M (Arnim iii 352).

[45]‘est genus iniustae servitutis, cum hi sunt alterius, qui sui possunt esse’ Cic.Rep.iii 25, 37.

[46]‘servus, ut placet Chrysippo, perpetuus mercennarius est’ Sen.Ben.iii 22, 1; ‘non male praecipiunt, qui [servis] ita iubent uti, ut mercennariis: operam exigendam, iusta praebenda’ Cic.Off.i 13, 41.

[47]‘potest [servus] dare beneficium domino, si a domino iniuriam accipere’ Sen.Ben.iii 22, 3.

[48]‘quod si natura hominis sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices et rusticos et mulieres doceri, ut sapiant: populumque [sapientium] ex omni lingua et condicione et sexu et aetate conflari. senserunt hoc adeo Stoici, qui et servis et mulieribus philosophandum esse dixerunt’ Lact.Div. inst.iii 25 (Arnim iii 253).

[49]See above, §110.

[50]Schmekel,Phil. d. mittleren Stoa, pp. 63, 69.

[51]‘eorum nullum ipsum per se separatum probo; anteponoque singulis illud, quod conflatum fuerit ex omnibus. sed si unum ac simplex probandum sit, regium probem atque inprimis laudem’ Cic.Rep.i 35, 54; ‘optimus civitatis status sub rege iusto est’ Sen.Ben.ii 20, 2.

[52]‘memineram persaepe te cum Panaetio disserere solitum coram Polybio ... optimum longe statum civitatis esse eum, quem maiores nostri nobis reliquissent’ Cic.Rep.i 21, 34.

[53]See below, ch. xvi.

[54]Arnim iii 354.

[55]Diog. L. vii 121.

[56]τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται καθηκόντως, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα Stob. ii 7, 3 b.

[57]‘virtus nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens’ Sen.Ep.113, 2; ‘virtus est adfectio animi constans conveniensque’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 15, 34.

[58]In numerous variations: for the present it is sufficient to quote Cicero’s phrase ‘convenienter naturae vivere’Fin.iii 9, 31, etc., and from Seneca ‘virtus secundum naturam est; vitia inimica et infesta sunt’Ep.50, 8. Cf. also ‘we ought to go to be instructed, in order that we may maintain our minds in harmony with the things that happen’ Epict.Disc.i 12, 17.

[59]‘[virtus] habebit illud in animo vetus praeceptum: deum sequere’ Sen.Dial.vii 15, 5.

[60]‘ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest’ Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 15, 34.

[61]‘virtutis definitio est—habitus consentiens vitae’ Comm.in Lucan.ii 380 (Arnim iii 199).

[62]‘perfecta virtus aequalitas [est] ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi’ Sen.Ep.31, 8.

[63]‘ante omnia hoc cura, ut constes tibi’ib.35, 4.

[64]‘virtus convenientia constat: omnia opera eius cum ipsa concordant et congruunt’ib.74, 30.

[65]‘[stultitia] semper incipit vivere: quam foeda [est] hominum levitas cottidie nova vitae fundamenta ponentium, novas spes in exitu incohantium! quid est turpius quam senex vivere incipiens?’ib.13, 16 and 17.

[66]‘Zeno is erat qui ... id appellaret honestum, quod esset simplex quoddam et solum et unum bonum’ Cic.Ac.i 10, 36. So Seneca: ‘quid est sapientia? semper idem velle atque idem nolle’ Sen.Ep.20, 5.

[67]See above, §81.

[68]Whether by Zeno (Diog. L. vii 87), or by Cleanthes (Stob. ii 7, 6 a: Arnim i 552) is a matter of no importance.

[69]See above, §108. The emphasis on individual nature is sometimes still greater; ἡ ἀρετὴ τελειότης ἐστὶ τῆς ἑκάστου φύσεως Galenplac. Hipp. et Plat.v 5, p. 468 K (from Chrysippus).

[70]Diog. L. vii 87 and 88.

[71]Stob. ii 7, 6 a. See also above, §258.

[72]Stob. ii 7, 6 a.

[73]See below, §320.

[74]Παναίτιος τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως ἀφορμὰς τέλος ἀπεφήνατο Clem. Al.Strom.ii 21, 129.

[75]‘sic est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus; ea tamen conservata, propriam naturam sequamur’Off.i 31, 110.

[76]‘vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum, quae natura evenirent’Fin.iv 6, 14.

[77]‘huc et illud accedit, ut perfecta virtus sit aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi, quod non potest esse nisi rerum scientia contingit et ars, per quam humana ac divina noscantur; hoc est summum bonum’ Sen.Ep.31, 8.

[78]See above, §98.

[79]‘non pareo deo, sed adsentior. ex animo illum, non quia necesse est, sequor’ Sen.Ep.96, 2.

[80]‘deo parere libertas est’Dial.vii 15, 7.

[81]Epict.Disc.iv 1, 89 and 90.

[82]ib.ii 10, 5.

[83]ib.iii 7, 7.

[84]‘Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam sapiens, nisi si quid impedierit’ Sen.Dial.viii 3, 2; πολιτεύσεσθαί φασι τὸν σοφόν, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος Diog. L. vii 121.

[85]See §306, note 26.

[86]Cic.Off.i 4, 12.

[87]τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναί φασι ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὑτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον Stob. ii 7, 5 b 1.

[88][ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη] πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι Xen.Mem.iii 9, 5; see also above, §§48,52.

[89]διδακτήν τε εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Ποσειδώνιος Diog. L. vii 91.

[90]‘They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Show them their errors, and you will see how they desist from their errors’ Epict.Disc.i 18, 3 and 4.

[91]See above, §177, note 28.

[92]‘If you would be a good reader, read; if a writer, write. Generally, if you would make anything a habit, do it; if you would not make it a habit, do not do it’ Epict.Disc.ii 18, 2 and 4; ‘nihil est quod non humana mens vincat, et in familiaritatem adducat adsidua meditatio’ Sen.Dial.iv 12, 3.

[93]ὧν κατορθοῦσιν [ἄνθρωποι], ἡ ὀρθὴ κρίσις ἐξηγεῖται μετὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐτονίας Chrys. ap. Galenplac. H. et Plat.iv 6, p. 403 K (Arnim iii 473).

[94]‘virtutem convenies ... pro muris stantem, pulverulentam, coloratam, callosas habentem manus’ Sen.Dial.vii 7, 3.

[95]‘Saturnalia Athenis agitabamus hilare prorsum et modeste, non (ut dicitur) “remittentes animum,” nam “remittere” inquit Musonius “animum quasi amittere est”’ Gellius,N. A.xviii 2, 1.

[96]‘iustum ac tenacem propositi virum | non civium ardor prava iubentium, | non vultus instantis tyranni | mente quatit solida’ Hor.C.iii 3, 1-4.

[97]‘hanc stabilem animi sedem Graeci εὐθυμίαν vocant; ego tranquillitatem voco’ Sen.Dial.ix 2, 3.

[98]Cic.Tusc. disp.iv 10, 23.

[99]‘ut enim corporis temperatio, cum ea congruunt inter se ex quibus constamus, sanitas, sic animi dicitur, cum eius iudicia opinionesque concordant, eaque animi est virtus’ib.13, 30.

[100]‘roga bonam mentem, bonam valetudinem animi, deinde tunc corporis’ Sen.Ep.10, 4; ‘orandum est, ut sit mens sana in corpore sano’ Juv.Sat.x 356.

[101]‘beata est vita conveniens naturae suae, quae non aliter contingere potest, quam si primum sana mens est et in perpetua possessione sanitatis suae, deinde fortis et vehemens, tum pulcherrima ac patiens, apta temporibus, corporis sui pertinentiumque ad id curiosa non anxie’ Sen.Dial.vii 3, 3.

[102]‘actio recta non erit, nisi fuerit recta voluntas’ Sen.Ep.95, 57; ‘gratus potest esse homo voluntate’Ben.ii 31, 1; ‘sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est, etiam sine effectu’ Cic.Fin.iii 9, 32; ‘The being of the good is a certain kind of will (προαίρεσις); the being of the bad is a certain kind of will. What then are externals? Material for the will’ Epict.Disc.i 29, 1 and 2.

[103]See below, §383.

[104]Arnim i 250.

[105]Diog. L. vii 33.

[106]‘placet Stoicis, suo quamque rem nomine appellare. sic enim disserunt, nihil esse obscenum, nihil turpe dictu’ Cic.Fam.ix 22, 1. See further below, §344.

[107]‘postea tuus ille Poenulus, causam non obtinens repugnante natura, verba versare coepit et primum rebus iis, quas non bonas dicimus, concessit ut haberentur † aestimabiles, et ad naturam accommodatae’Fin.iv 20, 56; ‘the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by the admission of προηγμένα’ Zeller,Stoics, p. 290. The true note is struck by Rendall,Introd.p. xlv: ‘the course of Stoic ethics is, in fact, the progressive enlargement and clarification of the Cynic ideal of conduct, under the stress of that larger conception of “nature” which was inherent in Stoic monism. The full content and interpretation of the formula was only gradually realised. Its deeper implications unfolded themselves through life even more than through thought, and find their fullest exposition in the pages of the Roman Stoics.’

[108]Stob. ii 7, 5 a.

[109]‘aestimatio, quae ἀξία dicitur’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 34. Posidonius seems to have practically substituted ἀξίαν ἔχοντα for προηγμένα, but in strict usage the latter term is narrower, and includes only such things as have measurable worth.

[110]‘inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen quo differrent esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum’ib.15, 50; τῶν δὲ ἀξίαν ἐχόντων τὰ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀξίαν, τὰ δὲ βραχεῖαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπαξίαν ἐχόντων ἃ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν, ἃ δὲ βραχεῖαν Stob. ii 7, 7 g; ‘quae essent sumenda ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris’ Cic.Ac.i 10, 37.

[111]Stob. ii 7, 7.

[112]Arnim iii 122.

[113]Plut.Sto. rep.23, 6.

[114]‘cetera autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat [Zeno], alia naturae esse contraria. his ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat’ Cic.Ac.i 10, 36.

[115]τὸ προηγμένον συνεγγίζειν πως τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει Stob. ii 7, 7 g.

[116]‘[hoc] Zeno προηγμένον nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis. “ut enim,” inquit, “nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id enim est προηγμένον), sed eos qui in aliquo honore sint, quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum”’ Cic.Fin.iii 15, 51.

[117]‘quae pluris, ea praeposita appellabat; reiecta autem, quae minoris’Ac.i 10, 37; ‘quae appellemus vel promota et remota, vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta’Fin.iii 16, 52.

[118]‘quis porro sapientum, nostrorum dico, quibus unum est bonum virtus, negat etiam haec, quae indifferentia vocamus, habere in se aliquid pretii et alia aliis esse potiora? quibusdam ex iis tribuitur aliquid honoris, quibusdam multum’ Sen.Dial.vii 22, 4.

[119]‘itaque commoda vocentur, et ut nostra lingua loquar, producta’Ep.74, 17.

[120]See above, §82.

[121]‘bonum appello quidquid secundum naturam est; quod contra, malum; nec ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis’ Cic.Fin.v 29, 89; cf. Arnim iii 137.

[122]‘sunt animi bona, sunt corporis, sunt fortunae; illa animi bona a stulto ac malo submoventur’ Sen.Ben.v 13, 1.

[123]‘deinceps explicatur differentia rerum; quam si non ullam esse diceremus, et confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone; neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur; cum inter res eas quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum delectum haberi oporteret’ Cic.Fin.iii 15, 50.

[124]‘virtutis hoc proprium [est], earum rerum quae secundum naturam sint, habere delectum’ib.4, 12.

[125]‘relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum quae natura eveniant, selegentem quae secundum naturam, et si quae contra naturam sunt, reicientem; id est, convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere’ib.9, 31 (after Posidonius).

[126]‘ut si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum, ut rectus assistat; qui ita talis erit iactus, ut cadat rectus, praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem; qui aliter, contra. neque tamen illa praepositio ad eum quem dixi finem pertinebit: sic ea, quae sunt praeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim naturamque nihil pertinent’ib.16, 54; compare also 6, 22; ‘non est turpe non consequi, dummodo sequaris’ Sen.Ben.v 5, 3.

[127]αὐτάρκη τε εἶναι αὐτὴν [τὴν ἀρετὴν] πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν Diog. L. vii 127; ‘a Zenone hoc magnifice tanquam ex oraculo editur: virtus ad bene vivendum se ipsa contenta est’ Cic.Fin.v 27, 79; cf. Pearson,Fragments, p. 19.

[128]‘testatur saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias, quae defendi possint, de finibus bonorum; aut enim honestatem esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque’ Cic.Ac.ii 45, 138.

[129]‘crescere bonorum finem non putamus’ Cic.Fin.iii 14, 48; ‘honestum nullam accessionem recipit’ Sen.Ep.66, 9; ‘summum bonum nec infringitur nec augetur; in suo modo permanet, utcunque se fortuna gessit. utrum maiorem an minorem circulum scribas, ad spatium eius pertinet, non ad formam’ib.74, 26 and 27.

[130]See above, §110.

[131]See above, §313.

[132]‘cum [Panaetius] sit is, qui id solum bonum iudicet, quod honestum sit’ Cic.Off.iii 3, 12; ‘solebat narrare Pompeius se, cum Rhodum venisset decedens ex Syria, audire voluisse Posidonium; sed cum audivisset eum graviter esse aegrum, quod vehementer eius artus laborarent, voluisse tamen nobilissimum philosophum visere ... itaque eum graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum, nisi quod honestum esset, cubantem disputavisse: cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur, saepe dixisse: “nihil agis, dolor: quamvis sis molestus, nunquam te esse confitebor malum”’Tusc. disp.ii 25, 61; cf. Sen.Ep.87, 35.

[133]See above, §114.

[134]Diog. L. vii 128.

[135]‘sapientem nulla re egere, et tamen multis ei rebus opus esse’ Sen.Ep.9, 14.

[136]‘[virtus] ipsa pretium sui’Dial.vii 9, 4; ‘recte factorum verus fructus [est] fecisse’Clem.i 1, 1; ‘virtutum omnium pretium in ipsis est’Ep.81, 20.

[137]‘sapienti non nocetur a paupertate, non a dolore, non ab aliis tempestatibus vitae; ipse semper in actu est; in effectu tunc maximus, cum illi fortuna se obposuit’ib.85, 37.

[138]‘virtutem nemo unquam deo acceptam rettulit ... iudicium hoc omnium mortalium est, fortunam a deo petendam, a se ipso sumendam esse sapientiam’ Cic.N. D.iii 36, 86 and 88; ‘aequum mi animum ipse parabo’ Hor.Ep.i 18, 112; ‘monstro, quod ipse tibi possis dare’ Juv.Sat.x 363.

[139]See note 129.

[140]‘Do you seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is good and just? Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be good and happy?’ Epict.Disc.iii 24, 51 and 52.

[141]‘What does not make the man himself worse, does not make his life worse either, nor injure him, without or within’To himselfiv 8.

[142]‘nec summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se viderit dissimile meliori’ Sen.Dial.vii 15, 1; ‘No man is able to make progress when he is wavering between opposite things; but if you have preferred this (one thing) to all things, if you choose to attend to this only, to work out this only, give up everything else’ Epict.Disc.iv 2, 4.

[143]Chrysippus wrote a book περὶ τοῦ ποιὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετάς; see Arnim iii 256.

[144]See below, §§335-350.

[145]Diog. L. vii 92.

[146]τὰς ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν Diog. L. vii 125; ‘quicquid honeste fit, una virtus facit, sed ex consilii sententia’ Sen.Ep.67, 10; ‘virtutibus inter se concordia [est]’Clem.i 5, 3.

[147]‘videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus; id autem est perfectum officium’ Cic.Fin.iii 18, 59; ‘rectum, quod κατόρθωμα dicebas’ib.iv 6, 15.

[148]‘quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere; attamen utrumque eorum fundi quodammodo et quasi dilatari putant’ib.iii 15, 48.

[149]See above, §153, note 66.

[150]‘scit [sapiens] neminem nasci sapientem sed fieri’ Sen.Dial.iv 10, 6.

[151]‘non dat natura virtutem; ars est bonum fieri’Ep.90, 44.

[152]Zeno probably took over the term προκοπή from the Peripatetics, see Diog. L. vii 127; its implications he adapted to Stoic principles. See Plut.prof. virt.12.

[153]‘hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum’ Cic.Fin.iii 10, 34.

[154]Stob. ii 7, 11 g; Diog. L. vii 127.

[155]τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος ἀποβλητήν ... διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίανib.

[156]See above, §289.

[157]‘semel traditi nobis boni perpetua possessio est; non dediscitur virtus. contraria enim mala in alieno haerent, ideo depelli et exturbari possunt’ Sen.Ep.50, 8. Just in the same spirit we say that a new language or (say) the art of swimming, if once learnt, is learnt ‘for good.’

[158]‘aliquis vir bonus nobis eligendus est, ac semper ante oculos habendus, ut sic tanquam illo spectante vivamus, et omnia tanquam illo vidente faciamus’ Sen.Ep.11, 8, quoting however from Epicurus.

[159]‘Heracles was the model whom [Antisthenes] and the other Cynics held up for imitation, the patron saint, so to speak, of the school. Antisthenes wrote a dialogue entitled “Heracles” and, with this for guidance, his followers delighted to tell again the story of the hero’s laborious and militant life, identifying, by ingenious allegories, the foul monsters which he vanquished with the vices and lusts that beset the souls of men’ Gomperz,Greek Thinkers, ii p. 151; ‘the more generous Cynics aver that the great Heracles also, as he became the author of other blessings, so also left to mankind the chief pattern of this (Cynic) life’ Julian,Or.vi p. 187, 3 (Mayor on Juv.Sat.x 361). So also in Buddhism: ‘besides the ideal King, the personification of Power and Justice, another ideal has played an important part in the formation of early Buddhist ideas regarding their master. It was the ideal of a perfectly Wise Man, the personification of Wisdom, the Buddha’ Rhys Davids,Hibbert Lectures, p. 141.

[160]‘Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio caelestium collocavit’ Cic.Off.iii 5, 25.

[161]‘Hercules nihil sibi vicit: orbem terrarum transiit non concupiscendo sed vindicando, quid vinceret; malorum hostis, bonorum vindex, terrarum marisque pacator’ Sen.Ben.i 13, 3. See also the brilliant descriptions in Epict.Disc.iii 24.

[162]‘Ulixen et Herculem ... Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrarum’ Sen.Dial.ii 2, 1. Yet there is something to be said on the other side: ‘Ulysses felt a desire for his wife, and wept as he sat on a rock.... If Ulysses did weep and lament, he was not a good man’ Epict.Disc.iii 24, 18.

[163]So Horace, quite in the Stoic spirit: ‘rursus quid virtus et quid patientia possit, | utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen’ Hor.Ep.i 2, 17 and 18.

[164]Diog. L. vi 1, 2.

[165]‘By acting thus Heraclitus and those like him were deservedly divine, and were so called’ Epict.Manual15.

[166]‘praeclara est aequabilitas in omni vita, et idem semper vultus eademque frons, ut de Socrate accepimus’ Cic.Off.i 26, 90; ‘Socrates ... violated nothing which was becoming to a good man, neither in making his defence nor by fixing a penalty on himself; nor even in the former part of his life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier’ Epict.Disc.iii 24, 61.

[167]See above, §17.

[168]‘si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de deorum immortalium statu’ Sen.Dial.ix 8, 5; ‘By acting thus Diogenes ... was deservedly divine, and was so called’ Epict.Manual15.

[169]See above, §306, note 25.

[170]δεύτερος Ἡρακλῆς ὁ Κλεάνθης ἐκαλεῖτο Diog. L. vii 170; ‘Learn how those live who are genuine philosophers: how Socrates lived, who had a wife and children; how Diogenes lived, and how Cleanthes, who attended to the school and drew water’ Epict.Disc.iii 26, 23.

[171]‘aut Cato ille sit aut Scipio aut Laelius’ Sen.Ep.25, 6; ‘elige remissioris animi virum Laelium’ib.11, 10.

[172]‘nam cum esset ille vir [P. Rutilius Rufus] exemplum, ut scitis, innocentiae, cumque illo nemo neque integrior esset in civitate neque sanctior, non modo supplex iudicibus esse noluit, sed ne ornatius quidem aut liberius causam dici suam, quam simplex ratio veritatis ferebat’ Cic.de Or.i 53, 229; cf. Sen.Dial.i 3, 4 and 7; and see further, §430.

[173]‘Catonem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortales dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus saeculis’ Sen.Dial.ii 2, 1.

[174]‘ego te [Cato] verissime dixerim peccare nihil’ Cic.Mur.29, 60.

[175]‘Catonis nobile letum’ Hor.C.i 12, 35 and 36; and see below, §430.

[176]‘nobis quoque militandum est’ Sen.Ep.51, 6; ‘This is the true athlete. Great is the combat, divine is the work’ Epict.Disc.ii 18, 28. See also below, §402.

[177]Euseb.pr. ev.vi 8, 13; Alex. Aph.de fato28, p. 199, 16 B.

[178]Plut.Sto. rep.31, 5.

[179]‘qui sapiens sit aut fuerit, ne ipsi quidem solent dicere’ Cic.Ac.ii 47, 145. Thus Panaetius made no reference to the wise man; whilst Posidonius only defended his possible existence in the future (Schmekel, pp. 213, 278).

[180]Sext.math.ix 133.

[181]See above, §214.

[182]Even if Cicero is not the creator of the conception of an ‘ideal character,’ nowhere else can we find its meaning so clearly expressed. So of the wise man; ‘iste vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere fortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, inquam, quem efficere volumus, quem quaerimus certe, et confidere sibi debet, et suae vitae et actae et consequenti, et bene de se iudicare’Fin.iii 8, 29.

[183]‘non est quod dicas hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inveniri’ Sen.Dial.ii 7, 1.

[184]‘ille alter [sapiens primae notae] fortasse tanquam phoenix semel anno quingentesimo nascitur’Ep.42, 1, cf. Alex. Aphr. p. 34, n. 2; ‘scit [sapiens] paucissimos omni aevo sapientes evadere’ Sen.Dial.iv 10, 6.

[185]See above, §126.

[186]‘Socrates in this way became perfect, in all things improving himself, attending to nothing except to reason. But you, though you are not yet a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes to be a Socrates’ Epict.Manual50. Epictetus did not however ignore failures: ‘we [Stoics] say one thing, but we do another; we talk of the things which are beautiful, but we do what is base’Disc.iii 7, 18.

[187]See above, §42.

[188]See above, §98.

[189]This is again a Socratic paradox: βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρα ἔχοντας ἔφη εἶναι ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἄρχειν Xen.Mem.iii 9, 10.

[190]Cic.Fin.iii 22, 75 and 76.

[191]‘eorum, qui dolorem in malis non habent, ratio certe cogit, uti in omnibus tormentis conservetur beata vita sapienti’ib.iii 13, 42; Arnim iii 585, 586; ‘shew me a man who is sick and happy, in danger and happy, in exile and happy, in disgrace and happy. Shew him; I desire, by the gods, to see a Stoic’ Epict.Disc.ii 19, 24.

[192]See below, §§431,439.

[193]‘bonus tempore tantum a deo differt’ Sen.Dial.i 1, 5; ‘sapiens excepta mortalitate similis deo’ib.ii 8, 2; and see above, §274.

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