CHAPTER II.

[1]Diog. XI. 12, 115, 116.

[2]Hyp. I. 5.

[3]Hyp. I. 36.

[4]Hyp. I. 164.

[5]ChaignetOp. cit.45.

[6]Aristocles of Euseb.Praep. Ev.XIV. E. 446.

This was after the dogmatic tendency of the Academy under Antiochus and his followers had driven Pyrrhonism from the partial union with the Academy, which it had experienced after the breaking up of the school under the immediate successors of Timon. Aenesidemus taught about the time of our era in Alexandria, and established the school there anew; and his followers are spoken of in a way that presupposes their continuing in the same place. There is every reason to think that the connection of Sextus with Alexandria was an intimate one, not only because Alexandria had been for so long a time the seat of Pyrrhonism, but also from internal evidence from his writings and their subsequent historical influence; and yet theHypotyposescould not have been delivered in Alexandria, as he often refers to that place in comparison with the place where he was then speaking. He says, furthermore, that he teaches in the same place where his master taught.[1]βλέπον τε ὅτι ἔνθα ὁ ὑφηγητὴς ὁ ἐμὸς διελέγετο, ἐνταῦθα ἐγὼ νῦν διαλέγομαι. Therefore the school must have been removed from Alexandria, in or before the time of the teacher of Sextus, to some other centre. TheHypotyposesare from beginning to end a direct attack on the Dogmatics; therefore Sextus must have taught either in some city where the dogmatic philosophy was strong, or in some rival philosophical centre. TheHypotyposesshow also that the writer had access to some large library. Alexandria, Rome and Athens are the three places the most probable for selection for such a purpose. For whatever reason the seat of the school was removed from Alexandria by the master of Sextus, or by himself, from the place where it had so long been united with the Empirical School of medicine, Athens would seem the most suitable city for its recontinuance, in the land where Pyrrhonism first had its birth. Sextus, however, in one instance, in referring to things invisible because of their outward relations, says in illustration, "as the city of Athens is invisible to us at present."[2]In other places also he contrasts the Athenians with the people whom he is addressing, equally with the Alexandrians, thus putting Athens as well as Alexandria out of the question.

[1]Hyp.III. 120.

[2]Hyp.II. 98.

Of the different writers on Sextus Empiricus, those who have treated this part of the subject most critically are Haas and Pappenheim. We will therefore consider, somewhat at length, the results presented by these two authors. Haas thinks that theHypotyposeswere delivered in Rome for the following reasons. Sextus' lectures must have been given in some centre of philosophical schools and of learning. He never opposes Roman relations to those of the place where he is speaking, as he does in regard to Athens and Alexandria. He uses the name "Romans" only three times,[1]once comparing them to the Rhodians, once to the Persians, and once in general to other nations.[2]In the first two of these references, the expression "among the Romans" in the first part of the antithesis is followed by the expression, "among us," in the second part, which Haas understands to be synonymous. The third reference is in regard to a Roman law, and the use of the word 'Roman' does not at all show that Sextus was not then in Rome. The character of the laws referred to by Sextus as παρ᾽ ἡμῖν shows that they were always Roman laws, and his definition of law[3]is especially a definition of Roman law. This argument might, it would seem, apply to any part of the Roman Empire, but Haas claims that the whole relation of law to custom as treated of by Sextus, and all his statements of customs forbidden at that time by law, point to Rome as the place of his residence. Further, Haas considers the Herodotus mentioned by Galen[4]as a prominent physician in Rome, to have been the predecessor and master of Sextus, in whose place Sextus says that he is teaching.[5]Haas also thinks that Sextus' refutation of the identity of Pyrrhonism with Empiricism evidently refers to a paragraph in Galen'sSubfiguratio Empirica,[6]which would be natural if theHypotyposeswere written shortly after Galen'sSub. Em., and in the same place. Further, Hippolytus, who wrote in or near Rome very soon after the time of Sextus, apparently used theHypotyposes, which would be more natural if he wrote in the same place. According to Haas, every thing in internal evidence, and outward testimony, points to Rome as having been the city where Sextus occupied his position as the head of the Sceptical School.

[1]HaasOp. cit.p. 15.

[2]Hyp.I. 149, 152; III. 211.

[3]Hyp.I. 146.

[4]Galende puls.IV. 11; Bd. VIII. 751.

[5]Hyp. III. 120.

[6]GalenSub. Em.123 B-126 D. (Basileae, 1542).

Coming now to the position of Pappenheim on this subject, we find that he takes very decided ground against the seat of the Sceptical School having been in Rome, even for a short time, in his latest publication regarding it.[1]This opinion is the result of late study on the part of Pappenheim, for in his work on theLebensverhältnisse des Sextus EmpiricusBerlin 1875, he says, "Dass Herodotus in Rom lebte sagt Galen. Vermuthlich auch Sextus." His reasons given in the later article for not connecting the Sceptical School at all with Rome are as follows. He finds no proof of the influence of Scepticism in Rome, as Cicero remarks that Pyrrhonism is extinct,[2]and he also gives weight to the well-known sarcastic saying of Seneca,Quis est qui tradat praecepta Pyrrhonis![3]While Haas claims that Sextus would naturally seek one of the centres of dogmatism, in order most effectively to combat it, Pappenheim, on the contrary, contends that it would have been foolishness on the part of Sextus to think of starting the Sceptical School in Rome, where Stoicism was the favored philosophy of the Roman Emperors; and when either for the possible reason of strife between the Empirical and Methodical Schools, or for some other cause, the Pyrrhonean School was removed from Alexandria, Pappenheim claims that all testimony points to the conclusion that it was founded in some city of the East. The name of Sextus is never known in Roman literature, but in the East, on the contrary, literature speaks for centuries of Sextus and Pyrrho. TheHypotyposes, especially, were well-known in the East, and references to Sextus are found there in philosophical and religious dogmatic writings. The Emperor Julian makes use of the works of Sextus, and he is frequently quoted by the Church Fathers of the Eastern Church.[4]Pappenheim accordingly concludes that the seat of Pyrrhonism after the school was removed from Alexandria, was in some unknown city of the East.

[1]PappenheimSitz der Skeptischen Schule. Archiv für Geschichte der Phil.1888.

[2]CiceroDe Orat.III. 17, 62.

[3]Senecanat. qu.VII. 32. 2.

[4]Fabriciusde Sexto Empirico Testimonia.

In estimating the weight of these arguments, we must accept with Pappenheim the close connection of Pyrrhonism with Alexandria, and the subsequent influence which it exerted upon the literature of the East. All historical relations tend to fix the permanent seat of Pyrrhonism, after its separation from the Academy, in Alexandria. There is nothing to point to its removal from Alexandria before the time of Menodotus, who is the teacher of Herodotus,[1]and for many reasons to be considered the real teacher of Sextus. It was Menodotus who perfected the Empirical doctrines, and who brought about an official union between Scepticism and Empiricism, and who gave Pyrrhonism in great measure, theéclatthat it enjoyed in Alexandria, and who appears to have been the most powerful influence in the school, from the time of Aenesidemus to that of Sextus. Furthermore, Sextus' familiarity with Alexandrian customs bears the imprint of original knowledge, and he cannot, as Zeller implies, be accepted as simply quoting. One could hardly agree with Zeller,[2]that the familiarity shown by Sextus with the customs of both Alexandria and Rome in theHypotyposesdoes not necessarily show that he ever lived in either of those places, because a large part of his works are compilations from other books; but on the contrary, the careful reader of Sextus' works must find in all of them much evidence of personal knowledge of Alexandria, Athens and Rome.

[1]Diog. IX. 12, 116.

[2]ZellerOp. cit.III. p. 39.

A part of Sextus' books also may have been written in Alexandria. Πρὸς φυσικοὺς could have been written in Alexandria.[1]If these were also lectures, then Sextus taught in Alexandria as well as elsewhere. The history of Eastern literature for the centuries immediately following the time of Sextus, showing as it does in so many instances the influence of Pyrrhonism, and a knowledge of theHypotyposes, furnishes us with an incontestable proof that the school could not have been for a long time removed from the East, and the absence of such knowledge in Roman literature is also a strong argument against its long continuance in that city. It would seem, however, from all the data at command, that during the years that the Sceptical School was removed from Alexandria, its head quarters were in Rome, and that the PyrrhoneanHypotyposeswere delivered in Rome. Let us briefly consider the arguments in favour of such a hypothesis. Scepticism was not unknown in Rome. Pappenheim quotes the remark of Cicero that Pyrrhonism was long since dead, and the sarcasm of Seneca,Quis est qui tradat praecepta Pyrrhonis?as an argument against the knowledge of Pyrrhonism in Rome. We must remember, however, that in Cicero's time Aenesidemus had not yet separated himself from the Academy; or if we consider the Lucius Tubero to whom Aenesidemus dedicated his works, as the same Lucius Tubero who was the friend of Cicero in his youth, and accordingly fix the date of Aenesidemus about 50 B.C.,[2]even then Aenesidemus' work in Alexandria was too late to have necessarily been known to Cicero, whose remark must have been referred to the old school of Scepticism. Should we grant, however, that the statements of Cicero and Seneca prove that in their time Pyrrhonism was extinct in Rome, they certainly do not show that after their death it could not have again revived, for theHypotyposeswere delivered more than a century after the death of Seneca. There are very few writers in Aenesidemus' own time who showed any influence of his teachings.[3]This influence was felt later, as Pyrrhonism became better known. That Pyrrhonism received some attention in Rome before the time of Sextus is nevertheless demonstrated by the teachings of Favorinus there. Although Favorinus was known as an Academician, the title of his principal work was τοὺς φιλοσοφουμένους αὐτῷ τῶν λόγων, ὧν ἄριστοι οἱ Πυῤῥώνειοι.[4]Suidas calls Favorinus a great author and learned in all science and philosophy,[5]and Favorinus made Rome the centre of his teaching and writing. His date is fixed by Zeller at 80-150 A.D., therefore Pyrrhonism was known in Rome shortly before the time of Sextus.

[1]PappenheimSitz der Skeptischen Schule; Archiv für Geschichte der Phil., 1888;Adv. Math.X. 15, 95.

[2]ZellerOp. cit.III. 10.

[3]ZellerOp. cit.p. 63.

[4]ZellerOp. cit.p. 67.

[5]BrochardOp. cit.329.

The whole tone of theHypotyposes, with the constant references to the Stoics as living present opponents, shows that these lectures must have been delivered in one of the centres of Stoicism. As Alexandria and Athens are out of the question, all testimony points to Rome as having been the seat of the Pyrrhonean School, for at least a part of the time that Sextus was at its head. We would then accept the teacher of Sextus, in whose place he says he taught, as the Herodotus so often referred to by Galen[1]who lived in Rome. Sextus' frequent references to Asclepiades, whom he mentions ten different times by name in his works,[2]speak in favour of Rome in the matter under discussion, as Asclepiades made that city one of the centres of medical culture. On the other hand, the fact that there is no trace of theHypotyposesin later Roman literature, with the one exception of the works of Hippolytus, as opposed to the wide-spread knowledge of them shown in the East for centuries, is incontestable historical proof that the Sceptical School could not long have had its seat at Rome. From the two passages given above from Sextus' work against physics, he must either have written that book in Alexandria, it would seem, or have quoted those passages from some other work. May we not then conclude, that Sextus was at the head of the school in Rome for a short time, where it may have been removed temporarily, on account of the difficulty with the Empiricists, implied inHyp. I. 236-241, or in order to be better able to attack the Stoics, but that he also taught in Alexandria, where the real home of the school was certainly found? There it probably came to an end about fifty years after the time of Sextus, and from that centre the Sceptical works of Sextus had their wide-spread influence in the East.

[1]Galen VIII. 751.

[2]BekkerIndex.

The books of Sextus Empiricus furnish us with the best and fullest presentation of ancient Scepticism which has been preserved to modern times, and give Sextus the position of one of the greatest men of the Sceptical School. His works which are still extant are thePyrrhonean Hypotyposesin three volumes, and the two works comprising eleven books which have been united in later times under the title of πρὸς μαθηματικούς, one of which is directed against the sciences in general, and the other against the dogmatic philosophers. The six books composing the first of these are written respectively against grammarians, rhetoricians, geometricians, arithmeticians, astronomers and musicians. The five books of the latter consist of two against the logicians, two against physics, and one against systems of morals. If the last short work of the first book directed against the arithmeticians is combined with the one preceding against the geometricians, as it well could be, the two works together would be divided into ten different parts; there is evidence to show that in ancient times such a division was made.[1]There were two other works of Sextus which are now lost, the medical work before referred to, and a book entitled περὶ ψυχῆς. The character of the extant works of Sextus is similar, as they are all directed either against science or against the dogmatics, and they all present the negative side of Pyrrhonism. The vast array of arguments comprising the subject-matter, often repeated in the same and different forms, are evidently taken largely from the Sceptical works which Sextus had resource to, and are, in fact, a summing up of all the wisdom of the Sceptical School. The style of these books is fluent, and the Greek reminds one of Plutarch and Thucydides, and although Sextus does not claim originality, but presents in all cases the arguments of the Sceptic, yet the illustrations and the form in which the arguments are presented, often bear the marks of his own thought, and are characterized here and there by a wealth of humor that has not been sufficiently noticed in the critical works on Sextus. Of all the authors who have reviewed Sextus, Brochard is the only one who seems to have understood and appreciated his humorous side.

We shall now proceed to the consideration of the general position and aim of Pyrrhonism.

[1]Diog. IX. 12, 116.

The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism.

The first volume of thePyrrhonean Hypotyposesgives the most complete statement found in any of the works of Sextus Empiricus of the teachings of Pyrrhonism and its relation to other schools of philosophy. The chief source of the subject-matter presented is a work of the same name by Aenesidemus,[1]either directly used by Sextus, or through the writings of those who followed Aenesidemus. The comprehensive title Πυῤῥώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις was very probably used in general to designate courses of lectures given by the leaders of the Sceptical School.

In the opening chapters of theHypotyposesSextus undertakes to define the position and aim of Pyrrhonism.[2]In introducing his subject he treats briefly of the differences between philosophical schools, dividing them into three classes; those which claim that they have found the truth, like the schools of Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics; those which deny the possibility of finding it, like that of the Academicians; and those that still seek it, like the Sceptical School. The accusation against the Academicians, that they denied the possibility of finding the truth, was one that the Sceptics were very fond of making. We shall discuss the justice of it later, simply remarking here, that to affirm the "incomprehensibility of the unknown," was a form of expression that the Pyrrhonists themselves were sometimes betrayed into, notwithstanding their careful avoidance of dogmatic statements.[3]

[1]Diog. IX. 11, 78.

[2]Hyp.I. 3, 4.

[3]Adv. Math.VIII. 191.

After defining the three kinds of philosophy as the Dogmatic, the Academic and the Sceptic, Sextus reminds his hearers that he does not speak dogmatically in anything that he says, but that he intends simply to present the Sceptical arguments historically, and as they appear to him. He characterizes his treatment of the subject as general rather than critical, including a statement of the character of Scepticism, its idea, its principles, its manner of reasoning, its criterion and aim, and a presentation of the Tropes, or aspects of doubt, and the Sceptical formulae and the distinction between Scepticism and the related schools of philosophy.[1]

The result of all the gradual changes which the development of thought had brought about in the outward relations of the Sceptical School, was to increase the earnestness of the claim of the Sceptics to be simply followers of Pyrrho, the great founder of the movement. In discussing the names given to the Sceptics, Sextus gives precedence very decidedly to the title "Pyrrhonean," because Pyrrho appears the best representative of Scepticism, and more prominent than all who before him occupied themselves with it.[2]

It was a question much discussed among philosophers in ancient times, whether Pyrrhonism should be considered a philosophical sect or not. Thus we find that Hippobotus in his work entitled περὶ αἱρέσεων, written shortly before our era, does not include Pyrrhonism among the other sects.[3]Diogenes himself, after some hesitation remarking that many do not consider it a sect, finally decides to call it so.[4]

[1]Hyp.I. 5, 6.

[2]Hyp.I. 7.

[3]Diog.Pro.19.

[4]Diog.Pro.20.

Sextus in discussing this subject calls Scepticism an ἀγωγή, or a movement, rather than a αἵρεσις, saying that Scepticism is not a sect, if that word implies a systematic arrangement of dogmas, for the Sceptic has no dogmas. If, however, a sect may mean simply the following of a certain system of reasoning according to what appears to be true, then Scepticism is a sect.[1]From a quotation given later on by Sextus from Aenesidemus, we know that the latter used the term ἀγωγή.[2]Sextus gives also the other titles, so well known as having been applied to Scepticism, namely, ζητητική, ἐϕεκτική, and ἀπορητική.[3]The δύναμις[4]of Scepticism is to oppose the things of sense and intellect in every possible way to each other, and through the equal weight of things opposed, or ἰσοσθένεια, to reach first the state of suspension of judgement, and afterwards ataraxia, or "repose and tranquillity of soul."[5]The purpose of Scepticism is then the hope of ataraxia, and its origin was in the troubled state of mind induced by the inequality of things, and uncertainty in regard to the truth. Therefore, says Sextus, men of the greatest talent began the Sceptical system by placing in opposition to every argument an equal one, thus leading to a philosophical system without a dogma, for the Sceptic claims that he has no dogma.[6]The Sceptic is never supposed to state a decided opinion, but only to say what appears to him. Even the Sceptical formulae, such as "Nothing more,"[7]or "I decide nothing,"[8]or "All is false," include themselves with other things. The only statements that the Sceptic can make, are in regard to his own sensations. He cannot deny that he is warm or cold or hungry.

[1]Hyp.I. 15, 17.

[2]Hyp.I. 210.

[3]Hyp.I. 7; Diog. IX. 11, 70.

[4]Hyp.I. 8.

[5]Hyp.I. 10.

[6]Hyp.I. 12.

[7]Hyp.I. 14.

[8]Hyp.I. 14.

Sextus replies to the charge that the Sceptics deny phenomena by refuting it.[1]The Sceptic does not deny phenomena, because they are the only criteria by which he can regulate his actions. "We call the criterion of the Sceptical School the phenomenon, meaning by this name the idea of it."[2]Phenomena are the only things which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his life by them. They are, however, subjective. Sextus distinctly affirms that sensations are the phenomena,[3]and that they lie in susceptibility and voluntary feeling, and that they constitute the appearances of objects.[4]We see from this that Sextus makes the only reality to consist in subjective experience, but he does not follow this to its logical conclusion, and doubt the existence of anything outside of mind. He rather takes for granted that there is a something unknown outside, about which the Sceptic can make no assertions. Phenomena are the criteria according to which the Sceptic orders his daily life, as he cannot be entirely inactive, and they affect life in four different ways. They constitute the guidance of nature, the impulse of feeling; they give rise to the traditions of customs and laws, and make the teaching of the arts important.[5]According to the tradition of laws and customs, piety is a good in daily life, but it is not in itself an abstract good. The Sceptic of Sextus' time also inculcated the teaching of the arts, as indeed must be the case with professing physicians, as most of the leading Sceptics were. Sextus says, "We are not without energy in the arts which we undertake."[6]This was a positive tendency which no philosophy, however negative, could escape, and the Sceptic tried to avoid inconsistency in this respect, by separating his philosophy from his theory of life. His philosophy controlled his opinions, and his life was governed by phenomena.

[1]Hyp.I. 19.

[2]Hyp.I. 19.

[3]Hyp.I. 22; Diog. IX. 11, 105.

[4]Hyp.I. 22.

[5]Hyp.I. 23.

[6]Hyp.I. 24.

The aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things which pertain to opinion, and moderation in the things which life imposes.[1]In other words, we find here the same natural desire of the human being to rise above and beyond the limitations which pain and passion impose, which is expressed in other forms, and under other names, in other schools of philosophy. The method, however, by which ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached, was peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a state of psychological equilibrium, which results from the equality of the weight of different arguments that are opposed to each other, and the consequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one, that it is correct.[2]The discovery of ataraxia was, in the first instance, apparently accidental, for while the Sceptic withheld his opinion, unable to decide what things were true, and what things were false, ataraxia fortunately followed.[3]After he had begun to philosophize, with a desire to discriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate the true from the false[4]during the time of ἐποχή, or suspension of judgement, ataraxia followed as if by chance, as the shadow follows the body.[5]

[1]Hyp.I. 25.

[2]Hyp.I. 26.

[3]Hyp.I. 26.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 107.

[5]Hyp.I. 29.

The Sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of opinion, does not entirely escape from suffering from his sensations. He is not wholly undisturbed, for he is sometimes cold and hungry, and so on.[1]He claims, nevertheless, that he suffers less than the dogmatist, who is beset with two kinds of suffering, one from the feelings themselves, and also from the conviction that they are by nature an evil.[2]To the Sceptic nothing is in itself either an evil or a good, and so he thinks that "he escapes from difficulties easier."[3]For instance, he who considers riches a good in themselves, is unhappy in the loss of them, and in possession of them is in fear of losing them, while the Sceptic, remembering the Sceptical saying "No more," is untroubled in whatever condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is no more an evil than the possession of them is a good.[4]For he who considers anything good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when that which seemed good is not present with him, he thinks that he is tortured by that which is by nature bad, and follows after what he thinks to be good. Having acquired it, however, he is not at rest, for his reason tells him that a sudden change may deprive him of this thing that he considers a good.[5]The Sceptic, however, endeavours neither to avoid nor seek anything eagerly.[6]

[1]Hyp.I. 30.

[2]Hyp.I. 30.

[3]Hyp.I. 30; Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[4]Adv. Math.XI. 146—160.

[5]Hyp.I. 27.

[6]Hyp.I. 28.

Ataraxia came to the Sceptic as success in painting the foam on a horse's mouth came to Apelles the painter. After many attempts to do this, and many failures, he gave up in despair, and threw the sponge at the picture that he had used to wipe the colors from the painting with. As soon as it touched the picture it produced a representation of the foam.[1]Thus the Sceptics were never able to attain to ataraxia by examining the anomaly between the phenomena and the things of thought, but it came to them of its own accord just when they despaired of finding it.

The intellectual preparation for producing ataraxia, consists in placing arguments in opposition to each other, both in regard to phenomena, and to things of the intellect. By placing the phenomenal in opposition to the phenomenal, the intellectual to the intellectual, and the phenomenal to the intellectual, andvice versa, the present to the present, past, and future, one will find that no argument exists that is incontrovertible. It is not necessary to accept any statement whatever as true, and consequently a state of ἐποχή may always be maintained.[2]Although ataraxia concerns things of the opinion, and must be preceded by the intellectual process described above, it is not itself a function of the intellect, or any subtle kind of reasoning, but seems to be rather a unique form of moral perfection, leading to happiness, or is itself happiness.

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