CHAPTER III.

[1]Hyp.I. 28, 29.

[2]Hyp.I. 32—35.

It was the aim of Scepticism to know nothing, and to assert nothing in regard to any subject, but at the same time not to affirm that knowledge on all subjects is impossible, and consequently to have the attitude of still seeking. The standpoint of Pyrrhonism was materialistic. We find from the teachings of Sextus that he affirmed the non-existence of the soul,[1]or the ego, and denied absolute existence altogether.[2]The introductory statements of Diogenes regarding Pyrrhonism would agree with this standpoint.[3]

There is no criterion of truth in Scepticism. We cannot prove that the phenomena represent objects, or find out what the relation of phenomena to objects is. There is no criterion to tell us which one is true of all the different representations of the same object, and of all the varieties of sensation that arise through the many phases of relativity of the conditions which control the character of the phenomena.

Every effort to find the truth can deal only with phenomena, and absolute reality can never be known.

[1]Adv. Math.VII. 55;Hyp.II. 32.

[2]Adv. Math.XI. 140.

[3]Diog. IX. 11, 61.

The Sceptical Tropes.

The exposition of the Tropes of Pyrrhonism constitutes historically and philosophically the most important part of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. These Tropes represent the sum total of the wisdom of the older Sceptical School, and were held in high respect for centuries, not only by the Pyrrhoneans, but also by many outside the narrow limits of that School. In the first book of theHypotyposesSextus gives two classes of Tropes, those of ἐποχή and the eight Tropes of Aenesidemus against Aetiology.

The Tropes of ἐποχή are arranged in groups of ten, five and two, according to the period of the Sceptical School to which they belong; the first of these groups is historically the most important, or the Ten Tropes of ἐποχή, as these are far more closely connected with the general development of Scepticism, than the later ones. By the name τρόπος or Trope, the Sceptic understood a manner of thought, or form of argument, or standpoint of judgement. It was a term common in Greek philosophy, used in this sense, from the time of Aristotle.[1]The Stoics, however, used the word with a different meaning from that attributed to it by the Sceptics.[2]Stephanus and Fabricius translate it by the Latin wordmodus[3]and τρόπος also is often used interchangeably with the word λόγος by Sextus, Diogenes Laertius, and others; sometimes also as synonymous with τόπος,[4]and τρόπος is found in the oldest edition of Sextus.[5]Diogenes defines the word as the standpoint, or manner of argument, by which the Sceptics arrived at the condition of doubt, in consequence of the equality of probabilities, and he calls the Tropes, the ten Tropes of doubt.[6]All writers on Pyrrhonism after the time of Aenesidemus give the Tropes the principal place in their treatment of the subject. Sextus occupies two thirds of the first book of theHypotyposesin stating and discussing them; and about one fourth of his presentation of Scepticism is devoted to the Tropes by Diogenes. In addition to these two authors, Aristocles the Peripatetic refers to them in his attack on Scepticism.[7]Favorinus wrote a book entitledPyrrhonean Tropes, and Plutarch one calledThe Ten (τόποι) Topes of Pyrrho.[8]Both of these latter works are lost.

[1]PappenheimErlauterung Pyrrh. Grundzugen, p. 35.

[2]Diog I. 76;Adv. Math.VIII. 227.

[3]Fabricius, Cap. XIV. 7.

[4]Hyp.I. 36.

[5]Fabricius onHyp.I. 36; Cap. XIV. G.

[6]Diog. IX. 11, 79-108.

[7]AristoclesEuseb. praep. ev.X. 14, 18.

[8]Fabricius onHyp.I. 36.

All authorities unite in attributing to Aenesidemus the work of systematizing and presenting to the world the ten Tropes of ἐποχή. He was the first to conceive the project of opposing an organized philosophical system of Pyrrhonism to the dogmatism of his contemporaries.[1]Moreover, the fact that Diogenes introduces the Tropes into his life of Pyrrho, does not necessarily imply that he considered Pyrrho their author, for Diogenes invariably combines the teachings of the followers of a movement with those of the founders themselves; he gives these Tropes after speaking of Aenesidemus' work entitledPyrrhonean Hypotyposes, and apparently quotes from this book, in giving at least a part of his presentation of Pyrrhonism, either directly or through, the works of others. Nietzsche proposes a correction of the text of Diogenes IX. 11, 79, which would make him quote the Tropes from a book by Theodosius,[2]author of a commentary on the works of Theodas. No writer of antiquity claims for the Tropes an older source than the books of Aenesidemus, to whom Aristocles also attributes them.[3]They are not mentioned in Diogenes' life of Timon, the immediate disciple of Pyrrho. Cicero has no knowledge of them, and does not refer to them in his discussion of Scepticism.

[1]Compare SaissetOp. cit.p. 78.

[2]BrochardOp. cit.254, Note 4.

[3]AristoclesEus. praep. ev.XIV. 18. 8.

Aenesidemus was undoubtedly the first to formulate these Tropes, but many things tend to show that they resulted, in reality, from the gradual classification of the results of the teachings of Pyrrho, in the subsequent development of thought from his own time to that of Aenesidemus. The ideas contained in the Tropes were not original with Aenesidemus, but are more closely connected with the thought of earlier times. The decidedly empirical character of the Tropes proves this connection, for the eight Tropes of Aetiology, which were original with Aenesidemus, bear a far stronger dialectic stamp, thus showing a more decided dialectic influence of the Academy than is found in the Tropes of ἐποχή. Many of the illustrations given of the Tropes also, testify to a time of greater antiquity than that of Aenesidemus. The name Trope was well known in ancient times, and the number ten reminds us of the ten opposing principles of Pythagoras, and the ten categories of Aristotle, the fourth of which was the same as the eighth Trope. The terminology, however, with very few exceptions, points to a later period than that of Pyrrho. Zeller points out a number of expressions in both Diogenes' and Sextus' exposition of the Tropes, which could not date back farther than the time of Aenesidemus.[1]One of the most striking features of the whole presentation of the Tropes, especially as given by Sextus, is their mosaic character, stamping them not as the work of one person, but as a growth, and also an agglutinous growth, lacking very decidedly the symmetry of thought that the work of one mind would have shown.

[1]ZellerOp. cit.p. 25.

At the time of the separation of Pyrrhonism from the Academy, no other force was as strong in giving life to the school as the systematic treatment by Aenesidemus of the Ten Tropes of ἐποχή. The reason of this is evident. It was not that the ideas of the Sceptical Tropes were original with Aenesidemus, but because a definite statement of belief is always a far more powerful influence than principles which are vaguely understood and accepted. There is always, however, the danger to the Sceptic, in making a statement even of the principles of Scepticism, that the psychological result would be a dogmatic tendency of mind, as we shall see later was the case, even with Aenesidemus himself. That the Sceptical School could not escape the accusation of dogmatizing, from the Dogmatics, even in stating the grounds of their Scepticism, we know from Diogenes.[1]To avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten Tropes, Sextus makes the frequent assertion that he does not affirm things to be absolutely true, but states them as they appear to him, and that they may be otherwise from what he has said.[2]

[1]Diog. IX. 11, 102.

[2]Hyp.I. 4, 24.

Sextus tells us that "Certain Tropes, ten in number, for producing the state of ἐποχή have been handed down from the older Sceptics."[1]He refers to them in another work as the "Tropes of Aenesidemus."[2]There is no evidence that the substance of these Tropes was changed after the time of Aenesidemus, although many of the illustrations given by Sextus must have been of a later date, added during the two centuries that elapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus. In giving these Tropes Sextus does not claim to offer a systematic methodical classification, and closes his list of them, in their original concise form, with the remark, "We make this order ourselves."[3]The order is given differently by Diogenes, and also by Favorinus.[4]The Trope which Sextus gives as the tenth is the fifth given by Diogenes, the seventh by Sextus is the eighth given by Diogenes, the fifth by Sextus, the seventh by Diogenes, the tenth by Diogenes, the eighth by Sextus. Diogenes says that the one he gives as the ninth Favorinus calls the eighth, and Sextus and Aenesidemus the tenth. This statement does not correspond with the list of the Tropes which Sextus gives, proving that Diogenes took some other text than that of Sextus as his authority.[5]The difference in the order of the Tropes shows, also, that the order was not considered a matter of great importance. There is a marked contrast in the spirit of the two presentations of the Tropes given by Sextus and Diogenes. The former gives them not only as an orator, but as one who feels that he is defending his own cause, and the school of which he is the leader, against mortal enemies, while Diogenes relates them as an historian.

[1]Hyp.I. 36.

[2]Adv. Math.VII. 345.

[3]Hyp.I. 38.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 87.

[5]Diog. IX. 11, 87.

Pappenheim tries to prove[1]that Aenesidemus originally gave only nine Tropes in hisPyrrhonean Hypotyposes, as Aristocles mentions only nine in referring to the Tropes of Aenesidemus, and that the tenth was added later. Had this been the case, however, the fact would surely have been mentioned either by Diogenes or Sextus, who both refer to the ten Tropes of Aenesidemus.

The Tropes claim to prove that the character of phenomena is so relative and changeable, that certain knowledge cannot be based upon them, and as we have shown, there is no other criterion of knowledge for the Sceptic than phenomena.[2]All of the Tropes, except the tenth, are connected with sense-perception, and relate to the difference of the results obtained through the senses under different circumstances. They may be divided into two classes,i.e., those based upon differences of our physical organism, and those based upon external differences. To the first class belong the first, second, third and fourth; to the second class, the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, and also the ninth. The eighth, or that of relation, is applied objectively both by Sextus and Diogenes in their treatment of the Tropes, and is not used for objects of thought alone, but principally to show the relation of outward objects to each other. The tenth is the only one which has a moral significance, and it has also a higher subjective value than the others; it takes its arguments from an entirely different sphere of thought, and deals with metaphysical and religious contradictions in opinion, and with the question of good and evil. That this Trope is one of the oldest, we know from its distinct mention in connection with the foundation theories of Pyrrho, by Diogenes.[3]In treating of the subjective reasons for doubt as to the character of external reality, the Sceptics were very near the denial of all outward reality, a point, however, which they never quite reached.

[1]Pappenheim,Die Tropen der Griechen, p. 23.

[2]Hyp.I. 22.

[3]Diog. IX. 11, 61.

There is evidently much of Sextus' own thought mixed with the illustrations of the Tropes, but it is impossible to separate the original parts from the material that was the common property of the Sceptical School. Many of these illustrations show, however, perfect familiarity with the scientific and medical teachings of the time. Before entering upon his exposition of the Tropes, Sextus gives them in the short concise form in which they must first have existed[1]—

[1]Hyp.I. 36—38.

Although Sextus is careful not to dogmatise regarding the arrangement of the Tropes, yet there is in his classification of them a regular gradation, from the arguments based upon differences in animals to those in man, first considering the latter in relation to the physical constitution, and then to circumstances outside of us, and finally the treatment of metaphysical and moral differences.

The First Trope.[1]That the same mental representations are not found in different animals, may be inferred from their differences in constitution resulting from their different origins, and from the variety in their organs of sense. Sextus takes up the five senses in order, giving illustrations to prove the relative results of the mental representations in all of them, as for example the subjectivity of color[2]and sound.[3]All knowledge of objects through the senses is relative and not absolute. Sextus does not, accordingly, confine the impossibility of certain knowledge to the qualities that Locke regards as secondary, but includes also the primary ones in this statement.[4]The form and shape of objects as they appear to us may be changed by pressure on the eyeball. Furthermore, the character of reflections in mirrors depend entirely on their shape, as the images in concave mirrors are very different from those in convex ones; and so in the same way as the eyes of animals are of different shapes, and supplied with different fluids, the ideas of dogs, fishes, men and grasshoppers must be very different.[5]

[1]Hyp.. I. 40—61.

[2]Hyp.. I. 44—46.

[3]Hyp.. I. 50.

[4]Hyp.. I. 47.

[5]Hyp.. I. 49.

In discussing the mental representations of animals of different grades of intelligence, Sextus shows a very good comprehension of the philogenetic development of the organs of sense, and draws the final conclusion that external objects are regarded differently by animals, according to their difference in constitution.[1]These differences in the ideas which different animals have of the same objects are demonstrated by their different tastes, as the things desired by some are fatal to others.[2]The practical illustrations given of this result show a familiarity with natural history, and cognizance of the tastes and habits of many animals,[3]but were probably few of them original with Sextus, unless perhaps in their application; that this train of reasoning was the common property of the Sceptic School, we know from the fact that Diogenes begins his exposition of the first Trope in a way similar to that of Sextus.[4]His illustrations are, however, few and meagre compared with those of Sextus, and the scientific facts used by both of them may mostly be found in other authors of antiquity given in a similar way.[5]The logical result of the reasoning used to explain the first Trope, is that we cannot compare the ideas of the animals with each other, nor with our own; nor can we prove that our ideas are more trustworthy than those of the animals.[6]As therefore an examination of ideas is impossible, any decided opinion about their trustworthiness is also impossible, and this Trope leads to the suspension of judgment regarding external objects, or to ἐποχή.[7]

[1]Hyp.. I. 54.

[2]Hyp.. I. 55.

[3]Hyp.. I. 55-59.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 79-80.

[5]PappenheimErlauterung Pyrr. Grundzüge Par. 41.

[6]Hyp. I. 59.

[7]Hyp. I. 61.

After reaching this conclusion, Sextus introduces a long chapter to prove that animals can reason. There is no reference to this in Diogenes, but there is other testimony to show that it was a favourite line of argument with the Sceptics.[1]Sextus, however, says that his course of reasoning is different from that of most of the Sceptics on the subject,[2]as they usually applied their arguments to all animals, while he selected only one, namely the dog.[3]This chapter is full of sarcastic attacks on the Dogmatics, and contains the special allusion to the Stoics as the greatest opponents of the Sceptics, which has been before referred to.[4]

Sextus claims with a greater freedom of diction than in some apparently less original chapters, and with a wealth of special illustrations, that the dog is superior to man in acuteness of perception,[5]that he has the power of choice, and possesses an art, that of hunting,[6]and, also, is not deprived of virtue,[7]as the true nature of virtue is to show justice to all, which the dog does by guarding loyally those who are kind to him, and keeping off those who do evil.[8]The reasoning power of this animal is proved by the story taken from Chrysippus, of the dog that came to a meeting of three roads in following a scent. After seeking the scent in vain in two of the roads, he takes the third road without scenting it as a result of a quick process of thought, which proves that he shares in the famous dialectic of Chrysippus,[9]the five forms of ἀναπόδεικτοι λόγοι, of which the dog chooses the fifth. EitherAorBorC, notAorB,thereforeC.

[1]Hyp. I. 238.

[2]Compare BrochardOp. cit.256.

[3]Hyp. I. 62-63.

[4]Hyp. I. 65.

[5]Hyp. I. 64.

[6]Hyp. I. 66.

[7]Hyp. I. 67.

[8]Hyp. I. 67.

[9]Hyp. I. 69;Hyp. II. 166; Diog. VII. 1, 79.

The dog and other irrational animals may also possess spoken language, as the only proof that we have to the contrary, is the fact that we cannot understand the sounds that they make.[1]We have an example in this chapter of the humor of Sextus, who after enlarging on the perfect character of the dog, remarks, "For which reason it seems to me some philosophers have honoured themselves with the name of this animal,"[2]thus making a sarcastic allusion to the Cynics, especially Antisthenes.[3]

[1]Hyp. I. 74.

[2]Hyp. I. 72.

[3]Diog. VI. 1, 13.

The Second Trope. Passing on to the second Trope, Sextus aims to prove that even if we leave the differences of the mental images of animals out of the discussion, there is not a sufficient unanimity in the mental images of human beings to allow us to base any assertions upon them in regard to the character of external objects.[1]He had previously announced that he intended to oppose the phenomenal to the intellectual "in any way whatever,"[2]so he begins here by referring to the two parts of which man is said to be composed, the soul and the body, and proceeds to discuss the differences among men in sense-perception and in opinion.[3]Most of the illustrations given of differences in sense-perception are medical ones; of the more general of these I will note the only two which are also given by Diogenes in his exposition of this Trope,[4]viz., Demophon, Alexander's table waiter, who shivered in the sun, and Andron the Argive, who was so free from thirst that he travelled through the desert of Libya without seeking a drink. Some have reasoned from the presence of the first of these illustrations in the exposition of the Tropes, that a part of this material at least goes back to the time of Pyrrho, as Pyrrho from his intimacy with Alexander, when he accompanied him to India, had abundant opportunities to observe the peculiarities of his servant Demophon.[5]The illustration of Andron the Argive is taken from Aristotle, according to Diogenes.[6]

[1]Hyp. I. 79.

[2]Hyp.I. 8.

[3]Hyp.I. 80.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 80-81.

[5]ComparePyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive, Revue phil., Paris 1885, No. 5; Victor Brochard, p. 521.

[6]Diog. IX. 11, 81.

Passing on to differences of opinion, we have another example of the sarcastic humor of Sextus, as he refers to the φυσιογνωμονκή σοφία[1]as the authority for believing that the body is a type of the soul. As the bodies of men differ, so the souls also probably differ. The differences of mind among men is not referred to by Diogenes, except in the general statement that they choose different professions; while Sextus elaborates this point, speaking of the great differences in opposing schools of philosophy, and in the objects of choice and avoidance, and sources of pleasure for different men.[2]The poets well understand this marked difference in human desires, as Homer says,

"One man enjoys this, another enjoys that."

Sextus also quotes the beautiful lines of Pindar,[3]

"One delights in getting honours and crowns through stormfooted horses,Others in passing life in rooms rich in gold,Another safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the sea.

"One delights in getting honours and crowns through stormfooted horses,

Others in passing life in rooms rich in gold,

Another safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the sea.

[1]Hyp.I. 85.

[2]Hyp.I. 87-89.

[3]Hyp.I. 86.

The Third Trope. The third Trope limits the argument to the sense-perceptions of one man, a Dogmatic, if preferred, or to one whom the Dogmatics consider wise,[1]and states that as the ideas given by the different sense organs differ radically in a way that does not admit of their being compared with each other, they furnish no reliable testimony regarding the nature of objects.[2]"Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to present itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant brown and sweet." The apple was evidently the ordinary example given for this Trope, for Diogenes uses the same, but in a much more condensed form, and not with equal understanding of the results to be deduced from it.[3]The consequence of the incompatibility of the mental representations produced through the several sense organs by the apple, may be the acceptance of either of the three following propositions: (i) That only those qualities exist in the apple which we perceive. (ii) That more than these exist. (iii) That even those perceived do not exist.[4]Accordingly, any experience which can give rise to such different views regarding outward objects, cannot be relied upon as a testimony concerning them.

[1]Hyp.I. 90.

[2]Hyp.I. 94.

[3]Diog. IX. 11 81.

[4]Hyp.I. 99.

The non-homogeneous nature of the mental images connected with the different sense organs, as presented by Sextus, reminds us of the discussion of the same subject by Berkeley in hisTheory of Vision.

Sextus says that a man born with less than the usual number of senses, would form altogether different ideas of the external world than those who have the usual number, and as our ideas of objects depend on our mental images, a greater number of sense organs would give us still different ideas of outward reality.[1]The strong argument of the Stoics against such reasoning as this, was their doctrine of pre-established harmony between nature and the soul, so that when a representation is produced in us of a real object, a καταληπτικὴ φαντασία,[2]by this representation the soul grasps a real existence. There is a λόγος in us which is of the same kind, σύγγενος, or in relation to all nature. This argument of pre-established harmony between the faculties of the soul and the objects of nature, is the one that has been used in all ages to combat philosophical teaching that denies that we apprehend the external world as it is. It was used against Kant by his opponents, who thought in this way to refute his teachings.[3]The Sceptics could not, of course, accept a theory of nature that included the soul and the external world in one harmonious whole, but Sextus in his discussion of the third Trope does not refute this argument as fully as he does later in his work against logic.[4]He simply states here that philosophers themselves cannot agree as to what nature is, and furthermore, that a philosopher himself is a part of the discord, and to be judged, rather than being capable of judging, and that no conclusion can be reached by those who are themselves an element of the uncertainty.[5]

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