CHAPTER V.

[3]Adv. Math.VII. 150.

In reply to Zeller's position, that Sextus and Tertullian have misunderstood Aenesidemus, and quote from some common author who misrepresents him, we would admit that such a misunderstanding might be possible where Sextus gives long explanations of Heraclitus' teachings, beginning with quoting Aenesidemus, and continuing in such a way that it is not always possible to distinguish just the part that is attributed to Aenesidemus; but such a misunderstanding certainly cannot be asserted in regard to the direct statement that Aenesidemus regarded Scepticism as the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, for the reasons previously given. Neither would we agree with Brochard, whose solution of the difficulty is on the whole the most logical,i.e., that Aenesidemus had necessarily already passed through two phases of philosophical belief. It is possible to admit a gradual evolution of thought in Aenesidemus without supposing in either case a change of basis. His withdrawal from the Academy is an argument against, rather than in favor of a change on his part, and was caused by the well-known change in the attitude of the Academy.

Many of the teachings of the Sceptical School were taken directly from the Academy, belonging to those doctrines advocated in the Academy before the eclectic dogmatic tendency introduced by Antiochus. In fact, Sextus himself claims a close relation between the Middle Academy and Pyrrhonism.[1]Aenesidemus, although he was a Sceptic, belonged to the Academy, and on leaving it became, as it were, a pioneer in Pyrrhonism, and cannot be judged in the same way as we should judge a Sceptic of Sextus' time.

It seems a self-evident fact that during the two centuries which elapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus, the standpoint of judgment in the Sceptical School had greatly changed. An example illustrating this change we find in a comparison of the presentation of Scepticism by Diogenes with that of Sextus. The author Whom Diogenes follows, probably one of the Sceptical writers, considers Xenophanes, Zeno, and Democritus, Sceptics, and also Plato,[2]while Sextus, in regard to all of these men, opposes the idea that they were Sceptics.[3]Diogenes also calls Heraclitus a Sceptic, and even Homer,[4]and quotes sceptical sayings from the Seven Wise Men;[5]he includes in the list of Sceptics, Archilochus, Euripides, Empedocles, and Hippocrates,[6]and, furthermore, says that Theodosius, probably one of the younger Sceptics, objected to the name 'Pyrrhonean' on the ground that Pyrrho was not the first Sceptic.[7]

[1]Hyp.I. 232.

[2]Diog. IX. 11, 17—72.

[3]Hyp.I. 213—214; I. 223—225.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 71.

[5]Diog. IX. 11, 71.

[6]Diog. IX. 11, 71—73.

[7]Diog. IX. 11. 70.

We have given the testimony from many sources to the effect that before the time of Sextus the Empirical School of Medicine was considered identical with Scepticism, although not so by Sextus himself. From all of these things we may infer a narrowing of the limits of Pyrrhonism in the time of Sextus.

Let us accept with Brochard the development of thought seen in Aenesidemus from the beginning to the end of his career, without agreeing with him that Aenesidemus ever consciously changed his basis. He was a Sceptic in the Academy. He left the Academy on that account, and he remained a Sceptic to the end, in so far as a man can be a Sceptic, and take the positive stand that Aenesidemus did.

Two things might account for his apparent dogmatism—

Let us consider the first of these causes. Aenesidemus, although not the first of the later Sceptics, was apparently the first to separate himself from the Academy. He was the founder of a new movement, the attempt to revive the older Scepticism as taught by Pyrrho and Timon, and separate it from the dogmatic teachings of the Stoics which were so greatly affecting the Scepticism of the New Academy. It was the spirit of his time to seek to sustain all philosophical teaching by the authority of as many as possible of the older philosophers, and he could hardly escape the tendency which his training in the Academy had unconsciously given him. Therefore we find him trying to prove that the philosophy of Heraclitus follows from Scepticism. It is not necessary either to explain the matter, as both Hirzel and Natorp so ingeniously attempt to do, by claiming that the truth of contradictory predicates which Aenesidemus accepted from Heraclitus referred only to phenomena. The history of philosophy gives us abundant proof of the impossibility of absolute Scepticism, and Aenesidemus furnishes us with one example of many of this impossibility, and of the dogmatism that must exist in connection with all thought. In the case of Aenesidemus, who evidently gave the best efforts of his life to establish the Sceptical School, the dogmatism was probably unconscious. That he remained to the end a Sceptic is shown by the fact that he was known as such to posterity. Nowhere do we find a change of basis referred to in regard to him, and Sextus, in refuting the mistakes which he attributes to Aenesidemus, does it, as it were, to point out something of which Aenesidemus had been unconscious.

Let us consider here the second cause of Aenesidemus' Dogmatism, the psychological effect upon himself of formulating Sceptical beliefs. The work that he did for the Sceptical School was a positive one. It occupied years of his life, and stamped itself upon his mental development. In formulating Scepticism, and in advocating it against the many enemies of the School, and amidst all the excitement of the disruption from the Academy, and of establishing a new School, it was inevitable that his mind should take a dogmatic tendency. He remained a Sceptic as he had always been, but must have grown dogmatic in his attitude towards the Sceptical formulae, and was thus able to adopt some of the teachings of Heraclitus, unconscious of their inconsistency.

Where should we find a modern writer who is consistent in all his statements? Could we read the works of Aenesidemus, we might better understand the connection between the apparently contradictory ideas in his teaching, but the inconsistencies in statement would probably remain. It is necessary to remember the position of Aenesidemus in breaking away from the Academy and in founding a new school, the full significance of which he could not foresee. There must necessarily be some crudeness in pioneer work, and some failure to see the bearing of all its parts, and a compiler like Sextus could point out the inconsistencies which the two centuries since the time of Aenesidemus had made plain. Aenesidemus was too positive a character to admit of absolute Sceptical consistency. He was nevertheless the greatest thinker the Sceptical School had known since the age of Pyrrho, its founder. In claiming a union between Pyrrhonism and the philosophy of Heraclitus, he recognised also the pre-Socratic tendency of the Sceptical School. The name of Socrates was all powerful in the Academy, but Aenesidemus comprehended the fact that the true spirit of Pyrrhonism was of earlier origin than the Academic Scepsis.

Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism.

The distinct philosophical movement of which Pyrrho was the author bore his name for five centuries after his death. It had an acknowledged existence as a philosophical tendency, if indeed not a sect, for a great part of that time. Yet, when we carefully analyse the relation of Pyrrhonism, as presented to us by Sextus, to the teachings of Pyrrho himself, in so far as they can be known, we find many things in Pyrrhonism for which Pyrrho was not responsible.

The foundation elements of the movement, the spirit of Empirical doubt that lay underneath and caused its development in certain directions rather than others, are due to Pyrrho. The methods of the school, however, were very foreign to anything found in the life or teachings of Pyrrho. Pyrrho was eminently a moralist. He was also to a great degree an ascetic, and he lived his philosophy, giving it thus a positive side wanting in the Pyrrhonism presented to us by Sextus. Timon represents him as desiring to escape from the tedious philosophical discussions of his time—

ὦ γέρον ὦ Πύρρων, πῶς ἤ πόθεν ἔκδυσιν εὗρεςλατρείης δοξῶν τε κενοφροσύνης τε σοφιστῶν;

ὦ γέρον ὦ Πύρρων, πῶς ἤ πόθεν ἔκδυσιν εὗρες

λατρείης δοξῶν τε κενοφροσύνης τε σοφιστῶν;

and again he speaks of his modest and tranquil life—

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ Πύρρων, ἱμείρεται ἦτορ ἀκοῦσαιπῶς πότ᾽ ἀνὴρ ἔτ᾽ ἄγεις πάντα μεθ᾽ ἡσυχίηςμοῦνος δ᾽ἀνθρώποισι θεοῦ τρόπον ἡγεμονεύεις. . . . . . φῇστα μεθ᾽ ἡσυχίηςαἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτος κατὰ ταῦταμὴ πρόσεχ᾽ ἰνδαλμοῖς ἡδυλόγου σόφιης.[1]

τοῦτό μοι, ὦ Πύρρων, ἱμείρεται ἦτορ ἀκοῦσαι

πῶς πότ᾽ ἀνὴρ ἔτ᾽ ἄγεις πάντα μεθ᾽ ἡσυχίης

μοῦνος δ᾽ἀνθρώποισι θεοῦ τρόπον ἡγεμονεύεις

. . . . . . φῇστα μεθ᾽ ἡσυχίης

αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτος κατὰ ταῦτα

μὴ πρόσεχ᾽ ἰνδαλμοῖς ἡδυλόγου σόφιης.[1]

Pyrrho wished more than anything else to live in peace, and his dislike of the Sophists[2]may well have made him try to avoid dialectic; while, on the contrary, in the Pyrrhonean School of later times discussion was one of the principal methods of contest, at least after the time of Agrippa. Pyrrhonism seems to have been originally a theory of life, like the philosophy of Socrates, to whom Pyrrho is often compared,[3]and Pyrrho, like Socrates, lived his philosophy. Our knowledge of Pyrrho is gained from Aristocles, Sextus Empiricus, and Diogenes, and from the Academic traditions given by Cicero. Diogenes gives us details of his life which he attributes to Antigonus of Carystius, who lived about the time of Pyrrho.[4]Pyrrho was a disciple and admirer of Democritus,[5]some of whose teachings bore a lasting influence over the subsequent development of Pyrrhonism. He accompanied Alexander the Great to India, where he remained as a member of his suite for some time, and the philosophical ideas of India were not without influence on his teachings. Oriental philosophy was not unknown in Greece long before the time of Pyrrho, but his personal contact with the Magi and the Gymnosophists of the far East, apparently impressed upon his mind teachings for which he was not unprepared by his previous study and natural disposition. In his indifference to worldly goods we find a strong trace of the Buddhistic teaching regarding the vanity of human life. He showed also a similar hopelessness in regard to the possibility of finding a satisfactory philosophy, or absolute truth. He evidently returned from India with the conviction that truth was not to be attained.[6]

[1]Diog. IX. 11, 65. Given from Mullach's edition of Timon by Brochard,Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive, p. 525.

[2]Diog. IX. 11, 69.

[3]LewesOp. cit.p. 460.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 62.

[5]Diog. IX. 11, 67.

[6]Compare MaccollOp. cit.

After the death of Alexander and Pyrrho's return to Greece, he lived quietly with his sister at Elis, and Diogenes says that he was consistent in his life, asserting and denying nothing, but in everything withholding his opinion, as nothing in itself is good or shameful, just or unjust.[1]He was not a victim of false pride, but sold animals in the market place, and, if necessary, washed the utensils himself.[2]He lived in equality of spirit, and practised his teachings with serenity. If one went out while he was talking he paid no attention, but went calmly on with his remarks.[3]He liked to live alone, and to travel alone, and on one occasion, being knocked about in a vessel by a storm at sea, he did not lose his imperturbability, but pointed to a swine calmly eating on board, and said that the wise man should have as much calmness of soul as that. He endured difficult surgical operations with indifference,[4]and when his friend Anaxarchus was once unfortunate enough to fall into a morass, he went calmly by without stopping to help him, for which consistency of conduct Anaxarchus afterwards praised him. There are two instances given by Diogenes when he lost control of himself; once in getting angry with his sister, and once in trying to save himself when chased by a dog. When accused of inconsistency, he said it was difficult to entirely give up one's humanity.[5]He was greatly venerated by the people among whom he lived, who made him high priest, and on his account exempted all philosophers from taxation,[6]and after his death erected a statue to his memory. These facts testify to his moral character, and also to fulfil the functions of high priest a certain amount of dogmatism must have been necessary.

[1]Diog. IX. 11, 61, 62.

[2]Diog. IX. 11, 66.

[3]Diog. IX. 11, 63.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 67.

[5]Diog. IX. 11, 66.

[6]Diog. IX. 11, 64.

According to Diogenes, "We cannot know," said Pyrrho, "what things are in themselves, either by sensation or by judgment, and, as we cannot distinguish the true from the false, therefore we should live impassively, and without an opinion." The term ἐποχή, so characteristic of Pyrrhonism, goes back, according to Diogenes, to the time of Pyrrho.[1]Nothing is, in itself, one thing more than another, but all experience is related to phenomena, and no knowledge is possible through the senses.[2]Pyrrho's aim was ἀταραξία and his life furnished a marked example of the spirit of indifference, for which the expression ἀπάθεια is better suited than the later one, ἀταραξία. The description of his life with his sister confirms this, where the term ἀδιαφορία is used to describe his conduct.[3]He founded his Scepticism on the equivalence of opposing arguments.[4]

[1]Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[2]Diog. IX. 11, 61—62.

[3]Diog. IX. 11. 66.

[4]Diog. IX. 11. 106.

The picture given of Pyrrho by Cicero is entirely different from that of Diogenes, and contrasts decidedly with it.[1]Cicero knows Pyrrho as a severe moralist, not as a Sceptic. Both authors attribute to Pyrrho the doctrine of indifference and apathy, but, according to Cicero, Pyrrho taught of virtue, honesty, and thesummum bonum, while Diogenes plainly tells us that he considered nothing as good in itself, "and of all things nothing as true."[2]Cicero does not once allude to Pyrrhonean doubt. We see on the one hand, in Cicero's idea of Pyrrho, the influence of the Academy, perhaps even of Antiochus himself,[3]which probably colored the representations given of Pyrrho; but, on the other hand, there is much in Diogenes' account of Pyrrho's life and teachings, and in the writings of Timon, which shows us the positive side of Pyrrho. Pyrrho, in denying the possibility of all knowledge, made that rather a motive for indifference in the relations of life, than the foundation thought of a philosophical system. His teaching has a decided ethical side, showing in that respect the strong influence of Democritus over him, who, like Pyrrho, made happiness to consist in a state of feeling.[4]The one motive of all of Pyrrho's teaching is a positive one, the desire for happiness.

[1]De orat.III, 62.

[2]Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[3]Compare NatorpOp. cit.p. 71.

[4]ZellerGrundriss der Griechischen Phil.p. 70.

The essence of Pyrrhonism as given by Timon is as follows:[1]Man desires to be happy. To realise his desire he must consider three things:

The nature of things is unknown. Our relation to them must be one of suspension of judgment, without activity, desire, or belief,—that is, an entirely negative relation. The result is that state of having no opinion, called ἐποχή, which is followed in turn by ἀταραξία.

[1]Aristoclesap. Eusebium Praep. Ev.XIV. 18.

[1]The problem of philosophy is here proposed very nearly in the terms of Kant, but not with the positive motive, like that of the great philosopher of Germany, of evolving a system to present the truth. Yet the importance of these questions shows the originality of Pyrrho. The earnestness of Pyrrho is further shown by an example given by Diogenes. Once on being found talking to himself alone, he said, when asked the reason, that he was meditating how to become a good man (χρηστός),[2]thus showing an entirely different spirit from anything found in Sextus' books. The explanation of his life and teachings is to be found largely in his own disposition. Such an attitude of indifference must belong to a placid nature, and cannot be entirely the result of a philosophical system, and, while it can be aimed at, it can never be perfectly imitated. One of his disciples recognised this, and said that it was necessary to have the disposition of Pyrrho in order to hold his doctrines.[3]Diogenes tells us that he was the first to advance any formulae of Scepticism,[4]but they must have been very elementary, as Pyrrho himself wrote nothing. We find no trace of formulated Tropes in Pyrrho's teachings, yet it is probable that he indicated some of the contradictions in sensation, and possibly the Tropes in some rudimentary form. Of the large number of sceptical formulae, or φωναί, the three which seem to have the oldest connection with Scepticism are the ἀντιλογία, the οὐδὲν ὁρίζω, and the οὐ μᾶλλον.[5]We know from Diogenes that Protagoras is the authority for saying that in regard to everything there are two opposing arguments.[6]The saying "to determine nothing" is quoted from Timon'sPythonby Diogenes,[7]and the other two mentioned are also attributed to him by Aristocles.[8]We have also in the οὐ μᾶλλον a direct connection with Democritus, although the difference in the meaning which he attributed to it is shown by Sextus.[9]So while the expression is the same, the explanation of it given by Pyrrho must have been different. It would seem probable that Pyrrho used all of these three sayings, from the account of Diogenes, and that even then they gave rise to the accusation of the Dogmatics, that simply by possessing such sayings the Sceptics dogmatised,[10]for the refutation of this used by Sextus occurs in the old account of the sayings, namely, that these formulae include also themselves in the meaning, as a cathartic removes itself together with other harmful objects.[11]

[1]Compare MaccollOp. cit.p. 21.

[2]Diog. IX. 11, 64.

[3]Diog. IX. 11, 70, 64.

[4]Diog. IX. 11, 69; IX. 11, 61.

[5]Hyp.I. 202; Diog. IX. 8, 51;PhotiusBekker's ed. 280 H.

[6]PhotiusBekker's ed. 280 H.

[7]Hyp.I. 197; Diog. IX. 11, 76.

[8]Aristocles ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev.XIV. 18.

[9]Hyp.I. 213.

[10]Diog. IX. 11, 68-76.

[11]Diog. IX. 11, 76;Hyp.I. 206.

In comparing the later Pyrrhonism with the teachings of Pyrrho, we would sharply contrast the moral attitude of the two. With Pyrrho equilibrium of soul was a means to be applied to his positive theory of life; with the later Pyrrhoneans it was the end to be attained. We would attribute, however, the empirical tendency shown during the whole history of Pyrrhonism to Pyrrho as its originator. He was an empirical philosopher, and the result of his influence in this respect, as seen in the subsequent development of the school, stands in marked contrast to the dialectic spirit of the Academic Scepsis. The empiricism of the school is shown in its scientific lore, in the fact that so many of the Sceptics were physicians, and in the character of the ten Tropes of ἐποχή. We may safely affirm that the foundation principles of Pyrrhonism are due to Pyrrho, and the originality which gave the school its power. The elaborated arguments, however, and the details of its formulae belong to later times.

Coming now to the relation of Pyrrhonism to the Academy, the connection between the two is difficult to exactly determine, between the time of Pyrrho and that of Aenesidemus. Scepticism in the Academy was, however, never absolutely identical with Pyrrhonism, although at certain periods of the history of the Academy the difference was slight. We can trace throughout the evolution of doubt, as shown to us in Pyrrhonism, and in Academic Scepticism, the different results which followed the difference in origin of the two movements, and these differences followed according to general laws of development of thought. Arcesilaus, who introduced doubt into the Academy, claimed to return to the dialectic of Socrates, and suppressing the lectures,[1]which were the method of teaching in the later schools of philosophy, introduced discussions instead, as being more decidedly a Socratic method. Although, according to Sextus, he was the one leader of the Academy whose Scepticism most nearly approached that of Pyrrhonism,[2]yet underneath his whole teaching lay that dialectic principle so thoroughly in opposition to the empiricism of Pyrrho. The belief of Socrates and Plato in the existence of absolute truth never entirely lost its influence over the Academy, but was like a hidden germ, destined to reappear after Scepticism had passed away. It finally led the Academy back to Dogmatism, and prepared the way for the Eclecticism with which it disappeared from history.

[1]Compare MaccollOp. cit.p. 36.

[2]Hyp. I. 232.

The history of Pyrrhonism and that of Academic Scepticism were for a time contemporaneous. The immediate follower of Pyrrho, Timon, called by Sextus the "prophet of Pyrrho,"[1]was a contemporary of Arcesilaus. That he did not consider the Scepticism of the Academy identical with Pyrrhonism is proved from the fact that he did not himself join the Academy, but was, on the contrary, far from doing so. That he regarded Arcesilaus as a Dogmatic is evident from his writings.[2]One day, on seeing the chief of the Academy approaching, he cried out, "What are you doing here among us who are free?"[3]After the death of Timon, the Pyrrhonean School had no representative till the time of Ptolemy of Cyrene,[4]and Greek Scepticism was represented by the Academy. That Pyrrho had a strong influence over Arcesilaus, the founder of the Middle Academy, is evident[5]; but there was also never a time when the Academy entirely broke away from all the teachings of Plato, even in their deepest doubt.[6]It is true that Arcesilaus removed, nominally as well as in spirit, some of the dialogues of Plato from the Academy, but only those that bore a dogmatic character, while those that presented a more decided Socratic mode of questioning without reaching any decided result, men regarded as authority for Scepticism.

[1]Adv. Math.I. 53.

[2]Diog. IV. 6, 33, 34.

[3]Diog. IX. 12, 114.

[4]Diog. IX. 12, 115.

[5]Diog. IV. 6, 33.

[6]Diog. IV. 6, 32.

Sextus does not deny that Arcesilaus was almost a Pyrrhonean, but he claims that his Pyrrhonism was only apparent, and not real, and was used as a cloak to hide his loyalty to the teachings of Plato.[1]As Ariston said of him,[2]"Plato before, Pyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle." Sextus also characterises the method of Arcesilaus as dialectic,[3]and we know from Cicero that it was his pride to pretend to return to the dialectic of Socrates.

It is interesting to note that Sextus, in his refutation of the position that the Academy is the same as Pyrrhonism, takes up the entire development of Academic thought from the time of Plato till that of Antiochus, and does not limit the argument to Scepticism under Arcesilaus. The claim made by some that the two schools were the same, is stated by him,[4]and the word 'some' probably refers to members of both schools at different periods of their history. Sextus recognises three Academies, although he remarks that some make even a further division, calling that of Philo and Charmides, the fourth, and that of Antiochus and his followers, the fifth.

[1]Hyp.I. 234.

[2]Diog. IV. 6, 33.

[3]Hyp.I. 234.

[4]Hyp.I. 220.

That many in the Academy, and even outside of it, regarded Plato as a Sceptic, and an authority for subsequent Scepticism, we find both from Sextus and Diogenes.[1]As Lewes justly remarks, one could well find authority for Scepticism in the works of Plato, as indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sum total of his teachings was considered. The spirit of Plato's teachings was dogmatic, as Sextus most decidedly recognises, and as Aenesidemus and Menodotus[2]recognised before him.[3]Sextus himself shows us that Plato's idealism and ethical teachings can have nothing in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts the desirability of the virtuous life, and the existence of Providence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards them as probable, he gives preference to one set of ideas over another, and departs from the sceptical character. Sextus characterises the sceptical side of Plato's writings as mental gymnastics,[4]which do not authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirms that Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknown things to others in trustworthiness. The ethical difference underlying the teachings of the Academy and Pyrrhonism, Sextus was very quick to see, and although it is very probable that the part of theHypotyposeswhich defines the difference between the Academy and Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the introduction to Aenesidemus' works, yet Sextus certainly gives these statements the strong stamp of his approval. He condemns the Academy because of the theory that good and evil exist, or if this cannot be decidedly proved, yet that it is more probable that what is called good exists than the contrary.[5]

[1]Hyp.I. 221; Diog. IX. 11, 72.

[2]Bekker's edition ofHyp.I. 222.

[3]Hyp.I. 222.

[4]Hyp.I. 223.

[5]Hyp. I. 226.

The whole Academic teaching of probabilities contradicted the standpoint of the Sceptics—that our ideas are equal as regards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,[1]for the Academicians declared that some ideas are probable and some improbable, and they make a difference even in those ideas that they call probable.

Sextus claims that there are three fundamental grounds of difference between Pyrrhonism and the Academy. The first is the doctrine of probability which the Academicians accept in regard to the superior trustworthiness of some ideas over others.[2]The second is the different way in which the two schools follow their teachers. The Pyrrhoneans follow without striving or strong effort, or even strong inclination, as a child follows his teacher, while the Academicians follow with sympathy and assent, as Carneades and Clitomachus affirm.[3]The third difference is in the aim, for the Academicians follow what is probable in life. The Sceptics follow nothing, but live according to laws, customs, and natural feelings undogmatically.[4]

The difference between the later teaching of the Academy and Pyrrhonism is evident, and Sextus treats of it briefly, as not requiring discussion,[5]as Philo taught that the nature of facts is incomprehensible, and Antiochus transferred the Stoa to the Academy. It is therefore evident, from the comparison which we have made, that we do not find in the Academy, with which Scepticism after the death of Timon was so long united, the exact continuance of Pyrrhonism. The philosophical enmity of the two contemporaries, Timon and Arcesilaus, the Academician who had most in common with Pyrrhonism, is an expression of the fundamental incompatibility between the two schools.

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