The Gin Act came too late. The passion for spirits had become firmly rooted among the people, and they would not consent to have their supplies cut off. They rose against the officers appointed to carry out the Act, and in many of the larger towns there was for some time danger of rebellion. The legal sale of proof spirits dropped in a year to two-thirds of its former proportions; but an immense illicit trade was carried on, which far more than balanced the reduction. All the power at the back of the Government was not enough to obtain the enforcement of this measure, though the magistrates made strenuous efforts to carry it out. In two years 12,000 persons were convicted of breaking the law, but all the prisons of the country would have failed to hold a tithe of those who openly set it at defiance. The excise officers were held in general detestation, and informers or any who dared to appear in excise prosecutions went in danger of their lives. At last the Government had to give way, and in 1742 the Act was repealed.
In 1828 the various Acts relating to the licensing ofpublic-houses were consolidated, and the control of them was made more stringent. Two years later a new and most unfortunate departure was taken. With the hope of causing people to abandon the drinking of spirits, Parliament determined to encourage the sale of beer; and an Act was passed permitting any householder to open a beer shop on paying an excise fee of two guineas. The consumption of beer rose twenty-eight per cent. in consequence; but it was soon found that this, in place of checking the rush to spirits, aided it; and the increase in the spirit trade was even greater than that in beer. The number of houses for the sale of intoxicating liquors rose from 88,930 to 123,396; and many old inns, that formerly had been respectably conducted, were now driven by the stress of competition to very doubtful means for the promotion of their trade. At the same time crime showed a great increase, and, to quote from a Report of a Committee of the House of Lords, “The commitments for trial in England and Wales in the years 1848-49 were, in the proportion to those of 1830-31, the two first years after the enactment of the Beer Act, of 156 to 100; that this is not a mere casual coincidence the Committee have the strongest reasons to believe from the general evidence submitted to them, but more especially from that of the chief constables of police and the chaplains of gaols, who have the best opportunities, the one of watching the character of the beer shops and of those who frequent them, the other of tracing the causes of crime and the career of criminals”.
The Report of a Committee of the House of Commons in 1854 was still more emphatic. “The beer shop system,” it said truly, “has proved a failure.”
Off Licences.—Through legislation introduced by Mr. Gladstone early in the “sixties,” persons are now permitted to sell spirits, wine or beer in bottles, for consumption off the premises, on payment of a small licence fee. Previous to then it was illegal for any spirit merchant to supply less than two gallons at a time. The new law has led to a considerable trade in strong drink through grocers, and it has been estimated that the off licence holders supply about five per cent. of spirits sold. This departure has been the object of very considerable opposition from both publicans and temperance advocates. The publicans naturally object to having a large part of what was their monopoly thrown open to almost free competition; and temperance advocates declare that the off licences are very largely responsible for the rapid increase of intemperance among women. It is said that many who would not venture to go to a public-house to order what they want, quietly and secretly obtain their supplies through the grocer, and are able to indulge at home without restraint. Innumerable clergymen and doctors declare that, to their personal knowledge, these facilities have largely promoted female intemperance. But in the very nature of the thing, these statements, while worthy of all attention, are not capable of ordinary proof. The only way they could be shown to be true would be by naming a large number of cases,with names and addresses, and submitting them for examination. Naturally neither clergymen nor doctors can do this; for it would be impossible for them to make public the secrets of persons whose inner histories they learn in their professional administrations. It was this that caused the failure of the temperance party to convince the Committee of the House of Lords, in 1879, as to the harmfulness of the off licences. In its Report, the Lords’ Committee made this statement about the matter:—
“The question which the Committee have had to consider is, not whether some cases of intemperance may be traced to the purchase of spirits at grocers’ shops, but whether any general increase of intemperance can be attributed to grocers’ licences. After the examination of many witnesses on the point, and after the best inquiries they could make, the Committee have obtained very little direct evidence in support of this view; and the conclusion they have come to is, that upon the whole there have been no sufficient grounds shown for specially connecting intemperance with the retail of spirits at shops as contrasted with their retail at other licensed houses.”
Sunday Closing.—Sunday closing now prevails over almost the whole of the empire, with the exception of England itself. It is in force in nearly every colony, and in Scotland, Wales and Ireland. For the latter country an Act was passed in 1877, granting this measure to the whole island, except Dublin, Cork, Belfast,Limerick and Waterford, for the space of four years. The Act was looked upon as purely experimental; but it operated so successfully that it has since been renewed, year by year, as an annual measure. Many efforts have been made to place it on a permanent basis, and to include the five exempted cities in its scope. Both Protestants and Catholics are agreed as to its necessity, and leading statesmen of both parties have testified to its beneficial effects.
In 1888, when Mr. T. W. Russell brought before the House a Bill to make Sunday closing permanent and general in Ireland, the opponents of the measure obtained the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the results of the Act. After a most exhaustive inquiry this Committee reported in favour of it, and recommended—
(a) That all drink shops in Ireland close at nineP.M.on Saturdays.
(b) That the present Irish Sunday Closing Act be made permanent, and include the five hitherto exempted towns.
(c) That the distance requisite for a person to travel to qualify as abonâ-fidetraveller entitled to purchase refreshments be increased from three miles to six.
This was a great triumph for the Sunday closers. In the words of Mr. A. J. Balfour, “it was not unfair to say that the whole weight of evidence, with comparatively insignificant exceptions, was in favour of the continuance of Sunday closing in Ireland, and of the adoption of Saturday closing after nine o’clock. The people whogave evidence were not drawn from one class of the community, but they represented every class and every section of opinion.”
Since then Acts have been brought in year after year embodying these recommendations; but although supported by the Government it has never been found possible to carry them, chiefly on account of the congested condition of business in the Commons.
In Scotland Sunday closing has been in force under the “Forbes-Mackenzie Act” since 1854. It works on the whole very successfully, as might be expected from the fact that in all things Scotland is strongly a Sabbath-observing country. In Wales this law has also been in force since 1882. It is admitted to be a fair success in the interior of Wales; but great difficulty has been found in enforcing it in Cardiff, and along the border line between England and Wales. In Cardiff a very large shebeen trade has sprung up, and a number of clubs have been established for the avowed purpose of supplying their members with liquor on Sundays.
In 1889, in consequence of many statements that were in circulation declaring Sunday closing in Wales to be a failure, the Government appointed a Royal Commission, presided over by Lord Balfour of Burleigh, to inquire into the matter. To the great surprise of many, the Commission reported in favour of the Act, and declined to recommend either modification or repeal of it, stating that “a change in this direction would be unwelcome to a vast majority of the population”.
Plans for the reform of the licensing laws are legion, and more Bills are brought before the House of Commons year by year dealing with this matter than with any other. To describe every one of these plans would be wearisome and useless. It will answer every purpose to confine this chapter to the chief measures proposed within this last quarter of a century.
Mr. Bruce’s Bill.—No more careful or more thorough attempt has been made to change the licensing laws than that introduced by Mr. Bruce (now Lord Aberdare), who, as Home Secretary to the Liberal Government, framed a Bill on the subject in 1871. In bringing it before the House of Commons he laid down five propositions, as leading principles which he thought might be expected to receive the assent of all the members. They were:—
1. That under the existing system of licensing, far more licences have been issued than are required by public convenience, there being one to every 182 people.
2. That the present mode of issuing licences is unsatisfactory, no guidance being given to the magistrates either as to the number to be issued or the respectabilityand the responsibility of the persons seeking to be licensed.
3. That no sufficient guarantees are taken as to the orderly management of public-houses or their supervision.
4. That the laws against adulteration are insufficient, and, such as they are, are imperfectly enforced.
5. That the hours during which public-houses are allowed to be open admit of reduction without interfering with the liberty or the material convenience of the people generally.
To these he added two other propositions, on which he did not expect such unanimous agreement. (1) That the public have a right to be supplied with places of refreshment sufficient in number, convenient, and respectably conducted. (2) That all existing interests, however qualified the interests may be, are entitled to just and fair consideration.
On the basis of these propositions he built up a plan which still deserves the careful attention of all licensing reformers. The leading principles of it were as follows: The licensing powers were to still be retained by the magistrates, and no liquor licences were to be issued without their certificates. All old licences were to remain in force for ten years from the passing of the Act, as of right, and then they were to absolutely lapse. New licences were to be granted on a novel plan. The justices would meet together before the licensing day, and would decide on the number of new licences to beissued, altogether apart from the question of to whom they were to be given. If the number of public-houses in the neighbourhood, when the proposed new establishments had been added, did not exceed a certain fixed scale, then the decision of the magistrates would be final. If, however, the new licences would bring the total above that proportion, then it would be necessary to take a vote of the ratepayers as to whether the increase should be permitted or not, and the majority of those voting would decide. The scale was, in towns, one licensed house for 1500 people and under, two houses for up to 3000 people, and one more for every additional 1000; in the country, one licensed house for 900 people and under, two for up to 1200, three for up to 1800, and one more for every additional 600 inhabitants.
When the number of new licences to be issued had been fixed, they were to be put up to public auction, and sold to the highest bidders, one person having power to buy any number or all of them. The purchaser would be allowed to select his own house for carrying on the business, provided it was within the limits of the district; but before receiving his licence he would have to obtain a certificate from the magistrates that the premises chosen were suitable for the purpose, and that the proposed manager was a proper person. It would not be necessary for the licence-holder to be his own manager. All licences so purchased were to be renewed annually, as of right, for ten years after the passing of the Act, except when forfeited by misconduct.
At the end of ten years, when all licences, old and new, were about to lapse, the magistrates would decide anew what the number of public-houses in their neighbourhood should be. If they decided to exceed the statutory limits, then it would be necessary to poll the ratepayers and obtain their sanction to the proposal; but if the number proposed by them was not in excess of those limits, then this need not be done. The licences would again be put up for sale for another ten years, and the same process would be repeated at the end of each decade. In the case of eating-houses and beer and wine licences for refreshment-rooms these regulations would not apply, but the magistrates might grant licences at their discretion. Nor would they apply to houses selling drink for consumption off the premises only; for these, the justices would grant certificates, on certain conditions being observed by the applicants.
The control of drink shops was to be made much stricter. A second conviction for serious breaches of the law would lead to forfeiture of the licences, without choice on the part of the magistrates. Every conviction must be recorded on the back of the licensing certificates; and on the police penalties for offences under the Act amounting in three consecutive years to £65, or in five years to £100, the licence would be taken away.
In order to secure the better enforcement of the law an entirely new body of inspectors was to be created. These should be quite independent of the local authorities, and their sole duty would consist of supervising theliquor sellers. There was to be one inspector-in-chief; England and Wales would be divided into counties with an inspector for each, and every large town and district would have a superintendent, under whom there would be a carefully selected and well-paid body of men. “The police cannot properly and ought not to be entrusted within the walls of a public-house,” Mr. Bruce said. “It is utterly impracticable to have a proper system of inspection if steps are not taken to make the inspection more efficacious; and efficient inspection can in my opinion be conducted only by a body of men altogether independent of the police.... They will be ... specially charged with the duty of seeing that no offence is committed in a public-house which is prohibited by law.” The cost of this inspection was to be defrayed from the licence fees.
Finally, the Bill contained clauses specially directed against adulteration. Samples of the liquors sold were to be frequently taken and analysed at Somerset House laboratory. When it was found that any injurious ingredients had been mixed with them, the seller would be liable, for a first offence, to a fine of £20 or imprisonment for one month, with or without hard labour; and, for a second offence, to a fine of £100 or three months’ hard labour, and forfeiture of licence.
Mr. Bruce’s proposals fell like a bomb among the brewers and publicans. They realised that the time had now come when they must fight for their very existence; and fight they did. Temperance meetings were brokenup all over the country, every tap-room became the centre of a campaign against the Government, and all the liquor sellers and their adherents became unswerving Tories in a day. Intense pressure was brought to bear on individual members, and the Government became the object of most intense hostility. There was not, at that time, the strong sentiment throughout the country in favour of restrictive legislation which is to be found now; and every bar parlour was used as the headquarters and meeting house of a propaganda to convince working men that the Bill was a measure aimed against the liberty of the people. TheTimes, to the surprise of many, gave Mr. Bruce its warmest support, and day by day did its best to strengthen the hands of the Government. The great body of middle-class people, too, were inclined to approve of the measure. But the forces against it were too strong; and after a few weeks the Ministry gave way, and it was announced that, owing to the time that had been wasted over the Budget, there would be no opportunity of proceeding with the measure that Session.
What were the teetotalers doing all this time? Where was the United Kingdom Alliance? Where were the hundred and one other bodies that had been clamouring for years for reform? Here was a Ministry that had been bold enough to risk office in order to promote temperance; surely it had a right to look to the temperance party for cordial support! If it looked, however, it looked in vain, for the influence of the teetotalers was worse than thrownaway in this struggle. The United Kingdom Alliance was so busy promoting petitions in favour of a Permissive Bill which every one knew had no chance of success, that it had no energy to spare for helping on the Government. It officially announced that its attitude was one of “friendly neutrality”; and when the secretary of the Alliance was urged by theLeeds Mercuryto support the Bill, he replied that “it (the drink trade) ought not to be sanctioned by law, nor tolerated within the range of Christian civilisation”.
No more suicidal policy, no course more fatal to the promotion of temperance in our land, could possibly have been taken. At a time when every publican and every brewer was seeking the destruction of the Government on account of its attitude to the drink question, the Alliance was content to be “friendly neutral”! By their almost inexplicable conduct, the leaders of that body helped to delay temperance legislation for a quarter of a century, and created a deep distrust of teetotalers in the minds of most politicians. If they had actively thrown themselves into the breach, had used all their forces to support the Ministry, had been content to drop for a few months the plan of bringing forward a measure which they knew Parliament would certainly reject,—then Mr. Bruce and his colleagues might have been encouraged to proceed, and the liquor traffic in England would by this time have been cut down to a fraction of its old proportions.
Mr. Caine recently claimed that the temperance partyrather supported than opposed the Government at this crisis; and that, in fact, “practically, their only friends and supporters in the constituencies were the teetotalers”. No one denies that many individual abstainers, as, for instance, Mr. Caine himself, were active in helping on the measure; but the temperance party as a whole was not. The month after the Bill was abandoned, Mr. Bruce publicly charged Sir Wilfrid Lawson, in the House of Commons, with having hindered and greatly diminished its chance of success by the course he had taken. While the Bill was still before the country, and while its fate was trembling in the balance, many prominent abstainers opposed it bitterly, and spoke and wrote against it. Professor Newman, in answer to a request from Mr. S. Morley, that he and his friends of the Alliance would not refuse an instalment because they did not get all they wanted, replied: “The United Kingdom Alliance cannot postpone its action for ten years.... Its (the Bill’s) good points will not help us; they are not things which we asked; its evil points will damage us extremely. Hence if we fail to induce Mr. Bruce to withdraw his astonishing innovations of principle, I certainly do not guarantee that our friends will refrain from total opposition.”
Mr. Raper, a leading temperance speaker, at a meeting in the Manchester Town Hall, held under the auspices of the United Kingdom Alliance, said: “It is strange that a man of such a powerful intellect as the Home Secretary should be so remarkably defective in observation ofa logical kind. I have not seen a greater wonder this quarter of a century than I did when I saw this able man standing for two hours and ten minutes giving forth grand principles and then cutting them to pieces—making statements which he followed up with nothing.”
To judge from the speeches of Dr. F. R. Lees, who is considered by many the premier writer on total abstinence, one would think that the Bill had been framed by a committee of Burton brewers. “Give no unwise and blind support to the proposition of the Government,” he said. “I do not think that the Bill, as a practical Bill, is worth discussing in detail.... It is a wholesome and righteous principle, that of public control over the liquor traffic; but you are denied your claim, it is postponed for ten years, while the existing generation of victims shall perish, and a new generation shall take their place.”
Why rake up all these old mistakes? it may be asked. Why not forget the past? The answer is plain. The old matter must be borne in mind, not in order to belittle and denounce the men who made the mistakes, but so that the reformers of the present may learn from the blunders of their predecessors, and not again wreck the ship because it is only sailing towards port with a couple of sails instead of a full rig.
Mr. Chamberlain’s Plan.—In 1876 some stir was made by Mr. Chamberlain advocating an adoption of the Gothenburg system in England. The Birmingham Town Council expressed its approval of the plan; and on 13th March, 1877, Mr. Chamberlain brought forward aresolution in the House of Commons: “That it is desirable to empower the Town Councils of boroughs, under the Municipal Corporation Acts, to acquire compulsorily, on payment of fair compensation, the existing interests in the retail sale of intoxicating drinks within their respective boroughs; and thereafter, if they see fit, to carry on the trade for the convenience of the inhabitants, but so that no individual shall have any interest in nor derive any profit from the sale”.
This motion was supported by Sir Wilfrid Lawson and his allies; but was rejected by a large majority, 103 voting against and only 51 in its favour.
Mr. Ritchie’s Local Government Bill.—In 1888, when the Local Government Bill was introduced by the Unionist Government, it contained clauses providing that the whole of the licensing of public-houses should be handed over to the County Councils; and that, in addition to the powers now held by the magistrates, the Councils should have authority to close the houses on Sunday, Good Friday and Christmas Day, either altogether or for part of the day, to alter the hour of closing at night, and to increase the licensing fees not more than 20 per cent. There were two great limits to the proposed power of the Councils. The first gave the magistrates power to prevent the renewal of a licence on proof that the holder was guilty of illegal conduct. The second limit was the provision that when the Councils refused the renewal of a licence for any other cause than the fault of the holder, the latter should be entitled tocompensation. Such compensation was to be assessed on “the basis of the difference (if any) between the value of the licensed premises immediately before the passing of this Act and the value which such premises would have then borne if the licence had then determined”. The compensation was to be divided between the persons interested in the premises, either by agreement among themselves, by arbitration, or, finally, by the County Court. The cost of the compensation was to be borne ordinarily by the licensing division of the county in which the house was situated; or sometimes, under exceptional circumstances, by the whole county.
The temperance party, although on the whole preferringad hocBoards, would gladly have accepted the proposals, but for the compensation clauses. Over these a hot fight was made, and innumerable meetings were held all over the country against them. The licensed victuallers were at first also inclined to oppose the measure; but they soon realised that it would be on the whole a great gain to them. As Mr. Ritchie, the father of the Bill, pointed out to a deputation, “We practically give you a vested interest by the Bill”. But the opposition to the objectionable clauses was too strong; and in June Mr. W. H. Smith announced, for the Government, that the whole of the licensing section would be withdrawn.
Mr. Goschen’s Compensation Plan.—Two years later a second attempt was made by the same Government to legalise compensation. In theLocal Taxation(Customs and Excise) Billa scheme was formulated for the gradual reduction of public-houses. The main idea of this scheme was that each year the sum of £440,000, raised by increased taxes of 3d. a barrel on malt liquors and 6d. a gallon on spirits, should be used for the buying up of licences for the purpose of extinction. Of this sum, £350,000 was to go to England, £50,000 to Scotland and £40,000 to Ireland. In England and Scotland the money was to be apportioned among the County Councils, which would be permitted to buy up such licensed premises as they thought proper; in Ireland the authority to be appointed was the National Debt Commissioners. No compulsory powers of purchase were given; but all purchases would have to be made by agreement with the owners of the houses, at prices and under conditions fixed by mutual arrangement. After the passing of the Act, no new licences, except for eating-houses and refreshment-rooms, were to be granted unless the consent of the County Councils had first been obtained, and even when new licences were granted, it was to be on the express understanding that their renewal might “at any time be refused at the free and unqualified discretion of the licensing authority”.
In bringing the Bill before the House of Commons Mr. Ritchie said: “I assure the House that the sole object which the Government has in view is to promote temperance, and to help those who are endeavouring and who have so long endeavoured to battle against intemperance.... I have not the least intention of interferingwith any powers now possessed by licensing magistrates.... Our sole object has been to help temperance reformers, and to promote the cause of temperance.” But temperance reformers did not see the matter quite in the same light as Mr. Ritchie; and the opposition to the proposals of 1890 was even stronger than to those of 1888. The main objections were that the measure created a vested interest where none previously existed, and that the proposals for extinction were utterly and ridiculously inadequate. Mr. Caine, a prominent Liberal Unionist supporter of the Government, resigned his seat in Parliament as a protest against the scheme; and before many weeks had passed, the second attempt was sent the same way as the first. The money intended for the compensation of the publicans was devoted instead to technical education.
Lord Randolph Churchill’s Bill.—In the same month as the Local Taxation Bill was introduced, Lord Randolph brought before the House of Commons his scheme for amending the licensing laws. This plan was admittedly partly based on Mr. Bruce’s Bill of 1871. The licensing authority was to be vested in the municipal authorities for boroughs and the County Council for counties. These bodies were not only to have the right to license, but also to regulate the hours of closing on Sundays and week-days. The power of direct veto was to be placed in the hands of the people, and in a parish where two-thirds of the ratepayers on the municipal rate book voted for prohibition, no licences were to be granted.Beer shops were to be swept away, and the kinds of licences were to be reduced to two,—the full publican’s licence and the refreshment-house wine and beer licence; and the rating qualification for a building used as a public-house was also to be considerably increased. Clubs in which drink was consumed were to be registered and to pay fees ranging from 30s. a year for a working men’s club to from £1000 to £2000 for the great West-end clubs. The noble lord was strongly in favour of compensation, and declared: “I hold that compensation for vested interests is an indispensable accompaniment to any scheme of licensing reform. Any such reform not accompanied by compensation for vested interests would be sheer confiscation and robbery.” But he did not deal with this detail in his Bill, on the ground that it would entail taxation in some form or another; and it is not in the power of a private member of Parliament to propose to the House taxation of any form or kind. Lord Randolph’s measure met with a very favourable reception when introduced, but he did not proceed even to the second reading with it.
The Bishop of Chester’s Bill.—In 1892, Dr. Jayne, Bishop of Chester, brought before the public a modification of the Gothenburg system that has since attracted a considerable amount of attention. He recognises that intemperance is far too common, and that our public-house system stands urgently in need of reform; but he believes that the use of alcoholic beverages must be accepted as inevitable, and that the best plan to adoptis not to seek to abolish the drink trade altogether, but to reform it. One of the great evils of the present system is that those who conduct public-houses have a direct pecuniary interest in selling the largest amount of drink possible; the Bishop desires to change the object of the sellers from private profit to the public welfare. To do this he would have philanthropic companies formed, which should buy up all the public-houses in a district, have a monopoly of sale, and conduct the traffic for the public welfare. The companies would derive no profit from the sale, except a certain fixed amount of interest on the capital invested. In their houses (to quote Dr. Jayne’s own description) “alcoholic beverages, though frankly recognised, will be disposed from their aggressive supremacy, and supplied under less seductive conditions. These conditions would, for example, be comfortable, spacious, well-ventilated accommodation; temperance drinks brought well to the front, invested with prestige, and supplied in the most convenient, attractive and inexpensive way; the pecuniary interests of the managers (e.g., in the form of bonus) made to depend entirely on the sale of eatables and non-alcoholic beverages; alcoholic liquors secured against adulteration; newspapers, indoor games, and, where practicable, outdoor games and music, provided; while the mere drink shop, the gin palace, and ‘the bar’—that pernicious incentive to drinking for drinking’s sake—would be utterly abolished.”
Dr. Jayne’s first thought was that such houses mightbe managed by the County Councils, but he soon saw that it would be better to place them in the hands of private companies. The methods by which he proposes that the companies should set to work may be best seen from an account given by him in theDaily Graphicfor 25th October, 1893: “We are prepared to undertake the licensed victualling of your locality, paying to the dispossessed publicans such compensation as law and equity may require. We will at once reduce our houses to such number as the licensing authority may deem necessary; we will re-engage respectable publicans as managers on terms far more favourable to themselves, their families and the community, than managers now enjoy under the tied-house system. They will receive a fixed salary, with a bonus on the sale of eatables and non-alcoholic drinkables, but with absolutely no benefit from the sale of intoxicants. They will thus have no inducement to push the sale of alcohol, to drink with their customers, or to adulterate their liquors. As regards hours of closing and details of management we shall, within legal limits, be guided by local experience and opinion. Our surplus profits will be applied to public, non-rate-aided objects, including the establishment of bright and attractive temperance houses, to which those who wish to keep quite clear of the temptations of alcohol in any shape may safely resort.”
In 1893 he incorporated these proposals in a Bill which he brought before the House of Lords. The measure was defeated on the second reading; but Dr.Jayne is still hopeful that Parliament will grant the necessary powers for the attempt to be made where desired. Would it not be better for some town to definitely decide to adopt the Gothenburg system, and then go to Parliament with a request for an authorisation to do so? Such a demand is far more likely to be granted than a proposal that may be adopted anywhere or nowhere. If the method proved a success when first tried, there would be little difficulty in obtaining permission for other places to follow suit.
The Bishop of London’s Bill.—The Licensing Boards Billmay be taken as representing the plans of a moderate school of reformers. It was framed under the supervision of the Church of England Temperance Society, and introduced into the House of Lords in 1893 by Dr. Temple, Bishop of London. The Church of England Temperance Society differs in many ways from most temperance organisations. Its social work is worthy of all praise, and its magnificent agencies for the rescue of criminals and inebriates are so well known as hardly to require mention. But in the matter of legislative action, this society does not take up the extreme attitude of such organisations as the United Kingdom Alliance. Its membership contains a very large, if not a predominating Conservative element; and hence its proposals deserve attention as being those of the members of a party usually not foremost in legislation of this kind.
The Bill brought forward by the Bishop of London in 1893 proposed to transfer the power of granting alldrink, billiard, music and dancing licences from the justices in each district to a specially elected Licensing Board. The Board was to be elected triennially by persons on the local government register of electors, and the cost of such elections and other expenses of management were to be borne by the borough or County Council. The Board would have power to alter the hour of closing on week-days, and all licensed houses would be closed on Sunday unless by special order of the Board. Even when the Board sanctioned Sunday opening, the houses would only be permitted to remain open for two hours, and could only sell drink for consumption off the premises. All clubs would have to be registered, fees being payable for such registration; and power would be given to the police to enter any club which they had reason to believe was carried on simply as a drinking club, and to charge the members found on the premises and the owner of the house before a magistrate. The principal provisions of the Bill, however, would not come into effect until five years after the passing of the Bill, when a large reduction of licences would take place compulsorily. This five years’ term of grace was provided for as a kind of compensation. At the end of five years from the passing of the Bill into law the following provisions would come into operation:—
(a) The only licences that are to be granted are (i.) a full publican’s licence; (ii.) a wine and beer on licence for a refreshment house; (iii.) a wineand beer off licence; (iv.) a licence for an hotel; and (v.) a licence for a railway refreshment room, the two last being special forms of the publican’s licence. After 1898, therefore, the following kinds of licence will cease to be obtainable: (i.) The beer dealer’s additional licence (off); (ii.) the beer retailer’s on and off licences; (iii.) the cider and perry on and off licence; (iv.) the table beer retailer’s licence (off); (v.) the wine retailer’s on and off licences; and (vi.) the sweets retailer’s on and off licences. None of these licences are required by a person holding a superior licence.(b) The Board is to have full discretion to grant or not to grant any licence. After this provision comes into effect the present restrictions on the power to refuse certain licences, except on certain grounds, will cease.(c) Licences, exclusive of hotels and railway refreshment rooms, are not to be granted in excess of a fixed proportion to the population of each district—one per 1000 in towns, one per 600 in country—but proper notice is to be given to a licence holder before discontinuing his licence under this clause.(d) The value qualification of premises is raised.(e) A licensed person is not to carry on any other retail business on the licensed premises.
(a) The only licences that are to be granted are (i.) a full publican’s licence; (ii.) a wine and beer on licence for a refreshment house; (iii.) a wineand beer off licence; (iv.) a licence for an hotel; and (v.) a licence for a railway refreshment room, the two last being special forms of the publican’s licence. After 1898, therefore, the following kinds of licence will cease to be obtainable: (i.) The beer dealer’s additional licence (off); (ii.) the beer retailer’s on and off licences; (iii.) the cider and perry on and off licence; (iv.) the table beer retailer’s licence (off); (v.) the wine retailer’s on and off licences; and (vi.) the sweets retailer’s on and off licences. None of these licences are required by a person holding a superior licence.
(b) The Board is to have full discretion to grant or not to grant any licence. After this provision comes into effect the present restrictions on the power to refuse certain licences, except on certain grounds, will cease.
(c) Licences, exclusive of hotels and railway refreshment rooms, are not to be granted in excess of a fixed proportion to the population of each district—one per 1000 in towns, one per 600 in country—but proper notice is to be given to a licence holder before discontinuing his licence under this clause.
(d) The value qualification of premises is raised.
(e) A licensed person is not to carry on any other retail business on the licensed premises.
The measure came before the House of Lords for itssecond reading on the 12th May, 1893. It met with a very unfavourable reception, and Lord Salisbury opposed it hotly as being “the wrong remedy for the evil we all deplore”. At last Dr. Temple, seeing that it was perfectly evident the measure would be rejected by a considerable majority, consented to allow the motion to be negatived without a division. It is the intention of the Church of England Temperance Society, however, to keep its Bill as far as possible to the front, and to make persistent efforts to have it carried into law.
Local Option.—Few schemes of reform have been so unceasingly pushed as that for giving to localities the option of prohibition. Forty years ago, when it was first brought before the British public, it was laughed at, and hardly deemed worthy of the serious notice of politicians; in 1893 it was introduced by the Government to the House of Commons; and to-day it has all the weight of one of the two great political parties behind it. Whatever may be thought of the practical usefulness of such an option in the present state of public opinion, it is hardly possible to deny to the men who demand it a tribute of admiration for their persistency and pluck.
On the 1st June, 1853, the United Kingdom Alliance was founded for the purpose of securing “the total and immediate legislative suppression of the liquor traffic”. Its plan of operations was to secure for any locality that wishes it the right to prohibit the traffic in intoxicants there. Eleven years after the formation of the Alliance Sir W. Lawson introduced his famous Permissive Bill,embodying the demands of the Alliance, to the House of Commons. It was defeated by a majority of over seven to one; but in 1869 the majority against it was reduced to a little over two to one. In 1879 Sir Wilfrid changed his tactics; and instead of incurring the cost of introducing a Bill year by year, he brought forward a resolution in favour of “some efficient measure of local option”. In 1880, before a full House, the resolution was at last carried by a majority of 26; 245 voting for, and 219 against.
It was expected that the Liberal Government then in force would do something to carry the resolution into effect; but nothing was done until 1893, when Sir William Harcourt’s much-debated Local Option Bill was introduced. The provisions of this Bill are very simple, and include two things,—the option of prohibition, and the option of Sunday closing. It provided that on one-tenth of the local government electors in any division making the request in writing, a poll shall be taken as to whether all public-houses be closed there, or whether there shall be Sunday closing. The latter proposal can be carried by a simple majority of those voting; but to secure entire prohibition there must be a majority of two-thirds. Whatever way the electors decide would remain in force for three years; but at the end of that time the question might be re-opened by a similar petition, and a fresh poll held. But when prohibition had been carried it could only be repealed by a two-third vote against it. The electoral areas were very small, each ward in aborough divided into wards being a separate district. No compensation was provided; but the clauses for prohibition were not to come into effect until three years after the passing of the Act. The prohibition was not to affect railway refreshment-rooms, hotels, or eating-houses.
The Bill caused considerable excitement; but there was a noticeable difference in its reception and in that accorded to Mr. Bruce’s Bill of 1871. In 1871 the working men were on the whole opposed to restriction; in 1893 they were largely in favour of it. A demonstration called by “the trade” at Trafalgar Square against the Bill was swamped by friends of it, who carried resolutions by overwhelming majorities in its favour. The change of attitude of the working classes is very likely partly due to political partisanship; but still it is a notable fact, and makes the way for temperance reform much smoother than it otherwise would have been.
Owing to the time taken up by the debate on the Home Rule Bill, the Government found it impossible to do more than introduce its local option measure in 1893. It promised to proceed with it this Session (1894); but at the time of writing it seems very improbable that this will be done.
Four main problems have to be faced before any adequate scheme of licensing reform can be formulated. They are: (1) compensation; (2) of whom shall the licensing bodies consist? (3) what is to be done with the clubs? (4) shall “tied houses” be permitted?
Compensation.—This has been for many years the main block to reform. Are publicans, when deprived of their licences through no fault of their own, entitled to compensation or not? For long there was considerable doubt as to the legal aspects of the matter. One party argued that as the publican has his licence granted for one year alone, and as the magistrates have power to refuse to renew such a licence, therefore the drink seller has no vested interest in its continuance, nor the slightest claim to compensation if its renewal is refused. On the other hand, it was said that while the justices have nominally the power of refusing the renewal of old licences, it is a strictly limited power that they never put into force except for wrong-doing on the part of the licensees; and that the custom has so long prevailed of regularly renewing the certificates of all publicans who behave properly, that an expectation of renewal has become universal; andthat by virtue of custom they have a vested interest, and are entitled to compensation if renewal is refused.
The legal aspects of the matter were finally cleared up in 1891 by the decision of the House of Lords in the well-known case of “Sharpv.Wakefield”. The magistrates of the Kendal division of Westmoreland refused, in September, 1887, to renew the licence of an inn at Kentmere on the grounds of the remoteness of the premises from police supervision, and the character and necessities of the locality. The owner of the house, Susannah Sharp, appealed to the Quarter Sessions, but that body upheld the magistrates. It was resolved by the drink interest to make this case a test one. Their argument was that for the renewal of an existing licence the justices are not entitled to inquire into the character and wants of the neighbourhood, or to refuse a licence on the grounds that there is no longer a necessity for a licensed house there.
The case was taken from court to court, and everywhere the decision of the magistrates was upheld. Finally it came before the House of Lords in January, 1891; and the judgment of their lordships was given in the following March. The five law-lords were unanimously of opinion that justices have the right to refuse the renewal of a licence if the circumstances of the neighbourhood or any other sufficient cause render it desirable. The Legislature, their lordships stated, gave the magistrates an absolute discretion both for granting and renewing licences: and such discretion is to be exercised(to quote the Lord Chancellor) “according to the rules of reason and justice, within the limits to which an honest man, competent to the discharge of his office, ought to confine himself”.
This decision was a serious blow to the owners of licensed premises. It at once and for ever swept away all claims of a legal right to compensation, and showed that vested interests in licences are absolutely nonexistent.
But the question still remains whether, although the publican has no legal claim to compensation, he is not morally entitled (under ordinary circumstances) to some consideration, if suddenly and through no fault of his own he is deprived of what he was for long encouraged to look upon as his right. It is felt by many that it would be a hardship to take from a well-behaved licensed victualler his means of livelihood without some consideration. Whether this sentiment is right or not the writer of this book does not propose to discuss; but it undoubtedly exists, and the temperance party will gain nothing by shutting its eyes to it.
On the one hand we have the claim of prohibitionists that no publican should have a penny from public funds as recompense for dispossession; on the other hand, there is the plea of the “trade” advocates, that he ought to have the full difference between the “trade” value of his house and its value as ordinary premises. The first of these seems rather harsh, and the second is certainly unreasonable. Is there novia media?
The unreasonableness of the second proposition may best be seen from the fact that in many towns a very large proportion of the public-houses do not pay their way. Yet every one of these places is valued at a price far above its value as an ordinary business house; consequently, if the authorities were to pay the terms asked by the owners on closing them, they would actually be giving considerable sums for losing concerns.
It may be asked why, if such houses do not clear their expenses, their proprietors keep them open year after year. The reasons are twofold: First, the houses are usually owned by brewers, who fear that if they abandon the licences, rival brewers may persuade the magistrates to grant additional licences in other parts of the place. Secondly, the establishments are often used as traps for depriving the inexperienced of their stock of money. The process is very simple. A house owned by a brewer goes to the bad, custom falls off, and the receipts fail to cover the outgoings. Thereupon the tenant is given notice to quit; and a salaried manager, skilled in the art of drawing custom, is placed in charge of it. This manager is usually a man well known in the neighbourhood, and with plenty of friends. He belongs to nearly all the friendly societies in the place, Buffaloes, Oddfellows, and the rest; he can give a tip on the coming race with any man, and he is “hail fellow, well met” with every Tom, Dick and Harry. All his friends, of course, flock to patronise him; the brewer is careful to supply specially good drink; a pull over is given for every one’s measure;and soon the takings of the house are increased enormously. Then the place is advertised, and a novice is attracted by it. The brewer’s agent shows him the books, and is able to prove that the business is going up by leaps and bounds; and so the novice is persuaded to pay, say £100 in cash for the good-will, and take over the house. The manager who has drawn all the custom leaves; and his friends leave with him. The poor new publican soon finds that he is losing money every week, and before long he begins to get in debt to the brewer. This goes on until his debt amounts to the price he paid for the good-will. Then the agent visits him, explains that as he is evidently not suited for the trade he had better go. The brewer will kindly allow the £100 paid as good-will to go to cancel the debt; and the tenant must leave as quickly as possible. The house is then used for the fleecing of another novice; and so on.
If any reader doubts the truth of this, let him consult some experienced publican who is not afraid to speak the truth, or let him notice in any moderate-sized town how often many of the smaller licensed houses are advertised as being “under new management”.
Now, it cannot be said that the owners of such houses as these mentioned have the slightest equitable claim to any consideration. The only way to avoid paying money to such would be to base any scheme of pecuniary compensationnot on the artificial trade value of the house, but on the actual profits gained, as shown by the books and vouchers of the place and by the publican’s income-tax returns.
A second limit to any scheme of compensation should be that no one, save the licence holder himself, should be entitled to any consideration. Big brewing firms that have bought up large numbers of licences are well acquainted with the risks attaching to them. The British public may be anxious to treat the poor licensed victualler generously; but it will hardly sanction the appropriation by wealthy wholesale firms, that thrive by fostering public misery, of large sums of public money. This is the opinion of many by no means opposed to any compensation. Mr. Gladstone, in the House of Commons (15th May, 1890), in speaking of this matter, declared: “This I must say, I cannot conceive any state of things in which the State authority would have the smallest duty or the smallest warrant for looking to anybody in these transactions, except the man with whom it deals—that is to say, the man to whom the licence is issued, and on whom it imposes its responsibility”.
In any plan of compensation the money should be raised from the publicans themselves. Those remaining benefit by the closing of other houses; for there are fewer shops selling drink, and therefore those left get more custom. This has already been done successfully in Victoria by means of increased licence fees, etc.
As the publicans have no legal claim to consideration it cannot be expected that any scheme for their compensation will be permanent. It will rather provide for a softening to them of a time of transition.
Within these limits, surely some practicable schemecan be formulated. The following, while dealing liberally with the keepers of licensed houses, would yet be an advance on the present position. Let it be arranged that for ten years the men at present holding licences shall be allowed to retain them; and if during those years the authorities wish to close any public-houses they shall pay the holders compensation based on the following scale: during the first two years, five years’ purchase, reckoned on the average profits of the previous three years; during the third and fourth years, four years’ profits; during the fifth and sixth years, three years’ profits, and so on till at the end of the tenth year no compensation would be payable. The funds for such payments to be raised by increased licensing fees and an extra tax on liquor. No money to be paid to any person but the licence holder himself. At the end of the ten years the number of houses could be reduced to a fixed scale, say one for every 500 or 1000 of population.
The principal objectors to such a compromise would probably be the teetotalers. But they would do well to consider whether it will not hasten forward the coming of that sober England for which we all long if some method can be found of breaking through the present intolerable deadlock. There is nothing opposed to temperance in granting compensation. It is merely a matter of policy, not of principle: though, to hear some reformers talk, it might be imagined that the idea of partly recompensing licence holders for their loss involves some terrible wrong.
Both Sir Wilfrid Lawson and Mr. Caine have in the past admitted that a compromise about compensation might be worth considering. In the House of Commons (5th March, 1880) Sir W. Lawson said: “Honourable members tell me that there ought to be something about compensation in my resolution. If I would only do that they would find it in their hearts to vote for me. Now I do not want to condemn compensation, but this is not the question which is before the House. The question is, whether it is right to force these houses upon an unwilling neighbourhood; and if it cannot be done without compensation, let us have compensation. I am very sure that if ever my resolution is crystallised into an Act of Parliament this House will never refuse a fair demand from any body of men.”
Mr. Caine, in talking to aPall Mall Gazetteinterviewer, said, when dealing with the compensation proposals of the Church Temperance Society: “The time plan would work in this way: You might give to all old licences a definite lease of life, ten years being the utmost limit conceivable.... At the close of the ten years’ term licences would be granted for one year only, and no compensation whatever would be granted in case of extinction.... (It) would present to temperance reformers the attractive and important feature of finality. It certainly demands most careful consideration on all hands.”
Mr. Chamberlain, in 1876, proposed terms very similar to these. His idea, when discussing the buying up oflicensed premises in order to commence municipal public-houses, was that compensation should be paid to the licence holder alone at the rate of five years’ profit, based on the average profits of the previous three years.
Truth compels the admission, however, that Mr. Chamberlain’s views on this point have greatly altered in recent years. In writing to me in April, 1894, he said:—“Further consideration has convinced me that the method of compensation proposed by me in 1876 would not be the best guide to a fair settlement, and that it would be impossible to ignore the interests of other persons besides the licensed holder. I think now that the best way would be to submit all claims to an official arbitrator, who would be instructed to give for the property such sum as would be given by a willing buyer to a willing seller in the open market—in other words, the fair market price.”
Licensing Bodies.—Of whom should the licensing bodies consist? There are three different kinds of bodies proposed: (a) The magistrates, as at present; (b) county and town councils; (c) elective boardsad hoc. The magistrates have for long carried out the necessary duties; and in the country parts they have done as well as could be expected. In towns, more particularly in small boroughs, their rule has not worked quite so satisfactorily. Occasional charges of being influenced by pecuniary considerations in the performance of their duties have been brought against them; but such charges are so very rare that direct bribery maybe said to be practically unknown. But magistrates in small boroughs are often influenced by some very extra-judicial considerations. Many of them are small tradesmen, appointed for political reasons. They are well acquainted with the brewer who is at the back of the application for a licence, and possibly have business transactions with him: naturally they do not care to offend him, and so a licence is often granted when it ought not to be.
The licensing authority is altogether outside the usual province of the magistrate’s duties, which should be purely judicial. It has never been found satisfactory to unite judicial and executive functions in one body; and jurists are agreed that this should be avoided; yet while they are the licensing authority the magistrates are both administrators and judges. But the principal objection to magistrates is that they are not in the least representative, and can do as they please entirely irrespective of the public.
A proposal favoured by many statesmen is that of taking the duty of issuing licences from the magistrates and placing it in the hands of county and borough councils. A representative body would thus be secured; but the result of this would simply be to ruin many of the councils. The liquor question would swallow up every other in public estimation, like a veritable Joseph’s rod. Men would be elected solely because of their views on licensing reform. The publicans would appoint their candidates, and the teetotalers theirs; and both partieswould have a pitched battle at almost every election. Many good administrators, rather than face such contests, would remain outside, and the whole tone of the councils would be lowered.
The most practicable plan of securing a popular licensing authority seems to be the election of Boards specially for this one purpose, as School Boards are elected for the management of elementary schools. The area which such Boards control should not be too small and particular care would have to be taken to prevent those pecuniarily interested in the traffic getting on them.
But it must be remembered that no change in thepersonnelof the licensing authority will effect much, and it is possible that any change may do harm. A representative body will be more liable to be influenced by outside consideration than are the justices; and the Boards in some places will favour the drink sellers more than the magistrates do now. This consideration has induced some reformers to advocate leaving the administration in the hands of the present authorities, but limiting their power by a direct popular control over the issuance of new licences.
Clubs.—No licensing reform, however complete the restraints it places on public-houses, will accomplish much unless at the same time it deals with the club evil. In the ordinary drinking club we have something far more dangerous to society than the worst-conducted public-house. Reformers were for long so absorbed in fighting the open drink shop, that they had no time forattending to anything else; and statesmen of all parties dreaded arousing against themselves the opposition which they knew would follow the curtailing of any of the privileges of club-land. The result is that there is to-day in every large town a considerable and rapidly increasing number of drinking dens, subject to no control, paying no fees, requiring no licences, and allowed to keep open all day and every day, Sunday and week-day alike. With the genuine club no one wishes to meddle; but the majority of places which go under this name are nothing but drinking and gambling hells, and are usually financed by, and run for the profit of, some brewer. Within ten years their number has increased almost tenfold, and from all parts of the land comes the same tale of the mischief they are doing. Some months ago, the Dublin Corporation sent a petition to the Government in which it said: “We view with alarm and dismay the rapid increase of bogus drinking clubs in all parts of the city; in our opinion these clubs are a prolific source of poverty, crime, and disorder; they are instrumental in depreciating the ratable value of property wherever they are established; and the laws which allow, without let or hindrance, their degrading operations at all hours of the night and of the day, are a disgrace to civilisation.” The Corporation urged the Government to introduce a measure “that will be effective in grappling with this degrading and pestiferous evil”. At Cardiff the notorious “Field Clubs,” formed solely and avowedly for the purpose of supplying theirmembers with ale on Sundays, and so setting the Sunday Closing Act at defiance, were able to carry on business for some time without any hindrance from the police. A case which shows even more clearly than this how our licensing system is being reduced to little better than a mere farce, was mentioned last year in the House of Commons. The licence of a certain village public-house had been taken away because of the misconduct of the publican, and because the place was not required. Thereupon the brewer who owned the building opened it as a club, making the former publican manager. The rules were carefully drawn up, with the aid of counsel, to keep the house open to as many as possible; an entrance fee of a few pence was fixed; and the club was in a position to accommodate almost all its old customers. It had not to observe any of the regulations imposed on the regular drink shops, and consequently did twice as much business as before its licence was taken away.
Such instances might be multiplied indefinitely, but there is no need; for to all who know anything of the inner life of our great cities these things are commonplaces. How to deal with these bogus establishments, and yet not at the same time to unduly interfere with genuine clubs, has become an urgent and serious question. The Royal Commission on the Sunday Closing (Wales) Act recommended that all clubs where intoxicating liquors are sold should be registered with the local authority, and that the register should be open for the inspection of the police. The Commission was alsostrongly of opinion that “clubs which exist only for the purpose of supplying drink, or only colourably for some other purpose, should be declared absolutely illegal”. When Lord Randolph Churchill brought his licensing scheme before the House of Commons, he incorporated with it clauses for the registration and taxation of clubs, as has already been described in the previous chapter. The Bishop of London’s Bill in 1893 contained similar clauses, but neither measure ever got beyond the initial stages.The Clubs Registration Bill, as amended by a Select Committee of the House of Commons last year, provided (1) that every club (with certain strictly defined exceptions) selling intoxicating liquors on unlicensed premises must be registered; (2) that it shall only be managed in accordance with its registered constitution; and (3) that an annual return shall be made of the members of the club. There were further provisions forbidding the sale of any drink to be taken from the club premises, preventing any person under eighteen years old becoming a member of the club, and limiting the number of honorary members to one for every twenty ordinary members. The Bill applied only to England, and was admitted by its supporters to be miserably inadequate; but it would have been a great improvement, had it passed into law, on the present state of affairs. However, it went the usual way of Bills in that barren Session.
Happily our colonies can teach us something on this matter. During the last nine years there has been anextremely simple yet very practical clause in the Victorian licensing law dealing with clubs. It provides that everybonâ-fideassociation that was formed before the passing of the Act should be regarded as a club; but that any club established afterwards must, in order to obtain the right to supply its members with intoxicants, consist of “not less than fifty members, united for the purpose of providing accommodation for and conferring privileges and advantages upon the members thereof”. Such accommodation has to be provided from the funds of the club, and no person is allowed to get any benefit from the club which may not be shared equally by every member. All clubs have to be registered, and their certificates may be withdrawn at any time by the Licensing Board.
In the Licensed Victuallers’ Amendment Act, brought before the South Australian Parliament in 1890, more elaborate provisions were made for meeting the club difficulty. Clubs numbering not less than fifty members in Adelaide, or not less than twenty-five in other parts, are exempt from the ordinary Licensing Act, so far as selling to their own members goes, provided the following conditions exist:—
1. The club must be established upon premises of which such association or company are thebonâ-fideoccupiers, and maintained from the joint funds of the club; and no persons must be entitled under its rules to derive any benefit or profit from the club or for the sale of liquors which is not shared equally by every other member.
2. It must have been proved to the satisfaction of the licensing bench at an annual or quarterly meeting that the club is such an association or company as in this section is defined, and that the premises of the club are suitable for the purpose.
3. It must be proved to the satisfaction of the licensing bench that such club has a committee of management, and that some person has been appointed by them steward or manager.
The club is obliged to pay an annual registration fee of £5, and to obtain a certificate from the clerk of the licensing district; such certificate being withdrawable if any of the conditions under which it is issued are broken.
On some such lines as these we must look for the solution of the club problem in England. Any measure to be really effective must provide, first, that proprietary clubs and clubs financed by those interested in the sale of drink shall be treated exactly the same as public-houses. The various regulations given inThe Clubs Registration Billshould be retained, but the certificate of registration should only be obtainable after the licensing justices are satisfied as to the genuine character of the association, and have ascertained that it is established primarily for some other purpose than the supply of intoxicants. As clubs cause a decided diminution in the revenue obtained from licensed houses, it seems reasonable that they should be subject to a special excise tax, graduated somewhat after the manner provided in Lord Randolph Churchill’s Bill.
Tied Houses.—During recent years it has become more and more common for brewers to own public-houses, and to make the holders of the licences nominees of their own, dismissable at will. In many towns over four-fifths of the drink shops are either owned or controlled by brewers or wholesale spirit merchants. Year by year the wholesale firms are driven by competition to purchase more and more houses; and soon it will be difficult to find establishments in which the nominal publican is master of his own business. It was manifestly the intention of Parliament, in passing the various licensing Acts, to make the managers of licensed houses responsible persons, who would have some stake in the business, and to whose interest it would be to strictly observe the law; but by the “tied-house” system all this is changed. Through it the licensee is but little better than a man of straw, and the real controller is the brewer.
There are two principal ways in which the wholesale firms “tie” a house. The first is as follows: A man with a small amount of capital wishes to take a public-house. The price of the good-will, stock and fittings of the place is, say, £1500. The would-be publican has only £300, but a brewer agrees to lend him £800, and a spirit merchant £400, on condition that he binds himself to deal solely off them for his liquors. This is the least objectionable method. The other way is for the brewer to be the owner of the public-house, and the publican his tenant. The latter pays a certain amount, varying according to the value of the house, as good-will;and it is stipulated that he shall deal off the brewer for all his malt liquors. He is usually liable to dismissal at a very short notice; and it is an understood thing that if the trade of the house drops at all he will have to leave. He must push his business at any cost and by any means. Most of the breaches of the law committed by publicans are due to this; for the unhappy licensed victualler has often no choice except between fostering his trade by illegal methods or getting notice to quit.
It might be thought that it is hardly to the interest of the brewers to risk losing the licences in order to do a somewhat larger trade; but those who argue thus are not acquainted with the working of the law. Let us suppose a case typical of many. A publican is convicted before the magistrates on some very serious charge, say that of harbouring improper characters; and his licence is endorsed. It may be mentioned, in passing, that most magistrates refuse to endorse a licence except an offence is very grave or frequently repeated. At the next licensing sessions the case comes on, and the justices demur at renewing the certificate. The lawyer for the owners then addresses them somewhat in this way. “The house in question,” he says, “is owned by the well-known firm of Messrs. Grey & Black. They had not the slightest idea that their tenant was guilty of such conduct as was unhappily proved, and they greatly regret it. It is their wish to keep their houses respectable, and they do all in their power to accomplish this. In this case, immediately the licence holder wasconvicted they gave him notice to quit. The good-will of the house has been sold to Mr. Tom Brown for a substantial consideration, and the old tenant who was convicted has no longer any interest in the place. Mr. Brown is amostrespectable man; and I can bring forward unimpeachable witnesses, gentlemen well known to you, who will testify to this fact. Now, gentlemen, I cannot deny that you have the power to refuse the licence if you wish; but I would venture to point out to you that by doing so you would punish, not the man whose wrongdoing we all condemn, but Messrs. Grey & Black who own the premises, and Mr. Tom Brown who has bought the good-will. Mr. Brown, though he has done nothing wrong, will be the loser of a very considerable sum by such a refusal. You will, perhaps, permit me to say, gentlemen, with all deference to your judgment, that such a course would not be in accordance with justice, nor with the honourable traditions that have always distinguished this bench.”
In nineteen cases out of twenty the magistrates agree that it would be rather hard on Brown to refuse; and accordingly they grant the renewal. The risks of losing a licence are so small that they are hardly worth taking into consideration. First of all, there is very little probability of the police proceeding against a house, except when compelled by outside pressure. Then, when the police do proceed and secure a conviction, the licence is not usually endorsed. Even after endorsement, a judicious change of tenants can be made; and so the licence retained.
The system of “tied houses” is bad for every one except the brewer. It is bad for the publican, for it reduces him from master of his own house to a servant of the wholesale firms. He has to take such liquor as they please, and pay the price they demand for it. It is a recognised custom in the trade for some if not all of the brewers to charge their “tied” customers more than they do the free.