CHAPTER XXII
Theend of the “Brothers’ War” had made of the United States a nation. Our country took its place in the world, and its fleets again reached into every sea. But the lessons of the navy had not touched the dull minds which in June, 1860, had voted down the supplies of the little navy which was to expand so greatly in the four succeeding years. To such, the whole work of defeating the Confederacy appeared to be the more spectacular work of the army. The constriction of the blockade was not of the dramatic character of Gettysburg or the battles of the Wilderness. Its meaning was to filter but slowly into even the more thoughtful. Thus for years, while immense changes were going on elsewhere, we were at a standstill in naval matters, or rather slowly sinking to absolute nonentity. By 1882 the shameful condition of neglect began to be remedied. That year may be taken as the birth-year of our navy of to-day. For seven years we had to go abroad for such material—gun-forgings,shafting, and armor—as we wanted, until our naval demands forced upon our steel establishments the work of putting themselves in order. The story of this work has never been told, but the country can be assured that it was to the navy that the initial great development of steel manufacture in this country was due. In 1882 we could make only a forged iron shaft for the littleDolphin, which promptly broke on her trial trip. It was through arrangements made by the Navy Department that our steel works, beginning with Bethlehem, established modern conditions.
The story of the building of the new navy is outside the scope of this book. It suffices to say that by 1898 we had in service four battleships, theIowa,Indiana,Oregon, andMassachusetts, of the first class; theTexas, of the second; two armored cruisers, theNew YorkandBrooklyn; eleven protected cruisers of from 3,000 to 7,735 tons, and twenty unprotected cruisers of from 839 to 2,089 tons. We also had eight torpedo boats, a dynamite vessel, theVesuvius, and six ships of the monitor type, from 4,000 to 6,060 tons. It was with this fleet we fought the war with Spain.
The causes of this war stretch back throughgenerations. Their foundation was, essentially, a difference in race. The American is mainly an Anglo-Saxon, direct and practical in his way; the Spaniard an oriental, courteous, kindly in the relations of friendship and family, with much that is lovable, but impracticable, tribal in his tendencies, knowing little of the modern phases of government by a constitution, and bloodthirsty and devastating in putting down revolt or in settling political differences. An anarchic century in Spain produced like conditions in Cuba. Our proximity to Cuba and our many commercial interests there were very strong elements in the situation.
A great impetus was given to feeling for Cuba and against Spain by the explosion of theMainein Havana Harbor about 9:30P.M., February 15th. Two months, however, were yet to pass before war was declared, though at the last moment Spain had acceded to all our demands. While our diplomacy may thus be said to have been not entirely “correct,” President McKinley may be ruled to have been wise in cutting the Gordian knot by war, which his message of April 11, 1898, practically did in referring the whole subject to Congress. The joint resolution passed and signed on April 20th,demanding that Spain should relinquish her authority in Cuba, was of course taken as a declaration of war by Spain, and April 21st was declared by Congress a few days later as the official date of its beginning.
On the afternoon of May 21st Captain William T. Sampson, who was now in command of the North Atlantic station, and was with the flagshipNew Yorkoff the reef at Key West where well-nigh all the available ships in the Atlantic were collected, received a telegram announcing his assignment to the command, with the rank of rear-admiral, an advancement only possible by selection by the President in time of war. This was the first indication of actual hostilities, but it was soon followed by another ordering to blockade immediately the coast of Cuba from Cardenas to Bahia Honda (a little west of Havana). Gathering during the night outside the reef (distant six miles from Key West) all the ships ready to move, the fleet early next morning was on its way, and by evening was off Havana, the searchlights of which were sweeping the sea in expectancy of the American fleet. Powerfully armed as were its batteries, they were, curiously enough, so disposed that they were open to attack from thesouthwest, with little possibility of return. It was Sampson’s eager wish to make this attack at once, and a battle-order had been drawn in anticipation of war, early in April, but the Navy Department in a letter of April 6th set its face so decidedly against the attempt, that Sampson had to yield. The department from the view of the necessity of preserving the fleet to meet Cervera was justified, but Sampson’s view, as later analysis of the situation showed, was correct. Had action been allowed, Havana would have been ours, without loss, on April 23d.
In addition to Sampson’s command, a squadron made up of theBrooklyn,Massachusetts, andTexaswas stationed at Hampton Roads under Commodore Schley; and several others, among them the fastColumbiaandMinneapolisand the cruiserSan Francisco, were kept north to meet the clamor of the seacoast in general for protection. The public could not understand that the only real protection was concentration against, and the destruction of, the enemy’s fleet.
As the joint resolution of Congress of April 20th declared the aim of the United States to be relinquishment of Spanish authority in the island of Cuba, our main sphere of action wasnaturally the Caribbean. As soon as Spain should have yielded the island, the war would naturally end unless Spain should choose to continue it. There were in the island, by official statement, 159,297 regular troops and 119,160 volunteers. The American regular army, distributed from Maine to Alaska, was but 28,183. Of course it was necessary to call for a large number of volunteers.
To preserve Cuba it was necessary for Spain to preserve communication with the island. This could be done only by obtaining and keeping command of the Atlantic. To do this she had an effective force of only four armored cruisers: theInfanta Maria Teresa,Almirante Oquendo,Vizcaya(Biscay), andCristóbal Colón, each of about 7,000 tons. A battleship, thePelayo, and a large armored cruiser, theCarlos V, were not yet ready for service. This was of course a hopeless disparity of fighting force as compared with Admiral Sampson’s fleet of five powerful battleships and two armored cruisers. Admiral Cervera, who had been placed in command of the Spanish squadron, saw this clearly and protested, without avail, against sending it across the Atlantic. On April 29, 1898, he left the Cape Verde Islands with the four armoredcruisers first mentioned and with three torpedo-boat destroyers, with orders to go to San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Commodore George Dewey, commanding our naval forces in Asia, had, under the orders of the department, collected his whole force at Hong Kong in anticipation of the war, and had made ready for the eventuality. TheBaltimore, a large cruiser for the period, had fortunately reached him in time with a precious supply of extra ammunition. The British Declaration of Neutrality had obliged him to withdraw on April 24th his force consisting of theOlympia,Baltimore,Boston,Raleigh,Concord,Petrel, and the revenue cutterMcCulloch, from Hong Kong to Mirs Bay, thirty miles away on the China coast. Here, on April 26th, he received a telegram informing him officially of the declaration of war and adding: “Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.” The last three words were certainly unnecessary. He left as soon as possible, this being the afternoon of May 27th. It was 620 miles to Manila.
It must be confessed that the outlook for theSpanish at Manila was not cheerful. They had but two vessels of any considerable size, theReina Cristinaand theCastilla, of 3,100 and 3,300 tons, and the latter, which had been in use as a receiving ship, had no motive power. In addition there were available two small cruisers of 1,152 tons, two of 1,040, and a gunboat of 500. Three other small vessels, one theVelasco, of 1,139 tons, were under repairs, with some of their guns in the batteries at the entrance of the bay, twenty-five miles away. Dewey had theOlympia, of 5,870 tons;Baltimore, 4,413;Raleigh, 3,183;Boston, 3,000;Concord, 1,710; andPetrel, 892. The guns, besides a number of 3 and 6 pounders, were:
The complements of the two squadrons were: American, 1,707 men; Spanish, 1,664.
It was a ten-mile stretch across the entrance to the bay, divided into two deep channels by islands upon which had been hastily establishedbatteries mounted with seventeen guns varying in calibre from 7 to 4.3 inch; nine of these were muzzle-loaders and thus could not be fired nearly so rapidly as the 4.3-inch, which were quick-firers. At Manila were mounted 226 guns of all kinds, most of which were inefficient; but there were twelve good breech-loaders of from 9.45-inch to 4.7-inch, with much less range, however, than the modern 8-inch carried by theOlympia. The Manila defences, however, were such that it would have been much wiser for Montojo to have anchored close as possible to the fortifications and thus obtain such support as was available. As it was, he was out of their protection, supported by only eight guns, mostly ineffective weapons, in battery at Sangley Point and Cavite; three of these, two 6.3-inch and one 4.7-inch, were of value.
Dewey was off Subig Bay on Saturday, April 30th. After examining the bay for the Spanish ships he stood for Manila, fifty-seven miles away. At midnight he passed the rock El Fraile in Boca Grande, the battery on which fired upon the squadron, which answered with a few shots. At five o’clock the squadron was near the mouth of the river, on both sides of which Manila is built, when the Spanish squadronwas sighted at anchor off Cavite, six miles to the southward, and our ships at once turned in that direction. Fire was opened at 5:41 by theOlympia. The American squadron stood down slowly to the westward, turned and turned again, passing thus five times before the anchored Spanish ships, thrice to the west, twice to the east. After an action of two hours, on a report of shortness of ammunition (which proved incorrect) the squadron hauled off for a count of its supply and to give the men breakfast, the captains being called aboard to report damages. None of these were serious, and no men had been killed, though several were wounded. During this time the Spanish squadron was seen to be in flames, and the American squadron then stood in and completed its work. The victory was complete. The Americans had fired in all 5,859 shots, 1,414 of which were 5, 6, and 8 inch; there remained 2,861 of the heavier shell and over 30,000 of the 6, 3, and 1 pounders.
The result of the action depended upon gunnery efficiency, as there was no ship on either side which was not thoroughly vulnerable to the guns used. And though our gunnery was (as also at Santiago) far below the present highstandard, the result was positive proof of great superiority to that of the Spanish.
The Americans had two officers and six men wounded in theBaltimore. Otherwise they were scathless. The Spanish loss, as reckoned by “painstaking inquiry” by an American officer, was 167 killed and 214 wounded. Admiral Montojo’s own statement, which puts his whole force at but 1,134, was 75 killed and 281 wounded.
Dewey cut and buoyed the cable on May 2d, took position in the bay, and awaited the coming of troops which were soon to be on their way. He sent the revenue cutterMcCulloch, which had taken no part in the action, to telegraph his victory home. Before he had cut the cable, however, the news had been telegraphed to Madrid, and it was thence received on May 2d with great enthusiasm in the United States. On May 10th Dewey received the thanks of Congress and was raised to the rank of Admiral of the Navy.
While the victory was to have great results in determining our attitude toward the Philippines, it could in no sense determine the result of the war; this could only be attained by the destruction of one or the other battle fleetsnow in the Atlantic. The event, however, put a very different complexion upon the attitude of Europe. There was to be no further European talk of putting limitations upon our conduct of the struggle.