FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES[1]Among these wereJones, author of the admirable Treatise on the Canon of the New Testament:Lardner,Maddox,Chandler, ArchbishopSecker, &c.[2]Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham’s trial.[3]Among them wereCudworth, born 1617; “Intel. Syst. of the Universe:”Boyle, 1626; “Things above Reason:”Stillingfleet, 1635; “Letters to a Deist:” SirI. Newton, 1642; “Observations on Prophecy:”Leslie, 1650; “Short Method with Deists:”Lowth, 1661, Vindic. of the Divine Author of the Bible:King, 1669; “Origin of Evil:”Sam. Clark, 1675; “Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion:”Waterland, 1683; “Scripture Vindicated:”Lardner, 1684; “Credibility of Gospel History:”Leland, 1691; “View of Deistical Writers,” and “Advantage and Necessity of Rev.:”Chandler, 1693; “Definition of Christianity,” on “Prophecy,” &c.:Warburton, 1698; “Divine Leg. of Moses;” BishopNewton, 1704; “On the Prophecies:”Watson, 1737; “Apology for Christianity,” (against Gibbon,) and also “Apology for the Bible,” (against Paine.)[4]McIntosh: “Progress of Ethical Philosophy.”[5]Brougham: “Disc. on Nat. Theology.”[6]Verisimile.[7][These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each other. The first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second produces belief, because the same evidence made us believe in a similar case. The third is just an analogy, in the popular sense of the term.][8]The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability.[9][This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. But it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “He thatbelievethnot shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He thatbelievethhath everlasting life:” John iii. 36. “With the heart manbelievethunto righteousness:” Rom. x. 10. Belief is part of the sinner’sdutyin submitting himself to God; and not merely a question of prudence.][10]SeePart II. chap. vi.[11]Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.[12][Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of absurdity and impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “Historical and Critical Dictionary.” See as instances, the articlesOrigen,Manichæus,Paulicians.][13]Ch. i.[14]Ch. ii.[15]Ch. iii.[16]Ch. iv.[17]Ch. v.[18]Ch. vi.[19]Ch. vii.[20]Part II. Ch. i.[21]Ch. ii.[22]Ch. iii.[23]Ch. iv.[24]Ch. v.[25]Ch. vi.vii.[26]Ch. viii.[27][This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book: not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected with the obscure metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only serves to show that B. has perhaps made too much of the argument from the indivisibility of consciousness; and by no means that he does not fairly use it.We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not made plain. Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or crystallization, or any thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of personal identity, (see Essay, ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. His definition is, “Existence itself, which determines a being of any sort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind.” I had rather define it “the uninterrupted continuance of being.” What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: for then it would exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed before it existed. Locke makesconsciousnessto constitute identity, and argues that a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a man, but was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten, I am not the same person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very ludicrously.Butler, in his “Dissertation,” urges that consciousnesspresupposesidentity, as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke’s theory, no person would have existed any earlier than the period to which his memory extends. We cannot suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, nor could memory, if material, spread itself over successive years of life.][28]I saykindof presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that there is the samedegreeof conviction, that our living powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.[29]Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify eitherthe destruction of a living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all; orthe destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithetpresentis added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.[30][The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers thinks, consider this argument as “handing us over to an absolute demonstration.” It just places all arguments for and against the soul’s future life, in that balanced condition, which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation, free from presumptionsagainstits truth. This view of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the future, both of man and beast.][31][Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human souls are notnaturallyimmortal, but become so, by the power of the Holy Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was continued by Collins. Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject.These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have extension. But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger an inch thick? How superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been! Cicero makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, without parts or mixture: it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish.” And in another place, “I never could believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter; or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and again, “I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I cease to live in this world,” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his last moments, “O my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me from you, I shall cease to exist.”][32]See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.[33][As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, an average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind changes with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for the sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is driven to affirm thatthe wholeis not altered, though every particle be changed.This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our identity, and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not also destroy all presumption that the Ego cannot exist without this particular body?][34]SeeDissertation I.[35][The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. Love, anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may stop it altogether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical causes, and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The brain of a maniac, seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But this does not prove that there was nofunctionalderangement.][36][“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man thenusehis whole body? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.”Plat. Alcibi. Prim.p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.“It may easily be perceived that themindboth sees and hears, and not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither are we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body.” “Whatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.”Cicero, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed out with the finger.”Cic., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.][37][Butler’s argument, if advanced forproofwould prove too much, not only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence. And this is really the tenet, (i.e.transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any presumptionsagainsteither a future or a pre-existent state.Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who cancreate, under infinite diversity of forms, cansustainexistence, in any mode he pleases.The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out inPolignac’sAnti-Lucretius, and still more inBayle’sDictionary, under the articlesPereira, andRorarius. The topic is also discussed inDes Carteson the Passions:Baxteron The Nature of the Soul:Hume’sEssays, Essay 9:Search’sLight of Nature:Cheyne’sPhilosophical Principles:Wagstaffon the Immortality of Brutes:Edwards’Critical and Philosophical Exercitations:Watt’sEssays, Essay 9:Colliber’sEnquiry:Lockeon the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.:Dittonon the Resurrection:WillisDe Anima Brutæ.][38][It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye sees, or a finger feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or spectacles. If thenervebe paralyzed, there is no vision, though the eye be perfect. A few words spoken or read, may at once deprive of sight, or knock a person down.The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from palsy, retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind.Morgagni,Haller,Bonnet, and others, have proved that there is no part of the brain, not even the pineal gland, which has not been found destroyed by disease, where there had been no hallucination of mind, nor any suspicion of such disease, during life.][39]Pp.84,85.[40][We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and complicated organization.” A mere jumble of words! But were the mind material, there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do not see that death has any power over matter. The body remains the very same as it does in a swoon, tillchemicalchanges begin.][41]There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not, Whether it be the destruction of theirpresentpowers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for the first.[42]This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς φιλοσοφήσασι· Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“For they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born; and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς τῆς γυναικός σου ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι, τὴν ὥραν ὲν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριόν σου τοῦ ἐλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται. Lib. ix. c. 3. [As this last passage may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left untranslated.][43][Theincreaseof a force in any direction, cannot of itselfchangethat direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, does not aim at some other object, by being shot with more force.][44][Our nature willalwaysbe ours, or we should cease to be ourselves, and become something else. And this nature issocial. Every one feels, at least sometimes, that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness; and so looks round for that which may fit his wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within. Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is of the body. Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in a right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. But Such society must include God.][45]SeePart II. chap. ii.andPart II. chap. iv.[46][Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, insomeof their bearings. Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which care and candor may remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine, that it is attacked with objections, both real and merely plausible. Error has been spread by two opposite means:—a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable cavilling at certain truth.][47]Part I. chap. vii.[48][Our relation to God is “even necessary,” because we are his creatures: so that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But our relations to other creatures are contingent, and may be changed or abrogated.][49]Pp.93,94.[50][“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, are but empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently. The raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle, the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason than because one is usual the other unusual. Did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural.” Dr.Clarke, Controv. with Leibnitz.][51][That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, and of the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part we learn what itis, and what it isto do:e.g.the eye, the hand, the heart. So of mental faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, shame to deter us from things shameful, compassion to induce us to relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we may see an ultimate design,—viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be our end, it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin.SeeLaw’sNotes on King’s Origin of Evil.][52][It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the laws of matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which reveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very result of philosophy,—viz.: that the world is governed bygeneral laws. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90, 91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.][53]SeePart II. chap. vi.[54]Part II. chap. vi.[55]The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this world; that each shallthenreceive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked: but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; butthe mystery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail,shall then be finished; and he willtake to him his great power and will reign, by rendering to every one according to his works.[56][Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical. Butler here seizes the very points, which are most plausible and most insisted on, as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the same things, in the universally observed course of nature.][57]Chap. i.[58]See chaps.iv.andvi.[59][This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive argument. If in this world, we haveproofsthat God is a moral governor, then in order to evince that we shall be under moral governmenthereafter, we have only to supply an intermediate consideration,—viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, because admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the veryprincipleson which God’s government goes at present, compel us not only tosupposethat the principles of God will remain, but tobelieveso.][60]Chap. ii.[61]The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter.[62]Dissertation II.[63]Chap. vi.[64]See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.[65][At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction that what is right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This again is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all power over us for good or evil. As creation is full of the evidences ofdesign, so is Providence. And as the human mind shows, in its structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the attributes of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay plans, and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as to secure success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or disapprove our modes, constitutes an evidentadaptednessto a moral government on the part of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if there be no such government. Every rule of action, deduced by reason from the light of nature, may fairly be regarded as God’s law; and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, are God’s retributions. These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying, emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do actually so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance, gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God’s law; and we would deem it insane to act in opposition.][66][ConsultCappon the Gov. of God:TwisseVindiciæ Prov. Dei:WittichiiExcre. Theol.:Dwight’sTheol.:Martiniusde Gubernatione Mundi:Liefchildon Providence:Mortonon do.:Sherlockon do.:Rutherfordon do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, Hunt, Davies, Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.][67]Chap. ii.[68][In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no contrivances for disease or pain, so that in general those who conform to the laws of their being, enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct. But, as without revelation we could only learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and would often learn it too late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has in mercy given forth his teachings, by which,beforehand, we may know the effects of actions.][69]SeeDissertation II.[70][It was contended byMandevillein his “Fable of the Bees,” that private vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the well-being of society. This idea is fully refuted byWarburton, Divine Legation of Moses, b. 1:Berkeley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and byBrown, Characteristics, Ess. 2.][71][A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the “delivering up” of our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of delivering up, we find it referred,1.To God the Father, John iii. 16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32.2.To Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literallydelivered himself.3.To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12.4.To Pontius Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6.5.To Judas, Matt. xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12.As to themere act, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, and our Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike thequalitiesof the act!][72][“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories which are told aboutHades, that such, as have practised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will support old age.”Plato, Respub. i. s. 5.][73]SeeDissertation II.[74][Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the argumenta fortiori, “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but thathe sees, for he makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have them, from him.This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknowledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to theirunderstanding, but deny his moral ones, because theirheartsare hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.][75][It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.][76][The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true only with qualifications. The apostles, as tothislife, were the most miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does notalwaysbring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness were theonlyreward of virtue? 3. This reward, at best, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must haveobvioustriumphs.On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, whollydepriveshim of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his only punishment.Virtuous persons, in the strong language ofRobert Hall,[A]would be “theonlypersons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural propensities and passions, and all in vain!”[A]Sermon on the Vanity of Man.][77][Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams, in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]

[1]Among these wereJones, author of the admirable Treatise on the Canon of the New Testament:Lardner,Maddox,Chandler, ArchbishopSecker, &c.

[1]Among these wereJones, author of the admirable Treatise on the Canon of the New Testament:Lardner,Maddox,Chandler, ArchbishopSecker, &c.

[2]Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham’s trial.

[2]Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham’s trial.

[3]Among them wereCudworth, born 1617; “Intel. Syst. of the Universe:”Boyle, 1626; “Things above Reason:”Stillingfleet, 1635; “Letters to a Deist:” SirI. Newton, 1642; “Observations on Prophecy:”Leslie, 1650; “Short Method with Deists:”Lowth, 1661, Vindic. of the Divine Author of the Bible:King, 1669; “Origin of Evil:”Sam. Clark, 1675; “Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion:”Waterland, 1683; “Scripture Vindicated:”Lardner, 1684; “Credibility of Gospel History:”Leland, 1691; “View of Deistical Writers,” and “Advantage and Necessity of Rev.:”Chandler, 1693; “Definition of Christianity,” on “Prophecy,” &c.:Warburton, 1698; “Divine Leg. of Moses;” BishopNewton, 1704; “On the Prophecies:”Watson, 1737; “Apology for Christianity,” (against Gibbon,) and also “Apology for the Bible,” (against Paine.)

[3]Among them wereCudworth, born 1617; “Intel. Syst. of the Universe:”Boyle, 1626; “Things above Reason:”Stillingfleet, 1635; “Letters to a Deist:” SirI. Newton, 1642; “Observations on Prophecy:”Leslie, 1650; “Short Method with Deists:”Lowth, 1661, Vindic. of the Divine Author of the Bible:King, 1669; “Origin of Evil:”Sam. Clark, 1675; “Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion:”Waterland, 1683; “Scripture Vindicated:”Lardner, 1684; “Credibility of Gospel History:”Leland, 1691; “View of Deistical Writers,” and “Advantage and Necessity of Rev.:”Chandler, 1693; “Definition of Christianity,” on “Prophecy,” &c.:Warburton, 1698; “Divine Leg. of Moses;” BishopNewton, 1704; “On the Prophecies:”Watson, 1737; “Apology for Christianity,” (against Gibbon,) and also “Apology for the Bible,” (against Paine.)

[4]McIntosh: “Progress of Ethical Philosophy.”

[4]McIntosh: “Progress of Ethical Philosophy.”

[5]Brougham: “Disc. on Nat. Theology.”

[5]Brougham: “Disc. on Nat. Theology.”

[6]Verisimile.

[6]Verisimile.

[7][These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each other. The first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second produces belief, because the same evidence made us believe in a similar case. The third is just an analogy, in the popular sense of the term.]

[7][These three ways of being “like,” are very distinct from each other. The first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second produces belief, because the same evidence made us believe in a similar case. The third is just an analogy, in the popular sense of the term.]

[8]The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability.

[8]The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability.

[9][This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. But it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “He thatbelievethnot shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He thatbelievethhath everlasting life:” John iii. 36. “With the heart manbelievethunto righteousness:” Rom. x. 10. Belief is part of the sinner’sdutyin submitting himself to God; and not merely a question of prudence.]

[9][This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. But it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. “He thatbelievethnot shall be damned:” Mark xvi. 16. “He thatbelievethhath everlasting life:” John iii. 36. “With the heart manbelievethunto righteousness:” Rom. x. 10. Belief is part of the sinner’sdutyin submitting himself to God; and not merely a question of prudence.]

[10]SeePart II. chap. vi.

[10]SeePart II. chap. vi.

[11]Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.

[11]Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.

[12][Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of absurdity and impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “Historical and Critical Dictionary.” See as instances, the articlesOrigen,Manichæus,Paulicians.]

[12][Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of absurdity and impiety, may be found in Bayle’s great “Historical and Critical Dictionary.” See as instances, the articlesOrigen,Manichæus,Paulicians.]

[13]Ch. i.

[13]Ch. i.

[14]Ch. ii.

[14]Ch. ii.

[15]Ch. iii.

[15]Ch. iii.

[16]Ch. iv.

[16]Ch. iv.

[17]Ch. v.

[17]Ch. v.

[18]Ch. vi.

[18]Ch. vi.

[19]Ch. vii.

[19]Ch. vii.

[20]Part II. Ch. i.

[20]Part II. Ch. i.

[21]Ch. ii.

[21]Ch. ii.

[22]Ch. iii.

[22]Ch. iii.

[23]Ch. iv.

[23]Ch. iv.

[24]Ch. v.

[24]Ch. v.

[25]Ch. vi.vii.

[25]Ch. vi.vii.

[26]Ch. viii.

[26]Ch. viii.

[27][This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book: not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected with the obscure metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only serves to show that B. has perhaps made too much of the argument from the indivisibility of consciousness; and by no means that he does not fairly use it.We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not made plain. Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or crystallization, or any thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of personal identity, (see Essay, ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. His definition is, “Existence itself, which determines a being of any sort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind.” I had rather define it “the uninterrupted continuance of being.” What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: for then it would exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed before it existed. Locke makesconsciousnessto constitute identity, and argues that a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a man, but was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten, I am not the same person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very ludicrously.Butler, in his “Dissertation,” urges that consciousnesspresupposesidentity, as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke’s theory, no person would have existed any earlier than the period to which his memory extends. We cannot suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, nor could memory, if material, spread itself over successive years of life.]

[27][This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book: not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected with the obscure metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only serves to show that B. has perhaps made too much of the argument from the indivisibility of consciousness; and by no means that he does not fairly use it.

We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not made plain. Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or crystallization, or any thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of personal identity, (see Essay, ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. His definition is, “Existence itself, which determines a being of any sort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind.” I had rather define it “the uninterrupted continuance of being.” What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: for then it would exist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed before it existed. Locke makesconsciousnessto constitute identity, and argues that a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a man, but was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten, I am not the same person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very ludicrously.Butler, in his “Dissertation,” urges that consciousnesspresupposesidentity, as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke’s theory, no person would have existed any earlier than the period to which his memory extends. We cannot suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, nor could memory, if material, spread itself over successive years of life.]

[28]I saykindof presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that there is the samedegreeof conviction, that our living powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.

[28]I saykindof presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that there is the samedegreeof conviction, that our living powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.

[29]Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify eitherthe destruction of a living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all; orthe destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithetpresentis added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.

[29]Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify eitherthe destruction of a living being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all; orthe destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithetpresentis added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.

[30][The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers thinks, consider this argument as “handing us over to an absolute demonstration.” It just places all arguments for and against the soul’s future life, in that balanced condition, which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation, free from presumptionsagainstits truth. This view of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the future, both of man and beast.]

[30][The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers thinks, consider this argument as “handing us over to an absolute demonstration.” It just places all arguments for and against the soul’s future life, in that balanced condition, which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation, free from presumptionsagainstits truth. This view of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the future, both of man and beast.]

[31][Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human souls are notnaturallyimmortal, but become so, by the power of the Holy Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was continued by Collins. Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject.These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have extension. But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger an inch thick? How superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been! Cicero makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, without parts or mixture: it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish.” And in another place, “I never could believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter; or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and again, “I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I cease to live in this world,” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his last moments, “O my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me from you, I shall cease to exist.”]

[31][Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human souls are notnaturallyimmortal, but become so, by the power of the Holy Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was continued by Collins. Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject.These “presumptions” form the base of materialism, and hence the denial of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have extension. But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger an inch thick? How superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been! Cicero makes Cato say, “The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, without parts or mixture: it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish.” And in another place, “I never could believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter; or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;” and again, “I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I cease to live in this world,” Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his last moments, “O my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me from you, I shall cease to exist.”]

[32]See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.

[32]See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.

[33][As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, an average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind changes with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for the sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is driven to affirm thatthe wholeis not altered, though every particle be changed.This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our identity, and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not also destroy all presumption that the Ego cannot exist without this particular body?]

[33][As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, an average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind changes with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for the sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is driven to affirm thatthe wholeis not altered, though every particle be changed.This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our identity, and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not also destroy all presumption that the Ego cannot exist without this particular body?]

[34]SeeDissertation I.

[34]SeeDissertation I.

[35][The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. Love, anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may stop it altogether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical causes, and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The brain of a maniac, seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But this does not prove that there was nofunctionalderangement.]

[35][The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. Love, anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may stop it altogether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical causes, and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The brain of a maniac, seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But this does not prove that there was nofunctionalderangement.]

[36][“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man thenusehis whole body? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.”Plat. Alcibi. Prim.p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.“It may easily be perceived that themindboth sees and hears, and not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither are we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body.” “Whatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.”Cicero, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed out with the finger.”Cic., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.]

[36][“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man thenusehis whole body? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.”Plat. Alcibi. Prim.p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.“It may easily be perceived that themindboth sees and hears, and not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither are we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body.” “Whatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.”Cicero, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed out with the finger.”Cic., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.]

[37][Butler’s argument, if advanced forproofwould prove too much, not only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence. And this is really the tenet, (i.e.transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any presumptionsagainsteither a future or a pre-existent state.Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who cancreate, under infinite diversity of forms, cansustainexistence, in any mode he pleases.The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out inPolignac’sAnti-Lucretius, and still more inBayle’sDictionary, under the articlesPereira, andRorarius. The topic is also discussed inDes Carteson the Passions:Baxteron The Nature of the Soul:Hume’sEssays, Essay 9:Search’sLight of Nature:Cheyne’sPhilosophical Principles:Wagstaffon the Immortality of Brutes:Edwards’Critical and Philosophical Exercitations:Watt’sEssays, Essay 9:Colliber’sEnquiry:Lockeon the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.:Dittonon the Resurrection:WillisDe Anima Brutæ.]

[37][Butler’s argument, if advanced forproofwould prove too much, not only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence. And this is really the tenet, (i.e.transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any presumptionsagainsteither a future or a pre-existent state.Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who cancreate, under infinite diversity of forms, cansustainexistence, in any mode he pleases.The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out inPolignac’sAnti-Lucretius, and still more inBayle’sDictionary, under the articlesPereira, andRorarius. The topic is also discussed inDes Carteson the Passions:Baxteron The Nature of the Soul:Hume’sEssays, Essay 9:Search’sLight of Nature:Cheyne’sPhilosophical Principles:Wagstaffon the Immortality of Brutes:Edwards’Critical and Philosophical Exercitations:Watt’sEssays, Essay 9:Colliber’sEnquiry:Lockeon the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.:Dittonon the Resurrection:WillisDe Anima Brutæ.]

[38][It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye sees, or a finger feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or spectacles. If thenervebe paralyzed, there is no vision, though the eye be perfect. A few words spoken or read, may at once deprive of sight, or knock a person down.The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from palsy, retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind.Morgagni,Haller,Bonnet, and others, have proved that there is no part of the brain, not even the pineal gland, which has not been found destroyed by disease, where there had been no hallucination of mind, nor any suspicion of such disease, during life.]

[38][It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye sees, or a finger feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or spectacles. If thenervebe paralyzed, there is no vision, though the eye be perfect. A few words spoken or read, may at once deprive of sight, or knock a person down.The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from palsy, retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind.Morgagni,Haller,Bonnet, and others, have proved that there is no part of the brain, not even the pineal gland, which has not been found destroyed by disease, where there had been no hallucination of mind, nor any suspicion of such disease, during life.]

[39]Pp.84,85.

[39]Pp.84,85.

[40][We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and complicated organization.” A mere jumble of words! But were the mind material, there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do not see that death has any power over matter. The body remains the very same as it does in a swoon, tillchemicalchanges begin.]

[40][We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and complicated organization.” A mere jumble of words! But were the mind material, there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do not see that death has any power over matter. The body remains the very same as it does in a swoon, tillchemicalchanges begin.]

[41]There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not, Whether it be the destruction of theirpresentpowers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for the first.

[41]There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not, Whether it be the destruction of theirpresentpowers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for the first.

[42]This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς φιλοσοφήσασι· Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“For they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born; and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς τῆς γυναικός σου ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι, τὴν ὥραν ὲν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριόν σου τοῦ ἐλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται. Lib. ix. c. 3. [As this last passage may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left untranslated.]

[42]This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς φιλοσοφήσασι· Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“For they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born; and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς τῆς γυναικός σου ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι, τὴν ὥραν ὲν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριόν σου τοῦ ἐλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται. Lib. ix. c. 3. [As this last passage may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left untranslated.]

[43][Theincreaseof a force in any direction, cannot of itselfchangethat direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, does not aim at some other object, by being shot with more force.]

[43][Theincreaseof a force in any direction, cannot of itselfchangethat direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, does not aim at some other object, by being shot with more force.]

[44][Our nature willalwaysbe ours, or we should cease to be ourselves, and become something else. And this nature issocial. Every one feels, at least sometimes, that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness; and so looks round for that which may fit his wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within. Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is of the body. Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in a right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. But Such society must include God.]

[44][Our nature willalwaysbe ours, or we should cease to be ourselves, and become something else. And this nature issocial. Every one feels, at least sometimes, that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness; and so looks round for that which may fit his wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within. Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is of the body. Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in a right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. But Such society must include God.]

[45]SeePart II. chap. ii.andPart II. chap. iv.

[45]SeePart II. chap. ii.andPart II. chap. iv.

[46][Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, insomeof their bearings. Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which care and candor may remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine, that it is attacked with objections, both real and merely plausible. Error has been spread by two opposite means:—a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable cavilling at certain truth.]

[46][Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, insomeof their bearings. Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which care and candor may remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine, that it is attacked with objections, both real and merely plausible. Error has been spread by two opposite means:—a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable cavilling at certain truth.]

[47]Part I. chap. vii.

[47]Part I. chap. vii.

[48][Our relation to God is “even necessary,” because we are his creatures: so that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But our relations to other creatures are contingent, and may be changed or abrogated.]

[48][Our relation to God is “even necessary,” because we are his creatures: so that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But our relations to other creatures are contingent, and may be changed or abrogated.]

[49]Pp.93,94.

[49]Pp.93,94.

[50][“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, are but empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently. The raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle, the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason than because one is usual the other unusual. Did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural.” Dr.Clarke, Controv. with Leibnitz.]

[50][“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, are but empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently. The raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle, the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason than because one is usual the other unusual. Did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural.” Dr.Clarke, Controv. with Leibnitz.]

[51][That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, and of the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part we learn what itis, and what it isto do:e.g.the eye, the hand, the heart. So of mental faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, shame to deter us from things shameful, compassion to induce us to relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we may see an ultimate design,—viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be our end, it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin.SeeLaw’sNotes on King’s Origin of Evil.]

[51][That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, and of the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part we learn what itis, and what it isto do:e.g.the eye, the hand, the heart. So of mental faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, shame to deter us from things shameful, compassion to induce us to relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we may see an ultimate design,—viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be our end, it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin.SeeLaw’sNotes on King’s Origin of Evil.]

[52][It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the laws of matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which reveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very result of philosophy,—viz.: that the world is governed bygeneral laws. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90, 91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.]

[52][It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the laws of matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which reveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very result of philosophy,—viz.: that the world is governed bygeneral laws. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90, 91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.]

[53]SeePart II. chap. vi.

[53]SeePart II. chap. vi.

[54]Part II. chap. vi.

[54]Part II. chap. vi.

[55]The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this world; that each shallthenreceive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked: but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; butthe mystery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail,shall then be finished; and he willtake to him his great power and will reign, by rendering to every one according to his works.

[55]The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this world; that each shallthenreceive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked: but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; butthe mystery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail,shall then be finished; and he willtake to him his great power and will reign, by rendering to every one according to his works.

[56][Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical. Butler here seizes the very points, which are most plausible and most insisted on, as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the same things, in the universally observed course of nature.]

[56][Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical. Butler here seizes the very points, which are most plausible and most insisted on, as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the same things, in the universally observed course of nature.]

[57]Chap. i.

[57]Chap. i.

[58]See chaps.iv.andvi.

[58]See chaps.iv.andvi.

[59][This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive argument. If in this world, we haveproofsthat God is a moral governor, then in order to evince that we shall be under moral governmenthereafter, we have only to supply an intermediate consideration,—viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, because admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the veryprincipleson which God’s government goes at present, compel us not only tosupposethat the principles of God will remain, but tobelieveso.]

[59][This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive argument. If in this world, we haveproofsthat God is a moral governor, then in order to evince that we shall be under moral governmenthereafter, we have only to supply an intermediate consideration,—viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, because admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the veryprincipleson which God’s government goes at present, compel us not only tosupposethat the principles of God will remain, but tobelieveso.]

[60]Chap. ii.

[60]Chap. ii.

[61]The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter.

[61]The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter.

[62]Dissertation II.

[62]Dissertation II.

[63]Chap. vi.

[63]Chap. vi.

[64]See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.

[64]See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.

[65][At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction that what is right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This again is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all power over us for good or evil. As creation is full of the evidences ofdesign, so is Providence. And as the human mind shows, in its structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the attributes of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay plans, and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as to secure success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or disapprove our modes, constitutes an evidentadaptednessto a moral government on the part of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if there be no such government. Every rule of action, deduced by reason from the light of nature, may fairly be regarded as God’s law; and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, are God’s retributions. These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying, emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do actually so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance, gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God’s law; and we would deem it insane to act in opposition.]

[65][At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction that what is right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This again is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all power over us for good or evil. As creation is full of the evidences ofdesign, so is Providence. And as the human mind shows, in its structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the attributes of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay plans, and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as to secure success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or disapprove our modes, constitutes an evidentadaptednessto a moral government on the part of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if there be no such government. Every rule of action, deduced by reason from the light of nature, may fairly be regarded as God’s law; and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, are God’s retributions. These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying, emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do actually so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance, gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God’s law; and we would deem it insane to act in opposition.]

[66][ConsultCappon the Gov. of God:TwisseVindiciæ Prov. Dei:WittichiiExcre. Theol.:Dwight’sTheol.:Martiniusde Gubernatione Mundi:Liefchildon Providence:Mortonon do.:Sherlockon do.:Rutherfordon do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, Hunt, Davies, Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.]

[66][ConsultCappon the Gov. of God:TwisseVindiciæ Prov. Dei:WittichiiExcre. Theol.:Dwight’sTheol.:Martiniusde Gubernatione Mundi:Liefchildon Providence:Mortonon do.:Sherlockon do.:Rutherfordon do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, Hunt, Davies, Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.]

[67]Chap. ii.

[67]Chap. ii.

[68][In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no contrivances for disease or pain, so that in general those who conform to the laws of their being, enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct. But, as without revelation we could only learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and would often learn it too late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has in mercy given forth his teachings, by which,beforehand, we may know the effects of actions.]

[68][In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no contrivances for disease or pain, so that in general those who conform to the laws of their being, enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct. But, as without revelation we could only learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and would often learn it too late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has in mercy given forth his teachings, by which,beforehand, we may know the effects of actions.]

[69]SeeDissertation II.

[69]SeeDissertation II.

[70][It was contended byMandevillein his “Fable of the Bees,” that private vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the well-being of society. This idea is fully refuted byWarburton, Divine Legation of Moses, b. 1:Berkeley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and byBrown, Characteristics, Ess. 2.]

[70][It was contended byMandevillein his “Fable of the Bees,” that private vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the well-being of society. This idea is fully refuted byWarburton, Divine Legation of Moses, b. 1:Berkeley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and byBrown, Characteristics, Ess. 2.]

[71][A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the “delivering up” of our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of delivering up, we find it referred,1.To God the Father, John iii. 16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32.2.To Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literallydelivered himself.3.To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12.4.To Pontius Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6.5.To Judas, Matt. xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12.As to themere act, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, and our Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike thequalitiesof the act!]

[71][A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the “delivering up” of our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of delivering up, we find it referred,1.To God the Father, John iii. 16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32.2.To Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literallydelivered himself.3.To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12.4.To Pontius Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6.5.To Judas, Matt. xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12.As to themere act, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, and our Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike thequalitiesof the act!]

[72][“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories which are told aboutHades, that such, as have practised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will support old age.”Plato, Respub. i. s. 5.]

[72][“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories which are told aboutHades, that such, as have practised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will support old age.”Plato, Respub. i. s. 5.]

[73]SeeDissertation II.

[73]SeeDissertation II.

[74][Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the argumenta fortiori, “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but thathe sees, for he makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have them, from him.This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknowledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to theirunderstanding, but deny his moral ones, because theirheartsare hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.]

[74][Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the argumenta fortiori, “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but thathe sees, for he makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have them, from him.This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknowledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to theirunderstanding, but deny his moral ones, because theirheartsare hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.]

[75][It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.]

[75][It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.]

[76][The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true only with qualifications. The apostles, as tothislife, were the most miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does notalwaysbring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness were theonlyreward of virtue? 3. This reward, at best, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must haveobvioustriumphs.On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, whollydepriveshim of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his only punishment.Virtuous persons, in the strong language ofRobert Hall,[A]would be “theonlypersons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural propensities and passions, and all in vain!”[A]Sermon on the Vanity of Man.]

[76][The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true only with qualifications. The apostles, as tothislife, were the most miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does notalwaysbring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness were theonlyreward of virtue? 3. This reward, at best, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must haveobvioustriumphs.On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, whollydepriveshim of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his only punishment.Virtuous persons, in the strong language ofRobert Hall,[A]would be “theonlypersons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural propensities and passions, and all in vain!”

[A]Sermon on the Vanity of Man.]

[A]Sermon on the Vanity of Man.]

[77][Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams, in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]

[77][Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams, in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]

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