CHAPTER III.
1.Imagination defined.2.Sleep and dreams defined.3.Causes of dreams.4.Fiction defined.5.Phantasms defined.6.Remembrance defined.7.Wherein remembrance consisteth.8.Why in a dream a man never thinks he dreams.9.Why few things seem strange in dreams.10.That a dream may be taken for reality and vision.
Imagination defined.
1. As standing water put into motion by the stroke of astone, or blast of wind, dothnot presentlygive over moving as soon as the wind ceaseth, or the stone settleth: soneitherdoth theeffectcease which theobjecthath wrought upon thebrain, so soon as ever by turning aside of the organs theobject ceasethto work; that is to say, though thesensebepast, theimageorconceptionremaineth; but moreobscurewhile we areawake, because someobjector other continuallypliethand soliciteth our eyes, and ears,keepingthe mind in astrongermotion, whereby theweakerdoth not easilyappear. And this obscure conception is that we callphantasy, orimagination:imaginationbeing, to define it,conception remaining, and by little and little decaying from and after the act of sense.
Sleep and dreams defined.
2. But whenpresentsense isnot, as insleep, there theimagesremaining after sense, when there be many, as in dreams, arenot obscure, butstrongandclear, as in sense itself. The reason is, thatwhich obscured and made the conceptions weak, namely sense, and presentoperationof the object, isremoved: forsleepis theprivation of the act of sense, (the power remaining) anddreamsare theimaginationof them thatsleep.
Causes of dreams.
3. Thecausesof dreams, if they be natural, are theactionsor violence of theinwardparts of a man upon hisbrain, by which thepassagesof sense by sleepbenumbed, arerestoredto their motion. The signs by which this appeareth to be so, are thedifferencesof dreams (old men commonly dream oftener, and have their dreams more painful than young) proceeding from thedifferentaccidents of man’s body, as dreams oflust, as dreams ofanger, according as the heart, or other parts within, work more or less upon the brain, by more or lessheat; so also the descents of differentsorts of phlegmmaketh us a dream of different tastes of meats and drinks; and I believe there is areciprocationof motion from the brain to the vital parts, and back from the vital parts to the brain; whereby not onlyimaginationbegettethmotionin those parts; but also motion in those parts begetteth imagination like to that by which it was begotten. If this be true, and thatsadimaginations nourish thespleen, then we see also a cause, why a strongspleenreciprocally causethfearful dreams, and why the effects oflasciviousnessmay in a dream produce the image of some person that hadcausedthem. Another sign that dreams are caused by the action of the inward parts, is thedisorderand casual consequence of one conception or image to another: for when we arewaking, theantecedentthought or conception introduceth, and is cause oftheconsequent, as the water followeth a man’s finger upon a dry and level table; but indreamsthere is commonlyno coherence, and when there is, it is by chance, which must needs proceed from this, that thebrainin dreams isnot restoredto its motion in every part alike; whereby it cometh to pass, that our thoughts appear like the stars between the flying clouds, not in the order which a man would choose to observe them, but as the uncertain flight of broken clouds permits.
Fiction defined.
4. As when thewater, or any liquid thing moved at once bydiversmovents, receivethonemotion compounded of them all; so also thebrainor spirit therein, having been stirred bydiversobjects, composeth an imagination ofdiversconceptions that appeared single to the sense. As for example, the sense sheweth at one time the figure of amountain, and at another time the colour ofgold; but the imagination afterwards hath them both at once in agolden mountain. From the same cause it is, there appear unto uscastlesin theair,chimeras, and other monsters which arenotinrerum natura,buthave been conceived by the sense in pieces at several times. And this composition is that which we commonly callfictionof the mind.
Phantasms defined.
5. There is yet another kind of imagination, which forclearness contendethwithsense, as well as adream; and that is, when theactionof sense hath beenlongorvehement: and the experience thereof is more frequent in the sense of seeing, than the rest. An example whereof is, theimageremaining before theeyeafter looking upon thesun. Also, those little images that appear beforethe eyes in thedark(whereof I think every man hath experience, but they most of all, who aretimorousor superstitious) are examples of the same. And these, for distinction-sake, may be calledphantasms.
Remembrance defined.
6. By thesenses, which are numbered according to theorgansto befive, we take notice (as hath been said already) of the objectswithoutus; and thatnoticeis ourconceptionthereof: but we takenoticealso some way or otherof our conceptions: for when the conception of the same thing comethagain, we take notice that it isagain; that is to say, that we have had the same conceptionbefore; which is as much as to imagine a thingpast; which is impossible to thesense, which is only of thingspresent. This therefore may be accounted asixth sense, butinternal, (notexternal, as the rest) and is commonly calledremembrance.
Wherein remembrance consisteth.
7. For themannerby which we take notice of a conceptionpast, we are to remember, that in thedefinitionofimagination, it is said to be a conception bylittleandlittle decaying, or growing moreobscure. Anobscureconception is that which representeth thewhole objecttogether, butnoneof thesmaller partsby themselves; and asmoreorfewerparts be represented, so is the conception or representation said to bemoreorless clear. Seeing then theconception, which when it wasfirstproduced by sense, wasclear, and represented thepartsof the objectdistinctly; and when it comethagainisobscure, we findmissingsomewhat that we expected; by which we judge itpastanddecayed. For example, a man that is present in a foreigncity, seeth not onlywholestreets, but canalso distinguish particularhouses, andpartsof houses; but departed thence, he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his mind as he did, somehouseor turning escaping him; yet is this toremember: whenafterwardsthere escape himmoreparticulars, this is also toremember, butnotso well. In process of time, theimageof the cityreturnethbut as amassof buildingonly, which isalmostto haveforgottenit. Seeing then remembrance ismoreorless, as we find more or lessobscurity, why may not we well thinkremembranceto be nothing else but themissing of parts, which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a conception of the whole? To see at a great distance of place, and to remember at a great distance of time, is to have like conceptions of the thing: for there wanteth distinction of parts in both; the one conception being weak by operation at distance, the other by decay.
Why in a dream a man never thinks he dreams.
8. And from this that hath been said, there followeth, that a man cannever knowhedreameth; hemaydream hedoubteth, whether it be a dream or no: but the clearness of the imagination representeth every thing with as many parts as doth sense itself, and consequently, he can take notice of nothing but as present; whereas to think he dreameth, is to think those his conceptions, that is to say dreams, obscurer than they were in the sense: so that he must think them both as clear, and not as clear as sense; which is impossible.
Why few things seem strange in dreams.
9. From the same ground it proceedeth, that menwonder notin their dreams at place and persons, as they would do waking: for waking, a man would think it strange to be in a place wherehe never was before, and remember nothing of how he came there; but in a dream, there cometh little of that kind into consideration. Theclearnessof conception in a dream, taketh awaydistrust, unless thestrangenessbeexcessive, as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt, and then most commonly hewaketh.
That a dream may be taken for reality and vision.
10. Nor is itimpossiblefor a man to be so far deceived, as when his dream ispast, to think it real: for if he dream of such things as are ordinarily in his mind, and in such order as he useth to do waking, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the place where he findeth himself when he awaketh; all which may happen: I know no κριτήριον or mark by which he can discern whether it were a dream or not, and therefore do the less wonder to hear a man sometimes to tell his dream for a truth, or to take it for a vision.
1.Discourse.2.The cause of coherence of thoughts.3.Ranging.4.Sagacity.5.Reminiscence.6.Experience.7.Expectation.8.Conjecture.9.Signs.10.Prudence.11.Caveats of concluding from experience.
Discourse.
1. Thesuccessionof conceptions in the mind, series or consequence of one after another, may becasualand incoherent, as in dreams for the most part; and it may beorderly, as when the former thought introduceth the latter; and this isdiscourseof the mind. But because the word discourse is commonly taken for thecoherenceand consequence of words, I will, to avoid equivocation, call itdiscursion.
The cause of coherence of thoughts.
2. Thecauseof thecoherenceor consequence of one conception to another, is their firstcoherenceor consequence at thattimewhen they are produced by sense: as for example, from St. Andrew the mind runneth to St. Peter, because their names are read together; from St. Peter to astone, for the same cause; fromstonetofoundation, because we see them together; and for the same cause, from foundation tochurch, and from church topeople, and from people totumult: and according to this example, the mind may run almost from anything to anything. But as in thesensethe conception of cause and effect may succeed one another; so may they after sense in theimagination: and for the most part they do so; thecausewhereof is theappetiteof them, who, having a conception of theend, have next unto it a conception of the nextmeansto that end: as, when a man, from a thought ofhonourto which he hath an appetite, cometh to the thought ofwisdom, which is the next means thereunto; and from thence to the thought ofstudy, which is the next means to wisdom.
Ranging.
3. To omit that kind of discursion by which we proceed from anything to anything, there are of theotherkinddiverssorts: as first, in thesensesthere are certain coherences of conceptions, which we may callranging; examples whereof are; a man casteth hiseyeupon theground, to look about for somesmallthing lost; thehoundscasting about at a fault in hunting; and therangingof spaniels: and herein we take a beginning arbitrary.
Sagacity.
4. Another sort of discursion is, when theappetitegiveth a man his beginning, as in the examplebefore, where honour to which a man hath appetite, maketh him think upon the next means of attaining it, and that again of the next, &c. And this the Latins callsagacitas, and we may callhuntingortracing, as dogs trace beasts by the smell, and men hunt them by their footsteps; or as men hunt after riches, place, or knowledge.
Reminiscence.
5. There is yet another kind of discursion beginning with the appetite torecoversomething lost, proceeding from thepresent backward, from thought of the place where wemissat, to the thought of the place from whence we camelast; and from the thought of that, to the thought of a placebefore, till we have in our mind some place, wherein we had the thing we miss: and this is calledreminiscence.
Experience.
6. Theremembranceof succession of one thing to another, that is, of what wasantecedent, and whatconsequent, and whatconcomitant, is called anexperiment; whether the same be made by usvoluntarily, as when a man putteth any thing into the fire, to see what effect the fire will produce upon it: ornotmade by us, as when we remember a fair morning after a red evening. To have had manyexperiments, is that we callexperience, which is nothing else butremembranceof what antecedents have been followed by what consequents.
Expectation.
7. No man can have in his mind a conception of thefuture, for the future isnot yet: but of our conceptions of thepast, we make afuture; or rather, callpast,futurerelatively. Thus after a man hath been accustomed to see like antecedents followed by like consequents, whensoever he seeththe like come to pass to any thing he had seen before, he looks there should follow it the same that followed then: as for example, because a man hath often seen offences followed by punishment, when he seeth an offence in present, he thinketh punishment to be consequent thereto; but consequent unto that which is present, men call future; and thus we makeremembranceto be theprevisionof things to come, orexpectationor presumption of the future.
Conjecture.
8. In the same manner, if a man seeth in present that which he hath seen before, he thinks that that which was antecedent to that which he saw before, is also antecedent to that he presently seeth: as for example, he that hath seen the ashes remain after the fire, and now again seeth ashes, concludeth again there hath been fire: and this is called againconjectureof the past, or presumption of the fact.
Signs.
9. When a man hathso oftenobserved like antecedents to be followed by like consequents, thatwhensoeverhe seeth the antecedent, he looketh again for the consequent; or when he seeth the consequent, maketh account there hath been the like antecedent; then he calleth both the antecedent and the consequent,signsone of another, as clouds are signs of rain to come, and rain of clouds past.
Prudence.
10. This taking of signs byexperience, is that wherein men do ordinarily think, the difference stands between man and man inwisdom, by which they commonly understand a man’s whole ability orpower cognitive; but this is anerror: for the signs are butconjectural; and according as theyhave often or seldom failed, so theirassuranceis more or less; butnever fullandevident: for though a man have always seen the day and night to follow one another hitherto; yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so eternally:experience concludeth nothing universally. If the signs hit twenty times for one missing, a man may lay a wager of twenty to one of the event; but may not conclude it for a truth. But by this it is plain, that they shallconjecture best, that havemost experience, because they have most signs to conjecture by: which is the reasonold menaremore prudent, that is, conjecture better,cæteris paribus, than young: for, being old, they remember more; and experience is but remembrance. Andmenofquickimagination,cæteris paribus, are moreprudentthan those whose imaginations are slow: for they observemoreinlesstime. Prudence is nothing but conjecture from experience, or taking of signs from experience warily, that is, that the experiments from which he taketh such signs be all remembered; for else the cases are not alike that seem so.
Caveats of concluding from experience.
11. As in conjecture concerning things past and future, it is prudence to conclude from experience, what is like to come to pass, or to have passed already; so it is an error to conclude from it, thatit isso or socalled; that is to say, we cannot from experience conclude, that any thing is to be calledjustorunjust,trueorfalse, or any propositionuniversalwhatsoever, except it be from remembrance of the use of names imposed arbitrarily by men: for example, to have heard a sentence given in the like case, the like sentence a thousandtimes is not enough to conclude that the sentence is just; though most men have no other means to conclude by: but it isnecessary, for the drawing of such conclusion, totraceandfind out, by many experiences, what men do mean by calling things just and unjust. Further, there is anothercaveatto be taken in concluding by experience, from thetenth sectionof the second chapter; that is, that we conclude such things to be without, that are within us.
1.Of marks.2.Names or appellations.3.Names positive and privative.4.Advantage of names maketh us capable of science.5.Names universal and singular.6.Universals not inrerum natura.7.Equivocal names.8.Understanding.9.Affirmation, negation, proposition.10.Truth, falsity.11.Ratiocination.12.According to reason, against reason.13.Names causes of knowledge, so of error.14.Translation of the discourse of the mind into the discourse of the tongue, and of the errors thence proceeding.
Of marks.
1. Seeing thesuccessionof conceptions in themindare caused, as hath been said before, by the succession theyhadone to another when they were produced by thesenses, and that there is no conception that hath not been produced immediately before or after innumerable others, by the innumerable acts of sense; it must needs follow, that oneconceptionfollowethnotanother, according to our election, and the need we have of them,butas itchancethus to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our mind. The experience we have hereof, is in such brute beasts, which, having the providence to hide the remains and superfluity oftheir meat, do nevertheless want the remembrance of the place where they hid it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger: but man, who in this point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the nature of beasts, hath observed and remembered the cause of this defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible mark, the which, when he seeth it again, may bring to his mind the thought he had when he set it up. Amarktherefore is asensible objectwhich a man erecteth voluntarily to himself, to the end torememberthereby somewhat past, when the same is objected to his sense again: as men that have passed by a rock at sea, set up some mark, thereby to remember their former danger, and avoid it.
Names or appellations.
2. In the number of thesemarks, are thosehuman voices, which we call thenamesor appellations of things sensible by the ear, by which we recall into our mind some conceptions of the things to which we gave those names or appellations; as the appellationwhitebringeth to remembrance the quality of such objects as produce that colour or conception in us. Anameor appellation therefore is thevoiceof a manarbitrary, imposed for amarkto bring into his mind some conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed.
Names positive and privative.
3. Things named, are either theobjectsthemselves, as a man; or theconceptionitself that we have of man, as shape and motion: or some privation, which is when we conceive that there is something which we conceive, not in him; as when we conceive he is not just, not finite, we give him the name of unjust, of infinite, which signify privationor defect; and to the privations themselves we give the names of injustice and infiniteness: so that here betwo sortsof names; one ofthings, in which we conceive something; or of the conceptions themselves, which are calledpositive: the other of things wherein we conceiveprivationor defect, and those names are calledprivative.
Advantage of names maketh us capable of science.
4. By the advantage ofnamesit is that we are capable ofscience, which beasts, for want of them are not; nor man, without the use of them: for as a beast misseth not one or two out of many her young ones, for want of those names of order, one, two, and three, and which we callnumber; so neither would a man, without repeating orally or mentally the words of number, know how many pieces of money or other things lie before him.
Names universal and singular.
5. Seeing there bemanyconceptions ofoneand the same thing, and foreveryconception we give it aseveralname; it followeth that for one and the same thing, we have many names or attributes; as to the same man we give the appellations ofjust,valiant, &c. for diversvirtues; ofstrong,comely, &c. for diversqualitiesof thebody. And again, because from divers things we receive like conceptions, many things must needs have the same appellation: as to all things wesee, we give the same name ofvisible; and to all things wesee moveable, we give the appellation ofmoveable: and those names we give tomany, are calleduniversalto them all; as the name of man to every particular of mankind: such appellation as we give tooneonly thing, we callindividual, or singular; as Socrates, and other proper names: or, by circumlocution, he that writ theIliads, for Homer.
Universals not inrerum natura.
6. The universality ofone nameto many things, hath been the cause that men think thethingsare themselves universal; and so seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet something else that we callman, viz.man in general, deceiving themselves, by taking the universal, or general appellation, for the thing it signifieth: for if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general; he meaneth no more, but that the painter should choose what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be, none of which areuniversal. But when he would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chooseth. It is plain therefore, that there isnothing universalbutnames; which are therefore calledindefinite; because we limit them not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer: whereas a singular name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it signifieth; as when we say, this man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper name, or by some such other way.
Equivocal names.
7. The appellations that beuniversal, and common to many things, arenotalways given to all theparticulars, (as they ought to be) for like conceptions, and like considerations in them all; which is the cause that many of them arenotofconstantsignification, but bring into our mind other thoughts than those for which they were ordained, and these are called equivocal. As for example, the word faith signifieth the same with belief;sometimes it signifieth particularly that belief which maketh a Christian; and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a promise. Also allmetaphorsare by professionequivocal: and there is scarce any word that is not madeequivocalby divers contextures of speech, or by diversity of pronunciation and gesture.
Understanding.
8. Thisequivocationof names maketh itdifficultto recover those conceptions for which the name was ordained; and that not only in the language of other men, wherein we are to consider thedrift, andoccasion, andcontextureof the speech, as well as thewordsthemselves; but also in our discourse, which being derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth unto us not our own conceptions. It is therefore a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of language, to deliver himself fromequivocation, and to find out the true meaning of what is said: and this is it we callunderstanding.
Affirmation, negation, proposition.
9. Of twoappellations, by the help of this little verbis, or something equivalent, we make anaffirmationornegation, either of which in the Schools we call also aproposition, and consisteth of two appellations joined together by the said verbis: as for example, man is a living creature; or thus, man is not righteous: whereof the former is called anaffirmation, because the appellation, living creature, ispositive; the latter anegative, because not righteous isprivative.
Truth, falsity.
10. Inevery proposition, be it affirmative or negative, the latter appellation either comprehendeth the former, as in this proposition, charity is a virtue,the name of virtue comprehendeth the name of charity, and many other virtues beside; and then is the proposition said to betrue, ortruth: for,truth, and atrue proposition, is all one. Orelsethelatterappellation comprehendethnotthe former; as in this proposition, every man is just; the name of just comprehendeth not every man; for unjust is the name of the far greater part of men: and the proposition is said to befalse, or falsity:falsityand afalse propositionbeing also the same thing.
Ratiocination.
11. In what manner of two propositions, whetherbothaffirmative, oroneaffirmative, theothernegative, is made asyllogism, I forbear to write. All this that hath been said of names or propositions, thoughnecessary, is butdrydiscourse: and this place is not for the whole art of logic, which if I enter further into, I ought to pursue: besides, it is not needful; for there be few men which have not so much natural logic, as thereby to discern well enough, whether any conclusion I shall make in this discourse hereafter, be well or ill collected: only thus much I say in this place, thatmaking of syllogismsis that we callratiocinationorreasoning.
According to reason, against reason.
12. Now when a manreasonethfromprinciplesthat arefoundindubitable by experience, all deceptions of sense and equivocation of words avoided, the conclusion he maketh is said to beaccording to right reason: but when from his conclusion a man may, by good ratiocination, derive that which iscontradictoryto any evident truth whatsoever, then he is said to have concludedagainst reason: and such a conclusion is calledabsurdity.
Names causes of knowledge, so of error.
13. As theinventionofnameshath beennecessaryfor the drawing menout ofignorance, by calling to their remembrance the necessarycoherenceof one conception to another; so also hath it on the other side precipitated men intoerror: insomuch, that whereas by the benefit ofwordsand ratiocination they exceedbrute beastsin knowledge, and the commodities that accompany the same; so they exceed them also inerror: fortrueandfalseare things not incident to beasts, because they adhere not to propositions and language; nor have they ratiocination, whereby to multiply one untruth by another, as men have.
Translation of the discourse of the mind into the discourse of the tongue, and of the errors thence proceeding.
14. It is thenaturealmost of everycorporalthing, beingoften movedin one and the same manner, to receive continually agreaterandgreater easinessand aptitude to thesamemotion, insomuch as in time the same becometh sohabitual, that, tobegetit, there needs no more than tobeginit. Thepassionsof man, as they are the beginning ofvoluntarymotions; so are they the beginning ofspeech, which is the motion of the tongue. And men desiring to shew others the knowledge, opinions, conceptions, and passions which are in themselves, and to that end having inventedlanguage, have by that means transferred all thatdiscursionof theirmindmentioned in the former chapter, by themotionof theirtongues, intodiscourseofwords: andrationow is butoratio, for the most part, wherein custom hath so great a power, that the mind suggesteth only the first word; the rest followhabitually, and are not followed by the mind; as it is with beggars, when they say theirpaternoster, putting together such words, and in suchmanner, as in their education they have learned from their nurses, from their companies, or from their teachers, havingno imagesorconceptionsin their mind, answering to the words they speak: and as they have learned themselves, so they teach posterity. Now, if we consider the power of thosedeceptionsof the sense, mentioned chapterII.section 10, and also howunconstantlynames have been settled, and how subject they are toequivocation, and howdiversifiedbypassion, (scarce two men agreeing what is to be called good, and what evil; what liberality, what prodigality; what valour, what temerity) and how subject men are to paralogism or fallacy in reasoning, I may in a manner conclude, that it is impossible torectifyso many errors of any one man, as must needs proceed from those causes, without beginninganewfrom the very first grounds of all our knowledge and sense; and instead of books, reading over orderly one’s own conceptions: in which meaning, I takenoscete ipsumte ipsumfor a precept worthy the reputation it hath gotten.
1.Of the two kinds of knowledge.2.Truth and evidence necessary to knowledge.3.Evidence defined.4.Science defined.5.Supposition defined.6.Opinion defined.7.Belief defined.8.Conscience defined.9.Belief, in some cases, no less from doubt than knowledge.
Of the two kinds of knowledge.
1. There is a story somewhere, of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of blindness, wherewith he was born, by St. Alban or other Saints, at the town of St. Alban’s; and that theDuke of Gloucester being there, to be satisfied of the truth of the miracle, asked the man, What colour is this? who, by answering, it was green, discovered himself, and was punished for a counterfeit: for though by his sight newly received he might distinguish between green, and red, and all other colours, as well as any that should interrogate him, yet he could not possibly know at first sight which of them was called green, or red, or by any other name. By this we may understand, there betwo kindsof knowledge, whereof theoneis nothing else butsense, or knowledgeoriginal, as I have said in the beginning of the second chapter, andremembranceof the same; theotheris calledscienceor knowledge of thetruth of propositions, and how things are called, and is derived fromunderstanding. Both of these sorts are butexperience; the former being the experience of the effects of things that work upon us fromwithout; and the latter experience men have from the proper use ofnamesin language: and all experience being, as I have said, but remembrance, all knowledge is remembrance: and of theformer, the register we keep in books, is calledhistory; but the registers of thelatterare called thesciences.
Truth and evidence necessary to knowledge.
2. There aretwo thingsnecessarily implied in this wordknowledge; the one istruth, the otherevidence; for what is not truth, can never be known. For, let a man say he knoweth a thing never so well, if the same shall afterwards appear false, he is driven to confession, that it was not knowledge, but opinion. Likewise, if the truth be not evident, though a man holdeth it, yet is his knowledge thereof no more than theirs who holdthe contrary: for if truth were enough to make it knowledge, all truth were known; which is not so.
Evidence defined.
3. Whattruthis, hath been defined in the precedent chapter; whatevidenceis, Inowset down: and it is the concomitance of a man’sconceptionwith thewordsthat signify such conception in the act of ratiocination: for when a man reasoneth with his lips only, to which the mind suggesteth only the beginning, and followeth not the words of his mouth with the conceptions of his mind, out of custom of so speaking; though he begin his ratiocination with true propositions, and proceed with certain syllogisms, and thereby make always true conclusions; yet are not his conclusionsevidentto him, for want of theconcomitance of conceptionwith his words: for if the words alone were sufficient, aparrotmight be taught as well to know truth, as to speak it. Evidence is to truth, as the sap to the tree, which, so far as it creepeth along with the body and branches, keepeth them alive; where it forsaketh them, they die: for this evidence, which is meaning with our words, is the life of truth.
Science defined.
4. Knowledge thereof, which we callscience, I define to beevidence of truth, from some beginning or principle ofsense: for the truth of a proposition is never evident, until we conceive the meaning of the words or terms whereof it consisteth, which are always conceptions of the mind: nor can we remember those conceptions, without the thing that produced the same by our senses. Thefirstprinciple of knowledge is, that we have such and suchconceptions; thesecond, that we have thus and thusnamedthe things whereof they are conceptions; thethirdis, that we havejoinedthosenamesin such manner as to make true propositions; thefourthand last is, that we havejoinedthosepropositionsin such manner as they be concluding, and the truth of the conclusion said to be known. And of these two kinds of knowledge, whereof the former isexperience of fact, and the latterevidence of truth; as theformer, if it be great, is calledprudence; so thelatter, if it be much, hath usually been called, both by ancient and modern writers,sapienceor wisdom: and of thislatter,manonly is capable; of theformer,brute beastsalso participate.