Supposition defined.
5. A proposition is said to besupposed, when, beingnot evident, it is neverthelessadmitted for a time, to the end, that, joining to it other propositions, we mayconcludesomething; and toproceedfrom conclusion to conclusion, for atrialwhether the same will lead us into anyabsurdor impossible conclusion; which if itdo, then we know such supposition to have been false.
Opinion defined.
6. But if running throughmanyconclusions, we come tononethat areabsurd, then we think the propositionprobable; likewise we think probable whatsoever proposition weadmitfor truth by error of reasoning, or from trusting to other men: and all such propositions as are admitted bytrustor error, we are not said toknow, but tothinkthem to be true; and the admittance of them is calledopinion.
Belief defined.
7. And particularly, when the opinion is admitted out oftrusttoothermen, they are said tobelieveit; and their admittance of it is calledbelief, and sometimesfaith.
Conscience defined.
8. It is eitherscienceoropinionwhich we commonly mean by the wordconscience: for men saythat such and such a thing is true in or upon their conscience; which theyneverdo, when they think itdoubtful; and therefore theyknow, orthinkthey know it to be true. But men, when they say things upon their conscience, are not therefore presumed certainly to know the truth of what they say; it remaineth then, that that word is used by them that have anopinion,notonly of thetruthof the thing,butalso of theirknowledgeof it, to which thetruthof the proposition is consequent.ConscienceI therefore define to beopinion of evidence.
Belief, in some cases, no less from doubt than knowledge.
9.Belief, which is the admitting of propositions upontrust, in many cases is no less free fromdoubt, than perfect and manifestknowledge: for as there is nothing whereof there is not some cause; so, when there is doubt, there must be some cause thereof conceived. Now there be many things which we receive fromreport of others, of which it is impossible to imagine any cause ofdoubt: for what can be opposed against the consent of all men, in things they can know, and have no cause to report otherwise than they are, such as is a great part of ourhistories, unless a man would say that all the world hadconspiredto deceive him.
And thus much ofsense,imagination,discursion,ratiocination, andknowledge, which are the acts of ourpower cognitive, orconceptive. That power of themindwhich we callmotive, differeth from the powermotiveof thebody; for the powermotiveof thebodyis that by which itmoveth otherbodies, and we callstrength: but the power motive of themind, is that by which the mind givethanimal motionto thatbodywherein it existeth; the acts hereof are ouraffectionsandpassions, of which I am to speak in general.
1.Of delight, pain, love, hatred.2.Appetite, aversion, fear.3.Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude.4.End, fruition.5.Profitable, use, vain.6.Felicity.7.Good and evil mixed.8.Sensual delight, and pain; joy and grief.
Of delight, pain, love, hatred.
1. In theeighthsection of the second chapter is shewed,that conceptionsandapparitionsare nothingreally, butmotionin some internal substance of thehead; which motionnot stoppingthere, but proceeding to theheart, of necessity must there eitherhelporhinderthe motion which is calledvital; when ithelpeth, it is calleddelight,contentment, orpleasure, which is nothing really but motion about the heart, as conception is nothing but motion in the head: and theobjectsthat cause it are calledpleasantordelightful, or by some name equivalent; the Latins havejucundum,a juvando, from helping; and the same delight, with reference to the object, is calledlove: but when such motionweakenethor hindereth the vital motion, then it is calledpain; and in relation to that which causeth it, hatred, which the Latins express sometimes byodium, and sometimes bytædium.
Appetite, aversion, fear.
2. This motion, in which consistethpleasureorpain, is also asolicitationor provocation either to drawnearto the thing that pleaseth, or toretirefrom the thing that displeaseth; and this solicitation is theendeavouror internal beginning ofanimalmotion, which when the objectdelighteth, is calledappetite; when itdispleaseth, it is calledaversion, in respect of the displeasurepresent;but in respect of the displeasureexpected,fear. So thatpleasure,love, andappetite, which is also called desire, aredivers namesfor divers considerations of thesame thing.
Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude.
3. Every man, for his own part, calleth that whichpleaseth, and is delightful to himself,good; and thatevilwhichdispleasethhim: insomuch that while every mandifferethfrom another inconstitution, they differ also from one another concerning the common distinction of good and evil. Nor is there any such thing as absolute goodness, considered without relation: for even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, ishis goodness to us. And as we callgoodandevilthethingsthat please and displease; so call wegoodnessandbadness, thequalitiesor powers whereby they do it: and the signs of that goodness are called by the Latins in one wordpulchritudo, and the signs of evil,turpitudo; to which we have no words precisely answerable.
As all conceptions we have immediately by thesense, are,delight, orpain, orappetite, orfear; so are all theimaginationsafter sense. But as they are weaker imaginations, so are they also weaker pleasures, or weaker pain.
End, fruition.
4. Asappetiteis the beginning ofanimalmotion towards something that pleaseth us; so is theattainingthereof, theendof that motion, which we also call thescope, and aim, and final cause of the same: and when we attain that end, the delight we have thereby is called thefruition: so thatbonumandfinisare different names, but for different considerations of the same thing.
Profitable, use, vain.
5. And ofends, some of them are calledpropinqui,that is, near at hand; othersremoti, far off: but when the ends that be nearer attaining, be compared with those that be further off, they are called not ends, butmeans, and thewayto those. But for anutmostend, in which the ancientphilosophershave placedfelicity, and disputed much concerning the way thereto, there is no such thing in this world, nor way to it, more than to Utopia: for while we live, we have desires, and desire presupposeth a further end. Those things which please us, as the way ormeansto a further end, we callprofitable; and thefruitionof them,use; and those things that profit not,vain.
Felicity.
6. Seeing alldelightisappetite, and presupposeth afurtherend, there can beno contentmentbut inproceeding: and therefore we are not to marvel, when we see, that as men attain to more riches, honour, or other power; so their appetite continually groweth more and more; and when they are come to the utmost degree of some kind of power, they pursue some other, as long as in any kind they think themselves behind any other: of those therefore that have attained to the highest degree of honour and riches, some have affected mastery in some art; as Nero in music and poetry, Commodus in the art of a gladiator; and such as affect not some such thing, must find diversion and recreation of their thoughts in the contention either of play or business: and men justly complain of a great grief, that they know not what to do.Felicity, therefore, by which we mean continual delight, consistethnotinhavingprospered, but inprospering.
Good and evil mixed.
7. There are few things in this world, buteitherhavemixtureof good and evil,orthere is a chain of them so necessarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other: as for example, the pleasures of sin, and the bitterness of punishment, are inseparable; as is also labour and honour, for the most part. Now when in thewhole chain, thegreater partis good, thewholeis calledgood; and when theevilover-weigheth, thewholeis calledevil.
Sensual delight, and pain; joy and grief.
8. There are two sorts of pleasure, whereof theoneseemeth to affect thecorporealorgan of the sense, and that I callsensual; thegreatestpart whereof, is that by which we are invited to give continuance to ourspecies; and thenext, by which a man is invited to meat, for the preservation of hisindividualperson: theother sortof delight is not particular to any part of the body, and is called the delight of themind, and is that which we calljoy. Likewise ofpains, some affect thebody, and are therefore called thepainsof the body; and somenot, and those are calledgrief.
1, 2.Wherein consist the pleasures of sense.3, 4.Of the imagination, or conception of power in man.5.Honour, honourable, worth.6.Signs of honour.7.Reverence.8.Passions.
Wherein consist the pleasures of sense.
1. Having in thefirst sectionof the precedent chapter presupposed, that motion andagitation of the brainwhich we call conception, to be continuedto the heart, and there to be calledpassion; I have therefore obliged myself, as far forth as I am able, to search out and declarefrom whatconceptionproceedethevery one of thosepassionswhich we commonly take notice of: for, seeing the things that please and displease, are innumerable, and work innumerable ways, men have not taken notice but of a very few, which also are many of them without name.
2. And first, we are to consider, that of conceptions there arethree sorts, whereof one is of that which ispresent, which issense; another, of that which ispast, which isremembrance; and the third, of that which isfuture, which we callexpectation: all which have been manifestly declared in the second and third chapters; and every of these conceptions ispleasureorpainpresent. And first for the pleasures of thebodywhich affect the sense oftouchandtaste, as far forth as they beorganical, their conceptions aresense: so also is the pleasure of allexonerationsof nature: all which passions I have before named,sensual pleasures; and their contrary,sensual pains: to which also may be added the pleasures and displeasures ofodours, if any of them shall be found organical, which for the most part they are not, as appeareth by this experience which every man hath, that the same smells, when they seem to proceed from others, displease, though they proceed from ourselves; but when we think they proceed from ourselves, they displease not, though they come from others: the displeasure of this is a conception of hurt thereby from those odours, as being unwholesome, and is therefore a conception of evil to come, and not present. Concerning the delight ofhearing, it is diverse, and the organ itself not affected thereby:simple soundsplease byequality, as the sound of a bell or lute: insomuch as it seems, anequality continued by the percussion of the object upon the ear, is pleasure; the contrary is calledharshness, such as is grating, and some other sounds, which do not always affect the body, but only sometime, and that with a kind of horror beginning at the teeth.Harmony, or many sounds together agreeing, please by the same reason as theunison, which is the sound of equal strings equally stretched. Sounds that differ in anyheight, please byinequality and equality alternate, that is to say, the higher note striketh twice, for one stroke of the other, whereby they strike together every second time; as is well proved by Galileo, in the first dialogue concerning local motion: where he also sheweth, that two sounds differing afifth, delight the ear by anequalityof strikingafter two inequalities; for the higher note striketh the ear thrice, while the other strikes but twice. In like manner he sheweth wherein consisteth the pleasure of concord, and the displeasure of discord, in other difference of notes. There is yetanotherpleasure and displeasure of sounds, which consisteth inconsequence of one note after another, diversifiedboth byaccentandmeasure; whereof that which pleaseth is called anair; but for what reason one succession in tone and measure is a more pleasing air than another, I confess I know not; but I conjecture the reason to be, for that some of them imitate and revive some passion which otherwise we take no notice of, and the other not; forno air pleaseth but for a time, no more doth imitation. Also the pleasures of theeyeconsist in a certainequalityofcolour: forlight, the most glorious of all colours, is made byequaloperation of the object; whereascolourisperturbed, that is to say, unequal light, as hath been said, chapterII.section 8. And therefore colours, the more equality is in them, the more resplendent they are; and asharmonyis pleasure to theear, which consisteth ofdivers sounds; so perhaps may some mixture ofdivers coloursbeharmonyto theeye, more than another mixture. There is yet another delight by theear, which happeneth only to men of skill in music, which is of another nature, and not, as these, conception of the present, but rejoicing of their own skill; of which nature are the passions of which I am to speak next.
Of the imagination, or conception of power in man.
3. Conception of thefuture, is but asuppositionof thesame, proceeding fromremembranceof what is past; and we so farconceivethat anythingwill be hereafter, as weknowthere issomething at the presentthat hath power to produce it: and that anything hath power now to produce another thing hereafter, we cannot conceive, but by remembrance that it hath produced the like heretofore. Wherefore all conception of future, is conception of power able to produce something. Whosoever therefore expecteth pleasure to come, must conceive withal some power in himself by which the same may be attained. And because the passions, whereof I am to speak next, consist in conception of the future, that is to say, in conception of power past, and the act to come; before I go any further, I must in the next place speak somewhat concerning this power.
4. By this power I mean the same with the faculties of thebody,nutritive,generative,motive, and of themind,knowledge; and besides these,suchfurtherpower as by them is acquired,viz.riches,placeof authority,friendshiporfavour, andgood fortune;whichlast is really nothing else but the favour of God Almighty. Thecontrariesof these areimpotencies,infirmities, ordefectsof the said powers respectively. And because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another,powersimply is no more, but theexcessof the power of one above that of another: for equal powers opposed, destroy one another; and such their opposition is called contention.
Honour, honourable, worth.
5.signsby which we know our ownpower, are thoseactionswhich proceed from the same; and the signs by whichother menknow it, are suchactions,gesture,countenanceandspeech, as usually such powers produce: and theacknowledgmentof power is calledhonour; and to honour a man inwardly, is to conceive or acknowledge that that man hath the odds or excess of that power above him with whom he contendeth or compareth himself. And honourable are those signs for which one man acknowledgeth power or excess above his concurrent in another: as for example,beautyof person, consisting in a lively aspect of the countenance, and othersignsofnatural heat, are honourable, being signs precedent of powergenerative, and much issue; as also, general reputation among those of the other sex, because signs consequent of the same. And actions proceeding fromstrength of body, and open force, are honourable, as signs consequent of powermotive, such as are victory in battle or duel;a d’avoir tué son homme. Also to adventure upongreat exploits and danger, as being a sign consequent of opinion of our own strength, and that opinion a sign of the strength itself. And to teach or persuade are honourable, because they be signs ofknowledge. And riches are honourable; as signs of the power that acquired them: and gifts, cost, and magnificence of houses, apparel, and the like, are honourable, as signs of riches. Andnobilityis honourable by reflection, as a sign of power in the ancestors: andauthority, because a sign of the strength, wisdom, favour or riches by which it is attained. Andgood fortuneor casual prosperity is honourable, because a sign of the favour of God, to whom is to be ascribed all that cometh to us by fortune, no less than that we attain unto by industry. And the contraries and defects of these signs are dishonourable; and according to the signs of honour and dishonour, so we estimate and make the value or worth of a man: for so much worth is every thing, as a man will give for the use of all it can do.
Signs of honour.
6. Thesignsofhonourare those by which we perceive that one man acknowledgeth the power and worth of another; such as these, topraise, tomagnify, tobless, to call happy, to pray or supplicate to, to thank, to offer unto or present, to obey, to hearken unto with attention, to speak to with consideration, to approach unto in decent manner, to keep distance from, to give way to, and the like, which are the honour the inferior giveth to the superior.
But thesigns of honourfrom the superior to the inferior, are such as these; topraiseor prefer him before his concurrent, to hear morewillingly, to speak to him more familiarly, to admit him nearer, to employ him rather, to ask his advice rather, to take his opinions, and to give himany gifts rather than money; or if money, so much as maynotimply hisneedof alittle: for need of a little is greater poverty than need of much. And this is enough for examples of the signs of honour and power.
Reverence.
7.Reverenceis the conception we have concerning another, that he hath thepowerto do unto us bothgoodandhurt, butnotthewillto do ushurt.
Passions.
8. In the pleasure men have, or displeasure from the signs of honour or dishonour done unto them, consisteth the nature of the passions, whereof we are to speak in the next chapter.
1.Glory aspiring, false glory, vain glory.2.Humility and dejection.3.Shame.4.Courage.5.Anger.6.Revengefulness.7.Repentance.8.Hope, despair, diffidence.9.Trust.10.Pity and hardness of heart.11.Indignation.12.Emulation and envy.13.Laughter.14.Weeping.15.Lust.16.Love.17.Charity.18.Admiration and curiosity.19.Of the passion of them that flock to see danger.20.Of magnanimity and pusillanimity.21.A view of the passions represented in a race.
Glory aspiring, false glory, vain glory.
1. Glory, or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is the passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of ourown powerabove the power of him that contendeth with us; thesignswhereof, besides those in the countenance, and other gestures of the body which cannot be described, are,ostentationin words, andinsolencyin actions: and this passion, of themwhom it displeaseth, is calledpride; by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed ajust valuationof himself. This imagination of our power or worth, may be from an assured and certainexperienceof our own actions; and then is that gloryjust, and well grounded, and begetteth an opinion ofincreasingthe same by other actions to follow; in which consisteth the appetite which we callaspiring, or proceeding from one degree of power to another. The same passion may proceednotfrom anyconscienceof our own actions, but from fame and trust ofothers, whereby one may think well of himself, and yet be deceived; and this isfalse glory, and the aspiring consequent thereto procureth ill success. Further, thefiction, which is also imagination, of actions done by ourselves, which never were done, isglorying; but because it begetteth no appetite nor endeavour to any further attempt, it is merelyvainand unprofitable; as when a man imagineth himself to do the actions whereof he readeth in someromance, or to be like unto some other man whose acts he admireth: and this is calledvain glory; and is exemplified in the fable, by the fly sitting on the axletree, and saying to himself, What a dust do I make rise! The expression ofvain gloryis that wish, which some of the Schools mistaking for some appetite distinct from all the rest, have calledvelleity, making a new word, as they made a new passion which was not before.Signsofvain gloryin thegestureare,imitationof others, counterfeiting and usurping the signs of virtue they have not, affectation of fashions, captation of honour from their dreams, and other little stories of themselves,from their country, from their names, and from the like.
Humility and dejection.
2. The passioncontrary to glory, proceeding from apprehension of our own infirmity, is calledhumilityby those by whom it is approved; by the rest,dejectionand poorness: which conception may be well or ill grounded; if well, it produceth fear to attempt any thing rashly; if ill, it utterly cows a man, that he neither dares speak publicly, nor expect good success in any action.
Shame.
3. It happeneth sometimes, that he that hath agoodopinion of himself, and upon good ground, may nevertheless, by reason of thefrowardnesswhich that passion begetteth, discover in himself somedefector infirmity, the remembrance whereof dejecteth him; and this passion is calledshame; by which being cooled and checked in hisfrowardnessfrowardness, he is more wary for the time to come. This passion, as it is a sign ofinfirmity, which isdishonour; so also it is a sign ofknowledge, which ishonour. The sign of it isblushing, which appeareth less in men conscious of their own defect, because they less betray the infirmities they acknowledge.
Courage.
4.Courage, in alargesignification, is theabsenceoffearin the presence of any evil whatsoever: but in astrictand more common meaning, it iscontemptofwoundsanddeath, when they oppose a man in the way to his end.
Anger.
5.Angeror sudden courage is nothing but theappetiteor desire ofovercoming presentopposition. It hath been defined commonly to be grief proceeding from an opinion of contempt; which is confuted by the often experience which we haveof being moved to anger by things inanimate, and without sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us.
Revengefulness.
6.Revengefulnessis that passion which ariseth from an expectation orimaginationofmakinghim that hathhurtus,findhisown action hurtfulto himself, and toacknowledgethe same; and this is the height of revenge: for though it be not hard, by returning evil for evil, to make one’s adversary displeased with his own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult, that many a man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the death, but at the captivity or subjection of an enemy; which was well expressed in the exclamation of Tiberius Cæsar, concerning one, that, to frustrate his revenge, had killed himself in prison;Hath he escaped me?Tokill, is the aim of them thathate, toridthemselves out of fear:revengeaimeth attriumph, which over the dead is not.
Repentance.
7.Repentanceis the passion which proceedeth fromopinionor knowledge that theactionthey have done isout of the wayto theendthey would attain: the effect whereof is, to pursue that way no longer, but, by the consideration of the end, to direct themselves into a better. The first motion therefore in this passion isgrief; but the expectation or conception of returning again into the way, isjoy; and consequently, the passion ofrepentanceis compounded and allayed of both: but thepredominantisjoy; else were the whole grief, which cannot be, forasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the end, he conceiveth good, proceedeth with appetite; and appetite is joy, as hath been said, chapterVII.section 2.
Hope, despair, diffidence.
8.Hopeisexpectationofgoodto come, as fear is the expectation of evil: but when there be causes, some that make us expect good, and some that make us expect evil, alternately working in our mind; if the causes that make us expect good, be greater than those that make us expect evil, the whole passion is hope; if contrarily, the whole is fear. Absoluteprivationof hope isdespair, a degree whereof isdiffidence.
Trust.
9.Trustis a passion proceeding from thebelief ofhim from whom weexpectorhopefor good, sofreefromdoubtthat upon the same we pursue no other way to attain the same good; asdistrustor diffidence isdoubtthat maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other means. And that this is the meaning of the words trust and distrust, is manifest from this, that a man never provideth himself by a second way, but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold.
Pity and hardness of heart.
10.Pityisimaginationorfictionoffuturecalamity toourselves, proceeding from the sense ofanotherman’s calamity. But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more probability that the same may happen to us: for, the evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon ourselves, the pity is the less. And therefore men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of good, and therefore not worthy of calamity. Thence it is also, that men pity the vices of some persons at the first sight only, out of loveto their aspect. The contrary of pity ishardness of heart, proceeding either fromslownessof imagination, or some extreme greatopinionof their ownexemptionfrom the like calamity, or from hatred of all or most men.
Indignation.
11.Indignationis thatgriefwhich consisteth in the conception ofgood successhappening to them whom they thinkunworthythereof. Seeing therefore men think all those unworthy whom they hate, they think them not only unworthy of the good fortune they have, but also of their own virtues. And of all the passions of the mind, these two, indignation and pity, are most raised and increased by eloquence: for, theaggravationofthe calamity, andextenuationof thefault, augmentethpity; and theextenuationof theworthof the person, together with the magnifying of his success, which are the parts of an orator, are able to turn these two passions intofury.
Emulation and envy.
12.Emulationisgriefarising from seeingone’s self exceededor excelled by hisconcurrent, together withhopetoequalor exceed him in time to come, by his own ability. But,envyis the samegriefjoined withpleasureconceived in the imagination of someillfortune that may befall him.
Laughter.
13. There is a passion that hathno name; but the sign of it is that distortion of the countenance which we calllaughter, which is alwaysjoy: but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it consisteth inwit, or, as they call it, in thejest, experienceconfuteth: for men laugh at mischances and indecencies, wherein there lieth no wit nor jest at all. And forasmuch as the samething is no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual, whatsoever it be that moveth laughter, it must benewandunexpected. Men laugh often, especially such as are greedy of applause from every thing they do well, at their own actions performed never so little beyond their own expectations; as also at their ownjests: and in this case it is manifest, that the passion of laughter proceedeth from asudden conceptionof someabilityin himself that laugheth. Also men laugh at theinfirmitiesof others, by comparison wherewith their own abilities are set off and illustrated. Also men laugh atjests, thewitwhereof always consisteth in the elegantdiscoveringand conveying to our minds someabsurdityofanother: and in this case also the passion of laughter proceedeth from thesuddenimagination of our own odds and eminency: for what is else the recommending of ourselves to our own good opinion, by comparison with another man’s infirmity or absurdity? For when a jest is broken upon ourselves, or friends of whose dishonour we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else butsudden gloryarising from some suddenconceptionof someeminencyin ourselves, bycomparisonwith theinfirmityof others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance, except they bring with them any present dishonour. It is no wonder therefore that men take heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over. Laughterwithout offence, must be atabsurditiesand infirmitiesabstractedfrom persons, and when all thecompany may laugh together: for laughing to one’s-self putteth all the rest into jealousy and examination of themselves. Besides, it is vain glory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmity of another, sufficient matter for his triumph.
Weeping.
14. The passion opposite hereunto, whose signs are another distortion of the face with tears, calledweeping, is thesudden falling out withourselves, or sudden conception of defect; and thereforechildrenweep often; for seeing they think that every thing ought to be given them which they desire, of necessity every repulse must be a check of their expectation, and puts them in mind of their too much weakness to make themselves masters of all they look for. For the same causewomenare more apt to weep than men, as being not only more accustomed to have their wills, but also to measure their powers by the power and love of others that protect them. Men are apt to weep that prosecute revenge, when the revenge is suddenly stopped or frustrated by the repentance of their adversary; and such are the tears ofreconciliation. Also revengeful men are subject to this passion upon the beholding those men they pity, and suddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping in men proceedeth for the most part from the same cause it proceedeth from in women and children.
Lust.
15. The appetite which men calllust, and the fruition that appertaineth thereunto, is asensualpleasure, butnot onlythat; there is in it also a delight of the mind: for it consisteth of two appetites together, toplease, and tobe pleased; and the delight men take in delighting, is not sensual,but a pleasure or joy of the mind consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please. But the namelustis used where it is condemned; otherwise it is called by the general wordlove: for the passion is one and the same indefinite desire of different sex, as natural as hunger.
Love.
16. Oflove, by which is understood the joy man taketh in the fruition of anypresentgood, hath been already spoken of in thefirst section, chapterVII.under which is contained thelovemen bear to oneanother, or pleasure they take in one another’s company; and by which nature, men are said to be sociable. But there is another kind of love, which the Greeks call Ἔρως, and is that which we mean, when we say that a man is in love: forasmuch as this passion cannot be without diversity of sex, it cannot be denied but that itparticipatethof that indefinitelovementioned in the former section. But there is a great difference betwixt the desire of a manindefinite, and the same desirelimited ad hunc; and this is thatlovewhich is the great theme of poets: but notwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the wordneed: for it is a conception a man hath of his need ofthat one persondesired. The cause of this passion isnotalwaysnorfor the most partbeauty, or other quality in the beloved, unless there be withalhopein the person that loveth: which may be gathered from this, that in great difference of persons, thegreaterhave often fallen in love with themeaner; but not contrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have much better fortune in love, whose hopes are built upon somethingintheir person, than those that trust to theirexpressionsandservice; and they thatcare less, than they thatcare more: which not perceiving, many men cast away their services, as one arrow after another, till, in the end, together with their hopes, they lose their wits.
Charity.
17. There is yet another passion sometimes calledlove, but more properlygood willorcharity. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also toassistother men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consistethcharity. In which, first, is contained thatnatural affectionof parents to their children, which the Greeks call Στοργὴ, asalso, that affection wherewith men seek toassistthose that adhere unto them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits onstrangers, is not to be called charity, but eithercontract, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; orfear, which maketh them to purchase peace. The opinion of Plato concerning honourable love, delivered according to his custom in the person of Socrates, in the dialogue intituledConvivium, is this, that a man full and pregnant with wisdom and other virtues, naturally seeketh out some beautiful person, of age and capacity to conceive, in whom he may, without sensual respects, engender and produce the like. And this is theideaof the then notedloveof Socrates wise and continent, to Alcibiades young and beautiful: in which, love is not the sought honour, but the issue of his knowledge; contrary to the common love, to which though issue sometimes follows, yet men seek not that,but to please, and to be pleased. It should be therefore this charity, or desire to assist and advance others. But why then should the wise seek the ignorant, or be more charitable to the beautiful than to others? There is something in it savouring of the use of that time: in which matter though Socrates be acknowledged for continent, yet thecontinenthave the passion theycontain, asmuchand more than they thatsatiatethe appetite; which maketh me suspect thisplatoniclove for merely sensual; but with an honourable pretence for the old to haunt the company of the young and beautiful.