And that revenge ought to respect the future only.
10. And seeing the law of nature commandeth pardon, when there is repentance and caution for the future, it followeth, that the same law ordaineth,That no revenge be taken upon the consideration only of the offence past, but of the benefit to come; that is to say, that all revenge ought to tend to amendment, either of the person offending, or of others, by the example of his punishment; which is sufficiently apparent, in that the law of nature commandeth pardon, where the future time is secured. The same is also apparent by this, that revenge when it considereth the offence past, is nothing else, but present triumph and glory, and directeth to no end: and what is directed to no end, is therefore unprofitable; and consequentlythe triumph of revenge, is vain glory: and whatsoever is vain, is against reason; and to hurt one another without reason, is contrary to that, which by supposition is every man’s benefit, namely peace; and what is contrary to peace, is contrary to the law of nature.
That reproach and contempt declared is against the law of nature.
11. And because all signs which we shew to one another of hatred and contempt, provoke in the highest degree to quarrel and battle, (inasmuch as life itself, with the condition of enduring scorn, is not esteemed worth the enjoying, much less peace) it must necessarily be implied as a law of nature,That no man reproach, revile, deride, or any otherwise declare his hatred, contempt, or disesteem of any other. But this law is very little practised. For what is more ordinary than reproaches of those that are rich, towards them that are not? or of those that sit in place of judicature, towards those that are accused at the bar? although to grieve them in that manner, be no part of the punishment for their crime, nor contained in their office. But use hath prevailed, that what was lawful in the lord towards the servant whom he maintaineth, is also practised as lawful in the more mighty towards the less; though they contribute nothing towards their maintenance.
That indifference of commerce is of the law of nature.
12. It is also a law of nature,That one man allow commerce and traffic indifferently to one another. For he that alloweth that to one man, which he denieth to another, declareth his hatred to him, to whom he denieth. And to declare hatred is war. And upon this title was grounded the great war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. For would the Athenians havecondescended to suffer the Megareans, their neighbours, to traffic in their ports and markets, that war had not begun.
That messengers employed to procure or maintain peace, ought to be safe by the law of nature.
13. And this also is a law of nature,That all messengers of peace, and such as are employed to procure and maintain amity between man and man, may safely come and go. For seeing peace is the general law of nature, the means thereto, such as are these men, must in the same law be comprehended.
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1.A law of nature, that every man acknowledge other for his equal.2.Another, that men allowæqualia æqualibus.3.Another, that those things which cannot be divided, be used in common.4.Another, that things indivisible and incommunicable, be divided by lot.5.Natural lot, primogeniture, and first possession.6.That men submit to arbitration.7.Of an arbitrator.8.That no man press his counsel upon any man against his will.9.How to know suddenly what is the law of nature.10.That the law of nature taketh place after security from others to observe the same.11.The right of nature not to be taken away by custom, nor the law of nature abrogated by any act.12.Why the dictates of nature are called laws.13.Whatsoever is against conscience in a man that is his own judge, is against the law of nature.14.Ofmalum pœnæ, malum culpæ; virtue and vice.15.Aptitude to society fulfilleth the law of nature.
A law of nature, that every man acknowledge other for his equal.
1. The question, which is the better man, is determinable only in the estate of government and policy, though it be mistaken for a question of nature, not only by ignorant men, that think one man’s blood better than another’s by nature, but also by him, whose opinions are at this day, and in these parts, of greater authority than any otherhuman writings. For he putteth so much difference between the powers of men by nature, that he doubteth not to set down, as the ground of all his politics, that some men are by nature worthy to govern, and others by nature ought to serve. Which foundation hath not only weakened the whole frame of his politics, but hath also given men colour and pretences, whereby to disturb and hinder the peace of one another. For though there were such a difference of nature, that master and servant were not by consent of men, but by inherent virtue; yet who hath that eminency of virtue, above others, and who is so stupid, as not to govern himself, shall never be agreed upon amongst men, who do every one naturally think himself, as able, at the least, to govern another, as another to govern him. And when there was any contention between the finer and the courser wits, (as there hath been often in times of sedition and civil war) for the most part, these latter carried away the victory; and as long as men arrogate to themselves more honour than they give to others, it cannot be imagined, how they can possibly live in peace: and consequently we are to suppose, that for peace sake, nature hath ordained this law,That every man acknowledge other for his equal. And the breach of this law, is that we callpride.
Another, that men allowæqualia æqualibus.
2. As it was necessary that a man should not retain his right to every thing, so also was it, that he should retain his right to some things; to his own body, for example, the right of defending, whereof he could not transfer; to the use of fire, water, free air, and place to live in, and to all things necessary for life. Nor doth the law ofnature command any divesting of other rights, than of those only which cannot be retained without the loss of peace. Seeing then many rights are retained, when we enter into peace one with another, reason and the law of nature dictateth,Whatsoever right any man requireth to retain, he allow every other man to retain the same. For he that doth not so, alloweth not the equality mentioned in the former section. For there is no acknowledgment of worth, without attribution of the equality of benefit and respect. And this allowance ofæqualia æqualibus, is the same thing with the allowing ofproportionalia proportionalibus. For when a man alloweth to every man alike, the allowance he maketh, will be in the same proportion, in which are the numbers of men to whom they are made. And this is it men mean bydistributive justice, and is properly termedequity. The breach of the law is that which the Greeks call Πλεονεξία, which is commonly renderedcovetousness, but seemeth to be more precisely expressed by the wordencroaching.
Another, that those things which cannot be divided, be used in common.
3. If there pass no other covenant, the law of nature is,That such things as cannot be divided, be used in common, proportionably to the numbers of them that are to use the same, or without limitation, when the quantity thereof sufficeth. For first supposing the thing to be used in common, not sufficient for them that are to use it without limitation, if a few shall make more use thereof than the rest, that equality is not observed, which is required in the second section. And this is to be understood, as all the rest of the laws of nature, without any other covenant antecedent: for a manmay have given away his right of common, and so the case be altered.
Another, that things indivisible and incommunicable, be divided by lot.
4. In those things which neither can be divided, nor used in common, the rule of nature must needs be one of these,lot, oralternate use: for besides these two ways, there can no other equality be imagined; and for alternate use, he that beginneth, hath the advantage; and to reduce that advantage to equality, there is no other way but lot, in things, therefore indivisible and incommunicable, it is the law of nature,That the use be alternate, or the advantage given away by lot; because there is no other way of equality. And equality is the law of nature.
Natural lot, primogeniture, and first possession.
5. There be two sorts of lots; one arbitrary, made by men, and commonly known by the names oflot,chance,hazard, and the like; and there isnatural lot, such as isprimogeniture, which is no more but the chance, or lot, of being first born, which it seemeth they considered, that call inheritance by the name of κληρονομία, which signifiethdistributionby lot. Secondly,prima occupatio, first seizing, or finding of a thing, whereof no man made use before, which for the most part also is merelychance.
That men submit to arbitration.
6. Although men agree upon these laws of nature, and endeavour to observe the same; yet considering the passions of men, that make it difficult to understand by what actions, and circumstances of actions, those laws are broken, there must needs arise many great controversies about the interpretation thereof, by which the peace must needs be dissolved, and men return again to their former estate of hostility. For the taking away of whichcontroversies, it is necessary that there be some commonarbitratorandjudge, to whose sentence both the parties in the controversies ought to stand. And therefore it is a law of nature,That in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein. For where every man is his ownjudge, there properly is no judge at all; as where every man carveth out his own right, it hath the same effect, as if there were no right at all: and where is no judge, there is no end of controversy: and therefore the right of hostility remaineth.
Of an arbitrator.
7. Anarbitratortherefore, or he that is judge, is trusted by the parties to any controversy, to determine the same by the declaration of his own judgment therein. Out of which followeth first, that the judge ought not to be concerned in the controversy he endeth; for in that case he is a party, and ought by the same reason to be judged by another. Secondly, that he maketh no covenant with either of the parties, to pronounce sentence for the one, more than for the other. Nor doth he covenant so much, as that his sentence shall be just; for that were to make the parties judges of the sentence, whereby the controversy would remain still undecided. Nevertheless for the trust reposed in him, and for the equality which the law of nature requireth him to consider in the parties, he violateth that law, if for favour, or hatred to either party, he give other sentence than he thinketh right. And thirdly, that no man ought to make himself judge in any controversy between others, unless they consent and agree thereto.
That no man press his counsel upon any man against his will.
8. It is also the law of nature,That no man obtrude or press his advice or counsel to any man, that declareth himself unwilling to hear the same. For seeing a man taketh counsel concerning what is good or hurt of himself only, and not of his counsellor, and that counsel is a voluntary action, and therefore tendeth also to the good of the counsellor, there may be often just cause to suspect the counsellor: and though there be none, yet seeing counsel unwillingly heard, is a needless offence to him that is not willing to hear it, and offences tend all to the breach of peace, it is therefore against the law of nature to obtrude it.
How to know suddenly what is the law of nature.
9. A man that shall see these laws of nature set down and inferred with so many words, and so much ado, may think there is yet much more difficulty and subtlety required to acknowledge and do according to the said laws in every sudden occasion, when a man hath but a little time to consider. And while we consider man in most passions, as ofanger,ambition,covetousness,vain glory, and the like, that tend to the excluding of natural equality, it is true. But without these passions, there is an easy rule to know upon a sudden, whether the action I be to do, be against the law of nature, or not. And it is but this:That a man imagine himself in place of the party with whom he hath to do, and reciprocally him in his. Which is no more but a changing, as it were, of the scales. For every man’s passion weigheth heavy in his own scale, but not in the scale of his neighbour. And this rule is very well known and expressed in this old dictate,Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.
That the law of nature taketh place after security from others to observe the same.
10. These laws of nature, the sum whereof consistethin forbidding us to be our own judges, and our own carvers, and in commanding us to accommodate one another, in case they should be observed by some, and not by others, would make the observers but a prey to them that should neglect them, leaving the good both without defence against the wicked, and also with a charge to assist them: which is against the scope of the said laws, that are made only for the protection and defence of them that keep them. Reason therefore, and the law of nature over and above all these particular laws, doth dictate this law in general,That those particular laws be so far observed, as they subject us not to any incommodity, that in our own judgments may arise, by the neglect thereof in those towards whom we observe them; and consequently requireth no more but the desire and constant intention to endeavour and be ready to observe them, unless there be cause to the contrary in other men’s refusal to observe them towards us. The force therefore of the law of nature, is notin foro externo, till there be security for men to obey it, but is alwaysin foro interno, wherein the action of obedience being unsafe, the will and readiness to perform, is taken for the performance.
The right of nature not to be taken away by custom, nor the law of nature abrogated by any act.
11. Amongst the laws of nature, customs and prescriptions are not numbered. For whatsoever action is against reason, though it be reiterated never so often, or that there be never so many precedents thereof, is still against reason, and therefore not a law of nature, but contrary to it. But consent and covenant may so alter the cases, which in the law of nature may be put, by changing the circumstances, that that which was reason before, mayafterwards be against it; and yet is reason still the law. For though every man be bound to allow equality to another, yet if that other shall see cause to renounce the same, and make himself inferior, then, if from thenceforth he consider him as inferior, he breaketh not thereby that law of nature that commandeth to allow equality. In sum,a mans own consent may abridge him of the liberty which the law of nature leaveth him, but custom not; nor can either of them abrogate either these, or or any other law of nature.
Why the dictates of nature are called laws.
12. And forasmuch as law, to speak properly, is a command, and these dictates, as they proceed from nature, are not commands, they are not therefore called laws, in respect of nature, but in respect of the author of nature, God Almighty.
Whatsoever is against conscience in a man, that is his own judge, is against the law of nature.
13. And seeing the laws of nature concern the conscience, not he only breaketh them that doth any action contrary, but also he whose action is conformable to them, in case he think it contrary. For though the action chance to be right, yet in his judgment he despiseth the law.
Ofmalum pœnæ, malum culpæ; virtue and vice.
14. Every man by natural passion, calleth that good which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like manner, that which displeaseth him, evil. And therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his preservation, which is the end that every one by nature aimeth at, must also call it good, and the contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason, and the breaking of them evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, or intention tofulfil them good; and the neglect of them evil. And from hence cometh that distinction ofmalum pœnæ, andmalum culpæ; formalum pœnæis any pain or molestation of the mind whatsoever; butmalum culpæis that action which is contrary to reason and the law of nature: as also the habit of doing according to these and other laws of nature, that tend to our preservation, is that we callvirtue; and the habit of doing the contrary,vice. As for example, justice is that habit by which we stand to covenants, injustice the contrary vice; equity that habit by which we allow equality of nature, arrogancy the contrary vice; gratitude the habit whereby we requite the benefit and trust of others, ingratitude the contrary vice; temperance the habit by which we abstain from all things that tend to our destruction, intemperance the contrary vice; prudence, the same with virtue in general. As for the common opinion, that virtue consisteth in mediocrity, and vice in extremes, I see no ground for it, nor can find any such mediocrity. Courage may be virtue, when the daring is extreme, if the cause be good, and extreme fear no vice when the danger is extreme. To give a man more than his due, is no injustice, though it be to give him less: and in gifts it is not the sum that maketh liberality, but the reason. And so in all other virtues and vices. I know that this doctrine of mediocrity is Aristotle’s, but his opinions concerning virtue and vice, are no other than those, which were received then, and are still by the generality of men unstudied, and therefore not very likely to be accurate.
Aptitude to society, fulfilleth the law of nature.
15. The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, and formidable to them thatwill not. And the same is the sum of the law of nature: for in being sociable, the law of nature taketh place by way of peace and society; and to be formidable, is the law of nature in war, where to be feared is a protection a man hath from his own power: and as the former consisteth in actions of equity and justice, the latter consisteth in actions of honour. And equity, justice, and honour, contain all virtues whatsoever.
A Confirmation out of Holy Scripture of the principal points mentioned in the two last Chapters concerning the Law of Nature.
Confirmation out of Scripture, &c.
1. The laws mentioned in the former chapters, as they are called the laws of nature, for that they are the dictates of natural reason, and also moral laws, because they concern the manners and conversation of men, one towards another; so are they also divine laws in respect of the author thereof, God Almighty; and ought therefore to agree, or at least, not to be repugnant to the word of God revealed in Holy Scripture. In this chapter therefore, I shall produce such places of Scripture, as appear to be most consonant to the said laws.
2. And first, the word of God seemeth to place the divine law in reason, by all such texts as ascribe the same to the heart and understanding; as Psalm xl. 8:Thy law is in my heart. Heb. viii. 10:After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my laws in their mind: and Heb. x. 16, the same. Psalm xxxvii. 31, speaking of the righteous man,he saith,The law of God is in his heart. Psalm xix. 7, 8:The law of God is perfect, converting the soul. It giveth wisdom to the simple, and, light unto the eyes. Jer. xxxi. 33:I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts. And (John i.) the lawgiver himself, God Almighty, is called by the name of Λόγος, which is also called (verse 4)The light of men; and (verse 9)The light which lighteth every man, which cometh into the world. All which are descriptions of natural reason.
3. And that the law divine, for so much as is moral, are those precepts which tend to peace, seemeth to be much confirmed by such places of Scripture as these: Rom. iii. 17, righteousness which is the fulfilling of the law, is calledThe way of peace. And Psalm lxxxv. 10:Righteousness and peace shall kiss each other. And Matth. v. 9:Blessed are the peace-makers. And Heb. vii. 2,Melchisedec king of Salemis interpretedking of righteousness, andking of peace. And (verse 21) our Saviour Christ is said to bea priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec: out of which may be inferred, that the doctrine of our Saviour Christ annexeth the fulfilling of the law to peace.
4. That the law of nature is unalterable, is intimated by this, that the priesthood of Melchisedec is everlasting; and by the words of our Saviour, (Matth. v. 18):Heaven and earth shall pass away, but one jot or tittle of the law shall not pass till all things be fulfilled.
5. That men ought to stand to their covenants, is taught Psalm xv, where the question beingasked (verse 1),Lord who shall dwell in thy tabernacle, &c. It is answered (verse 4),He that sweareth to his own hindrance, and yet changeth not. And that men ought to be gratified, where no covenant passeth, Deut. xxv. 4:Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn, which St. Paul (1 Cor. ix. 9) interpreteth not of oxen but of men.
6. That men content themselves with equality, as it is the foundation of natural law, so also is it of the second table, of the divine law, Matth. xxii. 39, 40:Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two laws depend the whole law and the prophets; which is not so to be understood, as that a man should study so much his neighbour’s profit as his own, or that he should divide his goods amongst his neighbours; but that he should esteem his neighbour worthy all rights and privileges that himself enjoyeth; and attribute unto him, whatsoever he looketh should be attributed unto himself: which is no more, but that he should be humble, meek, and content with equality.
7. And that in distributing of right amongst equals, that distribution is to be made according to the proportions of the numbers, which is the giving ofæqualia æqualibus, et proportionalia proportionalibus; we have Numb. xxvi. 53, 54, the commandment of God to Moses:Thou shalt divide the land according to the number of names; to many thou shalt give more, to few thou shalt give less, to every one according to his number. That decision by lot is a means of peace, Prov. xviii. 18:The lot causeth contention to cease, and maketh partition among the mighty.
8. That the accommodation and forgiveness of one another, which have before been put for laws of nature, are also law divine, there is no question. For they are the essence of charity, which is the scope of the whole law. That we ought not to reproach, or reprehend one another, is the doctrine of our Saviour, Matth. vii. 1:Judge not, that ye be not judged: (verse 3):Why seest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, and seest not the beam that is in thine own eye?Also the law that forbiddeth us to press our counsel upon others further than they admit, is a divine law. For after our charity and desire to rectify one another is rejected, to press it further, is to reprehend him, and condemn him, which is forbidden in the text last recited; as also Rom. xiv. 12, 13:Every one of us shall give account of himself to God. Let us not therefore judge one another any more, but use your judgment rather in this, that no man put an occasion to fall, or a stumbling block before his brother.
9. Further, the rule of men concerning the law of nature,Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris, is confirmed by the like, Matth. vii. 12:Whatsoever therefore you would have men do unto you, that do you unto them: for this is the law and the prophets. And Rom. ii. 1:In that thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself, &c.
10. It is also manifest by the Scriptures, that these laws concern only the tribunal of our conscience; and that the actions contrary to them, shall be no further punished by God Almighty, than as they proceed from negligence, or contempt. And first, that these laws are made to the conscience,appeareth, Matth. v. 20:For I say unto you, except your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.Now the Pharisees were the most exact amongst the Jews in the external performance; they therefore must want the sincerity of conscience; else could not our Saviour have required a greater righteousness than theirs. For the same reason our Saviour Christ saith (Luke, xviii. 14):The publican departed from the temple justified, rather than the Pharisee. And Christ saith, (Matth. xi. 30):My yoke is easy, and my burthen light; which proceedeth from this, that Christ required no more than our best endeavour. And Rom. xiv. 23:He that doubteth, is condemned, if he eat. And in innumerable places both in the Old and New Testament, God Almighty declareth, that he taketh the will for the deed, both in good and evil actions. By all which it plainly appears, that the divine law is dictated to the conscience. On the other side it is no less plain, that how many and heinous actions soever a man commit through infirmity, he shall nevertheless, whensoever he shall condemn the same in his own conscience, be freed from the punishments that to such actions otherwise belong. For,At what time soever a sinner doth repent him of his sins from the bottom of his heart, I will put all his iniquities out of my remembrance, saith the Lord.
11. Concerning revenge, which by the law of nature ought not to aim, as I have said chapterIII.section 10, at present delight, but future profit, there is some difficulty made, as if the same accordednot with the law divine, by such as object the continuance of punishment after the day of judgment, when there shall be no place, neither for amendment, nor for example. This objection had been of some force, if such punishment had been ordained after all sins were past; but considering the punishment was instituted before sin, it serveth to the benefit of mankind, because it keepeth men in peaceable and virtuous conversation by the terror. And therefore such revenge was directed to the future only.
12. Finally, there is no law of natural reason, that can be against the law divine: for God Almighty hath given reason to a man to be a light unto him. And I hope it is no impiety to think, that God Almighty will require a strict account thereof, at the day of judgment, as of the instructions which we were to follow in our peregrination here, notwithstanding the opposition and affronts of supernaturalists now a-days, to rational and moral conversation.
1.That men, notwithstanding these laws, are still in the state of war, till they have security one against another.2.The law of nature in war, is nothing but honour.3.No security without the concord of many.4.That concord of many cannot be maintained without power to keep them all in awe.5.The cause why concord remaineth in a multitude of some irrational creatures, and not of men.6.That union is necessary for the maintaining of concord.7.How union is made.8.Body politic defined.9.Corporation defined.10.Sovereign and subject defined.11.Two sorts of bodies politic, patrimonial and commonwealth.
That men, notwithstanding these laws, are still in the state of war, till they have security one against another.
1. In chapterXII.section 6, of theTreatise of Human Nature, it hath been shewed, that the opinions men have of the rewards and punishments which are to follow their actions, are the causes that make and govern the will to those actions. In this estate of man therefore, wherein all men are equal, and every man allowed to be his own judge, the fears they have one of another are equal, and every man’s hopes consist in his own sleight and strength: and consequently when any man by his natural passion, is provoked to break these laws of nature, there is no security in any other man of his own defence butanticipation. And for this cause, every man’s right, howsoever he be inclined to peace, of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth with him still, as the necessary means of his preservation. And therefore till there be security amongst men for the keeping of the law of nature one towards another, men are still in the estate of war, and nothing is unlawfulto any man that tendeth to his own safety or commodity: and this safety and commodity consisteth in the mutual aid and help of one another, whereby also followeth the mutual fear of one another.
The law of nature in war, is nothing but honour.
2. It is a proverbial saying,inter arma silent leges. There is a little therefore to be said concerning the laws that men are to observe one towards another in time of war, wherein every man’s being and well-being is the rule of his actions. Yet thus much the law of nature commandeth in war, that men satiate not the cruelty of their present passions, whereby in their own conscience they foresee no benefit to come. For that betrayeth not a necessity, but a disposition of the mind to war, which is against the law of nature. And in old time we read, that rapine was a trade of life, wherein nevertheless many of them that used it, did not only spare the lives of those they invaded, but left them also such things, as were necessary to preserve that life which they had given them; as namely their oxen and instruments for tillage, though they carried away all their other cattle and substance. And as the rapine itself was warranted in the law of nature, by the want of security otherwise to maintain themselves, so the exercise of cruelty was forbidden by the same law of nature, unless fear suggested anything to the contrary. For nothing but fear can justify the taking away of another’s life. And because fear can hardly be made manifest, but by some action dishonourable, that bewrayeth the conscience of one’s own weakness, all men, in whom the passion of courage or magnanimity hath been predominant, have abstainedfrom cruelty; insomuch, that though there be in war no law, the breach whereof is injury, yet there are in war those laws, the breach whereof is dishonour. In one word, therefore, the only law of actions in war, ishonour; and the right of war,providence.
No security without the concord of many.
3. And seeing natural aid is necessary for defence, as mutual fear is necessary for peace, we are to consider how great aids are required for such defence, and for the causing of such mutual fear, as men may not easily adventure on one another. And first, it is evident, that the mutual aid of two or three men is of very little security. For the odds on the other side, of a man or two, giveth sufficient encouragement to an assault. And therefore before men have sufficient security in the help of one another, their number must be so great, that the odds of a few which the enemy may have, be no certain and sensible advantage.
That concord of many cannot be maintained without power to keep them all in awe.
4. And supposing how great a number soever of men assembled together for their mutual defence, yet shall not the effect follow, unless they all direct their actions to one and the same end; which direction to one and the same end is that which, chap.XII.sect. 7, is calledconsent. Thisconsent, or concord, amongst so many men, though it may be made by the fear of a present invader, or by the hope of a present conquest, or booty, and endure as long as that action endureth, nevertheless, by the diversity of judgments and passions in so many men contending naturally for honour and advantage one above another, it is impossible, not only that their consent to aid each other against an enemy, but also that the peace should last betweenthemselves, without some mutual and common fear to rule them.
The cause why concord remaineth in a multitude of some irrational creatures, and not of men.
5. But contrary hereunto may be objected, the experience we have of certain living creatures irrational, that nevertheless continually live in such good order and government for their common benefit, and are so free from sedition and war amongst themselves, that for peace, profit, and defence, nothing more can be imaginable. And the experience we have in this, is in that little creature the bee, which is therefore reckoned amongstanimalia politica. Why therefore may not men, that foresee the benefit of concord, continually maintain the same without compulsion, as well as they? To which I answer, that amongst other living creatures, there is no question of precedence in their own species, nor strife about honour, or acknowledgment of one another’s wisdom, as there is amongst men, from whence arise envy and hatred of one towards another, and from thence sedition and war. Secondly, those living creatures aim every one at peace and food common to them all; men aim at dominion, superiority, and private wealth, which are distinct in every man, and breed contention. Thirdly, those living creatures that are without reason, have not learning enough to espy, or to think they espy, any defect in the government; and therefore are contented therewith. But in a multitude of men, there are always some that think themselves wiser than the rest, and strive to alter what they think amiss, and divers of them strive to alter divers ways, and that causeth war. Fourthly, they want speech,and are therefore unable to instigate one another to faction, which men want not. Fifthly, they have no conception of right and wrong, but only of pleasure and pain, and therefore also no censure of one another, nor of their commander, as long as they are themselves at ease; whereas men that make themselves judges of right and wrong, are then least at quiet, when they are most at ease. Lastly, natural concord, such as is amongst those creatures, is the work of God by the way of nature; but concord amongst men is artificial, and by way of covenant. And therefore no wonder, if such irrational creatures as govern themselves in multitude, do it much more firmly than mankind, that do it by arbitrary institution.
That union is necessary for the maintaining of concord.
6. It remaineth therefore still, that consent, by which I understand the concurrence of many men’s wills to one action, is not sufficient security for their common peace, without the erection of some common power, by the fear whereof they may be compelled both to keep the peace amongst themselves, and to join their strengths together, against a common enemy. And that this may be done, there is no way imaginable, but only union, which is defined, chapterXII.section 8, to be the involving, or including the wills of many in the will of one man, or in the will of the greatest part of any one number of men, that is to say, in the will of one man, or of onecouncil. For a council is nothing else but anassemblyof men deliberating concerning something common to them all.
How union is made.
7. The making of union consisteth in this, that every man by covenant oblige himself to some oneand the same man, or to some one and the same council, by them all named and determined, to do those actions, which the said man or council shall command them to do, and to do no action, which he or they shall forbid, or command them not to do. And further, in case it be a council, whose commands they covenant to obey, that then also they covenant, that every man shall hold that for the command of the whole council, which is the command of the greater part of those men, whereof such council consisteth. And though the will of man being not voluntary, but the beginning of voluntary actions, is not subject to deliberation and covenant; yet when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of another, he obligeth himself to this, that he resign his strength and means to him, whom he covenanteth to obey. And hereby he that is to command, may by the use of all their means and strength, be able by the terror thereof, to frame the will of them all to unity and concord, amongst themselves.
Body politic defined.
8. This union so made, is that which men call now a-days, abody politic, or civil society; and the Greeks call it πόλις, that is to say, a city, which may be defined to be a multitude of men, united as one person, by a common power, for their common peace, defence, and benefit.
Corporation defined.
9. And as this union into a city or body politic, is instituted with common power over all the particular persons, or members thereof, to the common good of them all; so also may there be amongst a multitude of those members instituted, a subordinate union of certain men, for certaincommon actions to be done by those men for some common benefit of theirs, or of the whole city; as for subordinate government, for counsel, for trade, and the like. And these subordinate bodies politic are usually calledcorporations; and their power such over the particulars of their own society, as the whole city, whereof they are members, have allowed them.
Sovereign and subject defined.
10. In all cities, or bodies politic not subordinate, but independent, that one man, or one council, to whom the particular members have given that common power, is called theirsovereign, and his power, the sovereign power; which consisteth in the power and the strength, that every of the members have transferrred to him from themselves by covenant. And because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another, or for that other to receive it; it is to be understood, that to transfer a man’s power and strength, is no more but to lay by, or relinquish his own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it. And every member of the body politic, is called asubject, to wit, to thesovereign.
Two sorts of bodies politic, patrimonial and commonwealth.
11. The cause in general, which moveth a man to become subject to another, is (as I have said already) the fear of not otherwise preserving himself. And a man may subject himself to him that invadeth, or may invade him, for fear of him; or men may join amongst themselves, to subject themselves to such as they shall agree upon for fear of others. And when many men subject themselves the former way, there ariseth thence a body politic, as it were naturally. From whence proceedethdominion,paternalanddespotic. And when they subject themselves the other way, by mutual agreement amongst many, the body politic they make, is for the most part, called acommonwealth, in distinction from the former, though the name be the general name for them both. And I shall speak in the first place of commonwealths, and afterwards of bodies politic, patrimonial, and despotical.