NOTESBOOK I[1]For this term, as here employed, our language contains no equivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.There are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (in which it is here employed) is its strict etymological signfication “The science of Society,” and this includes everything which can bear at all upon the well-being of Man in his social capacity, “Quicquid agunt homines nostri est farrago libelli.” It is in this view that it is fairly denominated most commanding and inclusive.The second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is “Moral Philosophy.” Aristotle explains the term in this sense in the Rhetoric (1 2) [Greek: hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen dikaion esti prosagoreuen politikaen]. He has principally in view in this treatise the moral training of the Individual, the branch of the Science of Society which we call Ethics Proper, bearing the same relation to the larger Science as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the building of the Temple, or the drill of the Recruit to the manoeuvres of the field. Greek Philosophy viewed men principally as constituent parts of a [Greek: polis], considering this function to be the real End of each, and this state as that in which the Individual attained his highest and most complete development.The third sense is “The detail of Civil Government,” which Aristotle expressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.[2]Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to some definite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is the best judge who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, in the latter, the man whose powers have been developed and matured by education. A lame horse one would show to a farmer, not to the best and wisest man of one’s acquaintance; to the latter, one would apply in a difficult case of conduct.Experience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.[3]In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it is said of the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only insatiable, but indiscriminate in its objects, πανταχόθεν.[4]Ἀρχὴ is a word used in this treatise in various significations. The primary one is “beginning or first cause,” and this runs through all its various uses.“Rule,” and sometimes “Rulers,” are denoted by this term the initiative being a property of Rule.“Principle” is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most characteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means “starting-point.” Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve οὗ ἕνεκα, and that of Action (ὅθεν ἡ κινήσις). I desire praise of men this then is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be attained, I resolve upon some course and this Resolve is the beginning of Action.The beginnings of Resolve, Ἀρχὶ or Motives, when formally stated, are the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the συλλογίσμοι τῶν πρακτῶν, i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be analysed.Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:Whatever gains human praise is to be done;Public praying and almsgiving gave human praise:[ergo] Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action, and this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.[5]The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the signification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima aplos]I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as denoting respectively whatisand whatmaybe known. All truth is [Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we individually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek: gnorima aemin] whichwe have received as true. From this appears immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study of Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either work principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as soon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can do. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have heard the fifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally true and right the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for which he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove its truth if he should ask.But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect. 10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have existed before the instances of their operation. Justice must have existed before just actions, Redness before red things, but since what we meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the principles and laws), the particulars are said to be [Greek: gnorimotera aemin]Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage, which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, “We must begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes either particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with particulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training in habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for a fact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there will be no want of the reason for the fact in addition”The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai] occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of “principles.”Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.[6]Or “prove themselves good,” as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25, [Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supported by a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d’ upo ton epieikon kai eidoton oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai peri auton chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legonton krisei][7][Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statement by any philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to mean any dialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.[8]A lost work, supposed to have been so called, because containing miscellaneous questions.[9]It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotle refers to this, and allows that [Greek: theoria] constitutes the highest happiness because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man the reason of thus deferring the statement being that till the lower, that is the moral, nature has been reduced to perfect order, [Greek: theoria] cannot have place, though, had it been held out from the first, men would have been for making the experiment at once, without the trouble of self-discipline.[10]Or, as some think, “many theories have been founded on them.”[11]The ἰδέα is the archetype, the εἶδος the concrete embodying the resemblance of it; hence Aristotle alludes to the theory under both names, and this is the reason for retaining the Greek terms.[12]The list ran thus—[Greek:to peras to apeiron | to euthuto perisson to artion | to phosto en to plethos | to tetragononto dexion to aristeron | to aeremounto arren to thelu | to agathon][13]Plato’s sister’s son.[14]This is the capital defect in Aristotle’s eyes, who being eminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did not necessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by enabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way of stating facts, and leads to no action.[15]i.e.the identification of Happiness with the Chief Good.[16]i.e.without the capability of addition.[17]And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the Chief Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the Chief Good. See Book X. chap. 11. [Greek: delon os oud allo ouden tagathon an eiae o meta tenos ton kath’ auto agathon airetoteron ginetai.][18]Compare Bishop Butler’s account of “Human Nature as a System” in the Preface to his Sermons.[19]i.e.as working or as quiescent.[20]The mere translation of this term would convey no idea of its meaning, I have therefore retained the Greek term. It is afterwards explained to include space of time and external appliances requisite for the full development of Man’s energies; here the time only is alluded to.[21]This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations, in the Topics, I. chap. ix.[22]Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral senses. “Fire burns,” is an instance of the former, “Treason is odious,” of the latter.[23]I have thought it worthwhile to vary the interpretation of this word, because though “habitus” may be equivalent to all the senses of [Greek: exis], “habit” is not, at least according to our colloquial usage we commonly denote by “habit” a state formed by habituation.[24]Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this passage is to apply [Greek: kalon kagathon] to things, and let them depend grammatically on [Greek: epaeboli]. It is to be remembered, however, that [Greek: kalos kagathos] bore a special and well-known meaning also the comparison is in the text more complete, and the point of the passage seems more completely brought out.[25]“Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affection to goodness.” (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii ) Aristotle describes pleasure in the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of perception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure being as truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness then implies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its object present, and pleasure continually result.[26]In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact that external circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness not that Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to be identical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have a fair field; in fact, the other side of [Greek: bios teleios].[27]It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he considers an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct gift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to self-discipline and moral improvement would vanish He shows therefore that it is no depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it to come partly at least from ourselves, and he then goes on with other reasons why we should think with him.[28]This term is important, what has been maimed was once perfect; he does not contemplate as possible the case of a man being born incapable of virtue, and so of happiness.[29][Greek] Plato. Phædon. xlvi.[30]But why give materials and instruments, if there is no work to do?[31]The supposed pair of ancestors.[32]Solon says, “Call no man happy till he is dead.” He must mean either, The man when deadishappy (a), or, The man when deadmay be said to have been happy(b). If the former, does he mean positive happiness (a)? or only freedom from unhappiness (β)?Wecannot allow (a), Men’s opinions disallow (β), We revert now to the consideration of (b).[33]The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notion commonly held, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceive that Happiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune is changeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because we have therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause.[34]I have taken τούτον αὐτῶν to refer to ἐπιστημῶν, against Magirus and the Paraphrase of Andronicus Rhodius. I would refer to Aristotle’s account of θεωρία in the Tenth Book, chap. vii. where he expressly says of the working of νοῦς or pure intelect, that it is “most continuous.”[35]The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, of course, dressed his actorsfor their parts;not according to their fancies or his own.Hooker has (E. P. v. ixxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirable paraphrase on this.“Again, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken by proportion with that which every man’s estate in this present life requireth. External abilities are instruments of action. It contenteth wise artificers to have their instruments proportionable to their work, rather fit for use than huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing then the actions of a servant do not need that which may be necessary for men of calling and place in the world, neither men of inferior condition many things which greater personages can hardly want; surely they are blessed in worldly respects who have wherewith to perform what their station and place asketh, though they have no more.”[36]Always bearing in mind that man “never continueth in one stay.”[37]The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, must be in certain weight and number to affect our own happiness, this will be true, of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends: and these are the only ones to which the dead are supposed to be liable? add then the difference of sensibility which it is fair to presume, and there is a very small residuum of joy or sorrow.[38]This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, which are either soin esseorin posse.Ifin esse, they are either above praise, or subjects of praise. Thosein posse, here called faculties, are good only when rightly used. Thus Rhetoric is a faculty which may be used to promote justice or abused to support villainy. Money in like way.[39]The doubt is, whether [Greek] or [Greek] is the subject of the sentence. It is translated as above, not merely with reference to the sense of this passage, but on a comparison with a similar one in Book X. chap 8. [Greek].[40]Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwards adopted by Epicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies in the Tenth Book) of irreproachable character.[41]See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap ix.[42]The unseen is at least as real as the seen.[43]The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book and are here used in their strict philosophical meaning. The [Greek: enkrates] is he who has bad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough to keep them under. The [Greek: akrates] is he whose appetites constantly prevail over his reason and previous good resolutions.By the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a state in which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called [Greek: sophrosyne], and the man in it [Greek: sophron]. By the same law the remonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till they are silenced for ever. This state is called [Greek: akolasia], and the man in it [Greek: akolastos].[44]This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, [Greek: echein logon tinos], really denotes substituting that person’s [Greek: logos] for one’s own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-control or perfected self-mastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its own impulses. The other phrase means the actual possession of mathematical truths as part of the mental furniture,i.e.knowing them.[45][Greek: xin] may be taken as opposed to [Greek: energeian], and the meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral and Intellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having the latter, but only for exerting and using the former.BOOK II[1]Which we call simply virtue.[2]For nature must of course supply the capacity.[3]Or “as a simple result of nature.”[4]This is done in the Sixth Book.[5]It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular details of practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rule can be so framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon on the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit.[6]The words ἀκόλαστος and δειλὸς are not used here in their strict significations to denote confirmed states of vice: the ἐγκρατὴς necessarily feels pain, because he must always be thwarting passions which are a real part of his nature; though this pain will grow less and less as he nears the point of σωφροσύνη or perfected Self-Mastery, which being attained the pain will then and then only cease entirely. So a certain degree of fear is necessary to theformationof true courage. All that is meant here is, that no habit of courage or self-mastery can be said to be matured, until pain altogether vanishes.[7]Virtue consists in the due regulation ofallthe parts of our nature our passions are a real part of that nature, and as such have their proper office, it is an error then to aim at their extirpation. It is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will be rare, but then this will have been gained by regular process, being the legitimate result of the law that “passive impressions weaken as active habits are strengthened, by repetition.” If musical instruments are making discord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony in either case I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positive enjoyment of music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted out, Aristotle would have them cultivated to use an apt figure (whose I know not), They would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it to fall in due course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might truly say,Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. See on this point Bishop Butler’s fifth Sermon, and sect. 11. of the chapter on Moral Discipline in the first part of his Analogy.[8]I have adopted this word from our old writers, because our wordactis so commonly interchanged withaction. [Greek: Praxis] (action) properly denotes the whole process from the conception to the performance. [Greek: Pragma] (fact) only the result. The latter may be right when the former is wrong if, for example, a murderer was killed by his accomplices. Again, the [Greek: praxis] may begoodthough the [Greek: pragma] be wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions does what would have been right if his impressions had been true (subject of course to the question how far he is guiltless of his original error), but in this case we could not call the [Greek: praxis]right. No repetition of [Greek: pragmata] goes to form a habit. See Bishop Butler on the Theory of Habits m the chapter on Moral Discipline, quoted above, sect. 11. “And in like manner as habits belonging to the body,” etc.[9]Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue, Aristotle ascertains first what is its genus [Greek: ti estin].[10]That is, not formerely havingthem, because we did not make ourselves.See Bishop Butler’s account of our nature as containing “particular propensions,” in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and in the Preface to the Sermons.[11]This refers to the division of quantity ([Greek: poson]) in the Categories. Those Quantities are called by Aristotle Continuous whose parts have position relatively to one another, as a line, surface, or solid, those discrete, whose parts have no such relation, as numbers themselves, or any string of words grammatically unconnected.[12]Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usually called progression), when they increase or decrease by a common difference thus, 2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 + 4 = 6, 6 + 4= 10, orvice versa, 10 - 4 = 6, 6 - 4 = 2.[13]If the mina be taken at 15 oz. avoirdupois, (Dict. of G. and R. Antiquities, articleTalentum,) we must be sadly degenerate in our gastric capacity.[14]The two are necessary, because since the reason itself may be perverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard; we may suppose his [Greek: logos] originally to have been a sufficient guide, but when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must go out of himself for direction.[15]This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply that this treatise is rather a collection of notes of avivâ vocelecture than a set formal treatise. “The table” of virtues and vices probably was sketched out and exhibited to the audience.[16]Afterwards defined as “All things whose value is measured by money.”[17]We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustrated by Horace’s use of the termhiatus:“Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?” Opening the mouth wide gives a promise of something great to come, if nothing great does come, this is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] or fruitless and unmeaninghiatus; the transference to the present subject is easy.[18]In like mannerwetalk of laudable ambition, implying of course there may be that which is not laudable.[19]An expression of Bishop Butler’s, which corresponds exactly to the definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric.[20]That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must be generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.[21]“[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb,” says the Scholiast on the Phaedo, “used of those who do anything safely and cautiously inasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about then: preparations for the second cautiously,” and he then alludes to this passage.[22]That is, you must allow for therecoil. “Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret.”[23]This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have no difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go, that she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.This exactly represents Aristotle’s relation to Pleasure he does not, with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it wholly evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused had “banished all the beauty from her cheek,” but, with the aged counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness resolves to deny himself, he “feels her sweetness, yet defies her thrall.”[24]Αἴσθησις is here used as an analogous noun, to denote the faculty which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same function that bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth while to notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same analogy. We say of a transaction, that it “looks ugly,” “sounds oddly,” is a “nasty job,” “stinks in our nostrils,” is a “hard dealing.”BOOK III[1]A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because “particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle.” But he is responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed, he “might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his integrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his security against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.” (From the chapter on Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the third chapter of this Book.[2]Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in Bishop Butler’s manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest, and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon II.)[3]Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of the [Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance ofi.e.incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution to have been depraved,i.e.shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of Self-love to be impaired.[4][Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and effect all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are [Greek: eneka] that result.From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce, these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely, butdesignedcausation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive, or final cause.It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of a man’s being ignorant of his own Motive of action.When the man “drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel between the joints of the harnesss” (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek: eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of [Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King’s death wasin fact the result, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.[5]Bishop Butler would agree to this: he says of settled deliberate anger, “It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and vice, of moral good and evil.” See the whole Sermon on Resentment.[6]Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using [Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no following his argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our word lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, “What man is he that lusteth to live?”[7]The meaning is, that theonus probandiis thrown upon the person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has aprima faciecase. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker’s seems to intend al 81 ir/jd£eis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be a merepetitio principii. I have adopted Cardwell’s reading in part, but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell’s reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.[8]i.e.on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute character, opinions are in generalsignsof character, but when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral Choice.“Treason doth never prosper, what’s the reason?When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.”[9]The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to [Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished or systematic one.[10]Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta], the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].[11]Compare Bishop Butler’s “System of Human Nature,” in the Preface to the Sermons.[12]These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai—bouleusin], contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected, the two last constitute [Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means literally “a grasping at or after” now as this physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act, consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric (I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into [Greek: alogos] and [Greek: logistikae].The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival at land is naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question being debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to the Will, which causes the owner’s hands to throw overboard his goods: the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless, consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.[13]Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d hae men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho einai agathon)][14]A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which gravitation operates irretrievably, “there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things.” Bishop Butler’s Analogy, First Part, chap 11.[15]Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what circumstances we will have to act under.[16]“MoralCourage” is our phrase.[17]The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a paraphrase.“The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords with Courage,i.e.Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of each separate act of bravery is honour.”[18]For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both.[19]This may merely mean, “who give strict orders” not to flinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible.[20]See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen oun logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)][21]Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata invanostumultus gens.[22]In Coronea in Bœotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed to some Phocians. “The regulars” were Boeotian troops, the [Greek: politika] Coroneans.[23]By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to imitate.[24]The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as here used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia todi aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata sumbebaekos de to proteron].BOOK V[1]Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.[2]But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, “to love” and “to kiss,” [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap. XIII. 5.[3]Thingsare [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name in common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] isclosetherefore when the difference though real is but slight. There is no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], “equivocal” being applied to a term and not to its various significates.[4]See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen echei kai tagatha k.t.l.][5]A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as confining his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to touch him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue to his own person.[6]See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.[7]Cardwell’s text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon], yields a much easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but only the particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the unlawful : the unequal :: universal Injustice the particulari.e.as whole to part.There is a reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis, but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.[8]There are two reasons why the characters are not necessarily coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out the [Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so thereforepro tantois he.Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he does thefactsof a good man but for the perfection of his own individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightly in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III. chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler’s first Sermon.[9]Terms used for persons.[10]By [Greek:——] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50, etc, by [Greek:——] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.[11]The profits of a mercantile transaction (say £1000) are to be divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real point to be settled); then,A : B :: 400 : 600.A : 400 :: B : 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as to make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).A+400 : B+600 :: A : B. This represents the actual distribution; its fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.[12]i.e.where the ratio is that of equality, thus 2 : 2 :: 40 : 40[13]Her Majesty’s “Justices.”[14]I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that he put them where they made the best sense.[15]This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not pretend to be able to get it out of the words.[16]This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and another against the office.[17]χάρις denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.[18]The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only had (say) one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have. Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most valuable, andvice versa.Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:——] at [Greek:——], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the wares as between the persons,i.e.the ratio of equality.If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both [Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr. shoes = 1 house.
[1]For this term, as here employed, our language contains no equivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.There are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (in which it is here employed) is its strict etymological signfication “The science of Society,” and this includes everything which can bear at all upon the well-being of Man in his social capacity, “Quicquid agunt homines nostri est farrago libelli.” It is in this view that it is fairly denominated most commanding and inclusive.The second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is “Moral Philosophy.” Aristotle explains the term in this sense in the Rhetoric (1 2) [Greek: hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen dikaion esti prosagoreuen politikaen]. He has principally in view in this treatise the moral training of the Individual, the branch of the Science of Society which we call Ethics Proper, bearing the same relation to the larger Science as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the building of the Temple, or the drill of the Recruit to the manoeuvres of the field. Greek Philosophy viewed men principally as constituent parts of a [Greek: polis], considering this function to be the real End of each, and this state as that in which the Individual attained his highest and most complete development.The third sense is “The detail of Civil Government,” which Aristotle expressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.
[2]Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to some definite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is the best judge who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, in the latter, the man whose powers have been developed and matured by education. A lame horse one would show to a farmer, not to the best and wisest man of one’s acquaintance; to the latter, one would apply in a difficult case of conduct.Experience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.
[3]In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it is said of the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only insatiable, but indiscriminate in its objects, πανταχόθεν.
[4]Ἀρχὴ is a word used in this treatise in various significations. The primary one is “beginning or first cause,” and this runs through all its various uses.“Rule,” and sometimes “Rulers,” are denoted by this term the initiative being a property of Rule.“Principle” is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most characteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means “starting-point.” Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve οὗ ἕνεκα, and that of Action (ὅθεν ἡ κινήσις). I desire praise of men this then is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be attained, I resolve upon some course and this Resolve is the beginning of Action.The beginnings of Resolve, Ἀρχὶ or Motives, when formally stated, are the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the συλλογίσμοι τῶν πρακτῶν, i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be analysed.Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:
Whatever gains human praise is to be done;Public praying and almsgiving gave human praise:[ergo] Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.
The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action, and this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.
[5]The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the signification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima aplos]I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as denoting respectively whatisand whatmaybe known. All truth is [Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we individually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek: gnorima aemin] whichwe have received as true. From this appears immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study of Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either work principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as soon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can do. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have heard the fifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally true and right the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for which he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove its truth if he should ask.But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect. 10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have existed before the instances of their operation. Justice must have existed before just actions, Redness before red things, but since what we meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the principles and laws), the particulars are said to be [Greek: gnorimotera aemin]Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage, which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, “We must begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes either particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with particulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training in habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for a fact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there will be no want of the reason for the fact in addition”The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai] occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of “principles.”
Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.
[6]Or “prove themselves good,” as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25, [Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supported by a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d’ upo ton epieikon kai eidoton oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai peri auton chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legonton krisei]
[7][Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statement by any philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to mean any dialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.
[8]A lost work, supposed to have been so called, because containing miscellaneous questions.
[9]It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotle refers to this, and allows that [Greek: theoria] constitutes the highest happiness because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man the reason of thus deferring the statement being that till the lower, that is the moral, nature has been reduced to perfect order, [Greek: theoria] cannot have place, though, had it been held out from the first, men would have been for making the experiment at once, without the trouble of self-discipline.
[10]Or, as some think, “many theories have been founded on them.”
[11]The ἰδέα is the archetype, the εἶδος the concrete embodying the resemblance of it; hence Aristotle alludes to the theory under both names, and this is the reason for retaining the Greek terms.
[12]The list ran thus—
[Greek:to peras to apeiron | to euthuto perisson to artion | to phosto en to plethos | to tetragononto dexion to aristeron | to aeremounto arren to thelu | to agathon]
[13]Plato’s sister’s son.
[14]This is the capital defect in Aristotle’s eyes, who being eminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did not necessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by enabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way of stating facts, and leads to no action.
[15]i.e.the identification of Happiness with the Chief Good.
[16]i.e.without the capability of addition.
[17]And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the Chief Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the Chief Good. See Book X. chap. 11. [Greek: delon os oud allo ouden tagathon an eiae o meta tenos ton kath’ auto agathon airetoteron ginetai.]
[18]Compare Bishop Butler’s account of “Human Nature as a System” in the Preface to his Sermons.
[19]i.e.as working or as quiescent.
[20]The mere translation of this term would convey no idea of its meaning, I have therefore retained the Greek term. It is afterwards explained to include space of time and external appliances requisite for the full development of Man’s energies; here the time only is alluded to.
[21]This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations, in the Topics, I. chap. ix.
[22]Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral senses. “Fire burns,” is an instance of the former, “Treason is odious,” of the latter.
[23]I have thought it worthwhile to vary the interpretation of this word, because though “habitus” may be equivalent to all the senses of [Greek: exis], “habit” is not, at least according to our colloquial usage we commonly denote by “habit” a state formed by habituation.
[24]Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this passage is to apply [Greek: kalon kagathon] to things, and let them depend grammatically on [Greek: epaeboli]. It is to be remembered, however, that [Greek: kalos kagathos] bore a special and well-known meaning also the comparison is in the text more complete, and the point of the passage seems more completely brought out.
[25]“Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affection to goodness.” (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii ) Aristotle describes pleasure in the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of perception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure being as truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness then implies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its object present, and pleasure continually result.
[26]In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact that external circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness not that Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to be identical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have a fair field; in fact, the other side of [Greek: bios teleios].
[27]It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he considers an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct gift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to self-discipline and moral improvement would vanish He shows therefore that it is no depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it to come partly at least from ourselves, and he then goes on with other reasons why we should think with him.
[28]This term is important, what has been maimed was once perfect; he does not contemplate as possible the case of a man being born incapable of virtue, and so of happiness.
[29][Greek] Plato. Phædon. xlvi.
[30]But why give materials and instruments, if there is no work to do?
[31]The supposed pair of ancestors.
[32]Solon says, “Call no man happy till he is dead.” He must mean either, The man when deadishappy (a), or, The man when deadmay be said to have been happy(b). If the former, does he mean positive happiness (a)? or only freedom from unhappiness (β)?Wecannot allow (a), Men’s opinions disallow (β), We revert now to the consideration of (b).
[33]The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notion commonly held, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceive that Happiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune is changeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because we have therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause.
[34]I have taken τούτον αὐτῶν to refer to ἐπιστημῶν, against Magirus and the Paraphrase of Andronicus Rhodius. I would refer to Aristotle’s account of θεωρία in the Tenth Book, chap. vii. where he expressly says of the working of νοῦς or pure intelect, that it is “most continuous.”
[35]The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, of course, dressed his actorsfor their parts;not according to their fancies or his own.Hooker has (E. P. v. ixxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirable paraphrase on this.“Again, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken by proportion with that which every man’s estate in this present life requireth. External abilities are instruments of action. It contenteth wise artificers to have their instruments proportionable to their work, rather fit for use than huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing then the actions of a servant do not need that which may be necessary for men of calling and place in the world, neither men of inferior condition many things which greater personages can hardly want; surely they are blessed in worldly respects who have wherewith to perform what their station and place asketh, though they have no more.”
[36]Always bearing in mind that man “never continueth in one stay.”
[37]The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, must be in certain weight and number to affect our own happiness, this will be true, of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends: and these are the only ones to which the dead are supposed to be liable? add then the difference of sensibility which it is fair to presume, and there is a very small residuum of joy or sorrow.
[38]This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, which are either soin esseorin posse.Ifin esse, they are either above praise, or subjects of praise. Thosein posse, here called faculties, are good only when rightly used. Thus Rhetoric is a faculty which may be used to promote justice or abused to support villainy. Money in like way.
[39]The doubt is, whether [Greek] or [Greek] is the subject of the sentence. It is translated as above, not merely with reference to the sense of this passage, but on a comparison with a similar one in Book X. chap 8. [Greek].
[40]Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwards adopted by Epicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies in the Tenth Book) of irreproachable character.
[41]See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap ix.
[42]The unseen is at least as real as the seen.
[43]The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book and are here used in their strict philosophical meaning. The [Greek: enkrates] is he who has bad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough to keep them under. The [Greek: akrates] is he whose appetites constantly prevail over his reason and previous good resolutions.By the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a state in which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called [Greek: sophrosyne], and the man in it [Greek: sophron]. By the same law the remonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till they are silenced for ever. This state is called [Greek: akolasia], and the man in it [Greek: akolastos].
[44]This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, [Greek: echein logon tinos], really denotes substituting that person’s [Greek: logos] for one’s own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-control or perfected self-mastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its own impulses. The other phrase means the actual possession of mathematical truths as part of the mental furniture,i.e.knowing them.
[45][Greek: xin] may be taken as opposed to [Greek: energeian], and the meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral and Intellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having the latter, but only for exerting and using the former.
[1]Which we call simply virtue.
[2]For nature must of course supply the capacity.
[3]Or “as a simple result of nature.”
[4]This is done in the Sixth Book.
[5]It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular details of practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rule can be so framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon on the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit.
[6]The words ἀκόλαστος and δειλὸς are not used here in their strict significations to denote confirmed states of vice: the ἐγκρατὴς necessarily feels pain, because he must always be thwarting passions which are a real part of his nature; though this pain will grow less and less as he nears the point of σωφροσύνη or perfected Self-Mastery, which being attained the pain will then and then only cease entirely. So a certain degree of fear is necessary to theformationof true courage. All that is meant here is, that no habit of courage or self-mastery can be said to be matured, until pain altogether vanishes.
[7]Virtue consists in the due regulation ofallthe parts of our nature our passions are a real part of that nature, and as such have their proper office, it is an error then to aim at their extirpation. It is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will be rare, but then this will have been gained by regular process, being the legitimate result of the law that “passive impressions weaken as active habits are strengthened, by repetition.” If musical instruments are making discord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony in either case I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positive enjoyment of music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted out, Aristotle would have them cultivated to use an apt figure (whose I know not), They would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it to fall in due course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might truly say,Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. See on this point Bishop Butler’s fifth Sermon, and sect. 11. of the chapter on Moral Discipline in the first part of his Analogy.
[8]I have adopted this word from our old writers, because our wordactis so commonly interchanged withaction. [Greek: Praxis] (action) properly denotes the whole process from the conception to the performance. [Greek: Pragma] (fact) only the result. The latter may be right when the former is wrong if, for example, a murderer was killed by his accomplices. Again, the [Greek: praxis] may begoodthough the [Greek: pragma] be wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions does what would have been right if his impressions had been true (subject of course to the question how far he is guiltless of his original error), but in this case we could not call the [Greek: praxis]right. No repetition of [Greek: pragmata] goes to form a habit. See Bishop Butler on the Theory of Habits m the chapter on Moral Discipline, quoted above, sect. 11. “And in like manner as habits belonging to the body,” etc.
[9]Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue, Aristotle ascertains first what is its genus [Greek: ti estin].
[10]That is, not formerely havingthem, because we did not make ourselves.See Bishop Butler’s account of our nature as containing “particular propensions,” in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and in the Preface to the Sermons.
[11]This refers to the division of quantity ([Greek: poson]) in the Categories. Those Quantities are called by Aristotle Continuous whose parts have position relatively to one another, as a line, surface, or solid, those discrete, whose parts have no such relation, as numbers themselves, or any string of words grammatically unconnected.
[12]Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usually called progression), when they increase or decrease by a common difference thus, 2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 + 4 = 6, 6 + 4= 10, orvice versa, 10 - 4 = 6, 6 - 4 = 2.
[13]If the mina be taken at 15 oz. avoirdupois, (Dict. of G. and R. Antiquities, articleTalentum,) we must be sadly degenerate in our gastric capacity.
[14]The two are necessary, because since the reason itself may be perverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard; we may suppose his [Greek: logos] originally to have been a sufficient guide, but when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must go out of himself for direction.
[15]This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply that this treatise is rather a collection of notes of avivâ vocelecture than a set formal treatise. “The table” of virtues and vices probably was sketched out and exhibited to the audience.
[16]Afterwards defined as “All things whose value is measured by money.”
[17]We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustrated by Horace’s use of the termhiatus:“Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?” Opening the mouth wide gives a promise of something great to come, if nothing great does come, this is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] or fruitless and unmeaninghiatus; the transference to the present subject is easy.
[18]In like mannerwetalk of laudable ambition, implying of course there may be that which is not laudable.
[19]An expression of Bishop Butler’s, which corresponds exactly to the definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric.
[20]That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must be generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15.
[21]“[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb,” says the Scholiast on the Phaedo, “used of those who do anything safely and cautiously inasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about then: preparations for the second cautiously,” and he then alludes to this passage.
[22]That is, you must allow for therecoil. “Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret.”
[23]This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully.The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have no difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go, that she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity.This exactly represents Aristotle’s relation to Pleasure he does not, with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it wholly evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused had “banished all the beauty from her cheek,” but, with the aged counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness resolves to deny himself, he “feels her sweetness, yet defies her thrall.”
[24]Αἴσθησις is here used as an analogous noun, to denote the faculty which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same function that bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth while to notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same analogy. We say of a transaction, that it “looks ugly,” “sounds oddly,” is a “nasty job,” “stinks in our nostrils,” is a “hard dealing.”
[1]A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because “particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of the moral principle.” But he is responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed, he “might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his integrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his security against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.” (From the chapter on Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the third chapter of this Book.
[2]Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in Bishop Butler’s manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest, and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon II.)
[3]Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of the [Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance ofi.e.incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution to have been depraved,i.e.shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of Self-love to be impaired.
[4][Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and effect all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are [Greek: eneka] that result.From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce, these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely, butdesignedcausation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive, or final cause.It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of a man’s being ignorant of his own Motive of action.When the man “drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel between the joints of the harnesss” (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek: eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of [Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King’s death wasin fact the result, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.
[5]Bishop Butler would agree to this: he says of settled deliberate anger, “It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and vice, of moral good and evil.” See the whole Sermon on Resentment.
[6]Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using [Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no following his argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our word lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, “What man is he that lusteth to live?”
[7]The meaning is, that theonus probandiis thrown upon the person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has aprima faciecase. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker’s seems to intend al 81 ir/jd£eis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be a merepetitio principii. I have adopted Cardwell’s reading in part, but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell’s reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.
[8]i.e.on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute character, opinions are in generalsignsof character, but when they begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral Choice.
“Treason doth never prosper, what’s the reason?When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.”
[9]The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to [Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished or systematic one.
[10]Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta], the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].
[11]Compare Bishop Butler’s “System of Human Nature,” in the Preface to the Sermons.
[12]These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai—bouleusin], contain the account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the mental hand towards the object thus selected, the two last constitute [Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means literally “a grasping at or after” now as this physically may be either vague or definite, so too may the mental act, consequently the term as transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric (I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into [Greek: alogos] and [Greek: logistikae].The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which then proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival at land is naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question being debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to the Will, which causes the owner’s hands to throw overboard his goods: the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was obtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage of Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless, consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no Choice.
[13]Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d hae men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho einai agathon)]
[14]A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which gravitation operates irretrievably, “there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things.” Bishop Butler’s Analogy, First Part, chap 11.
[15]Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what circumstances we will have to act under.
[16]“MoralCourage” is our phrase.
[17]The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a paraphrase.“The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords with Courage,i.e.Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of each separate act of bravery is honour.”
[18]For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger. 2. A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be found to fail in one or other, or both.
[19]This may merely mean, “who give strict orders” not to flinch, which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of the sense given above, which seems more forcible.
[20]See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen oun logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]
[21]Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata invanostumultus gens.
[22]In Coronea in Bœotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed to some Phocians. “The regulars” were Boeotian troops, the [Greek: politika] Coroneans.
[23]By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to imitate.
[24]The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as here used, in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia todi aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata sumbebaekos de to proteron].
[1]Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.
[2]But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, “to love” and “to kiss,” [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap. XIII. 5.
[3]Thingsare [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name in common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] isclosetherefore when the difference though real is but slight. There is no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], “equivocal” being applied to a term and not to its various significates.
[4]See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen echei kai tagatha k.t.l.]
[5]A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as confining his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to touch him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue to his own person.
[6]See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.
[7]Cardwell’s text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon], yields a much easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but only the particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the unlawful : the unequal :: universal Injustice the particulari.e.as whole to part.There is a reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis, but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.
[8]There are two reasons why the characters are not necessarily coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out the [Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so thereforepro tantois he.Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he does thefactsof a good man but for the perfection of his own individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move rightly in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III. chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler’s first Sermon.
[9]Terms used for persons.
[10]By [Greek:——] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50, etc, by [Greek:——] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.
[11]The profits of a mercantile transaction (say £1000) are to be divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real point to be settled); then,A : B :: 400 : 600.A : 400 :: B : 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as to make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).A+400 : B+600 :: A : B. This represents the actual distribution; its fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.
[12]i.e.where the ratio is that of equality, thus 2 : 2 :: 40 : 40
[13]Her Majesty’s “Justices.”
[14]I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that he put them where they made the best sense.
[15]This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not pretend to be able to get it out of the words.
[16]This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and another against the office.
[17]χάρις denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.
[18]The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only had (say) one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have. Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most valuable, andvice versa.Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:——] at [Greek:——], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the wares as between the persons,i.e.the ratio of equality.If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both [Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr. shoes = 1 house.