Note1.—This rule is transgressed in the following examples: “Beware of false prophets,whichcome to you in sheep’s clothing.” “The fruit tree bearing fruit afterhiskind.” “There was indeed in our destinies such a conformity, as seldom is found inthatof two persons in the same age.” Here that, referring todestinies, is put forthose. “The crown had it intheirpower to give such rewards as they thought proper.”—Parliamentary Debates.Note2.—The relative should be placed as near as possible to the antecedent, otherwise ambiguity is sometimes occasioned.Note3.—In the earlier editions of Murray’s Grammar, we find the following rule: “When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different persons, it may agree in person with either, as, ‘I am the man who commands you,’ or ‘I am the man who command you.’” The rule here given is erroneous. The construction is by no means arbitrary. If we say, “I am the man who commands you,” the relative clause, with the antecedentman, form the predicate; andthe sentence is equivalent to “I am your commander.” If we say, “I am the man who command you,”the mansimply is the predicate, andI who command youthe subject; thus, “I who command you,” or “I your commander am the man.” This error, sufficiently obvious to every discerning reader, I pointed out in the former edition of this Treatise. Murray’s rule, as it stood, is clearly repugnant to perspicuity, and syntactical correctness.In the last edition of his Grammar, and, I believe, in every edition posterior to the publication of the “Etymology and Syntax,” the rule is altered; but whether from a disinclination to expunge a rule, which he had once delivered—a disinclination perhaps accompanied with a belief, that it might be corrected with little prejudice to its original form, or from what other motive he has left it in its present state, I will not presume to determine; but in the alteration, which he has introduced, he appears to me to have consulted neither usefulness nor perspicuity. He says, “When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different persons, itmayagree in person with either.” So far he has transcribed the former rule; but he adds, “according to the sense.” Now it cannot be questioned, and the learner needs not to be informed, that the relativemayagree with either. If after having taught the learner, that a Latin adjectivemustagree with its substantive, we were to add, as a distinct rule, that itmayagree with either of the two substantives, according to the sense, I apprehend, we should be chargeable with vain repetition, or with extreme inattention to correctness and precision. For what would our rule imply? Clearly nothing more, than that the adjective is capable of agreeing with the substantive to which it belongs; and of this capacity no scholar, who had learned to decline an adjective, could possibly be ignorant; or it might convey some idea, that the concord is optional. Now, is it not certain, that the adjective must agree with its proper substantive, namely, that whose meaning it is intended to modify, and no other? The relative, in like manner,mustagree with that antecedent, and that only, whose representative it is in the relative clause. There is nothing arbitrary in either the one case, or the other.Perhaps it may be answered that, though the former part of the altered rule leaves the concord as it first stood, discretionary, the latter confines the agreement of the relative to its proper antecedent. But why this apparent contrariety? Why is that represented as arbitrary, which is determined by the sense? This, however, is not the only objection; for it may be affirmed, without hesitation, that the rule, thus considered, is completely superfluous. For the learner has been already told, that the relative agrees with the antecedent in gender, number, and person. And can the antecedent be any other, than that which the sense indicates? And what does this rule teach? Precisely the same thing. The rule, therefore, is either calculated to mislead by representing as arbitrary what is fixed and determinate, or it is purely a rule of supererogation. As it stood originally, it gave some new information; but that information was erroneous: as it stands now, it is either indefinite, or it is useless.The scholar may require an admonition, when there are two antecedents of different persons, to be careful in referring the relative to its proper antecedent; but to tell him that it may agree with the one, or the other, according to the sense, is to tell him nothing, or tell him that, which he already knows. In the examples just now adduced, the termination of the verb, by indicating the person of the relative, clearly shows the antecedent; but, where the substantives are of the same person, and the verb cannot therefore by its termination indicate the antecedent, ambiguity should be precluded by the mode of arrangement. Thus, “He is the hero who did it,” and “He who did it is the hero.” In the former,heis the subject, and thehero who did itthe predicate; and in the latter,he who did itis the subject, and theherothe predicate.Note4.—The relative, instead of referring to any particular word as its antecedent, sometimes refers to a whole clause, thus, “the bill was rejected by the lords, which excited no small degree of jealousy and discontent,” that is, “which thing,” namely, the rejection of the bill.Note5.—The antecedent pronoun of the third person is often suppressed, when no particular emphasis is implied;as, “Who steals my purse, steals trash,”i.e.“he,” or “the man, who.” “Whom he would he slew; and whom he would he kept alive,”Bible;i.e.“Those whom he would.” “Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin.” In this example the antecedenthe, and nominative to the principal verb, is understood.Priestley has remarked that the pronounswhoeverandwhosoeverhave sometimes a double construction. He gives the two following examples. “Elizabeth publicly threatened that she would have the head of whoever had advised it.”—Hume.“He offered a great recompense to whomsoever would help him to a sight of him.”—Hume.Though the learned author seems to admit both these modes of construction, we apprehend that only one of them is grammatical. It has been just now observed that the antecedent is often understood to the relativewho, and to the compoundswhoeverandwhosoever. If the antecedent be supplied, it will be found that the construction is not arbitrary, as Priestley supposes, but definite and fixed. The first sentence is correct. “She would have the head of him, or them, whoever had advised,” the relative being the nominative to the verb. “He offered a great recompense to him, or them, whosoever should help him.”Whomsoeveris a solecism: though close to the prepositionto, it is not under its government. (See the following rules.)
Note1.—This rule is transgressed in the following examples: “Beware of false prophets,whichcome to you in sheep’s clothing.” “The fruit tree bearing fruit afterhiskind.” “There was indeed in our destinies such a conformity, as seldom is found inthatof two persons in the same age.” Here that, referring todestinies, is put forthose. “The crown had it intheirpower to give such rewards as they thought proper.”—Parliamentary Debates.
Note2.—The relative should be placed as near as possible to the antecedent, otherwise ambiguity is sometimes occasioned.
Note3.—In the earlier editions of Murray’s Grammar, we find the following rule: “When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different persons, it may agree in person with either, as, ‘I am the man who commands you,’ or ‘I am the man who command you.’” The rule here given is erroneous. The construction is by no means arbitrary. If we say, “I am the man who commands you,” the relative clause, with the antecedentman, form the predicate; andthe sentence is equivalent to “I am your commander.” If we say, “I am the man who command you,”the mansimply is the predicate, andI who command youthe subject; thus, “I who command you,” or “I your commander am the man.” This error, sufficiently obvious to every discerning reader, I pointed out in the former edition of this Treatise. Murray’s rule, as it stood, is clearly repugnant to perspicuity, and syntactical correctness.
In the last edition of his Grammar, and, I believe, in every edition posterior to the publication of the “Etymology and Syntax,” the rule is altered; but whether from a disinclination to expunge a rule, which he had once delivered—a disinclination perhaps accompanied with a belief, that it might be corrected with little prejudice to its original form, or from what other motive he has left it in its present state, I will not presume to determine; but in the alteration, which he has introduced, he appears to me to have consulted neither usefulness nor perspicuity. He says, “When the relative is preceded by two nominatives of different persons, itmayagree in person with either.” So far he has transcribed the former rule; but he adds, “according to the sense.” Now it cannot be questioned, and the learner needs not to be informed, that the relativemayagree with either. If after having taught the learner, that a Latin adjectivemustagree with its substantive, we were to add, as a distinct rule, that itmayagree with either of the two substantives, according to the sense, I apprehend, we should be chargeable with vain repetition, or with extreme inattention to correctness and precision. For what would our rule imply? Clearly nothing more, than that the adjective is capable of agreeing with the substantive to which it belongs; and of this capacity no scholar, who had learned to decline an adjective, could possibly be ignorant; or it might convey some idea, that the concord is optional. Now, is it not certain, that the adjective must agree with its proper substantive, namely, that whose meaning it is intended to modify, and no other? The relative, in like manner,mustagree with that antecedent, and that only, whose representative it is in the relative clause. There is nothing arbitrary in either the one case, or the other.
Perhaps it may be answered that, though the former part of the altered rule leaves the concord as it first stood, discretionary, the latter confines the agreement of the relative to its proper antecedent. But why this apparent contrariety? Why is that represented as arbitrary, which is determined by the sense? This, however, is not the only objection; for it may be affirmed, without hesitation, that the rule, thus considered, is completely superfluous. For the learner has been already told, that the relative agrees with the antecedent in gender, number, and person. And can the antecedent be any other, than that which the sense indicates? And what does this rule teach? Precisely the same thing. The rule, therefore, is either calculated to mislead by representing as arbitrary what is fixed and determinate, or it is purely a rule of supererogation. As it stood originally, it gave some new information; but that information was erroneous: as it stands now, it is either indefinite, or it is useless.
The scholar may require an admonition, when there are two antecedents of different persons, to be careful in referring the relative to its proper antecedent; but to tell him that it may agree with the one, or the other, according to the sense, is to tell him nothing, or tell him that, which he already knows. In the examples just now adduced, the termination of the verb, by indicating the person of the relative, clearly shows the antecedent; but, where the substantives are of the same person, and the verb cannot therefore by its termination indicate the antecedent, ambiguity should be precluded by the mode of arrangement. Thus, “He is the hero who did it,” and “He who did it is the hero.” In the former,heis the subject, and thehero who did itthe predicate; and in the latter,he who did itis the subject, and theherothe predicate.
Note4.—The relative, instead of referring to any particular word as its antecedent, sometimes refers to a whole clause, thus, “the bill was rejected by the lords, which excited no small degree of jealousy and discontent,” that is, “which thing,” namely, the rejection of the bill.
Note5.—The antecedent pronoun of the third person is often suppressed, when no particular emphasis is implied;as, “Who steals my purse, steals trash,”i.e.“he,” or “the man, who.” “Whom he would he slew; and whom he would he kept alive,”Bible;i.e.“Those whom he would.” “Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin.” In this example the antecedenthe, and nominative to the principal verb, is understood.
Priestley has remarked that the pronounswhoeverandwhosoeverhave sometimes a double construction. He gives the two following examples. “Elizabeth publicly threatened that she would have the head of whoever had advised it.”—Hume.“He offered a great recompense to whomsoever would help him to a sight of him.”—Hume.Though the learned author seems to admit both these modes of construction, we apprehend that only one of them is grammatical. It has been just now observed that the antecedent is often understood to the relativewho, and to the compoundswhoeverandwhosoever. If the antecedent be supplied, it will be found that the construction is not arbitrary, as Priestley supposes, but definite and fixed. The first sentence is correct. “She would have the head of him, or them, whoever had advised,” the relative being the nominative to the verb. “He offered a great recompense to him, or them, whosoever should help him.”Whomsoeveris a solecism: though close to the prepositionto, it is not under its government. (See the following rules.)
Rule X.—If no nominative intervene between the relative and the verb, the relative shall be the nominative to the verb, as, “Solomon, who was the son of David, built the temple of Jerusalem.” Herewhois the nominative to the verbwas.
Rule XI.—But, if a nominative intervene between the relative and the verb, the relative shall be under the government of the preposition going before, or the noun or verb following, as, “God, whom we worship, is the Lord, by whose gift we live, and by whom all things were made.” In the first relative clause, whereweisthe intervening nominative, the relative is in the objective case, and governed by the verb following: in the second clause, where the intervening nominative is likewisewe, the relative is in the genitive case, and governed by the noun following, thus, “by whose gift,” or “by the gift of whom;” and in the third clause, wherethingsis the intervening nominative, the relative is in the objective case, and governed by the preposition.
Note1.—The case of the relative may always be ascertained by repeating the antecedent, and arranging the clause in the natural order, thus, “the city, which is called Rome, was founded by Romulus,”i.e.“the city, which city is called Rome.” The antecedent repeated is the nominative to the verbis,whichtherefore agrees with it in case. “God, who sees all things, will punish the wicked,”i.e.“God, which God sees all things;” the relative, therefore, is the nominative to the verbsees, that is, it is in the same case in which the antecedent would be put, if again expressed. “Solomon, whom David loved, was the wisest of princes.” Here, if we arrange the relative clause in the natural order, beginning with the nominative and the verb, it will run thus, “David loved whom,” an expression analogous to “David loved him,” or “David loved which Solomon.” Many solecisms in the construction of the relative would be easily avoided, by a little attention to the natural arrangement. Thus, instead of committing the error involved in the following examples, “The philosopher, who he saw to be a man of profound knowledge,” “’Twas my brother, who you met with,” “I was a stranger to the person, who I spoke to,” we should be led by the natural order to the correct phraseology; “he saw whom,” “you met with whom,” “I spoke to whom.” It is to be observed, however, that, though the personal pronouns, when under the government of a verb, may either precede or follow it, the relative in the same state of government must invariably go before it.Note2.—The relativeswhoandwhichare often understood, especially in colloquial language: “The friend Ivisited yesterday is dead to-day,”i.e.“the friend whom I visited yesterday is dead to-day.”Note3.—After a comparative, both relative and antecedent are often understood. “The damage was far greater than he knew.” Here there is a comparison of two objects, the damage suffered, and the damage known; but only one is expressed. The sentence, if the ellipsis were supplied, would run thus, “The damage was far greater, than what,” or “that, which he knew.”Note4.—There are a few cases, which are considered by some distinguished critics and grammarians, as requiring the use ofthatin preference to the pronounswhoandwhich.1st. After superlatives the pronounthatis generally used, as, “The wisest man, that ever lived, is liable to error.”2ndly. After the wordsame,thatis generally used, as, “he is the same man, that you saw yesterday.” But, if a preposition should precede the relative, one of the other two pronouns must be employed, the pronounthatnot admitting a preposition prefixed to it, as, “he is the same man, with whom you were acquainted.” It is remarkable, however, that whenthe arrangement issomewhat changed, the wordthatadmits the preposition, as, “he is the same man, that you were acquainted with.”3rdly.Thatis used afterwho, taken interrogatively, as, “Who, that has the spirit of a man, would suffer himself to be thus degraded?”4thly. When persons and things are referred to, as, “themenandthings,thathe hath studied, have not contributed to the improvement of his morals.”
Note1.—The case of the relative may always be ascertained by repeating the antecedent, and arranging the clause in the natural order, thus, “the city, which is called Rome, was founded by Romulus,”i.e.“the city, which city is called Rome.” The antecedent repeated is the nominative to the verbis,whichtherefore agrees with it in case. “God, who sees all things, will punish the wicked,”i.e.“God, which God sees all things;” the relative, therefore, is the nominative to the verbsees, that is, it is in the same case in which the antecedent would be put, if again expressed. “Solomon, whom David loved, was the wisest of princes.” Here, if we arrange the relative clause in the natural order, beginning with the nominative and the verb, it will run thus, “David loved whom,” an expression analogous to “David loved him,” or “David loved which Solomon.” Many solecisms in the construction of the relative would be easily avoided, by a little attention to the natural arrangement. Thus, instead of committing the error involved in the following examples, “The philosopher, who he saw to be a man of profound knowledge,” “’Twas my brother, who you met with,” “I was a stranger to the person, who I spoke to,” we should be led by the natural order to the correct phraseology; “he saw whom,” “you met with whom,” “I spoke to whom.” It is to be observed, however, that, though the personal pronouns, when under the government of a verb, may either precede or follow it, the relative in the same state of government must invariably go before it.
Note2.—The relativeswhoandwhichare often understood, especially in colloquial language: “The friend Ivisited yesterday is dead to-day,”i.e.“the friend whom I visited yesterday is dead to-day.”
Note3.—After a comparative, both relative and antecedent are often understood. “The damage was far greater than he knew.” Here there is a comparison of two objects, the damage suffered, and the damage known; but only one is expressed. The sentence, if the ellipsis were supplied, would run thus, “The damage was far greater, than what,” or “that, which he knew.”
Note4.—There are a few cases, which are considered by some distinguished critics and grammarians, as requiring the use ofthatin preference to the pronounswhoandwhich.
1st. After superlatives the pronounthatis generally used, as, “The wisest man, that ever lived, is liable to error.”
2ndly. After the wordsame,thatis generally used, as, “he is the same man, that you saw yesterday.” But, if a preposition should precede the relative, one of the other two pronouns must be employed, the pronounthatnot admitting a preposition prefixed to it, as, “he is the same man, with whom you were acquainted.” It is remarkable, however, that whenthe arrangement issomewhat changed, the wordthatadmits the preposition, as, “he is the same man, that you were acquainted with.”
3rdly.Thatis used afterwho, taken interrogatively, as, “Who, that has the spirit of a man, would suffer himself to be thus degraded?”
4thly. When persons and things are referred to, as, “themenandthings,thathe hath studied, have not contributed to the improvement of his morals.”
Rule XII.—An active transitive verb governs the accusative or objective case, as,
“He teaches me.”“We honour him.”
Note1.—As examples of transgression against this rule, we may adduce the following: “Whodo I love so much?”—Shakspeare.“Whoshould I meet the other day, but myold friend?”—Spectator.“Those,whohe thought true to his party.”—Clarendon.Note2. As substantives have no objective case, the subject or object of the energy or affection is distinguished by its place, which is after the verb, as “Achilles slew Hector,” whereAchilles, the agent, precedes, andHector, the subject of the action, follows the verb. Reverse this order, and the meaning is reversed, as “Hector slew Achilles.” Where the proper arrangement is not observed, ambiguity or misconstruction is frequently produced. Thus, when Pope says, Odyss. xix.“And thus the son the fervent sire address’d,”it may be asked, did the son address the sire, or the sire address the son? A little attention would have prevented the ambiguity. If the sire addressed the son, the line should run thus,“And thus his son the fervent sire address’d.”If the son addressed the sire,“And thus the son his fervent sire address’d.”Note3.—An active intransitive verb sometimes governs the objective case of a noun, of the same or a kindred signification, as, “Let us run the race, which is set before us.” “If any man see his brother sin a sin, which is not unto death.”—Bible.The latter verb, however, though thus used, must not be employed in a transitive sense. It is an error, therefore, to say, “What have I sinned?”—Bible.It should be, “How?” or “In what?” Some intransitive verbs also, when used in a reflex sense, are joined to an objective case, as, “Then having shown his wounds, he’d sit him down.”—Home’s Douglas.This is a poetic licence, which, in a prose writer, would not be tolerated, unless in colloquial and very familiar language.Note4.—The objective case should not, if possible, be separated from its verb. This rule is violated in the following sentence: “Becket could not better discover, than by attacking so powerful an interest, his resolution to maintain,” &c.—Hume.The regimen is here unnecessarily, and very inelegantly, separated from its verb.
Note1.—As examples of transgression against this rule, we may adduce the following: “Whodo I love so much?”—Shakspeare.“Whoshould I meet the other day, but myold friend?”—Spectator.“Those,whohe thought true to his party.”—Clarendon.
Note2. As substantives have no objective case, the subject or object of the energy or affection is distinguished by its place, which is after the verb, as “Achilles slew Hector,” whereAchilles, the agent, precedes, andHector, the subject of the action, follows the verb. Reverse this order, and the meaning is reversed, as “Hector slew Achilles.” Where the proper arrangement is not observed, ambiguity or misconstruction is frequently produced. Thus, when Pope says, Odyss. xix.
“And thus the son the fervent sire address’d,”
“And thus the son the fervent sire address’d,”
“And thus the son the fervent sire address’d,”
it may be asked, did the son address the sire, or the sire address the son? A little attention would have prevented the ambiguity. If the sire addressed the son, the line should run thus,
“And thus his son the fervent sire address’d.”
“And thus his son the fervent sire address’d.”
“And thus his son the fervent sire address’d.”
If the son addressed the sire,
“And thus the son his fervent sire address’d.”
“And thus the son his fervent sire address’d.”
“And thus the son his fervent sire address’d.”
Note3.—An active intransitive verb sometimes governs the objective case of a noun, of the same or a kindred signification, as, “Let us run the race, which is set before us.” “If any man see his brother sin a sin, which is not unto death.”—Bible.The latter verb, however, though thus used, must not be employed in a transitive sense. It is an error, therefore, to say, “What have I sinned?”—Bible.It should be, “How?” or “In what?” Some intransitive verbs also, when used in a reflex sense, are joined to an objective case, as, “Then having shown his wounds, he’d sit him down.”—Home’s Douglas.This is a poetic licence, which, in a prose writer, would not be tolerated, unless in colloquial and very familiar language.
Note4.—The objective case should not, if possible, be separated from its verb. This rule is violated in the following sentence: “Becket could not better discover, than by attacking so powerful an interest, his resolution to maintain,” &c.—Hume.The regimen is here unnecessarily, and very inelegantly, separated from its verb.
Rule XIII.—Verbs signifying to ask, teach, offer, promise, pay, tell, allow, deny, and some others of like signification, are sometimes, especially in colloquial language, followed in the passive voice by an objective case.
Note1.—This rule seems to have escaped the attention of all our English grammarians, except Priestley, who observes, “that in some familiar phrases, the subject and object of our affirmation seem to be transposed.” This idiom, except in a very few instances, is not to be found in Latin, though it occurs pretty often in Greek: it therefore particularly merits the attention of the junior Latin scholar, lest in his Anglo-Latin translations it should betray him into an egregious solecism. “He allowed me great liberty,” turned passively, in concurrence with the Latin idiom, “great liberty was allowed me.” But we say also in English, “I was allowed great liberty.” “He promised (to) me a ship in five days,” passively, “a ship was promised me,” and “I was promisedherin five days.” “She would not accept the jewels, though they were offered to her by her mother,” or, “though she was offeredthemby her mother.”Note2.—After verbs ofgiving,telling,sending,promising,offering, and others of like signification, the thing is very generally placed before the person. In the time of Swift and Addison this rule was not uniformly observed. We find authors of that period saying indiscriminately, “Give it us,” and “Give us it;” “Tell him it,” and “Tell it him;” “He promised me it,” and “He promised it me.” In Scotland these two modes of expression still obtain. In England they are now reduced under one general rule. We say, “Give it me,” “Tell it him,” “He sent it us.”
Note1.—This rule seems to have escaped the attention of all our English grammarians, except Priestley, who observes, “that in some familiar phrases, the subject and object of our affirmation seem to be transposed.” This idiom, except in a very few instances, is not to be found in Latin, though it occurs pretty often in Greek: it therefore particularly merits the attention of the junior Latin scholar, lest in his Anglo-Latin translations it should betray him into an egregious solecism. “He allowed me great liberty,” turned passively, in concurrence with the Latin idiom, “great liberty was allowed me.” But we say also in English, “I was allowed great liberty.” “He promised (to) me a ship in five days,” passively, “a ship was promised me,” and “I was promisedherin five days.” “She would not accept the jewels, though they were offered to her by her mother,” or, “though she was offeredthemby her mother.”
Note2.—After verbs ofgiving,telling,sending,promising,offering, and others of like signification, the thing is very generally placed before the person. In the time of Swift and Addison this rule was not uniformly observed. We find authors of that period saying indiscriminately, “Give it us,” and “Give us it;” “Tell him it,” and “Tell it him;” “He promised me it,” and “He promised it me.” In Scotland these two modes of expression still obtain. In England they are now reduced under one general rule. We say, “Give it me,” “Tell it him,” “He sent it us.”
Rule XIV.—The verbto behas the same case after it as it has before it, thus denoting that the subjects are identical, or that the one term is the predicate of the other, as, “It is he,” “You believed it to be him.” In the former example,itis the nominative to the verb, the nominative casehetherefore follows theverb. In the latter,itis the regimen of the verbbelieved, the verbto beis therefore followed by the objective case.
Note1.—This rule is violated in such examples as “it isme,” “it washim,” “I believed it to behe,” “whomdo men say that I am?” In the last example, the natural arrangement is, “men say that I am whom,” where, contrary to the rule, the nominativeIprecedes, and the objective casewhomfollows the verb.Note2.—Priestley has asked, “Who would not say, ‘If it be me,’ rather than ‘If it be I?’” Our ears are certainly more familiar with the former than with the latter phraseology, and those who consult the ear only, may prefer it: but, where no advantage is gained by a departure from analogy, every deviation is at once idle and reprehensible.Note3.—The verbto beis called by logicians thecopula, as connecting the subject with the predicate. Thus, when we say, “he is wise,” “they are learned,”heandtheyare the subjects;wiseandlearnedthe predicates. Now, it particularly deserves the attention of the classical scholar, that in English almost any verb may be used as acopula. This circumstance is the more worthy of his notice, as a conformity to the Latin idiom may lead him to reject expressions, which are unexceptionable, and to adopt others not strictly correct[125]. Thus we say, “it tastes good,” “he strikes hard,” “I remember right,” “he feels sick;” “we came late,” “they rise early,” “he drinks deep.” I am aware that the wordslate,early, are in such examples considered as adverbs. It appears to me they are adjectives,—that the idiom is truly English, and that all these expressions are perfectly analogous.
Note1.—This rule is violated in such examples as “it isme,” “it washim,” “I believed it to behe,” “whomdo men say that I am?” In the last example, the natural arrangement is, “men say that I am whom,” where, contrary to the rule, the nominativeIprecedes, and the objective casewhomfollows the verb.
Note2.—Priestley has asked, “Who would not say, ‘If it be me,’ rather than ‘If it be I?’” Our ears are certainly more familiar with the former than with the latter phraseology, and those who consult the ear only, may prefer it: but, where no advantage is gained by a departure from analogy, every deviation is at once idle and reprehensible.
Note3.—The verbto beis called by logicians thecopula, as connecting the subject with the predicate. Thus, when we say, “he is wise,” “they are learned,”heandtheyare the subjects;wiseandlearnedthe predicates. Now, it particularly deserves the attention of the classical scholar, that in English almost any verb may be used as acopula. This circumstance is the more worthy of his notice, as a conformity to the Latin idiom may lead him to reject expressions, which are unexceptionable, and to adopt others not strictly correct[125]. Thus we say, “it tastes good,” “he strikes hard,” “I remember right,” “he feels sick;” “we came late,” “they rise early,” “he drinks deep.” I am aware that the wordslate,early, are in such examples considered as adverbs. It appears to me they are adjectives,—that the idiom is truly English, and that all these expressions are perfectly analogous.
Rule XV.—When two verbs come together, the attribute signified by the one verb being the subject or object of the action, energy, or affection expressed by the other, the former is governed in the infinitivemood, as, “he taught me to read,” “I knew him to be.”
Note1.—The infinitive thus frequently supplies the place of an objective case after the verb, as it often stands for a nominative before it, as, “he loves to study,” or “he loves study.”Note2.—In such examples as, “I read to learn,” where the latter phrase, though in the same form asto study, in the preceding example, has, notwithstanding, a different meaning, and cannot be resolved like it into “I read learning,” in such examples, as Tooke justly observes, the prepositionfordenoting the object, and equivalent topourin French, is understood, as, “I read for to learn.” Our southern neighbours indeed, in these examples, never omit the casual term; and Trusler has not improperly observed, that, when the verb does not express the certain and immediate effect, but something remote and contingent, the wordsin order to, which are nearly equivalent tofor, may be pertinently introduced as, “in order to acquire fame, men encounter the greatest dangers.”Note3.—The verbs tobid,dare,need,make,see,hear,feel,let, are not followed by the sign of the infinitive, as, “He bade me go,” “I saw him do it.” It is to be observed, however, that in the language of Scripture the verb “to make” is often followed byto, as, “He maketh his suntorise.” The verb “to dare,” for “to challenge,” or “to defy,” is also construed withto, “I dare thee buttobreathe upon my love.”—Shakspeare.Note4.—Nouns, adjectives, and participles, are often followed by an infinitive, as, “yourdesire to improvewill ultimately contribute to your happiness.” “Good men aredesirous to dogood.”Note5.—As the proper tense of the subsequent or secondary verb has, in certain cases, been a subject of dispute, it may be necessary to observe, that, when the simple attribute, or merely the primary idea expressed by the subsequent verb, is intended to be signified, it should then be put in the present tense: but when the idea of perfection or completion is combined with the primary idea, the subsequent verb should have that form, which is termed the perfect ofthe infinitive. Or, perhaps, this rule may, more intelligibly to the scholar, though less correctly, be thus expressed, that when the action or state, denoted by the subsequent verb, is contemporary with that of the primary verb, then the secondary verb must be put in the present tense; but when the action or state is prior to that expressed by the secondary verb, the latter must be put in the preterite tense. Usage, indeed, and the opinions of grammarians, are divided on this subject. But when nothing but usage can be pleaded in favour of one phraseology, and when reason concurs with usage to recommend another, it will not be questioned that the latter deserves the preference. Thus, we should say, “I expected to see you,” and not “I expected to have seen you;” because either the expectation and the seeing must be regarded as contemporary, or the former must be considered as prior to the latter. But why, it may be asked, must the seeing be considered as contemporary with the expectation? Might not the former have been anterior to the latter? This is certainly possible; I may see a friend before I expect him. But though the sight, abstractedly considered, may precede the expectation, it cannot possibly, as an object of expectation, be prior to it. The idea involves absurdity, equal and analogous to the assertion, that the paper, on which I write, existed as an object of my perception, previously to my perceiving it. Agreeably to the second form of the rule here given, we find that the Latins very generally used the present of the infinitive, to express an action or state contemporary with the attribute of the primary verb. Thus,dixit me scribere, “he said that I wrote,” or “was writing,” that is, at the time of his saying so:dixit me scripsisse, “he said that I had written.”I have observed, that, when the simple attribute denoted by the subsequent verb is implied, we should use the present of the infinitive. This phraseology should not only be used in all cases, where contemporary actions or states are to be signified, but may also be sometimes employed, where the secondary verb denotes something posterior to what is implied by the first. For though in no instance, where the simple action or state is to be expressed, should we use the sign of past or future time, yet for obvious reasons we may, and oftendo, employ the present infinitive, or simple name, to denote what is future, when the primary verb necessarily implies the futurity of its object. Thus, instead of saying, “he promised that he would pay,” where the constructive sign of futurity is used to denote the posteriority of the payment, we often say, “he promised to pay,” employing the present tense, synonymous with the simple name, as, “he promised payment.” The Latins also, though they almost universally, unless in colloquial language, preferred the former mode of expression, sometimes adopted the latter, as,denegavit se dare.—Plaut.Jusjurandum pollicitus est dare.—Id.“He refused to give,” “he promised to give,” or “he promised giving,” the secondary verb expressing the act simply, and the time being necessarily implied.Note6.—The infinitive mood is sometimes used in an absolute or independent sense, as, “to speak the truth, we are all liable to error.” “Not to trespass on your time, I will briefly explain the whole affair,” that is, “that I may speak,” “that I may not trespass.”
Note1.—The infinitive thus frequently supplies the place of an objective case after the verb, as it often stands for a nominative before it, as, “he loves to study,” or “he loves study.”
Note2.—In such examples as, “I read to learn,” where the latter phrase, though in the same form asto study, in the preceding example, has, notwithstanding, a different meaning, and cannot be resolved like it into “I read learning,” in such examples, as Tooke justly observes, the prepositionfordenoting the object, and equivalent topourin French, is understood, as, “I read for to learn.” Our southern neighbours indeed, in these examples, never omit the casual term; and Trusler has not improperly observed, that, when the verb does not express the certain and immediate effect, but something remote and contingent, the wordsin order to, which are nearly equivalent tofor, may be pertinently introduced as, “in order to acquire fame, men encounter the greatest dangers.”
Note3.—The verbs tobid,dare,need,make,see,hear,feel,let, are not followed by the sign of the infinitive, as, “He bade me go,” “I saw him do it.” It is to be observed, however, that in the language of Scripture the verb “to make” is often followed byto, as, “He maketh his suntorise.” The verb “to dare,” for “to challenge,” or “to defy,” is also construed withto, “I dare thee buttobreathe upon my love.”—Shakspeare.
Note4.—Nouns, adjectives, and participles, are often followed by an infinitive, as, “yourdesire to improvewill ultimately contribute to your happiness.” “Good men aredesirous to dogood.”
Note5.—As the proper tense of the subsequent or secondary verb has, in certain cases, been a subject of dispute, it may be necessary to observe, that, when the simple attribute, or merely the primary idea expressed by the subsequent verb, is intended to be signified, it should then be put in the present tense: but when the idea of perfection or completion is combined with the primary idea, the subsequent verb should have that form, which is termed the perfect ofthe infinitive. Or, perhaps, this rule may, more intelligibly to the scholar, though less correctly, be thus expressed, that when the action or state, denoted by the subsequent verb, is contemporary with that of the primary verb, then the secondary verb must be put in the present tense; but when the action or state is prior to that expressed by the secondary verb, the latter must be put in the preterite tense. Usage, indeed, and the opinions of grammarians, are divided on this subject. But when nothing but usage can be pleaded in favour of one phraseology, and when reason concurs with usage to recommend another, it will not be questioned that the latter deserves the preference. Thus, we should say, “I expected to see you,” and not “I expected to have seen you;” because either the expectation and the seeing must be regarded as contemporary, or the former must be considered as prior to the latter. But why, it may be asked, must the seeing be considered as contemporary with the expectation? Might not the former have been anterior to the latter? This is certainly possible; I may see a friend before I expect him. But though the sight, abstractedly considered, may precede the expectation, it cannot possibly, as an object of expectation, be prior to it. The idea involves absurdity, equal and analogous to the assertion, that the paper, on which I write, existed as an object of my perception, previously to my perceiving it. Agreeably to the second form of the rule here given, we find that the Latins very generally used the present of the infinitive, to express an action or state contemporary with the attribute of the primary verb. Thus,dixit me scribere, “he said that I wrote,” or “was writing,” that is, at the time of his saying so:dixit me scripsisse, “he said that I had written.”
I have observed, that, when the simple attribute denoted by the subsequent verb is implied, we should use the present of the infinitive. This phraseology should not only be used in all cases, where contemporary actions or states are to be signified, but may also be sometimes employed, where the secondary verb denotes something posterior to what is implied by the first. For though in no instance, where the simple action or state is to be expressed, should we use the sign of past or future time, yet for obvious reasons we may, and oftendo, employ the present infinitive, or simple name, to denote what is future, when the primary verb necessarily implies the futurity of its object. Thus, instead of saying, “he promised that he would pay,” where the constructive sign of futurity is used to denote the posteriority of the payment, we often say, “he promised to pay,” employing the present tense, synonymous with the simple name, as, “he promised payment.” The Latins also, though they almost universally, unless in colloquial language, preferred the former mode of expression, sometimes adopted the latter, as,denegavit se dare.—Plaut.Jusjurandum pollicitus est dare.—Id.“He refused to give,” “he promised to give,” or “he promised giving,” the secondary verb expressing the act simply, and the time being necessarily implied.
Note6.—The infinitive mood is sometimes used in an absolute or independent sense, as, “to speak the truth, we are all liable to error.” “Not to trespass on your time, I will briefly explain the whole affair,” that is, “that I may speak,” “that I may not trespass.”
Rule XVI.—The imperative, agreeably to the general rule, agrees with its nominative, as,
“Love thou;” “listen ye,” or “you.”
Note1.—The imperative is frequently used, without its subject, that is, the nominative being suppressed, but the person or persons being perfectly understood. “And Samuel said to the people, Fear not,”i.e.“Fear ye not.”Note2.—It is employed in the same way, in an absolute sense, without its subject. “Our ideas are movements of the nerves of sense, as of the optic nerve, in recollecting visible ideas,supposeof a triangular piece of ivory.”—Darwin.I agree with Webster in thinking, that there is “a peculiar felicity” in such absolute forms of expression, the verb being thus applicable to any of the three persons, thus, “I may suppose,” “you may suppose,” “one may suppose.”
Note1.—The imperative is frequently used, without its subject, that is, the nominative being suppressed, but the person or persons being perfectly understood. “And Samuel said to the people, Fear not,”i.e.“Fear ye not.”
Note2.—It is employed in the same way, in an absolute sense, without its subject. “Our ideas are movements of the nerves of sense, as of the optic nerve, in recollecting visible ideas,supposeof a triangular piece of ivory.”—Darwin.I agree with Webster in thinking, that there is “a peculiar felicity” in such absolute forms of expression, the verb being thus applicable to any of the three persons, thus, “I may suppose,” “you may suppose,” “one may suppose.”
Rule XVII.—Participles are construed as the verbs to which they belong, as,
“Teaching usto deny ungodliness.”
Note1.—The imperfect participle is frequently used like a substantive, and is, in such examples, of the same import with the infinitive of the verb; as, “they love reading,”i.e.“they love to read.” In some examples it becomes a real noun, and has a plural number, as,the outgoings of the morning.Note2.—Lowth contends that, when the imperfect participle of a transitive verb is not preceded by the definite article, it properly governs the objective case, and is analogous to the Latin gerund, as, “much advantage will be derived from observing this rule;” in which example,this ruleis the regimen of the participleobserving; and that, when the definite article precedes the participle, it becomes then a pure noun, and, therefore, cannot have the regimen of a verb. He therefore condemns this expression, “by the sending them the light of thy holy Spirit.” Some of our grammarians consider Lowth, in this instance, as fastidiously critical; but to me he appears chargeable with error. Let us examine the reasons, which the author adduces in support of his opinion.In this inquiry, the first and most pertinent question is, does usage justify the opinion of the author? He acknowledges the contrary: he even admits that there is not a single writer who does not violate this rule. Were it necessary, indeed, after this concession, it would be easy to evince, that not only our translators of the Bible, whose authority surely is of great weight, but also other writers of the highest eminence, employ the phraseology which he condemns.Again. Does the distinction, which he wishes to establish, favour perspicuity? The very reverse appears to me to be the case; for he admits an identity of sense in two distinct phraseologies, which are incontestably, in many instances, susceptible of different meanings. And, though this ambiguity may not be involved in every example, we have surely good reasons for repudiating a phraseology which may, in any instance, be liable to misconstruction. We are to prescribe, not what may be perspicuous in some instances, but what must be intelligible in all.Lowth says, that we may express the sentiment, either byinserting the article before the participle and the preposition after it, or by the omission of both; in other words, that these phraseologies are equivalent. Thus, according to him, we may say either, “by sendinghis Son into the world,” or “by the sendingofhis Son.” Here, perhaps, the meaning is sufficiently clear, whichsoever of these forms of expression be adopted. But let us take another example, as, “he expressed the pleasure he had, in hearing the philosopher.” Now, according to Lowth, we may also say, “he expressed the pleasure he had, in the hearing of the philosopher.” Is there no difference of sentiment here? Are these expressions equivalent? The contrary must be obvious to the most inattentive reader. According to the former phraseology, the philosopher was heard—he is represented as passive; agreeably to the latter, he was active—he heard.Again. “When the Lord saw it, he abhorred them, because of the provoking of his sons and daughters.” Our translators have correctly exhibited the sentiment. The sons and daughters had given offence; they had provoked the Deity. But, if Lowth’s opinion be correct, the expression might be “because of provoking his sons and daughters;” a phrase which evidently conveys a very different idea.Again. When it is said, “at the hearing of the ear, they will believe,” is this expression convertible, without violating the sense, into, “at hearing the ear they will believe?” Many more examples might be produced to prove that these phraseologies, which Lowth considers of the same import, are by no means equivalent. It appears, then, that perspicuity is not consulted by adopting this rule.Again. He considers the participle, with a preposition before it, as correspondent to the Latin gerund, and therefore governing an objective case; but the participle preceded by an article, he considers as a substantive, and therefore incapable of any regimen. Now, as the author reasons from one language to another, we may pertinently ask, is not the Latin gerund a noun, a verbal substantive, not only having the form, and the inflexions of a noun, but governed like it, by nouns, adjectives, verbs, and prepositions, itself likewise governing the case of its verb? This position, were this theplace for it, we could easily prove, notwithstanding the objections which Scioppius, Vossius, with some other grammarians, have alleged against it. Nay, whatever theory be adopted respecting the nature of the gerund, there cannot exist a doubt, that, in the early ages of Roman literature, the verbal nouns iniogoverned an accusative, like the verbs whence they were derived.Quid tibi curatio est hanc rem, is one example from Plautus out of many, which might be produced[126]. That the supines also were, in truth, substantives admitting a regimen, is equally clear:Difficile dictuwas originallydifficile in dictu; andmisit oratum opem,misit ad oratum opem. Nor can the structure of the future infinitive passive be so satisfactorily resolved, notwithstanding a few repugnant examples, as on this supposition:Dixit libros lectum iriis resolved intodixit (id) iri ad lectum libros, wherelibrosis the regimen of the verbal nounlectum.Thus it is evident, that the Latin gerunds, supines, and verbal nouns inio, though in form and inflexion substantives, governed an accusative case. It matters not, indeed, to the point in question, what was the practice of the ancients in this respect; nor should I, therefore, have dwelt so long on this subject, did I not conceive, that the very authority to which Dr. Lowth seems to appeal, militates against him; and that the very language, to which in this, as in most other cases, he strives to assimilate ours, had nouns governing cases, like the verbs from which they came.From the preceding observations, I think it must appear, that the rule given by Dr. Lowth, is neither sanctioned by general usage, nor friendly to perspicuity; while the violation of it is perfectly reconcilable with the practice of the Roman writers, if their authority can, in this question, be deemed of any value.Having attempted to prove the invalidity of Lowth’s argument, and the impropriety of his rule, as establishing an identity of meaning, where a difference must exist, I would submit to the candid and judicious critic the following remarks.The participle ininghas either an active or passive signification;its import must, therefore, be determined by the judgment of the reader, or by explanatory adjections. Whatever, then, is calculated to remove all misconstruction, and to render its import clear and unequivocal, merits attention. Consistently, then, with some of the examples already adduced, I am inclined to suggest, that, when the noun, connected with the participle, is active or doing something, the preposition should be inserted, as, “in the hearing of the philosopher,” that is,the philosopher hearing; and that, when the noun represents the subject of an action, or what is suffering, the preposition should be omitted, as, “in hearing the philosopher,” orthe philosopher being heard. An attention to this rule will, I conceive, in most cases prevent ambiguity.If it should be said that I have admitted Lowth’s phraseologies, I answer, it is true; but with this difference, that he considers them as equivalent, and I as diametrically opposite. I observe, likewise, that, though I prefer the suppression of the article when the participle is not followed byof, and its insertion when it is followed by the preposition, it is not because I perceive any impropriety in the other phraseology, but because, since the publication of Lowth’s Grammar, it has been less employed; and because also it less forcibly marks the distinction, which I have recommended. That it has the sanction of good authority, is unquestionable; and that it is not inconsistent with analogy, will still further appear from the following note.Note3.—The participle iningis construed like a noun, governing the genitive case, and, at the same time, having the regimen of its proper verb, as, “Much depends on Richard’s observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his neglecting it.” In this example, the wordsRichard’sandhisare in the genitive case, governed by the participlesobservingandneglecting, while these participles, having here every character of a noun, admit the objective case. This form of expression has been received as unexceptionable; the following phraseology, however, has been censured, though, in truth, precisely analogous to the one now exemplified: “Much depends on the rule’s being observed,and error will be the consequence of its being neglected.” “Here,” said a certain writer, “is a noun with a pronoun representing it, each in the possessive case, that is, under the government of another noun, but without any other noun to govern it; forbeing observedandbeing neglectedare not nouns, nor can you supply the place of the possessive case by the prepositionof, before the noun or pronoun.”I concur with Dr. Campbell, who has examined this objection, in thinking, that the expression is not only sanctioned by good usage, but is also agreeable to analogy, and preventive of circumlocution. The objector, indeed, does not seem to have been aware, that his opinion is at variance with itself; and that the reason, which he assigns for rejecting this phraseology, would, with equal force, conclude against another mode of expression, which he himself approves. For he would have no objection to say, “Much depends on his observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his neglecting it.” Now let us try whether this sentence be not liable to the same objection as the other. In the former, he says, you cannot possibly supply the place of the possessive case, by the prepositionofbefore the noun or pronoun. This is true; for it would not be English to say, “Much depends on the being observed of the rule; and error will be the consequence of the being neglected of it.” But will his own approved phraseology admit this? Let us see; “Much depends on the observing of him of the rule, and error will be the consequence of the neglecting of him of it.” Were the example simpler, the argument would be equally strong; as, “Much depends on your pupil’s composing, but more on his reading frequently.” This sentence, the author alluded to, would have approved. Let us try if it can be resolved byof: “Much depends on the composing of your pupil, but more on the reading of him frequently.”The author’s argument, then, if it prove anything, proves too much; it cannot, therefore, have any weight.In addition to these observations, I would remark, that the writer’s argument involves another inconsistency. He admits that the participle iningmay be thus construed; for he approves the phrases, “his observing the rule,” and “his neglectingit.” Why then does he reject “his being” and “its being?” for the past or perfect participlesobservedandneglectedhave no share in the government,rule’sandit’sbeing under the regimen of the participle ining. In fact, then, the phrase seems no more objectionable than “his being a great man did not make him a happy man;” which our author would admit to be wholly unexceptionable.Some late writers, reasoning doubtless on a principle similar to that, the absurdity of which we have been attempting to expose, have discarded a phraseology which appears unobjectionable, and substituted one which seems less correct. Many writers, instead of saying, “his being smitten with the love of Orestilla was the cause of his murdering his son,” would say, “he being smitten with the love of Orestilla was the cause.” This seems to me an idle affectation of the Latin idiom, less precise than the common mode of expression, and less consonant with the genius of our language. For, ask what was the cause; and, according to this phraseology, the answer must behe; whereas the meaning is, that nothe, buthis being smitten, was the cause of his murder.“This jealousy accounts for Hall charging the Duke of Gloucester with the murder of Prince Edward.” “This,” says Mr. Baker, very justly, “is, in my opinion, a very uncouth way of speaking, though much used by ignorant people, and often affected by those who are not ignorant.” The writer should have said, “for Hall’s charging.” “His words being applicable to the common mistake of our age induce me to transcribe them.” Here I agree with the same writer in thinking, that it would be better to considerwordsas in the genitive case plural, governed by the participle, asHall’sin the preceding example, and joinhis words’ being applicable, equivalent tothe applicability of his words, with the verb singular; thus, “his words’ being applicable to the common mistake of our age, induces me to transcribe them.” A ridiculous partiality in favour of the Latin idiom, which in this case is not so correct as our own, not exhibiting the sentiment with equal precision, has given birth to this phraseology, which in many cases conveys not the intended idea. For, as Priestley remarks, if it is said, “What thinkyou of my horse’s running to-day?” it is implied, that the horse did actually run. If it is said, “What think you of my horse running to-day?” it is intended to ask, whether it be proper for my horse to run to-day. This distinction, though frequently neglected, deserves attention; for it is obvious, that ambiguity may arise from using the latter only of these phraseologies, to express both meanings.Note4.—This participle is sometimes used absolutely, in the same manner as the infinitive mood, as, “this conduct,viewing it in the most favourable light, reflects discredit on his character.” Here the participle is made absolute, and is equivalent to the infinitive in that state, as, “to view it in the most favourable light.” Both these modes of expression are resolvable, either by the hypothetical, or the perfective conjunctions; thus, “if we view it in the most favourable light.” “To confess the truth, I have no merit in the case;”i.e.“that I may confess.”
Note1.—The imperfect participle is frequently used like a substantive, and is, in such examples, of the same import with the infinitive of the verb; as, “they love reading,”i.e.“they love to read.” In some examples it becomes a real noun, and has a plural number, as,the outgoings of the morning.
Note2.—Lowth contends that, when the imperfect participle of a transitive verb is not preceded by the definite article, it properly governs the objective case, and is analogous to the Latin gerund, as, “much advantage will be derived from observing this rule;” in which example,this ruleis the regimen of the participleobserving; and that, when the definite article precedes the participle, it becomes then a pure noun, and, therefore, cannot have the regimen of a verb. He therefore condemns this expression, “by the sending them the light of thy holy Spirit.” Some of our grammarians consider Lowth, in this instance, as fastidiously critical; but to me he appears chargeable with error. Let us examine the reasons, which the author adduces in support of his opinion.
In this inquiry, the first and most pertinent question is, does usage justify the opinion of the author? He acknowledges the contrary: he even admits that there is not a single writer who does not violate this rule. Were it necessary, indeed, after this concession, it would be easy to evince, that not only our translators of the Bible, whose authority surely is of great weight, but also other writers of the highest eminence, employ the phraseology which he condemns.
Again. Does the distinction, which he wishes to establish, favour perspicuity? The very reverse appears to me to be the case; for he admits an identity of sense in two distinct phraseologies, which are incontestably, in many instances, susceptible of different meanings. And, though this ambiguity may not be involved in every example, we have surely good reasons for repudiating a phraseology which may, in any instance, be liable to misconstruction. We are to prescribe, not what may be perspicuous in some instances, but what must be intelligible in all.
Lowth says, that we may express the sentiment, either byinserting the article before the participle and the preposition after it, or by the omission of both; in other words, that these phraseologies are equivalent. Thus, according to him, we may say either, “by sendinghis Son into the world,” or “by the sendingofhis Son.” Here, perhaps, the meaning is sufficiently clear, whichsoever of these forms of expression be adopted. But let us take another example, as, “he expressed the pleasure he had, in hearing the philosopher.” Now, according to Lowth, we may also say, “he expressed the pleasure he had, in the hearing of the philosopher.” Is there no difference of sentiment here? Are these expressions equivalent? The contrary must be obvious to the most inattentive reader. According to the former phraseology, the philosopher was heard—he is represented as passive; agreeably to the latter, he was active—he heard.
Again. “When the Lord saw it, he abhorred them, because of the provoking of his sons and daughters.” Our translators have correctly exhibited the sentiment. The sons and daughters had given offence; they had provoked the Deity. But, if Lowth’s opinion be correct, the expression might be “because of provoking his sons and daughters;” a phrase which evidently conveys a very different idea.
Again. When it is said, “at the hearing of the ear, they will believe,” is this expression convertible, without violating the sense, into, “at hearing the ear they will believe?” Many more examples might be produced to prove that these phraseologies, which Lowth considers of the same import, are by no means equivalent. It appears, then, that perspicuity is not consulted by adopting this rule.
Again. He considers the participle, with a preposition before it, as correspondent to the Latin gerund, and therefore governing an objective case; but the participle preceded by an article, he considers as a substantive, and therefore incapable of any regimen. Now, as the author reasons from one language to another, we may pertinently ask, is not the Latin gerund a noun, a verbal substantive, not only having the form, and the inflexions of a noun, but governed like it, by nouns, adjectives, verbs, and prepositions, itself likewise governing the case of its verb? This position, were this theplace for it, we could easily prove, notwithstanding the objections which Scioppius, Vossius, with some other grammarians, have alleged against it. Nay, whatever theory be adopted respecting the nature of the gerund, there cannot exist a doubt, that, in the early ages of Roman literature, the verbal nouns iniogoverned an accusative, like the verbs whence they were derived.Quid tibi curatio est hanc rem, is one example from Plautus out of many, which might be produced[126]. That the supines also were, in truth, substantives admitting a regimen, is equally clear:Difficile dictuwas originallydifficile in dictu; andmisit oratum opem,misit ad oratum opem. Nor can the structure of the future infinitive passive be so satisfactorily resolved, notwithstanding a few repugnant examples, as on this supposition:Dixit libros lectum iriis resolved intodixit (id) iri ad lectum libros, wherelibrosis the regimen of the verbal nounlectum.
Thus it is evident, that the Latin gerunds, supines, and verbal nouns inio, though in form and inflexion substantives, governed an accusative case. It matters not, indeed, to the point in question, what was the practice of the ancients in this respect; nor should I, therefore, have dwelt so long on this subject, did I not conceive, that the very authority to which Dr. Lowth seems to appeal, militates against him; and that the very language, to which in this, as in most other cases, he strives to assimilate ours, had nouns governing cases, like the verbs from which they came.
From the preceding observations, I think it must appear, that the rule given by Dr. Lowth, is neither sanctioned by general usage, nor friendly to perspicuity; while the violation of it is perfectly reconcilable with the practice of the Roman writers, if their authority can, in this question, be deemed of any value.
Having attempted to prove the invalidity of Lowth’s argument, and the impropriety of his rule, as establishing an identity of meaning, where a difference must exist, I would submit to the candid and judicious critic the following remarks.
The participle ininghas either an active or passive signification;its import must, therefore, be determined by the judgment of the reader, or by explanatory adjections. Whatever, then, is calculated to remove all misconstruction, and to render its import clear and unequivocal, merits attention. Consistently, then, with some of the examples already adduced, I am inclined to suggest, that, when the noun, connected with the participle, is active or doing something, the preposition should be inserted, as, “in the hearing of the philosopher,” that is,the philosopher hearing; and that, when the noun represents the subject of an action, or what is suffering, the preposition should be omitted, as, “in hearing the philosopher,” orthe philosopher being heard. An attention to this rule will, I conceive, in most cases prevent ambiguity.
If it should be said that I have admitted Lowth’s phraseologies, I answer, it is true; but with this difference, that he considers them as equivalent, and I as diametrically opposite. I observe, likewise, that, though I prefer the suppression of the article when the participle is not followed byof, and its insertion when it is followed by the preposition, it is not because I perceive any impropriety in the other phraseology, but because, since the publication of Lowth’s Grammar, it has been less employed; and because also it less forcibly marks the distinction, which I have recommended. That it has the sanction of good authority, is unquestionable; and that it is not inconsistent with analogy, will still further appear from the following note.
Note3.—The participle iningis construed like a noun, governing the genitive case, and, at the same time, having the regimen of its proper verb, as, “Much depends on Richard’s observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his neglecting it.” In this example, the wordsRichard’sandhisare in the genitive case, governed by the participlesobservingandneglecting, while these participles, having here every character of a noun, admit the objective case. This form of expression has been received as unexceptionable; the following phraseology, however, has been censured, though, in truth, precisely analogous to the one now exemplified: “Much depends on the rule’s being observed,and error will be the consequence of its being neglected.” “Here,” said a certain writer, “is a noun with a pronoun representing it, each in the possessive case, that is, under the government of another noun, but without any other noun to govern it; forbeing observedandbeing neglectedare not nouns, nor can you supply the place of the possessive case by the prepositionof, before the noun or pronoun.”
I concur with Dr. Campbell, who has examined this objection, in thinking, that the expression is not only sanctioned by good usage, but is also agreeable to analogy, and preventive of circumlocution. The objector, indeed, does not seem to have been aware, that his opinion is at variance with itself; and that the reason, which he assigns for rejecting this phraseology, would, with equal force, conclude against another mode of expression, which he himself approves. For he would have no objection to say, “Much depends on his observing the rule, and error will be the consequence of his neglecting it.” Now let us try whether this sentence be not liable to the same objection as the other. In the former, he says, you cannot possibly supply the place of the possessive case, by the prepositionofbefore the noun or pronoun. This is true; for it would not be English to say, “Much depends on the being observed of the rule; and error will be the consequence of the being neglected of it.” But will his own approved phraseology admit this? Let us see; “Much depends on the observing of him of the rule, and error will be the consequence of the neglecting of him of it.” Were the example simpler, the argument would be equally strong; as, “Much depends on your pupil’s composing, but more on his reading frequently.” This sentence, the author alluded to, would have approved. Let us try if it can be resolved byof: “Much depends on the composing of your pupil, but more on the reading of him frequently.”
The author’s argument, then, if it prove anything, proves too much; it cannot, therefore, have any weight.
In addition to these observations, I would remark, that the writer’s argument involves another inconsistency. He admits that the participle iningmay be thus construed; for he approves the phrases, “his observing the rule,” and “his neglectingit.” Why then does he reject “his being” and “its being?” for the past or perfect participlesobservedandneglectedhave no share in the government,rule’sandit’sbeing under the regimen of the participle ining. In fact, then, the phrase seems no more objectionable than “his being a great man did not make him a happy man;” which our author would admit to be wholly unexceptionable.
Some late writers, reasoning doubtless on a principle similar to that, the absurdity of which we have been attempting to expose, have discarded a phraseology which appears unobjectionable, and substituted one which seems less correct. Many writers, instead of saying, “his being smitten with the love of Orestilla was the cause of his murdering his son,” would say, “he being smitten with the love of Orestilla was the cause.” This seems to me an idle affectation of the Latin idiom, less precise than the common mode of expression, and less consonant with the genius of our language. For, ask what was the cause; and, according to this phraseology, the answer must behe; whereas the meaning is, that nothe, buthis being smitten, was the cause of his murder.
“This jealousy accounts for Hall charging the Duke of Gloucester with the murder of Prince Edward.” “This,” says Mr. Baker, very justly, “is, in my opinion, a very uncouth way of speaking, though much used by ignorant people, and often affected by those who are not ignorant.” The writer should have said, “for Hall’s charging.” “His words being applicable to the common mistake of our age induce me to transcribe them.” Here I agree with the same writer in thinking, that it would be better to considerwordsas in the genitive case plural, governed by the participle, asHall’sin the preceding example, and joinhis words’ being applicable, equivalent tothe applicability of his words, with the verb singular; thus, “his words’ being applicable to the common mistake of our age, induces me to transcribe them.” A ridiculous partiality in favour of the Latin idiom, which in this case is not so correct as our own, not exhibiting the sentiment with equal precision, has given birth to this phraseology, which in many cases conveys not the intended idea. For, as Priestley remarks, if it is said, “What thinkyou of my horse’s running to-day?” it is implied, that the horse did actually run. If it is said, “What think you of my horse running to-day?” it is intended to ask, whether it be proper for my horse to run to-day. This distinction, though frequently neglected, deserves attention; for it is obvious, that ambiguity may arise from using the latter only of these phraseologies, to express both meanings.
Note4.—This participle is sometimes used absolutely, in the same manner as the infinitive mood, as, “this conduct,viewing it in the most favourable light, reflects discredit on his character.” Here the participle is made absolute, and is equivalent to the infinitive in that state, as, “to view it in the most favourable light.” Both these modes of expression are resolvable, either by the hypothetical, or the perfective conjunctions; thus, “if we view it in the most favourable light.” “To confess the truth, I have no merit in the case;”i.e.“that I may confess.”
Rule XVIII.—A noun or pronoun joined to a participle, its case being dependent on no word in the sentence, is put in the nominative.
Note1.—This rule will be perfectly understood by the classical scholar, when we say, that the absolute case in English is the nominative. Thus, “We being exceedingly tossed the next day, they lightened the ship.” The pronoun of the first person, joined to the participle,being, is neither the nominative to any verb, nor is it connected with any word, of which it can be the regimen. It is therefore put in the nominative case.Note2.—This rule is violated in such examples as the following, “Solomon made as wise proverbs as anybody has done,himonly excepted, who was a much wiser man than Solomon.”—Tillotson.“For only in destroying I find easeTo my relentless thoughts; and,himdestroy’d,Or won to what may work his utter loss,For whom all this was made, all this will soonFollow,”—Milton.This seems to be the only example in which the poet hastransgressed this rule; and in several instances, in which he has observed it, Bentley would erroneously substitute the objective case.
Note1.—This rule will be perfectly understood by the classical scholar, when we say, that the absolute case in English is the nominative. Thus, “We being exceedingly tossed the next day, they lightened the ship.” The pronoun of the first person, joined to the participle,being, is neither the nominative to any verb, nor is it connected with any word, of which it can be the regimen. It is therefore put in the nominative case.
Note2.—This rule is violated in such examples as the following, “Solomon made as wise proverbs as anybody has done,himonly excepted, who was a much wiser man than Solomon.”—Tillotson.
“For only in destroying I find easeTo my relentless thoughts; and,himdestroy’d,Or won to what may work his utter loss,For whom all this was made, all this will soonFollow,”—Milton.
“For only in destroying I find easeTo my relentless thoughts; and,himdestroy’d,Or won to what may work his utter loss,For whom all this was made, all this will soonFollow,”—Milton.
“For only in destroying I find ease
To my relentless thoughts; and,himdestroy’d,
Or won to what may work his utter loss,
For whom all this was made, all this will soon
Follow,”—Milton.
This seems to be the only example in which the poet hastransgressed this rule; and in several instances, in which he has observed it, Bentley would erroneously substitute the objective case.
Rule XIX.—Prepositions are joined with the objective case, or govern nouns and pronouns in the accusative, as, “he ran to me,” “he was loved by us.”
Note1.—This rule is violated in such expressions as these, “Who servest thou under?” “Who do you speak to?” for the syntactical arrangement is, “thou servest under who?” “thou speakest to who?” instead of “under whom?” “to whom?”Note2.—The preposition is frequently separated from its regimen, as, “Horace is an author, whom I am much delighted with,”i.e.“with whom I am much delighted.”Note3.—The prepositionstoandforare often understood, as, “he gave me a book,” “he told me the news:”i.e.“he gave to me,” “he told to me.”Lowth has, indeed, observed, that in such examples, the pronouns,me,thee, &c., may be considered to be in the dative case, as, in truth, they are in Saxon the datives of their respective pronouns, and in their form includeto, as, “woe is to me.” This phrase, he observes, is pure Saxon, the same as, “wae is me,” in whichmeis a dative case.The prepositionbyis also, in a few colloquial expressions, omitted, as, “he went across the bridge,” “he crossed the bridge,” for “he crossed (the river) by the bridge.”Note4.—A preposition, following a verb, constituting with it what has been termed a compound active verb, is sometimes suppressed. We say, “he hoped for a reward,” “you wondered at his courage.” Addison, Steele, and Johnson, with several other reputable writers, say, “It is to be hoped,” instead of “to be hoped for;” and Johnson very generally says, “It is not to be wondered,” for “not to be wondered at.” The latter form of expression seems to have been adopted, in order to avoid the abrupt and inelegant conclusion of the clause, especially when followed by the wordthat.Note5.—The prepositionsin,on,for, andfrom, are often understood before nouns of time and place; thus, “this day,”“next month,” “last year,” are often used elliptically for “on this day,” “in next month,” “in last year.” We say, also, “He was banished England,”i.e.“fromEngland.”Care, however, should be taken that the omission create no ambiguity. If we say, “He was deaf some years before he died,” referring to a temporary deafness, and a point of time at which it occurred, the expression is not improper, though the meaning might be more clearly expressed; but if we intend to signify a continued deafness, we ought to say, “for” or “during some years.”Note6.—The preposition is improperly omitted in the following line of Pope’s:“And virgins smiled at what they blush’d before.”It should be, according to the rules of syntax, “smiled at what they blushed at before,” both verbs requiringatafter them, thus, “they smiled at that, at which they blushed before.”Note7.—Prepositions should be placed as near as possible to each of the words, whose relation they express. The following sentence from Hume is, in this respect, faulty: “The ignorance of the age in mechanical arts, rendered the progress very slow of this new invention.” It should be, “the progress of this new invention.” The following sentence from Johnson, is, for the same reason, chargeable with faulty arrangement: “The country first dawned, that illuminated the world, and beyond which the arts cannot be traced of civil society or domestic life.”—Rasselas.It should be, “the arts of civil society or domestic life cannot be traced.” Priestley has censured the following clause from Harris, “being in no sense capable of either intention or remission.” If it be considered, however, that the wordeitherproperly means “the one or the other,” and in truth denotes the subject, being, therefore, in strict propriety, the regimen of the preposition, the arrangement of Harris, though now not so common as the other, will not appear exceptionable. Nay, whatever may be the future decision of usage, that great arbitress of all language, (for at present she is divided,) Harris’s arrangement seems more conformable to the strict meaning of the words, as well as to Priestley’s own rule, than that, which the latterrecommends; thus, “capable of either (i.e.of the one or of the other), intension, or remission.”
Note1.—This rule is violated in such expressions as these, “Who servest thou under?” “Who do you speak to?” for the syntactical arrangement is, “thou servest under who?” “thou speakest to who?” instead of “under whom?” “to whom?”
Note2.—The preposition is frequently separated from its regimen, as, “Horace is an author, whom I am much delighted with,”i.e.“with whom I am much delighted.”
Note3.—The prepositionstoandforare often understood, as, “he gave me a book,” “he told me the news:”i.e.“he gave to me,” “he told to me.”
Lowth has, indeed, observed, that in such examples, the pronouns,me,thee, &c., may be considered to be in the dative case, as, in truth, they are in Saxon the datives of their respective pronouns, and in their form includeto, as, “woe is to me.” This phrase, he observes, is pure Saxon, the same as, “wae is me,” in whichmeis a dative case.
The prepositionbyis also, in a few colloquial expressions, omitted, as, “he went across the bridge,” “he crossed the bridge,” for “he crossed (the river) by the bridge.”
Note4.—A preposition, following a verb, constituting with it what has been termed a compound active verb, is sometimes suppressed. We say, “he hoped for a reward,” “you wondered at his courage.” Addison, Steele, and Johnson, with several other reputable writers, say, “It is to be hoped,” instead of “to be hoped for;” and Johnson very generally says, “It is not to be wondered,” for “not to be wondered at.” The latter form of expression seems to have been adopted, in order to avoid the abrupt and inelegant conclusion of the clause, especially when followed by the wordthat.
Note5.—The prepositionsin,on,for, andfrom, are often understood before nouns of time and place; thus, “this day,”“next month,” “last year,” are often used elliptically for “on this day,” “in next month,” “in last year.” We say, also, “He was banished England,”i.e.“fromEngland.”
Care, however, should be taken that the omission create no ambiguity. If we say, “He was deaf some years before he died,” referring to a temporary deafness, and a point of time at which it occurred, the expression is not improper, though the meaning might be more clearly expressed; but if we intend to signify a continued deafness, we ought to say, “for” or “during some years.”
Note6.—The preposition is improperly omitted in the following line of Pope’s:
“And virgins smiled at what they blush’d before.”
“And virgins smiled at what they blush’d before.”
“And virgins smiled at what they blush’d before.”
It should be, according to the rules of syntax, “smiled at what they blushed at before,” both verbs requiringatafter them, thus, “they smiled at that, at which they blushed before.”
Note7.—Prepositions should be placed as near as possible to each of the words, whose relation they express. The following sentence from Hume is, in this respect, faulty: “The ignorance of the age in mechanical arts, rendered the progress very slow of this new invention.” It should be, “the progress of this new invention.” The following sentence from Johnson, is, for the same reason, chargeable with faulty arrangement: “The country first dawned, that illuminated the world, and beyond which the arts cannot be traced of civil society or domestic life.”—Rasselas.It should be, “the arts of civil society or domestic life cannot be traced.” Priestley has censured the following clause from Harris, “being in no sense capable of either intention or remission.” If it be considered, however, that the wordeitherproperly means “the one or the other,” and in truth denotes the subject, being, therefore, in strict propriety, the regimen of the preposition, the arrangement of Harris, though now not so common as the other, will not appear exceptionable. Nay, whatever may be the future decision of usage, that great arbitress of all language, (for at present she is divided,) Harris’s arrangement seems more conformable to the strict meaning of the words, as well as to Priestley’s own rule, than that, which the latterrecommends; thus, “capable of either (i.e.of the one or of the other), intension, or remission.”
Rule XX.—Adverbs have no government.