Aug. 28.
During the night the enemy retired from our front, and in the morning the remnants of the Battalion were reorganised, and continued the advance over the original frontage for about 1700 yards to a marked-out trench called Bank's Reserve. Here some machine-guns were encountered, but a good and continuous line was established with connection on both flanks.
This line was handed over to the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders on the night of the 28th-29th, and the Battalion marched back to the trenches east of Hamelincourt. The only officers left with the Battalion were Lieut.-Colonel Rasch,Captain Cornforth, Captain Briscoe, and Lieutenant Morgan. The total casualties were 12 officers and 278 other ranks. Amongst the officers the casualties were as follows:
In a message, which Major-General Feilding afterwards sent to Brigadier-General de Crespigny, he said: "All Battalions of the 1st Guards Brigade discharged their duty splendidly. The attack delivered by the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards on August 27 not only inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and brought in large numbers of prisoners, but also compelled him next day to relax his hold on the high ground south of Croisilles."
July.
The first week in July was spent by the 3rd Battalion at Labazeque, and on the 7th it proceeded to Ransart, where it relieved the 10th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in the right sector of the front occupied by the Guards Division.
Two companies were placed in the front line with one company in support and one in reserve, and officers' patrols were sent out every nightfrom dusk to dawn, but there was no movement on the part of the enemy. On the 10th the Battalion moved back into support, and on the 15th into Divisional Reserve, where it remained for three days. From the 19th to the 24th the Battalion went up again into the front trenches, where the work consisted of improving the line by laying down duckboards and digging sumps and latrines. Fifteen officers, 30 sergeants, and 55 corporals from the American Army were attached to the Battalion, and were distributed between the four companies and Battalion Headquarters. Lieutenant S. G. Fairbairn, Second Lieutenant H. P. Gordon, and Second Lieutenant S. Calvocoressi arrived during this tour of duty in the trenches, and on the 25th the Battalion retired into support, where more officers and men of the American Army were attached for instruction. On the 30th the Battalion moved back into Divisional Reserve.
Aug.
After four days in reserve the Battalion went up into the front line near Adinfer, where it remained for a week carrying out inter-company relief. In this part of the line patrols were sent out every night, and a company from the 320th Regiment of the United States Army, which accompanied the Battalion, supplied a certain number of men for this purpose. On the 6th Second Lieutenant R. P. Papillon when out on patrol duty, encountered a German patrol in Observation Trench, and after severely wounding one of the enemy, succeeded in bringing back an identification mark. The Higher Command, however, required further information, and accordingly a special patrol was sent out on the night of the 10th. Captain Churchill, whose great experience in all kinds of incursions into the enemy's line rendered him eminently fitted for the task, was sent from the Brigade Headquarters, to take charge of the party, which consisted of Second Lieutenant de Reuter and seven men. A covering-party composed of thirteen men, under the command of Sergeant Birtles, accompanied the raiders. Hardly had the patrol started, when a shell fell among them, wounding one man, who had to be carried back to the trenches. Following the German outpost line, which consisted of small adjacent rifle-pits, but which showed no sign of frequent occupation, the patrol came on the German wire. This formidable obstacle consisted of barbed wire in concertina shape, staked to the ground, with strands running through it. After a careful search a gap was found, and through this the patrol went. After following the track for about forty yards a German sentry was seen. The patrol stood still, and the sentry walked away unconscious of its presence. Soon afterwards some more of the enemy were seen moving round to the left of the track. They were evidently suspicious, as they only whispered. Three of them came crawling slowly towards the patrol. In dead silence the patrol waited, but the Germans turned back, and apparently reported all clear, for thirty to forty more Germans appeared, and stood up close together. They came to within thirty yards of the patrol, when Lieutenant de Reuter gave the order "rapid fire." Several of them were seento fall. It was now merely a question whether the Germans would attempt to capture the patrol or not, but they contented themselves with firing and throwing a few bombs, while Véry lights were sent up. Captain Churchill therefore retired unmolested through the wire, having only had one man wounded.
On the 10th Second Lieutenant de Geijer and twenty other ranks raided a German post under an artillery barrage. At 3.15A.M.a Stokes mortar barrage supplemented the artillery bombardment, and the raiding party in two groups, under Second Lieutenant de Geijer and Sergeant Butler respectively, rushed the enemy's post. The Germans had, however, abandoned the post just before the raid took place, and the last two were seen to run from it, as the raiders started. Much valuable information was gained, as the Germans left everything behind, but, with the exception of Lieutenant de Geijer who was slightly wounded, there were no casualties.
On the 11th the Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion Coldstream, and went into support, moving on four days later to billets in Saulty, where it remained until the 20th.
On the 20th the Battalion "debussed" between Blaireville and Heudecourt, and took up its assembly positions east and south-east of Boiry.
The orders General Sergison-Brooke received were to attack Moyenneville in conjunction with the Second and Third Divisions on the right. In the operation orders which he issued the capture of the first two objectives was to be carried out by the 1st Battalion Scots Guards on the right,and by the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers was then to pass through, and secure the third objective. Eight tanks would co-operate in front of each Battalion.
The following officers of the 3rd Battalion took part in these operations:
Aug. 21.
There was a thick mist in the morning, so thick that it was impossible to see more than a few yards ahead. On the one hand this favoured the attackers; on the other there was always the risk of the Battalion losing its way and never reaching the enemy's lines. In spite of everything, however, the leading Battalions eventually succeeded in securing the first two objectives.
The 3rd Battalion had breakfasted, water-bottles had been refilled, and the companies were beginning to get ready for the advance, whenthis blanket of fog came down. At zero hour, 4.53a.m., the barrage opened up and the attack began. Captain Smith, who commanded C Company 15th Battalion Tank Corps (Mark V. Star Tanks), arrived at Battalion Headquarters, and reported that his tanks had been delayed by gas in Coseul Valley, so that they would not be able to advance with the Battalion as arranged, but that they would endeavour to overtake it on the second objective. The Battalion started off with No. 3 Company under Captain Tufnell on the right, No. 4 under Captain Hirst on the left, No. 2 under Lieutenant Adair in support, and No. 1 under Captain Fryer in reserve. The fog was as thick as ever, and the smoke shells in the barrage increased its density. Keeping direction by compass was tedious and difficult, since it necessitated the removal of the steel helmet and box respirator, and even then it was far from accurate. To add to the difficulties, there were several pockets of German machine-gunners, which had been missed by the 1st Battalion Scots Guards in their advance, and which suddenly loomed out in the mist often in rear of the Battalion as it advanced. No. 12 Platoon captured two machine-gun posts in the first objective, and the markers under Lieutenant de Geijer, the Intelligence Officer, found German machine-gunners still holding out to the west of the second objective, in the area where the Battalion should have formed up. The 1st Battalion Scots Guards had captured the right and left of the second objective, but owing to the fog the centre was still in the hands of the Germans.
The 1st Battalion Scots Guards, on finding out what had happened, soon cleared out these Germans with the aid of No. 1 Company (the Reserve Company).
By 6A.M.the Battalion Headquarters had reached its destination, namely, the two trees between the first and second objectives, but was unable to get in touch with any of the companies. Tanks were moving about in the fog, and the Lewis guns were engaging the German machine-guns at close quarters, and were firing indiscriminately into the fog. To give an example of how confusing the situation was, the Battalion Headquarters was charged from the front by two platoons of the Scots Guards, who mistook it in the fog for a German machine-gun post.
By 7.30 No. 2 Company, under Lieutenant Adair, had gone through the junction of the 1st Battalion Scots Guards and 1st Battalion Coldstream, and was advancing on its objective, which was the valley between the railway and Moyenneville. A little later Captain Tufnell and Captain Hirst reported that Nos. 9 and 12 Platoons of No. 3 Company and all No. 4 Company were near Moyblain Trench, having completely lost their way. No. 11 Platoon had also lost its bearings, and after moving round in a semicircle, was discovered heading towards the rear instead of towards the front.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Duff Cooper, with No. 10 Platoon, having entirely lost touch with the remainder of the company, had wandered too far to the south, and after pushing on in whathe thought was the right direction for three hours, found himself in the outskirts of Courcelles. There he met a platoon of the 7th Battalion K.S.L.I., which had also lost its way, and, knowing that the Halte on the railway was the eventual objective, he determined to make for it. Together these two platoons started off, and as they were clearing the dug-outs on the road, they fell in with a tank which suddenly appeared out of the fog. With its assistance they attacked and captured the railway on each side of the Halte, where a German aid-post was placed. There is no doubt that these two isolated platoons were the only units that succeeded in reaching the third objective for some hours, on the whole front of the two Northern Divisions.
When Lieut.-Colonel Thorne received a message from Lieutenant Duff Cooper, saying that the Halte had been taken, he sent up No. 1 Company under Captain Fryer to the assistance of this isolated platoon, and in order to save time directed No. 2 Company to advance on the objective originally assigned to No. 4. Lieutenant Forbes with two machine-guns was sent up to co-operate with No. 1 Company, and Lieutenant Hulme with two more to assist No. 2 Company. No barrage could be arranged for this attack, and it was impossible to obtain any assistance from the tanks, which were now returning to their rallying positions, since they were all suffering from engine trouble or the lack of petrol.
At 10A.M.the fog began to lift, but CaptainFryer had by this time brought up Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons to the assistance of No. 10 Platoon. Captain Fryer and Lieutenant Duff Cooper made a most valuable reconnaissance of the railway north of the Halte under heavy fire, and on returning decided at once to attack the German posts they had discovered. No. 10 Platoon started off, and supported by Nos. 1 and 2 Platoons succeeded in capturing the whole of the objectives allotted to No. 3 Company. This attack was carried out with great dash, but Lieutenant Delacombe and Second Lieutenant Clough-Taylor were wounded.
Nos. 7 and 8 Platoons of No. 2 Company had in the meantime commenced their advance on the railway cutting, but soon found that they were exposed to heavy enfilade fire from the railway north of the Halte. They made but little headway at first, but, when the attack of No. 10 Platoon lifted the enemy's fire off them, they pushed forward, and rushed the railway and hollow ground to the east of it, capturing 5 machine-guns and 60 prisoners, and gaining touch with the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards on the left and No. 1 Company on the right.
No. 3 Company now moved up into support of No. 1, and four machine-guns were placed in Magazine Trench as barrage guns. No. 6 Platoon made a farther advance, and seized the hollow east of the railway and west of Hameau North, where 10 machine-guns and 60 prisoners were captured. Nos. 3 and 8 Platoons advanced to the east of the railway, and completed the capture of the whole objective allotted to the Battalion. Although twelve hours behind thescheduled time, Lieut.-Colonel Thorne was able to report that the task of the Battalion had been successfully carried out.
The leading of No. 10 Platoon and Nos. 1 and 2 Companies was particularly fine, and the response made by the men was beyond all praise. The fact that in spite of the fog each platoon managed to get to its own place was entirely due to the persistence with which Platoon Commanders advanced whenever opportunity offered, and to the determination on the part of the men to reach the enemy. After the fog lifted the attack was carried out steadily and relentlessly across ground swept by shell-fire and machine-guns, and succeeded in spite of the lack of an artillery barrage or tanks.
After dark, ammunition, water and rations were sent up by pack animals, and all the platoons rejoined their companies. Reconnoitring patrols under Lieutenant Clifton Brown and Lieutenant West were sent out to locate the new German line, and discovered that the enemy was holding the line of the sunken road about half a mile east of the railway. The Germans were apparently in some strength, and very much on the look-out.
Photographed by the Mendoza GalleriesEmery Walker ph. sc.Brigadier-General B. N. Sergison-Brooke D.S.O.
Photographed by the Mendoza GalleriesEmery Walker ph. sc.
Brigadier-General B. N. Sergison-Brooke D.S.O.
Aug. 22.
The next morning a heavy hostile barrage came down on the whole position occupied by the Battalion, and the outposts could see the enemy advancing in three waves. The S.O.S. signal at once went up. Immediately our artillery put down a magnificent and accurate barrage, and the companies in front opened a concentrated fire with Lewis guns and rifles on the advancingenemy. The German counter-attack stood no chance at all, and completely crumbled away; only in one place did the Germans succeed in gaining a footing, and that was on the right, where they captured a trench. When the attack utterly failed, this party of Germans had to withdraw with heavy loss.
The following German orders that were subsequently taken from a prisoner give the details of this counter-attack. It will be seen that they advanced in some strength, and it is all the more remarkable that this carefully planned attack should have been repulsed by only two companies of the 3rd Battalion.
234 Div.
Div. H.Q.,
Abt. la. 2802.
21-8-18.
1. According to information received from the Army we have repulsed 4½ English Divisions to-day. The enemy has been beaten and he knows it.The enemy has reached the Achiet le Grand Boisleux Railway. New artillery positions have been located, large enemy concentrations and movement observed.2. XVIII. Corps will retake the old main line of resistance.For this operation the 234 Div.—under the orders of the 40th Div.—will attack with the 2nd Guards Res. Div.—under the orders of the 6th Bav. Res. Div.—on its left.3. The infantry will be divided into three attacking groups under the command of Col. Reichart (Comdr. 88 Inf. Bde.).
1. According to information received from the Army we have repulsed 4½ English Divisions to-day. The enemy has been beaten and he knows it.
The enemy has reached the Achiet le Grand Boisleux Railway. New artillery positions have been located, large enemy concentrations and movement observed.
2. XVIII. Corps will retake the old main line of resistance.
For this operation the 234 Div.—under the orders of the 40th Div.—will attack with the 2nd Guards Res. Div.—under the orders of the 6th Bav. Res. Div.—on its left.
3. The infantry will be divided into three attacking groups under the command of Col. Reichart (Comdr. 88 Inf. Bde.).
Right attacking group.
Major v. Kluefer.
181 I.R.3rd Bn. 452 I.R.3 Batteries, 32 F.A.R.Res. Pion. Coy. 55.
Centre attacking group.
Major v. Pape.
104 I.R.451 I.R. less 2nd Bn.3 Batteries 32 F.A.R.3 Coy. Pion. Bn. 22.
Left attacking group.
Capt. Heine.
1st and 3rd Bns. 453 I.R.2nd Bn. 452 I.R.359 Pion. Coy.360 Pion. Coy.
Objective:— Moyenneville—Aerodrome ridge.
4. The 21st Res. Div. will detail one Bn. to support the attack on Moyenneville. 88 Inf. Bde. will establish liaison with this Bn. Zero hour on the whole front of attack will be 5.45A.M.(German time).
5. 134 I.R. with three Batteries F.A.R. 32 as Divisional Reserve will be held in readiness N.E. of Mory.
6. Col. v. Bibra (Comdr. 234 Inf. Bde.) with the battalions formerly in support (1st Bn. 452 I.R., 3rd Bn. 451 I.R., 2nd Bn. 453 I.R.) will hold the artillery defensive position. These Battalions will remain as "safety garrison" and will hold the line at all costs in the event of a hostile counter-attack.
7. Duties of the Artillery:
X-15 to X.Burst of fire on the enemy front line on the Railway embankment.X.Heavy bombardment on Moyenneville and Courcelles. Lift on to the line Eastern outskirts Moyenneville Eastern outskirts Courcelles, continue heavy bombardment on Moyenneville and Courcelles.X plus 20.Lift to the lineEasternoutskirts Moyenneville—Westernoutskirts of Courcelles.X plus 40.Lift to the line W. of the Moyenneville—Ablainzeville Road.X plus 60.Lift to the trench which extends from Moyenneville across Aerodrome ridge towards the S. (former main line of resistance).X " 5.45a.m.Three Batteries F.A.R. 501 and Foot Art. Bn. 401 have occupied positions E. of Ervillers.
X-15 to X.Burst of fire on the enemy front line on the Railway embankment.
X.Heavy bombardment on Moyenneville and Courcelles. Lift on to the line Eastern outskirts Moyenneville Eastern outskirts Courcelles, continue heavy bombardment on Moyenneville and Courcelles.
X plus 20.Lift to the lineEasternoutskirts Moyenneville—Westernoutskirts of Courcelles.
X plus 40.Lift to the line W. of the Moyenneville—Ablainzeville Road.
X plus 60.Lift to the trench which extends from Moyenneville across Aerodrome ridge towards the S. (former main line of resistance).X " 5.45a.m.Three Batteries F.A.R. 501 and Foot Art. Bn. 401 have occupied positions E. of Ervillers.
11. Div. H. Q.... Queant.
v. Stumpff,
G.O.C., 234 Div.