CHAPTER XVIII.THE OPERATIONS TOWARDS VALENCIENNES.

“Now that the gallant 51st Division is passing from my command, may I be permitted to say that I shall always remember with the greatest pride that for six stirring days you formed part of the Canadian Corps. I remember very well when the Division first came to France in May 1915, and that we took part together in the fighting at Festubert and Givenchy. Again we were associated in the memorable battle of Arras in April 1917, and now again we have kicked off side by side in an advance the results of which I have every reason to believe will be far-reaching. That your Division was able after the continuous fighting in which it has been engaged this year to take and keep the strong position of Greenland Hill, testifies in the strongest possible manner to the fact thatthe fighting qualities of the 51st are second to none in all the Allied armies.“On behalf of the Canadian Divisions I thank you most sincerely for the splendid help and support you have given to the main advance south of the river. I wish you all the best of luck always, and have every confidence that the splendid reputation that the Division now enjoys will ever be maintained.”Until 14th September, when the Division was relieved by the 49th Division, no events occurred which materially changed the tactical situation. The period was not, however, a quiet one. The enemy was at times extremely active with his guns, on occasions using quantities of mustard gas, the targets against which he chiefly vented his spleen being the railway cutting, Greenland Hill, and Fampoux.Enemy aircraft were also unusually active in this area, particularly in bombing the troops in the line. On one occasion in particular, 4th September, aircraft were crossing over lines frequently throughout the night—singly, by twos, and in flights up to six in number—which heavily bombed the vicinity of Roeux, Fampoux, and the valley north of Fampoux.Patrolling was maintained with the greatest energy, as it was anticipated that the success of the operations in the south in which Cambrai was becoming threatened might at any time lead the enemy to further withdrawals.In consequence, encounters in No Man’s Land were of frequent occurrence, in which considerable damage was inflicted on the enemy—not, however, without losses also being sustained by the Jocks. On one occasion a daylight patrol of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, consisting of one officer and two other ranks, had a lively fight with an enemy post 200 yards from Biache power station. They killed two of the enemy and wounded several others, and then returned to our lines, all three having first been wounded.On relief on 14th September the Division remained at rest and training until 24th September, when it again returned to the same sector, and remained in the line until 4th October, when it was again relieved by the 44th Division. This relief was not, however, carried out with the object of allowing the Division a period of rest, but for the purpose of its being moved to another portion of the front to take part again in active operations.Probably, in common with many other Divisions, the men of the 51st had come to consider that they were doing more than their fair share of battle fighting. They had, indeed, been engaged in nine major operations in the period of seventeen months from April 1917 to August 1918.The men thus felt entitled to covet the long periods of rest such as fell to the lot of some of the more fortunate Corps and Divisions, which occasionally were given five or six weeks’ rest in which to regain their form after an operation.They, however, comforted themselves by the thought that they were so continuously employed in the forefront of the battle because the Higher Command had learnt to rely on them to carry to a successful issue any task that was set them.CHAPTER XVIII.THE OPERATIONS TOWARDS VALENCIENNES.On 5th October the Division began its move southwards, with orders to relieve the 3rd Canadian Division in the line north-west of Cambrai, and by the evening of 8th October was concentrated in the Queant-Inchy area. However, a rapidly-changing situation on the 8th necessitated an alteration in the plans. On that date an attack was delivered by the Third and Fourth British Armies, which was continued by the French on their right. Farther south on the same date French troops attacked east of the Meuse and in Champagne. This attack progressed for some three or four miles into the enemy’s lines, with the result that his resistance temporarily gave way. During the night the Canadian Corps captured Ramillies and crossed the Scheldt Canal at Pont d’Aire, and entered Cambrai from the north. The following day the advance was continued. Cambrai was in our hands, and our troops established themselves on a line three miles east of the town.Orders were therefore issued for the 51st Division to move to the Bourlon area, and to be placed under the command of the Canadian Corps. Accordingly on 10th October the 152nd Brigade moved to Bourlon village, 153rd Brigade to the area north-east of Bourlon, and 154th Brigade north of Fontaine Notre Dame, the village in which they had experienced such savage fighting in November 1917.On 11th October orders were issued for the 51st Division to relieve the 2nd Canadian Division, which was attacking the village of Iwuy on the same day, the instructions being that the 51st was to take over from the 2nd Canadianson whatever line they had established themselves at the conclusion of the operations.Prior to these moves an important change had taken place in the composition of the Division: the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who had been employed as pioneer battalion to the 5th Division ever since they had left the 51st in the Labyrinth in 1916, rejoined the Division as an infantry battalion. They were allotted to the 153rd Brigade in place of the 7th Gordon Highlanders, who, on account of the difficulty of finding further reinforcements, were transferred to the 152nd Brigade and amalgamated with the 6th Gordon Highlanders. This composite battalion was known as the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders.In view of the coming relief, the 152nd and 154th Brigades moved forward during the morning into the 2nd Canadian Division area, the 153rd Brigade moved towards Tilloy and Essars, and the Divisional staff headquarters opened a report centre at the headquarters of the 2nd Canadian Division at Escadœuvres.At 4P.M.the 51st Division again came under the XXIInd Corps, and received orders that it would attack through the 2nd Canadian Division on the following day in conjunction with an attack to be delivered by the Corps on either flank.The operations on which the Division was now to embark constituted a complete change from any in which it had previously taken part. Trench warfare, in which the enemy’s defences can be largely definitely located, now belonged to the past. The scene of the fighting was for the future to be laid amidst large uplands, checkered with undestroyed villages, many of them still occupied by their civilian inhabitants, and with occasional woods and spinneys with living trees in full leaf. Continuous trenches no longer stretched across the battle front.The country was, however, well adapted for the rear-guard action which the enemy was fighting. On the western edge of the uplands he could adequately cover the eastern slopes of those facing him with comparatively few machine-guns, skilfully hidden in spinneys and sunken roads, in positions which dominated the open country over which the attacking troops must advance.Moreover, two serious obstacles in the shape of riverscompletely crossed the Divisional front—namely, the river Selle and the river Ecaillon. These rivers, with soft treacherous beds and steep muddy sides, were not fordable. Further, their course ran through narrow steeply-sloped valleys, so that the high ground on the eastern banks afforded magnificent observation to machine-gunners and artillery observers of the western slopes of the valleys and of the crossings of the river.To the north of the Divisional front ran the Canal de l’Escaut in a north-easterly direction until it passed Denain, where, in a short reach, it suddenly turned south-east and traversed almost half the Divisional front before it again bent north-eastwards and resumed its course.Traversing the Divisional front obliquely from south-west to north-east ran the great Cambrai-Valenciennes road.The country was for the most part not so enclosed as it was further south, where innumerable orchards, spinneys, and woods blinded the enemy’s troops, and so compelled him either to fall back to more open country, or to employ strong rearguards to cover the ground and hold it. In this case each attack required delicate handling to prevent large numbers of men falling victims in an endeavour to close with a few marksmen on well-sited machine-gun nests.To protect the infantry from this fate creeping barrages were arranged wherever possible, and even when this form of attack was not considered advisable or was impracticable, sections of field-guns and howitzers were invariably detailed, as far as the crossings of the river allowed, to accompany the infantry in close support. In fact, it will be seen that in this battle the co-operation between the artillery and infantry had reached an abnormally high standard, due to the gallantry, initiative, and efficiency of the junior officers and men.In appreciating the true value of the success of the Highland Division in this, its last engagement, it must not be forgotten that since 21st March it had lost in major operations, apart from sickness and trench warfare, over a thousand officers and many thousands of men. Thus it was embarking on a form of warfare of which the bulk of its commanders had had no experience, and with its infantry composed for the most part of immature youthsor men who had only recently joined the ranks of the infantry. Taking these facts into consideration, the repeated incidents of unusual daring and gallantry displayed in these operations will give clear proof of the great vitality of the Division. This was largely due to the manner in which its reinforcements, earnestly applying themselves to the upholding of its traditions, supported the commanders and more experienced comrades.In the early hours of 12th October 1918, orders were received that the Division was to form up on a line roughly 1000 yards north-east of the village of Iwuy, and to attack with the object of capturing a line running from Avesnes le Sec inclusive along the Lieu St Amand road as far as Maison Blanche Farm, thence to the railway at Houdain, the breadth of line to be attacked being about 5000 yards.The 49th Division was co-operating in this attack on the right, and a brigade of the 2nd Canadian Division was to operate on the left flank and clear the country between the railway and the Canal de l’Escaut.Two brigades were detailed by the G.O.C. for the attack, the 152nd Brigade on the right and 154th Brigade on the left. The 152nd Brigade attacked on a two-battalion front, the leading battalions being the 5th Seaforth Highlanders and the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders, each on a two-company front. The 154th Brigade, however, employed only one battalion on the front line, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders, who formed up on a three-company front.By 4.45A.M.the attacking brigades had completed the relief of the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades. The remainder of the morning was spent by the battalions in moving into position and completing their arrangements for the attack.At 8A.M.General Carter-Campbell took over command of the sector.At 10A.M.reports were received at Divisional headquarters that the enemy were withdrawing on the front of the 49th Division on the right, and that their brigades were moving forward without waiting for the artillery barrage. No reports could, however, be obtained on the Divisional front that the enemy had withdrawn there; it was in consequence decided that the attack should be carried out as originally planned.Accordingly at 12 noon the infantry advanced, preceded by a creeping barrage fired by six brigades of field artillery. It, however, quickly transpired that the attack had coincided with an enemy withdrawal, and the prescribed objective was reached with little opposition. On the extreme right the 5th Seaforth Highlanders had some fighting in clearing Avesnes le Sec; while on the left, on crossing the spur facing Lieu St Amand, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders came under heavy fire from that village, but managed in spite of it to establish themselves on the forward slope.By 1.30P.M.the objective was gained on the whole Divisional front.It had been previously arranged that if success attended these operations the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, accompanied by a mobile 18-pounder section under the command of Lieutenant J. Gillespie of “A” Battery, 256th Brigade, should pass through the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and if possible occupy Lieu St Amand and the station at Pavé de Valenciennes, situated close to the junction of the railway and the Valenciennes-Cambrai road near Lieu St Amand.Accordingly, as soon as the protective barrage that was covering the 4th Seaforth Highlanders had ceased, two companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders continued the advance. Though at first under fairly heavy hostile artillery barrage, they moved rapidly forward until on a line about 150 yards from the southernmost houses of the village. Here, faced by the enemy, who appeared to have established a firm line all along the front, they came under a heavy burst of machine-gun fire which first checked their pace, and, finally, as the German machine-gunners began to get on to their targets, brought the general advance to a standstill.The 18-pounder section at once came into action in the open, and silenced many of the machine-guns; but the guns hidden amongst the houses could not be located, and so could not be effectively bombarded. While searching for these guns, a German 8-inch howitzer battery got on to the 18-pounder section, and shelled it so effectively that it was forced to withdraw temporarily.The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, however, did not give up their attempts to reach the village, andeach platoon endeavoured to work its way forward. One of them, from a point 200 yards from the south-west corner of the village, crawled forward between the furrows of a newly-ploughed field until within twenty-five yards of two machine-guns which were firing from behind a bank.Unfortunately, just at the moment when the sections were about to rise and rush this post, a burst of enfilade machine-gun fire from the railway caught them. Swept by the bullets from this gun, they were unable to rise from the furrows, and movement forwards, rearwards, or to the flank became impossible. In this position they remained until an hour or so later. About 4P.M.the men were able to dribble back to cover singly.During this movement on the left, the information having been received at Divisional headquarters that all objectives had been gained, orders had therefore been issued for the attacking brigades to move forward to gain a line running from the river Selle just north of Haspres round Lieu St Amand to the railway. The 152nd Brigade on the right, however, found the resistance as strong as it had been in front of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and no substantial alterations in the line took place.It was therefore decided to subject Lieu St Amand to a heavy bombardment from 5P.M.to 5.30P.M., and then to advance strong patrols against the village, and if possible occupy it.At that time many batteries were moving forward, and though the 18-pounder section attached to the infantry again did gallant work in the open, the officer commanding the company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders concerned decided that the attack was unlikely to be successful, and so cancelled the orders for the advance. One platoon, however, which did not receive its instructions in time, had already moved forward, and reached a line about 100 yards from the outskirts of the village. At this point they were swept by machine-gun fire from the houses; but, nevertheless, with a fine determination to reach their objective, the men rushed the village and disappeared amongst the buildings. Those of them who had successfully crossed the open in face of the hostile fire and reached the village were at once subjected to close-range fire from all sides. The survivors, however,hung on behind what cover they could obtain from walls and buildings, and managed to extricate themselves one by one when darkness came.The performances of the two platoons of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which each had tried to carry Lieu St Amand individually, were characterised by great gallantry and skill on the part of the men. They had not only advanced against considerable machine-gun opposition, but they had also, having found themselves cut off from immediate assistance and at close grips with an enemy considerably superior to them in numbers and fire power, successfully extricated themselves from serious predicaments.The mobile section accompanying the Argylls had supported the infantry in these attacks magnificently. They had drawn considerable shell-fire when in action in the open, and had had one of their ammunition limbers set on fire, Lieutenant Gillespie himself extinguishing the flames.By 6P.M., a farther advance that evening appearing impracticable, orders were issued for a line to be consolidated roughly on the original objective given for the first attack.At 9P.M.orders were received from the Corps that pressure was to be exercised against the enemy’s rear-guards on the morrow by carrying out an attack with the object of gaining a line running from the railway east of the river Selle 1000 yards north of Haspres, east of Fleury and Noyelles, and thence running westwards to the railway north of Lieu St Amand.October 13th turned out to be a day of heavy and costly fighting. It was evident from the outset that the enemy was making a determined stand south of Valenciennes, so as to secure the flanks of his withdrawals that were taking place in other parts of the front. Indeed, orders captured during the forthcoming operations showed that the troops had been instructed to hold the line of the river Selle at all costs. In consequence, he was holding his position with machine-guns in considerable strength.Moreover, the protection afforded him by the river Selle and the Canal de l’Escaut enabled him to mass to the north-east a weight of artillery which he would not otherwise have dared to maintain in action in such close support to the infantry of his rear-guard.To increase his powers of resistance further, he also employed on this portion of the front a number of aeroplanes, which flew low over our attacking waves, and constantly bombed and machine-gunned the troops and batteries.The enemy’s determination to stand not having yet been disclosed at this time, it was decided to attempt to gain this objective by exploitation, and not to employ a creeping barrage. The 255th Brigade, R.F.A., was, however, detailed to follow the infantry in close support as a mobile brigade.At 9A.M.on the 18th the same four battalions as had been engaged on the 12th moved forward to the attack, two sections of machine-guns being sent forward with each leading battalion, as well as three light trench-mortars which accompanied them.Prior to the attack, places which appeared suitable for enemy concentrations and nests of machine-guns had been heavily bombarded by the artillery.Only on the right was any substantial progress made. On that flank the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, suffering heavy casualties from frontal and enfilade machine-gun fire, forced their way forward to a line 1000 yards north-east of Avesnes le Sec, where they were finally checked.On their left the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders came under such a blast of machine-gun fire that they made practically no advance, and sustained over 300 casualties; the effect of this fire was so destructive that the four sections of machine-guns, in their efforts to beat it down, had three officers killed and six guns knocked out, while the teams of the light trench-mortars lost so heavily that the survivors were too few in number to work the guns, and so joined in the fighting as infantry.Meanwhile the enemy had also opened an intense artillery barrage all along the line.In order to help forward the infantry on this point of the field, 2nd Lieutenant P. H. Unwin from “A” Battery, 256th Brigade, R.F.A., brought his section into action at 800 yards’ distance from the enemy, and immediately opened fire with great effect, driving back parties ofinfantry that were counter-attacking, and inflicting serious losses on them. 2nd Lieutenant Unwin remained in action in his exposed position throughout the day, and gave great moral assistance to the infantry.On the left brigade front it was arranged that the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on the left flank should move forward and capture Lieu St Amand before the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on the left centre moved forward to attack.Two companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders therefore went forward with the artillery bombarding the village; but as soon as the guns lifted off the southernmost houses, a white Very light was fired by the enemy, followed by an intense burst of machine-gun fire which swept the attacking waves.As no covered approaches existed except on the right, all forward movement was at once paralysed, apart from that of one platoon on the extreme right flank. Here a certain amount of cover existed, and the men worked their way forward to within fifty yards of some enemy machine-guns, and maintained themselves there, unable to make further progress, as the country had again become open.Attempts to rush forward were beaten down by hostile fire; and though one Lewis-gun team worked its way into position, and by excellent shooting knocked out a machine-gun team and inflicted casualties on parties seen in the village, no further progress was made.The advance made by the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had not carried the line sufficiently forward to enable the 4th Seaforth Highlanders to gain Maison Blanche in the centre, and by 11A.M.most of the attacking waves were back on the jumping-off line, though seriously depleted in numbers.On the right, however, parties of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, with both their flanks in the air, were digging-in along the railway north of Avesnes le Sec, and held on in this position until 2P.M.A party of an officer and twenty men protecting their right beat off several attempts to work round their flanks, covered the withdrawal of the troops on the railway, and remained in position until dusk, when they regained our lines.The platoons of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which had also been brought to a standstill, with both its flanks in the air, close against Lieu St Amand, similarly regained our lines at dusk, this being the third platoon of this battalion which had made a great endeavour to carry Lieu St Amand single-handed.Neither of the Divisions on the flanks was able to make progress during this day, and it was clearly evident that the enemy had selected the line of the Haspres-Lieu St Amand road as his line of resistance for his rearguards.No further attack was carried out until 19th October. As a result of operations in other parts of this line, everything pointed to an early withdrawal on the front south of Douai, which might possibly extend as far southwards as the front of the 51st Division. Extensive patrolling was therefore carried out during this period, but the enemy was always found in strength and alert, and numerous patrol encounters took place.The artillery, who were well provided with good observation posts, carried out numerous bombardments against enemy movement, and selected strong places with satisfactory results. They, however, received in return a very considerable ration of shells from the German gunners, who were still in force, and harassed the forward areas and battery positions continuously, particularly with gas.On the 17th October the enemy withdrawal south of Douai began, and on the 18th it had extended as far as the front occupied by the Canadians on the left flank of the 51st. The enemy was, however, still firmly in position along the Haspres-Lieu St Amand road.These days of respite from active operations were employed by the R.E. in solving many problems. Water for the forward troops was located in damaged wells in Avesnes le Sec and Iwuy, which had to be repaired and tested.A track for horse transport had to be made south of the village of Iwuy on account of the continuous bombardment of that village by the German artillery.The enemy had also, with characteristic thoroughness, destroyed all the bridges on the railway from Cambrai to Denain, and had thus effectually interfered with lateral communications on this area. The 8th Royal Scots were therefore employed working continuously in conjunctionwith a field company of the 4th Division in removing the debris of the broken arches from the roads so as to reopen them for troops and transport.An attack was now planned for the 20th October, the objectives given being the same as had been arranged for the attack on the 12th.However, on the early morning of 19th October, favoured by a thick mist, the enemy withdrew on the Divisional front. At this time the 153rd Brigade had taken over the line on the left, while the 154th Brigade had, after three days’ rest, relieved the 152nd Brigade on the right.Until the mist lessened the enemy could not be actively followed, but patrols from both brigades came into contact with him shortly after dawn.On the left of the Division the Canadians also reported that the enemy was withdrawing on their front, and that they were moving forward to seize the crossing on the left bank of the Canal de l’Escaut at Bouchain, north-west of Lieu St Amand.The withdrawal on the front of the 51st Division was, however, slow, and by noon patrols had reported that the enemy was still in position both on the right front and in Lieu St Amand.However, at 2.10P.M., the enemy began to bombard the latter, and twenty minutes later patrols of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were in its streets.Orders were then issued for the brigades to gain the line Fleury-Noyelles-Douchy, or, in other words, to seize the bridgeheads across the river Selle. The advance began on the greater part of the Divisional front at 3P.M., covered by detachments of the Corps cyclists and infantry patrols. It was at once discovered that while the resistance on the left was almost negligible, the enemy was holding on to Haspres, and was making some effort to delay the advance on the right.On the left progress became rapid. The two leading battalions, the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 7th Black Watch, at first moved forward in extended order; but later, as only stray groups of the enemy were encountered at this stage, a screen of scouts was sent forward, the companies following in artillery formation, and later by platoons in column of route. Simultaneouslythe artillery brigades advanced to positions in and about Avesnes le Sec and Lieu St Amand with mobile 18-pounder sections closely following the infantry battalions.By 6P.M.the woods east of Maison Blanche were cleared, and the troops were well east of Lieu St Amand. Before midnight Neuville sur l’Escaut, in which 1500 civilians were found, and Douchy, also full of civilians, were rushed. In the latter village a few riflemen had been left behind by the enemy to check the advance, but these fled as the leading troops approached.On the right brigade front the 4th Gordon Highlanders advanced towards Fleury with two companies, the remaining two companies forming a defensive flank to protect the right, as Haspres was still held by the enemy.As they approached Fleury they came under considerable artillery and machine-gun fire; but they pushed forward in spite of it, and reached the west banks of the river Selle. Here they found all bridges destroyed, so that the stream, some 20 feet wide, 5 feet deep, and with muddy banks and a soft bed, presented a serious obstacle. The advance therefore came to a standstill, while the troops collected material with which to improvise bridges.On the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had made rapid progress. They had, in fact, outrun their neighbouring battalions, and their three leading companies were in consequence compelled to form deep flanks as they advanced, while the fourth company moved in close support to them on their right flank.By 7P.M.they had reached Noyelles, which they found clear of the enemy, but, like Douchy and Neuville, occupied by numbers of civilians. They had dispersed a small party of Germans on the east bank of the river Selle, and though the bridge had been blown up, three companies had established themselves on the east bank of the river by 9.45P.M.in touch with the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The 4th Seaforth Highlanders also advanced in rear of the 1/7 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders towards Noyelles, while sections of the 400th and 404th Field Companies, R.E., were hastening forward with bridging material so as to prepare passages across the river for artillery at the earliest possible moment.The situation of the troops at midnight 19-20th October was thus as described above, while on the right, though Saubroir had fallen, the enemy in Haspres were still gallantly holding out. On the left the 4th Canadian Division had reached Denain.During the night the 404th Field Company, R.E., who had reconnoitred and selected a site for a bridge just north of Noyelles as soon as the infantry patrols had passed that village, moved forward with the pontoon and trestle waggons. Though they came under both rifle and machine-gun fire as they neared the village, the waggons reached the site successfully, and a bridge of two Weldon trestles was completed by 3.45A.M.The construction of a bridge within eight hours of the infantry having reached the east bank of the river, within a few hundred yards of enemy riflemen and machine-gunners, was an exceptionally fine performance.The advance continued throughout the night, but it was found that the enemy was making a stand roughly on the line of the road from Haspres through La Croix St Marie to Denain.On the right the 4th Gordon Highlanders, by improvising rough bridges from beams, branches, and straw, crossed the river Selle south of Fleury, and at 6.45A.M.on 20th October occupied the village. The enemy machine-gun teams had bolted from the eastern outskirts of the village as the troops approached.The 4th Seaforth Highlanders then crossed the river at Noyelles over the bridge just completed by the R.E., and formed up on a two-company front east and south of the village on the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders; and with the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on their left, the Argylls and Seaforths then attempted to advance at 5A.M.Heavy machine-gun fire was, however, at once opened on the 4th Seaforth Highlanders, with such effect that they were unable to make material progress, and were compelled to dig in only slightly in advance of their forming-up line. In this position they tried to locate the enemy machine-guns so that they might deal with them and continue the advance.The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders also foundthat their patrols could not get forward on to the high ground north of Noyelles, and so discontinued their advance until arrangements could be made for artillery support.Similarly on the left the two leading battalions were well across the river Selle at dawn, but were in their turn checked by machine-gun fire from the wood north-west of La Croix St Marie, and were also preparing to attack with artillery.Considerable fighting occurred during the early part of the day. In the night two attacks carried out by the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and one by the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders ultimately, about 8A.M., forced the enemy beyond the Haspres-La Croix St Marie road, machine-guns being captured at Maison Rouge. Beyond this point, however, the troops could make no headway against the volume of fire drawn by any attempt to move forward in the open.On the left brigade front the artillery came into action at 9.30A.M., when a concentrated fifteen minutes shoot was carried out against the woods and houses west of La Croix St Marie. The infantry line attacked, but failed to dislodge the enemy.The shoot was then repeated for a second fifteen minutes, and the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and 7th Black Watch again went forward, cleared the woods and houses, and quickly reached the La Croix St Marie-Denain road, touch being obtained in Denain with the 4th Canadians on the left.The mobile section of “A” Battery, 256th Brigade, R.F.A., under the command of Lieutenant S. Simkins, attached to the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, had materially assisted in this advance. Lieutenant Simkins, having been pointed out houses in which machine-guns were located, engaged them over open sights. Civilians who were taking shelter in the cellar of one of these houses afterwards told Lieutenant Simkins that the shooting was very accurate, and that the enemy machine-gunner in that house had left badly wounded.In spite of the proximity of the enemy and the fighting going on in that neighbourhood, the 404th Field Company, R.E., erected a bridge at Fleury. Owing to the hostile fire they could not get their waggons forward until 11.30A.M., but by 6.10P.M.a bridge consisting of a pontoon and a trestle was completed and brought into use.The 400th Field Company, R.E., had been ordered to bridge the river at Douchy, but they experienced similar difficulty in getting their waggons forward. They, however, found and repaired a partially-destroyed German bridge, and constructed a new bridge of two Weldon trestles south of the village. In each case the bridges were completed in time for the advance of the artillery.At 12 noon the 153rd Brigade continued its advance and made rapid progress. The enemy on the extreme left, fearing that he might be driven against the now bridgeless Canal de l’Escaut, withdrew rapidly, the 7th Black Watch reaching the canal bank along their whole front by 5P.M.They then detached two platoons to operate against the rear of the Germans resisting the 4th Canadians at Wavrechain, north of the canal, but they were held up through being unable to find a crossing.The advance of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was slower, not so much on account of the German resistance to them frontally, but on account of the fire which came from the high ground on their right flank. However, by 10P.M.they had established themselves on the canal bank from the rubber factory south of Prouvy westwards, capturing Haulchin and releasing 1500 French civilians. This advance was materially assisted by the Corps Cyclists, who patrolled the country well in front of the infantry, and enabled the latter to advance with few delays.After dark, at 8P.M., the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders resumed their advance, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the Divisional right at 10P.M.This advance proceeded successfully, and by midnight the leading troops had reached the eastern edges of the Grand Bois and the Bois de l’Entrée, the line running thence north-westwards to the railway leading to Denain.Throughout the night 20-21st October, which fortunately was light and clear, the advance continued. The 153rd Brigade had already reached the canal bank throughout their front, and had formed a defensive flank on their right along the railway line facing Thiant. The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on the right of the 153rdBrigade also made great progress. In the grey of the morning their first company entered Thiant. Here they encountered a burst of machine-gun fire, but by 9A.M.they had beaten down all resistance, and had worked through the village as far as to the banks of the Ecaillon. They, however, found the enemy in strength on the eastern banks, and so took up positions in houses and hedgerows on the edge of the stream. At 10A.M.21st October they gained touch with the Canadians, who had entered Prouvy.The 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the 11th Brigade, 4th Division, who were now up in line with them on the high ground overlooking Monchaux and the river Ecaillon, were now unable to make further progress towards the banks of the river, as they found the western sides of the river valley were very exposed and covered by the fire of the enemy holding strong natural positions in sunken roads.During the day the field artillery moved into positions west of Thiant.From this point onwards, as the villages in front of the line were occupied by French civilians, the Divisional commander decided only to use 18-pounder shrapnel against them. Similarly, for the same reason, gas was not employed against the villages. This was a great deprivation, as a large supply of the long awaited mustard gas had just arrived.Naturally the Germans used gas in similar circumstances freely.Meanwhile the bridges thrown across the Selle were only sufficient for field-guns and horsed transport. Arrangements had therefore to be made by the C.R.E., Lieut.-Colonel Napier-Clavering, to provide bridges which would enable the Corps heavy artillery and lorry traffic to keep pace with the advance, so that all weapons would be available to engage the enemy should he decide to stand on the east banks of the Ecaillon.Reconnaissances were therefore carried out by the 400th and 404th Field Companies, R.E., at Douchy and Noyelles for sites for the construction of heavy bridges over the river Selle. In both places the enemy had destroyed the original brick bridges, totally removing the central pier and one abutment in each case. The Douchy gap measured72 feet and that at Noyelles 88 feet. No long girders were available to bridge these gaps without piers, and the difficulty of securing foundations for the piers on the mass of brick debris in the river-bed had therefore to be overcome.For the Douchy bridge standard girder spans of 16 feet by 18 feet were available, so that work was begun by the 400th Field Company, R.E., on the 20th. By 10.30A.M.on the 23rd the bridge was completed for all traffic except heavy tanks, thus enabling the heavy artillery to cross the river in time to take part in the attack to be delivered on the 24th.For the bridge at Noyelles only salved German materials were available, which had to be collected and brought to the site of the bridge by horse transport. Work was begun on the 21st, and the bridge was completed for heavy traffic on the 28th.The result of the preceding operations had materially altered the dispositions of the Division. The 153rd Brigade had been pinched out of the front line, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of the 154th Brigade occupying the whole of what was now the Divisional front, with the 4th Gordon Highlanders in support of them at Fleury. The 153rd Brigade was therefore concentrated at Haulchin and Douchy, while the 152nd Brigade moved forward to Douchy and Noyelles.The 21st, 22nd, and 23rd October were passed in making preparations for forcing the passage of the river Ecaillon. At 11A.M.on the 21st the enemy began to shell Thiant, and for the next three days the artillery and machine-gun fire against our positions on the west bank of the river continued briskly. Orders were issued to accept any opportunity offered of crossing the river, but in only one case was an attempt to carry out this order successful, and then only temporarily. The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had made three such attempts at Thiant, and at the third a small party succeeded in crossing the river. They rushed a machine-gun post, but the alarm had been given, and a strong machine-gun and trench-mortar bombardment was opened by the enemy. In the face of this fire no support could be pushed across the river to help the Argylls, and they were therefore compelled to return, bringing the captured machine-gun with them.On 22nd October the 4th Seaforth Highlanders successfully advanced, and occupied the sunken road running parallel with the Ecaillon west of Monchaux. Their patrols had previously reached the west bank of the river, but had drawn such a storm of fire from the east bank that they were unable to maintain themselves there.While the troops were thus situated, it was decided to carry out an attack to force the passage of the Ecaillon on the 24th. On the evening of the 23rd, the 153rd Brigade, to whom this attack was to be entrusted, accordingly relieved the 154th Brigade in the line.The objective allotted to the Division for this attack was the village of Maing and the high ground south-east of it, the 4th Division being ordered to attack simultaneously on the right with a similar objective. The frontage of the attack allotted to the Division was 3000 yards in breadth, and for the operation seven brigades of field artillery and one of heavy artillery were placed at the disposal of the Divisional commander.Three intermediate objectives were selected, the first being the river Ecaillon including the eastern outskirts of Thiant, and for the 4th Division, Monchaux; the second objective was the western outskirts of Maing, while the railway running north and south between Maing and Famars was given as a line of exploitation for the operations if the attack was successful.The artillery, as soon as it had got into its own position east of the Selle, had fired Chinese barrages over the enemy’s front system on the 22nd and 23rd. These were most successful, the enemy becoming completely demoralised, vacating his rifle-pits and running from one place to another, undoubtedly suffering many casualties, as the number of stretcher parties seen at work after each barrage had lifted proved.It was therefore hoped that when the real attack came the German infantry would be considerably shaken, although patrols up to this point had always found them in position and alert on the east bank.Two companies of machine-guns were also detailed to fire a barrage, while a section of machine-guns and light trench-mortars accompanied each infantry battalion.Further, two sections of machine-guns were placed in the4th Canadian Division area amongst the houses on the north bank of the canal to enfilade the positions to be attacked.As it was necessary for the infantry to cross the Ecaillon on a broad front to enable them to take full advantage of the barrage, a number of bridges of 15 and 20 feet span were made. These were fitted with petrol tins and cork floats, which would prevent them from sinking should any of them prove too short to span the river.Demonstrations in the use of these bridges were given to officers and men at the river Selle at Noyelles, but no adequate inspection of the places where they were to be employed in the crossing of the Ecaillon could be made, owing to the vigilance of the enemy’s patrols.The two Black Watch battalions were detailed for this attack by the 153rd Brigade, and were disposed with the 6th battalion on the right on a two-company front, and the 7th battalion on the left on a one-company front.At 4A.M.on 24th October, supported by a great weight of artillery, this attack was launched. Each company carried with it eight bridges, each supported by two to four men. Several of these, however, were destroyed by shell-fire before they had arrived at the water’s edge.The Ecaillon was found to be swollen by recent rains, and south of Thiant to be about 20 feet wide, from 4 to 6 feet deep, with bed and sides of soft mud, and banks, often steep, from 3 to 6 feet high. A single line of wire entanglement, except at Thiant, ran along the east bank of the river, and also along the greater part of the western bank.The right company of the 6th Black Watch, whose advance had to be carried out down a glacis dominated by the village of Monchaux, encountered strong opposition. In the first instance, only one platoon, No. 11, commanded by Lieutenant Walker, managed to cross the river. This platoon, on the left of its company frontage, found its bridge too short to span the river; it was therefore discarded, and Lieutenant Walker, with his sergeant and runner, under the fire of machine-guns, plunged into the water and swam across to the other side. They were then followed by the remainder of the platoon, whom they helped to drag ashore as they struggled across the river, swimming and wading, in their heavy kits.The next platoon on their right found themselves in a zone of machine-gun bullets, and in ten minutes only a corporal and six men were surviving. Nevertheless, the corporal crossed the stream alone, but had to return, and then crawled back with his six men to the assembly position.The platoon in rear then renewed the attempt, but after suffering many casualties on a glacis destitute of cover, had also to withdraw.The second platoon on the left—that is, the one in rear of No. 11—placed their bridge in position across the wreckage of an old German bridge and scrambled across.Meanwhile the commander of No. 11 platoon and the company commander, realising that the machine-guns holding up the advance of the platoons on the right were located in Monchaux, turned their men right-handed, entered the village, and set upon the machine-gunners with their rifles and destroyed them. The two platoons that had already failed to cross then ran down to the river banks, and assisted by some men on the east bank, who threw out a stout ladder towards them, managed to cross the river. Three Lewis guns were then put out at once north-east of Monchaux to pin the enemy into that village while No. 11 platoon was dealing with the enemy in it. Monchaux was finally cleared, 68 prisoners and 9 machine-guns being captured there. Touch was also established in the village with men of the Hampshire Regiment, 4th Division.The left-hand company of the 6th Black Watch, not being involved in the close-range machine-gun fire from Monchaux, and meeting no direct fire, quickly threw their bridges across the river, and were at once in possession of their first objective.The company of the 6th Black Watch on the left crossed after many adventurous incidents by six bridges, placed across the river between the northern and southern outskirts of Thiant. Three of these had been quietly placed in position across the river before zero hour, and were crossed without difficulty when the barrage opened. The fixing of the remaining bridges, however, presented several difficulties. In one case, when the bridges were too short, one was used as a ladder down to the water, and a second was attached to it and to débris on the other side. Anotherparty crossed by a hand-rail and girder remaining on a destroyed bridge. Another bridge, which was found to be too short, was floated across the river and lashed by a wire to a tree, each man having to leap from the bridge on to the beach on the opposite bank.Crossings were made by a section at a time. In each case the foremost man as he reached the bank rushed into the nearest house to deal with the enemy there. Throughout, the crossing was effected under fairly lively machine-gun and trench-mortar fire.The second objective was attacked by two companies on the right and one on the left of the same battalions. The advance was met by heavy shelling and considerable machine-gun fire. The progress was slow, and it was not before 8A.M.that the objective was reached. The 7th Black Watch had for some time been held up by machine-guns in the Chateau des Pres, but they brought their Lewis guns into action, successfully countered the guns, and rushed the chateau. Farther on, in the outskirts of the village, they captured a German trench-mortar, which they turned on the enemy with good effect.Heavy fighting ensued in the attack on Maing. The troops operating south of the village, one of the companies of the 6th Black Watch which had forced the passage of the Ecaillon, found it impossible to advance owing to the severity of the fire from the south-east corner of the village and from the sunken roads in front of them.On the left, where two companies entered the village of Maing, close fighting went on for many hours in the streets and amongst the houses. Mobile 18-pounders, two reserve sections of machine-guns and the German trench-mortars already referred to, were all employed in the effort to secure the village. It was not, however, until 3P.M.that the bulk of Maing was captured, the line then running round the eastern outskirts of the village to the cemetery, and thence along the sunken road running south-eastwards. The chateau at the eastern corner still remained in the enemy’s hands.Meanwhile the Divisional engineers had made every effort to bridge the Ecaillon for the passage of artillery. A section of the 404th Field Company had moved to the river-banks early in the morning to build foot-bridges forinfantry; the remainder of the company also came up with bridging material, but owing to the heavy hostile barrage fire which greeted the attack, they were unable for some time to get their waggons forward. By 9A.M., however, the reconnaissances of the bridge sites had been completed, and between 9 and 10A.M., in spite of heavy shell-fire, the waggons moved forward. The first bridge just north of Thiant was completed by 10.30A.M., and the second at the southern edge of the village by 11.45A.M.The 400th Field Company completed a third bridge just south of the village. The first was completed in sufficient time to allow the mobile sections of the field artillery to be in action in close support of the infantry by 11A.M.A reconnaissance for a site for a heavy bridge at Thiant capable of carrying lorry traffic was made during the morning of the attack, and the abutments and foundations of the pier of a bridge destroyed by the Germans were found to be sound.In spite of a considerable amount of shell-fire, work was carried on in preparing this site. The material for the bridge could not, however, be dumped at the site until the debris of the railway bridge over the Denain-Thiant road which had been blown up had been cleared away. The 8th Royal Scots had begun working continuously on the removal of this debris on 23rd October. In the course of the morning of the 24th they had cleared a path for horse-drawn vehicles, which greatly assisted the artillery moving forward, and by 3P.M.of 25th October a passage was ready for lorry traffic. Shortly after this hour the lorries carrying the material for the heavy bridge reached Thiant, and by 7.50A.M.on 26th October the bridge was ready for all traffic, including heavy tanks.On the conclusion of this day’s fighting the following message was received by the G.O.C. from the Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Sir A. J. Godley:—

“Now that the gallant 51st Division is passing from my command, may I be permitted to say that I shall always remember with the greatest pride that for six stirring days you formed part of the Canadian Corps. I remember very well when the Division first came to France in May 1915, and that we took part together in the fighting at Festubert and Givenchy. Again we were associated in the memorable battle of Arras in April 1917, and now again we have kicked off side by side in an advance the results of which I have every reason to believe will be far-reaching. That your Division was able after the continuous fighting in which it has been engaged this year to take and keep the strong position of Greenland Hill, testifies in the strongest possible manner to the fact thatthe fighting qualities of the 51st are second to none in all the Allied armies.“On behalf of the Canadian Divisions I thank you most sincerely for the splendid help and support you have given to the main advance south of the river. I wish you all the best of luck always, and have every confidence that the splendid reputation that the Division now enjoys will ever be maintained.”

“Now that the gallant 51st Division is passing from my command, may I be permitted to say that I shall always remember with the greatest pride that for six stirring days you formed part of the Canadian Corps. I remember very well when the Division first came to France in May 1915, and that we took part together in the fighting at Festubert and Givenchy. Again we were associated in the memorable battle of Arras in April 1917, and now again we have kicked off side by side in an advance the results of which I have every reason to believe will be far-reaching. That your Division was able after the continuous fighting in which it has been engaged this year to take and keep the strong position of Greenland Hill, testifies in the strongest possible manner to the fact thatthe fighting qualities of the 51st are second to none in all the Allied armies.

“On behalf of the Canadian Divisions I thank you most sincerely for the splendid help and support you have given to the main advance south of the river. I wish you all the best of luck always, and have every confidence that the splendid reputation that the Division now enjoys will ever be maintained.”

Until 14th September, when the Division was relieved by the 49th Division, no events occurred which materially changed the tactical situation. The period was not, however, a quiet one. The enemy was at times extremely active with his guns, on occasions using quantities of mustard gas, the targets against which he chiefly vented his spleen being the railway cutting, Greenland Hill, and Fampoux.

Enemy aircraft were also unusually active in this area, particularly in bombing the troops in the line. On one occasion in particular, 4th September, aircraft were crossing over lines frequently throughout the night—singly, by twos, and in flights up to six in number—which heavily bombed the vicinity of Roeux, Fampoux, and the valley north of Fampoux.

Patrolling was maintained with the greatest energy, as it was anticipated that the success of the operations in the south in which Cambrai was becoming threatened might at any time lead the enemy to further withdrawals.

In consequence, encounters in No Man’s Land were of frequent occurrence, in which considerable damage was inflicted on the enemy—not, however, without losses also being sustained by the Jocks. On one occasion a daylight patrol of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, consisting of one officer and two other ranks, had a lively fight with an enemy post 200 yards from Biache power station. They killed two of the enemy and wounded several others, and then returned to our lines, all three having first been wounded.

On relief on 14th September the Division remained at rest and training until 24th September, when it again returned to the same sector, and remained in the line until 4th October, when it was again relieved by the 44th Division. This relief was not, however, carried out with the object of allowing the Division a period of rest, but for the purpose of its being moved to another portion of the front to take part again in active operations.

Probably, in common with many other Divisions, the men of the 51st had come to consider that they were doing more than their fair share of battle fighting. They had, indeed, been engaged in nine major operations in the period of seventeen months from April 1917 to August 1918.

The men thus felt entitled to covet the long periods of rest such as fell to the lot of some of the more fortunate Corps and Divisions, which occasionally were given five or six weeks’ rest in which to regain their form after an operation.

They, however, comforted themselves by the thought that they were so continuously employed in the forefront of the battle because the Higher Command had learnt to rely on them to carry to a successful issue any task that was set them.

On 5th October the Division began its move southwards, with orders to relieve the 3rd Canadian Division in the line north-west of Cambrai, and by the evening of 8th October was concentrated in the Queant-Inchy area. However, a rapidly-changing situation on the 8th necessitated an alteration in the plans. On that date an attack was delivered by the Third and Fourth British Armies, which was continued by the French on their right. Farther south on the same date French troops attacked east of the Meuse and in Champagne. This attack progressed for some three or four miles into the enemy’s lines, with the result that his resistance temporarily gave way. During the night the Canadian Corps captured Ramillies and crossed the Scheldt Canal at Pont d’Aire, and entered Cambrai from the north. The following day the advance was continued. Cambrai was in our hands, and our troops established themselves on a line three miles east of the town.

Orders were therefore issued for the 51st Division to move to the Bourlon area, and to be placed under the command of the Canadian Corps. Accordingly on 10th October the 152nd Brigade moved to Bourlon village, 153rd Brigade to the area north-east of Bourlon, and 154th Brigade north of Fontaine Notre Dame, the village in which they had experienced such savage fighting in November 1917.

On 11th October orders were issued for the 51st Division to relieve the 2nd Canadian Division, which was attacking the village of Iwuy on the same day, the instructions being that the 51st was to take over from the 2nd Canadianson whatever line they had established themselves at the conclusion of the operations.

Prior to these moves an important change had taken place in the composition of the Division: the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who had been employed as pioneer battalion to the 5th Division ever since they had left the 51st in the Labyrinth in 1916, rejoined the Division as an infantry battalion. They were allotted to the 153rd Brigade in place of the 7th Gordon Highlanders, who, on account of the difficulty of finding further reinforcements, were transferred to the 152nd Brigade and amalgamated with the 6th Gordon Highlanders. This composite battalion was known as the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders.

In view of the coming relief, the 152nd and 154th Brigades moved forward during the morning into the 2nd Canadian Division area, the 153rd Brigade moved towards Tilloy and Essars, and the Divisional staff headquarters opened a report centre at the headquarters of the 2nd Canadian Division at Escadœuvres.

At 4P.M.the 51st Division again came under the XXIInd Corps, and received orders that it would attack through the 2nd Canadian Division on the following day in conjunction with an attack to be delivered by the Corps on either flank.

The operations on which the Division was now to embark constituted a complete change from any in which it had previously taken part. Trench warfare, in which the enemy’s defences can be largely definitely located, now belonged to the past. The scene of the fighting was for the future to be laid amidst large uplands, checkered with undestroyed villages, many of them still occupied by their civilian inhabitants, and with occasional woods and spinneys with living trees in full leaf. Continuous trenches no longer stretched across the battle front.

The country was, however, well adapted for the rear-guard action which the enemy was fighting. On the western edge of the uplands he could adequately cover the eastern slopes of those facing him with comparatively few machine-guns, skilfully hidden in spinneys and sunken roads, in positions which dominated the open country over which the attacking troops must advance.

Moreover, two serious obstacles in the shape of riverscompletely crossed the Divisional front—namely, the river Selle and the river Ecaillon. These rivers, with soft treacherous beds and steep muddy sides, were not fordable. Further, their course ran through narrow steeply-sloped valleys, so that the high ground on the eastern banks afforded magnificent observation to machine-gunners and artillery observers of the western slopes of the valleys and of the crossings of the river.

To the north of the Divisional front ran the Canal de l’Escaut in a north-easterly direction until it passed Denain, where, in a short reach, it suddenly turned south-east and traversed almost half the Divisional front before it again bent north-eastwards and resumed its course.

Traversing the Divisional front obliquely from south-west to north-east ran the great Cambrai-Valenciennes road.

The country was for the most part not so enclosed as it was further south, where innumerable orchards, spinneys, and woods blinded the enemy’s troops, and so compelled him either to fall back to more open country, or to employ strong rearguards to cover the ground and hold it. In this case each attack required delicate handling to prevent large numbers of men falling victims in an endeavour to close with a few marksmen on well-sited machine-gun nests.

To protect the infantry from this fate creeping barrages were arranged wherever possible, and even when this form of attack was not considered advisable or was impracticable, sections of field-guns and howitzers were invariably detailed, as far as the crossings of the river allowed, to accompany the infantry in close support. In fact, it will be seen that in this battle the co-operation between the artillery and infantry had reached an abnormally high standard, due to the gallantry, initiative, and efficiency of the junior officers and men.

In appreciating the true value of the success of the Highland Division in this, its last engagement, it must not be forgotten that since 21st March it had lost in major operations, apart from sickness and trench warfare, over a thousand officers and many thousands of men. Thus it was embarking on a form of warfare of which the bulk of its commanders had had no experience, and with its infantry composed for the most part of immature youthsor men who had only recently joined the ranks of the infantry. Taking these facts into consideration, the repeated incidents of unusual daring and gallantry displayed in these operations will give clear proof of the great vitality of the Division. This was largely due to the manner in which its reinforcements, earnestly applying themselves to the upholding of its traditions, supported the commanders and more experienced comrades.

In the early hours of 12th October 1918, orders were received that the Division was to form up on a line roughly 1000 yards north-east of the village of Iwuy, and to attack with the object of capturing a line running from Avesnes le Sec inclusive along the Lieu St Amand road as far as Maison Blanche Farm, thence to the railway at Houdain, the breadth of line to be attacked being about 5000 yards.

The 49th Division was co-operating in this attack on the right, and a brigade of the 2nd Canadian Division was to operate on the left flank and clear the country between the railway and the Canal de l’Escaut.

Two brigades were detailed by the G.O.C. for the attack, the 152nd Brigade on the right and 154th Brigade on the left. The 152nd Brigade attacked on a two-battalion front, the leading battalions being the 5th Seaforth Highlanders and the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders, each on a two-company front. The 154th Brigade, however, employed only one battalion on the front line, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders, who formed up on a three-company front.

By 4.45A.M.the attacking brigades had completed the relief of the 4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades. The remainder of the morning was spent by the battalions in moving into position and completing their arrangements for the attack.

At 8A.M.General Carter-Campbell took over command of the sector.

At 10A.M.reports were received at Divisional headquarters that the enemy were withdrawing on the front of the 49th Division on the right, and that their brigades were moving forward without waiting for the artillery barrage. No reports could, however, be obtained on the Divisional front that the enemy had withdrawn there; it was in consequence decided that the attack should be carried out as originally planned.

Accordingly at 12 noon the infantry advanced, preceded by a creeping barrage fired by six brigades of field artillery. It, however, quickly transpired that the attack had coincided with an enemy withdrawal, and the prescribed objective was reached with little opposition. On the extreme right the 5th Seaforth Highlanders had some fighting in clearing Avesnes le Sec; while on the left, on crossing the spur facing Lieu St Amand, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders came under heavy fire from that village, but managed in spite of it to establish themselves on the forward slope.

By 1.30P.M.the objective was gained on the whole Divisional front.

It had been previously arranged that if success attended these operations the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, accompanied by a mobile 18-pounder section under the command of Lieutenant J. Gillespie of “A” Battery, 256th Brigade, should pass through the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and if possible occupy Lieu St Amand and the station at Pavé de Valenciennes, situated close to the junction of the railway and the Valenciennes-Cambrai road near Lieu St Amand.

Accordingly, as soon as the protective barrage that was covering the 4th Seaforth Highlanders had ceased, two companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders continued the advance. Though at first under fairly heavy hostile artillery barrage, they moved rapidly forward until on a line about 150 yards from the southernmost houses of the village. Here, faced by the enemy, who appeared to have established a firm line all along the front, they came under a heavy burst of machine-gun fire which first checked their pace, and, finally, as the German machine-gunners began to get on to their targets, brought the general advance to a standstill.

The 18-pounder section at once came into action in the open, and silenced many of the machine-guns; but the guns hidden amongst the houses could not be located, and so could not be effectively bombarded. While searching for these guns, a German 8-inch howitzer battery got on to the 18-pounder section, and shelled it so effectively that it was forced to withdraw temporarily.

The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, however, did not give up their attempts to reach the village, andeach platoon endeavoured to work its way forward. One of them, from a point 200 yards from the south-west corner of the village, crawled forward between the furrows of a newly-ploughed field until within twenty-five yards of two machine-guns which were firing from behind a bank.

Unfortunately, just at the moment when the sections were about to rise and rush this post, a burst of enfilade machine-gun fire from the railway caught them. Swept by the bullets from this gun, they were unable to rise from the furrows, and movement forwards, rearwards, or to the flank became impossible. In this position they remained until an hour or so later. About 4P.M.the men were able to dribble back to cover singly.

During this movement on the left, the information having been received at Divisional headquarters that all objectives had been gained, orders had therefore been issued for the attacking brigades to move forward to gain a line running from the river Selle just north of Haspres round Lieu St Amand to the railway. The 152nd Brigade on the right, however, found the resistance as strong as it had been in front of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and no substantial alterations in the line took place.

It was therefore decided to subject Lieu St Amand to a heavy bombardment from 5P.M.to 5.30P.M., and then to advance strong patrols against the village, and if possible occupy it.

At that time many batteries were moving forward, and though the 18-pounder section attached to the infantry again did gallant work in the open, the officer commanding the company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders concerned decided that the attack was unlikely to be successful, and so cancelled the orders for the advance. One platoon, however, which did not receive its instructions in time, had already moved forward, and reached a line about 100 yards from the outskirts of the village. At this point they were swept by machine-gun fire from the houses; but, nevertheless, with a fine determination to reach their objective, the men rushed the village and disappeared amongst the buildings. Those of them who had successfully crossed the open in face of the hostile fire and reached the village were at once subjected to close-range fire from all sides. The survivors, however,hung on behind what cover they could obtain from walls and buildings, and managed to extricate themselves one by one when darkness came.

The performances of the two platoons of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which each had tried to carry Lieu St Amand individually, were characterised by great gallantry and skill on the part of the men. They had not only advanced against considerable machine-gun opposition, but they had also, having found themselves cut off from immediate assistance and at close grips with an enemy considerably superior to them in numbers and fire power, successfully extricated themselves from serious predicaments.

The mobile section accompanying the Argylls had supported the infantry in these attacks magnificently. They had drawn considerable shell-fire when in action in the open, and had had one of their ammunition limbers set on fire, Lieutenant Gillespie himself extinguishing the flames.

By 6P.M., a farther advance that evening appearing impracticable, orders were issued for a line to be consolidated roughly on the original objective given for the first attack.

At 9P.M.orders were received from the Corps that pressure was to be exercised against the enemy’s rear-guards on the morrow by carrying out an attack with the object of gaining a line running from the railway east of the river Selle 1000 yards north of Haspres, east of Fleury and Noyelles, and thence running westwards to the railway north of Lieu St Amand.

October 13th turned out to be a day of heavy and costly fighting. It was evident from the outset that the enemy was making a determined stand south of Valenciennes, so as to secure the flanks of his withdrawals that were taking place in other parts of the front. Indeed, orders captured during the forthcoming operations showed that the troops had been instructed to hold the line of the river Selle at all costs. In consequence, he was holding his position with machine-guns in considerable strength.

Moreover, the protection afforded him by the river Selle and the Canal de l’Escaut enabled him to mass to the north-east a weight of artillery which he would not otherwise have dared to maintain in action in such close support to the infantry of his rear-guard.

To increase his powers of resistance further, he also employed on this portion of the front a number of aeroplanes, which flew low over our attacking waves, and constantly bombed and machine-gunned the troops and batteries.

The enemy’s determination to stand not having yet been disclosed at this time, it was decided to attempt to gain this objective by exploitation, and not to employ a creeping barrage. The 255th Brigade, R.F.A., was, however, detailed to follow the infantry in close support as a mobile brigade.

At 9A.M.on the 18th the same four battalions as had been engaged on the 12th moved forward to the attack, two sections of machine-guns being sent forward with each leading battalion, as well as three light trench-mortars which accompanied them.

Prior to the attack, places which appeared suitable for enemy concentrations and nests of machine-guns had been heavily bombarded by the artillery.

Only on the right was any substantial progress made. On that flank the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, suffering heavy casualties from frontal and enfilade machine-gun fire, forced their way forward to a line 1000 yards north-east of Avesnes le Sec, where they were finally checked.

On their left the 6/7 Gordon Highlanders came under such a blast of machine-gun fire that they made practically no advance, and sustained over 300 casualties; the effect of this fire was so destructive that the four sections of machine-guns, in their efforts to beat it down, had three officers killed and six guns knocked out, while the teams of the light trench-mortars lost so heavily that the survivors were too few in number to work the guns, and so joined in the fighting as infantry.

Meanwhile the enemy had also opened an intense artillery barrage all along the line.

In order to help forward the infantry on this point of the field, 2nd Lieutenant P. H. Unwin from “A” Battery, 256th Brigade, R.F.A., brought his section into action at 800 yards’ distance from the enemy, and immediately opened fire with great effect, driving back parties ofinfantry that were counter-attacking, and inflicting serious losses on them. 2nd Lieutenant Unwin remained in action in his exposed position throughout the day, and gave great moral assistance to the infantry.

On the left brigade front it was arranged that the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on the left flank should move forward and capture Lieu St Amand before the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on the left centre moved forward to attack.

Two companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders therefore went forward with the artillery bombarding the village; but as soon as the guns lifted off the southernmost houses, a white Very light was fired by the enemy, followed by an intense burst of machine-gun fire which swept the attacking waves.

As no covered approaches existed except on the right, all forward movement was at once paralysed, apart from that of one platoon on the extreme right flank. Here a certain amount of cover existed, and the men worked their way forward to within fifty yards of some enemy machine-guns, and maintained themselves there, unable to make further progress, as the country had again become open.

Attempts to rush forward were beaten down by hostile fire; and though one Lewis-gun team worked its way into position, and by excellent shooting knocked out a machine-gun team and inflicted casualties on parties seen in the village, no further progress was made.

The advance made by the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had not carried the line sufficiently forward to enable the 4th Seaforth Highlanders to gain Maison Blanche in the centre, and by 11A.M.most of the attacking waves were back on the jumping-off line, though seriously depleted in numbers.

On the right, however, parties of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, with both their flanks in the air, were digging-in along the railway north of Avesnes le Sec, and held on in this position until 2P.M.A party of an officer and twenty men protecting their right beat off several attempts to work round their flanks, covered the withdrawal of the troops on the railway, and remained in position until dusk, when they regained our lines.

The platoons of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, which had also been brought to a standstill, with both its flanks in the air, close against Lieu St Amand, similarly regained our lines at dusk, this being the third platoon of this battalion which had made a great endeavour to carry Lieu St Amand single-handed.

Neither of the Divisions on the flanks was able to make progress during this day, and it was clearly evident that the enemy had selected the line of the Haspres-Lieu St Amand road as his line of resistance for his rearguards.

No further attack was carried out until 19th October. As a result of operations in other parts of this line, everything pointed to an early withdrawal on the front south of Douai, which might possibly extend as far southwards as the front of the 51st Division. Extensive patrolling was therefore carried out during this period, but the enemy was always found in strength and alert, and numerous patrol encounters took place.

The artillery, who were well provided with good observation posts, carried out numerous bombardments against enemy movement, and selected strong places with satisfactory results. They, however, received in return a very considerable ration of shells from the German gunners, who were still in force, and harassed the forward areas and battery positions continuously, particularly with gas.

On the 17th October the enemy withdrawal south of Douai began, and on the 18th it had extended as far as the front occupied by the Canadians on the left flank of the 51st. The enemy was, however, still firmly in position along the Haspres-Lieu St Amand road.

These days of respite from active operations were employed by the R.E. in solving many problems. Water for the forward troops was located in damaged wells in Avesnes le Sec and Iwuy, which had to be repaired and tested.

A track for horse transport had to be made south of the village of Iwuy on account of the continuous bombardment of that village by the German artillery.

The enemy had also, with characteristic thoroughness, destroyed all the bridges on the railway from Cambrai to Denain, and had thus effectually interfered with lateral communications on this area. The 8th Royal Scots were therefore employed working continuously in conjunctionwith a field company of the 4th Division in removing the debris of the broken arches from the roads so as to reopen them for troops and transport.

An attack was now planned for the 20th October, the objectives given being the same as had been arranged for the attack on the 12th.

However, on the early morning of 19th October, favoured by a thick mist, the enemy withdrew on the Divisional front. At this time the 153rd Brigade had taken over the line on the left, while the 154th Brigade had, after three days’ rest, relieved the 152nd Brigade on the right.

Until the mist lessened the enemy could not be actively followed, but patrols from both brigades came into contact with him shortly after dawn.

On the left of the Division the Canadians also reported that the enemy was withdrawing on their front, and that they were moving forward to seize the crossing on the left bank of the Canal de l’Escaut at Bouchain, north-west of Lieu St Amand.

The withdrawal on the front of the 51st Division was, however, slow, and by noon patrols had reported that the enemy was still in position both on the right front and in Lieu St Amand.

However, at 2.10P.M., the enemy began to bombard the latter, and twenty minutes later patrols of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were in its streets.

Orders were then issued for the brigades to gain the line Fleury-Noyelles-Douchy, or, in other words, to seize the bridgeheads across the river Selle. The advance began on the greater part of the Divisional front at 3P.M., covered by detachments of the Corps cyclists and infantry patrols. It was at once discovered that while the resistance on the left was almost negligible, the enemy was holding on to Haspres, and was making some effort to delay the advance on the right.

On the left progress became rapid. The two leading battalions, the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 7th Black Watch, at first moved forward in extended order; but later, as only stray groups of the enemy were encountered at this stage, a screen of scouts was sent forward, the companies following in artillery formation, and later by platoons in column of route. Simultaneouslythe artillery brigades advanced to positions in and about Avesnes le Sec and Lieu St Amand with mobile 18-pounder sections closely following the infantry battalions.

By 6P.M.the woods east of Maison Blanche were cleared, and the troops were well east of Lieu St Amand. Before midnight Neuville sur l’Escaut, in which 1500 civilians were found, and Douchy, also full of civilians, were rushed. In the latter village a few riflemen had been left behind by the enemy to check the advance, but these fled as the leading troops approached.

On the right brigade front the 4th Gordon Highlanders advanced towards Fleury with two companies, the remaining two companies forming a defensive flank to protect the right, as Haspres was still held by the enemy.

As they approached Fleury they came under considerable artillery and machine-gun fire; but they pushed forward in spite of it, and reached the west banks of the river Selle. Here they found all bridges destroyed, so that the stream, some 20 feet wide, 5 feet deep, and with muddy banks and a soft bed, presented a serious obstacle. The advance therefore came to a standstill, while the troops collected material with which to improvise bridges.

On the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had made rapid progress. They had, in fact, outrun their neighbouring battalions, and their three leading companies were in consequence compelled to form deep flanks as they advanced, while the fourth company moved in close support to them on their right flank.

By 7P.M.they had reached Noyelles, which they found clear of the enemy, but, like Douchy and Neuville, occupied by numbers of civilians. They had dispersed a small party of Germans on the east bank of the river Selle, and though the bridge had been blown up, three companies had established themselves on the east bank of the river by 9.45P.M.in touch with the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The 4th Seaforth Highlanders also advanced in rear of the 1/7 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders towards Noyelles, while sections of the 400th and 404th Field Companies, R.E., were hastening forward with bridging material so as to prepare passages across the river for artillery at the earliest possible moment.

The situation of the troops at midnight 19-20th October was thus as described above, while on the right, though Saubroir had fallen, the enemy in Haspres were still gallantly holding out. On the left the 4th Canadian Division had reached Denain.

During the night the 404th Field Company, R.E., who had reconnoitred and selected a site for a bridge just north of Noyelles as soon as the infantry patrols had passed that village, moved forward with the pontoon and trestle waggons. Though they came under both rifle and machine-gun fire as they neared the village, the waggons reached the site successfully, and a bridge of two Weldon trestles was completed by 3.45A.M.The construction of a bridge within eight hours of the infantry having reached the east bank of the river, within a few hundred yards of enemy riflemen and machine-gunners, was an exceptionally fine performance.

The advance continued throughout the night, but it was found that the enemy was making a stand roughly on the line of the road from Haspres through La Croix St Marie to Denain.

On the right the 4th Gordon Highlanders, by improvising rough bridges from beams, branches, and straw, crossed the river Selle south of Fleury, and at 6.45A.M.on 20th October occupied the village. The enemy machine-gun teams had bolted from the eastern outskirts of the village as the troops approached.

The 4th Seaforth Highlanders then crossed the river at Noyelles over the bridge just completed by the R.E., and formed up on a two-company front east and south of the village on the left of the 4th Gordon Highlanders; and with the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on their left, the Argylls and Seaforths then attempted to advance at 5A.M.

Heavy machine-gun fire was, however, at once opened on the 4th Seaforth Highlanders, with such effect that they were unable to make material progress, and were compelled to dig in only slightly in advance of their forming-up line. In this position they tried to locate the enemy machine-guns so that they might deal with them and continue the advance.

The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders also foundthat their patrols could not get forward on to the high ground north of Noyelles, and so discontinued their advance until arrangements could be made for artillery support.

Similarly on the left the two leading battalions were well across the river Selle at dawn, but were in their turn checked by machine-gun fire from the wood north-west of La Croix St Marie, and were also preparing to attack with artillery.

Considerable fighting occurred during the early part of the day. In the night two attacks carried out by the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and one by the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders ultimately, about 8A.M., forced the enemy beyond the Haspres-La Croix St Marie road, machine-guns being captured at Maison Rouge. Beyond this point, however, the troops could make no headway against the volume of fire drawn by any attempt to move forward in the open.

On the left brigade front the artillery came into action at 9.30A.M., when a concentrated fifteen minutes shoot was carried out against the woods and houses west of La Croix St Marie. The infantry line attacked, but failed to dislodge the enemy.

The shoot was then repeated for a second fifteen minutes, and the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and 7th Black Watch again went forward, cleared the woods and houses, and quickly reached the La Croix St Marie-Denain road, touch being obtained in Denain with the 4th Canadians on the left.

The mobile section of “A” Battery, 256th Brigade, R.F.A., under the command of Lieutenant S. Simkins, attached to the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, had materially assisted in this advance. Lieutenant Simkins, having been pointed out houses in which machine-guns were located, engaged them over open sights. Civilians who were taking shelter in the cellar of one of these houses afterwards told Lieutenant Simkins that the shooting was very accurate, and that the enemy machine-gunner in that house had left badly wounded.

In spite of the proximity of the enemy and the fighting going on in that neighbourhood, the 404th Field Company, R.E., erected a bridge at Fleury. Owing to the hostile fire they could not get their waggons forward until 11.30A.M., but by 6.10P.M.a bridge consisting of a pontoon and a trestle was completed and brought into use.

The 400th Field Company, R.E., had been ordered to bridge the river at Douchy, but they experienced similar difficulty in getting their waggons forward. They, however, found and repaired a partially-destroyed German bridge, and constructed a new bridge of two Weldon trestles south of the village. In each case the bridges were completed in time for the advance of the artillery.

At 12 noon the 153rd Brigade continued its advance and made rapid progress. The enemy on the extreme left, fearing that he might be driven against the now bridgeless Canal de l’Escaut, withdrew rapidly, the 7th Black Watch reaching the canal bank along their whole front by 5P.M.They then detached two platoons to operate against the rear of the Germans resisting the 4th Canadians at Wavrechain, north of the canal, but they were held up through being unable to find a crossing.

The advance of the 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders was slower, not so much on account of the German resistance to them frontally, but on account of the fire which came from the high ground on their right flank. However, by 10P.M.they had established themselves on the canal bank from the rubber factory south of Prouvy westwards, capturing Haulchin and releasing 1500 French civilians. This advance was materially assisted by the Corps Cyclists, who patrolled the country well in front of the infantry, and enabled the latter to advance with few delays.

After dark, at 8P.M., the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders resumed their advance, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders on the Divisional right at 10P.M.This advance proceeded successfully, and by midnight the leading troops had reached the eastern edges of the Grand Bois and the Bois de l’Entrée, the line running thence north-westwards to the railway leading to Denain.

Throughout the night 20-21st October, which fortunately was light and clear, the advance continued. The 153rd Brigade had already reached the canal bank throughout their front, and had formed a defensive flank on their right along the railway line facing Thiant. The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on the right of the 153rdBrigade also made great progress. In the grey of the morning their first company entered Thiant. Here they encountered a burst of machine-gun fire, but by 9A.M.they had beaten down all resistance, and had worked through the village as far as to the banks of the Ecaillon. They, however, found the enemy in strength on the eastern banks, and so took up positions in houses and hedgerows on the edge of the stream. At 10A.M.21st October they gained touch with the Canadians, who had entered Prouvy.

The 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the 11th Brigade, 4th Division, who were now up in line with them on the high ground overlooking Monchaux and the river Ecaillon, were now unable to make further progress towards the banks of the river, as they found the western sides of the river valley were very exposed and covered by the fire of the enemy holding strong natural positions in sunken roads.

During the day the field artillery moved into positions west of Thiant.

From this point onwards, as the villages in front of the line were occupied by French civilians, the Divisional commander decided only to use 18-pounder shrapnel against them. Similarly, for the same reason, gas was not employed against the villages. This was a great deprivation, as a large supply of the long awaited mustard gas had just arrived.

Naturally the Germans used gas in similar circumstances freely.

Meanwhile the bridges thrown across the Selle were only sufficient for field-guns and horsed transport. Arrangements had therefore to be made by the C.R.E., Lieut.-Colonel Napier-Clavering, to provide bridges which would enable the Corps heavy artillery and lorry traffic to keep pace with the advance, so that all weapons would be available to engage the enemy should he decide to stand on the east banks of the Ecaillon.

Reconnaissances were therefore carried out by the 400th and 404th Field Companies, R.E., at Douchy and Noyelles for sites for the construction of heavy bridges over the river Selle. In both places the enemy had destroyed the original brick bridges, totally removing the central pier and one abutment in each case. The Douchy gap measured72 feet and that at Noyelles 88 feet. No long girders were available to bridge these gaps without piers, and the difficulty of securing foundations for the piers on the mass of brick debris in the river-bed had therefore to be overcome.

For the Douchy bridge standard girder spans of 16 feet by 18 feet were available, so that work was begun by the 400th Field Company, R.E., on the 20th. By 10.30A.M.on the 23rd the bridge was completed for all traffic except heavy tanks, thus enabling the heavy artillery to cross the river in time to take part in the attack to be delivered on the 24th.

For the bridge at Noyelles only salved German materials were available, which had to be collected and brought to the site of the bridge by horse transport. Work was begun on the 21st, and the bridge was completed for heavy traffic on the 28th.

The result of the preceding operations had materially altered the dispositions of the Division. The 153rd Brigade had been pinched out of the front line, the 4th Seaforth Highlanders and the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of the 154th Brigade occupying the whole of what was now the Divisional front, with the 4th Gordon Highlanders in support of them at Fleury. The 153rd Brigade was therefore concentrated at Haulchin and Douchy, while the 152nd Brigade moved forward to Douchy and Noyelles.

The 21st, 22nd, and 23rd October were passed in making preparations for forcing the passage of the river Ecaillon. At 11A.M.on the 21st the enemy began to shell Thiant, and for the next three days the artillery and machine-gun fire against our positions on the west bank of the river continued briskly. Orders were issued to accept any opportunity offered of crossing the river, but in only one case was an attempt to carry out this order successful, and then only temporarily. The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had made three such attempts at Thiant, and at the third a small party succeeded in crossing the river. They rushed a machine-gun post, but the alarm had been given, and a strong machine-gun and trench-mortar bombardment was opened by the enemy. In the face of this fire no support could be pushed across the river to help the Argylls, and they were therefore compelled to return, bringing the captured machine-gun with them.

On 22nd October the 4th Seaforth Highlanders successfully advanced, and occupied the sunken road running parallel with the Ecaillon west of Monchaux. Their patrols had previously reached the west bank of the river, but had drawn such a storm of fire from the east bank that they were unable to maintain themselves there.

While the troops were thus situated, it was decided to carry out an attack to force the passage of the Ecaillon on the 24th. On the evening of the 23rd, the 153rd Brigade, to whom this attack was to be entrusted, accordingly relieved the 154th Brigade in the line.

The objective allotted to the Division for this attack was the village of Maing and the high ground south-east of it, the 4th Division being ordered to attack simultaneously on the right with a similar objective. The frontage of the attack allotted to the Division was 3000 yards in breadth, and for the operation seven brigades of field artillery and one of heavy artillery were placed at the disposal of the Divisional commander.

Three intermediate objectives were selected, the first being the river Ecaillon including the eastern outskirts of Thiant, and for the 4th Division, Monchaux; the second objective was the western outskirts of Maing, while the railway running north and south between Maing and Famars was given as a line of exploitation for the operations if the attack was successful.

The artillery, as soon as it had got into its own position east of the Selle, had fired Chinese barrages over the enemy’s front system on the 22nd and 23rd. These were most successful, the enemy becoming completely demoralised, vacating his rifle-pits and running from one place to another, undoubtedly suffering many casualties, as the number of stretcher parties seen at work after each barrage had lifted proved.

It was therefore hoped that when the real attack came the German infantry would be considerably shaken, although patrols up to this point had always found them in position and alert on the east bank.

Two companies of machine-guns were also detailed to fire a barrage, while a section of machine-guns and light trench-mortars accompanied each infantry battalion.

Further, two sections of machine-guns were placed in the4th Canadian Division area amongst the houses on the north bank of the canal to enfilade the positions to be attacked.

As it was necessary for the infantry to cross the Ecaillon on a broad front to enable them to take full advantage of the barrage, a number of bridges of 15 and 20 feet span were made. These were fitted with petrol tins and cork floats, which would prevent them from sinking should any of them prove too short to span the river.

Demonstrations in the use of these bridges were given to officers and men at the river Selle at Noyelles, but no adequate inspection of the places where they were to be employed in the crossing of the Ecaillon could be made, owing to the vigilance of the enemy’s patrols.

The two Black Watch battalions were detailed for this attack by the 153rd Brigade, and were disposed with the 6th battalion on the right on a two-company front, and the 7th battalion on the left on a one-company front.

At 4A.M.on 24th October, supported by a great weight of artillery, this attack was launched. Each company carried with it eight bridges, each supported by two to four men. Several of these, however, were destroyed by shell-fire before they had arrived at the water’s edge.

The Ecaillon was found to be swollen by recent rains, and south of Thiant to be about 20 feet wide, from 4 to 6 feet deep, with bed and sides of soft mud, and banks, often steep, from 3 to 6 feet high. A single line of wire entanglement, except at Thiant, ran along the east bank of the river, and also along the greater part of the western bank.

The right company of the 6th Black Watch, whose advance had to be carried out down a glacis dominated by the village of Monchaux, encountered strong opposition. In the first instance, only one platoon, No. 11, commanded by Lieutenant Walker, managed to cross the river. This platoon, on the left of its company frontage, found its bridge too short to span the river; it was therefore discarded, and Lieutenant Walker, with his sergeant and runner, under the fire of machine-guns, plunged into the water and swam across to the other side. They were then followed by the remainder of the platoon, whom they helped to drag ashore as they struggled across the river, swimming and wading, in their heavy kits.

The next platoon on their right found themselves in a zone of machine-gun bullets, and in ten minutes only a corporal and six men were surviving. Nevertheless, the corporal crossed the stream alone, but had to return, and then crawled back with his six men to the assembly position.

The platoon in rear then renewed the attempt, but after suffering many casualties on a glacis destitute of cover, had also to withdraw.

The second platoon on the left—that is, the one in rear of No. 11—placed their bridge in position across the wreckage of an old German bridge and scrambled across.

Meanwhile the commander of No. 11 platoon and the company commander, realising that the machine-guns holding up the advance of the platoons on the right were located in Monchaux, turned their men right-handed, entered the village, and set upon the machine-gunners with their rifles and destroyed them. The two platoons that had already failed to cross then ran down to the river banks, and assisted by some men on the east bank, who threw out a stout ladder towards them, managed to cross the river. Three Lewis guns were then put out at once north-east of Monchaux to pin the enemy into that village while No. 11 platoon was dealing with the enemy in it. Monchaux was finally cleared, 68 prisoners and 9 machine-guns being captured there. Touch was also established in the village with men of the Hampshire Regiment, 4th Division.

The left-hand company of the 6th Black Watch, not being involved in the close-range machine-gun fire from Monchaux, and meeting no direct fire, quickly threw their bridges across the river, and were at once in possession of their first objective.

The company of the 6th Black Watch on the left crossed after many adventurous incidents by six bridges, placed across the river between the northern and southern outskirts of Thiant. Three of these had been quietly placed in position across the river before zero hour, and were crossed without difficulty when the barrage opened. The fixing of the remaining bridges, however, presented several difficulties. In one case, when the bridges were too short, one was used as a ladder down to the water, and a second was attached to it and to débris on the other side. Anotherparty crossed by a hand-rail and girder remaining on a destroyed bridge. Another bridge, which was found to be too short, was floated across the river and lashed by a wire to a tree, each man having to leap from the bridge on to the beach on the opposite bank.

Crossings were made by a section at a time. In each case the foremost man as he reached the bank rushed into the nearest house to deal with the enemy there. Throughout, the crossing was effected under fairly lively machine-gun and trench-mortar fire.

The second objective was attacked by two companies on the right and one on the left of the same battalions. The advance was met by heavy shelling and considerable machine-gun fire. The progress was slow, and it was not before 8A.M.that the objective was reached. The 7th Black Watch had for some time been held up by machine-guns in the Chateau des Pres, but they brought their Lewis guns into action, successfully countered the guns, and rushed the chateau. Farther on, in the outskirts of the village, they captured a German trench-mortar, which they turned on the enemy with good effect.

Heavy fighting ensued in the attack on Maing. The troops operating south of the village, one of the companies of the 6th Black Watch which had forced the passage of the Ecaillon, found it impossible to advance owing to the severity of the fire from the south-east corner of the village and from the sunken roads in front of them.

On the left, where two companies entered the village of Maing, close fighting went on for many hours in the streets and amongst the houses. Mobile 18-pounders, two reserve sections of machine-guns and the German trench-mortars already referred to, were all employed in the effort to secure the village. It was not, however, until 3P.M.that the bulk of Maing was captured, the line then running round the eastern outskirts of the village to the cemetery, and thence along the sunken road running south-eastwards. The chateau at the eastern corner still remained in the enemy’s hands.

Meanwhile the Divisional engineers had made every effort to bridge the Ecaillon for the passage of artillery. A section of the 404th Field Company had moved to the river-banks early in the morning to build foot-bridges forinfantry; the remainder of the company also came up with bridging material, but owing to the heavy hostile barrage fire which greeted the attack, they were unable for some time to get their waggons forward. By 9A.M., however, the reconnaissances of the bridge sites had been completed, and between 9 and 10A.M., in spite of heavy shell-fire, the waggons moved forward. The first bridge just north of Thiant was completed by 10.30A.M., and the second at the southern edge of the village by 11.45A.M.The 400th Field Company completed a third bridge just south of the village. The first was completed in sufficient time to allow the mobile sections of the field artillery to be in action in close support of the infantry by 11A.M.

A reconnaissance for a site for a heavy bridge at Thiant capable of carrying lorry traffic was made during the morning of the attack, and the abutments and foundations of the pier of a bridge destroyed by the Germans were found to be sound.

In spite of a considerable amount of shell-fire, work was carried on in preparing this site. The material for the bridge could not, however, be dumped at the site until the debris of the railway bridge over the Denain-Thiant road which had been blown up had been cleared away. The 8th Royal Scots had begun working continuously on the removal of this debris on 23rd October. In the course of the morning of the 24th they had cleared a path for horse-drawn vehicles, which greatly assisted the artillery moving forward, and by 3P.M.of 25th October a passage was ready for lorry traffic. Shortly after this hour the lorries carrying the material for the heavy bridge reached Thiant, and by 7.50A.M.on 26th October the bridge was ready for all traffic, including heavy tanks.

On the conclusion of this day’s fighting the following message was received by the G.O.C. from the Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Sir A. J. Godley:—

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