[171]I cannot doubt that every one of our cognitive faculties,—in short the human mind as a whole,—has been derived and developed, through a gradual process of physical change, out of some lower life in which cognition, properly speaking, had no place. On this view, the distinction between ‘original’ and ‘derived’ reduces itself to that between ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ in development: and the fact that the moral faculty appears somewhat later in the process of evolution than other faculties can hardly be regarded as an argument against the validity of moral intuition; especially since this process is commonly conceived to be homogeneous throughout. Indeed such a line of reasoning would be suicidal; as the cognition that the moral faculty is developed is certainly later in development than moral cognition, and would therefore, by this reasoning, be less trustworthy.[172]It is more convenient, for the purpose of expounding the morality of common sense, to understand by Virtue a quality exhibited in right conduct; for then we can use the common notions of the particular virtues as heads for the classification of the most important kinds or aspects of right conduct as generally recognised. And I think that this employment of the term is as much in accordance with ordinary usage as any other equally precise use would be.[173]In Book i. chap. v. §3I have explained the sense in which Determinists no less than Libertarians hold that it is in a man’s power to do his duty.[174]Cf.Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix iv.[175]If the phrase in the text were used by a moral person, with a sincere and predominant desire to do his duty, it must, I conceive, be used in one of two senses: either (1) half-ironically, in recognition of a customary standard of virtuous conduct which the speaker is not prepared expressly to dispute, but which he does not really adopt as valid—as when we say that it would be virtuous to read a new book, hear a sermon, pay a visit, etc.; or (2) it might be used loosely to mean that such and such conductwouldbe best if the speaker were differently constituted.[176]Chap.xiv.of this Book.[177]Cf.Met. Anf. d. Tugendlehre, § 33: “diese Tugend, welche mit Innigkeit der wohlwollenden Gesinnung zugleich Zärtlichkeit des Wohlwollens verbindet.”[178]Or no “merit”:—but so far as this latter notion is precisely applied, it will be more appropriately considered in ch.v.of this Book (on Justice).[179]I have before said that decidedly wrong acts are frequently considered to exhibit in a high degree the tendencies which, when exhibited in right acts, we call particular virtues—generosity, courage, patriotism, etc.: and this is especially true of acts bad through ignorance.[180]This, I think, is a conclusion which common sense on the whole accepts: though I note a considerable reluctance to accept it; which, however, is not shown in the attribution of virtue to persons who do clearly wrong acts, but rather in an effort to explain their ignorance as caused by some previous wilful wrongdoing. We try to persuade ourselves that if (e.g.) Torquemada did not know that it was wrong to torture heretics, he might have known if he had not wilfully neglected means of enlightenment: but there are many cases in which this kind of explanation is unsupported by facts, and I see no ground for accepting it as generally true.[181]Hence the Socratic doctrine that ‘all virtue is knowledge’; on the assumption that a rational being must necessarily wish for what is good.[182]See chap. xiv. §1of this Book.[183]Indeed Aristotle, who stood alone among the schools sprung from Socrates in distinguishing sharply ‘theoretic’ from ‘practical’ wisdom, restricts the term σοφία to the former, and uses another word (φρόνησις) to denote the latter.[184]I have already adverted to the difference between ancient and modern thought in this respect. Cf.ante, Book i. chap. v. § 1, p.59, note.[185]It may be observed that there is another meaning again in which the term ‘Caution’ is sometimes used. Since of the various means which we may use to gain any end, some are more and some less certain; and some are dangerous—that is, involve a chance of consequences either antagonistic to our pursuit, or on different grounds to be avoided—while others are free from such danger; ‘Caution’ is often used to denote the temper of mind which inclines to the more certain and less dangerous means. In this sense, in so far as the chance in each case of winning the end, and the value of the end as compared with other ends, and as weighed against the detriment which its pursuit may entail, can be precisely estimated, the limits of the duty of Caution may obviously be determined without difficulty.[186]See p.223, and §2of the next chapter.[187]The qualifications which this proposition requires have been already noticed, and will be further illustrated as we proceed.[188]The phase of this view most current at present would seem to be Utilitarianism, the principles and method of which will be more fully discussed hereafter: but in some form or degree it has been held by many whose affinities are rather with the Intuitional school.[189]Seenoteat end of chapter.[190]Cf. Book i. chaps.vii.ix.[191]A further reason for so doing will appear in the sequel; when we come to survey the general relation of Virtue to Happiness, as the result of that detailed examination of the particular virtues which forms the main subject of the present book. Cf.post, chap.xiv.of this Book.[192]This reluctance, however, seems largely due to the fact that this precise measure of duty is most frequently demanded when the issue lies between Duty and Self-interest.[193]It must be admitted that the more the benevolent impulse is combined with the habit of considering the complex consequences of different courses of action that may be presented as alternatives, and comparing the amounts of happiness to others respectively resulting from them, the more good,ceteris paribus, is likely to be caused by it on the whole. And so far as there seems to be a certain natural incompatibility between this habit of calculation and comparison and the spontaneous fervour of kindly impulse, Common Sense is somewhat puzzled which to prefer; and takes refuge in an ideal that transcends this incompatibility and includes the two.[194]This question will be further discussed in the concluding chapter of this Book (chap.xiv.).[195]It may be said that a child owes gratitude to the authors of its existence. But life alone, apart from any provision for making life happy, seems a boon of doubtful value, and one that scarcely excites gratitude when it was not conferred from any regard for the recipient.[196]In 1868 it was affirmed, in an Act passed by the Congress of the United States, that “the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people.” I do not know how far this would be taken to imply that a man has a moral right to leave his country whenever he finds it convenient—provided no claims except those of Patriotism retain him there. But if it was intended to imply this, I think the statement would not be accepted in Europe without important limitations: though I cannot state any generally accepted principle from which such limitations could be clearly deduced.[197]How far we are bound to make reparation when the harm is involuntary, and such as could not have been prevented by ordinary care on our part, is not clear: but it will be convenient to defer the consideration of this till the next chapter (§5): as the whole of this department of duty is more commonly placed under the head of Justice.[198]I raise this question, because if the rule of ‘living according to Nature’ were really adopted as a first principle, in any ordinary meaning of the term ‘nature,’ it would certainly seem to be the duty of all normal human beings to enter into conjugal relations: but just this instance seems to show that the principle is not accepted by Common Sense. See Book i. chap. vi. §2.[199]The moral necessity of prohibiting polygamy is sometimes put forward as an immediate inference from the equality of the numbers of the two sexes. This argument, however, seems to require the assumption that all men and women ought to marry: but this scarcely any one will expressly affirm: and actually considerable numbers remain unmarried, and there is no reason to believe that in countries where polygamy is allowed, paucity of supply has ever made it practically difficult for any man to find a mate.[200]Cf. Wayland,Elements of Moral Science, Book ii. part ii. class 2, § 2.[201]I use the term here to imply a mutual affection more intense than the kindly feeling which a moral man desires to find towards all persons with whom he is brought into continual social relations, through business or otherwise.[202]It was before observed that this is only one—and not always the most prominent—element of the whole emotional state which we call love.[203]See Book iv. chap. iii. §3.[204]How far an independent principle of Justice is required for the Utilitarian method will be hereafter considered. (Book iv. chap.i.)[205]Aristotle, in expounding the virtue of Δικαιοσύνη, which corresponds to our Justice, notices that the word has two meanings; in the wider of which it includes in a manner all Virtue, or at any rate the social side or aspect of Virtue generally. The word ‘Justice’ does not appear to be used in English in this comprehensive manner (except occasionally in religious writings, from the influence of the Greek word as used in the New Testament): although the verb “to justify” seems to have this width of meaning; for when I say that one is “justified” in doing so and so, I mean no more than that such conduct is right for him. In the present discussion, at any rate, I have confined myself to the more precise signification of the term.[206]I ought to say that, in my view, this only applies to taxes in the narrower sense in which they are distinguished from payments for services received by individuals from Government. In the case of these latter, I conceive that Justice is rather held to lie in duly proportioning payment to amount of service received. Some persons have held that all payments made to Government ought to be determined on this principle: and this view seems to me to be consistent with the individualistic ideal of political order, which I shall presently examine: but, as I have elsewhere tried to show (Princ. of Pol. Econ.Book iii. chap. viii.), there is an important department of Governmental expenditure to which this principle is not applicable.[207]It may be well to notice a case in which the very equality of application, which is, as has been said, implied in the mere idea of a law couched in general terms, is felt to be unjust. This is the case where the words of a statute, either from being carelessly drawn, or on account of the inevitable defects of even the most precise terminology, include (or exclude) persons and circumstances which are clearly not included in (or excluded from) the real intent and purpose of the law. In this case a particular decision, strictly in accordance with a law which generally considered is just, may cause extreme injustice: and so the difference between actual Law and Justice is sharply brought out. Still we cannot in this way obtain principles for judging generally of the justice of laws.[208]It should be observed that we cannot even say, in treating of the private conduct of individuals, thatallarbitrary inequality is recognised as unjust: it would not be commonly thought unjust in a rich bachelor with no near relatives to leave the bulk of his property in providing pensions exclusively for indigent red-haired men, however unreasonable and capricious the choice might appear.[209]It may be observed that sometimes claims generated in this way have legal validity; as when a right of way is established without express permission of the landowner, merely by his continued indulgence.[210]This is the case even, as I say, when laws are altered lawfully: still more after any exceptional crisis at which there has occurred a rupture of political order: for then the legal claims arising out of the new order which is thus rooted in disorder conflict with those previously established in a manner which admits of no theoretical solution: it can only be settled by a rough practical compromise. See next chapter, §3.[211]Book i. chap. vi. §2.[212]It is characteristic of an unprogressive society that in it these two points of view are indistinguishable; the Jural Ideal absolutely coincides with the Customary, and social perfection is imagined to consist in the perfect observance of a traditional system of rules.[213]This question, how far the conception of Freedom involves unlimited right to limit Freedom by free contract, will meet us again in the next chapter, when we consider the general duty of obedience to Law.[214]It has often been urged as a justification for expropriating savages from the land of new colonies that tribes of hunters have really no moral right to property in the soil over which they hunt.[215]This is the argument used by optimistic political economists such as Bastiat.[216]The further consideration of Political Freedom, with which we shall be occupied in the next chapter, will afford additional illustrations of the difficulties involved in the notion.[217]If the view given in the text be sound, it illustrates very strikingly the difference between natural instincts and moral intuitions. For the impulse to requite a service is, on its emotional side, quite different from that which prompts us to claim the fruits of our labour, or “a fair day’s wages for a fair day’s work.” Still, our apprehension of thedutyof Gratitude seems capable of being subsumed under the more general intuition ‘that desert ought to be requited.’[218]It certainly requires a considerable strain to bring the ‘right of First Discovery’ under the notion of ‘right to the produce of one’s labour.’ Hence Locke and others have found it necessary to suppose, as the ultimate justification of the former right, ‘a tacit consent’ of mankind in general that all things previously unappropriated shall belong to the first appropriator. But this must be admitted to be a rather desperate device of ethico-political construction: on account of the fatal facility with which it may be used to justify almost any arbitrariness in positive law.[219]The reader will find an interesting illustration of the perplexity of Common Sense on this point in Mr. O. W. Holmes, Junior’s, book onThe Common Law, chap. iii., where the author gives a penetrating discussion of the struggle, in the development of the doctrine of torts in English Law, between two opposing views: (1) that “the risk of a man’s conduct is thrown upon him as the result of some moral short-coming,” and (2) that “a man acts at his peril always, and wholly irrespective of the state of his consciousness upon the matter.” The former is the view that has in the main prevailed in English Law; and this seems to me certainly in harmony with the Common Sense of mankind, so far as legal liability is concerned; but I do not think that the case is equally clear as regards moral obligation.[220]Cf.post, pp.292-3. It may be added that there is often a further difficulty in ascertaining the amount of compensation due: for this frequently involves a comparison of things essentially disparate, and there are some kinds of harm which it seems impossible to compensate.[221]In the earlier stage of moral development, referred to in the preceding paragraph, retribution inflicted on the wrongdoer was regarded as the normal mode of reparation to the person injured. But this view is contrary to the moral Common Sense of Christian Societies.[222]I think the term “merit” often blends the two notions, as when we speak of “promotion by merit.” By moralists, however, “merit” is generally used as exactly equivalent to what I have called “desert.”[223]The only tenable Determinist interpretation of Desert is, in my opinion, the Utilitarian: according to which, when a man is said to deserve reward for any services to society, the meaning is that it is expedient to reward him, in order that he and others may be induced to render similar services by the expectation of similar rewards. Cf.post, Book iv. chap. iii. §4.[224]Perhaps we may partly attribute to the difficulties above discussed, that the notion of Desert has sometimes dropped out of the ideal of Utopian reconstructors of society, and ‘Equality of Happiness’ has seemed to be the only end. Justice, it has been thought, prescribes simply that each should have an equal share of happiness, as far as happiness depends on the action of others. But there seems to be much difficulty in working this out: for (apart from the considerations of Fitness above mentioned) equal happiness is not to be attained by equal distribution of objects of desire. For some require more and some less to be equally happy. Hence, it seems, we must take differences ofneedsinto consideration. But if merely mental needs are included (as seems reasonable) we should have to give less to cheerful, contented, self-sacrificing people than to those who are naturally moody andexigeant, as the former can be made happy with less. And this is too paradoxical to recommend itself to Common Sense.[225]No doubt, it would be possible to remove, to some extent, the inequalities that are attributable to circumstances, by bringing the best education within the reach of all classes, so that all children might have an equal opportunity of being selected and trained for any functions for which they seemed to be fit: and this seems to be prescribed by ideal justice, in so far as it removes or mitigates arbitrary inequality. Accordingly in those ideal reconstructions of society, in which we may expect to find men’s notions of abstract justice exhibited, such an institution as this has generally found a place. Still, there will be much natural inequality which we cannot remove or even estimate.[226]Cf.post, Book iv. chap. iii. §4.[227]It is not perhaps necessary that I should here enlarge on thepracticalobstacles in the way of any attempt to realise such an ideal system.[228]I have already expressed my opinion that this Utilitarian view of punishment is gradually tending to prevail; but I do not think that it has yet prevailed.[229]Of course those who hold that the essence of Justice consists in securing external Freedom among the members of a community, and that punishment is only justified as a means to this end, naturally think that in awarding punishment we ought to consider merely its efficacy as such means. But this can scarcely be put forward as an interpretation of the common notion of Just Punishment.[230]By ‘arbitrary’ I mean such definitions and limitations as destroy the self-evidence of the principle; and, when closely examined, lead us to regard it as subordinate.[231]Cf.ante, Book ii. chap. v. §2.[232]It is perhaps hardly necessary that I should here notice the Hobbist doctrine, revived in a modified form by Austin, that “the power of the sovereign is incapable of [legal] limitation.” For no one now maintains pure Hobbism: and Austin is as far as possible from meaning that there cannot be an express or tacit understanding between Sovereign and Subjects, the violation of which by the former may make it morally right for the latter to rebel. In fact, as used by him, Hobbes’ doctrine reduces itself to the rather unimportant proposition that a sovereign will not be punished for unconstitutional conduct through the agency of his own law-courts, so long as he remains sovereign. I may take this opportunity of observing that Austin’s definition of Law is manifestly unsuited for our present purpose: since a law, in his view, is not a command that ought to be obeyed, but a command for the violation of which we may expect a particular kind of punishment.[233]Cf. Blackstone,Introduction, § 2. “In relation to those laws which enjoin only positive duties, and forbid only such things as are notmala in se, butmala prohibitamerely, without any intermixture of moral guilt, annexing a penalty to non-compliance, here I apprehend conscience is no further concerned, than by directing a submission to the penalty in case of our breach of those laws ... the alternative is offered to every man, ‘either abstain from this or submit to such a penalty.’”[234]Into the ethical difficulties peculiar to International Law, I have not thought it worth while to enter.[235]Vows to God constitute another exception: and it is thought by many that if these are binding, there must be some way in which God can be understood to grant release from them. But this it is beyond my province to discuss.[236]The case is somewhat different when the act has become immoral after the promise was made: still, here also, the prior duty of abstaining from it would be universally held to prevail.[237]What is here said of a ‘statement’ may be extended to any mode of producing a false impression.[238]The case where set forms are used being theexceptio probans regulam.[239]It can hardly be said that the advocate merelyreportsthe false affirmations of others: since the whole force of his pleading depends upon his adopting them and working them up into a view of the case which, for the time at least, he appears to hold.[240]E.g.certain religious persons hold—or held in 1873—that it is right solemnly to affirm a belief that God created the world in 6 days and rested on the 7th, meaning that 1 : 6 is the divinely ordered proportion between rest and labour.[241]Cf. Whewell,Elements of Morality, Book ii. chap. xv. § 299.[242]Cf. chap. i. §3of this Book.[243]See Book iv. chap. v. §3for a further discussion of this axiom.[244]It is to be observed that men derive pleasure from the pains and losses of others, in various ways, without the specific emotion which I distinguish as malevolent affection: either (1) from the sense of power exercised—which explains much of the wanton cruelty of schoolboys, despots, etc.—or (2) from a sense of their own superiority or security in contrast with the failures and struggles of others, or (3) even merely from the excitement sympathetically caused by the manifestation or representation of any strong feeling in others; a real tragedy is interesting in the same way as a fictitious one. But these facts, though psychologically interesting, present no important ethical problems; since no one doubts that pain ought not to be inflicted from such motives as these.[245]Butler (SermonVIII.,Upon Resentment) recognises that deliberate resentment “has in fact a good influence upon the affairs of the world”; though “it were much to be wished that men would act from a better principle.”[246]If the amount at stake is such as to constitute a real sacrifice, the conduct seems to be more than liberal, and (unless blamed as extravagant) is rather praised as generous or highminded.[247]Kant argues (Met. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre, Th. I., § iv.) that as every one “inevitably wills” means to promote his own happiness this cannot be regarded as a duty. But, as I have before urged (Book i. chap. iv. §1), a man does not “inevitably will” to do what he believes will be most conducive to his owngreatesthappiness.The view in the text is that of Butler (DissertationOf the nature of Virtue); who admits that “nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty”; but points out that such sensible disapprobation is for various reasons less needed in the former case.[248]See Whewell’sElements of Morality, Book ii. chap. x.[249]The notion of Chastity is nearly equivalent to that of Purity, only somewhat more external and superficial.[250]In so far as mere illegitimacy of union is conceived to be directly and specially prohibited, and not merely from considerations of Prudence and Benevolence, it is regarded as a violation of Order rather than of Purity.[251]It was partly owing to the serious oversight of not perceiving that Purity itself forbids too minute a system of rules for the observance of purity that the mediæval Casuistry fell into disrepute.[252]In the case of pain which cannot be avoided we consider that Fortitude will suppress outcries and lamentations: though in so far as these relieve the sufferer without annoying others, the duty seems doubtful.[253]Cf.ante, chap. iv. §5of this Book.[254]The above remarks apply in a less degree to the “moral courage” by which men face the pains and dangers of social disapproval in the performance of what they believe to be duty: for the adequate accomplishment of such acts depends less on qualities not within the control of the will at any given time.[255]I do not refer to customary marks of respect for officials, the omission of which would be a breach of established order; since the special political reason for requiring these obviously takes the question beyond the sphere of application of the Virtue of Humility.[256]Hence the practical importance of the Formal test of Rightness, on which Kant insists: cf.ante, chap. i. §3of this Book.[257]The final arbiter, that is, on the question what the rule is: of course the moral obligation to conform to any rule laid down by an external authority must rest on some principle which the individual’s reason has to apply.[258]Cf. Book i. chap. iii. §2.
[171]I cannot doubt that every one of our cognitive faculties,—in short the human mind as a whole,—has been derived and developed, through a gradual process of physical change, out of some lower life in which cognition, properly speaking, had no place. On this view, the distinction between ‘original’ and ‘derived’ reduces itself to that between ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ in development: and the fact that the moral faculty appears somewhat later in the process of evolution than other faculties can hardly be regarded as an argument against the validity of moral intuition; especially since this process is commonly conceived to be homogeneous throughout. Indeed such a line of reasoning would be suicidal; as the cognition that the moral faculty is developed is certainly later in development than moral cognition, and would therefore, by this reasoning, be less trustworthy.
[171]I cannot doubt that every one of our cognitive faculties,—in short the human mind as a whole,—has been derived and developed, through a gradual process of physical change, out of some lower life in which cognition, properly speaking, had no place. On this view, the distinction between ‘original’ and ‘derived’ reduces itself to that between ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ in development: and the fact that the moral faculty appears somewhat later in the process of evolution than other faculties can hardly be regarded as an argument against the validity of moral intuition; especially since this process is commonly conceived to be homogeneous throughout. Indeed such a line of reasoning would be suicidal; as the cognition that the moral faculty is developed is certainly later in development than moral cognition, and would therefore, by this reasoning, be less trustworthy.
[172]It is more convenient, for the purpose of expounding the morality of common sense, to understand by Virtue a quality exhibited in right conduct; for then we can use the common notions of the particular virtues as heads for the classification of the most important kinds or aspects of right conduct as generally recognised. And I think that this employment of the term is as much in accordance with ordinary usage as any other equally precise use would be.
[172]It is more convenient, for the purpose of expounding the morality of common sense, to understand by Virtue a quality exhibited in right conduct; for then we can use the common notions of the particular virtues as heads for the classification of the most important kinds or aspects of right conduct as generally recognised. And I think that this employment of the term is as much in accordance with ordinary usage as any other equally precise use would be.
[173]In Book i. chap. v. §3I have explained the sense in which Determinists no less than Libertarians hold that it is in a man’s power to do his duty.
[173]In Book i. chap. v. §3I have explained the sense in which Determinists no less than Libertarians hold that it is in a man’s power to do his duty.
[174]Cf.Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix iv.
[174]Cf.Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix iv.
[175]If the phrase in the text were used by a moral person, with a sincere and predominant desire to do his duty, it must, I conceive, be used in one of two senses: either (1) half-ironically, in recognition of a customary standard of virtuous conduct which the speaker is not prepared expressly to dispute, but which he does not really adopt as valid—as when we say that it would be virtuous to read a new book, hear a sermon, pay a visit, etc.; or (2) it might be used loosely to mean that such and such conductwouldbe best if the speaker were differently constituted.
[175]If the phrase in the text were used by a moral person, with a sincere and predominant desire to do his duty, it must, I conceive, be used in one of two senses: either (1) half-ironically, in recognition of a customary standard of virtuous conduct which the speaker is not prepared expressly to dispute, but which he does not really adopt as valid—as when we say that it would be virtuous to read a new book, hear a sermon, pay a visit, etc.; or (2) it might be used loosely to mean that such and such conductwouldbe best if the speaker were differently constituted.
[176]Chap.xiv.of this Book.
[176]Chap.xiv.of this Book.
[177]Cf.Met. Anf. d. Tugendlehre, § 33: “diese Tugend, welche mit Innigkeit der wohlwollenden Gesinnung zugleich Zärtlichkeit des Wohlwollens verbindet.”
[177]Cf.Met. Anf. d. Tugendlehre, § 33: “diese Tugend, welche mit Innigkeit der wohlwollenden Gesinnung zugleich Zärtlichkeit des Wohlwollens verbindet.”
[178]Or no “merit”:—but so far as this latter notion is precisely applied, it will be more appropriately considered in ch.v.of this Book (on Justice).
[178]Or no “merit”:—but so far as this latter notion is precisely applied, it will be more appropriately considered in ch.v.of this Book (on Justice).
[179]I have before said that decidedly wrong acts are frequently considered to exhibit in a high degree the tendencies which, when exhibited in right acts, we call particular virtues—generosity, courage, patriotism, etc.: and this is especially true of acts bad through ignorance.
[179]I have before said that decidedly wrong acts are frequently considered to exhibit in a high degree the tendencies which, when exhibited in right acts, we call particular virtues—generosity, courage, patriotism, etc.: and this is especially true of acts bad through ignorance.
[180]This, I think, is a conclusion which common sense on the whole accepts: though I note a considerable reluctance to accept it; which, however, is not shown in the attribution of virtue to persons who do clearly wrong acts, but rather in an effort to explain their ignorance as caused by some previous wilful wrongdoing. We try to persuade ourselves that if (e.g.) Torquemada did not know that it was wrong to torture heretics, he might have known if he had not wilfully neglected means of enlightenment: but there are many cases in which this kind of explanation is unsupported by facts, and I see no ground for accepting it as generally true.
[180]This, I think, is a conclusion which common sense on the whole accepts: though I note a considerable reluctance to accept it; which, however, is not shown in the attribution of virtue to persons who do clearly wrong acts, but rather in an effort to explain their ignorance as caused by some previous wilful wrongdoing. We try to persuade ourselves that if (e.g.) Torquemada did not know that it was wrong to torture heretics, he might have known if he had not wilfully neglected means of enlightenment: but there are many cases in which this kind of explanation is unsupported by facts, and I see no ground for accepting it as generally true.
[181]Hence the Socratic doctrine that ‘all virtue is knowledge’; on the assumption that a rational being must necessarily wish for what is good.
[181]Hence the Socratic doctrine that ‘all virtue is knowledge’; on the assumption that a rational being must necessarily wish for what is good.
[182]See chap. xiv. §1of this Book.
[182]See chap. xiv. §1of this Book.
[183]Indeed Aristotle, who stood alone among the schools sprung from Socrates in distinguishing sharply ‘theoretic’ from ‘practical’ wisdom, restricts the term σοφία to the former, and uses another word (φρόνησις) to denote the latter.
[183]Indeed Aristotle, who stood alone among the schools sprung from Socrates in distinguishing sharply ‘theoretic’ from ‘practical’ wisdom, restricts the term σοφία to the former, and uses another word (φρόνησις) to denote the latter.
[184]I have already adverted to the difference between ancient and modern thought in this respect. Cf.ante, Book i. chap. v. § 1, p.59, note.
[184]I have already adverted to the difference between ancient and modern thought in this respect. Cf.ante, Book i. chap. v. § 1, p.59, note.
[185]It may be observed that there is another meaning again in which the term ‘Caution’ is sometimes used. Since of the various means which we may use to gain any end, some are more and some less certain; and some are dangerous—that is, involve a chance of consequences either antagonistic to our pursuit, or on different grounds to be avoided—while others are free from such danger; ‘Caution’ is often used to denote the temper of mind which inclines to the more certain and less dangerous means. In this sense, in so far as the chance in each case of winning the end, and the value of the end as compared with other ends, and as weighed against the detriment which its pursuit may entail, can be precisely estimated, the limits of the duty of Caution may obviously be determined without difficulty.
[185]It may be observed that there is another meaning again in which the term ‘Caution’ is sometimes used. Since of the various means which we may use to gain any end, some are more and some less certain; and some are dangerous—that is, involve a chance of consequences either antagonistic to our pursuit, or on different grounds to be avoided—while others are free from such danger; ‘Caution’ is often used to denote the temper of mind which inclines to the more certain and less dangerous means. In this sense, in so far as the chance in each case of winning the end, and the value of the end as compared with other ends, and as weighed against the detriment which its pursuit may entail, can be precisely estimated, the limits of the duty of Caution may obviously be determined without difficulty.
[186]See p.223, and §2of the next chapter.
[186]See p.223, and §2of the next chapter.
[187]The qualifications which this proposition requires have been already noticed, and will be further illustrated as we proceed.
[187]The qualifications which this proposition requires have been already noticed, and will be further illustrated as we proceed.
[188]The phase of this view most current at present would seem to be Utilitarianism, the principles and method of which will be more fully discussed hereafter: but in some form or degree it has been held by many whose affinities are rather with the Intuitional school.
[188]The phase of this view most current at present would seem to be Utilitarianism, the principles and method of which will be more fully discussed hereafter: but in some form or degree it has been held by many whose affinities are rather with the Intuitional school.
[189]Seenoteat end of chapter.
[189]Seenoteat end of chapter.
[190]Cf. Book i. chaps.vii.ix.
[190]Cf. Book i. chaps.vii.ix.
[191]A further reason for so doing will appear in the sequel; when we come to survey the general relation of Virtue to Happiness, as the result of that detailed examination of the particular virtues which forms the main subject of the present book. Cf.post, chap.xiv.of this Book.
[191]A further reason for so doing will appear in the sequel; when we come to survey the general relation of Virtue to Happiness, as the result of that detailed examination of the particular virtues which forms the main subject of the present book. Cf.post, chap.xiv.of this Book.
[192]This reluctance, however, seems largely due to the fact that this precise measure of duty is most frequently demanded when the issue lies between Duty and Self-interest.
[192]This reluctance, however, seems largely due to the fact that this precise measure of duty is most frequently demanded when the issue lies between Duty and Self-interest.
[193]It must be admitted that the more the benevolent impulse is combined with the habit of considering the complex consequences of different courses of action that may be presented as alternatives, and comparing the amounts of happiness to others respectively resulting from them, the more good,ceteris paribus, is likely to be caused by it on the whole. And so far as there seems to be a certain natural incompatibility between this habit of calculation and comparison and the spontaneous fervour of kindly impulse, Common Sense is somewhat puzzled which to prefer; and takes refuge in an ideal that transcends this incompatibility and includes the two.
[193]It must be admitted that the more the benevolent impulse is combined with the habit of considering the complex consequences of different courses of action that may be presented as alternatives, and comparing the amounts of happiness to others respectively resulting from them, the more good,ceteris paribus, is likely to be caused by it on the whole. And so far as there seems to be a certain natural incompatibility between this habit of calculation and comparison and the spontaneous fervour of kindly impulse, Common Sense is somewhat puzzled which to prefer; and takes refuge in an ideal that transcends this incompatibility and includes the two.
[194]This question will be further discussed in the concluding chapter of this Book (chap.xiv.).
[194]This question will be further discussed in the concluding chapter of this Book (chap.xiv.).
[195]It may be said that a child owes gratitude to the authors of its existence. But life alone, apart from any provision for making life happy, seems a boon of doubtful value, and one that scarcely excites gratitude when it was not conferred from any regard for the recipient.
[195]It may be said that a child owes gratitude to the authors of its existence. But life alone, apart from any provision for making life happy, seems a boon of doubtful value, and one that scarcely excites gratitude when it was not conferred from any regard for the recipient.
[196]In 1868 it was affirmed, in an Act passed by the Congress of the United States, that “the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people.” I do not know how far this would be taken to imply that a man has a moral right to leave his country whenever he finds it convenient—provided no claims except those of Patriotism retain him there. But if it was intended to imply this, I think the statement would not be accepted in Europe without important limitations: though I cannot state any generally accepted principle from which such limitations could be clearly deduced.
[196]In 1868 it was affirmed, in an Act passed by the Congress of the United States, that “the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people.” I do not know how far this would be taken to imply that a man has a moral right to leave his country whenever he finds it convenient—provided no claims except those of Patriotism retain him there. But if it was intended to imply this, I think the statement would not be accepted in Europe without important limitations: though I cannot state any generally accepted principle from which such limitations could be clearly deduced.
[197]How far we are bound to make reparation when the harm is involuntary, and such as could not have been prevented by ordinary care on our part, is not clear: but it will be convenient to defer the consideration of this till the next chapter (§5): as the whole of this department of duty is more commonly placed under the head of Justice.
[197]How far we are bound to make reparation when the harm is involuntary, and such as could not have been prevented by ordinary care on our part, is not clear: but it will be convenient to defer the consideration of this till the next chapter (§5): as the whole of this department of duty is more commonly placed under the head of Justice.
[198]I raise this question, because if the rule of ‘living according to Nature’ were really adopted as a first principle, in any ordinary meaning of the term ‘nature,’ it would certainly seem to be the duty of all normal human beings to enter into conjugal relations: but just this instance seems to show that the principle is not accepted by Common Sense. See Book i. chap. vi. §2.
[198]I raise this question, because if the rule of ‘living according to Nature’ were really adopted as a first principle, in any ordinary meaning of the term ‘nature,’ it would certainly seem to be the duty of all normal human beings to enter into conjugal relations: but just this instance seems to show that the principle is not accepted by Common Sense. See Book i. chap. vi. §2.
[199]The moral necessity of prohibiting polygamy is sometimes put forward as an immediate inference from the equality of the numbers of the two sexes. This argument, however, seems to require the assumption that all men and women ought to marry: but this scarcely any one will expressly affirm: and actually considerable numbers remain unmarried, and there is no reason to believe that in countries where polygamy is allowed, paucity of supply has ever made it practically difficult for any man to find a mate.
[199]The moral necessity of prohibiting polygamy is sometimes put forward as an immediate inference from the equality of the numbers of the two sexes. This argument, however, seems to require the assumption that all men and women ought to marry: but this scarcely any one will expressly affirm: and actually considerable numbers remain unmarried, and there is no reason to believe that in countries where polygamy is allowed, paucity of supply has ever made it practically difficult for any man to find a mate.
[200]Cf. Wayland,Elements of Moral Science, Book ii. part ii. class 2, § 2.
[200]Cf. Wayland,Elements of Moral Science, Book ii. part ii. class 2, § 2.
[201]I use the term here to imply a mutual affection more intense than the kindly feeling which a moral man desires to find towards all persons with whom he is brought into continual social relations, through business or otherwise.
[201]I use the term here to imply a mutual affection more intense than the kindly feeling which a moral man desires to find towards all persons with whom he is brought into continual social relations, through business or otherwise.
[202]It was before observed that this is only one—and not always the most prominent—element of the whole emotional state which we call love.
[202]It was before observed that this is only one—and not always the most prominent—element of the whole emotional state which we call love.
[203]See Book iv. chap. iii. §3.
[203]See Book iv. chap. iii. §3.
[204]How far an independent principle of Justice is required for the Utilitarian method will be hereafter considered. (Book iv. chap.i.)
[204]How far an independent principle of Justice is required for the Utilitarian method will be hereafter considered. (Book iv. chap.i.)
[205]Aristotle, in expounding the virtue of Δικαιοσύνη, which corresponds to our Justice, notices that the word has two meanings; in the wider of which it includes in a manner all Virtue, or at any rate the social side or aspect of Virtue generally. The word ‘Justice’ does not appear to be used in English in this comprehensive manner (except occasionally in religious writings, from the influence of the Greek word as used in the New Testament): although the verb “to justify” seems to have this width of meaning; for when I say that one is “justified” in doing so and so, I mean no more than that such conduct is right for him. In the present discussion, at any rate, I have confined myself to the more precise signification of the term.
[205]Aristotle, in expounding the virtue of Δικαιοσύνη, which corresponds to our Justice, notices that the word has two meanings; in the wider of which it includes in a manner all Virtue, or at any rate the social side or aspect of Virtue generally. The word ‘Justice’ does not appear to be used in English in this comprehensive manner (except occasionally in religious writings, from the influence of the Greek word as used in the New Testament): although the verb “to justify” seems to have this width of meaning; for when I say that one is “justified” in doing so and so, I mean no more than that such conduct is right for him. In the present discussion, at any rate, I have confined myself to the more precise signification of the term.
[206]I ought to say that, in my view, this only applies to taxes in the narrower sense in which they are distinguished from payments for services received by individuals from Government. In the case of these latter, I conceive that Justice is rather held to lie in duly proportioning payment to amount of service received. Some persons have held that all payments made to Government ought to be determined on this principle: and this view seems to me to be consistent with the individualistic ideal of political order, which I shall presently examine: but, as I have elsewhere tried to show (Princ. of Pol. Econ.Book iii. chap. viii.), there is an important department of Governmental expenditure to which this principle is not applicable.
[206]I ought to say that, in my view, this only applies to taxes in the narrower sense in which they are distinguished from payments for services received by individuals from Government. In the case of these latter, I conceive that Justice is rather held to lie in duly proportioning payment to amount of service received. Some persons have held that all payments made to Government ought to be determined on this principle: and this view seems to me to be consistent with the individualistic ideal of political order, which I shall presently examine: but, as I have elsewhere tried to show (Princ. of Pol. Econ.Book iii. chap. viii.), there is an important department of Governmental expenditure to which this principle is not applicable.
[207]It may be well to notice a case in which the very equality of application, which is, as has been said, implied in the mere idea of a law couched in general terms, is felt to be unjust. This is the case where the words of a statute, either from being carelessly drawn, or on account of the inevitable defects of even the most precise terminology, include (or exclude) persons and circumstances which are clearly not included in (or excluded from) the real intent and purpose of the law. In this case a particular decision, strictly in accordance with a law which generally considered is just, may cause extreme injustice: and so the difference between actual Law and Justice is sharply brought out. Still we cannot in this way obtain principles for judging generally of the justice of laws.
[207]It may be well to notice a case in which the very equality of application, which is, as has been said, implied in the mere idea of a law couched in general terms, is felt to be unjust. This is the case where the words of a statute, either from being carelessly drawn, or on account of the inevitable defects of even the most precise terminology, include (or exclude) persons and circumstances which are clearly not included in (or excluded from) the real intent and purpose of the law. In this case a particular decision, strictly in accordance with a law which generally considered is just, may cause extreme injustice: and so the difference between actual Law and Justice is sharply brought out. Still we cannot in this way obtain principles for judging generally of the justice of laws.
[208]It should be observed that we cannot even say, in treating of the private conduct of individuals, thatallarbitrary inequality is recognised as unjust: it would not be commonly thought unjust in a rich bachelor with no near relatives to leave the bulk of his property in providing pensions exclusively for indigent red-haired men, however unreasonable and capricious the choice might appear.
[208]It should be observed that we cannot even say, in treating of the private conduct of individuals, thatallarbitrary inequality is recognised as unjust: it would not be commonly thought unjust in a rich bachelor with no near relatives to leave the bulk of his property in providing pensions exclusively for indigent red-haired men, however unreasonable and capricious the choice might appear.
[209]It may be observed that sometimes claims generated in this way have legal validity; as when a right of way is established without express permission of the landowner, merely by his continued indulgence.
[209]It may be observed that sometimes claims generated in this way have legal validity; as when a right of way is established without express permission of the landowner, merely by his continued indulgence.
[210]This is the case even, as I say, when laws are altered lawfully: still more after any exceptional crisis at which there has occurred a rupture of political order: for then the legal claims arising out of the new order which is thus rooted in disorder conflict with those previously established in a manner which admits of no theoretical solution: it can only be settled by a rough practical compromise. See next chapter, §3.
[210]This is the case even, as I say, when laws are altered lawfully: still more after any exceptional crisis at which there has occurred a rupture of political order: for then the legal claims arising out of the new order which is thus rooted in disorder conflict with those previously established in a manner which admits of no theoretical solution: it can only be settled by a rough practical compromise. See next chapter, §3.
[211]Book i. chap. vi. §2.
[211]Book i. chap. vi. §2.
[212]It is characteristic of an unprogressive society that in it these two points of view are indistinguishable; the Jural Ideal absolutely coincides with the Customary, and social perfection is imagined to consist in the perfect observance of a traditional system of rules.
[212]It is characteristic of an unprogressive society that in it these two points of view are indistinguishable; the Jural Ideal absolutely coincides with the Customary, and social perfection is imagined to consist in the perfect observance of a traditional system of rules.
[213]This question, how far the conception of Freedom involves unlimited right to limit Freedom by free contract, will meet us again in the next chapter, when we consider the general duty of obedience to Law.
[213]This question, how far the conception of Freedom involves unlimited right to limit Freedom by free contract, will meet us again in the next chapter, when we consider the general duty of obedience to Law.
[214]It has often been urged as a justification for expropriating savages from the land of new colonies that tribes of hunters have really no moral right to property in the soil over which they hunt.
[214]It has often been urged as a justification for expropriating savages from the land of new colonies that tribes of hunters have really no moral right to property in the soil over which they hunt.
[215]This is the argument used by optimistic political economists such as Bastiat.
[215]This is the argument used by optimistic political economists such as Bastiat.
[216]The further consideration of Political Freedom, with which we shall be occupied in the next chapter, will afford additional illustrations of the difficulties involved in the notion.
[216]The further consideration of Political Freedom, with which we shall be occupied in the next chapter, will afford additional illustrations of the difficulties involved in the notion.
[217]If the view given in the text be sound, it illustrates very strikingly the difference between natural instincts and moral intuitions. For the impulse to requite a service is, on its emotional side, quite different from that which prompts us to claim the fruits of our labour, or “a fair day’s wages for a fair day’s work.” Still, our apprehension of thedutyof Gratitude seems capable of being subsumed under the more general intuition ‘that desert ought to be requited.’
[217]If the view given in the text be sound, it illustrates very strikingly the difference between natural instincts and moral intuitions. For the impulse to requite a service is, on its emotional side, quite different from that which prompts us to claim the fruits of our labour, or “a fair day’s wages for a fair day’s work.” Still, our apprehension of thedutyof Gratitude seems capable of being subsumed under the more general intuition ‘that desert ought to be requited.’
[218]It certainly requires a considerable strain to bring the ‘right of First Discovery’ under the notion of ‘right to the produce of one’s labour.’ Hence Locke and others have found it necessary to suppose, as the ultimate justification of the former right, ‘a tacit consent’ of mankind in general that all things previously unappropriated shall belong to the first appropriator. But this must be admitted to be a rather desperate device of ethico-political construction: on account of the fatal facility with which it may be used to justify almost any arbitrariness in positive law.
[218]It certainly requires a considerable strain to bring the ‘right of First Discovery’ under the notion of ‘right to the produce of one’s labour.’ Hence Locke and others have found it necessary to suppose, as the ultimate justification of the former right, ‘a tacit consent’ of mankind in general that all things previously unappropriated shall belong to the first appropriator. But this must be admitted to be a rather desperate device of ethico-political construction: on account of the fatal facility with which it may be used to justify almost any arbitrariness in positive law.
[219]The reader will find an interesting illustration of the perplexity of Common Sense on this point in Mr. O. W. Holmes, Junior’s, book onThe Common Law, chap. iii., where the author gives a penetrating discussion of the struggle, in the development of the doctrine of torts in English Law, between two opposing views: (1) that “the risk of a man’s conduct is thrown upon him as the result of some moral short-coming,” and (2) that “a man acts at his peril always, and wholly irrespective of the state of his consciousness upon the matter.” The former is the view that has in the main prevailed in English Law; and this seems to me certainly in harmony with the Common Sense of mankind, so far as legal liability is concerned; but I do not think that the case is equally clear as regards moral obligation.
[219]The reader will find an interesting illustration of the perplexity of Common Sense on this point in Mr. O. W. Holmes, Junior’s, book onThe Common Law, chap. iii., where the author gives a penetrating discussion of the struggle, in the development of the doctrine of torts in English Law, between two opposing views: (1) that “the risk of a man’s conduct is thrown upon him as the result of some moral short-coming,” and (2) that “a man acts at his peril always, and wholly irrespective of the state of his consciousness upon the matter.” The former is the view that has in the main prevailed in English Law; and this seems to me certainly in harmony with the Common Sense of mankind, so far as legal liability is concerned; but I do not think that the case is equally clear as regards moral obligation.
[220]Cf.post, pp.292-3. It may be added that there is often a further difficulty in ascertaining the amount of compensation due: for this frequently involves a comparison of things essentially disparate, and there are some kinds of harm which it seems impossible to compensate.
[220]Cf.post, pp.292-3. It may be added that there is often a further difficulty in ascertaining the amount of compensation due: for this frequently involves a comparison of things essentially disparate, and there are some kinds of harm which it seems impossible to compensate.
[221]In the earlier stage of moral development, referred to in the preceding paragraph, retribution inflicted on the wrongdoer was regarded as the normal mode of reparation to the person injured. But this view is contrary to the moral Common Sense of Christian Societies.
[221]In the earlier stage of moral development, referred to in the preceding paragraph, retribution inflicted on the wrongdoer was regarded as the normal mode of reparation to the person injured. But this view is contrary to the moral Common Sense of Christian Societies.
[222]I think the term “merit” often blends the two notions, as when we speak of “promotion by merit.” By moralists, however, “merit” is generally used as exactly equivalent to what I have called “desert.”
[222]I think the term “merit” often blends the two notions, as when we speak of “promotion by merit.” By moralists, however, “merit” is generally used as exactly equivalent to what I have called “desert.”
[223]The only tenable Determinist interpretation of Desert is, in my opinion, the Utilitarian: according to which, when a man is said to deserve reward for any services to society, the meaning is that it is expedient to reward him, in order that he and others may be induced to render similar services by the expectation of similar rewards. Cf.post, Book iv. chap. iii. §4.
[223]The only tenable Determinist interpretation of Desert is, in my opinion, the Utilitarian: according to which, when a man is said to deserve reward for any services to society, the meaning is that it is expedient to reward him, in order that he and others may be induced to render similar services by the expectation of similar rewards. Cf.post, Book iv. chap. iii. §4.
[224]Perhaps we may partly attribute to the difficulties above discussed, that the notion of Desert has sometimes dropped out of the ideal of Utopian reconstructors of society, and ‘Equality of Happiness’ has seemed to be the only end. Justice, it has been thought, prescribes simply that each should have an equal share of happiness, as far as happiness depends on the action of others. But there seems to be much difficulty in working this out: for (apart from the considerations of Fitness above mentioned) equal happiness is not to be attained by equal distribution of objects of desire. For some require more and some less to be equally happy. Hence, it seems, we must take differences ofneedsinto consideration. But if merely mental needs are included (as seems reasonable) we should have to give less to cheerful, contented, self-sacrificing people than to those who are naturally moody andexigeant, as the former can be made happy with less. And this is too paradoxical to recommend itself to Common Sense.
[224]Perhaps we may partly attribute to the difficulties above discussed, that the notion of Desert has sometimes dropped out of the ideal of Utopian reconstructors of society, and ‘Equality of Happiness’ has seemed to be the only end. Justice, it has been thought, prescribes simply that each should have an equal share of happiness, as far as happiness depends on the action of others. But there seems to be much difficulty in working this out: for (apart from the considerations of Fitness above mentioned) equal happiness is not to be attained by equal distribution of objects of desire. For some require more and some less to be equally happy. Hence, it seems, we must take differences ofneedsinto consideration. But if merely mental needs are included (as seems reasonable) we should have to give less to cheerful, contented, self-sacrificing people than to those who are naturally moody andexigeant, as the former can be made happy with less. And this is too paradoxical to recommend itself to Common Sense.
[225]No doubt, it would be possible to remove, to some extent, the inequalities that are attributable to circumstances, by bringing the best education within the reach of all classes, so that all children might have an equal opportunity of being selected and trained for any functions for which they seemed to be fit: and this seems to be prescribed by ideal justice, in so far as it removes or mitigates arbitrary inequality. Accordingly in those ideal reconstructions of society, in which we may expect to find men’s notions of abstract justice exhibited, such an institution as this has generally found a place. Still, there will be much natural inequality which we cannot remove or even estimate.
[225]No doubt, it would be possible to remove, to some extent, the inequalities that are attributable to circumstances, by bringing the best education within the reach of all classes, so that all children might have an equal opportunity of being selected and trained for any functions for which they seemed to be fit: and this seems to be prescribed by ideal justice, in so far as it removes or mitigates arbitrary inequality. Accordingly in those ideal reconstructions of society, in which we may expect to find men’s notions of abstract justice exhibited, such an institution as this has generally found a place. Still, there will be much natural inequality which we cannot remove or even estimate.
[226]Cf.post, Book iv. chap. iii. §4.
[226]Cf.post, Book iv. chap. iii. §4.
[227]It is not perhaps necessary that I should here enlarge on thepracticalobstacles in the way of any attempt to realise such an ideal system.
[227]It is not perhaps necessary that I should here enlarge on thepracticalobstacles in the way of any attempt to realise such an ideal system.
[228]I have already expressed my opinion that this Utilitarian view of punishment is gradually tending to prevail; but I do not think that it has yet prevailed.
[228]I have already expressed my opinion that this Utilitarian view of punishment is gradually tending to prevail; but I do not think that it has yet prevailed.
[229]Of course those who hold that the essence of Justice consists in securing external Freedom among the members of a community, and that punishment is only justified as a means to this end, naturally think that in awarding punishment we ought to consider merely its efficacy as such means. But this can scarcely be put forward as an interpretation of the common notion of Just Punishment.
[229]Of course those who hold that the essence of Justice consists in securing external Freedom among the members of a community, and that punishment is only justified as a means to this end, naturally think that in awarding punishment we ought to consider merely its efficacy as such means. But this can scarcely be put forward as an interpretation of the common notion of Just Punishment.
[230]By ‘arbitrary’ I mean such definitions and limitations as destroy the self-evidence of the principle; and, when closely examined, lead us to regard it as subordinate.
[230]By ‘arbitrary’ I mean such definitions and limitations as destroy the self-evidence of the principle; and, when closely examined, lead us to regard it as subordinate.
[231]Cf.ante, Book ii. chap. v. §2.
[231]Cf.ante, Book ii. chap. v. §2.
[232]It is perhaps hardly necessary that I should here notice the Hobbist doctrine, revived in a modified form by Austin, that “the power of the sovereign is incapable of [legal] limitation.” For no one now maintains pure Hobbism: and Austin is as far as possible from meaning that there cannot be an express or tacit understanding between Sovereign and Subjects, the violation of which by the former may make it morally right for the latter to rebel. In fact, as used by him, Hobbes’ doctrine reduces itself to the rather unimportant proposition that a sovereign will not be punished for unconstitutional conduct through the agency of his own law-courts, so long as he remains sovereign. I may take this opportunity of observing that Austin’s definition of Law is manifestly unsuited for our present purpose: since a law, in his view, is not a command that ought to be obeyed, but a command for the violation of which we may expect a particular kind of punishment.
[232]It is perhaps hardly necessary that I should here notice the Hobbist doctrine, revived in a modified form by Austin, that “the power of the sovereign is incapable of [legal] limitation.” For no one now maintains pure Hobbism: and Austin is as far as possible from meaning that there cannot be an express or tacit understanding between Sovereign and Subjects, the violation of which by the former may make it morally right for the latter to rebel. In fact, as used by him, Hobbes’ doctrine reduces itself to the rather unimportant proposition that a sovereign will not be punished for unconstitutional conduct through the agency of his own law-courts, so long as he remains sovereign. I may take this opportunity of observing that Austin’s definition of Law is manifestly unsuited for our present purpose: since a law, in his view, is not a command that ought to be obeyed, but a command for the violation of which we may expect a particular kind of punishment.
[233]Cf. Blackstone,Introduction, § 2. “In relation to those laws which enjoin only positive duties, and forbid only such things as are notmala in se, butmala prohibitamerely, without any intermixture of moral guilt, annexing a penalty to non-compliance, here I apprehend conscience is no further concerned, than by directing a submission to the penalty in case of our breach of those laws ... the alternative is offered to every man, ‘either abstain from this or submit to such a penalty.’”
[233]Cf. Blackstone,Introduction, § 2. “In relation to those laws which enjoin only positive duties, and forbid only such things as are notmala in se, butmala prohibitamerely, without any intermixture of moral guilt, annexing a penalty to non-compliance, here I apprehend conscience is no further concerned, than by directing a submission to the penalty in case of our breach of those laws ... the alternative is offered to every man, ‘either abstain from this or submit to such a penalty.’”
[234]Into the ethical difficulties peculiar to International Law, I have not thought it worth while to enter.
[234]Into the ethical difficulties peculiar to International Law, I have not thought it worth while to enter.
[235]Vows to God constitute another exception: and it is thought by many that if these are binding, there must be some way in which God can be understood to grant release from them. But this it is beyond my province to discuss.
[235]Vows to God constitute another exception: and it is thought by many that if these are binding, there must be some way in which God can be understood to grant release from them. But this it is beyond my province to discuss.
[236]The case is somewhat different when the act has become immoral after the promise was made: still, here also, the prior duty of abstaining from it would be universally held to prevail.
[236]The case is somewhat different when the act has become immoral after the promise was made: still, here also, the prior duty of abstaining from it would be universally held to prevail.
[237]What is here said of a ‘statement’ may be extended to any mode of producing a false impression.
[237]What is here said of a ‘statement’ may be extended to any mode of producing a false impression.
[238]The case where set forms are used being theexceptio probans regulam.
[238]The case where set forms are used being theexceptio probans regulam.
[239]It can hardly be said that the advocate merelyreportsthe false affirmations of others: since the whole force of his pleading depends upon his adopting them and working them up into a view of the case which, for the time at least, he appears to hold.
[239]It can hardly be said that the advocate merelyreportsthe false affirmations of others: since the whole force of his pleading depends upon his adopting them and working them up into a view of the case which, for the time at least, he appears to hold.
[240]E.g.certain religious persons hold—or held in 1873—that it is right solemnly to affirm a belief that God created the world in 6 days and rested on the 7th, meaning that 1 : 6 is the divinely ordered proportion between rest and labour.
[240]E.g.certain religious persons hold—or held in 1873—that it is right solemnly to affirm a belief that God created the world in 6 days and rested on the 7th, meaning that 1 : 6 is the divinely ordered proportion between rest and labour.
[241]Cf. Whewell,Elements of Morality, Book ii. chap. xv. § 299.
[241]Cf. Whewell,Elements of Morality, Book ii. chap. xv. § 299.
[242]Cf. chap. i. §3of this Book.
[242]Cf. chap. i. §3of this Book.
[243]See Book iv. chap. v. §3for a further discussion of this axiom.
[243]See Book iv. chap. v. §3for a further discussion of this axiom.
[244]It is to be observed that men derive pleasure from the pains and losses of others, in various ways, without the specific emotion which I distinguish as malevolent affection: either (1) from the sense of power exercised—which explains much of the wanton cruelty of schoolboys, despots, etc.—or (2) from a sense of their own superiority or security in contrast with the failures and struggles of others, or (3) even merely from the excitement sympathetically caused by the manifestation or representation of any strong feeling in others; a real tragedy is interesting in the same way as a fictitious one. But these facts, though psychologically interesting, present no important ethical problems; since no one doubts that pain ought not to be inflicted from such motives as these.
[244]It is to be observed that men derive pleasure from the pains and losses of others, in various ways, without the specific emotion which I distinguish as malevolent affection: either (1) from the sense of power exercised—which explains much of the wanton cruelty of schoolboys, despots, etc.—or (2) from a sense of their own superiority or security in contrast with the failures and struggles of others, or (3) even merely from the excitement sympathetically caused by the manifestation or representation of any strong feeling in others; a real tragedy is interesting in the same way as a fictitious one. But these facts, though psychologically interesting, present no important ethical problems; since no one doubts that pain ought not to be inflicted from such motives as these.
[245]Butler (SermonVIII.,Upon Resentment) recognises that deliberate resentment “has in fact a good influence upon the affairs of the world”; though “it were much to be wished that men would act from a better principle.”
[245]Butler (SermonVIII.,Upon Resentment) recognises that deliberate resentment “has in fact a good influence upon the affairs of the world”; though “it were much to be wished that men would act from a better principle.”
[246]If the amount at stake is such as to constitute a real sacrifice, the conduct seems to be more than liberal, and (unless blamed as extravagant) is rather praised as generous or highminded.
[246]If the amount at stake is such as to constitute a real sacrifice, the conduct seems to be more than liberal, and (unless blamed as extravagant) is rather praised as generous or highminded.
[247]Kant argues (Met. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre, Th. I., § iv.) that as every one “inevitably wills” means to promote his own happiness this cannot be regarded as a duty. But, as I have before urged (Book i. chap. iv. §1), a man does not “inevitably will” to do what he believes will be most conducive to his owngreatesthappiness.The view in the text is that of Butler (DissertationOf the nature of Virtue); who admits that “nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty”; but points out that such sensible disapprobation is for various reasons less needed in the former case.
[247]Kant argues (Met. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre, Th. I., § iv.) that as every one “inevitably wills” means to promote his own happiness this cannot be regarded as a duty. But, as I have before urged (Book i. chap. iv. §1), a man does not “inevitably will” to do what he believes will be most conducive to his owngreatesthappiness.
The view in the text is that of Butler (DissertationOf the nature of Virtue); who admits that “nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty”; but points out that such sensible disapprobation is for various reasons less needed in the former case.
[248]See Whewell’sElements of Morality, Book ii. chap. x.
[248]See Whewell’sElements of Morality, Book ii. chap. x.
[249]The notion of Chastity is nearly equivalent to that of Purity, only somewhat more external and superficial.
[249]The notion of Chastity is nearly equivalent to that of Purity, only somewhat more external and superficial.
[250]In so far as mere illegitimacy of union is conceived to be directly and specially prohibited, and not merely from considerations of Prudence and Benevolence, it is regarded as a violation of Order rather than of Purity.
[250]In so far as mere illegitimacy of union is conceived to be directly and specially prohibited, and not merely from considerations of Prudence and Benevolence, it is regarded as a violation of Order rather than of Purity.
[251]It was partly owing to the serious oversight of not perceiving that Purity itself forbids too minute a system of rules for the observance of purity that the mediæval Casuistry fell into disrepute.
[251]It was partly owing to the serious oversight of not perceiving that Purity itself forbids too minute a system of rules for the observance of purity that the mediæval Casuistry fell into disrepute.
[252]In the case of pain which cannot be avoided we consider that Fortitude will suppress outcries and lamentations: though in so far as these relieve the sufferer without annoying others, the duty seems doubtful.
[252]In the case of pain which cannot be avoided we consider that Fortitude will suppress outcries and lamentations: though in so far as these relieve the sufferer without annoying others, the duty seems doubtful.
[253]Cf.ante, chap. iv. §5of this Book.
[253]Cf.ante, chap. iv. §5of this Book.
[254]The above remarks apply in a less degree to the “moral courage” by which men face the pains and dangers of social disapproval in the performance of what they believe to be duty: for the adequate accomplishment of such acts depends less on qualities not within the control of the will at any given time.
[254]The above remarks apply in a less degree to the “moral courage” by which men face the pains and dangers of social disapproval in the performance of what they believe to be duty: for the adequate accomplishment of such acts depends less on qualities not within the control of the will at any given time.
[255]I do not refer to customary marks of respect for officials, the omission of which would be a breach of established order; since the special political reason for requiring these obviously takes the question beyond the sphere of application of the Virtue of Humility.
[255]I do not refer to customary marks of respect for officials, the omission of which would be a breach of established order; since the special political reason for requiring these obviously takes the question beyond the sphere of application of the Virtue of Humility.
[256]Hence the practical importance of the Formal test of Rightness, on which Kant insists: cf.ante, chap. i. §3of this Book.
[256]Hence the practical importance of the Formal test of Rightness, on which Kant insists: cf.ante, chap. i. §3of this Book.
[257]The final arbiter, that is, on the question what the rule is: of course the moral obligation to conform to any rule laid down by an external authority must rest on some principle which the individual’s reason has to apply.
[257]The final arbiter, that is, on the question what the rule is: of course the moral obligation to conform to any rule laid down by an external authority must rest on some principle which the individual’s reason has to apply.
[258]Cf. Book i. chap. iii. §2.
[258]Cf. Book i. chap. iii. §2.