FOOTNOTES:

From the number of casualties it might be inferred that the service was one of little danger. The inference would be wholly wrong. The column was engaged in bush or jungle fighting with the enemy almost every day, and if our casualties were not greater it was due as well to the precautions taken by the leader and to his skilful tactics as to the failure of the Kachins to defend their stockades. The heaviest part of the work fell on the Gurkhas of the Mogaung Levy (military police), who furnished the flanking parties. Without them the force must have lost heavily. "The flanking done by the Gurkhas was splendid indeed, and it is entirely owing to their jungle work that I had not more casualties."[51]The column marched over six hundred and fifty miles, fighting continually, and the men's clothes and boots were torn to pieces. It was a fine display of patient endurance, courage, and persistence, in face of great difficulties, by officers and men. The Commander, Captain O'Donnell, was one of the soldiers to whom the Administration of Burma in those days owed so much. And he was greatly assisted by Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, to whom fell the difficult duty of providing good guides and correct information.

Captain O'Donnell concluded his report on the results of the operations with a notice of Lieutenant W. Hawker, of the Hants Regiment. "He was spiked through the thigh while gallantly leading his men in a charge at Mukton on the 15th of March, 1889. He was attached to the Mogaung Levy for these operations. He was senior to Lieutenant Benson, and might have taken command of the levy from that officer." But he showed "a sincere spirit in the welfare of the service" in refusing to supersede Lieutenant Benson, who belonged to the Indian Army and knew the men and their language. "He volunteered to take charge of the transport on the line of march, and this he did until Captain Macdonald was wounded. He was commanding the Hants men when he received his death-wound."

FOOTNOTES:[41]A lesson enforced by many examples in Upper Burma was that until a country in the process of annexation can be held permanently, it is useless and sometimes cruel to occupy it and leave it after a time. The following is taken from a report on the Ava district: "Myotha is a large village which had previously welcomed and aided British detachments, and had as a consequence been plundered by the rebels on their departure. Most of the inhabitants were in hiding in the jungles; they came in on hearing of the arrival of the troops, but were much distressed at their leaving."[42]Videa short account of the expedition to the jade mines by Major C. H. E. Adamson, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo (J. Bell & Co., Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1889).[43]Colonel Hugh O'Donnell, D.S.O. He raised the Mogaung Levy, and served all through the Burma business, 1886-91, and did excellent work.[44]Colonel Charles Prideaux Triscott, R.A., C.B., D.S.O.[45]Present population something under 3,000. The Myit Kyina Railway has a station at Mogaung.[46]At some places the grass had to be trodden down by marching the men backwards and forwards.[47]This was not a mere suspicion. He was marked down and assassinated soon after this (videp. 264).[48]It must be remembered that we had not a spare man in these years; while the overworked civil staff, especially the best of them, were often disabled by sickness and compelled to leave.[49]{ Capt. Macdonald.Hants Regiment—51 rifles{{ Lieut. Richards.Mountain Battery} 2 guns, Capt. Fuller, R.A.No. 2 Bengal}320 Mogaung Levy{ Lieut. Benson, Munster Fusiliers, Commanding.(Gurkhas and{ Lieut. Hawker, Hants Regiment.Sikhs){ Lieut. Manning, South Wales Borderers.Mr. Crowther, Inspector of Police.Lieut. Clements, Staff Officer.Lieut. Eliott, Assistant Commissioner, Political Officer.Col. Cronin, Senior Medical Officer.Mr. Ogle, India Survey Department.[50]Under military regulations Captain O'Donnell, being in command of troops called Military Police, would have been unable to command regular troops, and thus his experience and ability would have been lost. This difficulty was easily avoided by Sir George White.[51]Captain O'Donnell's report.

[41]A lesson enforced by many examples in Upper Burma was that until a country in the process of annexation can be held permanently, it is useless and sometimes cruel to occupy it and leave it after a time. The following is taken from a report on the Ava district: "Myotha is a large village which had previously welcomed and aided British detachments, and had as a consequence been plundered by the rebels on their departure. Most of the inhabitants were in hiding in the jungles; they came in on hearing of the arrival of the troops, but were much distressed at their leaving."

[42]Videa short account of the expedition to the jade mines by Major C. H. E. Adamson, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo (J. Bell & Co., Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1889).

[43]Colonel Hugh O'Donnell, D.S.O. He raised the Mogaung Levy, and served all through the Burma business, 1886-91, and did excellent work.

[44]Colonel Charles Prideaux Triscott, R.A., C.B., D.S.O.

[45]Present population something under 3,000. The Myit Kyina Railway has a station at Mogaung.

[46]At some places the grass had to be trodden down by marching the men backwards and forwards.

[47]This was not a mere suspicion. He was marked down and assassinated soon after this (videp. 264).

[48]It must be remembered that we had not a spare man in these years; while the overworked civil staff, especially the best of them, were often disabled by sickness and compelled to leave.

[49]{ Capt. Macdonald.Hants Regiment—51 rifles{{ Lieut. Richards.Mountain Battery} 2 guns, Capt. Fuller, R.A.No. 2 Bengal}320 Mogaung Levy{ Lieut. Benson, Munster Fusiliers, Commanding.(Gurkhas and{ Lieut. Hawker, Hants Regiment.Sikhs){ Lieut. Manning, South Wales Borderers.Mr. Crowther, Inspector of Police.Lieut. Clements, Staff Officer.Lieut. Eliott, Assistant Commissioner, Political Officer.Col. Cronin, Senior Medical Officer.Mr. Ogle, India Survey Department.

[50]Under military regulations Captain O'Donnell, being in command of troops called Military Police, would have been unable to command regular troops, and thus his experience and ability would have been lost. This difficulty was easily avoided by Sir George White.

[51]Captain O'Donnell's report.

South of Bhamo when we took the country was a Shan State known as Möng Leng, and adjacent to it and separating it from the district of the Ruby Mines was another Shan State named Möng Mit. The two together covered a large area, including the lower valley of the Shwèli and stretching from the southern boundary of Bhamo to the northern and north-western limits of the Northern Shan States of Tawngpeng and North Hsenwi. Neither of them was included in the list of Shan States proper. They were much mixed up with the adjacent British districts Bhamo Katha and the Ruby Mines. They were little interested in the politics of the Shan States; and being more easily accessible to the Burmese and very open to Kachin raids, they had not much cohesion or independence. For these reasons they were not placed under the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, but were dealt with by the Commissioner of the Northern Division.

At the time of the annexation the Sawbwa of Möng Mit had died. His heir, a minor, was under the tutelage of theAmats, or ministers, who formed a council to rule the State; which, as well as its neighbour, Möng Leng, was in great disorder. The diverse races which people this country, Kachins and Palaungs[52]in the hills, Burmans and Shans in the more open parts, make it hard to govern. In Möng Leng there was in 1886-7 no central authority. In Möng Mit the administration was very feeble. The Kachins were in the ascendancy. They were ousting the Palaungs, and trampled on the more peaceful villagers of the plains. But even the Kachins had no cohesion and obeyed no central authority. Each chief did what seemed best in his own eyes; he raided and blackmailed every village that lay within reach of his hills. The formation of the country, a jumble of hills covered with dense jungle, through which the drainage of the higher ranges forces its way naturally, produced an unruly race. The only open tract of any extent is the valley of the Lower Shwèli from Myitson to the Irrawaddy at Pyinlebin.

Getting a Dhoolie up an awkward bit.

Climbing up the steep Chin Hills.Chin Campaign.

Early in 1886 one Hkam Leng came to the Deputy Commissioner of the Bhamo district which touches Möng Leng on the south, and claimed to be recognized as the chief of both Möng Leng and Möng Mit. He was told that his claim would be inquired into, and that meanwhile he should remain quietly in Katha. Towards the end of the year, however, growing impatient, he went to Möng Mit and presented himself to the people as their Sawbwa. But they rejected him without ceremony. He applied to the Deputy Commissioner for assistance without success, and then became irreconcilable and a centre of disturbance.

The ministers of Möng Mit, on the other hand, were loyal and helpful. To the extent of their power—not much, it is true—they gave active assistance to the British force which occupied the Ruby Mines in 1886-7. In April, 1887, the Chief Commissioner being at Mogok, the headquarters of the Ruby Mines district, received the ministers of Möng Mit there and inquired into the facts. Finding that the title of the young Sawbwa was good, he confirmed him in his position. It was decided to appoint a regent, assisted by the ministers, to govern the State until the young chief should come of age. The boundaries of Möng Mit territory were defined, and Hkam Leng was formally warned against overstepping them, while at the same time he was assured that if he came in and made submission to the Government he should be recognized as chief of Möng Leng. In despite of this he attacked villages in Möng Mit and endeavoured to establish himself by force of arms.

During 1887 he continued in open hostility. Severalsmall expeditions had to be made against him; and the southern border of the Bhamo district, as well as the Möng Leng country and the Kachins in all the hills about, were kept in a restless state. As it was found impossible to reconcile him, Hkam Leng was outlawed and the Möng Leng country partitioned. The northern part was added to the Bhamo district as the Upper Sinkan township; the remainder was made over to Möng Mit, to which it had at one time been subject.

Hkam Leng, however, was by no means disposed of. He lurked for the most part in the Kachin Hills to the east of the Möng Leng country, and was frequently in the villages along the upper reaches of the Sinkan. To him another restless spirit was soon allied. In 1886 the two sons of the Hmethaya Prince, one of King Mindon's numerous progeny, had made themselves prominent in resisting the British Government. Their cause was taken up by a notable guerilla leader, Shwè Yan, who raised their standard in the Ava district. Driven out of Ava at the end of 1886, they took hiding in Mandalay, where a plot was hatched for supporting their claims. The conspiracy was discovered and the leaders arrested. The younger Prince was captured and sent to school in Rangoon. The elder, Saw Yan Naing, escaped to Hsenwi, and failing to get help there retired to the mountainous and very difficult country on the borders of Tawnpeng and Möng Mit. There he made his quarters in a strong position not easy to approach, and gathered round him a band of discontented and desperate characters. No attempt was made during 1887-8 to dislodge him, and he contented himself with threatening Möng Mit. He was invited to surrender, and favourable terms were offered to him. The only wish was to relieve the country from his presence. But he would have no truck with us.

Early in 1889 reports came in from Bhamo and other sources that Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng had agreed to unite forces and make simultaneous attacks on various points in the north. They were reported to be enlisting the aid of Kachin tribesmen, Chinese bandits from across the border, and Burmese outlaws. Risings were to be organized in the Upper Sinkan township and a descentmade on Möng Mit. Even the date for the rising was fixed. Whether there was any systematic concert or not was never ascertained, but a good many outbreaks occurred without any visible connection and of no great magnitude, but enough, taken all together, to harass both soldiers and police, as well as those responsible for the administration. From the Ruby Mines district as early as the last week in December had come reports of a gathering, headed by Saw Yan Naing, at Manpun, in the hills, three marches from the town of Möng Mit. A detachment from the Hampshire Regiment was sent from Bernard Myo, the Cantonment of the Ruby Mines, to Möng Mit, to garrison the town, while the State levies went out to act against the body of rebels at Manpun.

Meanwhile Lieutenant Nugent, who was in command at Möng Mit, hearing that there were some dacoits a few miles off, went with sixteen men of the Hampshires to attack them. The dacoits were strongly posted. Lieutenant Nugent and one private were killed and six men wounded. The remaining nine men, encumbered with the wounded, had to retire. This disaster happened on the 14th of January. Lieutenant Nugent was a young officer without experience of the country, and he ought not to have been left without some one capable of advising him.

It was promptly retrieved. The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Archibald Colquhoun, getting together troops and police, renewed the attack on the enemy's position and drove them out with much loss. On the 20th of January the village or town of Twingé, on the Irrawaddy, was taken and burnt by one of Hkam Leng's adherents. No attempt was made on Möng Mit after that date, and no formidable bands were encountered, although the Ruby Mines districts and the adjacent parts of Möng Mit were harassed by small gangs of robbers. A feeling of anxiety, however, prevailed and begat alarming rumours. The imagination of Shans, Burmans, and perhaps of other nervous persons, is fertile in the matter of numbers, and loves to deal in large figures. At the end of January hostile gatherings at different points, amounting to nearly two thousand men—a quite impossible number—were reported from Mogok, the headquarters of the Ruby Mines district. With a viewto allaying these apprehensions the garrisons there and at Möng Mit were strengthened.

The Chief Commissioner thought it best, under the circumstances, to place the control in the hands of one man, and at his request Sir George White appointed Colonel Cockran, of the Hampshires, to command all the troops and military police in the disturbed area, with orders to take the measures necessary for the peace of the country and for the destruction of such gangs as might be found. Up to the end of March, however, no important action was taken, as no large body of the enemy had been located.

On the 30th of March a column under Major Garfit, of the Hampshire Regiment, was dispatched against Saw Yan Naing, who was still at Binbong, near Manpun. Four stockades were taken without loss on our side, and Saw Yan Naing and his following fell back for the time. The Chief Commissioner intended, and had arranged with the Major-General commanding, that this column should remain in Binbong and the neighbourhood at least till the middle of April, in order to make our influence felt in these wild parts and to co-operate with a police force which had been sent through Mönglong, a sub-State of Hsipaw, lying south-west of Möng Mit, and also to join hands with Lieutenant Daly, the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, who was ordered to come with military police through Tawnpeng. Unfortunately the officer commanding misunderstood his instructions, and leaving Binbong on the 6th of April returned to Möng Mit. The expedition consequently was not very fruitful of results, and Saw Yan Naing returned to the neighbourhood and took up his quarters at Manton a little farther north.

Unluckily, Lieutenant Daly was unable to leave his headquarters at Lashio until the 7th of April. He then proceeded to Tawnpeng in accordance with the orders he had received from the Chief Commissioner, directing him to co-operate if possible with the force acting against Saw Yan Naing. Lieutenant Daly had been instructed also to get into communication with the Prince, and to renew the offer of terms if he would surrender.

In January, when at Hsipaw, Lieutenant Daly had met a Shan who had been with Saw Yan Naing in July and August of the year preceding (1888); this man undertook to take letters to the pretender. He arrived at Möng Mit soon after the defeat of the band which had gathered near that place, and heard that the Prince had left Manpun after that encounter, in which one of his chief followers, besides many others, had fallen. The messenger, therefore, was unable to deliver the letters. However, in March Lieutenant Daly, being at Hsipaw, again met this man, and sent him off with fresh letters to the Prince. Again fortune was adverse. Major Garfit delivered his attack just before Lieutenant Daly's man reached Manpun, and the Prince had gone. However, he had not gone far, and was found by the messenger in Möng Mit territory, in a Palaung village. He had a following of one hundred men, more or less, of whom twenty were Burmans, the rest Shans and Kachins; none of them men of note. As Saw Yan Naing had been attacked only two or three days before by the column from Möng Mit, he was not disposed to trust the promises made to induce his surrender. Nevertheless, he behaved as a Prince should. The messengers were allowed to stay four days in his camp, and were hospitably treated.

They were then dismissed with a polite letter, to the effect that "he had not plotted against the Government, but that on account of his past offences he feared to come in, that he had no wish for Government alms" (an allowance had been offered to him); "and that he would take to flight if Lieutenant Daly came near his camp." He had married the daughter of a Kachin chief. It may be that beyond allowing himself to be made the centre of disturbance he had taken no active part in the movements made in his name. None the less his presence in British territory was the cause of trouble.

While these events were passing in Möng Mit a watchful eye had to be kept on other parts of the district. Towards the end of December, 1888, the Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo received news of the appearance of a Mintha, or prince of some kind, on the Molè River, north-east of Bhamo. This Prince gave out that he wasin concert with Saw Yan Naing, and his plans may have been conceived with the design of acting with Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng. The rising appeared to be somewhat formidable. It was promptly met. Mr. Segrave, the Superintendent of Police, was sent out at once with a strong detachment of military police. He encountered the band, which was made up mainly of Chinese brigands and deserters from the Chinese army, on the 9th of January, 1889, and punished it severely, killing more than fifty men. The rest dispersed and escaped, probably over the Chinese border. The peace of the district north of Bhamo was not disturbed again during the year. The connection of this band with Saw Yan Naing was not established. In their camp were found papers showing that they were in communication with the leaders of the Mogaung malcontents, namely, the Sawbwa of Thama and Po Saw.

Hitherto it had been found impossible to post military police in the Upper Sinkan township. The difficulty of communication, especially in the rains, was great, and the climate very hurtful. The best possible arrangement was made by appointing a Kachin of much influence to act as magistrate and executive officer, and this man had been able to keep order, at least on the surface. His headquarters were at Sikaw. In December, 1888, Mr. Shaw, the Deputy Commissioner, visited Sikaw and also Si-u, an important village near the head of the Sinkan stream. He learnt that Hkam Leng, who was allied by marriage to the Kachin chiefs of the Lweseng and Tonhon range in the east of the township, was harboured by them, and from time to time came down to Si-u and levied contributions from the peasants. The Kachin magistrate had followed the Burman plan of shutting his eyes to that which it was inconvenient to see, and, lest he should incur his superior's displeasure, he said nothing about it. He was warned against permitting Hkam Leng to enter his township, and ordered to send speedy information to Bhamo if he should reappear. This warning had a good effect. Early in January, 1889, he reported that Hkam Leng had returned to Si-u, and was corresponding with a pretended Prince at Hpon Kan, a hill range thirty miles from Bhamo, a very nest of hornets.At the same time information was received from other sources that a large gathering of Chinese and Burmese, said to number five hundred men, were at Hpon Kan.

The Chief Commissioner was at Bhamo at the end of January. He arranged that a patrol of troops should visit Sikaw and Si-u at least once a month. Unfortunately something prevented the despatch of the military patrol, and on the 3rd of February the duty was entrusted to a party of fifty military police. On the 4th of February, at Malin, a village on the Sinkan River, about twenty miles from Si-u, the police came on a large body of rebels strongly stockaded. They attacked the stockade, but were repulsed, losing two men killed and ten wounded and all their baggage.

A strong column, consisting of 60 rifles of the Hampshire Regiment, 150 of the 17th Bengal Infantry, and two guns, left Bhamo as soon as news of this disaster came in. On the 7th of February, after driving in their outposts, this force engaged the enemy at Malin, where they were holding a strong position. They stood their ground with more than usual courage, and were not dislodged without some severe fighting, which cost us the loss of one officer and four men killed and eighteen wounded. The pursuit was carried for some distance, but they did not rally, and dispersed over the country. It was ascertained that this rising had been organized by Hkam Leng and Saw Yan Naing. In fact, the nucleus of the gang was a body of eighty or ninety men from the Prince's headquarters at Manpun joined by large numbers of villagers, some of their own free will, some under compulsion. The villages that furnished contingents were fined, the police force increased at the cost of the township, and the population as far as possible disarmed. No attempt was made to punish the individuals who had taken part in the business. Hkam Leng retired to his Kachin wife and allies in the hills.

Late in May an attempt was made to capture him, but it was frustrated by his Kachin supporters, who afterwards came down in force and occupied Si-u. On the 2nd of June they were attacked by troops and police and driven out, losing twenty-one killed. The police force in the UpperSinkan was reinforced again. The rains being now at hand, further action had to be postponed.

Everything united to obstruct the work of bringing this part of the country into order. The hills and forests, the neighbourhood of the Chinese frontier, the character of the people, Kachins and Palaungs, who had to be dealt with piecemeal hill by hill, and had never submitted to any central control, all combined to make it a very hard task. The Burmese officials may have had some control over the tribes. But probably so long as they did not make too much disturbance the hill-men were left to do as they liked. When there is no government things arrange themselves, and a limit is automatically fixed which the raiding tribes cannot exceed without exhausting their preserves. The advent of the British cut the weak bonds by which the hill people had been held, and the appearance of Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng as active opponents of the foreign invaders gave them a rallying-point.

The first step towards peace was the capture or expulsion of these two leaders, both of whom, it may be noted, following the example of more enlightened princes, had cemented their alliances by marriage with Kachin ladies of rank. It was decided, therefore, so far as the northern part of the province was concerned, to devote the open season of 1889-90 to the complete subjugation of this tract of country. If possible, the two leaders were to be got rid of. In any case the recalcitrant Kachins and others were to be reduced to obedience and the authority of the Möng Mit State over its outlying parts affirmed. In the district north of Bhamo nothing called for immediate action. A strong body of seasoned Gurkhas from the Mogaung Levy under Captain O'Donnell could be detached to strengthen the column of troops provided from the Bhamo garrison.

It was arranged accordingly that one column should go to Si-u and move early in December against the Lwèseng and Ton Hon Kachins and then move on to Manpun; and that a second, starting from Möng Mit, should join the first at Manpun, while at the same time the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States (Lieutenant Hugh Daly) should move with some of the Shan Levy (Indian military police) through Hsenwi and act with the first two columns; and a fourth column, also of military police under Mr. H. F. Hertz, Assistant Superintendent of Police, should work up from the south-east through Möng Löng and along the Tawnpeng Möng Mit boundary.

Bargaining with Haka Chins.

Instructions were given to the Sawbwas of Tawnpeng and North Hsenwi to take measures to stop the passage of fugitives through their States. There was a reasonable hope that these measures, although they might not effect the capture of the leaders, would establish the authority of the British Government and bring home to the people of this difficult tract the inconvenience of resistance.

The Bhamo column, commanded by Major Blundell, accompanied by Mr. G. W. Shaw, the Deputy Commissioner, left Bhamo on the 15th of December, 1889, for Sikaw. The tribes began to take in the situation. Twelve hills or groups of the Lakun tribe came to Sikaw to make formal submission, and one of their leading men volunteered to guide the force against Lwèseng. This was a good beginning. Major Blundell, sending forward a detachment to Si-u to keep the road open, left Sikaw on the 20th of December and marched on Lwèseng. A party of Gurkhas under Captain O'Donnell was ordered to take up a position at the ferries in the rear of the Lwèseng Range, which were said to be the only places where the Shwèli River could be crossed. Several other such points, however, were found, and at one of them were signs that the fugitives had already crossed over. While making this reconnaissance Captain O'Donnell's men were exposed to Kachin fire from the hills, and a very distinguished Gurkha officer (Kala Thapa Sing) fell.

The main body reached Lwèseng on the 22nd of December. A stockade across the road a mile from the village was defended by Kachins, and in taking it a native officer was killed and five men wounded. The village was found deserted, and was occupied by our men. There was some sniping from the hill-slope afterwards, and two were wounded. Next day the force advanced to Ton Hon. Two stockades erected across the road were defended, but were turned, with the loss of two men wounded, and Ton Hon was occupied without further fighting. But again the Kachins fired from the hills into the village, and oneGurkha was killed and another wounded. A halt was made at Ton Hon for some days in order to open communications with the Kachins, in the hope of bringing them to terms. The elders of Lwèseng and Ton Hon and other neighbouring villages came in. The Deputy Commissioner selected seven villages which had opposed the troops and harboured rebels, and imposed on them a fine of money (Rs. 2,500) and guns (50). By the 30th of December all the villages belonging to these tribes had submitted and part of the fine had been paid. The chiefs, however, still held aloof.

On the 3rd of January, 1890, the column left for Manton, leaving a Burmese civil officer, supported by a detachment of the 17th Bengal Infantry, to collect the balance of the fine. Manton was reached without any fighting on the 11th of January; and the column from Möng Mit marched in on the same day. The village was found deserted, and Saw Yan Naing had fled. He made his escape, it was said, into the Chinese territory of Chefan. On his road through Northern Hsenwi he just missed falling into the hands of Mr. Daly, who arrived at Manton on the 16th of January. Thus the three parties met and were able to exchange information. After a few days' halt Mr. Daly continued his tour through Hsenwi territory, while the Möng Mit and Bhamo columns waited at Manton for supplies. Some villages which had been hostile were visited; and as a large body of Kachins and Palaungs was reported to have gathered at Lanchein, a few miles south of Manton, where Saw Yan Naing had stayed on his flight, two detachments were sent out to disperse them. Stockades had been built across the road and were stubbornly defended by the enemy. Here Major Forrest, in leading one of the detachments, was severely wounded. The village was taken and destroyed, while the troops returned to Manton.

It was now decided that the Möng Mit party under Major Greenaway, with Mr. Daniell as civil officer, should move south to Manpun, while the Bhamo column remained at Manton. On the way Mr. Daniell was met by the headmen of the villages between Manton and Manpun who had come to tender their submission to the British Government. They were told that if Saw Yan Naing was withthem he must be given up, and fines were imposed on those groups or circles of villages which were known to have given the rebel leaders active help.

By the 25th of January all the headmen of the five hills or circles comprised in the south-western quarter of the Möng Mit State had made formal submission. On the 26th of January Mr. Hertz, who had marched from the south-east through Möng Löng with his military police, arrived in Manton. The rough country along the Taungbaing border had been entrusted to him to search—a duty he performed well, while as a by-work he constructed a very useful map of the ground. The Möng Mit column moved to Yabon, a village nearer to Möng Mit, and from its position a better base for operations. News was now received that Hkam Leng was in hiding in Sumput, a village north of the Shwèli. Major Greenaway, accompanied by Mr. Shaw, marched with a part of his force for Sumput by way of Molo, which ferry was reached on the 1st of February. Hkam Leng, however, had left Sumput, and Major Greenaway moved across the Shwèli to Kyungyaung.

Convinced by the experience of these operations that the mere movement of troops through the country was ineffectual, the Chief Commissioner decided to take rougher measures to bring home to the people of this tract the power of the Government, and to convince them that they could not support these disturbers of the peace with impunity. Orders were issued, therefore, to arrest and deport the headmen of the villages which aided and sheltered the two leaders. These orders reached Mr. Shaw at Kyungyaung and were executed at once. The headmen of twelve villages who had been most active were arrested and sent into Bhamo, and at the same time monthly fines were imposed on their villages. Similar measures were adopted under Mr. Daniell and Mr. Hertz's supervision in the circles which had befriended Saw Yan Naing. But in spite of the efforts of the civil and military officers, who spared neither themselves nor their men, the capture of Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng was not effected.

The open season was now drawing to a close. It seemed unlikely that further action on the lines followed hitherto would have much more success. The Chief Commissionerasked Brigadier-General Gatacre to visit the country with Mr. Shaw and see if they could advise any other measures more adapted to the nature of the case. Early in March, with a strong force, General Gatacre visited Si-u Ton Hon and Lwèseng, north of the Shwèli, and then went southward through Molo to Manton. He reported the country through which he passed to be quiet and the people to be submissive. Leaving a party of one hundred rifles, including forty Mounted Infantry, at Sipein with Mr. Shaw, to work the circles north of the Shwèli, and Mr. Daniell with one hundred rifles at Manton to work south of that river, he withdrew the remainder of the troops. Proclamations were issued, with the Chief Commissioner's approval, warning the people of the consequences of opposing the troops and promising reduction or remission of the fines that had been imposed if the leaders of the revolt were surrendered. On the 28th of March the headmen gave Mr. Shaw a formal engagement to observe the terms of the proclamation, and he was able to withdraw the troops and return to Bhamo.

Before the close of the operations the headman of Manton, who was one of the most obstinate adherents of Hkam Leng and had hitherto evaded arrest, was captured by the Kachins of the neighbouring circles and delivered to Mr. Daniell. He was deported to Mogok, the headquarters of the Ruby Mines district. All this country, it should be remembered, known as the Myauk-Kodaung (the northern nine hills), estimated to contain 2,500 square miles, belongs to the Möng Mit State. On the withdrawal of the troops an official of that State was left in charge with a force of the Sawbwa's militia to keep order. Before the British troops left the Kachin Sawbwas entered into solemn engagements to keep the peace, to shut their hills against Saw Yan Naing, and to obey the Möng Mit Sawbwa to whom they are subject.

Some progress had been made by the middle of 1889 towards the establishment of order. The root of the trouble, however, lay in the weakness of the Möng Mit administration. The most effectual measure undoubtedly would have been to place the State directly under the administration of a British officer. This method of meetingthe difficulty was considered and set aside by the Chief Commissioner. In the earlier years of our rule there were strong reasons against absorbing any of these quasi-independent territories. It was our settled policy to maintain the Shan States in the position they enjoyed under the Burmese Government. The absorption of one of them would have alarmed the others just when we were striving to win their confidence and to bring them peacefully into the fold. For this reason mainly the Chief Commissioner refused to wipe out the Kalè State, although in that case there were much stronger reasons for adopting this course (videChapter XXI., pp. 291, 292), and a desire not to depart from this line of policy led him to treat Wuntho with forbearance. In the present instance, moreover, the Möng Mit chief was a minor; his ministers might be accused of incapacity but not of dishonesty or hostility.

It was sought by other means to improve the administration of Möng Mit. Saw Möng, who had been ejected by his enemies from his hereditary State of Yawnghè (videpp. 142-143), at the time of the annexation was selected as a man of some power and of known loyalty and placed as regent in Möng Mit. The experiment did not succeed. Whether from want of sufficient governing power or because, not being their hereditary chief, he met with little support from the people, Saw Möng[53]failed, and in 1892 it was found necessary to place the State temporarily under the Deputy Commissioner of the Ruby Mines, who governed it as part of his district until the year 1906, when the young Sawbwa came of age, and was entrusted with the administration of his State. He is doing well. Saw Yan Naing and Hkam Leng did not appear on the scene again. What has become of them is not known, and it is hardly necessary to inquire. It is hard to see what use they served except to try the endurance of our people and to harass the souls of their compatriots.

The narrative as regards Möng Mit and the territory once called Möng Leng, now known as the Upper Sinkan township of Bhamo, has been brought down to the year 1889-90.

It is now necessary to go back a year or two and deal with the range of hills known as Hpon Kan, lying about thirty miles to the south-east of Bhamo. The Kachins in these hills began to harass us from the first. Early in 1886 they attacked Sawadi on the Irrawaddy and exacted tribute from the Sinkan villages. They raided the open country near Bhamo several times, and on one occasion even made their way within our lines, killed some Indian soldiers and burnt some of the barracks.

They were in reality not of great account. But the first attempts to deal with them were unfortunate, and after a time they began to be regarded with a seriousness quite unmerited. Two military expeditions went from Bhamo in 1886, the objective being Karwan, the village of the most important chief of the tribe. The first expedition failed to reach the village and returned without doing anything. The second in the same year was well managed from a military point of view, and had forced its way against some opposition to a point close to Karwan, when the civil officer with the column, under some misunderstanding of the orders he had received from the Chief Commissioner, Sir Charles Bernard, stopped the advance, and the column retired without effecting the object for which it had been sent. The result was that the Karwan chieftain and his tribe were persuaded that the British were afraid to meet them. The chief would neither submit nor deign to visit the Deputy Commissioner, and his hill became a rendezvous for the restless and evil spirits around. Gatherings of Burmese and Chinese were reported, and it was apprehended at one time that they would join the rising in Upper Sinkan. They confined their action, however, to some small raids on insignificant villages below the hills. In the beginning of March, 1889, they again descended to the plains and stockaded themselves at a place named Kyawgaung, killed the headman and carried off his family. Some troops, sent out to cover a fatigue party building a post for the police at Mansi, about fifteen miles from Bhamo, were fired at from the jungle, and the village of Mansi, consisting of a few houses, was burnt by the Kachins, and two of the military police killed.

Marching into the Klang Klang Country.Chin-Lushai Campaign.

The necessity of punishing the Hpon Kan Kachins for all their misdeeds had long been admitted. The country round Bhamo was kept by them in constant alarm, and the failure to deal with them led to excitement and want of confidence in the Bhamo bazaar, peculiarly ready to believe absurd rumours and subject to panic. More urgent matters had hitherto delayed action, and the garrison of Bhamo had been so weakened by the despatch of troops to Mogaung, that it could not afford men for other work. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, was compelled to wait. Towards the end of March the return of troops from the north made it easier to find a force for the Hpon Kan business; and the opportunity was at once taken of destroying this nest of hornets, or, to describe them more accurately, mosquitoes. Sir George White arranged a plan of operations at the Chief Commissioner's request, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army, being at the time in Upper Burma, gave his approval at once.

The force was of such a strength as to ensure the complete reduction of the refractory tribes, it was hoped, without fighting. It consisted of two guns of a mountain battery, fifty sappers, two hundred and fifty British, two hundred and fifty Native Infantry, of whom one hundred were Gurkhas, and was commanded by Brigadier-General George Wolseley,[54]C.B. The civil officers with the force were Mr. Shaw, Deputy Commissioner of Bhamo, and Mr. Warry, of the Chinese Consular service, with whose name the reader is acquainted already (videChapter VII.). Regarding the work of the expedition and the manner in which it should be carried out, the Chief Commissioner gave full instructions. The punishment of the Sawbwa of Hpon Kan and of his people, unless they made timely submission, was the duty imposed on the force. Notice was to be given to the Kachins that villages which helped the advance of the force would be protected; villages from or near which any opposition was offered would be destroyed; and on those Kachins who would not submit as much damage as possible would be inflicted by destruction of their houses and property. In any case, the village where the Sawbwa had his residence was to be occupied; and a fine in money and guns was to be exacted from him. The amount of the fine was to be fixed by Mr. Shaw with reference to the Sawbwa's means and to the amount of damage done in his raids. All captives held by the Kachins were to be surrendered. If this was impossible the fines payable by the custom of the country in such cases were to be exacted. In the event of the Sawbwa rejecting the terms his village was to be destroyed.

In view of the former failures, strict orders were given that negotiations with the Sawbwa were not to be opened until Karwan, his capital village, was occupied by the British force. There, and nowhere else, were the terms of surrender to be settled. And it was added that "under no circumstances should Mr. Shaw advise the return of the force or the suspension of operations until the objects of the expedition should have been accomplished and the Sawbwa's village occupied." The Chief Commissioner added that "if it were possible the force should remain in the Sawbwa's village for some days so as to make his humiliation apparent to his people and to the neighbouring tribes." Orders were issued by the Commander-in-Chief of Madras, Sir Charles Arbuthnot, at the Chief Commissioner's request, for the troops to remain at Hpon Kan until the Chief Commissioner should be satisfied that they could be withdrawn without bad results.

The troops were divided into two columns, and, avoiding the direct road where the Kachins might be prepared to oppose us, they took different routes, and after very slight opposition Karwan was occupied. Our loss was two killed and three wounded. The Sawbwa did not make his appearance. Karwan and several other villages were therefore destroyed. On the 23rd of April the Sawbwa of Washa, a neighbouring village of another tribe, and the elders of Neinsin, one of the Hpon Kan villages, the headman of which was detained as a hostage in Bhamo, came forward and volunteered to bring in the headmen of Hpon Kan. They were given two days to make good their offer.

Haka slave woman.Smoking a pipe.

Haka Braves.

On the 25th of April they came back with two of the Karwan elders, who accepted the terms imposed by the Deputy Commissioner, and promised to bring in the Sawbwa and other elders. The terms imposed were that fines for various murders and for the burning of Mansi should be paid and fifty guns surrendered and captives restored. The money fine was paid in full and the guns delivered. The Chief Commissioner thereupon sanctioned the withdrawal of the troops, and the main body left Karwan on the 15th of May. Before the evacuation of the place the headmen of the Hpon Kan villages entered into a solemn agreement to cease from raiding. This promise has been kept.

The objects of the expedition were thus accomplished, and these tribes did not give trouble again.

While General Wolseley was at Karwan, Mr. Daly, the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, accompanied by Mr. Sherriff, a representative of the Rangoon Chamber of Commerce, came to Nam Kham, on the left bank of the Shwèli, the chief town of a small State subordinate to North Hsenwi. It was a good opportunity of joining hands and examining the road between Hpon Kan and Nam Kham.[55]Taking a sufficient escort, General Wolseley went by a circuitous route, to avoid a neck of Chinese territory which runs down between the Bhamo district and North Hsenwi. Leaving Karwan on the 2nd of May, Wolseley made Nam Kham on the 8th. After two days he returned to Bhamo with the troops.

It may be added, before closing this chapter, that the Kachin tribes, whom it was necessary to subdue with such severity, have been for many years furnishing excellent recruits to the military police; and Kachin detachments, officered by men of their own race, can now be entrusted with the charge of frontier outposts.

Back to Index Next