FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[52]Palaungs are a Mon-Anam tribe, found mostly in the uplands of the Northern Shan States (Upper Burma Gazetteer, vol. iv., p. 179).[53]In justice to Saw Möng it should be noted that he has been restored to his own State of Yawnghwè, and has shown much administrative power.[54]General Sir George Wolseley, G.C.B.[55]Nam Kham is the place where Mrs. Leslie Milne resided for fifteen months to gather materials for her charming book, "Shans at Home." Writing of the Northern Shans States she says (page 186): "Before the country was annexed to Great Britain, in 1886, each chief governed his own State, and the King of Burma was his overlord, to whom he was obliged to pay a heavy tribute. Burman officials terrorized over the Shans, and, owing to heavy and unjust taxation, the people were in a perpetual state of rebellion against their chiefs. The chiefs were constantly fighting amongst themselves, and were also trying to free themselves from the Burman rule." The condition of the country under Burma has been described in the historical chapter of her book, written by the Rev. Wilbur Willis Cochrane, of the American Baptist Mission. She goes on: "I should like to draw attention to the unhappy state of the people under the invasion of the Kachins, who were slowly but surely taking possession of the hill country." Then Mrs. Milne quotes from "Parliamentary papers for 1859-76." It is sufficient to give here only a part of the quotation: "They (the Kachins) have ousted many Shan tribes, and wherever they appear they assume the same character of 'lords of all they can reach,' only to be appeased by some form of 'blackmail.'... They inspire such terror that in the neighbouring plains no Burman or Shan will venture alone, or even in company, unarmed along the roads within their reach." "This state of affairs," Mrs. Milne concludes, "lasted until the British annexation, and our Government have worked what one might almost call a miracle; for, the first time since the beginning of Shan history, peace prevails all over the country."

[52]Palaungs are a Mon-Anam tribe, found mostly in the uplands of the Northern Shan States (Upper Burma Gazetteer, vol. iv., p. 179).

[53]In justice to Saw Möng it should be noted that he has been restored to his own State of Yawnghwè, and has shown much administrative power.

[54]General Sir George Wolseley, G.C.B.

[55]Nam Kham is the place where Mrs. Leslie Milne resided for fifteen months to gather materials for her charming book, "Shans at Home." Writing of the Northern Shans States she says (page 186): "Before the country was annexed to Great Britain, in 1886, each chief governed his own State, and the King of Burma was his overlord, to whom he was obliged to pay a heavy tribute. Burman officials terrorized over the Shans, and, owing to heavy and unjust taxation, the people were in a perpetual state of rebellion against their chiefs. The chiefs were constantly fighting amongst themselves, and were also trying to free themselves from the Burman rule." The condition of the country under Burma has been described in the historical chapter of her book, written by the Rev. Wilbur Willis Cochrane, of the American Baptist Mission. She goes on: "I should like to draw attention to the unhappy state of the people under the invasion of the Kachins, who were slowly but surely taking possession of the hill country." Then Mrs. Milne quotes from "Parliamentary papers for 1859-76." It is sufficient to give here only a part of the quotation: "They (the Kachins) have ousted many Shan tribes, and wherever they appear they assume the same character of 'lords of all they can reach,' only to be appeased by some form of 'blackmail.'... They inspire such terror that in the neighbouring plains no Burman or Shan will venture alone, or even in company, unarmed along the roads within their reach." "This state of affairs," Mrs. Milne concludes, "lasted until the British annexation, and our Government have worked what one might almost call a miracle; for, the first time since the beginning of Shan history, peace prevails all over the country."

General Faunce's Expedition

The seventeenth chapter told the story of the Sawlapaw expedition, which covered the time from the spring 1888 to the second month of 1889. The western frontier of the province was the scene of equally interesting and much more difficult operations during the same period. When Upper Burma was annexed it is doubtful whether the difficulties, that might arise from the wild tribes which would become our neighbours, received much consideration. The Burmese Government thought very little of raids and disturbances on their frontiers. A British Administration could not show the same indifference.

Along the west of the Upper Burma districts of the Upper and the Lower Chindwin, of Pakokku, and of Minbu, lies a wild region of hills, inhabited by semi-savage tribes known to us as Chins. This mountainous region forms a wedge very long in comparison to its width. The broad end marches with the south of Manipur, the Naga Cachar, and east Sylet hills, and the point rests on Cape Negrais. It is formed of high, narrow ridges and deep valleys, all running from north to south, and the people are split up into numerous tribes and clans speaking many different dialects. The only system of government was that of headmen of villages, or at the most of a small group of villages, and consequently negotiations with the Chins as a people were impossible. The principal tribes, with which the present narrative is concerned are, on the north, the Siyins, including the Sagyilains, and the Sokte tribe, including the Kanhows;in the centre of the country the Tashons and Hakas (nicknamed by the Burmese Baungshès); and, southward of them, a number of tribes, Chin-boks among others, who are less formidable as border neighbours.

Between the hills and the Chindwin, and forming an enclosure in the Upper Chindwin district, was the little Shan State of Kalè. Like the States on the Shan plateau, it was governed by a Sawbwa who had a measure of independence. Owing to its position, practically, on the Chindwin, Kalè was much more in subjection to the Government of Burma than the more distant Shan chiefships. It was, moreover, exposed to raids from the hill-men, and for a long time past had suffered much from the Siyin group, who were the most frequent and barbarous raiders, burning villages, slaughtering the peasants, and carrying off many as slaves into the mountains.

At the time of the annexation the Sawbwa of Kalè was an old man, by name Maung Ket, incapable of administering his country. On the 1st of January, 1887, the Chief Commissioner, finding that he could neither keep order within his territory nor protect it against enemies from without, caused him to be removed with some of his officials to Mandalay, and appointed his nephew to rule in his stead. In November, 1887, Maung Ket escaped from Mandalay with his followers and took refuge with the Tashon Chins, who in former years were on friendly terms with the Kalè State.

In March, 1887, the Deputy Commissioner of the Upper Chindwin (Captain Raikes) met representatives of the Tashon tribes at Indin and explained to them that raiding must be stopped. His warnings seem to have influenced them; for a whole year few villages were attacked. Several circumstances, however, had tended to unsettle the minds of these wild tribes.

The ex-Sawbwa of Kalè had a disturbing influence and endeavoured no doubt to persuade them to help him to regain his position. In the open season of 1887-8 a project for opening up the Chin country from the Bengal boundary in the west to the frontier of Burma proper on the east was started in India, prematurely so far as we were concerned. It was proposed that roads should be made through the hills, communications established, and the hill people subjugated. The phrase "from the Salween to the sea" was invented and had some effect.

On the Chin Hills—arranging a plan of attack.Chin-Liushai Campaign.

In the winter of 1887 Captain Raikes with another officer went up the Myittha River and arranged a meeting with the Tashon chiefs. Sonpek, the principal man of the tribe, came down from the mountains and met Captain Raikes on the 3rd of January, 1888. He was courteous, even friendly in his manner, but guarded in his speech. His fears were excited by the close questioning (concerning the routes through his country eastward) to which he was subjected, so much so that he would hardly accept the presents offered to him by Captain Raikes. The meeting, however, ended in outward friendliness on both sides. No action was taken by the Government towards entering or approaching the Tashon country, and nothing indicated that the Chins had been seriously alarmed.

Other events followed which added to their uneasiness. Captain Raikes had visited Indin in March, 1887, and had found two persons in the ruling Sawbwa's service whose intrigues were causing trouble in the Kalè State. One was Maung Tok San, the other Maung Tha Dun, styled "Chingeh," or "Minister for the Chins." These two men were removed by Captain Raikes from Kalè and confined at Alôn. After some months they were released on security. They made use of their freedom to escape to the Chin Hills, where they joined the old Sawbwa who had preceded them, and helped him to excite the tribes.

It happened at the same time that part of the Pakokku district on the Lower Chindwin was very much disturbed. The guerilla leader, known as the Shwègyobyu Prince, had been able to collect a considerable following and to raise a small revolt (see Chapter VIII., pp. 84, 85). Expelled from the low country, he also sought safety with the Tashons. The arrival of a Burman Prince, whether genuine or pretender, did not matter, a man with a certain amount of prestige, a good deal of energy, and a bitter hatred of the foreigners, gave the Tashons heart, and they determined to take action. On the 4th and 5th of May a body of Sonpek's Tashons, numbering some hundreds, descended on Indin, made the Sawbwa prisoner, and tookhim to Chingaing (a village near the foot of the hills), where he had interviews with Sonpek and the Shwègyobyu Prince. He promised to join them in their resistance to the British, and on that condition was allowed to return to Indin. The Sawbwa, however, kept faith with us. Getting some men together, he sent them to attack the Shwègyobyu Prince in Chingaing, and despatched urgent messengers to the Deputy Commissioner (Mr. Ross) asking for assistance.

This sudden raid by the Chins on the Kalè State, and their readiness to assist a pretender like the Shwègyobyu Prince, had not been foreseen, and took the authorities by surprise. The messages received at headquarters were alarming. Eleven hundred Tashon Chins were reported to have surrounded Indin and carried off the Sawbwa. Several thousands were said to be on the warpath; five hundred had occupied Indin, three hundred were marching on Taungdwin, three hundred on Kalewa—all these of the Tashon tribe. Of the Siyins, five hundred were making for Kalemyo, six hundred threatening the Kabaw Valley, and so on. The numbers were obviously much exaggerated. Nevertheless, as the men on the spot thought the situation serious, measures of precaution had to be taken. A force under Major Gleig, consisting of 100 rifles, Cheshire Regiment, 250 Madras Infantry (15th) and two guns, were sent up the Chindwin River in steamers to Kalemyo. At the same time 150 Mounted Infantry (100 British, 50 Native), accompanied by Captain Eyre, the Deputy Commissioner of the district, were despatched from Pakokku, viâ Pauk and Gangaw, to take the raiders in the rear. A party of military police from the Kabaw Valley Battalion, with two guns, were moved down to Kalewa.

These dispositions sufficed to restore order for the time. Major Gleig's force disembarked at Indin on the 24th of May; Captain Eyre with the Mounted Infantry was at Chingaing, a few miles from Indin, on the 26th, the rifles and guns from the Kabaw Valley arrived at Kalemyo about the same date. The party, accompanied by Captain Eyre, marched up through the Yaw country without meeting with any opposition. They covered 152 miles in eight days and hoped to surprise the Shwègyobyu, who,with a mixed following of Burmans and Chins, had continued to hold Chingaing; but as soon as the alarm was given by his scouts he fired the village and escaped into the hills. The enemy were encountered only on one occasion. On the 17th of May a police officer making a night march with 60 rifles of the military police (Indians) was attacked by a body of men under Bo Saga, a noted dacoit leader. The men lately enrolled were unsteady and fell back, and the party retired, losing two men wounded. The officer reported that he had found the villages on his march deserted and that the insurgents were collecting men and arms. Several Burman villages had been burnt; men, women, and children had been killed, and many carried off into the hills. The measures taken may seem in the recital out of proportion to the danger. But it was by no means a false alarm.

The rains had now set in, and the Kalè and Yaw country in that season does not tempt the hill-men to raid. They returned to their mountains. The disturbances ceased almost as suddenly as they had begun. The troops returned to their quarters, a guard of military police being left at Indin to protect the Sawbwa.

Although order had been restored for the present, it was evident to the Chief Commissioner that the Chins had yielded to the climate rather than to fear. They had escaped punishment; and as they had burnt villages and returned home with many captives the campaign in their eyes must have seemed successful.

It was necessary to protect the Yaw Valley which was our territory, and the Kalè country, the Sawbwa of which was our dependent and too weak to help himself. A proposal was made by the local officer to simplify matters by taking the Kalè State under direct administration. It was argued that as we were obliged to defend Kalè, we might as well administer the country and receive the revenues. Looking, however, to its effect on the minds of the people, this appeared to be a mistaken policy. Every Sawbwa in the Shan States might have been degraded on similar grounds. The Kalè man, so far as was known, had not been disloyal. In the early part of 1887 he had acted well, and in the present affair he had not actedbadly. If he had not been well informed regarding the movements of the Chins, he was no worse than the British officers in the district. He was suddenly surrounded and seized. In procuring his liberty by consenting to join the insurgents he took the best course, or what he thought the best course, for himself. He lost no time in sending information to the nearest officer, and he attacked the rebel gathering with his own men. To remove him under such circumstances would have been unfair, and might have alarmed others whose fears it was not good policy to arouse.

It was decided, therefore, by the Chief Commissioner not to absorb Kalè, but to leave a military or police guard at or near Indin, with supports at Kalewa. An ultimatum was sent to the Tashons, ordering them to deliver up the Shwègyobyu Prince and other leading rebels, as well as the leaders of the Chins who captured the Sawbwa of Kalè and raided his villages. On the 21st of July, 1888, the Chief Commissioner (in a minute submitted to the Government of India) recounted the events which have been narrated, and gave his opinion that there could be no peace until the Chin tribes had been subdued. He asked permission to take the matter in hand as soon as the dry weather set in, and to subjugate the Chins once for all.

The first step in the plan of campaign was to occupy in force and permanently the difficult country lying below the Chin Hills, and to bring it under efficient administrative control.

For this purpose the Chief Commissioner in June, 1887, asked the Government of India to raise a frontier battalion in India for the Yaw Valley. It was assumed, in framing the plan of campaign, that this battalion would have been ready before the rains ended, and that it would have been possible to hold this district firmly. To have attacked the Chins and to have withdrawn the troops would have been to leave the villages in the plains exposed to the vengeance of the hill-men.

The next step was to march an expedition into the Chin Hills. The force was to be divided into three parts. The Siyin and Sagyilain tribe was to be invaded from the Kalè Valley by a force of the Kabaw Valley military police, brought down for the duty. The Tashon country was to be entered simultaneously by a column of regular troops with two guns, having its base at Sihaung on the Myittha River, to which place the men, their baggage, and supplies, could be brought by water. At the same time a force collected at Gangaw was to threaten the Yokwa Haka and Thatta Chins, to prevent them from helping the Tashons.

Haka Chins.

A Chin "Zu" drink.

The subjugation of the Tashons was judged to be the most formidable task. The object was to reach and, if necessary, to destroy their chief village in Burmese Ywama. There were no roads, only difficult hill-paths. Hill-coolies and mules were necessary for transport. There were no supplies in the country. The work, therefore, would have to be taken in hand leisurely, the road cleared and made practicable for mules, supply-stations established, and nothing left to chance. A slow, determined advance, it was held, would have a greater moral effect than an attempt by forced marches to surprise the enemy. If it were possible a simultaneous attack should be made from the Arakan or Chittagong Hills on the west to take the Tashons in the rear.

In reply to the ultimatum sent to them (see above), the Tashons released the captives taken in the raids on the 18th and 19th of May, but declined to give up the Shwègyobu Prince and other Burman rebels. They put forward counter-claims on their own part, and threatened further raids if their demands were not complied with.

In August an order was sent to the chief of the Siyin and Sagyilain tribes to surrender the captives taken by them from several villages in the preceding April and July, and they were warned that if they did not comply with this demand punishment would follow.

Early in September raiding began again. While the Government of India were considering the Chief Commissioner's proposals the Chins acted. They put their threats into execution. A village near Sihaung was raided by the Tashons on the 17th of September, and an alliance was formed by a large number of subdivisions of the Haka tribe. On the 18th of September a village in the Gangaw circle of the Pakokku district was attacked, it was reported,by Tashons. It was clear to the local officers that the anticipation of serious trouble would be realized. The Government of India were pressed, therefore, to allow the immediate enlistment of the military police levy for the protection of the Chin frontier, which had been asked for early in June. In October the reply of the Governor-General in Council to the Chief Commissioner's minute of July 21st was received. It was a refusal to sanction the proposed expeditions.

About this time the local officers reported that Sonpek, the Tashon leader, was inclined to give up the Burman refugees, but that he would not surrender the old Sawbwa of Kalè. It was just possible that through the latter's influence Sonpek's inclination might be translated into action. The old Sawbwa, therefore, was informed that he would be pardoned for his part in the disturbances if he brought about the surrender of the Burman rebels by the Tashons. At the same time, as a precaution against the attacks which were anticipated, Kalewa and Sihaung were garrisoned, and endeavours made to prevent the Chins from getting their usual supplies of salt and other necessaries from the plains.

The country lying between the Chin mountains and the Chindwin and Irrawaddy Rivers is, speaking generally, what would be called in India "terai"; covered with large stretches of forest and intersected by numerous watercourses and streams, with a heavy rainfall and intense heat. It is very unhealthy and a difficult country for troops to work in. The main river in this track is the Myittha, which rises from the southern part of the Chin mountains; it runs almost due north for a hundred miles or more, and then turning suddenly to the east for fifteen or twenty miles joins the Chindwin at Kalewa. During its course northward it receives by many affluents the drainage of the eastern slopes of the Chindwin. Three ranges of thickly wooded hills, called the Pondaung Ranges, run parallel to the Myittha on the east, with intervening valleys which are fertile and cultivated. East of the third range of hills lies the Pagyi township of the Lower Chindwin district. In the west of this township, bordering on the hills above mentioned, is the country known as Shitywagyaung—"the valley of theeight villages"—of which the most important is Thitkyidaing. West of this village lie Saga and Kyaw. The country lying between the Myittha River and the range of hills on the east is known as the Yaw country, in the southern part of which is the Yaw River, which rises in the same hills as the Myittha, but, turning in a south-easterly direction, makes its way to the Irrawaddy below Pakokku, the river-port of the district in which the Yaw country lies. Gangaw is the chief village in the Yaw country, and is more than 100 miles from Pakokku. The road to it passes through Pauk at about the twentieth mile, and the Yaw River, which has to be crossed, is unfordable when in flood.

In 1888 the country about Thitkyidaing had not been thoroughly reduced, chiefly on account of its unhealthiness and the scarcity of civil officers. Mr. Carter and Colonel Symons worked this tract in 1887-8, and brought it to order after the disturbances raised by the Shwègyobyu Prince, in which Major Kennedy and Captain Beville, Assistant Commissioner, met their deaths. Many of the dacoit leaders were captured or killed at that time, but the country was not thoroughly controlled.

There was so much to do in the early years of the annexation and so few to do it, that outlying tracts like the Yaw country were neglected for a time. This tract had, it is believed, even in the King's time, been left very much to itself. In 1887 the Deputy Commissioner of Pakokku (Captain Eyre) visited it. The people received him well. An arrangement—the best possible at the time—was made with the local officials, who undertook to pay the revenue and to be responsible for the order and protection of the territory. Hitherto the people had defended themselves against the Chins; and, to encourage them, five or six hundred muskets were distributed to villagers who in the opinion of the Burman officials would make good use of them. In some cases a subsidy was given to pay for the maintenance of a rude militia or irregular police. This arrangement had worked well until the time of the events now to be told, and it had the recommendation of economy in money and men when economy was more than usually imperative.

The refusal of the Government of India to allow an expeditioninto the Chin country in no way absolved the Chief Commissioner from the duty of protecting the people against these savages, for which purpose he had sufficient means at his disposal. He therefore took counsel with the Major-General commanding in Upper Burma (Sir George White) as to the measures necessary. It was resolved to move a body of troops up from Pakokku through Gangaw along the whole line of the frontier subject to raids, and to establish a chain of posts, Tilin, Gangaw, Kan, Sihaung, Kambalè, and Indin. General Faunce, who commanded the military district in which the disturbed tracts were situated, was given the control of the operations. Major Raikes, who was at the time in charge of the Lower Chindwin, and had had more intercourse with the Chins than any other of the civil officers, was associated with General Faunce and entrusted with the political duties. A force about 500 strong was ordered to move up along the frontier with General Faunce, while three companies of Gurkhas were to be sent by river to Kalewa. No preparations were made for attacking the Chin strongholds in the hills, as the Government in India had forbidden it. Raiding parties were to be followed up and punished whenever and so far as it might be possible.

The Chins began to act before these arrangements had been completed. Reports of raiding came tumbling in fast. On the 14th of October Homalin was attacked by followers of the Shwègyobyu, assisted by Chins from the Tashon country. On the 17th Chitpauk, in the Kabaw Valley, was raided by Siyins, who killed seven and carried off forty-five villagers. On the 20th of October Kambalè was surrounded, two villagers were murdered and six kidnapped. On the 22nd of October the Siyins attacked Kantha, north of Kan, and made off with thirty-two villagers. On the 29th of October a large body of the hill-men came down on Kalémyo, the principal village in Kalè. They burnt part of it, killed three of the villagers, wounded four, and carried forty into slavery. On the same day Khampat, in the Kabaw Valley, was raided by a party of Kanhows, seven men were killed and twenty-seven taken away.

These occurrences gave the Chief Commissioner a text for again preaching the need of punishing these unrulymountaineers; and, meanwhile, such measures as were possible and within his powers were taken. On the 9th of November the Government of India intimated that they were inclined to reconsider the proposal of the Burman Administration. On the 16th their orders came, giving the Chief Commissioner a free hand to do what he could with the troops at his disposal, and with the transport to be had within the province.

General Faunce had left Pakokku on the 14th of November. Captain Eyre, the Deputy Commissioner of Pakokku, went with him. His orders were to give all the help possible to the General, especially in procuring transport. He was to retain charge of the Pakokku district, and was not to go beyond its limits. The force accompanying General Faunce consisted of 356 men of the 10th Madras Infantry, 49 Mounted Infantry of the 10th Bengal Infantry, and 50 lances of the 1st Madras Lancers. As they went forward posts were established at Chaungu, 7-1/2 miles north of Pauk, at Tilin, at Gangaw, and at Kan on the Myittha, 20 miles north of Gangaw, and at Sihaung, between Kan and Indin.

The garrisons at Gangaw and at Kan were strong, 170 rifles at each place, all of the 10th Regiment Madras Infantry. At Sihaung the strength was 250 rifles. Hitherto, as has been explained before, the task confided to General Faunce was to protect the frontier, to stop raids, and, if possible, to pursue and account for the raiding parties.

The sanction given by the Government of India on the 16th of November completely altered the character of the movement. It became primarily a punitive expedition against the Chins. The 1st Bengal Mountain Battery, 77 strong, with 6 guns, 58 Madras sappers, and three companies of the 44th Gurkhas, were sent up by steamer to Kalewa; and by the time the General arrived at Kambalè, which he made his headquarters and the base of his expedition, he had a force of twelve hundred men (650 being Gurkhas) under his orders, besides between 200 and 300 military police (Indians), who held Indin and Kalewa, and were placed at his disposal.

As a consequence of the change of policy, transportbecame an urgent question—in fact the main question. The military authorities asked for two thousand coolies, men that could carry loads in the hills. The Deputy Commissioner, Captain Eyre, believed that he could get the men, and at the instance of the General commanding, the Chief Commissioner consented to allow Captain Eyre to go with this large body of coolies if he could enlist them, and an officer was ordered up to Pakokku to take charge of the district and to set Captain Eyre free for this purpose. This fact is mentioned, as it explains in a measure how the Deputy Commissioner's attention was somewhat distracted from his immediate duty—the administration of the district for which he was responsible.

Captain Eyre accompanied General Faunce as far as Kan, near the northern boundary of the Pakokku district. He then left him, meaning to return to Gangaw for the purpose of collecting coolies. He had information of several gatherings of dacoits, under known leaders, in the hills north-east of Gangaw, and at Mozo, north of Kan, and some time was spent in looking after them. He heard of a body of dacoits in position in the bed of a stream, between two thickly wooded banks in a strongly stockaded camp. The dacoits were taken by surprise, and their camp was rushed and destroyed. Pursuit was impossible, owing to the nature of the country, and there was nothing to be done except to return to Kan. The enemy harassed the retiring party all the way, and our men had continually to turn and drive them off.

Next day reports came in that the villagers were joining the dacoits, and that a body of some hundreds were collected at Chaungzon. After arranging with the officer commanding at Kan that a party should be sent to attack this gathering, Captain Eyre returned to Gangaw to collect the coolies wanted by General Faunce. He reached Gangaw on the 11th, and busied himself with this duty. On the 16th of December, hearing that three of the dacoit leaders were in considerable strength at Kunze, north-east of Gangaw, a force of 105 rifles, 10th Madras Infantry, attacked and dispersed them, but without inflicting serious loss. From that date the garrison of Gangaw may be said to have done nothing. They sat still and allowed the rising to gather strength.

Seeing the dacoit bands active and gathering strength, while the British officers and the garrison were apparently helpless, the villagers, to whom guns had been given, the quasi-militia men amongst the foremost, joined the insurgents. It was another object-lesson in the folly of arming the Burmese peasantry, and the still greater folly of allowing an Asiatic foe to think you are afraid to attack him. The town of Gangaw was defended by a stockade of teak. The military post had been so placed as to rest on this stockade, and would have become untenable if the enemy had succeeded in occupying the town. The garrison of 170 men had therefore to defend the town stockade, nearly a mile in extent. It was not considered strong enough to hold the town and at the same time to move against the hostile bands, who had now gathered in considerable numbers, and were occupying a village called Shonshé on the south, and three villages on the north-west. On the 24th of December a convoy with supplies left Gangaw for Kan, which was the next post to the north. It was fired upon soon after leaving Gangaw, and lost two men killed and two wounded. From Kan this party went on to Sihaung, from which place it returned. It was again attacked on the march back, between Sihaung and Kan, and lost heavily. Meanwhile the enemy, who had been strengthened from the peasantry around, attacked Gangaw on the 30th of December, and again on the 31st. They were reckoned to number 500 men, but their attacks inflicted no loss on the garrison.

Some sort of council of war, in which both civil and military officers joined, now took place, and it was held that if a determined attack were made on Gangaw or Kan it must succeed. The garrison of Kan, therefore, was ordered into Gangaw, and they obeyed the order, to say the least, without reluctance. They met with no opposition on the way, but they brought with them reports of the loss suffered by the detachment which went to Sihaung, which helped further to depress the dispirited garrison.

In Gangaw itself, although it was assaulted daily until the 6th of January, when a relieving force arrived, there were no casualties. The enemy was contemptible, and even his numbers were, it is believed, exaggerated. Thedanger was created by the inaction of the defence rather than by the number or the enterprise of the assailants.

The Chief Commissioner was in Rangoon during the early days of December. The first news of the trouble came to him in a telegram from Major Raikes, who was on special duty on the Chin frontier; it was dated the 14th of December, from Gaungu on the Myittha, and was received in Rangoon on the 17th. It reported the attack made on the dacoit camp by Captain Eyre on the 9th of December, and recommended that troops should be sent against this gang. In reply, Major Raikes was reminded that all the troops and military police on the frontier were under the General's orders and were close to the scene of action, while it would take a fortnight or more to send troops up from Pakokku. On the 20th of December a second telegram came from Major Raikes, reporting the affair at Chaungzon on the 13th of December. He explained that General Faunce had ordered the officer commanding at Gangaw to deal effectively with these gatherings; that two attempts, both unsuccessful, had been made to disperse the band near Chaungzon; that a third attack was about to be made, but the force ordered to make it could only be spared for a few days, as the General wanted all his men for frontier patrols and for the expedition into the hills. He therefore pressed for reinforcements as necessary for the destruction of these gangs.

Orders were then given for a small column of military police and troops to march up at once from Pakokku. The Deputy Commissioner of the Lower Chindwin was told to send all the police he could spare across from Alôn to the disturbed area. The state of things was communicated by telegram to Sir George White, who was on the Chindwin on his way to Kalewa, and the despatch of reinforcements from Pakokku was suggested.

On Christmas Day the first reports from Captain Eyre himself came in. He described the insurgents as increasing in numbers rapidly, and begged for more troops. This was the first intimation received by the Chief Commissioner that the local officers were unable to cope with the rising and that it was of a serious character. The Commissionerwas thereupon ordered to Pakokku to hasten the dispatch of the small column previously mentioned; and lest there should be difficulty in finding Sir George White, the officer commanding at Myingan was asked to get a force ready for immediate despatch. On the 26th a message came from Sir George White, dated from Mingin on the Chindwin, that he had ordered the despatch of a force 200 strong from PakokkuviaPauk, and Major Kingston with 250 rifles, troops and military police, from Alôn, to hasten to Gangaw. At the same time Colonel Macgregor, with 150 rifles of the 44th Gurkhas, who were with General Faunce, was ordered down from Sihaung to Gangaw. Meanwhile the Chief Commissioner had sent up 125 rifles of the Pakokku military police, under Lieutenant Phillips, by forced marches by the Kyaw Valley route. Major Kingston and Lieutenant Phillips joined hands at Kyaw on the 2nd of January. On the 6th they attacked the insurgents in Shonshé, south of Gangaw, and drove them out with considerable loss. At the same moment Colonel Macgregor with his Gurkhas fell upon the bands who were occupying a village north of Gangaw, and handled them roughly. No stand was made by these people, who had kept nearly 350 Madras Infantry shut up in Gangaw.

The duty of restoring order in the Yaw country was entrusted to Colonel W. P. Symons, who had displayed great ability in dealing with dacoit gangs in Sagaing. He was assisted by Mr. D. Ross, as civil officer in charge of the district. The country was cleared of dacoits, partially disarmed, and reduced to order. The rank and file of the insurgents were allowed to return to their homes, the guilty villages being punished collectively by fines. The Yaw country has been peaceful ever since.

The Gangaw episode was, in the language of the Boer War, "a regrettable incident." The garrison at the outset may have been unable to face the insurgents in the field, but, after the Kan detachment had been called in, it numbered 340 rifles—a sufficient number of disciplined troops to deal with a much larger number of dacoits, a mere rabble, armed, when they were armed at all, with old muzzle-loading rifles, or still more ancient muskets. Theincident was not, however, barren of good results. It sufficed to convince even the most devoted admirer of "the old coast army" that a portion of the Madras troops was unfit for active service—a fact which had more than once been brought to notice by the Chief Commissioner. The disbanding of the regiment responsible for the failure was the beginning of a large measure of army reform that had been too long delayed. Hence these events, trivial in themselves, may be worth recording.

The narrative may now return to the central business, namely, the expedition against the Chins.

General Faunce arrived at Kambalè and assumed command of the operations on the 3rd of December. On the 7th the fighting began. A working-party sent to establish a post between Kambalè and the foot of the hills was fired on, and Lieutenant Palmer, R.E., who commanded the Madras Sappers, was killed. On the 10th of December a strong body of Chins of the Tashon tribe suddenly issued from the hills, and attacked the camp of the 42nd Gurkhas at Sihaung, and a simultaneous attack was made on the village. They paid dearly for their audacity. The Gurkhas drove them off, followed them up, and inflicted heavy loss on them. On the same date Indin, the capital of the Kalè Sawbwa, was fired into, and the military police post of Kangyi, twenty miles north of Kalemyo, was attacked.

It had been intended to limit the operations of the season 1888-9 to the Siyin and Sagyilaing tribes. In dealing with savage people it is not possible to lay down a line beyond which you will not step. In view, therefore, of the probable necessity of taking action against the Tashons, 200 rifles of the Norfolk Regiment, 50 Madras sappers, and the remaining companies of the 42nd Gurkhas from their quarters at Bernardmyo, were ordered to the front. Sir George White himself arrived at Kalewa on the 29th of December, but left to General Faunce the immediate command of the force in the field. Matters were further complicated by the appearance of another section of the Chins. In October, a village in the Kubo Valley had suffered from a raid by Kanhows. A large body of this tribe came down in December and attacked Kangyi, north of Kalemyo. It was held by military police, who repulsed them. Further investigations made it clear that these Kanhows were so closely related by position and ties of kindred to the Siyins and Sagyilains as to make them indistinguishable. A proposal, therefore, to include them in the operations against the latter was sanctioned. It was proposed also to send at the same time a column to Minlèdaung, on the borders of the Tashon country, but this was not found convenient and was dropped.

An ultimatum was now sent to the Siyins and Sagyilains, demanding the restoration of all their captives, the surrender of a certain number of fire-arms, and the payment of a fine. In default of the acceptance of these terms, General Faunce was told to destroy the villages of the tribes and by a rigorous blockade to prevent food supplies from reaching the hills. During December and January preparations for the advance occupied the attention of the General and his staff. Transport coolies were obtained from Manipur. A road was begun, and step by step the base of operations advanced towards the goal of the expedition, the main village of the Siyins, called Koset by them.

On the 23rd of January, 1889, Sir George White and General Faunce made a reconnaissance to the summit of the Letha Range, to an altitude of 8,200 feet above sea-level. The force then advanced steadily up the hills in the face of a continued but unsuccessful opposition; the sappers, assisted by coolies, making a road as the men climbed up, and constructing rough stockades in which the men slept and rations were stored. The advance was obstructed by formidable stockades, generally held by the enemy, but not firmly defended. Day and night the Chins ambushed our men, taking advantage of every suitable position. The following telegram from Sir George White to the Chief Commissioner, dated the 28th of January, 1889, describes one of the skirmishes: "Enemy yesterday attacked our working-party on road above this, and held our covering-party, 40 British and 100 Gurkhas, from 9 till 2, when I arrived and ordered their positions to be charged. We carried all, driving them entirely away, getting off ourselves wonderfully cheaply—only one Norfolk dangerously wounded. Enemy in considerable numbers, using many rifles and plenty of ammunition. They fired at least1,000 rounds, standing resolutely until actually charged, even trying to outflank us. Their loss probably about eight or ten, but they were carried down the Khuds at once. Most difficult enemy to see or hit I ever fought."

On the 4th of February the village of Koset was reached, and after a slight resistance, occupied. It was fired by the Siyins before they retreated, and was reduced to ashes before our men reached it. The enemy harassed the camp every night, firing into it from the higher ground, and at several villages they ineffectually opposed us. They opened communications at one time with the political officer, but as they continued ambushing and firing on the troops and refused to surrender the Burman captives, it was evident that they were fooling us. Step by step, therefore, the advance was made good, until the Siyin territory had been overrun, and by the 5th of March all their villages were in our hands. The site of the village of Tôklaing was chosen as the headquarters of the Chin expeditionary force, and its name was changed to "Fort White," and a post was built there with materials taken from the village.

The chastisement inflicted on the Siyins had some little effect on the Kanhows, who had made similarly insincere overtures. On the 24th of February a deputation of them came to Fort White, bringing presents and asking that their villages might be spared. With the Chief Commissioner's approval, terms were offered to them, namely: to surrender all the captives in their hands, and a portion of their fire-arms; to pay a fine of 1,000 rupees, and to engage to pay a light annual tribute as a token of submission. Ten days were given them to consider and accept these terms. On the 6th of March they returned, bringing six of the captives and presents, but failed to comply with the other conditions. Their presents, therefore, were refused, and on the 8th of March General Faunce moved against them. The force was actively engaged against them until the 20th of March, when it returned to Fort White. The operations were well planned and executed, and imposed great labour on the troops, as the mountain tracks were most precipitous and difficult. Most of the villages were destroyed, in many cases by the Chins themselves, and large stores of grain and other food-supplies were taken. April was occupied in negotiations with the Tashons, and the troops rested.

In the Second Defile of the Irrawaddy below Bhamo.

As it was ascertained that the Siyins had built a new Gurkha village at Tartan, which had been taken in the earlier operations, a force consisting of 65 rifles of the 2nd Battalion Norfolk Regiment and 60 rifles of the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry was sent to drive the Chins out. The village was strongly stockaded and obstinately defended. One of the two stockades was taken. The loss on our side was one officer (Second-Lieutenant Michel) and two men of the Norfolk Regiment killed, one Gurkha killed, and two officers and six men wounded. In this action Captain Le Quesne, of the Army Medical Corps, showed conspicuous courage in attending to Lieutenant Michel, and was awarded the Victoria Cross. The troops retired to Fort White without completing their work. A few days later they returned and destroyed the village and stockades unopposed.

The rains, which begin early in this region, had now set in, and active operations ceased. In this business, from first to last, including the engagements of Gangaw and Kan, our loss amounted to 26 killed and 54 wounded; the enemy's loss can only be conjectured—it was probably light. The main object now was to secure the peaceful submission of the Tashons. Towards the end of March they showed an inclination to parley, and sent letters purporting to come from six of their chiefs. It was decided to give them as much time as possible to consider the terms offered to them, and in the meanwhile no movement was to be made against their villages or certain settlements of the Kanhows which were within, or close to, the borders of the Tashon tribe. One of the Kalè officials, Maung Nwa, was selected to take a letter to the chiefs, giving them twenty-one days to decide on their course of action.

Maung Nwa succeeded in reaching Falam, the Ywama, or mother-village, of the Tashons. On the 18th of April he returned to Fort White, bringing letters from the chiefs and from the ex-Sawbwa of Kalè. A minor chief accompanied him, and on a subsequent day another Tashon chief came in with messages to Major Raikes. This beginningof personal intercourse was encouraging, and on our part concessions were made in respect of the surrender of the Burmese refugees, while the release of the captives was insisted on. Later on some overtures were made on the part of the Siyins and a few captives delivered to our officers. On the 2nd of May men from the Kanhow tribe came in; they brought the fine of Rs. 1,000, which had been imposed on them, and the tribute, and tendered the submission of their tribe, but no captives. They clung to their captives as to life. Later on, however, they released some and brought them to Fort White. It was believed at the time that they had given up all; it was discovered later that they had held back a considerable number. The Siyins surrendered seven captives; but they made no further steps towards submission. At the end of the open season of 1888-9 the situation was this: Severe punishment had been inflicted on the offending tribes, and 114 of the Burmans carried off by raiding parties had been recovered. The Siyins and Sagyilains, notwithstanding the destruction of their villages, had not given in; the Kanhows had made a show of submission, and had partly complied with our terms; the Tashons had exchanged messages, but had given no proof of penitence.

It was necessary to show the Chins that the arm of the British Government was long enough to reach them even in their mountain fortresses, and that our soldiers could remain in their country. It was decided, therefore, to keep the troops at Fort White during the rains and to prevent the Chins, who had not submitted, from rebuilding their villages or cultivating their fields. A rigorous blockade of the routes from their hills to the plains was ordered, in the hope that it would help to overcome their obstinacy. Nothing more could be done until the season for taking the field again came round.

General Faunce's column had done all that men could do in a very difficult and unknown country against a very difficult enemy, pronounced by a man who had seen some fighting to be "the most difficult enemy to see or hit I ever fought." The expedition was late in starting. The reason has been explained. That the next season's operations were more successful with less severity is no reproach tothe General commanding the first expedition or to the political officer. Their work had made our power felt, and had given us some knowledge of the people. If a garrison had not been established at Fort White in 1888-9, it would have been scarcely possible to have acted against the Tashons on the plan which ensured success in 1889-90.

General Faunce and his men had worked hard and well. By May, 1888, the advance had been made good as far as Tôklaing, called Fort White. But although that place was only a short distance (thirty miles) from Falam, the main settlement of the Tashons, we had not been able to reach it. This tribe was known to be the most numerous and the most influential of the Chins in these parts, and their subjugation was essential.

The character of the country which was the scene of operations has been described in the preceding chapter. For a successful effort to conquer it much and timely preparation was necessary. Several circumstances had made this impossible. It will be remembered, in the first place, the Government of India had viewed the enterprise askance. The head of an Indian province looks mainly to his own affairs; and not having a free hand, and being without direct responsibility for the financing of a military expedition, he presses hard for what he wants. To the Supreme Government, far from the scene of raids and disorder, and less directly concerned with the causes and consequences of them, the financial aspect looms largest. The Government of India were beginning to take alarm at the heavy burden with which the annexation of the new province was loading them. They were aware of the very wide extent of territory under the nominal sway of the dethroned King, and of the distant boundaries, ill-defined and seemingly endless, marching not only with China and Siam, but with savage peoples of whom hardly the names were known. They feared, naturally enough, that the local authorities might allow their zeal to pushthem on too hastily if not too far. Little was known about the relations of the King's Government to the wide region lying between the Irrawaddy Valley and the Mekong. The northern and north-eastern boundaries were very indistinctly defined, and no thought had been given to the great wedge of mountainous country between Burma proper and Bengal.

The end of 1888 found us engaged in all these outlying regions. Active operations were going on in the Shan States, in the difficult hills east of Bhamo, and in the rugged country about the Ruby Mines. In the far north there were disturbances all around Mogaung, which was inadequately garrisoned and difficult to get at. Added to this, there were still districts of Upper Burma which were harassed by gangs of guerillas. There was more than enough work for every soldier and every civilian in the country and for every penny that the Treasury could afford. Facts, however, had proved strong, and the Chins themselves forced us to act. But General Faunce's force started too late, and therefore without adequate preparation for a big campaign. Added to this came the unfortunate Gangaw affair, which interrupted his supplies and called off some of his best troops.

In the summer of 1889 the position at Fort White was hardly encouraging. The place had proved very unhealthy, and the garrison had few men fit for service. Not only had we failed to touch the Tashons, who had been chiefly responsible for the troubles of the past year, but we were far from having come to terms with the Siyins and Kanhows, on which tribes our hand had been heavy. The political officer, indeed, still believed that hunger would bring them in. The Kanhows had made a partial and half-hearted submission, retaining, however, most of their Burman captives. The others would have no truck with us, and treated our demands, as well as our advances, with obstinate silence. Their courage was higher, and the pressure on them less than had been thought. The Baungshès, moreover, to the south of the Tashons, including the Yokwa Haka and Thetta clans, had been continuously on the warpath, and had had no communication with our officers since the winter of 1887.

There were only two courses open—either to make a well-prepared systematic advance into the Chin Hills and bring these people under British rule, not necessarily administration in the full meaning; or to retire altogether and leave anenclaveof savagery between Burma and Bengal, trusting for the protection of the Burman villages to frontier posts and spasmodic expeditions. The long history of the dealings of the Bengal Government with the Lushais and Nagas, very similar people, had proved the futility of the latter course. The inclination in Burma was all for the former, and this met with the thorough approval of the Supreme Government. The work was to be undertaken in a whole-hearted manner that would ensure success.

During the inactive season of 1889, the scheme of operations was carefully worked out. The plan of campaign approved by the Supreme Government was very much on the lines sketched in the Chief Commissioner's minute of the 21st of July, 1888. The central object was the Tashon tribe. On their north we already had in Fort White a footing in the hills with communications secured to Kalewa, on the Chindwin. It was decided to make the attack from the Burma side in two strong columns. The Northern Column was to gather at Fort White, and was to deal in the first instance with the still refractory tribes in its immediate neighbourhood. The Southern Column was to muster at Pakokku and, making its base at Kan in the Myittha Valley, to move up deliberately into the hills to Yokwa and Haka, subjugating the villages as the force advanced and securing the release of the captives. Then, leaving a garrison in Haka, it was to move northward and, in combination with the Fort White Column, to make a simultaneous attack on Falam, the Tashon capital, from both sides. Meanwhile, a third force was to enter the hills from Bengal territory and open communications or, if necessary, join hands with the Burma columns. For the operations of this last force the Burma Administration had no responsibility.

To protect the villages in the plains from raids and to keep open communications while the expeditions were in progress, it was decided to establish ten posts along the more northern portion of the Chin-Burman frontier. Theforce to be employed from Burma was to be nearly four thousand fighting men, besides some military police. The number of transport animals and of coolies necessary for such a body would be very great. Carts were useless after the first few marches from the Irrawaddy. Some fodder for ponies and bullocks might be procurable, but it was certain that once in the hills almost every ounce of food for man and beast would have to be sent up from the Irrawaddy Valley.

The success of the campaign, therefore, was a question of transport and supply. Kan, which was to be the base of the Southern Column, was to be fed from Pakokku on the Irrawaddy, distant 165 miles through difficult and sparsely inhabited country. Work had been begun in 1888 on the road; but labour was scarce and the cart-track was not open for more than half the distance. Provisions for Fort White and its communications, as well as for the frontier posts, could be sent up by steamer to Kalewa on the Chindwin. The difficulty was to move them thence to Kalemyo within reach of the troops. If the Myittha were navigable, it would be invaluable; all the frontier posts from Kalemyo to Kan were on that river, but its waters were unknown. Mules and coolies in large numbers, men from Assam and from the Northern Punjab able to carry loads on hill paths, were promised by India. Arrangements for collecting some eight or nine hundred carts at Pakokku were put in train; and contracts for the hire of country boats, of which Pakokku is the great building centre, were given.

In August I went up the Chindwin to Kalewa to meet Major Raikes, who had been stationed at Fort White since the close of the active operations, and had been busy acquiring information of the people and country and endeavouring to induce the Chins to come to terms. I brought with me two naval officers—Captain Wilson, R.N., then Port Officer at Rangoon, and Commander Holland, of the Royal Indian Marine Service. These officers were deputed to ascertain how far the Myittha could be navigated; and, as their inquiries gave reason for hoping that the river might be navigable, the task of exploring it was entrusted to Commander Holland. The results of his work wereencouraging, and he was directed to organize a transport service of boats.

But to return to Kalewa. The Chief Commissioner, after discussing matters closely with Major Raikes, resolved to inform the Tashons that the British Representative, with an armed force, would proceed to Falam, their head village, and there receive the submission of the tribe, and if necessary enforce it. A proclamation to that effect was sent to the chiefs in the following terms:—

"A British army will march to the Tashon Ywama. The British Government wishes to preserve your tribe, and does not desire to punish you as it has punished the Kanhows and Siyins who have resisted the British forces.

"The British Government desires from you only two things: First, that the captives taken from Burman villages shall be released. Secondly, that you shall in the future behave peacefully, and cease to attack the subjects of the Government.

"Therefore the Chief Commissioner hereby declares and promises that you will be excused from punishment for the past if you comply with the following terms:—

"(i) That you shall assist the British troops in their march through your country to your Ywama, and that you will neither attack nor oppose them;"(ii) That you shall to the utmost of your power compel the Siyin and Kanhow tribes to surrender their captives."(iii) That the chiefs shall meet the officer in command of the British forces at the Ywama, and deliver up to him all the captives in the possession of your tribe and pay a fine of 10,000 rupees."(iv) That you shall render annually a tribute of two elephant tusks and ten silk pieces to the British Government.

"(i) That you shall assist the British troops in their march through your country to your Ywama, and that you will neither attack nor oppose them;

"(ii) That you shall to the utmost of your power compel the Siyin and Kanhow tribes to surrender their captives.

"(iii) That the chiefs shall meet the officer in command of the British forces at the Ywama, and deliver up to him all the captives in the possession of your tribe and pay a fine of 10,000 rupees.

"(iv) That you shall render annually a tribute of two elephant tusks and ten silk pieces to the British Government.

"If you comply with these terms your lives and property will be spared, and the former orders requiring you to deliver up the Shwègyobyu and other rebels will not be enforced.

"On the other hand, if you will not comply with these conditions the Chief Commissioner will direct the troops to punish you severely."

Up to this time the surrender of the Burman outlaws had been made a condition of peace with the Tashons. It was now said by those who knew them best that the surrender of the refugees was repugnant to Chin honour; and in the hope of making it easier for them to yield, the Chief Commissioner consented to waive this demand. Permission was also given to Major Raikes to reduce the fine, if it would make negotiations more hopeful. But on the other points, especially the condition that the troops should march to Falam, their capital, and there receive the formal and public submission of the chiefs to the British Government, no concession whatever was to be made. Negotiations on this basis continued between the political officer and the Tashons without result.

In the beginning of December the chiefs agreed to meet Major Raikes at Sihaung. The terms of the proclamation were explained to them, and they were made to understand that they were final and would be enforced. The chiefs were impracticable. They affirmed that if our men advanced they could not control their tribesmen. The ex-Sawbwa of Kalè was present at this meeting, having come down with the Chins. He wisely took the opportunity of surrendering to Major Raikes, and was sent to Pakokku, where he lived afterwards in receipt of a pension from the Government. His surrender exploded a theory which had been started, that the Tashons were holding out in order to procure his reinstatement in Kalè.

A proclamation in similar terms was sent to the Haka and Yokwa Chins.

Meanwhile the work of collecting transport and forwarding stores was pushed on; the boat service on the Myittha was organized, and was worked by Commander Holland with great energy and success.

Brigadier-General Faunce had left Burma. He was succeeded in command of the brigade by Colonel W. P. Symons (well known as General Sir W. Penn Symons), who met his death in the first action of the Boer War. Colonel Symons had made his reputation already as anactive and able soldier. He was much more. He was peculiarly fitted by temper, tact, and administrative ability to conduct a difficult business like that now in hand. The command of the Chin-Lushai expedition was given to him by the Chief Commissioner's request. The question arose whether he should have also the control of the negotiations and arrangements with the Chins.

For some time the feeling in India had been, as it still is, against the division of authority in expeditions of this kind. No doubt, as a rule, the man who holds the military command should have control of the negotiations also. At the same time the circumstances of each case and the qualifications of the man must be taken into account. In Burma hitherto it had been found more convenient, if not necessary, to divide the duties and to give what is called the political business to a civil officer acquainted with the language and customs of the people to be dealt with. In the present instance it happened that Major Raikes had from the beginning dealt, under the Chief Commissioner's orders, with the Chin tribes. He had had more opportunities than any one of acquiring a knowledge of their character and politics. It was somewhat difficult to ask him now to work in subordination to the military commander who had had no part in the business.

The Chief Commissioner was ready to brush aside this personal difficulty and to allow Major Raikes to resign his post if he preferred to go. He would willingly have placed the chief authority unreservedly in General Symons's hands. The question was carefully considered and discussed. Finally, by General Symons's desire it was arranged to leave to the civil officer the negotiations with the Chins and the arrangements to be made with them when they submitted. It happened, however, that before the advance into the hills had well begun, Major Raikes was compelled by illness to go away. General Symons was then put in undivided control of the whole business, under the Chief Commissioner's orders. Two civil officers were selected to serve as his assistants, absolutely in subordination to him. Mr. D. Ross was posted to the Southern Column and Mr. B. S. Carey to the Northern. This arrangement worked admirably.

The rains of 1889 were unfortunately late. The Southern Column, 1,869[56]strong, was concentrated at Pakokku. From Pakokku to Kan, which was to be the base for the operations, was one hundred and sixty-five miles. Shelters had been erected at the halting-places, and such provisions as could be procured were gathered and stored by the civil district officers. The troops began to move on the 23rd of November, and the march was successfully carried out in fifteen days, by detachments of one hundred fighting men with followers marching in succession daily. The first detachment left Pakokku on the 23rd of November, and the leading columns were only just able to get through the falling rivers and the drying country. The ground was heavy and the heat great. Nevertheless, troops and followers arrived at Kan in good condition, with only a nominal sick list.

By the middle of November the Northern Column, 1,622[57]strong, was ready at Fort White and was waiting for the hill-coolies who were to form the transport, before it should move out.

The garrisons for the ten posts which were to protect the frontier were sent up the Chindwin to Kalewa, and had to march down the Myittha Valley. Late rains had flooded the Kalè Valley, and as late as the end of November the country was impassable to anything but an elephant. On the 24th of October it took fifteen hours to get one hundred and seventy fresh mules, with elephants to carry their saddles and gear, through the bogs and swamps on the last five and a half miles of the road into Kalemyo, which was the distributing base for supplies for Fort White and for the posts in the Kalè Valley. By the end of December these ten posts were built, occupied, and rationed—a testimony to the qualities of the officers and men who overcame such difficulties.

By the end of January, 1890, five hundred and fifty-one tons of stores had been sent by road to Kan, and six hundred and thirty-eight tons landed at Kalemyo by water. The river transport service not only did this, but also provided, as a by-work, carriage for many men joining their corps and for sick sent down to the rear. From the beginning of February, when the country had become dry, all supplies for the Southern Column were brought in carts from Pakokku to Kan and on to Haka on hired pack-bullocks and Government transport animals. To add to the difficulties, virulent cattle disease broke out in the Myittha and Kalè Valleys, and caused enormous loss.

One-third of the pack-bullocks had died. The sickness was not confined to the transport animals. It was said that the villagers in the Kalè State lost 90 per cent. of their buffaloes.

The first troops of the Southern Column reached Kan on the 7th of December. On the 9th the sappers, with a covering escort, commenced work on the road to Haka, which was sixty-four miles distant. Every one thought that our men would be in Haka in ten or twelve days, and all calculations were based on this estimate. It was sixty-six days before the leading files entered Haka, and the mule-road did not reach that place until the seventy-seventh day. This, although the whole strength of the force was devoted to road work: every man who could dig was set to it. The country opposed to the engineers a tumbled network of steep hills and deep ravines. The climate proved deadly. Soldiers and coolies were ill with fever. Out of seven Royal Engineer officers, at the end of December six were lying ill. In comparison with the difficulties caused by the nature of the country and the climate, the fiercest opposition of the Chins was insignificant.

"This disappointing delay," wrote General Symons, "was not without its compensating advantages in dealingwith the Chins. They expected us to make a quick advance, do some damage, and retire. The steady, persistent advance, together with the pains that were taken to get into touch with them and to explain our objects and intentions, paralysed their spirits and efforts for resistance, and thus tribe after tribe submitted and yielded to our terms."

This is, no doubt, the true way of dealing with savages. They are like children. They are terrified if they see a person approaching them steadily, with measured steps and outstretched arms. But it is much more difficult and requires more resources in money and men and transport to advance into a difficult country, making each step good and permanent, than to rush in, burn, slay, and retire. The latter method of warfare the savage understands. His enemies appear suddenly, set fire to his village, kill those they come across, and are away again. He flees into the jungle at the first alarm, and comes back little the worse as soon as the other side retires. That the better method was not followed in 1887-8, and that the more barbarous system was adopted, was not voluntary. Circumstances forced it upon the authorities in Burma, as the only means at their disposal for protecting the peaceful population in the plains. Besides, it is only fair to say that the tribes dealt with the former year, the Siyins and Kanhows, were by far the most warlike and bloodthirsty of the Chins. The severe chastisement inflicted on them, and the maintenance of the garrison in Fort White during the year, had brought home to all the folly of trying conclusions with disciplined and well-armed troops.

On the 17th of December the advance-guard of the Southern Column occupied Taungtek on the road to Haka. From that date to the 28th of December the Chins from time to time made feeble attempts to resist, harassing the troops by firing into camp. On the 28th, near Taungtek, they had a considerable number of men in action; according to their own account five hundred men, of whom three hundred had fire-arms. But they could do nothing. From that day they gave up the fight and made no further opposition.

On the 8th of January two Yokwa Chins came into camp. The objects of our coming and the conditions ofpeace were explained to these two men, and they were sent back to repeat them to their chiefs. But therein lay the difficulty. Who were the real chiefs? There were numbers of chiefs, each with his own following, each bitterly jealous of his fellows. To negotiate under such conditions required the tact and patience which General Symons fortunately possessed. The most intelligent and influential of the rivals had to be discovered, and his position strengthened by dealing through him.

Henceforth affairs progressed well, and there was no combined opposition to the advance. One unfortunate incident, however, occurred. Some Chins lying in ambush shot Lieutenant Foster, of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. The tribes had been fully warned that acts of treachery would meet with punishment. The nearest village was destroyed. This, happily, was the sole occasion on which the Southern Column was compelled to use violence.

A few days afterwards Yokwa was occupied, and this section of the Baungshès yielded. The terms imposed on them were the surrender of the captives, the payment of a fine and of an annual tribute, and an engagement to keep the peace in future. The mule-path, meanwhile, was being pushed forward on to Haka, the headquarters of an important section. The same tactics soon led to their submission. The subjugation of the whole Baungshè clan was now complete, for the minor sections followed the lead of the premier communities. The headquarters of the expedition were fixed henceforward at Haka, and negotiations for the surrender of the captives were begun.

This was not an easy or speedy business. Nominal rolls of the persons held in durance by the Chins had been prepared, and it was known by which tribe and by which village the captives had been taken. But some of the raids had been committed months before. Slaves were current coin in the hills, and passed from hand to hand as easily as a bank-note in more civilized regions. Their value was fixed with reference to the customary ransom paid by their Burmese relatives, and seems to have averaged ten or twelve pounds sterling. In barter, according to Mr. Carey, a slave would exchange for three or four head ofcattle, a good gun, a dozen pigs, or a wife. However willing the tribe or the village, or even the original captor, might be to keep faith, it was often difficult to trace the slave and obtain his release from the present holder, who had bought him with a price and did not see why he should be at a loss. A view not unreasonable from a Chin point of view, but quite inadmissible from our side.

While these negotiations were proceeding at Haka, and the mule-road was being completed to that place, reconnaissance parties were sent out to the west, the country was explored, the submission of a western tribe, the Klanklangs, was secured, and communication with the Chittagong Column, under Brigadier-General Tregear,[58]was opened. The advance parties of General Symons and General Tregear's forces met on the 26th of February, at Tao village, fifty-two miles west of Haka. This meeting was notable for the recovery of the heads of Lieutenant John Stewart, of the Leinster Regiment, and the soldiers (two British and one Indian) who had been killed by Hoswata Shendoos on the 3rd of February, 1888, when surveying in the Chittagong Hill tracts. Their skulls had decorated the village of some Chin chief at Haka ever since. As to how they came to Haka nothing is known. The chief may have taken them himself, or he may have purchased the trophies from the real heroes. No inquiry was made, and no retaliation was inflicted on the accomplices in the murder of our fellow-countrymen.

The Southern Column being thus engaged, the Northern Column, under Colonel Skene, with Mr. Bertram Carey as civil officer, had not been idle. Mr. Carey had to do with a very difficult position. The tribes with whom he was immediately concerned were as defiant in December, 1889, as they had been a year before; and he had no medium of communication with them. Gradually, by patience and skilful handling, the Sagyilain Chins living in the nearest villages were induced to bring supplies of eggs and fowls to market. Trading led to closer intercourse. Mr. Carey established himself at Yawlu on the road from Fort White to Falam, the chief Tashon village, and very soon Tashons as well as Sagyilains came to Yawlu daily to sell their produce, and the situation became less strained, while the troops procured better food. After a little Manglön, the chief of the Sagyilains, came to see Mr. Carey, and made his submission to the British Government. This was a most welcome event. Manglön became a medium in all negotiations with the Siyins, and remained loyal and trustworthy in subsequent troubles.

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