Chapter Second: Of the difficulties which will result from abandoning these islands1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign—who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islandsto be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that “for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands.”3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money—as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing—at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin—an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it—andyet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon “San Joseph,” the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities—especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence—and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased—and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islandshave not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious—even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.5. I find another and greater objection to theabandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España—where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson’s Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),3have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea,4which falls[into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741—which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,5north of California and northwest from Canada.7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., “of the Kings”], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river—to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter—he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from thename of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin’s Bay, or else that of Hudson’s Bay.8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis’s Strait, or of Bafin’s Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard6relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspectthat there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson’s Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance—for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast—diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards—and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas—to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,7in order to go along the coast of the South—without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America—or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships ofthis [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España—just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in theExtracto historial8of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer—contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the saidExtracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile from Recueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales (Amsterdam, 1725)View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile fromRecueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales(Amsterdam, 1725)[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss whichwe have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years’ expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products—cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)—will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniardwill be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.
Chapter Second: Of the difficulties which will result from abandoning these islands1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign—who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islandsto be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that “for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands.”3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money—as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing—at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin—an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it—andyet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon “San Joseph,” the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities—especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence—and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased—and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islandshave not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious—even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.5. I find another and greater objection to theabandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España—where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson’s Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),3have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea,4which falls[into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741—which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,5north of California and northwest from Canada.7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., “of the Kings”], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river—to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter—he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from thename of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin’s Bay, or else that of Hudson’s Bay.8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis’s Strait, or of Bafin’s Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard6relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspectthat there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson’s Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance—for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast—diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards—and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas—to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,7in order to go along the coast of the South—without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America—or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships ofthis [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España—just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in theExtracto historial8of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer—contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the saidExtracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile from Recueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales (Amsterdam, 1725)View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile fromRecueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales(Amsterdam, 1725)[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss whichwe have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years’ expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products—cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)—will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniardwill be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.
Chapter Second: Of the difficulties which will result from abandoning these islands1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign—who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islandsto be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that “for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands.”3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money—as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing—at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin—an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it—andyet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon “San Joseph,” the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities—especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence—and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased—and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islandshave not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious—even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.5. I find another and greater objection to theabandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España—where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson’s Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),3have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea,4which falls[into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741—which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,5north of California and northwest from Canada.7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., “of the Kings”], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river—to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter—he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from thename of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin’s Bay, or else that of Hudson’s Bay.8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis’s Strait, or of Bafin’s Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard6relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspectthat there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson’s Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance—for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast—diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards—and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas—to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,7in order to go along the coast of the South—without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America—or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships ofthis [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España—just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in theExtracto historial8of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer—contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the saidExtracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile from Recueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales (Amsterdam, 1725)View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile fromRecueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales(Amsterdam, 1725)[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss whichwe have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years’ expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products—cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)—will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniardwill be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.
Chapter Second: Of the difficulties which will result from abandoning these islands1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign—who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islandsto be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that “for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands.”3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money—as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing—at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin—an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it—andyet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon “San Joseph,” the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities—especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence—and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased—and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islandshave not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious—even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.5. I find another and greater objection to theabandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España—where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson’s Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),3have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea,4which falls[into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741—which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,5north of California and northwest from Canada.7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., “of the Kings”], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river—to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter—he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from thename of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin’s Bay, or else that of Hudson’s Bay.8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis’s Strait, or of Bafin’s Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard6relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspectthat there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson’s Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance—for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast—diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards—and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas—to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,7in order to go along the coast of the South—without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America—or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships ofthis [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España—just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in theExtracto historial8of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer—contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the saidExtracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile from Recueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales (Amsterdam, 1725)View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile fromRecueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales(Amsterdam, 1725)[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss whichwe have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years’ expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products—cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)—will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniardwill be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.
Chapter Second: Of the difficulties which will result from abandoning these islands1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign—who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islandsto be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that “for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands.”3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money—as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing—at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin—an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it—andyet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon “San Joseph,” the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities—especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence—and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased—and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islandshave not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious—even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.5. I find another and greater objection to theabandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España—where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson’s Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),3have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea,4which falls[into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741—which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,5north of California and northwest from Canada.7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., “of the Kings”], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river—to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter—he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from thename of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin’s Bay, or else that of Hudson’s Bay.8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis’s Strait, or of Bafin’s Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard6relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspectthat there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson’s Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance—for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast—diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards—and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas—to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,7in order to go along the coast of the South—without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America—or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships ofthis [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España—just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in theExtracto historial8of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer—contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the saidExtracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile from Recueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales (Amsterdam, 1725)View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile fromRecueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales(Amsterdam, 1725)[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss whichwe have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years’ expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products—cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)—will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniardwill be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.
Chapter Second: Of the difficulties which will result from abandoning these islands1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign—who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islandsto be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that “for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands.”3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money—as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing—at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin—an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it—andyet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon “San Joseph,” the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities—especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence—and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased—and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islandshave not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious—even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.5. I find another and greater objection to theabandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España—where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson’s Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),3have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea,4which falls[into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741—which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,5north of California and northwest from Canada.7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., “of the Kings”], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river—to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter—he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from thename of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin’s Bay, or else that of Hudson’s Bay.8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis’s Strait, or of Bafin’s Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard6relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspectthat there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson’s Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance—for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast—diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards—and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas—to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,7in order to go along the coast of the South—without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America—or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships ofthis [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España—just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in theExtracto historial8of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer—contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the saidExtracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile from Recueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales (Amsterdam, 1725)View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile fromRecueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales(Amsterdam, 1725)[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss whichwe have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years’ expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products—cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)—will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniardwill be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.
Chapter Second: Of the difficulties which will result from abandoning these islands1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign—who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islandsto be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that “for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands.”3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money—as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing—at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin—an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it—andyet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon “San Joseph,” the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities—especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence—and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased—and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islandshave not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious—even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.5. I find another and greater objection to theabandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España—where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson’s Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),3have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea,4which falls[into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741—which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,5north of California and northwest from Canada.7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., “of the Kings”], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river—to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter—he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from thename of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin’s Bay, or else that of Hudson’s Bay.8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis’s Strait, or of Bafin’s Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard6relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspectthat there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson’s Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance—for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast—diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards—and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas—to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,7in order to go along the coast of the South—without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America—or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships ofthis [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España—just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in theExtracto historial8of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer—contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the saidExtracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile from Recueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales (Amsterdam, 1725)View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile fromRecueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales(Amsterdam, 1725)[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss whichwe have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years’ expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products—cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)—will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniardwill be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.
Chapter Second: Of the difficulties which will result from abandoning these islands
1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign—who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islandsto be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that “for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands.”3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money—as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing—at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin—an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it—andyet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon “San Joseph,” the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities—especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence—and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased—and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islandshave not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious—even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.5. I find another and greater objection to theabandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España—where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson’s Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),3have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea,4which falls[into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741—which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,5north of California and northwest from Canada.7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., “of the Kings”], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river—to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter—he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from thename of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin’s Bay, or else that of Hudson’s Bay.8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis’s Strait, or of Bafin’s Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard6relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspectthat there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson’s Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance—for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast—diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards—and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas—to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,7in order to go along the coast of the South—without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America—or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships ofthis [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España—just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in theExtracto historial8of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer—contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the saidExtracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile from Recueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales (Amsterdam, 1725)View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile fromRecueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales(Amsterdam, 1725)[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss whichwe have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years’ expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products—cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)—will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniardwill be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.
1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this country, so distant from its sovereign—who, besides the fact that it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary, urged that under no circumstances ought these islandsto be abandoned, which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign, and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.
2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that “for the sake of one single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the moneys that were being spent in these islands.”
3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at the beginning they would consume much money—as occurs in every new colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing—at the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years, with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be their ruin—an indication that we had a better opportunity than they to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the famous Legaspi established it—andyet continually with new burdens, on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions, and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury, and were made up from that of Mexico.
4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made, to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition, and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost; he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon “San Joseph,” the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy, with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest, zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their urgent necessities—especially as no increase of the royal revenue was established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence—and the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they might have been increased—and with the necessity of holding the Moros in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these were greater than the incomes, the islandshave not retrieved their condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China, the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the [mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of these islands would be very pernicious—even laying aside religious motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.
5. I find another and greater objection to theabandonment of these islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce with Nueva España—where they could land wherever they might please, and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias, in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the [route] northwest from Hudson’s Bay (called thus from the name of an English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),3have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical account of a modern geographer.
6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the Western Sea,4which falls[into the ocean] above [i.e., north of] Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar, and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in 1728, 1731, and 1741—which have a certain agreement with those of the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,5north of California and northwest from Canada.
7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., “of the Kings”], and reached Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river—to which he gave the name Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter—he arrived at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake, called Ronquillo (from thename of a captain in that squadron), and in one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place by the current from Bafin’s Bay, or else that of Hudson’s Bay.
8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard, and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of Davis’s Strait, or of Bafin’s Bay; and that in that place there was a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded that there was no passage or communication between the said strait and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592, as Samuel Ricard6relates, with the idea of passing over to China by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspectthat there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson’s Bay; and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and perseverance—for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt, motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.
9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea]; and from Europe, by the opposite coast—diverting our forces in one direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out], since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom, will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now benefits the Spaniards—and much more, on account of their greater application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.
10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection between the two seas—to which the inquisitive disposition of the English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water, to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess these islands. But without them the English could not maintain such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,7in order to go along the coast of the South—without fear of encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen, and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing, and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific] coast of America—or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as do the ships ofthis [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted, will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry on in Nueva España—just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento] and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].
11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment of these islands can be seen in theExtracto historial8of the commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer—contenting myself, lastly, with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This subject also is treated by the saidExtracto historial, and by the chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this money they have waged most cruel war against us.
View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile from Recueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales (Amsterdam, 1725)View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile fromRecueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales(Amsterdam, 1725)[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]
View of Spanish city and fort of Gammalamma, Terrenate; photographic facsimile fromRecueil des voiages Comp. Indes orientales(Amsterdam, 1725)
[From copy in library of Wisconsin Historical Society]
12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused us, and of the loss whichwe have experienced from abandoning them; and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years’ expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines, if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated, and worked up.
13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly rich products—cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron, and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said in its place)—will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to those [who possess them].
14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniardwill be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.