Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, inanother invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attemptsto capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.9Plan of the citadel of Santiago at ManilaPlan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called “floating bastions” [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can supportartillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transportingtroops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in theprovinces—and these in time of war could retreat to the forts—and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of fourthousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually—so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here—with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account itis found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain’s pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also—who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly thesum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia’s regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.
Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, inanother invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attemptsto capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.9Plan of the citadel of Santiago at ManilaPlan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called “floating bastions” [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can supportartillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transportingtroops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in theprovinces—and these in time of war could retreat to the forts—and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of fourthousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually—so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here—with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account itis found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain’s pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also—who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly thesum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia’s regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.
Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, inanother invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attemptsto capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.9Plan of the citadel of Santiago at ManilaPlan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called “floating bastions” [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can supportartillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transportingtroops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in theprovinces—and these in time of war could retreat to the forts—and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of fourthousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually—so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here—with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account itis found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain’s pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also—who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly thesum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia’s regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.
Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, inanother invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attemptsto capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.9Plan of the citadel of Santiago at ManilaPlan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called “floating bastions” [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can supportartillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transportingtroops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in theprovinces—and these in time of war could retreat to the forts—and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of fourthousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually—so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here—with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account itis found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain’s pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also—who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly thesum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia’s regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.
Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, inanother invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attemptsto capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.9Plan of the citadel of Santiago at ManilaPlan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called “floating bastions” [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can supportartillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transportingtroops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in theprovinces—and these in time of war could retreat to the forts—and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of fourthousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually—so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here—with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account itis found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain’s pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also—who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly thesum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia’s regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.
Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, inanother invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attemptsto capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.9Plan of the citadel of Santiago at ManilaPlan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called “floating bastions” [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can supportartillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transportingtroops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in theprovinces—and these in time of war could retreat to the forts—and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of fourthousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually—so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here—with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account itis found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain’s pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also—who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly thesum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia’s regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.
Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, inanother invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attemptsto capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.9Plan of the citadel of Santiago at ManilaPlan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called “floating bastions” [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can supportartillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transportingtroops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in theprovinces—and these in time of war could retreat to the forts—and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of fourthousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually—so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here—with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account itis found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain’s pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also—who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly thesum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia’s regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.
Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces
1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, inanother invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attemptsto capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.9Plan of the citadel of Santiago at ManilaPlan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called “floating bastions” [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can supportartillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transportingtroops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in theprovinces—and these in time of war could retreat to the forts—and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of fourthousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually—so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here—with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account itis found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain’s pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also—who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly thesum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia’s regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.
1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, inanother invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.
2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.
3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.
4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attemptsto capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.9
Plan of the citadel of Santiago at ManilaPlan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]
Plan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila
[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]
5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called “floating bastions” [baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength which can supportartillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels, which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.
6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better foreseen by those who understand the subject.
7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve, which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor, Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transportingtroops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros, and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs may progress in proportion to his ability.
8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands, with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance of timber and the low wages of the workmen.
9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.
10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in theprovinces—and these in time of war could retreat to the forts—and with three thousand who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making] earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.
11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete, it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular] footing of fourthousand men may always be maintained. They can easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally, they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent [son de potencias mui despejadas] usually—so much so that on this account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and, with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained here—with the additional consideration that they are better able than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships, which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España, to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it be permanent.
12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable, it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account itis found that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean, they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this [sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way, or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service; and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces, where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor, both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.
13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty pesos for the captain’s pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor, the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable; young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent, among the soldiers also—who, with such pay, would not be so eager to desert the service.
14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies, according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very nearly thesum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service, for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and, above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of either peace or war.
15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops stated in Señor Arandia’s regulations, amounts to the half more; and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.