Chapter IX

Chapter IXThe Conduct of the WarIt is not my intention to attempt to write a history of the war which began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss any one of its several campaigns. I propose to limit myself to a statement of the conditions under which it was conducted, and a description of the two periods into which it may be divided.From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated with marked severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, Aguinaldo issued an order to the military chiefs of certain towns in Cavite providing that a soldier wasting ammunition should be punished with twelve lashes for a first offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled and “severely punished” for a third.1On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that any officer allowing his soldiers to load their rifles when not before the enemy should be liable to capital punishment,2which in practice was frequently inflicted on soldiers for very minor offences.Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then excused from service on the payment of cash.The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed endless abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the outbreak of hostilities, as I have shown in the chapters dealing with Insurgent rule. They grew rapidly worse thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed.“The documents of this period show that the insurgent troops driven from the front of Manila fell upon the people of the neighbouring towns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. Either their officers lost all control over them, or else they directed these outrages. It was not for some days that control was regained.”3Government Centre at BaguioGovernment Centre at BaguioEndless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other high Insurgent officers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and robbery, and there was grave need of them. Unfortunately they could not be enforced. Indeed it was often impossible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure and simple.4Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands sometimes coöperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns which did not promptly and fully comply with the demands of Insurgent commanders,5and armed bandits appeared and plundered them.There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who suppressed brigandage with a heavy hand,6but many of them were indifferent, even if not in alliance with the evil doers.The VisayasFeeling between Tagálog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly more bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killing each other. The highest officers of the “Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas” protested vigorously to Aguinaldo,7but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing with them.8In Luzón General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens of his province of committing “robberies, assaults, kidnappings and crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes.”9That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively shown by the record of Aguinaldo’s government for February 24, 1899, when it decided—“that the president of the council shall study such measures as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between the civil and military authorities of every province, in order that fatal consequences may be avoided.”With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated.10American soldiers were trapped, poisoned11and murdered in other ways.12It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and kindness.A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American soldiers. I haveelsewhere described13the fate that overtook Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, but newspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civil officers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned, robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their alleged wholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence of the women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they were no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committed rape.14These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of the responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions,15but all such men soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them from the start.In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public, orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for the reason that Americans did not search them.16More significant yet, when conditionsbecame bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers sent their women and children to seek American protection in Manila or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles, shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself followed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from Villa’s famous diary:17—“December 22.—It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observed indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of every patriot who loves his country.“We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied.“The honorable president had already decided some days before to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.“December 24.—We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o’clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. The honourable president told his family and the other women that they should remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans, and he named Señors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and for his family.“The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o’clock in the morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila.”18A Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampA Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampThe houses are for visiting lecturers and persons of similar rank. The tents are for the teachers.In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treated and safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellows knew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown by a later entry:—“February 6.—We have been informed that the mother and son of the honourable president are at Manila, living in the house of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife and sister of the honourable president. We have also learned that Señor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila.”19The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselves to be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader who would turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiers for safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers, and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgent leaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded their wounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to General Moxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to what should be done with wounded men:—“If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammunition at once and carry them away as far as possible, so that they may not be captured by the enemy; and if the wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat from the place, let them be left there, because it is better to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle; and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take good care of them, while the rifles are destroyed; therefore,I repeat, they must endeavour to save the arms rather than the men.”20There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinos were treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by American soldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the “water cure” in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms to tell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horrible barbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those who had sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tell the truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruel acts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos, and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts to explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused, but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to the men who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptions to the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans were concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented under similar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilized warfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens’ clothes not only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not to offend again.The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no means limited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they were promptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage was bolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary, victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that manytimes more Americans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actually killed in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen and colonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In reality only fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzón during the entire month.On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the following remarkable news items among others:—“Pavia, April 6th, 1899.“The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local Presidents of the towns shown on the margin:“Towns:Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zárraga, Dumangas, Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.“Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death General and officers and many soldiers.“At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.“At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans dead and 600 prisoners.“Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley accomplished nothing.“To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.“Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow 7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little leaving for Manila.“General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.“According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay and Maytubig.“American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners taken.“General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who provoked war.“Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and officers dead.”21Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the main business streets of the city.Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were as numerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand of them killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for good measure.22We learn from theFilipino Heraldfor February 23, 1899, that on that day the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila, while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city, at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan.23But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippines was too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by the soldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said to be refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed in order properly to punish them.General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2, 1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on that date.24And what of conditions in the United States during this troubled period? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15, 1900, “the Union Army” had met with a new disaster, as a result of which President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded by Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed on February 4, 1899. On January 20, “General Otis’s successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party,” arrived at Manila with papers and instructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic.25Things nowwent from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901, President McKinley had brought about strained relations between Germany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate the German Emperor.26Before September 15, 1901, he had been killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos could acclaim their independence.27The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organized armed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed the second period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part of the Insurgents.On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Pío del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder, and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked to remove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forces everywhere before the end of November.Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:—“If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion to barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to savagery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious as is the material destruction which this method of warfare entails, the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in its wake.Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people who have chosen it.”28The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule.The Baguio Country ClubThe Baguio Country ClubSuch semblance of discipline as had previously existed among the Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been very bad under the “Republic” and worse during the first period of the war. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable in many regions, and the common people were driven into the arms of the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried out by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. I have described at some length the conditions which now arose in the chapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is referred for details.29In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly, the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. On March 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred two stations. By December of the same year the number had increased to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty men to a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of the humane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantly increasing numbers.It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, while continuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Further subdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardly possible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after another the Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Most officers of importance issued explanatory statements to the people shortly after giving up active field operations,whether they surrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himself was captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point on the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated, and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers, many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issued an address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognized the fact that they wanted peace. He said:—“Manila, April 19, 1901.“To the Filipino People:—“I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the complete termination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.“The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force—a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.“The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearly manifested its will.“So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearningto see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of the great American nation.“By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.“Emilio Aguinaldo.30“Manila, April 19, 1901.”This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagálog and English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:—“A force like Aguinaldo’s could not be surrendered. It had been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been very lax. It had originally been held together by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny.”31Aguinaldo’s forces now passed through these several stages. Some of his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had surrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his advice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time, but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who had been Insurgent officers or soldiers andwhile serving in this capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen, whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In my opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why it failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death, he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:—“The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings.”32These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure.The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom were irresponsible and unscrupulous.Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them was threatened, but not actually resorted to.The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bell was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration—not the kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but a measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:—“General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoid making war against those who really wanted the termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeance of others. Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. He accordingly, ‘in order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,’ ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna to ‘immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation of armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.“‘Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, includingrice,palay,33chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been reëstablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable.’“It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones; but they were warned that unless they accepted that protection their property, which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or destruction, because it might be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.“As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came to an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. The efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient, and from time to time many additional families entered the zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy they were armed and sent out into the mountains from which they brought back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-famished men, women, and children who, released from the intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zones of protection.“The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within these areas was caused to themestizoruling group, whose members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to have others work for them and obey them blindly. To a man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of hisbarrio,34the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. These men suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not their bodies which suffered—it was their pride.“Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people had turned against their once highly respected chief, and toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive leader. Realization of the fact that the people were against him materially aided in forcing his surrender.“General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to 10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another, in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the first week of July no political prisoners were held in this region. They had returned to their homes.“The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents even in the United States. One of these is the order issued on August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding the district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Mo., in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of three counties of that State to remove from their residences within fifteen days to the protection of the military stations which he had established. All grain and hay in that district was ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was not convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new method of procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, however, effectively employed an old one.“The insurrection had originated among the Tagálogs and had spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied by them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagálog provinces.“On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, the office of military governor in the archipelago was terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated in the insurrection.”General Bell’s motives and methods in reconcentrating the inhabitants of this troubled region have been grossly misrepresented, and he himself has been sadly maligned. He is the most humane of men, and the plan which he adopted resulted in the reëstablishment of law and order at a minimum cost of human suffering.Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps received there their first lessons in hygienic living. Many of them were reluctant to leave the camps and return to their homes when normal conditions again prevailed.The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas campaign was very small.35Blount has sought to make it appear that partly as an indirect consequence of war there was dreadful mortality there, citing by way of proof the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas, published as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission, gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the census of 1903 gave it as 257,715.36The report of the United States Philippine Commission for 1903 gives the population of Manila as 221,000, while in 1900 it had been 260,000. Does this mean that there had been a holocaust in Manila? Not at all. It meansonly that the thousands of Filipinos who had sought the protection of the American forces there during the period when they feared their own soldiers in the provinces had mostly returned to their homes. During the disturbed period in Batangas great numbers of people took refuge in other and more peaceful regions. Some of them returned later; others did not.Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report of the Provincial Secretary of Batangas to the effect that:“The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over 200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the province had.”37Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a mortality of a hundred thousand from disease alone, are hardly consistent with those quoted by Blount as showing a decrease in population during a longer period of only fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is not apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths due to malaria or dysentery, since no systematic effort to rid Batangas of these ills had ever previously been made, and the very thing which then prevented the adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put forth to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people themselves. As a simple matter of fact, however, there was no such dreadful mortality from these diseases at this time. Malaria has never been especially bad in this province, and even cholera, which swept it during the period in question and is far more readily communicated than is dysentery, caused only twenty-three hundred and ninety-nine known deaths.In the end peace was established and prosperity followed in its wake.This result was brought about in part by the efficient activity of the armed forces of the United States and in part by the efforts of the first and second Philippine Commissions.381“To the Military Chiefs of the towns mentioned in the margin[there is nothing in the margin.—TR.]:—“As there are still many soldiers paying no notice to the order forbidding the waste of cartridges, you are required to give a certain amount of ammunition to each soldier and to see every day if there is any cartridge missing, and if so, inquire into the reason. In order that this may be successfully carried out, I have deemed it proper to prescribe the punishment for such offence, of which you will inform the soldiers under your command, and post this circular in a prominent place. Said punishments are as follows:—“Art. 1. A soldier found wasting ammunition shall be punished with 12 lashes; in case he commits the same offence again he shall be punished with 24 lashes; and on a further offence of like character by the same soldier, he shall be court-martialled and severely punished.“Art. 2. A soldier who has been found short of even one cartridge out of the ammunition assigned to him, shall be punished with 12 lashes, provided that he has not previously been in any engagement.“Art. 3. A soldier who has been found with no cartridges by reason of throwing them away during an engagement, shall be court-martialled, and severely punished.“I most earnestly recommend you to carefully look after your soldiers and see that every one is complying with the foregoing order.“This order should be transmitted from one town to another mentioned in the margin, and the last one should return it to this officewith the information that the same has been received and complied with by all.“May God guard you many years.“E. Aguinaldo, Dictator.“Cavite, June 17th, 1898.”—P.I.R., 1124. 2.2“November 16, 1900.(Stamp) “Lacuna Brigade. Headquarters.“Major Thomas Tagunton: Advise all officers of this brigade that he who allows his soldiers to load their rifles without being before the enemy, shall be liable to capital punishment. If the soldiers intentionally or otherwise fire their pieces, whether in the air or at any determined or undetermined person, said soldiers and the officers to whose command they belong shall also be liable to the same punishment as above, without further proceedings, for the reason that we are almost in front of the enemy, and all the more if the shots take effect upon any of the soldiers or chiefs.“Sergeants and corporals shall also take heed of the present warnings, as they will also be given the same punishment if they by abandoning their squads allow them to commit certain outrages.“You will report receipt of and compliance with this order.“God preserve you many years.“General Headquarters, November 16, 1900.(Signed) “Lacuna, General, Political-Military Governor and Chief of Operations.”—P.I.R., 643. 1.3Taylor, AJ. 85.4“Kabatúan, Oct. 14th, 1899.“Edict“Martín F. Delgado, General and Politico-Military Governor of the Province of Iloílo.“As a consequence of the frequent assaults and robberies committed by persons wearing military uniforms, and with the determination to correct, with a firm hand, such scandalous conduct, which, besides causing such deeds to be laid at the door of the military, also makes it easier for evil-doers to commit their misdeeds, I have, at the suggestion of the Councillor of Police, ordered the following:—“1. From this date forward all private citizens are absolutely prohibited from wearing military uniforms.“2. All authorities, both civil and military, under this Government, are obliged to see to the strict enforcements of this edict.“3. All persons who, not being in the military service, are, after the publication of this edict, found wearing military uniforms, and who cannot show that they are in the military service, will be suspected as evil-doers and will be sent to this Government to be subjected to the corresponding corrective measures.(Signed) “Martín Delgado,“Governor-General-President.”—P.I.R., 881. 4.5“On April 10, 1899, General Delgado wrote that, benignity having failed, rigorous methods would be used to enforce collections and that if the people did not pay—“‘I shall, with great pain, see myself under the necessity of withdrawing all my forces to the mountains and leaving them [the pueblos] to the fate which God will decide upon,’ which of course meant that hewould leave them to the mercy of the bandits who stood ready to descend upon them.”—P.I.R., B., 4.“This threat was not an idle one.”—Taylor, 67 HS. E-L.6“Santa Cruz, Laguna, July, 1899.“Hon. Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo....“There was a notorious bandit here who was the terror of the province with his gang; I had him arrested and shot and the robberies ceased. Murders were being committed; I had the murderers caught, shot one of them, and there were no more murders; officers of the reserve would consider themselves kings in their towns, they would shoot the localpresidentesand commit other unlawful acts; I disarmed them, and tried the most celebrated one, called Arcadio Castillo, alias Bancucane, who attempted to escape and was killed. With the death of these persons order has been completely reëstablished in this province. Several had rifles that were used only for robbery and after two or three trials all turned over their rifles, and the arming of the battalion was completed.(Signed) “Juan Cailles.”—P.I.R., 7 & 8.7“Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas.“Office of the President.“Kabatúan, March 16, 1899.“To the Honourable President of the Philippine Republic,“Señor Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy,“Most Distinguished President:“In order to avoid the distress which the knowledge of the abuses which are already unbearable, daily committed by the troops of Señor Diocno, will cause you, this government has hesitated to communicate them to you, but, as there is almost a reign of terror here, it feels that it must inform you of them in order to remedy them. The death of private individuals and assaults committed in the towns are dailyreported as having been committed by the troops of General Diocno. Of the numerous companies of Señor Diocno, only two under the orders of General Araneta fight against the enemy, the remainder are the terror of the town and it is a week since Sr. Diocno went to Capiz without telling any one what he was going to do.“In view of the facts pointed out, the soldiers of this General constituting a constant danger to the town, this government asks you to order General Diocno to turn over his rifles to us to kill Americans with and to enable the towns to recover their former tranquillity; this government asks this of you, relying upon the well-known justice with which you act and it wishes for you many years of life for our liberty and our independence.“Kabatúan, March 16, 1899.(Signed) “Jovito Yusay,“Temporary President.(Signed) “Francisco Soriano,“General Secretary.”—P.I.R., 52. 5.8“Martin Delgado y Bermejo, lieutenant general and general in chief of the republican army of the Visayan Islands.“General Headquarters of Santa Barbara,“April 20, 1899.“The existence of a state of war, and the trying circumstances through which the country is now passing have brought about a complete change in the order of nearly all the pueblos; and I have noticed with profound regret that sacking, robbery, sequestrations, and other crimes highly dishonourable to our noble cause, are of daily occurrence. With a view to preventing such conduct in the future, and in order to guarantee to the inhabitants of the military district under my command the most complete tranquillity, I hereby decree:“1. That any person or persons who commit acts of brigandage, sequestration, incendiarism, rape, or other disturbances of a public nature calculated to excite the public, or which infringe individual or property rights, shall be severely punished in accordance with military law.“2. That all offenders who present themselves to the Local or Military Authorities within the 30 days immediately following this date, and who turn over their arms and join our forces and help to fight other outlaws and to defend the nation, will be pardoned for the crimes they have committed.“3. That when the period of 30 days above mentioned has passed,any person taken in the act of committing robbery, or who attempts to rob with an organized band of outlaws, or who steals, rapes, or performs acts of incendiarism, or any other criminal act, will be summarily condemned to death by a military tribunal.“The Local Juntas of the various towns in conjunction with citizens of standing and the military authorities will organize a vigilance service to maintain public order and the authority of the law.“M. Delgado.”—P.I.R., Books B 4.9“February 13, 1899.(In the margin: A stamp which says:) “Philippine Republic—Headquarters of operations of the provinces of Southern Luzón.“It is with great regret that I have learned that robberies, assaults, kidnapping, and other crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes, are taking place in our towns, without taking into consideration that the purpose of the insurrection which has given origin to our social regeneration is true justice, for the reëstablishment of which the lives and property are being sacrificed of all who are proud of being called Filipinos. These acts are being committed without restriction by civilians as well as soldiers perhaps with the coöperation of their respective chiefs, to the shame of the authority vested in them and to the prejudice of the society to which they unworthily belong, and even to the integrity itself of the Republic. And in order that these barbarous and savage acts may disappear and that rigorous and exemplary punishment be meted out, I have deemed it proper to forward to you for general information the proclamation of these Headquarters of February 12th last, which is as follows”:(Signed) “Mariano Trias.“Lieutenant-General.“To the Politico-Military Chief of Infanta.”—P.I.R., 896–9.10“There does not seem to have been the faintest conception that there was any reason for not using the white flag to deceive people who were foolish enough to believe that Aguinaldo was going to adhere to the rules prescribed for its use. The writer in the early spring of 1899 once watched an insurgent party advance under a white flag upon an American line of trenches. When an officer and a bugler went forward to receive them they threw down the flag and immediately opened fire with the rifles which they were then seen to be dragging behind them.”—Taylor, 48 HS.11“Such ammunition was not effective unless fired from very close quarters, but even its possession made the guerrillas stronger than the people of the country and undoubtedly had much to do with securing their coöperation, not only as bolomen but also in the digging of the pits which were placed in the trails and also set about the towns. These were required to be constructed by the local authorities. In the bottom was set a sharp spike of bamboo, sometimes poisoned; and the pit was covered with leaves and soil upon a fragile framework; so that if a man stood upon it he would fall through upon the spike. Bows were set in the jungle with a string set across the trail so that any one stumbling over it would discharge a sharp bamboo shaft with a poisoned head. On September 18, 1900, Lukban congratulated the people of the town of Katubig upon the efficient use they had made of arrows with the heads dipped in ‘dita,’ a native poison. (P.I.R., 502. 8.)”—Taylor, 83 HS.12See also the chapter entitled “Murder as a Governmental Institution.”13See p. 313.14The following newspaper supplement printed in Tagálog for the benefit of the common people, is typical of this class of literature, with which the country was kept flooded:(Circular printed in Tagálog. P.I.R., 17–6. Supplement toHeraldo Filipino.“Friday, 24th February, 1899.“Countrymen:“We must consider ourselves fortunate that the bad intentions of North America were found out early. If we had not found them out by this time we should have been entrapped. And we should thank God that they commenced the war.“You ought to know by this time that these people can teach us nothing good. What we can learn from them is all evil. You must admit the truth of what they are reported to do to our brothers in Manila where they rob the houses when the dwellers in them are out or busy. Their evil inclinations prevail over them to such an extent that the houses most worthy of consideration are not safe. They are worse than the wild people who live in the woods, they have not the slightest idea of looking at things from the point of view of a man of honour nor have they the slightest respect for reason, for this does not control their actions in the least. Without the slightest attention to civility they rush into houses and if they find the people eating, without saying a word, they take what they want from the table, put it into their mouths and go as they came.“If they find people sleeping or resting, taking the siesta, it makes no difference to them; they go into the most private parts of the house as though they were walking in the street.“In the shops they take what pleases them and if the owner wants payment they threaten him with their rifles.“One can hardly believe and my pen refuses to write all of the perversity, and evil and bad habits of these people.“Their habits and manners are a disgrace to the country where they were born. In no history have such customs and manners been described even in that of the most ignorant people.“They search women who pass, feeling all over their bodies, taking from them money and whatever else they carry and if they come on them in a lonely place they strip them naked after violating them and do not leave a rag on them.“Are these those honest men of whom we have heard? Are these the people who were going to teach us good habits? Are these the people who were going to guide us? The race which does these things is the most hated one in the world, it is the race which commits most cruelties, it is the race which does not treat its mother with respect; in this race there is not the slightest idea of personal dignity, it is a race which does not know what honour is, which does not possess the slightest vestige of regard for good manners. Are these the people who are going to protect us? It is better for us to die at once than fall into the power of these unequalled malefactors.“¡Down with the bad men!“¡Kill the Americans!!“¡Let the people of the United States be exterminated!!!“¡Notice.—This sheet is distributed gratis.”15“A light upon the treatment of women by these people is given by the fact that after an American detachment had captured Lukban’s papers and family on August 18, and came so close to taking him that he was able to recognize their guide, one of his correspondents wrote to him that to their surprise the women, who had fully expected to be abused, had been treated with respect and given a house to live in. (P.I.R., 1143.4.)”—Taylor, 84 HS.16In a letter to General Ambrosio Moxica from ——— dated March 2, 1900, occurs the following:—“The guerillas quartered in the neighbourhood must render mutual assistance and keep up communication, so as to get the news as to where the enemy comes or goes, and the time at which they will pass certain points, endeavouring also to arrange that all the guerilla bands should have regular couriers, with you or with general headquarters, giving advice daily of any occurrence and carrying correspondence. Theymust select trustworthy women to carry correspondence, charging them to hide the letters underneath their skirts, bearing in mind that the Americans do not search them; and in sending to the towns for arms or food, the orders must be sent by women and for small quantities, so as not to attract attention.”—P.I.R., 2035. 3.17Simeon Villa, who accompanied Aguinaldo on his long flight, kept a somewhat detailed account of events in the form of a diary.18P.I.R., 869.19Ibid.20P.I.R., 2035. 3.21P.I.R., 886. 13.22Exhibit 1233(Original in Spanish. Contemporary copy. P.I.R., Books B. 4.)“General Headquarters, Santa Barbara, Feb. 28th, 1899.”(Literal copy of telegram.)“Casualties, Americans, on 6th, 2000 Colonels dead, one General; all churches converted into hospitals full American wounded; total American casualties 7000 confirmed by General Fullón just arrived from Malolos; says also Iloílo quiet and not taken.“A true copy“By order of Chief of Staff.“Juan Beloso.”23(Supplement to theFilipino Herald.)“Thursday, Feb. 23rd, 1899.—4 P.M.“The Filipino Army occupies the suburbs of Manila.“The three columns commanded by Generals Pío del Pilar and Licerio and Col. Hizon now occupy the suburbs of Sampaloc, San Miguel, San Sebastian, Binondo, San Nicholas and Tondo.“The Cavite battalion has possession of the Cuartel de Meisic and our flag is now flying there.“Six Thousand Americans Besieged!!!“The American troops now in Caloocan and La Loma to the number of over six thousand are besieged by the columns commanded by Generals Luna, Llanera and García.“The Honourable President“This very moment the special train carrying the Honourable President has left for Caloocan.“Viva the independent Philippines!!!“Viva the unconquerable Philippine Army!!!“Notice. This sheet is distributed gratis.”—P.I.R., 70–6.24(News.) The American General, MacArthur, with his entire staff, was taken prisoner by our troops in Northern Luzón. Another American general died on the 5th of January last in the North, who was seriously wounded in an ambush or fight. When shot he was a colonel, but on account of said fight he was promoted to the rank of a general, so that later when he died, he had the benefit of that rank.”—P.I.R., 2035. 3.25(Telegrams)“Washington, January 15, 1900, 10 A.M.“(Received, Cebú, January 16, 1900, 11 A.M.)“Owing to a new disaster of the Union Army, MacKinley has tendered his resignation as President, Mr. Bryan succeeding him.“Peace promulgated in the Philippines. Basis of the protectorate is being discussed.“Philippine independence will be proclaimed February the 4th.“Remark.—The basis of a protectorate has been published in English.”“Manila, January 20, 1900, 10 A.M.“(Received at Cebú on the same day, at 11 A.M.)“Otis’ successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party, has just arrived. He brings with him papers and instructions in regard to proclamation of the Philippine Republic.“It is believed that Rev. Martin, Bishop of Cebú, will be transferred to the Archbishopric of Manila, and Rev. Nozaleda to Spain.”—P.I.R., Books B-10.26P.I.R., 1193. 2.27Ibid.,2025.28Taylor, 47 HS.29Beginning on page 730.30Taylor, 36 GV, Exhibit 1017.31Taylor, 28 HS.32P.I.R., 1021.6.33Unhusked rice.34Village.35153, according to Blount himself.36“Nor can the ultimate responsibility before the bar of history for the awful fact that, according to the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Atlas of the Philippines of 1899, the population of Batangas province was 312,192, and according to the American Census of the Philippines of 1903, it was 257,715, rest entirely on military shoulders.”—Blount, pp. 383–384.37Blount, p. 597.38See ChaptersXIandXII.

Chapter IXThe Conduct of the WarIt is not my intention to attempt to write a history of the war which began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss any one of its several campaigns. I propose to limit myself to a statement of the conditions under which it was conducted, and a description of the two periods into which it may be divided.From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated with marked severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, Aguinaldo issued an order to the military chiefs of certain towns in Cavite providing that a soldier wasting ammunition should be punished with twelve lashes for a first offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled and “severely punished” for a third.1On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that any officer allowing his soldiers to load their rifles when not before the enemy should be liable to capital punishment,2which in practice was frequently inflicted on soldiers for very minor offences.Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then excused from service on the payment of cash.The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed endless abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the outbreak of hostilities, as I have shown in the chapters dealing with Insurgent rule. They grew rapidly worse thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed.“The documents of this period show that the insurgent troops driven from the front of Manila fell upon the people of the neighbouring towns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. Either their officers lost all control over them, or else they directed these outrages. It was not for some days that control was regained.”3Government Centre at BaguioGovernment Centre at BaguioEndless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other high Insurgent officers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and robbery, and there was grave need of them. Unfortunately they could not be enforced. Indeed it was often impossible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure and simple.4Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands sometimes coöperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns which did not promptly and fully comply with the demands of Insurgent commanders,5and armed bandits appeared and plundered them.There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who suppressed brigandage with a heavy hand,6but many of them were indifferent, even if not in alliance with the evil doers.The VisayasFeeling between Tagálog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly more bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killing each other. The highest officers of the “Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas” protested vigorously to Aguinaldo,7but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing with them.8In Luzón General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens of his province of committing “robberies, assaults, kidnappings and crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes.”9That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively shown by the record of Aguinaldo’s government for February 24, 1899, when it decided—“that the president of the council shall study such measures as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between the civil and military authorities of every province, in order that fatal consequences may be avoided.”With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated.10American soldiers were trapped, poisoned11and murdered in other ways.12It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and kindness.A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American soldiers. I haveelsewhere described13the fate that overtook Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, but newspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civil officers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned, robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their alleged wholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence of the women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they were no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committed rape.14These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of the responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions,15but all such men soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them from the start.In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public, orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for the reason that Americans did not search them.16More significant yet, when conditionsbecame bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers sent their women and children to seek American protection in Manila or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles, shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself followed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from Villa’s famous diary:17—“December 22.—It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observed indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of every patriot who loves his country.“We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied.“The honorable president had already decided some days before to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.“December 24.—We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o’clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. The honourable president told his family and the other women that they should remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans, and he named Señors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and for his family.“The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o’clock in the morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila.”18A Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampA Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampThe houses are for visiting lecturers and persons of similar rank. The tents are for the teachers.In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treated and safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellows knew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown by a later entry:—“February 6.—We have been informed that the mother and son of the honourable president are at Manila, living in the house of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife and sister of the honourable president. We have also learned that Señor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila.”19The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselves to be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader who would turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiers for safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers, and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgent leaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded their wounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to General Moxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to what should be done with wounded men:—“If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammunition at once and carry them away as far as possible, so that they may not be captured by the enemy; and if the wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat from the place, let them be left there, because it is better to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle; and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take good care of them, while the rifles are destroyed; therefore,I repeat, they must endeavour to save the arms rather than the men.”20There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinos were treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by American soldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the “water cure” in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms to tell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horrible barbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those who had sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tell the truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruel acts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos, and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts to explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused, but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to the men who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptions to the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans were concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented under similar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilized warfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens’ clothes not only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not to offend again.The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no means limited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they were promptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage was bolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary, victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that manytimes more Americans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actually killed in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen and colonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In reality only fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzón during the entire month.On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the following remarkable news items among others:—“Pavia, April 6th, 1899.“The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local Presidents of the towns shown on the margin:“Towns:Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zárraga, Dumangas, Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.“Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death General and officers and many soldiers.“At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.“At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans dead and 600 prisoners.“Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley accomplished nothing.“To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.“Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow 7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little leaving for Manila.“General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.“According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay and Maytubig.“American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners taken.“General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who provoked war.“Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and officers dead.”21Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the main business streets of the city.Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were as numerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand of them killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for good measure.22We learn from theFilipino Heraldfor February 23, 1899, that on that day the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila, while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city, at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan.23But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippines was too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by the soldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said to be refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed in order properly to punish them.General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2, 1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on that date.24And what of conditions in the United States during this troubled period? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15, 1900, “the Union Army” had met with a new disaster, as a result of which President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded by Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed on February 4, 1899. On January 20, “General Otis’s successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party,” arrived at Manila with papers and instructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic.25Things nowwent from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901, President McKinley had brought about strained relations between Germany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate the German Emperor.26Before September 15, 1901, he had been killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos could acclaim their independence.27The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organized armed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed the second period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part of the Insurgents.On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Pío del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder, and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked to remove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forces everywhere before the end of November.Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:—“If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion to barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to savagery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious as is the material destruction which this method of warfare entails, the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in its wake.Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people who have chosen it.”28The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule.The Baguio Country ClubThe Baguio Country ClubSuch semblance of discipline as had previously existed among the Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been very bad under the “Republic” and worse during the first period of the war. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable in many regions, and the common people were driven into the arms of the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried out by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. I have described at some length the conditions which now arose in the chapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is referred for details.29In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly, the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. On March 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred two stations. By December of the same year the number had increased to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty men to a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of the humane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantly increasing numbers.It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, while continuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Further subdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardly possible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after another the Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Most officers of importance issued explanatory statements to the people shortly after giving up active field operations,whether they surrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himself was captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point on the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated, and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers, many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issued an address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognized the fact that they wanted peace. He said:—“Manila, April 19, 1901.“To the Filipino People:—“I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the complete termination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.“The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force—a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.“The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearly manifested its will.“So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearningto see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of the great American nation.“By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.“Emilio Aguinaldo.30“Manila, April 19, 1901.”This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagálog and English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:—“A force like Aguinaldo’s could not be surrendered. It had been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been very lax. It had originally been held together by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny.”31Aguinaldo’s forces now passed through these several stages. Some of his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had surrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his advice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time, but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who had been Insurgent officers or soldiers andwhile serving in this capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen, whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In my opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why it failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death, he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:—“The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings.”32These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure.The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom were irresponsible and unscrupulous.Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them was threatened, but not actually resorted to.The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bell was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration—not the kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but a measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:—“General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoid making war against those who really wanted the termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeance of others. Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. He accordingly, ‘in order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,’ ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna to ‘immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation of armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.“‘Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, includingrice,palay,33chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been reëstablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable.’“It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones; but they were warned that unless they accepted that protection their property, which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or destruction, because it might be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.“As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came to an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. The efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient, and from time to time many additional families entered the zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy they were armed and sent out into the mountains from which they brought back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-famished men, women, and children who, released from the intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zones of protection.“The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within these areas was caused to themestizoruling group, whose members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to have others work for them and obey them blindly. To a man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of hisbarrio,34the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. These men suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not their bodies which suffered—it was their pride.“Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people had turned against their once highly respected chief, and toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive leader. Realization of the fact that the people were against him materially aided in forcing his surrender.“General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to 10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another, in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the first week of July no political prisoners were held in this region. They had returned to their homes.“The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents even in the United States. One of these is the order issued on August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding the district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Mo., in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of three counties of that State to remove from their residences within fifteen days to the protection of the military stations which he had established. All grain and hay in that district was ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was not convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new method of procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, however, effectively employed an old one.“The insurrection had originated among the Tagálogs and had spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied by them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagálog provinces.“On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, the office of military governor in the archipelago was terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated in the insurrection.”General Bell’s motives and methods in reconcentrating the inhabitants of this troubled region have been grossly misrepresented, and he himself has been sadly maligned. He is the most humane of men, and the plan which he adopted resulted in the reëstablishment of law and order at a minimum cost of human suffering.Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps received there their first lessons in hygienic living. Many of them were reluctant to leave the camps and return to their homes when normal conditions again prevailed.The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas campaign was very small.35Blount has sought to make it appear that partly as an indirect consequence of war there was dreadful mortality there, citing by way of proof the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas, published as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission, gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the census of 1903 gave it as 257,715.36The report of the United States Philippine Commission for 1903 gives the population of Manila as 221,000, while in 1900 it had been 260,000. Does this mean that there had been a holocaust in Manila? Not at all. It meansonly that the thousands of Filipinos who had sought the protection of the American forces there during the period when they feared their own soldiers in the provinces had mostly returned to their homes. During the disturbed period in Batangas great numbers of people took refuge in other and more peaceful regions. Some of them returned later; others did not.Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report of the Provincial Secretary of Batangas to the effect that:“The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over 200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the province had.”37Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a mortality of a hundred thousand from disease alone, are hardly consistent with those quoted by Blount as showing a decrease in population during a longer period of only fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is not apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths due to malaria or dysentery, since no systematic effort to rid Batangas of these ills had ever previously been made, and the very thing which then prevented the adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put forth to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people themselves. As a simple matter of fact, however, there was no such dreadful mortality from these diseases at this time. Malaria has never been especially bad in this province, and even cholera, which swept it during the period in question and is far more readily communicated than is dysentery, caused only twenty-three hundred and ninety-nine known deaths.In the end peace was established and prosperity followed in its wake.This result was brought about in part by the efficient activity of the armed forces of the United States and in part by the efforts of the first and second Philippine Commissions.381“To the Military Chiefs of the towns mentioned in the margin[there is nothing in the margin.—TR.]:—“As there are still many soldiers paying no notice to the order forbidding the waste of cartridges, you are required to give a certain amount of ammunition to each soldier and to see every day if there is any cartridge missing, and if so, inquire into the reason. In order that this may be successfully carried out, I have deemed it proper to prescribe the punishment for such offence, of which you will inform the soldiers under your command, and post this circular in a prominent place. Said punishments are as follows:—“Art. 1. A soldier found wasting ammunition shall be punished with 12 lashes; in case he commits the same offence again he shall be punished with 24 lashes; and on a further offence of like character by the same soldier, he shall be court-martialled and severely punished.“Art. 2. A soldier who has been found short of even one cartridge out of the ammunition assigned to him, shall be punished with 12 lashes, provided that he has not previously been in any engagement.“Art. 3. A soldier who has been found with no cartridges by reason of throwing them away during an engagement, shall be court-martialled, and severely punished.“I most earnestly recommend you to carefully look after your soldiers and see that every one is complying with the foregoing order.“This order should be transmitted from one town to another mentioned in the margin, and the last one should return it to this officewith the information that the same has been received and complied with by all.“May God guard you many years.“E. Aguinaldo, Dictator.“Cavite, June 17th, 1898.”—P.I.R., 1124. 2.2“November 16, 1900.(Stamp) “Lacuna Brigade. Headquarters.“Major Thomas Tagunton: Advise all officers of this brigade that he who allows his soldiers to load their rifles without being before the enemy, shall be liable to capital punishment. If the soldiers intentionally or otherwise fire their pieces, whether in the air or at any determined or undetermined person, said soldiers and the officers to whose command they belong shall also be liable to the same punishment as above, without further proceedings, for the reason that we are almost in front of the enemy, and all the more if the shots take effect upon any of the soldiers or chiefs.“Sergeants and corporals shall also take heed of the present warnings, as they will also be given the same punishment if they by abandoning their squads allow them to commit certain outrages.“You will report receipt of and compliance with this order.“God preserve you many years.“General Headquarters, November 16, 1900.(Signed) “Lacuna, General, Political-Military Governor and Chief of Operations.”—P.I.R., 643. 1.3Taylor, AJ. 85.4“Kabatúan, Oct. 14th, 1899.“Edict“Martín F. Delgado, General and Politico-Military Governor of the Province of Iloílo.“As a consequence of the frequent assaults and robberies committed by persons wearing military uniforms, and with the determination to correct, with a firm hand, such scandalous conduct, which, besides causing such deeds to be laid at the door of the military, also makes it easier for evil-doers to commit their misdeeds, I have, at the suggestion of the Councillor of Police, ordered the following:—“1. From this date forward all private citizens are absolutely prohibited from wearing military uniforms.“2. All authorities, both civil and military, under this Government, are obliged to see to the strict enforcements of this edict.“3. All persons who, not being in the military service, are, after the publication of this edict, found wearing military uniforms, and who cannot show that they are in the military service, will be suspected as evil-doers and will be sent to this Government to be subjected to the corresponding corrective measures.(Signed) “Martín Delgado,“Governor-General-President.”—P.I.R., 881. 4.5“On April 10, 1899, General Delgado wrote that, benignity having failed, rigorous methods would be used to enforce collections and that if the people did not pay—“‘I shall, with great pain, see myself under the necessity of withdrawing all my forces to the mountains and leaving them [the pueblos] to the fate which God will decide upon,’ which of course meant that hewould leave them to the mercy of the bandits who stood ready to descend upon them.”—P.I.R., B., 4.“This threat was not an idle one.”—Taylor, 67 HS. E-L.6“Santa Cruz, Laguna, July, 1899.“Hon. Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo....“There was a notorious bandit here who was the terror of the province with his gang; I had him arrested and shot and the robberies ceased. Murders were being committed; I had the murderers caught, shot one of them, and there were no more murders; officers of the reserve would consider themselves kings in their towns, they would shoot the localpresidentesand commit other unlawful acts; I disarmed them, and tried the most celebrated one, called Arcadio Castillo, alias Bancucane, who attempted to escape and was killed. With the death of these persons order has been completely reëstablished in this province. Several had rifles that were used only for robbery and after two or three trials all turned over their rifles, and the arming of the battalion was completed.(Signed) “Juan Cailles.”—P.I.R., 7 & 8.7“Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas.“Office of the President.“Kabatúan, March 16, 1899.“To the Honourable President of the Philippine Republic,“Señor Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy,“Most Distinguished President:“In order to avoid the distress which the knowledge of the abuses which are already unbearable, daily committed by the troops of Señor Diocno, will cause you, this government has hesitated to communicate them to you, but, as there is almost a reign of terror here, it feels that it must inform you of them in order to remedy them. The death of private individuals and assaults committed in the towns are dailyreported as having been committed by the troops of General Diocno. Of the numerous companies of Señor Diocno, only two under the orders of General Araneta fight against the enemy, the remainder are the terror of the town and it is a week since Sr. Diocno went to Capiz without telling any one what he was going to do.“In view of the facts pointed out, the soldiers of this General constituting a constant danger to the town, this government asks you to order General Diocno to turn over his rifles to us to kill Americans with and to enable the towns to recover their former tranquillity; this government asks this of you, relying upon the well-known justice with which you act and it wishes for you many years of life for our liberty and our independence.“Kabatúan, March 16, 1899.(Signed) “Jovito Yusay,“Temporary President.(Signed) “Francisco Soriano,“General Secretary.”—P.I.R., 52. 5.8“Martin Delgado y Bermejo, lieutenant general and general in chief of the republican army of the Visayan Islands.“General Headquarters of Santa Barbara,“April 20, 1899.“The existence of a state of war, and the trying circumstances through which the country is now passing have brought about a complete change in the order of nearly all the pueblos; and I have noticed with profound regret that sacking, robbery, sequestrations, and other crimes highly dishonourable to our noble cause, are of daily occurrence. With a view to preventing such conduct in the future, and in order to guarantee to the inhabitants of the military district under my command the most complete tranquillity, I hereby decree:“1. That any person or persons who commit acts of brigandage, sequestration, incendiarism, rape, or other disturbances of a public nature calculated to excite the public, or which infringe individual or property rights, shall be severely punished in accordance with military law.“2. That all offenders who present themselves to the Local or Military Authorities within the 30 days immediately following this date, and who turn over their arms and join our forces and help to fight other outlaws and to defend the nation, will be pardoned for the crimes they have committed.“3. That when the period of 30 days above mentioned has passed,any person taken in the act of committing robbery, or who attempts to rob with an organized band of outlaws, or who steals, rapes, or performs acts of incendiarism, or any other criminal act, will be summarily condemned to death by a military tribunal.“The Local Juntas of the various towns in conjunction with citizens of standing and the military authorities will organize a vigilance service to maintain public order and the authority of the law.“M. Delgado.”—P.I.R., Books B 4.9“February 13, 1899.(In the margin: A stamp which says:) “Philippine Republic—Headquarters of operations of the provinces of Southern Luzón.“It is with great regret that I have learned that robberies, assaults, kidnapping, and other crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes, are taking place in our towns, without taking into consideration that the purpose of the insurrection which has given origin to our social regeneration is true justice, for the reëstablishment of which the lives and property are being sacrificed of all who are proud of being called Filipinos. These acts are being committed without restriction by civilians as well as soldiers perhaps with the coöperation of their respective chiefs, to the shame of the authority vested in them and to the prejudice of the society to which they unworthily belong, and even to the integrity itself of the Republic. And in order that these barbarous and savage acts may disappear and that rigorous and exemplary punishment be meted out, I have deemed it proper to forward to you for general information the proclamation of these Headquarters of February 12th last, which is as follows”:(Signed) “Mariano Trias.“Lieutenant-General.“To the Politico-Military Chief of Infanta.”—P.I.R., 896–9.10“There does not seem to have been the faintest conception that there was any reason for not using the white flag to deceive people who were foolish enough to believe that Aguinaldo was going to adhere to the rules prescribed for its use. The writer in the early spring of 1899 once watched an insurgent party advance under a white flag upon an American line of trenches. When an officer and a bugler went forward to receive them they threw down the flag and immediately opened fire with the rifles which they were then seen to be dragging behind them.”—Taylor, 48 HS.11“Such ammunition was not effective unless fired from very close quarters, but even its possession made the guerrillas stronger than the people of the country and undoubtedly had much to do with securing their coöperation, not only as bolomen but also in the digging of the pits which were placed in the trails and also set about the towns. These were required to be constructed by the local authorities. In the bottom was set a sharp spike of bamboo, sometimes poisoned; and the pit was covered with leaves and soil upon a fragile framework; so that if a man stood upon it he would fall through upon the spike. Bows were set in the jungle with a string set across the trail so that any one stumbling over it would discharge a sharp bamboo shaft with a poisoned head. On September 18, 1900, Lukban congratulated the people of the town of Katubig upon the efficient use they had made of arrows with the heads dipped in ‘dita,’ a native poison. (P.I.R., 502. 8.)”—Taylor, 83 HS.12See also the chapter entitled “Murder as a Governmental Institution.”13See p. 313.14The following newspaper supplement printed in Tagálog for the benefit of the common people, is typical of this class of literature, with which the country was kept flooded:(Circular printed in Tagálog. P.I.R., 17–6. Supplement toHeraldo Filipino.“Friday, 24th February, 1899.“Countrymen:“We must consider ourselves fortunate that the bad intentions of North America were found out early. If we had not found them out by this time we should have been entrapped. And we should thank God that they commenced the war.“You ought to know by this time that these people can teach us nothing good. What we can learn from them is all evil. You must admit the truth of what they are reported to do to our brothers in Manila where they rob the houses when the dwellers in them are out or busy. Their evil inclinations prevail over them to such an extent that the houses most worthy of consideration are not safe. They are worse than the wild people who live in the woods, they have not the slightest idea of looking at things from the point of view of a man of honour nor have they the slightest respect for reason, for this does not control their actions in the least. Without the slightest attention to civility they rush into houses and if they find the people eating, without saying a word, they take what they want from the table, put it into their mouths and go as they came.“If they find people sleeping or resting, taking the siesta, it makes no difference to them; they go into the most private parts of the house as though they were walking in the street.“In the shops they take what pleases them and if the owner wants payment they threaten him with their rifles.“One can hardly believe and my pen refuses to write all of the perversity, and evil and bad habits of these people.“Their habits and manners are a disgrace to the country where they were born. In no history have such customs and manners been described even in that of the most ignorant people.“They search women who pass, feeling all over their bodies, taking from them money and whatever else they carry and if they come on them in a lonely place they strip them naked after violating them and do not leave a rag on them.“Are these those honest men of whom we have heard? Are these the people who were going to teach us good habits? Are these the people who were going to guide us? The race which does these things is the most hated one in the world, it is the race which commits most cruelties, it is the race which does not treat its mother with respect; in this race there is not the slightest idea of personal dignity, it is a race which does not know what honour is, which does not possess the slightest vestige of regard for good manners. Are these the people who are going to protect us? It is better for us to die at once than fall into the power of these unequalled malefactors.“¡Down with the bad men!“¡Kill the Americans!!“¡Let the people of the United States be exterminated!!!“¡Notice.—This sheet is distributed gratis.”15“A light upon the treatment of women by these people is given by the fact that after an American detachment had captured Lukban’s papers and family on August 18, and came so close to taking him that he was able to recognize their guide, one of his correspondents wrote to him that to their surprise the women, who had fully expected to be abused, had been treated with respect and given a house to live in. (P.I.R., 1143.4.)”—Taylor, 84 HS.16In a letter to General Ambrosio Moxica from ——— dated March 2, 1900, occurs the following:—“The guerillas quartered in the neighbourhood must render mutual assistance and keep up communication, so as to get the news as to where the enemy comes or goes, and the time at which they will pass certain points, endeavouring also to arrange that all the guerilla bands should have regular couriers, with you or with general headquarters, giving advice daily of any occurrence and carrying correspondence. Theymust select trustworthy women to carry correspondence, charging them to hide the letters underneath their skirts, bearing in mind that the Americans do not search them; and in sending to the towns for arms or food, the orders must be sent by women and for small quantities, so as not to attract attention.”—P.I.R., 2035. 3.17Simeon Villa, who accompanied Aguinaldo on his long flight, kept a somewhat detailed account of events in the form of a diary.18P.I.R., 869.19Ibid.20P.I.R., 2035. 3.21P.I.R., 886. 13.22Exhibit 1233(Original in Spanish. Contemporary copy. P.I.R., Books B. 4.)“General Headquarters, Santa Barbara, Feb. 28th, 1899.”(Literal copy of telegram.)“Casualties, Americans, on 6th, 2000 Colonels dead, one General; all churches converted into hospitals full American wounded; total American casualties 7000 confirmed by General Fullón just arrived from Malolos; says also Iloílo quiet and not taken.“A true copy“By order of Chief of Staff.“Juan Beloso.”23(Supplement to theFilipino Herald.)“Thursday, Feb. 23rd, 1899.—4 P.M.“The Filipino Army occupies the suburbs of Manila.“The three columns commanded by Generals Pío del Pilar and Licerio and Col. Hizon now occupy the suburbs of Sampaloc, San Miguel, San Sebastian, Binondo, San Nicholas and Tondo.“The Cavite battalion has possession of the Cuartel de Meisic and our flag is now flying there.“Six Thousand Americans Besieged!!!“The American troops now in Caloocan and La Loma to the number of over six thousand are besieged by the columns commanded by Generals Luna, Llanera and García.“The Honourable President“This very moment the special train carrying the Honourable President has left for Caloocan.“Viva the independent Philippines!!!“Viva the unconquerable Philippine Army!!!“Notice. This sheet is distributed gratis.”—P.I.R., 70–6.24(News.) The American General, MacArthur, with his entire staff, was taken prisoner by our troops in Northern Luzón. Another American general died on the 5th of January last in the North, who was seriously wounded in an ambush or fight. When shot he was a colonel, but on account of said fight he was promoted to the rank of a general, so that later when he died, he had the benefit of that rank.”—P.I.R., 2035. 3.25(Telegrams)“Washington, January 15, 1900, 10 A.M.“(Received, Cebú, January 16, 1900, 11 A.M.)“Owing to a new disaster of the Union Army, MacKinley has tendered his resignation as President, Mr. Bryan succeeding him.“Peace promulgated in the Philippines. Basis of the protectorate is being discussed.“Philippine independence will be proclaimed February the 4th.“Remark.—The basis of a protectorate has been published in English.”“Manila, January 20, 1900, 10 A.M.“(Received at Cebú on the same day, at 11 A.M.)“Otis’ successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party, has just arrived. He brings with him papers and instructions in regard to proclamation of the Philippine Republic.“It is believed that Rev. Martin, Bishop of Cebú, will be transferred to the Archbishopric of Manila, and Rev. Nozaleda to Spain.”—P.I.R., Books B-10.26P.I.R., 1193. 2.27Ibid.,2025.28Taylor, 47 HS.29Beginning on page 730.30Taylor, 36 GV, Exhibit 1017.31Taylor, 28 HS.32P.I.R., 1021.6.33Unhusked rice.34Village.35153, according to Blount himself.36“Nor can the ultimate responsibility before the bar of history for the awful fact that, according to the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Atlas of the Philippines of 1899, the population of Batangas province was 312,192, and according to the American Census of the Philippines of 1903, it was 257,715, rest entirely on military shoulders.”—Blount, pp. 383–384.37Blount, p. 597.38See ChaptersXIandXII.

Chapter IXThe Conduct of the War

It is not my intention to attempt to write a history of the war which began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss any one of its several campaigns. I propose to limit myself to a statement of the conditions under which it was conducted, and a description of the two periods into which it may be divided.From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated with marked severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, Aguinaldo issued an order to the military chiefs of certain towns in Cavite providing that a soldier wasting ammunition should be punished with twelve lashes for a first offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled and “severely punished” for a third.1On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that any officer allowing his soldiers to load their rifles when not before the enemy should be liable to capital punishment,2which in practice was frequently inflicted on soldiers for very minor offences.Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then excused from service on the payment of cash.The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed endless abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the outbreak of hostilities, as I have shown in the chapters dealing with Insurgent rule. They grew rapidly worse thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed.“The documents of this period show that the insurgent troops driven from the front of Manila fell upon the people of the neighbouring towns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. Either their officers lost all control over them, or else they directed these outrages. It was not for some days that control was regained.”3Government Centre at BaguioGovernment Centre at BaguioEndless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other high Insurgent officers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and robbery, and there was grave need of them. Unfortunately they could not be enforced. Indeed it was often impossible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure and simple.4Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands sometimes coöperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns which did not promptly and fully comply with the demands of Insurgent commanders,5and armed bandits appeared and plundered them.There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who suppressed brigandage with a heavy hand,6but many of them were indifferent, even if not in alliance with the evil doers.The VisayasFeeling between Tagálog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly more bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killing each other. The highest officers of the “Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas” protested vigorously to Aguinaldo,7but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing with them.8In Luzón General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens of his province of committing “robberies, assaults, kidnappings and crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes.”9That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively shown by the record of Aguinaldo’s government for February 24, 1899, when it decided—“that the president of the council shall study such measures as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between the civil and military authorities of every province, in order that fatal consequences may be avoided.”With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated.10American soldiers were trapped, poisoned11and murdered in other ways.12It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and kindness.A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American soldiers. I haveelsewhere described13the fate that overtook Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, but newspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civil officers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned, robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their alleged wholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence of the women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they were no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committed rape.14These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of the responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions,15but all such men soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them from the start.In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public, orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for the reason that Americans did not search them.16More significant yet, when conditionsbecame bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers sent their women and children to seek American protection in Manila or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles, shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself followed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from Villa’s famous diary:17—“December 22.—It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observed indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of every patriot who loves his country.“We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied.“The honorable president had already decided some days before to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.“December 24.—We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o’clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. The honourable president told his family and the other women that they should remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans, and he named Señors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and for his family.“The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o’clock in the morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila.”18A Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampA Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampThe houses are for visiting lecturers and persons of similar rank. The tents are for the teachers.In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treated and safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellows knew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown by a later entry:—“February 6.—We have been informed that the mother and son of the honourable president are at Manila, living in the house of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife and sister of the honourable president. We have also learned that Señor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila.”19The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselves to be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader who would turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiers for safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers, and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgent leaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded their wounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to General Moxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to what should be done with wounded men:—“If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammunition at once and carry them away as far as possible, so that they may not be captured by the enemy; and if the wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat from the place, let them be left there, because it is better to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle; and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take good care of them, while the rifles are destroyed; therefore,I repeat, they must endeavour to save the arms rather than the men.”20There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinos were treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by American soldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the “water cure” in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms to tell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horrible barbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those who had sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tell the truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruel acts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos, and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts to explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused, but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to the men who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptions to the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans were concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented under similar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilized warfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens’ clothes not only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not to offend again.The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no means limited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they were promptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage was bolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary, victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that manytimes more Americans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actually killed in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen and colonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In reality only fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzón during the entire month.On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the following remarkable news items among others:—“Pavia, April 6th, 1899.“The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local Presidents of the towns shown on the margin:“Towns:Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zárraga, Dumangas, Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.“Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death General and officers and many soldiers.“At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.“At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans dead and 600 prisoners.“Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley accomplished nothing.“To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.“Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow 7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little leaving for Manila.“General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.“According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay and Maytubig.“American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners taken.“General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who provoked war.“Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and officers dead.”21Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the main business streets of the city.Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were as numerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand of them killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for good measure.22We learn from theFilipino Heraldfor February 23, 1899, that on that day the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila, while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city, at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan.23But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippines was too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by the soldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said to be refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed in order properly to punish them.General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2, 1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on that date.24And what of conditions in the United States during this troubled period? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15, 1900, “the Union Army” had met with a new disaster, as a result of which President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded by Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed on February 4, 1899. On January 20, “General Otis’s successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party,” arrived at Manila with papers and instructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic.25Things nowwent from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901, President McKinley had brought about strained relations between Germany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate the German Emperor.26Before September 15, 1901, he had been killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos could acclaim their independence.27The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organized armed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed the second period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part of the Insurgents.On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Pío del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder, and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked to remove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forces everywhere before the end of November.Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:—“If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion to barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to savagery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious as is the material destruction which this method of warfare entails, the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in its wake.Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people who have chosen it.”28The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule.The Baguio Country ClubThe Baguio Country ClubSuch semblance of discipline as had previously existed among the Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been very bad under the “Republic” and worse during the first period of the war. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable in many regions, and the common people were driven into the arms of the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried out by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. I have described at some length the conditions which now arose in the chapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is referred for details.29In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly, the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. On March 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred two stations. By December of the same year the number had increased to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty men to a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of the humane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantly increasing numbers.It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, while continuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Further subdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardly possible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after another the Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Most officers of importance issued explanatory statements to the people shortly after giving up active field operations,whether they surrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himself was captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point on the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated, and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers, many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issued an address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognized the fact that they wanted peace. He said:—“Manila, April 19, 1901.“To the Filipino People:—“I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the complete termination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.“The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force—a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.“The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearly manifested its will.“So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearningto see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of the great American nation.“By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.“Emilio Aguinaldo.30“Manila, April 19, 1901.”This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagálog and English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:—“A force like Aguinaldo’s could not be surrendered. It had been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been very lax. It had originally been held together by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny.”31Aguinaldo’s forces now passed through these several stages. Some of his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had surrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his advice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time, but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who had been Insurgent officers or soldiers andwhile serving in this capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen, whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In my opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why it failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death, he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:—“The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings.”32These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure.The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom were irresponsible and unscrupulous.Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them was threatened, but not actually resorted to.The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bell was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration—not the kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but a measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:—“General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoid making war against those who really wanted the termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeance of others. Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. He accordingly, ‘in order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,’ ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna to ‘immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation of armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.“‘Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, includingrice,palay,33chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been reëstablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable.’“It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones; but they were warned that unless they accepted that protection their property, which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or destruction, because it might be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.“As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came to an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. The efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient, and from time to time many additional families entered the zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy they were armed and sent out into the mountains from which they brought back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-famished men, women, and children who, released from the intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zones of protection.“The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within these areas was caused to themestizoruling group, whose members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to have others work for them and obey them blindly. To a man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of hisbarrio,34the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. These men suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not their bodies which suffered—it was their pride.“Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people had turned against their once highly respected chief, and toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive leader. Realization of the fact that the people were against him materially aided in forcing his surrender.“General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to 10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another, in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the first week of July no political prisoners were held in this region. They had returned to their homes.“The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents even in the United States. One of these is the order issued on August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding the district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Mo., in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of three counties of that State to remove from their residences within fifteen days to the protection of the military stations which he had established. All grain and hay in that district was ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was not convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new method of procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, however, effectively employed an old one.“The insurrection had originated among the Tagálogs and had spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied by them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagálog provinces.“On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, the office of military governor in the archipelago was terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated in the insurrection.”General Bell’s motives and methods in reconcentrating the inhabitants of this troubled region have been grossly misrepresented, and he himself has been sadly maligned. He is the most humane of men, and the plan which he adopted resulted in the reëstablishment of law and order at a minimum cost of human suffering.Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps received there their first lessons in hygienic living. Many of them were reluctant to leave the camps and return to their homes when normal conditions again prevailed.The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas campaign was very small.35Blount has sought to make it appear that partly as an indirect consequence of war there was dreadful mortality there, citing by way of proof the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas, published as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission, gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the census of 1903 gave it as 257,715.36The report of the United States Philippine Commission for 1903 gives the population of Manila as 221,000, while in 1900 it had been 260,000. Does this mean that there had been a holocaust in Manila? Not at all. It meansonly that the thousands of Filipinos who had sought the protection of the American forces there during the period when they feared their own soldiers in the provinces had mostly returned to their homes. During the disturbed period in Batangas great numbers of people took refuge in other and more peaceful regions. Some of them returned later; others did not.Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report of the Provincial Secretary of Batangas to the effect that:“The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over 200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the province had.”37Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a mortality of a hundred thousand from disease alone, are hardly consistent with those quoted by Blount as showing a decrease in population during a longer period of only fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is not apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths due to malaria or dysentery, since no systematic effort to rid Batangas of these ills had ever previously been made, and the very thing which then prevented the adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put forth to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people themselves. As a simple matter of fact, however, there was no such dreadful mortality from these diseases at this time. Malaria has never been especially bad in this province, and even cholera, which swept it during the period in question and is far more readily communicated than is dysentery, caused only twenty-three hundred and ninety-nine known deaths.In the end peace was established and prosperity followed in its wake.This result was brought about in part by the efficient activity of the armed forces of the United States and in part by the efforts of the first and second Philippine Commissions.38

It is not my intention to attempt to write a history of the war which began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss any one of its several campaigns. I propose to limit myself to a statement of the conditions under which it was conducted, and a description of the two periods into which it may be divided.

From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated with marked severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, Aguinaldo issued an order to the military chiefs of certain towns in Cavite providing that a soldier wasting ammunition should be punished with twelve lashes for a first offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled and “severely punished” for a third.1

On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that any officer allowing his soldiers to load their rifles when not before the enemy should be liable to capital punishment,2which in practice was frequently inflicted on soldiers for very minor offences.

Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then excused from service on the payment of cash.

The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed endless abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the outbreak of hostilities, as I have shown in the chapters dealing with Insurgent rule. They grew rapidly worse thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed.

“The documents of this period show that the insurgent troops driven from the front of Manila fell upon the people of the neighbouring towns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. Either their officers lost all control over them, or else they directed these outrages. It was not for some days that control was regained.”3

Government Centre at BaguioGovernment Centre at Baguio

Government Centre at Baguio

Endless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other high Insurgent officers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and robbery, and there was grave need of them. Unfortunately they could not be enforced. Indeed it was often impossible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure and simple.4

Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands sometimes coöperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns which did not promptly and fully comply with the demands of Insurgent commanders,5and armed bandits appeared and plundered them.

There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who suppressed brigandage with a heavy hand,6but many of them were indifferent, even if not in alliance with the evil doers.

The VisayasFeeling between Tagálog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly more bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killing each other. The highest officers of the “Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas” protested vigorously to Aguinaldo,7but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing with them.8In Luzón General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens of his province of committing “robberies, assaults, kidnappings and crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes.”9That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively shown by the record of Aguinaldo’s government for February 24, 1899, when it decided—“that the president of the council shall study such measures as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between the civil and military authorities of every province, in order that fatal consequences may be avoided.”With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated.10American soldiers were trapped, poisoned11and murdered in other ways.12It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and kindness.A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American soldiers. I haveelsewhere described13the fate that overtook Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, but newspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civil officers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned, robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their alleged wholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence of the women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they were no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committed rape.14These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of the responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions,15but all such men soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them from the start.In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public, orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for the reason that Americans did not search them.16More significant yet, when conditionsbecame bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers sent their women and children to seek American protection in Manila or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles, shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself followed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from Villa’s famous diary:17—“December 22.—It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observed indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of every patriot who loves his country.“We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied.“The honorable president had already decided some days before to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.“December 24.—We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o’clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. The honourable president told his family and the other women that they should remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans, and he named Señors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and for his family.“The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o’clock in the morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila.”18A Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampA Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampThe houses are for visiting lecturers and persons of similar rank. The tents are for the teachers.In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treated and safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellows knew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown by a later entry:—“February 6.—We have been informed that the mother and son of the honourable president are at Manila, living in the house of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife and sister of the honourable president. We have also learned that Señor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila.”19The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselves to be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader who would turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiers for safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers, and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgent leaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded their wounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to General Moxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to what should be done with wounded men:—“If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammunition at once and carry them away as far as possible, so that they may not be captured by the enemy; and if the wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat from the place, let them be left there, because it is better to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle; and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take good care of them, while the rifles are destroyed; therefore,I repeat, they must endeavour to save the arms rather than the men.”20There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinos were treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by American soldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the “water cure” in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms to tell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horrible barbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those who had sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tell the truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruel acts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos, and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts to explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused, but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to the men who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptions to the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans were concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented under similar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilized warfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens’ clothes not only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not to offend again.The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no means limited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they were promptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage was bolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary, victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that manytimes more Americans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actually killed in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen and colonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In reality only fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzón during the entire month.On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the following remarkable news items among others:—“Pavia, April 6th, 1899.“The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local Presidents of the towns shown on the margin:“Towns:Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zárraga, Dumangas, Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.“Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death General and officers and many soldiers.“At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.“At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans dead and 600 prisoners.“Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley accomplished nothing.“To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.“Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow 7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little leaving for Manila.“General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.“According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay and Maytubig.“American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners taken.“General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who provoked war.“Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and officers dead.”21Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the main business streets of the city.Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were as numerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand of them killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for good measure.22We learn from theFilipino Heraldfor February 23, 1899, that on that day the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila, while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city, at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan.23But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippines was too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by the soldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said to be refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed in order properly to punish them.General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2, 1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on that date.24And what of conditions in the United States during this troubled period? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15, 1900, “the Union Army” had met with a new disaster, as a result of which President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded by Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed on February 4, 1899. On January 20, “General Otis’s successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party,” arrived at Manila with papers and instructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic.25Things nowwent from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901, President McKinley had brought about strained relations between Germany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate the German Emperor.26Before September 15, 1901, he had been killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos could acclaim their independence.27The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organized armed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed the second period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part of the Insurgents.On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Pío del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder, and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked to remove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forces everywhere before the end of November.Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:—“If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion to barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to savagery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious as is the material destruction which this method of warfare entails, the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in its wake.Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people who have chosen it.”28The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule.The Baguio Country ClubThe Baguio Country ClubSuch semblance of discipline as had previously existed among the Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been very bad under the “Republic” and worse during the first period of the war. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable in many regions, and the common people were driven into the arms of the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried out by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. I have described at some length the conditions which now arose in the chapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is referred for details.29In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly, the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. On March 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred two stations. By December of the same year the number had increased to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty men to a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of the humane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantly increasing numbers.It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, while continuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Further subdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardly possible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after another the Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Most officers of importance issued explanatory statements to the people shortly after giving up active field operations,whether they surrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himself was captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point on the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated, and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers, many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issued an address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognized the fact that they wanted peace. He said:—“Manila, April 19, 1901.“To the Filipino People:—“I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the complete termination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.“The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force—a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.“The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearly manifested its will.“So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearningto see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of the great American nation.“By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.“Emilio Aguinaldo.30“Manila, April 19, 1901.”This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagálog and English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:—“A force like Aguinaldo’s could not be surrendered. It had been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been very lax. It had originally been held together by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny.”31Aguinaldo’s forces now passed through these several stages. Some of his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had surrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his advice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time, but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who had been Insurgent officers or soldiers andwhile serving in this capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen, whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In my opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why it failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death, he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:—“The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings.”32These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure.The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom were irresponsible and unscrupulous.Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them was threatened, but not actually resorted to.The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bell was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration—not the kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but a measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:—“General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoid making war against those who really wanted the termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeance of others. Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. He accordingly, ‘in order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,’ ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna to ‘immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation of armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.“‘Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, includingrice,palay,33chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been reëstablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable.’“It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones; but they were warned that unless they accepted that protection their property, which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or destruction, because it might be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.“As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came to an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. The efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient, and from time to time many additional families entered the zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy they were armed and sent out into the mountains from which they brought back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-famished men, women, and children who, released from the intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zones of protection.“The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within these areas was caused to themestizoruling group, whose members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to have others work for them and obey them blindly. To a man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of hisbarrio,34the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. These men suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not their bodies which suffered—it was their pride.“Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people had turned against their once highly respected chief, and toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive leader. Realization of the fact that the people were against him materially aided in forcing his surrender.“General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to 10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another, in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the first week of July no political prisoners were held in this region. They had returned to their homes.“The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents even in the United States. One of these is the order issued on August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding the district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Mo., in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of three counties of that State to remove from their residences within fifteen days to the protection of the military stations which he had established. All grain and hay in that district was ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was not convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new method of procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, however, effectively employed an old one.“The insurrection had originated among the Tagálogs and had spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied by them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagálog provinces.“On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, the office of military governor in the archipelago was terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated in the insurrection.”General Bell’s motives and methods in reconcentrating the inhabitants of this troubled region have been grossly misrepresented, and he himself has been sadly maligned. He is the most humane of men, and the plan which he adopted resulted in the reëstablishment of law and order at a minimum cost of human suffering.Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps received there their first lessons in hygienic living. Many of them were reluctant to leave the camps and return to their homes when normal conditions again prevailed.The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas campaign was very small.35Blount has sought to make it appear that partly as an indirect consequence of war there was dreadful mortality there, citing by way of proof the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas, published as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission, gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the census of 1903 gave it as 257,715.36The report of the United States Philippine Commission for 1903 gives the population of Manila as 221,000, while in 1900 it had been 260,000. Does this mean that there had been a holocaust in Manila? Not at all. It meansonly that the thousands of Filipinos who had sought the protection of the American forces there during the period when they feared their own soldiers in the provinces had mostly returned to their homes. During the disturbed period in Batangas great numbers of people took refuge in other and more peaceful regions. Some of them returned later; others did not.Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report of the Provincial Secretary of Batangas to the effect that:“The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over 200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the province had.”37Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a mortality of a hundred thousand from disease alone, are hardly consistent with those quoted by Blount as showing a decrease in population during a longer period of only fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is not apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths due to malaria or dysentery, since no systematic effort to rid Batangas of these ills had ever previously been made, and the very thing which then prevented the adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put forth to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people themselves. As a simple matter of fact, however, there was no such dreadful mortality from these diseases at this time. Malaria has never been especially bad in this province, and even cholera, which swept it during the period in question and is far more readily communicated than is dysentery, caused only twenty-three hundred and ninety-nine known deaths.In the end peace was established and prosperity followed in its wake.This result was brought about in part by the efficient activity of the armed forces of the United States and in part by the efforts of the first and second Philippine Commissions.38

The Visayas

Feeling between Tagálog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly more bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killing each other. The highest officers of the “Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas” protested vigorously to Aguinaldo,7but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing with them.8In Luzón General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens of his province of committing “robberies, assaults, kidnappings and crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes.”9That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively shown by the record of Aguinaldo’s government for February 24, 1899, when it decided—“that the president of the council shall study such measures as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between the civil and military authorities of every province, in order that fatal consequences may be avoided.”With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated.10American soldiers were trapped, poisoned11and murdered in other ways.12It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and kindness.A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American soldiers. I haveelsewhere described13the fate that overtook Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, but newspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civil officers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned, robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their alleged wholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence of the women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they were no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committed rape.14These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of the responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions,15but all such men soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them from the start.In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public, orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for the reason that Americans did not search them.16More significant yet, when conditionsbecame bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers sent their women and children to seek American protection in Manila or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles, shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself followed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from Villa’s famous diary:17—“December 22.—It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observed indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of every patriot who loves his country.“We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied.“The honorable president had already decided some days before to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.“December 24.—We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o’clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. The honourable president told his family and the other women that they should remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans, and he named Señors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and for his family.“The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o’clock in the morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila.”18A Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampA Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampThe houses are for visiting lecturers and persons of similar rank. The tents are for the teachers.In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treated and safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellows knew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown by a later entry:—“February 6.—We have been informed that the mother and son of the honourable president are at Manila, living in the house of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife and sister of the honourable president. We have also learned that Señor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila.”19The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselves to be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader who would turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiers for safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers, and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgent leaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded their wounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to General Moxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to what should be done with wounded men:—“If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammunition at once and carry them away as far as possible, so that they may not be captured by the enemy; and if the wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat from the place, let them be left there, because it is better to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle; and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take good care of them, while the rifles are destroyed; therefore,I repeat, they must endeavour to save the arms rather than the men.”20There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinos were treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by American soldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the “water cure” in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms to tell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horrible barbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those who had sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tell the truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruel acts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos, and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts to explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused, but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to the men who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptions to the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans were concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented under similar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilized warfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens’ clothes not only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not to offend again.The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no means limited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they were promptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage was bolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary, victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that manytimes more Americans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actually killed in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen and colonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In reality only fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzón during the entire month.On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the following remarkable news items among others:—“Pavia, April 6th, 1899.“The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local Presidents of the towns shown on the margin:“Towns:Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zárraga, Dumangas, Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.“Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death General and officers and many soldiers.“At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.“At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans dead and 600 prisoners.“Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley accomplished nothing.“To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.“Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow 7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little leaving for Manila.“General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.“According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay and Maytubig.“American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners taken.“General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who provoked war.“Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and officers dead.”21Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the main business streets of the city.Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were as numerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand of them killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for good measure.22We learn from theFilipino Heraldfor February 23, 1899, that on that day the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila, while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city, at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan.23But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippines was too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by the soldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said to be refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed in order properly to punish them.General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2, 1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on that date.24And what of conditions in the United States during this troubled period? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15, 1900, “the Union Army” had met with a new disaster, as a result of which President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded by Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed on February 4, 1899. On January 20, “General Otis’s successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party,” arrived at Manila with papers and instructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic.25Things nowwent from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901, President McKinley had brought about strained relations between Germany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate the German Emperor.26Before September 15, 1901, he had been killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos could acclaim their independence.27The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organized armed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed the second period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part of the Insurgents.On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Pío del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder, and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked to remove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forces everywhere before the end of November.Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:—“If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion to barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to savagery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious as is the material destruction which this method of warfare entails, the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in its wake.Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people who have chosen it.”28The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule.The Baguio Country ClubThe Baguio Country ClubSuch semblance of discipline as had previously existed among the Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been very bad under the “Republic” and worse during the first period of the war. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable in many regions, and the common people were driven into the arms of the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried out by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. I have described at some length the conditions which now arose in the chapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is referred for details.29In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly, the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. On March 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred two stations. By December of the same year the number had increased to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty men to a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of the humane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantly increasing numbers.It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, while continuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Further subdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardly possible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after another the Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Most officers of importance issued explanatory statements to the people shortly after giving up active field operations,whether they surrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himself was captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point on the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated, and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers, many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issued an address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognized the fact that they wanted peace. He said:—“Manila, April 19, 1901.“To the Filipino People:—“I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the complete termination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.“The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force—a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.“The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearly manifested its will.“So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearningto see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of the great American nation.“By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.“Emilio Aguinaldo.30“Manila, April 19, 1901.”This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagálog and English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:—“A force like Aguinaldo’s could not be surrendered. It had been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been very lax. It had originally been held together by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny.”31Aguinaldo’s forces now passed through these several stages. Some of his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had surrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his advice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time, but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who had been Insurgent officers or soldiers andwhile serving in this capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen, whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In my opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why it failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death, he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:—“The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings.”32These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure.The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom were irresponsible and unscrupulous.Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them was threatened, but not actually resorted to.The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bell was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration—not the kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but a measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:—“General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoid making war against those who really wanted the termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeance of others. Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. He accordingly, ‘in order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,’ ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna to ‘immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation of armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.“‘Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, includingrice,palay,33chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been reëstablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable.’“It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones; but they were warned that unless they accepted that protection their property, which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or destruction, because it might be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.“As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came to an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. The efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient, and from time to time many additional families entered the zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy they were armed and sent out into the mountains from which they brought back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-famished men, women, and children who, released from the intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zones of protection.“The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within these areas was caused to themestizoruling group, whose members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to have others work for them and obey them blindly. To a man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of hisbarrio,34the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. These men suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not their bodies which suffered—it was their pride.“Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people had turned against their once highly respected chief, and toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive leader. Realization of the fact that the people were against him materially aided in forcing his surrender.“General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to 10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another, in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the first week of July no political prisoners were held in this region. They had returned to their homes.“The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents even in the United States. One of these is the order issued on August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding the district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Mo., in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of three counties of that State to remove from their residences within fifteen days to the protection of the military stations which he had established. All grain and hay in that district was ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was not convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new method of procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, however, effectively employed an old one.“The insurrection had originated among the Tagálogs and had spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied by them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagálog provinces.“On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, the office of military governor in the archipelago was terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated in the insurrection.”General Bell’s motives and methods in reconcentrating the inhabitants of this troubled region have been grossly misrepresented, and he himself has been sadly maligned. He is the most humane of men, and the plan which he adopted resulted in the reëstablishment of law and order at a minimum cost of human suffering.Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps received there their first lessons in hygienic living. Many of them were reluctant to leave the camps and return to their homes when normal conditions again prevailed.The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas campaign was very small.35Blount has sought to make it appear that partly as an indirect consequence of war there was dreadful mortality there, citing by way of proof the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas, published as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission, gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the census of 1903 gave it as 257,715.36The report of the United States Philippine Commission for 1903 gives the population of Manila as 221,000, while in 1900 it had been 260,000. Does this mean that there had been a holocaust in Manila? Not at all. It meansonly that the thousands of Filipinos who had sought the protection of the American forces there during the period when they feared their own soldiers in the provinces had mostly returned to their homes. During the disturbed period in Batangas great numbers of people took refuge in other and more peaceful regions. Some of them returned later; others did not.Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report of the Provincial Secretary of Batangas to the effect that:“The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over 200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the province had.”37Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a mortality of a hundred thousand from disease alone, are hardly consistent with those quoted by Blount as showing a decrease in population during a longer period of only fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is not apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths due to malaria or dysentery, since no systematic effort to rid Batangas of these ills had ever previously been made, and the very thing which then prevented the adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put forth to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people themselves. As a simple matter of fact, however, there was no such dreadful mortality from these diseases at this time. Malaria has never been especially bad in this province, and even cholera, which swept it during the period in question and is far more readily communicated than is dysentery, caused only twenty-three hundred and ninety-nine known deaths.In the end peace was established and prosperity followed in its wake.This result was brought about in part by the efficient activity of the armed forces of the United States and in part by the efforts of the first and second Philippine Commissions.38

Feeling between Tagálog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly more bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killing each other. The highest officers of the “Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas” protested vigorously to Aguinaldo,7but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.

On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing with them.8

In Luzón General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens of his province of committing “robberies, assaults, kidnappings and crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes.”9

That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively shown by the record of Aguinaldo’s government for February 24, 1899, when it decided—

“that the president of the council shall study such measures as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between the civil and military authorities of every province, in order that fatal consequences may be avoided.”

“that the president of the council shall study such measures as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between the civil and military authorities of every province, in order that fatal consequences may be avoided.”

With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated.10American soldiers were trapped, poisoned11and murdered in other ways.12

It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.

I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and kindness.

A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American soldiers. I haveelsewhere described13the fate that overtook Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.

Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, but newspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civil officers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned, robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their alleged wholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence of the women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they were no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committed rape.14

These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of the responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions,15but all such men soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them from the start.

In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public, orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for the reason that Americans did not search them.16More significant yet, when conditionsbecame bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers sent their women and children to seek American protection in Manila or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles, shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself followed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from Villa’s famous diary:17—

“December 22.—It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observed indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of every patriot who loves his country.“We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied.“The honorable president had already decided some days before to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.“December 24.—We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o’clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. The honourable president told his family and the other women that they should remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans, and he named Señors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and for his family.“The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o’clock in the morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila.”18

“December 22.—It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were observed indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of every patriot who loves his country.

“We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites were satisfied.

“The honorable president had already decided some days before to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.

“December 24.—We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8 o’clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An immediate decision was made. The honourable president told his family and the other women that they should remain in the settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans, and he named Señors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for himself and for his family.“The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o’clock in the morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila.”18

A Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampA Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ CampThe houses are for visiting lecturers and persons of similar rank. The tents are for the teachers.

A Scene in the Baguio Teachers’ Camp

The houses are for visiting lecturers and persons of similar rank. The tents are for the teachers.

In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treated and safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellows knew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown by a later entry:—

“February 6.—We have been informed that the mother and son of the honourable president are at Manila, living in the house of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife and sister of the honourable president. We have also learned that Señor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila.”19

“February 6.—We have been informed that the mother and son of the honourable president are at Manila, living in the house of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long before the wife and sister of the honourable president. We have also learned that Señor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With reference to the wife and sister of the honourable president and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan and from there went by steamer to Manila.”19

The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselves to be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader who would turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiers for safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers, and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgent leaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded their wounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to General Moxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to what should be done with wounded men:—

“If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammunition at once and carry them away as far as possible, so that they may not be captured by the enemy; and if the wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat from the place, let them be left there, because it is better to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle; and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take good care of them, while the rifles are destroyed; therefore,I repeat, they must endeavour to save the arms rather than the men.”20

“If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and ammunition at once and carry them away as far as possible, so that they may not be captured by the enemy; and if the wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat from the place, let them be left there, because it is better to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos to fill up the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to secure for battle; and besides the Americans, coming upon any wounded, take good care of them, while the rifles are destroyed; therefore,I repeat, they must endeavour to save the arms rather than the men.”20

There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinos were treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by American soldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the “water cure” in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms to tell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horrible barbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those who had sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tell the truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruel acts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos, and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts to explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused, but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to the men who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptions to the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans were concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented under similar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilized warfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens’ clothes not only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not to offend again.

The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no means limited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they were promptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage was bolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary, victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that manytimes more Americans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actually killed in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen and colonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In reality only fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzón during the entire month.

On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the following remarkable news items among others:—

“Pavia, April 6th, 1899.“The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local Presidents of the towns shown on the margin:“Towns:Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zárraga, Dumangas, Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.“Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death General and officers and many soldiers.“At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.“At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans dead and 600 prisoners.“Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley accomplished nothing.“To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.“Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow 7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little leaving for Manila.“General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.“According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay and Maytubig.“American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners taken.“General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who provoked war.“Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and officers dead.”21

“Pavia, April 6th, 1899.

“The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local Presidents of the towns shown on the margin:

“Towns:Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zárraga, Dumangas, Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.

“Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death General and officers and many soldiers.

“At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.

“At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans dead and 600 prisoners.

“Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present, he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the parley accomplished nothing.

“To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.

“Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow 7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little leaving for Manila.

“General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.

“According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay and Maytubig.

“American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners taken.

“General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who provoked war.

“Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and officers dead.”21

Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the main business streets of the city.

Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were as numerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand of them killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for good measure.22

We learn from theFilipino Heraldfor February 23, 1899, that on that day the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila, while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city, at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan.23

But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippines was too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by the soldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said to be refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed in order properly to punish them.

General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2, 1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on that date.24

And what of conditions in the United States during this troubled period? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15, 1900, “the Union Army” had met with a new disaster, as a result of which President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded by Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed on February 4, 1899. On January 20, “General Otis’s successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party,” arrived at Manila with papers and instructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic.25Things nowwent from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901, President McKinley had brought about strained relations between Germany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate the German Emperor.26Before September 15, 1901, he had been killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos could acclaim their independence.27

The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organized armed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed the second period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part of the Insurgents.

On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Pío del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder, and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked to remove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forces everywhere before the end of November.

Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:—

“If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion to barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to savagery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious as is the material destruction which this method of warfare entails, the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in its wake.Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people who have chosen it.”28

“If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion to barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to savagery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious as is the material destruction which this method of warfare entails, the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in its wake.

Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people who have chosen it.”28

The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule.

The Baguio Country ClubThe Baguio Country Club

The Baguio Country Club

Such semblance of discipline as had previously existed among the Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been very bad under the “Republic” and worse during the first period of the war. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable in many regions, and the common people were driven into the arms of the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried out by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. I have described at some length the conditions which now arose in the chapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is referred for details.29

In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly, the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. On March 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred two stations. By December of the same year the number had increased to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty men to a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of the humane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantly increasing numbers.

It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, while continuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Further subdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardly possible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after another the Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Most officers of importance issued explanatory statements to the people shortly after giving up active field operations,whether they surrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himself was captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point on the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated, and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers, many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issued an address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognized the fact that they wanted peace. He said:—

“Manila, April 19, 1901.“To the Filipino People:—“I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the complete termination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.“The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force—a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.“The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearly manifested its will.“So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearningto see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of the great American nation.“By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.“Emilio Aguinaldo.30“Manila, April 19, 1901.”

“Manila, April 19, 1901.

“To the Filipino People:—

“I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested to me with irresistible force that the complete termination of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.

“The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness, nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in which they find their advance along the path impeded by an irresistible force—a force which, while it restrains them, yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the belief that under its protection our people will attain all the promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.

“The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people which has thus clearly manifested its will.

“So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me, and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearningto see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised by the generosity of the great American nation.

“By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee, my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.

“Emilio Aguinaldo.30

“Manila, April 19, 1901.”

This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagálog and English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:—

“A force like Aguinaldo’s could not be surrendered. It had been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been very lax. It had originally been held together by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny.”31

“A force like Aguinaldo’s could not be surrendered. It had been torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had always been very lax. It had originally been held together by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained from the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and the leaders had become the lords of life and property each in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate, but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny.”31

Aguinaldo’s forces now passed through these several stages. Some of his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had surrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his advice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time, but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who had been Insurgent officers or soldiers andwhile serving in this capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen, whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.

The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In my opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why it failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death, he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:—

“The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings.”32

“The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he was jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement, he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity, character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted by the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable sufferings.”32

These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed, but they foredoomed it to failure.

The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom were irresponsible and unscrupulous.

Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them was threatened, but not actually resorted to.

The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bell was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration—not the kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but a measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:—

“General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoid making war against those who really wanted the termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeance of others. Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. He accordingly, ‘in order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,’ ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna to ‘immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation of armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.“‘Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, includingrice,palay,33chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been reëstablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable.’“It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones; but they were warned that unless they accepted that protection their property, which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or destruction, because it might be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.“As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came to an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. The efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient, and from time to time many additional families entered the zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy they were armed and sent out into the mountains from which they brought back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-famished men, women, and children who, released from the intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zones of protection.“The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within these areas was caused to themestizoruling group, whose members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to have others work for them and obey them blindly. To a man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of hisbarrio,34the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. These men suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not their bodies which suffered—it was their pride.“Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people had turned against their once highly respected chief, and toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive leader. Realization of the fact that the people were against him materially aided in forcing his surrender.“General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to 10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another, in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the first week of July no political prisoners were held in this region. They had returned to their homes.“The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents even in the United States. One of these is the order issued on August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding the district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Mo., in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of three counties of that State to remove from their residences within fifteen days to the protection of the military stations which he had established. All grain and hay in that district was ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was not convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new method of procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, however, effectively employed an old one.“The insurrection had originated among the Tagálogs and had spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied by them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagálog provinces.“On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, the office of military governor in the archipelago was terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated in the insurrection.”

“General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be to avoid making war against those who really wanted the termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect them against the vengeance of others. Over and above all these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure food by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply for themselves and their families, it was determined to establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the people living within these zones efficient protection against ruinous exactions by insurgents. He accordingly, ‘in order to put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,’ ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna to ‘immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredation of armed insurgents. The limits may include the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.

“‘Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies, includingrice,palay,33chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been reëstablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered them as may be found practicable.’

“It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these zones; but they were warned that unless they accepted that protection their property, which consisted almost entirely of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or destruction, because it might be impossible to determine whether it belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to make use of the right of retaliation conferred by General Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more were assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.

“As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent that a large number of poor people had contributed through fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came to an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. The efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient, and from time to time many additional families entered the zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy they were armed and sent out into the mountains from which they brought back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-famished men, women, and children who, released from the intimidating influence of the insurgents, entered the zones of protection.

“The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within these areas was caused to themestizoruling group, whose members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to have others work for them and obey them blindly. To a man who could speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of hisbarrio,34the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. These men suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not their bodies which suffered—it was their pride.

“Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people had turned against their once highly respected chief, and toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive leader. Realization of the fact that the people were against him materially aided in forcing his surrender.

“General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to 10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another, in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the first week of July no political prisoners were held in this region. They had returned to their homes.

“The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents even in the United States. One of these is the order issued on August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding the district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Mo., in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of three counties of that State to remove from their residences within fifteen days to the protection of the military stations which he had established. All grain and hay in that district was ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was not convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new method of procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, however, effectively employed an old one.

“The insurrection had originated among the Tagálogs and had spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied by them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagálog provinces.

“On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, the office of military governor in the archipelago was terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all persons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated in the insurrection.”

General Bell’s motives and methods in reconcentrating the inhabitants of this troubled region have been grossly misrepresented, and he himself has been sadly maligned. He is the most humane of men, and the plan which he adopted resulted in the reëstablishment of law and order at a minimum cost of human suffering.

Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps received there their first lessons in hygienic living. Many of them were reluctant to leave the camps and return to their homes when normal conditions again prevailed.

The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas campaign was very small.35Blount has sought to make it appear that partly as an indirect consequence of war there was dreadful mortality there, citing by way of proof the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas, published as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission, gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the census of 1903 gave it as 257,715.36

The report of the United States Philippine Commission for 1903 gives the population of Manila as 221,000, while in 1900 it had been 260,000. Does this mean that there had been a holocaust in Manila? Not at all. It meansonly that the thousands of Filipinos who had sought the protection of the American forces there during the period when they feared their own soldiers in the provinces had mostly returned to their homes. During the disturbed period in Batangas great numbers of people took refuge in other and more peaceful regions. Some of them returned later; others did not.

Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report of the Provincial Secretary of Batangas to the effect that:

“The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over 200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the province had.”37

“The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease, such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over 200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former years the province had.”37

Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a mortality of a hundred thousand from disease alone, are hardly consistent with those quoted by Blount as showing a decrease in population during a longer period of only fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is not apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths due to malaria or dysentery, since no systematic effort to rid Batangas of these ills had ever previously been made, and the very thing which then prevented the adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put forth to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people themselves. As a simple matter of fact, however, there was no such dreadful mortality from these diseases at this time. Malaria has never been especially bad in this province, and even cholera, which swept it during the period in question and is far more readily communicated than is dysentery, caused only twenty-three hundred and ninety-nine known deaths.

In the end peace was established and prosperity followed in its wake.

This result was brought about in part by the efficient activity of the armed forces of the United States and in part by the efforts of the first and second Philippine Commissions.38

1“To the Military Chiefs of the towns mentioned in the margin[there is nothing in the margin.—TR.]:—“As there are still many soldiers paying no notice to the order forbidding the waste of cartridges, you are required to give a certain amount of ammunition to each soldier and to see every day if there is any cartridge missing, and if so, inquire into the reason. In order that this may be successfully carried out, I have deemed it proper to prescribe the punishment for such offence, of which you will inform the soldiers under your command, and post this circular in a prominent place. Said punishments are as follows:—“Art. 1. A soldier found wasting ammunition shall be punished with 12 lashes; in case he commits the same offence again he shall be punished with 24 lashes; and on a further offence of like character by the same soldier, he shall be court-martialled and severely punished.“Art. 2. A soldier who has been found short of even one cartridge out of the ammunition assigned to him, shall be punished with 12 lashes, provided that he has not previously been in any engagement.“Art. 3. A soldier who has been found with no cartridges by reason of throwing them away during an engagement, shall be court-martialled, and severely punished.“I most earnestly recommend you to carefully look after your soldiers and see that every one is complying with the foregoing order.“This order should be transmitted from one town to another mentioned in the margin, and the last one should return it to this officewith the information that the same has been received and complied with by all.“May God guard you many years.“E. Aguinaldo, Dictator.“Cavite, June 17th, 1898.”—P.I.R., 1124. 2.2“November 16, 1900.(Stamp) “Lacuna Brigade. Headquarters.“Major Thomas Tagunton: Advise all officers of this brigade that he who allows his soldiers to load their rifles without being before the enemy, shall be liable to capital punishment. If the soldiers intentionally or otherwise fire their pieces, whether in the air or at any determined or undetermined person, said soldiers and the officers to whose command they belong shall also be liable to the same punishment as above, without further proceedings, for the reason that we are almost in front of the enemy, and all the more if the shots take effect upon any of the soldiers or chiefs.“Sergeants and corporals shall also take heed of the present warnings, as they will also be given the same punishment if they by abandoning their squads allow them to commit certain outrages.“You will report receipt of and compliance with this order.“God preserve you many years.“General Headquarters, November 16, 1900.(Signed) “Lacuna, General, Political-Military Governor and Chief of Operations.”—P.I.R., 643. 1.3Taylor, AJ. 85.4“Kabatúan, Oct. 14th, 1899.“Edict“Martín F. Delgado, General and Politico-Military Governor of the Province of Iloílo.“As a consequence of the frequent assaults and robberies committed by persons wearing military uniforms, and with the determination to correct, with a firm hand, such scandalous conduct, which, besides causing such deeds to be laid at the door of the military, also makes it easier for evil-doers to commit their misdeeds, I have, at the suggestion of the Councillor of Police, ordered the following:—“1. From this date forward all private citizens are absolutely prohibited from wearing military uniforms.“2. All authorities, both civil and military, under this Government, are obliged to see to the strict enforcements of this edict.“3. All persons who, not being in the military service, are, after the publication of this edict, found wearing military uniforms, and who cannot show that they are in the military service, will be suspected as evil-doers and will be sent to this Government to be subjected to the corresponding corrective measures.(Signed) “Martín Delgado,“Governor-General-President.”—P.I.R., 881. 4.5“On April 10, 1899, General Delgado wrote that, benignity having failed, rigorous methods would be used to enforce collections and that if the people did not pay—“‘I shall, with great pain, see myself under the necessity of withdrawing all my forces to the mountains and leaving them [the pueblos] to the fate which God will decide upon,’ which of course meant that hewould leave them to the mercy of the bandits who stood ready to descend upon them.”—P.I.R., B., 4.“This threat was not an idle one.”—Taylor, 67 HS. E-L.6“Santa Cruz, Laguna, July, 1899.“Hon. Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo....“There was a notorious bandit here who was the terror of the province with his gang; I had him arrested and shot and the robberies ceased. Murders were being committed; I had the murderers caught, shot one of them, and there were no more murders; officers of the reserve would consider themselves kings in their towns, they would shoot the localpresidentesand commit other unlawful acts; I disarmed them, and tried the most celebrated one, called Arcadio Castillo, alias Bancucane, who attempted to escape and was killed. With the death of these persons order has been completely reëstablished in this province. Several had rifles that were used only for robbery and after two or three trials all turned over their rifles, and the arming of the battalion was completed.(Signed) “Juan Cailles.”—P.I.R., 7 & 8.7“Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas.“Office of the President.“Kabatúan, March 16, 1899.“To the Honourable President of the Philippine Republic,“Señor Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy,“Most Distinguished President:“In order to avoid the distress which the knowledge of the abuses which are already unbearable, daily committed by the troops of Señor Diocno, will cause you, this government has hesitated to communicate them to you, but, as there is almost a reign of terror here, it feels that it must inform you of them in order to remedy them. The death of private individuals and assaults committed in the towns are dailyreported as having been committed by the troops of General Diocno. Of the numerous companies of Señor Diocno, only two under the orders of General Araneta fight against the enemy, the remainder are the terror of the town and it is a week since Sr. Diocno went to Capiz without telling any one what he was going to do.“In view of the facts pointed out, the soldiers of this General constituting a constant danger to the town, this government asks you to order General Diocno to turn over his rifles to us to kill Americans with and to enable the towns to recover their former tranquillity; this government asks this of you, relying upon the well-known justice with which you act and it wishes for you many years of life for our liberty and our independence.“Kabatúan, March 16, 1899.(Signed) “Jovito Yusay,“Temporary President.(Signed) “Francisco Soriano,“General Secretary.”—P.I.R., 52. 5.8“Martin Delgado y Bermejo, lieutenant general and general in chief of the republican army of the Visayan Islands.“General Headquarters of Santa Barbara,“April 20, 1899.“The existence of a state of war, and the trying circumstances through which the country is now passing have brought about a complete change in the order of nearly all the pueblos; and I have noticed with profound regret that sacking, robbery, sequestrations, and other crimes highly dishonourable to our noble cause, are of daily occurrence. With a view to preventing such conduct in the future, and in order to guarantee to the inhabitants of the military district under my command the most complete tranquillity, I hereby decree:“1. That any person or persons who commit acts of brigandage, sequestration, incendiarism, rape, or other disturbances of a public nature calculated to excite the public, or which infringe individual or property rights, shall be severely punished in accordance with military law.“2. That all offenders who present themselves to the Local or Military Authorities within the 30 days immediately following this date, and who turn over their arms and join our forces and help to fight other outlaws and to defend the nation, will be pardoned for the crimes they have committed.“3. That when the period of 30 days above mentioned has passed,any person taken in the act of committing robbery, or who attempts to rob with an organized band of outlaws, or who steals, rapes, or performs acts of incendiarism, or any other criminal act, will be summarily condemned to death by a military tribunal.“The Local Juntas of the various towns in conjunction with citizens of standing and the military authorities will organize a vigilance service to maintain public order and the authority of the law.“M. Delgado.”—P.I.R., Books B 4.9“February 13, 1899.(In the margin: A stamp which says:) “Philippine Republic—Headquarters of operations of the provinces of Southern Luzón.“It is with great regret that I have learned that robberies, assaults, kidnapping, and other crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes, are taking place in our towns, without taking into consideration that the purpose of the insurrection which has given origin to our social regeneration is true justice, for the reëstablishment of which the lives and property are being sacrificed of all who are proud of being called Filipinos. These acts are being committed without restriction by civilians as well as soldiers perhaps with the coöperation of their respective chiefs, to the shame of the authority vested in them and to the prejudice of the society to which they unworthily belong, and even to the integrity itself of the Republic. And in order that these barbarous and savage acts may disappear and that rigorous and exemplary punishment be meted out, I have deemed it proper to forward to you for general information the proclamation of these Headquarters of February 12th last, which is as follows”:(Signed) “Mariano Trias.“Lieutenant-General.“To the Politico-Military Chief of Infanta.”—P.I.R., 896–9.10“There does not seem to have been the faintest conception that there was any reason for not using the white flag to deceive people who were foolish enough to believe that Aguinaldo was going to adhere to the rules prescribed for its use. The writer in the early spring of 1899 once watched an insurgent party advance under a white flag upon an American line of trenches. When an officer and a bugler went forward to receive them they threw down the flag and immediately opened fire with the rifles which they were then seen to be dragging behind them.”—Taylor, 48 HS.11“Such ammunition was not effective unless fired from very close quarters, but even its possession made the guerrillas stronger than the people of the country and undoubtedly had much to do with securing their coöperation, not only as bolomen but also in the digging of the pits which were placed in the trails and also set about the towns. These were required to be constructed by the local authorities. In the bottom was set a sharp spike of bamboo, sometimes poisoned; and the pit was covered with leaves and soil upon a fragile framework; so that if a man stood upon it he would fall through upon the spike. Bows were set in the jungle with a string set across the trail so that any one stumbling over it would discharge a sharp bamboo shaft with a poisoned head. On September 18, 1900, Lukban congratulated the people of the town of Katubig upon the efficient use they had made of arrows with the heads dipped in ‘dita,’ a native poison. (P.I.R., 502. 8.)”—Taylor, 83 HS.12See also the chapter entitled “Murder as a Governmental Institution.”13See p. 313.14The following newspaper supplement printed in Tagálog for the benefit of the common people, is typical of this class of literature, with which the country was kept flooded:(Circular printed in Tagálog. P.I.R., 17–6. Supplement toHeraldo Filipino.“Friday, 24th February, 1899.“Countrymen:“We must consider ourselves fortunate that the bad intentions of North America were found out early. If we had not found them out by this time we should have been entrapped. And we should thank God that they commenced the war.“You ought to know by this time that these people can teach us nothing good. What we can learn from them is all evil. You must admit the truth of what they are reported to do to our brothers in Manila where they rob the houses when the dwellers in them are out or busy. Their evil inclinations prevail over them to such an extent that the houses most worthy of consideration are not safe. They are worse than the wild people who live in the woods, they have not the slightest idea of looking at things from the point of view of a man of honour nor have they the slightest respect for reason, for this does not control their actions in the least. Without the slightest attention to civility they rush into houses and if they find the people eating, without saying a word, they take what they want from the table, put it into their mouths and go as they came.“If they find people sleeping or resting, taking the siesta, it makes no difference to them; they go into the most private parts of the house as though they were walking in the street.“In the shops they take what pleases them and if the owner wants payment they threaten him with their rifles.“One can hardly believe and my pen refuses to write all of the perversity, and evil and bad habits of these people.“Their habits and manners are a disgrace to the country where they were born. In no history have such customs and manners been described even in that of the most ignorant people.“They search women who pass, feeling all over their bodies, taking from them money and whatever else they carry and if they come on them in a lonely place they strip them naked after violating them and do not leave a rag on them.“Are these those honest men of whom we have heard? Are these the people who were going to teach us good habits? Are these the people who were going to guide us? The race which does these things is the most hated one in the world, it is the race which commits most cruelties, it is the race which does not treat its mother with respect; in this race there is not the slightest idea of personal dignity, it is a race which does not know what honour is, which does not possess the slightest vestige of regard for good manners. Are these the people who are going to protect us? It is better for us to die at once than fall into the power of these unequalled malefactors.“¡Down with the bad men!“¡Kill the Americans!!“¡Let the people of the United States be exterminated!!!“¡Notice.—This sheet is distributed gratis.”15“A light upon the treatment of women by these people is given by the fact that after an American detachment had captured Lukban’s papers and family on August 18, and came so close to taking him that he was able to recognize their guide, one of his correspondents wrote to him that to their surprise the women, who had fully expected to be abused, had been treated with respect and given a house to live in. (P.I.R., 1143.4.)”—Taylor, 84 HS.16In a letter to General Ambrosio Moxica from ——— dated March 2, 1900, occurs the following:—“The guerillas quartered in the neighbourhood must render mutual assistance and keep up communication, so as to get the news as to where the enemy comes or goes, and the time at which they will pass certain points, endeavouring also to arrange that all the guerilla bands should have regular couriers, with you or with general headquarters, giving advice daily of any occurrence and carrying correspondence. Theymust select trustworthy women to carry correspondence, charging them to hide the letters underneath their skirts, bearing in mind that the Americans do not search them; and in sending to the towns for arms or food, the orders must be sent by women and for small quantities, so as not to attract attention.”—P.I.R., 2035. 3.17Simeon Villa, who accompanied Aguinaldo on his long flight, kept a somewhat detailed account of events in the form of a diary.18P.I.R., 869.19Ibid.20P.I.R., 2035. 3.21P.I.R., 886. 13.22Exhibit 1233(Original in Spanish. Contemporary copy. P.I.R., Books B. 4.)“General Headquarters, Santa Barbara, Feb. 28th, 1899.”(Literal copy of telegram.)“Casualties, Americans, on 6th, 2000 Colonels dead, one General; all churches converted into hospitals full American wounded; total American casualties 7000 confirmed by General Fullón just arrived from Malolos; says also Iloílo quiet and not taken.“A true copy“By order of Chief of Staff.“Juan Beloso.”23(Supplement to theFilipino Herald.)“Thursday, Feb. 23rd, 1899.—4 P.M.“The Filipino Army occupies the suburbs of Manila.“The three columns commanded by Generals Pío del Pilar and Licerio and Col. Hizon now occupy the suburbs of Sampaloc, San Miguel, San Sebastian, Binondo, San Nicholas and Tondo.“The Cavite battalion has possession of the Cuartel de Meisic and our flag is now flying there.“Six Thousand Americans Besieged!!!“The American troops now in Caloocan and La Loma to the number of over six thousand are besieged by the columns commanded by Generals Luna, Llanera and García.“The Honourable President“This very moment the special train carrying the Honourable President has left for Caloocan.“Viva the independent Philippines!!!“Viva the unconquerable Philippine Army!!!“Notice. This sheet is distributed gratis.”—P.I.R., 70–6.24(News.) The American General, MacArthur, with his entire staff, was taken prisoner by our troops in Northern Luzón. Another American general died on the 5th of January last in the North, who was seriously wounded in an ambush or fight. When shot he was a colonel, but on account of said fight he was promoted to the rank of a general, so that later when he died, he had the benefit of that rank.”—P.I.R., 2035. 3.25(Telegrams)“Washington, January 15, 1900, 10 A.M.“(Received, Cebú, January 16, 1900, 11 A.M.)“Owing to a new disaster of the Union Army, MacKinley has tendered his resignation as President, Mr. Bryan succeeding him.“Peace promulgated in the Philippines. Basis of the protectorate is being discussed.“Philippine independence will be proclaimed February the 4th.“Remark.—The basis of a protectorate has been published in English.”“Manila, January 20, 1900, 10 A.M.“(Received at Cebú on the same day, at 11 A.M.)“Otis’ successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party, has just arrived. He brings with him papers and instructions in regard to proclamation of the Philippine Republic.“It is believed that Rev. Martin, Bishop of Cebú, will be transferred to the Archbishopric of Manila, and Rev. Nozaleda to Spain.”—P.I.R., Books B-10.26P.I.R., 1193. 2.27Ibid.,2025.28Taylor, 47 HS.29Beginning on page 730.30Taylor, 36 GV, Exhibit 1017.31Taylor, 28 HS.32P.I.R., 1021.6.33Unhusked rice.34Village.35153, according to Blount himself.36“Nor can the ultimate responsibility before the bar of history for the awful fact that, according to the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Atlas of the Philippines of 1899, the population of Batangas province was 312,192, and according to the American Census of the Philippines of 1903, it was 257,715, rest entirely on military shoulders.”—Blount, pp. 383–384.37Blount, p. 597.38See ChaptersXIandXII.

1“To the Military Chiefs of the towns mentioned in the margin

[there is nothing in the margin.—TR.]:—

“As there are still many soldiers paying no notice to the order forbidding the waste of cartridges, you are required to give a certain amount of ammunition to each soldier and to see every day if there is any cartridge missing, and if so, inquire into the reason. In order that this may be successfully carried out, I have deemed it proper to prescribe the punishment for such offence, of which you will inform the soldiers under your command, and post this circular in a prominent place. Said punishments are as follows:—

“Art. 1. A soldier found wasting ammunition shall be punished with 12 lashes; in case he commits the same offence again he shall be punished with 24 lashes; and on a further offence of like character by the same soldier, he shall be court-martialled and severely punished.

“Art. 2. A soldier who has been found short of even one cartridge out of the ammunition assigned to him, shall be punished with 12 lashes, provided that he has not previously been in any engagement.

“Art. 3. A soldier who has been found with no cartridges by reason of throwing them away during an engagement, shall be court-martialled, and severely punished.

“I most earnestly recommend you to carefully look after your soldiers and see that every one is complying with the foregoing order.

“This order should be transmitted from one town to another mentioned in the margin, and the last one should return it to this officewith the information that the same has been received and complied with by all.

“May God guard you many years.

“E. Aguinaldo, Dictator.

“Cavite, June 17th, 1898.”

—P.I.R., 1124. 2.

2“November 16, 1900.

(Stamp) “Lacuna Brigade. Headquarters.

“Major Thomas Tagunton: Advise all officers of this brigade that he who allows his soldiers to load their rifles without being before the enemy, shall be liable to capital punishment. If the soldiers intentionally or otherwise fire their pieces, whether in the air or at any determined or undetermined person, said soldiers and the officers to whose command they belong shall also be liable to the same punishment as above, without further proceedings, for the reason that we are almost in front of the enemy, and all the more if the shots take effect upon any of the soldiers or chiefs.

“Sergeants and corporals shall also take heed of the present warnings, as they will also be given the same punishment if they by abandoning their squads allow them to commit certain outrages.

“You will report receipt of and compliance with this order.

“God preserve you many years.

“General Headquarters, November 16, 1900.

(Signed) “Lacuna, General, Political-Military Governor and Chief of Operations.”—P.I.R., 643. 1.

3Taylor, AJ. 85.

4“Kabatúan, Oct. 14th, 1899.

“Edict

“Martín F. Delgado, General and Politico-Military Governor of the Province of Iloílo.

“As a consequence of the frequent assaults and robberies committed by persons wearing military uniforms, and with the determination to correct, with a firm hand, such scandalous conduct, which, besides causing such deeds to be laid at the door of the military, also makes it easier for evil-doers to commit their misdeeds, I have, at the suggestion of the Councillor of Police, ordered the following:—

“1. From this date forward all private citizens are absolutely prohibited from wearing military uniforms.

“2. All authorities, both civil and military, under this Government, are obliged to see to the strict enforcements of this edict.

“3. All persons who, not being in the military service, are, after the publication of this edict, found wearing military uniforms, and who cannot show that they are in the military service, will be suspected as evil-doers and will be sent to this Government to be subjected to the corresponding corrective measures.

(Signed) “Martín Delgado,

“Governor-General-President.”

—P.I.R., 881. 4.

5“On April 10, 1899, General Delgado wrote that, benignity having failed, rigorous methods would be used to enforce collections and that if the people did not pay—

“‘I shall, with great pain, see myself under the necessity of withdrawing all my forces to the mountains and leaving them [the pueblos] to the fate which God will decide upon,’ which of course meant that hewould leave them to the mercy of the bandits who stood ready to descend upon them.”—P.I.R., B., 4.

“This threat was not an idle one.”—Taylor, 67 HS. E-L.

6“Santa Cruz, Laguna, July, 1899.

“Hon. Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo....

“There was a notorious bandit here who was the terror of the province with his gang; I had him arrested and shot and the robberies ceased. Murders were being committed; I had the murderers caught, shot one of them, and there were no more murders; officers of the reserve would consider themselves kings in their towns, they would shoot the localpresidentesand commit other unlawful acts; I disarmed them, and tried the most celebrated one, called Arcadio Castillo, alias Bancucane, who attempted to escape and was killed. With the death of these persons order has been completely reëstablished in this province. Several had rifles that were used only for robbery and after two or three trials all turned over their rifles, and the arming of the battalion was completed.

(Signed) “Juan Cailles.”

—P.I.R., 7 & 8.

7“Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas.

“Office of the President.

“Kabatúan, March 16, 1899.

“To the Honourable President of the Philippine Republic,

“Señor Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy,

“Most Distinguished President:

“In order to avoid the distress which the knowledge of the abuses which are already unbearable, daily committed by the troops of Señor Diocno, will cause you, this government has hesitated to communicate them to you, but, as there is almost a reign of terror here, it feels that it must inform you of them in order to remedy them. The death of private individuals and assaults committed in the towns are dailyreported as having been committed by the troops of General Diocno. Of the numerous companies of Señor Diocno, only two under the orders of General Araneta fight against the enemy, the remainder are the terror of the town and it is a week since Sr. Diocno went to Capiz without telling any one what he was going to do.

“In view of the facts pointed out, the soldiers of this General constituting a constant danger to the town, this government asks you to order General Diocno to turn over his rifles to us to kill Americans with and to enable the towns to recover their former tranquillity; this government asks this of you, relying upon the well-known justice with which you act and it wishes for you many years of life for our liberty and our independence.

“Kabatúan, March 16, 1899.

(Signed) “Jovito Yusay,

“Temporary President.

(Signed) “Francisco Soriano,

“General Secretary.”

—P.I.R., 52. 5.

8“Martin Delgado y Bermejo, lieutenant general and general in chief of the republican army of the Visayan Islands.

“General Headquarters of Santa Barbara,

“April 20, 1899.

“The existence of a state of war, and the trying circumstances through which the country is now passing have brought about a complete change in the order of nearly all the pueblos; and I have noticed with profound regret that sacking, robbery, sequestrations, and other crimes highly dishonourable to our noble cause, are of daily occurrence. With a view to preventing such conduct in the future, and in order to guarantee to the inhabitants of the military district under my command the most complete tranquillity, I hereby decree:

“1. That any person or persons who commit acts of brigandage, sequestration, incendiarism, rape, or other disturbances of a public nature calculated to excite the public, or which infringe individual or property rights, shall be severely punished in accordance with military law.

“2. That all offenders who present themselves to the Local or Military Authorities within the 30 days immediately following this date, and who turn over their arms and join our forces and help to fight other outlaws and to defend the nation, will be pardoned for the crimes they have committed.

“3. That when the period of 30 days above mentioned has passed,any person taken in the act of committing robbery, or who attempts to rob with an organized band of outlaws, or who steals, rapes, or performs acts of incendiarism, or any other criminal act, will be summarily condemned to death by a military tribunal.

“The Local Juntas of the various towns in conjunction with citizens of standing and the military authorities will organize a vigilance service to maintain public order and the authority of the law.

“M. Delgado.”

—P.I.R., Books B 4.

9“February 13, 1899.

(In the margin: A stamp which says:) “Philippine Republic—Headquarters of operations of the provinces of Southern Luzón.

“It is with great regret that I have learned that robberies, assaults, kidnapping, and other crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes, are taking place in our towns, without taking into consideration that the purpose of the insurrection which has given origin to our social regeneration is true justice, for the reëstablishment of which the lives and property are being sacrificed of all who are proud of being called Filipinos. These acts are being committed without restriction by civilians as well as soldiers perhaps with the coöperation of their respective chiefs, to the shame of the authority vested in them and to the prejudice of the society to which they unworthily belong, and even to the integrity itself of the Republic. And in order that these barbarous and savage acts may disappear and that rigorous and exemplary punishment be meted out, I have deemed it proper to forward to you for general information the proclamation of these Headquarters of February 12th last, which is as follows”:

(Signed) “Mariano Trias.

“Lieutenant-General.

“To the Politico-Military Chief of Infanta.”—P.I.R., 896–9.

10“There does not seem to have been the faintest conception that there was any reason for not using the white flag to deceive people who were foolish enough to believe that Aguinaldo was going to adhere to the rules prescribed for its use. The writer in the early spring of 1899 once watched an insurgent party advance under a white flag upon an American line of trenches. When an officer and a bugler went forward to receive them they threw down the flag and immediately opened fire with the rifles which they were then seen to be dragging behind them.”—Taylor, 48 HS.

11“Such ammunition was not effective unless fired from very close quarters, but even its possession made the guerrillas stronger than the people of the country and undoubtedly had much to do with securing their coöperation, not only as bolomen but also in the digging of the pits which were placed in the trails and also set about the towns. These were required to be constructed by the local authorities. In the bottom was set a sharp spike of bamboo, sometimes poisoned; and the pit was covered with leaves and soil upon a fragile framework; so that if a man stood upon it he would fall through upon the spike. Bows were set in the jungle with a string set across the trail so that any one stumbling over it would discharge a sharp bamboo shaft with a poisoned head. On September 18, 1900, Lukban congratulated the people of the town of Katubig upon the efficient use they had made of arrows with the heads dipped in ‘dita,’ a native poison. (P.I.R., 502. 8.)”

—Taylor, 83 HS.

12See also the chapter entitled “Murder as a Governmental Institution.”

13See p. 313.

14The following newspaper supplement printed in Tagálog for the benefit of the common people, is typical of this class of literature, with which the country was kept flooded:

(Circular printed in Tagálog. P.I.R., 17–6. Supplement toHeraldo Filipino.

“Friday, 24th February, 1899.

“Countrymen:

“We must consider ourselves fortunate that the bad intentions of North America were found out early. If we had not found them out by this time we should have been entrapped. And we should thank God that they commenced the war.

“You ought to know by this time that these people can teach us nothing good. What we can learn from them is all evil. You must admit the truth of what they are reported to do to our brothers in Manila where they rob the houses when the dwellers in them are out or busy. Their evil inclinations prevail over them to such an extent that the houses most worthy of consideration are not safe. They are worse than the wild people who live in the woods, they have not the slightest idea of looking at things from the point of view of a man of honour nor have they the slightest respect for reason, for this does not control their actions in the least. Without the slightest attention to civility they rush into houses and if they find the people eating, without saying a word, they take what they want from the table, put it into their mouths and go as they came.

“If they find people sleeping or resting, taking the siesta, it makes no difference to them; they go into the most private parts of the house as though they were walking in the street.

“In the shops they take what pleases them and if the owner wants payment they threaten him with their rifles.

“One can hardly believe and my pen refuses to write all of the perversity, and evil and bad habits of these people.

“Their habits and manners are a disgrace to the country where they were born. In no history have such customs and manners been described even in that of the most ignorant people.

“They search women who pass, feeling all over their bodies, taking from them money and whatever else they carry and if they come on them in a lonely place they strip them naked after violating them and do not leave a rag on them.

“Are these those honest men of whom we have heard? Are these the people who were going to teach us good habits? Are these the people who were going to guide us? The race which does these things is the most hated one in the world, it is the race which commits most cruelties, it is the race which does not treat its mother with respect; in this race there is not the slightest idea of personal dignity, it is a race which does not know what honour is, which does not possess the slightest vestige of regard for good manners. Are these the people who are going to protect us? It is better for us to die at once than fall into the power of these unequalled malefactors.

“¡Down with the bad men!

“¡Kill the Americans!!

“¡Let the people of the United States be exterminated!!!

“¡Notice.—This sheet is distributed gratis.”

15“A light upon the treatment of women by these people is given by the fact that after an American detachment had captured Lukban’s papers and family on August 18, and came so close to taking him that he was able to recognize their guide, one of his correspondents wrote to him that to their surprise the women, who had fully expected to be abused, had been treated with respect and given a house to live in. (P.I.R., 1143.4.)”—Taylor, 84 HS.

16In a letter to General Ambrosio Moxica from ——— dated March 2, 1900, occurs the following:—

“The guerillas quartered in the neighbourhood must render mutual assistance and keep up communication, so as to get the news as to where the enemy comes or goes, and the time at which they will pass certain points, endeavouring also to arrange that all the guerilla bands should have regular couriers, with you or with general headquarters, giving advice daily of any occurrence and carrying correspondence. Theymust select trustworthy women to carry correspondence, charging them to hide the letters underneath their skirts, bearing in mind that the Americans do not search them; and in sending to the towns for arms or food, the orders must be sent by women and for small quantities, so as not to attract attention.”—P.I.R., 2035. 3.

17Simeon Villa, who accompanied Aguinaldo on his long flight, kept a somewhat detailed account of events in the form of a diary.

18P.I.R., 869.

19Ibid.

20P.I.R., 2035. 3.

21P.I.R., 886. 13.

22Exhibit 1233

(Original in Spanish. Contemporary copy. P.I.R., Books B. 4.)

“General Headquarters, Santa Barbara, Feb. 28th, 1899.”

(Literal copy of telegram.)

“Casualties, Americans, on 6th, 2000 Colonels dead, one General; all churches converted into hospitals full American wounded; total American casualties 7000 confirmed by General Fullón just arrived from Malolos; says also Iloílo quiet and not taken.

“A true copy

“By order of Chief of Staff.

“Juan Beloso.”

23(Supplement to theFilipino Herald.)

“Thursday, Feb. 23rd, 1899.—4 P.M.

“The Filipino Army occupies the suburbs of Manila.

“The three columns commanded by Generals Pío del Pilar and Licerio and Col. Hizon now occupy the suburbs of Sampaloc, San Miguel, San Sebastian, Binondo, San Nicholas and Tondo.

“The Cavite battalion has possession of the Cuartel de Meisic and our flag is now flying there.

“Six Thousand Americans Besieged!!!

“The American troops now in Caloocan and La Loma to the number of over six thousand are besieged by the columns commanded by Generals Luna, Llanera and García.

“The Honourable President

“This very moment the special train carrying the Honourable President has left for Caloocan.

“Viva the independent Philippines!!!

“Viva the unconquerable Philippine Army!!!

“Notice. This sheet is distributed gratis.”—P.I.R., 70–6.

24(News.) The American General, MacArthur, with his entire staff, was taken prisoner by our troops in Northern Luzón. Another American general died on the 5th of January last in the North, who was seriously wounded in an ambush or fight. When shot he was a colonel, but on account of said fight he was promoted to the rank of a general, so that later when he died, he had the benefit of that rank.”—P.I.R., 2035. 3.

25(Telegrams)

“Washington, January 15, 1900, 10 A.M.

“(Received, Cebú, January 16, 1900, 11 A.M.)

“Owing to a new disaster of the Union Army, MacKinley has tendered his resignation as President, Mr. Bryan succeeding him.

“Peace promulgated in the Philippines. Basis of the protectorate is being discussed.

“Philippine independence will be proclaimed February the 4th.

“Remark.—The basis of a protectorate has been published in English.”

“Manila, January 20, 1900, 10 A.M.

“(Received at Cebú on the same day, at 11 A.M.)

“Otis’ successor, John Waterly, of the democratic party, has just arrived. He brings with him papers and instructions in regard to proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

“It is believed that Rev. Martin, Bishop of Cebú, will be transferred to the Archbishopric of Manila, and Rev. Nozaleda to Spain.”—P.I.R., Books B-10.

26P.I.R., 1193. 2.

27Ibid.,2025.

28Taylor, 47 HS.

29Beginning on page 730.

30Taylor, 36 GV, Exhibit 1017.

31Taylor, 28 HS.

32P.I.R., 1021.6.

33Unhusked rice.

34Village.

35153, according to Blount himself.

36“Nor can the ultimate responsibility before the bar of history for the awful fact that, according to the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey Atlas of the Philippines of 1899, the population of Batangas province was 312,192, and according to the American Census of the Philippines of 1903, it was 257,715, rest entirely on military shoulders.”—Blount, pp. 383–384.

37Blount, p. 597.

38See ChaptersXIandXII.

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