Clausewitz defines strategy as "the use of the battle to gain the object of the war." War is "a chain of battles all strung together, one of which always brings onanother."40The great thing in strategy is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits. "The best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally; secondly, at the decisive point."41
"In such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operatingcircumstances. The direct result of all this is that thegreatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point.42Whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not, we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This isthe first great principle of strategy, as well suited for Greeks or Persians, or for Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French or Germans."
It sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. How many generals have been ruined in consequence!
Clausewitz says, "It is a fact that we may search modern military history in vain for a battle (except Leuthen orRosbach) in which an army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no means uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest general of modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception, that of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and when it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon, Waterloo, he wasbeaten."43"From this we may infer, in the present state of Europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now, if we see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even the greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small as well as in great combats, an important superiorityof numbers, but which need not be overtwo to one, will be sufficient toensure the victory, however disadvantageous other circumstances maybe."44
The double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore, the ideal of strategy. "The superiority of numbers is, therefore, to be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before all, and as far as possible." If strategy has done this, then it has done its utmost duty. It is then for the tactician to make the most of this superiority thus provided by strategy, and win the victory. Strategy then repeats the operation with new combinations suited to the altered circumstances to win the next battle, and so on, till the hostile armed force is destroyed.
Thissuperiority of numbersin battle as thefirst principle of strategywe require,on all occasions in season and out of season, to repeat and repeat. At present we have not the numbers we shall want. We must get them. Otherwise we are bound to be inferior in numbers, and "the best strategy" will be possible for our enemies and impossible for us. This rests with our statesmen.
If the double superiority, or as near the double as possible, at the decisive point is the ideal of strategy ... what is the decisive point?
Here we owe another debt to Clausewitz. Jomini, even after Napoleon, confuses us with three different sorts of decisive points in a theatre of war, but Clausewitz clears the air by asserting onlyone.
"But whatever may be the centralpoint of the enemy's power against which we are to direct our ultimate operations,still the conquest and destruction of his army is the surest commencementand,in all cases, the most essential."45
Here we have it in a nutshell; wherever the enemy's main force isTHEREis the decisive point, against which we must concentrateALLour forces.
"There are," said Napoleon, "many good generals in Europe, but they see too many things at one time.As for me, I see only one thing, the enemy's chief army, and I concentrate all my efforts to destroy it."
"The rule," says Clausewitz, "which we have been endeavouring to set forth is, therefore, that all the forces whichare available and destined for a strategic object should besimultaneouslyapplied to it. And this application will be all the more complete the more everything is compressed into one act and onemoment."46This he calls "the law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in strategy."47"In strategy we can never employ too manyforces."48"What can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of force must be regarded in strategy as a means of giving expansion to success." "No troops should be kept back as a strategic reserve," but every available man hurried up to the first battlefield, fresh levies being meanwhile formed in rear. As an instance of what not to do, Prussia, in 1806, kept back 45,000 men in Brandenburg and East Prussia; they might, if present at Jena,have turned defeat into victory, but they were uselessafterwards.49A fault so often made may be made again.
"It is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point," said Napoleon. To concentrate every available man and gun at the decisive point so as to attain superiority there, is not an easy thing, for the enemy will be making a similar attempt. "The calculation of time and space appears the most essential thing to this end. But the calculation of time and space, though it lies universally at the foundation of strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread, is still neither the most difficult nor the most decisive one." "Much more frequently the relative superiority, that is the skilful assemblage of superior forces at thedecisive point, has its foundation in the right appreciation of those points, in the judicious distribution which by that means has been given to the forces from the very first, and inthe resolution to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the important. In this respect Frederick the Great and Bonaparte are especiallycharacteristic."50
"There is no simpler and more imperative rule for strategy thanto keep all the forces concentrated.No portion to be separated from the main body unless called away by some urgent necessity.On this maxim we stand firm, and look upon it as a fact to be dependedupon."51
"The concentration of the whole force(i.e.within supporting distance)should be the rule, andevery separation or division is an exception which must bejustified."52Of course, this does not mean that all the troops are to be kept concentrated in one mass upon one road, but within supporting distance, for he expressly states, "It is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the course of the action."53This doctrine, qualified by the last sentence, makes Clausewitz the germ of modern military thought, for the last sentence leaves room for all the modern developments of new roads, railways, telegraphs, wire and wireless, and so forth.
Therefore in war, according to Clausewitz, concentration, concentration, concentration, andevery division or detachment is an evil which can only be justified by urgent necessity. Here again we find a simple truth, which, however, the history of all wars shows us to be very difficult to carry out. Hence the valueof keeping such an imperative maxim always in our minds.
"The more a general takes the field in the true spirit of war, as well as of every other contest, that he must andwillconquer, the more will he strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first battle, and hope and strive to win everything by it. Napoleon hardly ever entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at once in the firstbattle."54
"At the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the first battle, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage to which no one would willingly expose himself, and also because the first decision, though not the only one, still will have the more influenceon subsequent events the greater it is initself."55
"The law of the simultaneous use of the forces in strategy lets the principal result (which need not be the final one) take place almost always at the commencement of the greatact."55A great victory thus won at the outset will upset all the enemy's plan of campaign and allow us to carry out our own. The first pitched battle is, therefore, the crisis of the rival strategies, and towards its favourable decision all our preparations, all our forces, and all our energies should be directed. This is a point that civilians seem to find hard to grasp. Witness all our history, with inadequate forces at the beginning of every war, as even in the latest of our wars—that in South Africa. It is a point which our statesmen should very seriously consider.
The difficulty of concentrating superior numbers for the first battle is that the enemy will be, or should be, of the same opinion, and will be making equal efforts to win the first battle. So, then, the crisis will be all the more acute, the battle greater, and the result greater.
"We would not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's main force, is the first-born son of war."56
Till this is done, the first great victory gained, strategy should think of nothing else.
Then, and only then, a further combination in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the next.
"For we maintain that, with few exceptions,the victory at the decisive point will carry with it the decision on all minor points"57over the whole theatreof war. Therefore nothing else matters for long, and to victory in the first great battle "everything else must be sacrificed." For concentration can only be obtained by sacrifice.
"Once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about rest, not about taking breath, not about re-organizing, etc., but only of pursuit, of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the enemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or whatever else appears as a rallying point for theenemy."58
Clausewitz points out that this is very difficult, and that to compel his exhausted troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall requiresGREATforce ofWILLon thepart of the equally exhausted commander. We need only remember that Napoleon himself at the supreme crisis of his fate, being physically tired, failed to pursue the allies after his victory at Dresden, 1813, whereby he lost all the fruits of his victory, and indeed his last chance of ultimate success.
Leaving out, for the sake of shortness, the rest of his strategical thoughts, I hasten to conclude this sketch with a glance at Clausewitz's admirablesummary59of strategicprinciples:—
"The first and most important maxim which we can set before ourselves is to employALLthe forces which we can make available with theUTMOST ENERGY. Even if the result is tolerably certain in itself,it is extremely unwise not to make itperfectly certain.
"The second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible at the point where theDECISIVEblow is to be struck. The success at that point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points.
"The third principle is not to lose time. Rapidity and surprise are the most powerful elements of victory.
"Lastly, the fourth principle is toFOLLOW UP THE SUCCESSwe gain with theUTMOST ENERGY.The pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the only means of gathering up the fruits of victory.
"The first of these principles is the foundation of all the others.If we have followed the first principle, we can venture any length with regard to the three others without risking our all.It gives the means ofcontinually creating new forces behind us, and with new forces everydisaster may be repaired.In this, and not in going forward with timid steps, lies that prudence which may be called wise."
These great principles are everything in war, and "due regard being paid to these principles, the form (i.e.the geometrical element) in which the operations are carried on is in the end of little consequence."
"Therefore I am perfectly convinced that whoever calls forth all his powers to appearincessantly with new masses, whoever adoptsevery imaginable means of preparation, whoeverconcentrates his force at the decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with resolution and energy, has done all that can be done in a general way for the strategical conduct of the war, and that, unless he is altogether unfortunate in battle, will undoubtedly be victorious in the samemeasure that his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and energy."
When we have got these great simple leading principles of strategy firmly into our heads, the next question is how to make use of our knowledge. For principles are no use unless we apply them. On consideration it appears that there are three ways in which we can all apply these principles with advantage.
I. It will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise to apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about, to search for indications of their application in the strategy of each belligerent, how far each commander succeeded, and how far failed to carry them out in their entirety, and where, when, and why he succeeded orfailed, and the results of doing or not doing so. Also to search for the interaction of the political motive of the war on the military operations, and to see how far the belligerent statesmen gained or failed to gain their political object, according to the comparative degree of preparation they had made for it, and the magnitude of effort which they made or did not make to support it with the whole means of the nation, material, moral and physical. Also to see how far the national spirit was aroused or not, and the causes thereof, and to note the greater or less energy, resolution and boldness which was consequently infused into the war. Also to note how the thorough application of these great simple principles of strategy shortens the war and thereby reduces its cost (1866 to 1870), and how the neglect of them by statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards,lengthens a war and adds to its cost enormously (South Africa, etc.). Used thus, these principles give us a theoretically correct ground for criticism.
II. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for anticipating what the action of our opponents in any future war will be, the measure of the forces they will bring to bear, how they will direct those forces, and the amount of energy, resolution, and boldness with which they will use them against us. It is an axiom always to assume that the enemy will do the best and wisest thing, and to prepare accordingly.
III. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for our own counter-preparations. We require to take the most dangerous war which is probable or possible, and make every imaginable preparation to carry out these principles therein.
In such a case how are we going to render it possible for our generals to win, and thus save the nation from the irreparable consequences and the huge war indemnity of £800,000,000 or so, which would follow defeat? How are we going to do it? How are we going to render it possible for our generals to employ the best strategy? The ideal of strategy, always to be aimed at, is the double superiority of numbers. How are we going to give our generals that? If we cannot do that, how are we going to give them even any superiorityat all, so that they may be able to carry out the first principle of strategy? How? Or are we going to makeNOadequate preparationsfor these three eventualities, and when one of them suddenly comes ask our generals to save us from the fate we have brought upon ourselves, by performing the impossible? It is in this waythat a statesman should use these few great simple principles of strategy in order to attain his political object and safeguard the interests of the nation.
Now, as Clausewitz teaches it, the theory of war is easy enough to understand. There is no reason—one might almost say no excuse—why every one, soldier or statesman, should not know it fairly well. The great leading principles of strategy are few and simple. There is no reason why every one, soldier and statesman, should not understand and know these few simple principles thoroughly, and have them at his finger ends ready to apply them to the consideration of any military question, past, present, or future. So far all is easy. But when it is a question of carrying out in actualwar this easy theory, these simple strategical principles, then it isQUITEa different matter, then it is a matter of the very greatest difficulty. This is a difference which the mind always finds very hard to grasp, as witness the denunciations with which any failure in execution by a general, no matter how great the real difficulties with which he had to contend, is nearly always greeted. Observers rarely make allowances for these difficulties, very largely probably because they do not understand them. The present chapter is devoted to these difficulties of execution in war.
In Clausewitz's great chapter on "the genius forwar"60he sets forth the difficulties which confront a general, thecharacter and genius, the driving and animating force, required to overcome the friction of war. It is impossible to abstract it adequately; I can only advise all to read it for themselves. But I will endeavour to give an idea of it.
After discussing the various sorts of courage required by a general, physical before danger and moral before responsibility, the strength of body and mind, the personal pride, the patriotism, the enthusiasm, etc., he comes to the unexpected.
"War," he says, "is the province of uncertainty. Three-fourths of those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty.Here, then, above all other, a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the truth by the tact of its judgment." Mark this point, that three-fourths ofthe things that we as criticsAFTERthe event know, when all information of the situation has been collected and published, were unknown to the general who had to decide, or only dimly guessed at from a number of contradictory reports.
"From this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions,this continual interposition of chance." "Now, if he is to get safely throughthis perpetual conflict with the unexpected, two qualities are indispensable; in the first placean understanding which, even in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces of inner light, whichlead to the truth, and thenthe courage to follow this faint light. The first is expressed by the French phrasecoup d'œil; the second is resolution."
"Resolution is anact of courage in face of responsibility." "The forerunnerof resolution is an act of the mind making plain the necessity of venturing and thus influencing the will. This quite peculiar direction of the mind, which conquers every other fear in man by the fear of wavering or doubting, is what makes up resolution in strong minds."
The vital importance of firmness and resolution, so strongly urged by Clausewitz, will be apparent to all if we reflect how even the strongest characters have been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation in war. Compare, for instance, Yorkv.Wartenburg's masterly exposition of Napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation in 1813 at Dresden.
Also there is required "the power of listening to reason in the midst of the most intense excitement, in the storm of the most violent passions."
"But to keep to the result of by-gone reflections in opposition to the streamof opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it, is justTHEdifficulty." "Here nothing else can help us but an imperative maxim which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: that maxim is,in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion and not to give it up till a clear conviction forces us to do so."
"But as soon as difficulties arise, and that must always happen when great results are at stake, then the machine, the army itself, begins to offer a sort of passive resistance, and to overcome this the commander must have great force of will." Driving power, such as Napoleon's. And also "the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice, which the commander has to contend with in himself."
"These are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of thecommander have to contend with andOVERCOME, if he is to make his name illustrious." If he is to prevent the downfall of his country.
(1) In connection with these difficulties I would like to put forward a suggestion as to criticism of a general's action in war, which though not exactly Clausewitz's, is a corollary from Clausewitz. It is this. In reading a war with the clearness and after-knowledge of history nearly all defeats are easily seen to be due to the non-observance of one or other of the few leading principles of strategy referred to in the previous chapter. But we must assume that the defeated general wasfamiliarwith that principle, and that hiswillwas to carry it out. What, then, were the difficulties,the friction, which, on any particular day or days, overcame his will and made him sacrifice the principle? This is where most critics fail us. Here seems the matter to search for. And could a stronger resolution have enabled him to overcome those difficulties, that friction? And if so, how and by what means? But we must first discover the difficulties and uncertainties of the particular day when his will gave way. Take the Manchurian campaign as an instance. If we could only have a military history of the campaign of 1870 or that of Manchuria, written in the form of a series of "appreciations of the situation," so that we know nothing but what the general knew at the time as we read, and if the true state of affairs could be withheld from us till the end, this, I think, would be very instructive and helpful. It would be a more difficult way ofwriting a military history, but I think that the extra trouble would be repaid by the extra value. So at least it appears.
(2) If we reflect upon the enormous difficulties, so strikingly brought out by Clausewitz, whichourgenerals have to contend with andovercomein actual war, it should surely teach us to curb our criticism. It should surely also make us resolve in future to try to aid them as far as is in our power at home, and not thoughtlessly to increase their already stupendous burdens. In the past we at home have much to accuse ourselves of, much to regret. In the past often have we added to the difficulties of our generals, often have we greatly weakened their chances, and increased those of their opponents, often have we, unintentionally, through ignorance cast a weight into the scale against our country.
(3) The ignorance of the public regardingthe conduct of war constitutes for us a very serious national danger. If this ignorance were less pronounced, if our statesmen understood the vast importance of information to the enemy, and the equal importance to our generals that this information the enemy shouldNOTobtain, then the public craving for information regarding every detail of what occurs in the field, and the demand for the wide publication thereof, would certainly be repressed. Nothing occurs in any of our campaigns which is not immediately made known; reports of actions with the fullest details as to the troops engaged, and the casualties that have befallen them, appear in the columns of the Press within a few hours of their occurrence.Any efforts, therefore, of our generalsin the field to maintainsecrecy as to strength, intentions, and movements are deliberately, though probably unintentionally,counteracted by their own countrymen. This is due to pure ignorance of war, no doubt, but the effect of this ignorance is as bad as if it were due to evil intention. In fairness, however, we must admit that, in the past, the immense value of reticence has not been fully appreciated by some of our soldiers themselves, and it were well if, in the future, more attention were directed to the importance of secrecy.
The results of such almost criminal stupidity may not be apparent when we are fighting with a savage foe, but if we ever have, as we undoubtedly some day shall have, the misfortune to find ourselves engaged with a civilized Power, we may be certain that not only will the operations be indefinitely prolonged,and their cost enormously increased, but their successful issue will be for us highly problematical.
In this connection it must be remembered that every Great Power has secret agents in every country, including Great Britain, and that it will be easy for such a secret agent to telegraph in cypher or in some agreed code to an agent in a neutral State all war information published here, who will telegraph it on at once to the hostile general, who will thus get, within a very short time of its publication in London, perhaps just exactly the information he requires to clear up the strategical or tactical situation for him, and enable him to defeat the combinations of our generals. As a case in point, take Macmahon's march on Sedan to relieve Metz in 1870, where secrecy was absolutely necessary for success, but which became known to the Germans by the English newspapers.—Result, Sedan.
That this cannot be allowed is plain.It is believed that the patriotism of our Press will welcome any necessary measure to this end if it is made compulsory uponALL.61
Some will probably feel inclined to ask what Clausewitz, who wrote more than eighty years ago, can possibly have to say about tactics which can be valuable in the twentieth century.
It was said by Napoleon that tactics change every ten years, according, of course, to the progress of technicalities, etc. Weapons indeed change, but there is one thing that never changes, and that is human nature. The most important thing in tactics, the man behind the gun, never alters; in his heart and feelings, his strength and weakness, he is always much the same.
Therefore, Clausewitz's tactical deductions, founded on the immense and varied data supplied by the desperate and long-continued fighting of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, permeated as they are by his all-pervading psychological or moral view, can never lose their value to us.
It is true, no doubt, that our rifles of to-day can be used with effect at a distance ten times as great as the old smooth bores of Clausewitz's day, our shrapnel five times as far as his cannon, and that cover and ground play a far more important part now than then, and so on. All these things, of course, considerably modify the tactics of Clausewitz. Not so much, however, as some text-books would lead us to suppose, which always seem to assume clear ground and clear weather. For, after all, how many combats are fought on ground where thereis a very restricted field of fire (videHerbert's "Defence of Plevna," etc.), or at night? How many battles are fought during rain, or snow, or mist, or fog, which destroys all long range? Compare the tremendous fighting with "bullets, bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and even fists," of Nogi's attempt to cut the Russian line of retreat at Mukden, with the hand-to-hand fighting of Eylau, Friedland, Borodino, or with the desperate efforts of the French in 1812 to open their line of retreat through Maro-Jaroslawitz, where all day the masses of troops fought hand-to-hand in the streets, "the town was taken and retaken seven times, and the rival nations fought with the bayonet in the midst of the burning houses" (Alison).
When it comes to push of pike, as in all great decisions between equally resolute adversaries it is bound to do, the differencebetween the fighting of Clausewitz's day and ours is but small. The most recent instances of all, the hand-to-hand fighting in Manchuria, take us back to the Napoleonic struggles.
Therefore, despite the eighty years that have intervened, the writings of Clausewitz are still valuable from a tactical point of view, always considering of course the difference in weapons, because of the human heart in battle.
His ideas on tactics have largely filtered through his German pupils into our textbooks, minus the psychological or moral note, so that it is not necessary to go at length into the subject, or give a number of extracts. It would be wearisome. I will, however, give a few passages at haphazard as illustrations.
The endeavour to gain the enemy's line of retreat, and protect our own, on which so much learned erudition has been spent by various writers, he regards as aNATURALinstinct, which willALWAYSproduce itself both in generals and subalterns.
"From this arises, in the whole conduct of war, and especially in great and small combats, aPERFECT INSTINCT, which is the security of our own line of retreat and the seizure of the enemy's; this follows from the conception of victory, which, as we have seen, is something beyond mere slaughter. In this effort we see, therefore, theFIRSTimmediate purpose in the combat, and one which is quite universal. No combat isimaginablein which this effort, either in its double or single form, is not to go handin hand with the plain and simple stroke of force. Even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon the enemy without thinking of its line of retreat, and in most cases it will have an eye upon that of theenemy."62"This is a greatnatural lawof the combat," "and so becomes the pivot upon whichALLstrategical and tactical manœuvres turn."
The combat he regards as settled by whoever has the preponderance of moral force at the end; that is, in fresh or only partly used up troops.
The combat itself he divides into a destructive and a decisive act. During the long destructive act, or period of fire preparation, the troops engaged gradually wear each other out, and graduallyalmost cease to count as factors in the decision. "After a fire combat of some hours' duration, in which a body of troops has suffered severe losses—for instance, a quarter or one-third of its numbers—thedébrismay for the time be looked upon as a heap of cinders. For the men are physically exhausted; they have spent their ammunition; many have left the field with the wounded, though not themselves wounded (compare, for instance, Eylau and the 1870 battles); the rest think they have done their part for the day, and if they get beyond the sphere of danger, do not willingly return to it. The feeling of courage with which they originally started has had the edge taken off, the longing for the fight is satisfied, the original organization is partly destroyed, and the formations broken up."
"So that the amount of moral force lost may be estimated by the amount ofthe Reserves used up, almost as with a footrule."63
This goes on till, "In all probability, only the untouched reserve and some troops which, though they have been in action, have suffered very little, are in reality to be regarded as serviceable, and the remainder (perhaps four-sixths) may be looked upon for the present as a "caput mortuum."
Therefore the art of the commander he regards as "economy of force" during the destructive period; that is, to employ as few troops as possible, by taking advantage of ground, cover, etc., "to use a smaller number of men in the combat with firearms than the enemy employs," so that a smaller proportionate number of his own are reduced to a "heap of cinders" and more are left, more moral force, for the decision.
"Hundreds of times," he says, "a line of fire has maintained its own against one twice its strength" (e.g.the Boers).
To do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect demands very skilful handling of the troops, both on the part of the chief and subordinate leaders.
With the preponderance thus obtained the commander at last starts the decision. "Towards the close of a battle the line of retreat is always regarded with increased jealousy, therefore a threat against that line is always a potent means of bringing on the decision (Liao-yang, Mukden). On that account, when circumstances permit, the plan of battle will be aimed at that point from the very first." Or, "If this wear and tear and exhaustion of the forces has reached a certain pitch, then a rapid advance in concentrated masses on one side against the line of battle of the other" (i.e.the Napoleonicbreaking the centre, of recent years thought almost hopeless, but revived in Manchuria with success, in the case of Nodzu breaking the centre at Mukden).
From what precedes it is evident that, as in the preparatory acts, the utmost economy of forces must prevail, so in the decisive act to win the mastery throughnumbersmust be the ruling idea.
Just as in the preparatory acts endurance, firmness and coolness are the first qualities, so in the decisive act boldness and fiery spirit must predominate.
"The difference between these two acts will never be completely lost as respects the whole."
"This is the way in which our view is to be understood; then, on the one hand, it will not come short of the reality, and on the other it will direct the attention of the leader of a combat (be it great or small, partial or general)to giving each of the two acts of activity its due share, so that there may be neither precipitation nor negligence.
"Precipitationthere will be if space and time are not allowed for the destructive act.Negligencein general there will be if a complete decision does not take place, either from want of moral courage or from a wrong view of thesituation."64
"Even the resistance of an ordinary division of 8,000 or 10,000 men of all arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably superior in numbers, will last several hours, if the advantages of country are not too preponderating. And if the enemy is only a little or not at all superior in numbers, the combat will last half a day. A corps of three or four divisionswill prolong it to double that time; an army of 80,000 or 100,000 men to three or four times." "These calculations are the result ofexperience."65
As General von Caemmerer points out, if these calculations were adhered to in present-day German manœuvres, as they are now in all war games, tactical exercises, and staff rides, the dangerous dualism of their training, the difference between theory and manœuvre practice, would cease.
I have left to the last the consideration of three or four disputed points in Clausewitz. In considering these I shall quote a good deal from General von Caemmerer's "Development of Strategical Science," as in such matters it is best toquote the most recent authors of established reputation.
The most important of these, and the most disputed, is Clausewitz's famous dictum that "the defensive is the stronger form of making war." "The defence is the stronger form of war with a negative object; the attack is the weaker form with a positiveobject."66
General von Caemmerer says, "It is strange, we Germans look upon Clausewitz as indisputably the deepest and acutest thinker upon the subject of war; the beneficial effect of his intellectual labours is universally recognized and highly appreciated; but the more or less keen opposition against this sentence never ceases. And yet that sentence can as little be cut out of his work 'On War' as the heart out of a man. Our most distinguished and prominent militarywriters are here at variance with Clausewitz.
"Now, of course, I do not here propose to go into such a controversy. I only wish to point out that Clausewitz, in saying this, only meant the defensive-offensive, the form in which he always regards it, both strategically and technically, in oft-repeated explanations all through his works. Forinstance—
"It is aFIRSTmaximNEVERto remain perfectly passive, but to fall upon the enemy in front and flank, even when he is in the act of making an attack uponus."67
Andagain—
"A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive—the flashing sword of vengeance—is the most brilliant point in the defensive.He who does not at once think of it at the right moment, or rather he who does not from the first includethis transition in his idea of the defensive, will never understand its superiority as a form ofwar."68Von Caemmerer comments thus: "And this conception of the defence by Clausewitz has become part and parcel of our army—everywhere, strategically and tactically, he who has been forced into a defensive attitude at once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack. I am thus unable to see how the way in which Clausewitz has contrasted Attack and Defence could in any way paralyse the spirit of enterprise." Von Caemmerer also justly remarks that, as Clausewitz always insisted both in strategy and tactics, neither Attack nor Defence is pure, but oscillates between the two forms; and as the Attack is frequently temporarily reduced to defend itself, and also as no nation can be sure of never being invaded by a superiorcoalition, it is most desirable to encourage a belief in the strength of the Defence, if properly used. In this I think that Wellington would probably have agreed. Certainly Austerlitz and Waterloo were examples of battles such as Clausewitz preferred.
Still, one must admit that Clausewitz's chapter on "The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to each other in Tactics," Book VII. Chapter 2, is the least convincing chapter of his work.
Strategically, the argument is stronger. It always seems to me that we must remember that Clausewitz had taken part in the defensive-offensive in its strongest, most absolute and unlimited form, on the greatest possible scale—the Moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated before a single flake of snow fell) of the Grand Army. If he had lived to complete the revision of his works, italways seems to me that he would have made his theory undeniable by stating that the defensive is the strongest form of war,if unlimited by space. What, for instance, would have happened if the Japanese had tried to march through Siberia on to St. Petersburg?
But, after all, which of the two is absolutely the stronger form of war, attack or defence, is merely a theoretical abstraction, for, practically, the choice is always settled for us by the pressing necessity of circumstances. And, in this connection, let us always bear in mind Clausewitz's dictum: "A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive—the flashing sword of vengeance—is the most brilliant point in the defensive."
A second disputed point is Clausewitz's alleged preference, as a rule, for theInner Line in strategy. But it is necessary to remember that that was only due to the conditions of his time, before railways and telegraphs, when it was difficult to communicate between columns acting on concentric lines. And he is not in any way wedded to the Inner Line, like Jomini, butonlywhen circumstances are favourable. He has many sentences from which we may infer that, had he lived in railway and telegraph days, his strategy, like Moltke's, his most distinguished pupil, would have aimed at envelopment as a rule. For to bring up troops rapidly by several railways necessitates a broad strategic front, and Clausewitz especially lays down rapidity as his second great principle, andsays—
"If the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss of time, and the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too great, then the same maybe justifiable on these grounds; forto effect an unnecessary concentration of the forceswould be contrary to the second principle we have laid down (i.e.'to act as swiftly as possible')."69Also: "Such separation into several columns as is absolutely necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form,for that form is natural to the attack, and must not be disregarded without good reason."70Also: "It is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the action." So that while the conditions of his time led Clausewitz to prefer close concentration and the Inner Line, like Napoleon, yet his reflections led him to propound the germ of the strategy of Moltke. Substitute for Clausewitz's close concentration this: "As close concentration, the combined movements regulated by telegraph,as is compatible with the utmost use of the railways and the greatest rapidity" (as he would certainly have said), and we arrive at Moltke's strategy.
A third disputed point is his belief in the superior tactical efficiency, under favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic method of breaking the enemy's line in the centre. Breaking the line by a frontal attack was, of course, much easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic day than it is with the long-ranging arms of our day, and it is only natural that Clausewitz in his writings should give it the full tactical importance which it then deserved. His book would not be true to the tactical conditions of his day had he not done so, with Rivoli, Austerlitz, Salamanca, Eckmuhl, etc., before hismind. But it seems hardly correct to accuse him of over-partiality to frontal attacks, for he has examined both frontal and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving to each their relative advantages and disadvantages, and concluding: "The envelopment may lead directly to thedestructionof the enemy's army, if it is made with very superior numbers and succeeds. If it leads to victory the early results arein every casegreater than by breaking the enemy's line. Breaking the enemy's line can only lead indirectly to the destruction of the enemy's army, and its effects are hardly shown so much on the first day, but rather strategicallyafterwards,"71by forcing apart on different lines of retreat the separated fragments of the beaten army.
"The breaking through the hostile army by massing our principal forceagainst one point,supposes an excessive length of front on the part of the enemy; for in this form of attack the difficulty of occupying the remainder of the enemy's force with few troops is greater, because the enemy's forces nearer to the principal point of attack can easily join in opposing it. Now in an attack upon the centre there are such forces on both sides of the attack; in an attack upon a flank, only on one side. The consequence of this is that such a central attack may easily end in a very disadvantageous form of combat,through a convergent counter-attack." Which is exactly our modern difficulty. "The choice between these two forms of attack must therefore be made according to the existing conditions of the moment. Length of front, the nature and direction of the line of retreat, the military qualities of the enemy's troops, and the characteristics of their general,lastly the ground must determine the choice."
Speaking generally he regards theconcentricenveloping form of tactical attack aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as the most efficacious and natural. "On the field of battle itself ... the enveloping form must always be considered the mosteffectual."72And theeccentricor frontal counter-attack at the extended enveloping attack as the most efficacious and natural form of the defence, such as Napoleon's counter-attacks at Austerlitz or Dresden, or Wellington's at Salamanca. "And we think that one means is at least as good as theother."73