*****
"Thus matters stood when the French Revolution broke out; Austria and Prussia tried their diplomatic art of war; this very soon proved insufficient. Whilst, according to the usual way of seeing things, all hopes were placed on a very limited military force in 1793, such a force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. War had suddenly become again an affair of the people, and that of a people numbering thirty millions, every one of whom regardedhimself as a citizen of the State." "By this participation of the people in the war, instead of a cabinet and an army, a whole nation with its natural weight came into the scale. Henceforth the means available—the efforts which might be called forth—had no longer any definite limits; the energy with which the war itself might be conducted had no longer any counterpoise, and consequently the danger to the adversary had risen to the extreme."
If only our politicians could learn this old lesson of the French Revolution! For many, too many, of them appear to derive their ideas of war to-day from some dim reminiscent recollections of school histories of the wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
To continue: "After all this was perfected by the hand of Bonaparte, this military power based on the strength ofthe whole nation, marched over Europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly, that where it only encountered the old-fashioned armies the result was not doubtful for a moment.
"A reaction, however, awoke in due time. In Spain the war became of itself an affair of the people." In Austria. In Russia. "In Germany Prussia rose up the first, made the war a national cause, and without either money or credit, and with a population reduced one-half, took the field with an army twice as strong as in 1806. The rest of Germany followed the example of Prussia sooner or later." "Thus it was that Germany and Russia, in the years 1813 and 1814, appeared against France with about a million of men."
"Under these circumstances the energy thrown into the conduct of war was quite different." "In eight months thetheatre of war was removed from the Oder to the Seine. Proud Paris had to bow its head for the first time; and the redoubtable Bonaparte lay fettered on the ground."
"Therefore, since the time of Bonaparte, war, through being, first on one side, then again on the other, an affair of the whole nation, has assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer to its real nature, to its absolute perfection. The means then called forth had no visible limit, the limit losing itself in the energy and enthusiasm of the Government and its subjects. By the extent of the means, and the wide field of possible results, as well as by the powerful excitement of feeling which prevailed, energy in the conduct of war was immensely increased; the object of its action was the downfall of the foe; and not until the enemy lay powerlesson the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop, or to come to any understanding with regard to the mutual objects of the contest.
"Thus, therefore the element of war, freed from all conventional restrictions, broke loose with all its natural force. The cause was the participation of the people in this great affair of State, and this participation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on the internal affairs of other countries, partly from the threatening attitude of the French towards all nations.
"Now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars hereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the States, and, consequently,will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people, would be a difficult point to settle. But every one will agree with usthat, at least,Whenever great interests are in dispute, mutual hostility will discharge itself in the same manner as it has done in our times."
This is so true, that every war since the days of Clausewitz has made its truth more apparent. Since he wrote, the participation of the people in war has become, not a revolutionary fact, but an organized fact, an ordinary fact in the everyday life of nations. To-day every State except Great Britain, securely based on the system of the universal training of its sons to arms, stands ready to defend its interests with the whole concentrated power, physical, intellectual, and material, of its whole manhood. Consequently, European war, as Clausewitz foresaw, "will only take place onaccount of great interests closely affecting the people." The character of such war will be absolute, the object of its action will be the downfall of the foe, and not till the foe (be it Great Britain or not) lies powerless on the ground will it be supposed possible to stop. In the prosecution of such a national war the means available, the energy and the effort called forth, will be without limits. Such must be the conflicts of nations-in-arms.
Yet, even now, so many years after Clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he himself stated, "to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen," the great transformation in the character of modern war, due to the participation of the people therein, has not yet been adequately realized by many men in this countrywho ought to know. It is earnestly to be hoped that they will endeavour to adjust their minds, as regards war, tothe fact that we are living, not in the eighteenth century, but in the twentieth, and that they will consider that war has once for all become an affair of the people, that our opponents will be a people-in-arms, using the uttermost means of their whole manhood to crush us, and that disaster can only be prevented by a like utmost effort on our part, by an effort regardless of everything except self-preservation.
"War belongs, not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the province of social life. It is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from others. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to liken it to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again, on its part, may be looked upon as a kind of trade on a great scale. Besides, state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which its outlines lie hiddenin a rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creatures in theirgerms."13
These conflicts of interest can bring about gradually such a state of feeling that "even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other." It is an unpleasant fact for the philosopher, for the social reformer, to contemplate, but history repeats and repeats the lesson. Still more, "It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate—in fact, a perfect explosion."
"War is a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements—hatred and animosity—which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; andof the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.
"The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, more the general and his army; the third more the Government.The passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence in the peoples.
"These three tendencies are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject. A theory which would leave any one of them out of account would immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality, that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by thatalone."14
Clausewitz is the great thinker, the great realist, the great philosopher of war. His aim was, free from all bias, to get atthe truth of things. His view of war as a social act, as part of theintercourse of nations, so that occasional warlike struggles can no more be avoided than occasional commercial struggles, is a view which requires to be most carefully pondered over by every statesman. It is based upon the essential fundamental characteristics of human nature, which do not alter. It is not to be lightly set aside by declamation about the blessings of peace, the evils of war, the burden of armaments, and such-like sophistries. To submit without a struggle to injustice or to the destruction of one's vital interests is not in passionate human nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature of a virile people. It is indeed to be most sincerely hoped thatarbitrationwill be resorted to more and more as a means of peacefully settling all non-vital causes of dispute. But arbitration has its limits. Forno great nation will ever submit to arbitration any interest that it regards asabsolutely vital. The view of war, therefore, as a social act, as part of the intercourse of nations, with all that it implies, appears to be the only one which a statesman, however much he may regret the fact, can take. It has, therefore, been brought forward here at once, as it underlies the whole subject and is essential to all clear thought thereon.
So much for the influence of Public Opinion in producing war. Now for its influence in and during war.
"There are three principal objects in carrying on war," says Clausewitz.
"(a)To conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force."(b)To get possession of the material elements of aggression, and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army."(c)To gain Public Opinion.15
"(a)To conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force.
"(b)To get possession of the material elements of aggression, and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army.
"(c)To gain Public Opinion.15
"To attain the first of these objects, the chief operation must be directed against the enemy's principal army, for it must be beaten before we can follow up the other two objects with success.
"In order to seize the material forces, operations are directed against those points at which those resources are chiefly concentrated: principal towns, magazines, great fortresses. On the road to these the enemy's principal force, or a considerable part of his army, will be encountered.
"Public Opinion is ultimately gained by great victories, and by the possession of the enemy'scapital."16
This almost prophetic (as it was in his day) recognition by Clausewitz of the vast importance of gaining Public Opinionas one of the three great aims in war, is fundamental. It is just one of those instances of his rare insight into the principles and development of modern national war which make his book of such great and enduring value to us. For since his day Europe has become organized into great industrial nations, democracy and popular passion have become more and more a force to be reckoned with, and the gaining and preserving of Public Opinion in war has become more and more important. It has, in fact, become the statesman's chief business during a great modern national war. It has become necessary for him to study intently war in its relation to industry, and to the industrial millions over whom he presides, or over whom he may preside.
(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in Britain were a nation of 18,000,000, practically self-supporting, and governed by an aristocracy. To-day we are a crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent upon over-sea sources for three-fourths of our food, for our raw materials, for our trade, for our staying power,andwe are governed by a democracy. In a modern democratic State it will only be possible to carry on the most just and unavoidable war so long as the hardships brought on the democracy by the war do not become intolerable. To prevent these hardships from thus becoming intolerable to the people, to Public Opinion, will be the task of the modern statesman during war, and this can only be done by wise prevision and timely preparation.It requires the internal organization of the Industrial State for war.
It appears to thewriterthat internal organization can be subdivided asfollows:—
I. An adequate gold reserve.
II. The protection of our ships carrying raw material, food, and exports during their passage on the high seas from the places of origin to the consumers: (A) by the few available cruisers which could be spared from the fighting fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well thought out and prepared scheme of national indemnity (videBlue Book thereon); (B) by insuring the distribution to the consumers of food and raw material, after it has arrived in the country, by preparing a thorough organization which would deal with the blocking of any of the principal ports of arrival, and by guarding the vulnerable points of our internal lines of communications to and from the shipping centres.
III. Organization of Poor Law system to bring immediate relief by selling at peace price food to those unable to pay war prices owing to (A) normal poverty (7,000,000 to 8,000,000 souls), (B) out-of-works, due to effect of war on trade.
Work and wages the Statemustguarantee during modern war, and before the Statecanguarantee these, it is absolutely necessary that it should satisfy itself that the above preparations are actuallyin being. This pre-supposes a more earnest study of the industrial effects of a great national war than has yet been given to the subject by our political leaders. For in the warfare of the present and future the importance of gaining and preserving Public Opinion, as pointed out by Clausewitz, cannot be over-estimated. It is as fundamentally importantto safeguard our own Public Opinion as it is to attack, weaken, andgain over that of the enemy. This has not yet passed the stage of thought. But good thoughts are no better than good dreams unless they be put into action. We are waiting for the statesman to DO it. There is no great difficulty.
(2) In arousing the national spirit to the requisite height of patriotic self-denial and self-sacrifice, in elevating, preserving, and safe-guarding Public Opinion during a great national struggle, much may be hoped for from the patriotism of our Press. Only in fairness to those whose patriotism is self-originating and spontaneous, it must be made compulsory uponALL, so that no journal may suffer loss of circulation or pecuniary injury thereby.
(3) There lies a practical task immediately to the hand of our statesmen if they will seriously set themselves to the task of improving themoralof ournation by reforming our educationcurriculum, on the leading principle that the moral is to the physical as three to one in life, and that therefore character-building must be its chief aim. Then they will do much towards strengthening us for war, towards carrying out Clausewitz's idea of the gaining and preserving of our Public Opinion in War.
"It is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole, because it is particularly necessary that, in the consideration of any of the parts, the whole should be kept constantly in view. We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by Publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless numbers of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to throw his adversary, and thusto render him incapable of further resistance.
"Violence arms itself with the inventions of arts and science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible, andhardly worth mentioning, termedusages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power.
"Violence, that is to say physical force, is thereforethe Means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimateobject. In order to attain this object fully the enemy must first be disarmed: and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities intheory."17
Now, "philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an adversary without causing great bloodshed, and that thisis the proper tendency of the art of war. However plausible this may appear,still it is an error which must be extirpated, for in such dangerous things as warthe errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows thathe who uses force unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed,MUSTobtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise." "To introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity." "We therefore repeat our proposition, thatWar is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds."
In endeavouring briefly to describe Clausewitz's method of looking at war,one is continually confronted by the difficulty of selecting a few leading ideas out of so many profound thoughts and pregnant passages. However, a selection must be made.
I assign the first place to his conception of war as a part of policy, because that is fundamentally necessary to understand his practical way of looking at things. This point of view is as necessary for the strategist as for the statesman, indeed for every man who would understand the nature of war. For otherwise it is impossible to understand the military conduct of many campaigns and battles, in which the political outweighed the military influence, and led to action incomprehensible almost from a purely military point of view. History is full of such examples.
Clausewitz clearly lays down: "War is only a continuation of State policyby other means.This point of view being adhered to will introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and things will be more easily disentangled from eachother."18"It is only thus that we can obtain a clear conception of war, for the political view is theobject, war is themeans, and the means must always include the object in our conception." "Each (nation or government) strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to itswill."19
Owing to the great importance of this point of view, so little understood in this country, I have devoted the next chapter to it alone, so as to bring out Clausewitz's view more in detail. We can, therefore, pass on for the present.
Secondly, I select his doctrine of the culminating point of victory, because that is essential in order to understand his division of all wars into two classes, according to how far the attack is likely to be able to extend into the hostile country before reaching its culminating point, where reaction may setin.20
"The conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his adversary completely. Often, in fact almostuniversally, there is a culminating point of victory. Experience shows thissufficiently."21As the attack or invasion progresses it becomes weaker even from its successes, from sieges or corps left to observe fortified places, from the troops required to guard the territory gained, and the lengthening line ofcommunications, from the fact that we are removing further from our resource while the enemy is falling back upon and drawing nearer to his, from the danger of other States joining in to prevent the utter destruction of the defeated nation, from the rousing of the whole nation in extremity to save themselves by a people's war, from the slackening of effort in the victorious army itself, etc., etc. Leoben, Friedland, Austerlitz, Moscow, are instances of such a culminating point, and probably in the late Russo-Japanese war Harbin would have proved so, too, if peace had not intervened.
Clausewitz continues: "It is necessary to know how far it (our preponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and, instead of fresh advantage, reap disaster." He defines it as "The point at which the offensive changes into the defensive," and says, "tooverstep this point is more than simply a useless expenditure of power yielding no further results, it is adestructivestep which causes reaction, and the reaction is, according to all experience, productive of most disproportionateeffects."22The reader will find it an interesting exercise to search for this culminating point of victory in historical campaigns, and mark the result where it has been overstepped and where it has not been overstepped.
From this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the two classes into which Clausewitz divides all wars.
"The two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the completeoverthrow of the enemy, whether it be thatwe aim at his destruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and,next, those in which our aim is merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to account as matters for exchange in the settlement ofPeace."23
All wars, therefore, are wars for the complete destruction of the enemy,i.e."unlimited object," or wars with a "limited object." In the plan of a war it is necessary to settle which it is to be in accordance with our powers and resources of attack compared with the enemy's resources for defence, and where our culminating point of victory is likely to be, on this side of the enemy's capital or beyond it. If the former—then the plan should be one with a "limitedobject," such as the Crimea, Manchuria, etc.; if the latter—then the plan should aim at the enemy's total destruction, such as most of Napoleon's campaigns, or the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as 1866, or 1870. As Clausewitz says: "Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages, not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which, by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be.This, therefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical questions."24
In Clausewitz's two plans for war with France in1831,25this difference is plain. In the first plan, he considered Prussia, Austria, the German Confederation, and Great Britain united as alliesagainst France,—and with this great superiority of numbers he plans an attack by two armies, each of 300,000 men, one marching on Paris from Belgium, one on Orleans from the Upper Rhine. In the second plan the political conditions had meanwhile changed; Austria and Great Britain were doubtful, and Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious if Prussia and the German Confederation alone could appear before Paris in sufficient strength to guarantee victory in a decisive battle, and with which it would be permissible to venture even beyond Paris. So he proposed to limit the object to the conquest of Belgium, and to attack the French vigorously the moment they entered that country.
Which strict limitation of the object within the means available to attain it is characteristic of Clausewitz's practical way of looking at things. In each plan,however, a vigorous offensive aiming at a decisive victory was to be adopted.
The third place, in respect to its present-day importance, I assign to Clausewitz's clear statementthat—
"If we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal classes, into such as are onlypreparations for warand intothe war itself. This distinction must also be made in theory."
Nothing could be more clearly stated than this, or place in greater honour peace preparations. Like his doctrine of the importance of gaining public opinion in war, it is one of those almost prophetic utterances which make Clausewitzthe germ of modern military evolution.
Clausewitz, unlike Jomini who did not, foresaw to a certain extent (probably owing to his employment in organizing the new Prussian short-service army after 1806) the nation-in-arms of the present day. And, since his time, the greater the forces which have to be prepared, the greater has become the value of preparation for war. It has been continually growing, till to-day it has obtained such overwhelming importance that one may almost say that a modern war is practically (or nearly so) decidedbeforewar breaks out, according to which nation has made the greatest and most thorough peace preparations.
Clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every imaginable preparation." We may nowadays almost go so far as to say that preparation is war, and that that nationwhich is beaten in preparation is already beatenBEFOREthe war breaks out.
A failure to understand this fact is a fundamental error at the root of the idea of war as held by civilians, for many of them think that speeches are a substitute for preparations.
It is plain that these three ideas of Clausewitz regarding the nature of war, its political nature, the distinction between wars with an unlimited object and a limited object, and preparations in peace-time, are as much matters for the statesman as for the soldier, and require study and reflection on the part of the former as much as on the part of the latter.
I place friction here before the more detailed consideration of actual war, ofwar in itself, because it is that which distinguishes war on paper from real war, the statesman's and soldier's part from the part of the soldier only, and is therefore to be fitly treated midway between the two.
Friction in war is one of Clausewitz's most characteristic ideas. He always looks at everything from that point of view, and as friction and the fog of war, and their influence on human nature will always be the chief characteristic of real war as distinguished from theoretical war or war on paper, it is chiefly this habit or mode of thought which makes his writings of such great and permanent value. It is also a habit which we ought sedulously to cultivate in ourselves.
"In war everything is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult,"26runs hisfamous saying. Why is the simplest thing difficult? Because of the friction of war. And how can that friction be minimized? Only by force of character, and the military virtues of discipline, perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness. Hence the great emphasis which he always and everywhere lays upon character and these military virtues as the deciding factors in war.
"Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which distinguishes real war from war on paper," he says. Each individual of the army "keeps up his own friction in all directions." "The danger which war brings with it, the bodily exertions which it requires, augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the greatest causes ofit."27"This enormous friction is everywhere brought into contact withchance, and thus facts take place upon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being chance. As an instance of one such chance take the weather. Here the fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time,—a battery from firing, or a report from reaching the general. The rain (mud) prevents a battalion from arriving,—or the cavalry from charging effectively, because it had stuck fast in the heavy ground." And so on. Consider for examples the foggy mornings of Jena or Austerlitz, of Eylau, the Katzbach, Grosbeeren, Dennewitz, Pultusk, Dresden, Sadowa; or the mud of Poland, the snow of Russia, or, latest, the mud of Manchuria.
"Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium." "The knowledge of friction is a chief part of that so often talked of experience in war, which is required in a good general." "It istherefore this friction which makes that which appears easy in war so difficult inreality."28In considering any situation in war we must therefore always add to the known circumstances—friction.
In Clausewitz's way of looking at war itself I assign at once the first place to his doctrine, "The destruction of the enemy's military force is the leading principle of war, and for the whole chapter of positive actionthe direct way to the aim."29This dictum, repeated in many different forms, underlies his whole conception of war. All the old theoretical ideas about threatening by manœuvring, conquering by manœuvring, forcing the enemy to retreat by manœuvring, and so forth, in which his predecessors entangledstrategy, and from which even the Archduke Charles and Jomini had not completely freed themselves, he brushes aside by "our assertion is thatONLYgreat tactical results can lead to great strategicalresults."30Thus he leads and concentrates our thoughts in strategy on the central idea of victory in battle, and frees us once for all from the obscuring veil of lines and angles and geometrical forms by which other writers have hidden that truth. "Philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of overcoming and disarming an adversary without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However plausible this may appear,it is an error which must be extirpated, for, in such dangerous things as war,the errors which spring from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst."31For "he who uses force unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed,mustobtain the superiority if his adversary does not act likewise." And the "worst of all errors in wars" is still the idea of war too commonly held by civilians in this country, as witness the outcries which greeted every loss during the South African war, which shows how much Clausewitz is needed as a tonic to brace their minds to the reality.
"War is an act of violence which in its application knowsNObounds." "Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed; if a bloody slaughter be a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to war (for avoiding unnecessary war), but not for making the sword we wear blunt and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, till some one steps in with a sword that issharp, and lops off the arm from our body."
The second place I assign to his doctrine ofthe simplest plans, because time is required for the completion of complicated evolutions, but "a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us havetimefor wide-reaching skilfulcombination."32"By this it appears to us that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are complicated is conclusively shown."
"We must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike," or the opponent will get his thrust in first.
"Whenever this is the case, we must ourselves choose the shorter." "Therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by complicated plans,we must always rather endeavour to be beforehand with him by the simplest and shortest."
The salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between the numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation, and lines of manœuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in Jomini and his predecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing a part,—for these Clausewitz has little respect. In his chapter on "The GeometricalElement,"33he says, "We therefore do not hesitate to regard it as an established truth thatin strategy more depends upon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on the form of the great lines by which they are connected."34Of coursehe does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above sentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. He therefore frees us from a great deal of pedantry, and takes us back to the heart of things.
has been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about its components.
"An ordinary character never attains to complete coolness" in danger. "Danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is necessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under noticehere."35
Clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul." "Like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes offriction."36
To one who, like Clausewitz, had seen the retreat from Moscow, the awful passage of the Beresina, and the battle of the nations round Leipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. Had he not seen bodily exertion and hardship break up the Grand Army into a small horde of stragglers, and destroy the army of Kutusoff in almost an equal measure, in 1812, as well as practically ruin the spirit, and largely break up the great army of Napoleon in 1813?
As for the effects of bodily exertion onthe mind, purpose, and resolution of the general, compare Benningsen at Eylau after thirty-six hours in the saddle, or Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost all the results of his victory.
"The foundation of all our ideas and actions," but "in a few words,most reports are false." "When in the thick of war itself one report follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of probability." In another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual uncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he compares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and groping uncertainly for one another.
"These things which as elements meettogether in the atmosphere of war and make it aresistant medium for every activity, we have designated danger, bodily exertion, information, andfriction."37He never loses sight of this; it pervades everything he writes.
"And therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in this book are composedhalf of physical, half of moral causes and effects, and we might say that the physical are almost no more than the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real bright polishedweapon."38Pages might be filled with extracts showing his opinion that the moral is everything in war, but the reader is already convinced of that. Compare Napoleon's in war, "The moralis to the physical as three to one." Clausewitz regards all military questions from this point. His psychological attitude is what chiefly characterizes Clausewitz from all writers who came before him, and which makes his deductions so realistic, so interesting and so valuable for all who come after him.
In order not to weary the reader I will bring this chapter to a conclusion with one or two extracts relating to "tension and rest; the suspension of the act in warfare." This is explanatory of those frequent halts which take place in a campaign, which appear at first sight contradictory to the absolute theory of war. These halts are due to many causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, uncertainty, irresolution, friction, waiting for reinforcements, etc.
In this connection one must remember that war is "a chain of battles all strung together, one of which always brings on another." But they seldom follow each other immediately; there is usually a certain pause between. As soon as one battle is gained, strategy makes new combinations in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the next. Whilst these new combinations are being developed, or perhaps considered, there may be a greater or less suspension of the act, a longer or shorter halt in the forward movement. Then another spring forward. Clausewitz has a great many interesting things to say on thissubject.39
"If there is a suspension of the act in war, that is to say, if neither party for the moment wills anything positive, there isrest, and for the moment equilibrium.... As soon as ever one of theparties proposes to himself a new positive object, and commences active steps towards it, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as the enemy opposes this, there istensionof the powers; this lasts until the decision takes place.... This decision, the foundation of which lies always in the battle-combinations which are made on each side, ... is followed by a movement in one or other direction."
"It may so happen that both parties, at one and the same time, not only feel themselves too weak to attack, but are so in reality."
"Wild as is the nature of war it still wears the claims of human weakness, and the contradiction we see here, that man seeks and creates dangers which he fears at the same time, will astonish no one."
"If we cast a glance at military history in general, there we find so much the opposite of an incessant advance towardsthe aim, thatstanding stillanddoing nothingis quite plainly thenormal conditionof an army in the midst of war,actingtheexception. This must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception. But if military history has this effect by the great body of its events, so also the latest series of wars redeem the view. The war of the French Revolution shows only too plainly its reality, and only proves too plainly its necessity. In that war, and especially in the campaigns of Bonaparte, the conduct of war attained to that unlimited degree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the element. This degree is therefore possible, and if it is possible then it is necessary."
(1) "Hardly worth mentioning"! So that is how Clausewitz regards InternationalLaw, Clausewitz to whom in Germany "our most famous victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training," and on whom "everybody who to-day either makes or teaches modern war bases himself, even if he is not conscious of it." And we must regard nearly every foreign statesman as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time that we should cease to pin our faith on International Law, or think that it can in any way protect us, if we neglect strongly to protect ourselves. Power and expediency are the only rules that the practical politicians of foreign countries recognize, and the only question they ask themselves is, "Have we got sufficient power to do this," and if so, "Is it expedient to do it?"
(2) Treaties, too, what reliance can we place upon them for any length of time?None whatever. For treaties are only considered binding as long as the interests ofbothcontracting parties remain the same. Directly circumstances change, and they change constantly, the most solemn treaties are torn up, as Russia tore up the Treaty of Paris, or as Austria tore up the Treaty of Berlin. All history is full of torn-up treaties. And as it has been so it will be. The European waste-paper basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way, and a thing which can any day be thrown into a waste-paper basket is, indeed, a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. Only in ourselves can we trust. Therefore no treaties at present existing should be allowed in any way to alter or lessen our preparations to enable us to fightalonewhen necessary.
(3) It cannot be too often repeated, or too much insisted on, that the successor failure of a State policy is dependent upon the amount of armed force behind it. For upon the amount of armed force behind a policy depends the greater or less amount of resistance, of friction, which that policy will meet with on the part of other nations. The prestige of a nation depends upon the general belief in its strength. The less its prestige, the more it will be checked and foiled by its rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded into a war which would have been prevented if its prestige, or armed force, had been greater. On the other hand, the greater its prestige, its armed force, the more reasonable and inclined to a fair compromise are its rivals found. So that the greater the prestige, the armed force, of our nation is, the more likely is it that all our negotiations will be settled by peaceful compromise, and the longer we shall enjoy peace.
Therefore, under this consideration, those who would reduce our national forces are deeply mistaken, for such action would imperil our prestige, imperil our negotiations, imperil our peace, and perhaps lead eventually to a war that we might otherwise have avoided. Therefore no such deeply mistaken economy for us. A few hundred thousand pounds saved would be dear economy indeed if it led, as well it might, to the payment before many years of a War Indemnity of £800,000,000 or so. Better the evils we know than the far greater evils we know not of.
(4) Surprise in war is what we have to fear. There are two sorts of national surprise that we must consider. These are (A) thesurprise by actual hostilitiestaking place before the actual declaration of war, such as the Japanese surprise and practical destruction of the fighting forceof the Russian fleet at Port Arthur; (B) thesurprise by superior preparation, silently carried out till all is ready for a decisive blow, whilst we are not ready for equally efficient defence, and then a declaration of war before we have time to get properly ready, as the surprise in this sense of France by Germany in 1870.
(A) Every successful example is always copied, and usually on a larger scale. We may be quite certain that our rivals have taken to heart the lesson of Port Arthur. It is possible that our next war will open with a similar night attack on our fleet, either just before, or simultaneously with the declaration of war. If it is successful, or even partially successful, it may produce the most grave results, as in the Russo-Japanese War. Itmayrender possible a naval action with almost equal forces, in which our opponentsmightbe victorious. The invasion of this country on a gigantic scale by 300,000 men or more would then follow as a certainty. This is not a probability, but a possibility which requires to be kept in our view.
(B)The surprise by superior preparation, as I term it, for want of a better name, is a danger to which we are peculiarly liable. As Lord Salisbury said, "The British constitution is a bad fighting machine," and it is made an infinitely worse fighting machine by the lack of interest which our politicians appear to take in all that appertains to war. Hence they are always liable to oppose, as excessive, preparations which are in reality the minimum consistent with national safety. Consequently our preparations for war, controlled as they are by those who have no special knowledge of war, are always apt to be insufficient,as were those of France in 1870. In former days this did not perhaps so very much matter, although it resulted in the unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands of British lives and hundreds of millions of British treasure. But still we were able, at this somewhat excessive price, to "muddle through," owing to the heroic efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make bricks without straw and retrieve the mistakes of our policy. For our opponents then conducted war in such a slow way as to give us time to repairafterthe outbreak of war our lack of preparationbeforeit. But opposed to a modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen and led by generals brought up in the school of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Moltke—all will be different. In such a war the national forces brought into play are so immense that it is only possible to do so efficaciously if everything hasbeen most carefully prepared and organized beforehand. It is notpossibleto improvise such organization of national forceafterthe war has begun, for there cannot be sufficient time. If our rival makes adequate preparation before the war to bring to bear in that war thewholeof its national force, material, moral, and physical, while we only prepare to bring to bear asmall portionthereof, then there will be no time afterwards for us to repair our negligence. The war will be conducted with the utmost energy, and the aim will be to utilize to the utmost the superiority obtained by superior preparation, so as to make the decision as rapid as possible before we have time to recover from the effects of our surprise. That is the danger we have to fear, and to keep ever in mind.
"War," says Clausewitz, "is only a continuation of State policy by other means." The first question that at once arises in the mind is what is meant by Policy. We may safely lay down that State policy is the defence and furtherance of the interests of the nation as a whole amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies towards rest and towards acquisition, and that its instruments are the pen and the sword. There can, of course, be any degree of consistency or fickleness, of strength or weakness, of success or failure, in the policy of a State.
Clausewitz expressly stated that hehoped "to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen," such, for instance, as the idea that it is possible to consider either policy or war as independent of the other.
It is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy if we regard it as continuous both in peace and war, using sometimes peace negotiations, sometimes war negotiations, as circumstances require, to attain the political object.
War is only a part of policy, a continuance of the previous negotiations; but the instrument is now the sword and not the pen. As Clausewitz says, "In one word, the art of war, in its highest point of view, is policy; but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes." War is merely a means whereby a nation attempts to impose its will upon another nation in order to attain a political object. Thisobject is settled by policy, which also orders the war, determines what sort of war it is to be, with what means and resources and expenditure it is to be waged, when its object has been attained, and when it is to cease. In fact, policy prepares, leads up to, orders, supports, guides, and stops the war. As Clausewitz said, "All the leading outlines of a war are always determined by the Cabinet—that is, by a political, not a military functionary."
Unity of thought is only to be obtained by "the conception that war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself." "And how can we conceive it to be otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political relations between different nations and governments? Is not war merely another kind of writing and language for politicalthoughts?" "Accordingly war can never be separated from political intercourse; and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object."
"If war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from policy. If the policy is grand and powerful, so will also be the war, and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its absolute form." "Only through this kind of view war recovers unity; only by it can we seeallwars ofonekind, and it is only through it that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of view from whichgreat plansmay be traced out and determined upon."
"There is upon the whole nothingmore important in life than to find out therightpoint of view from which things should be looked at and judged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend the mass of events in their unity fromonestandpoint; and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency." "We can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests generally of the whole community," and "wars are in reality only the expressions or manifestations of policy itself."
To the student of history this unity of conception is equally necessary, for it supplies the key to many a military puzzle. Without it we can never understand, for instance, Napoleon's conduct in 1812, 1813, 1814; nor without it can we see the compelling reason of many battles, apparently fought against military judgment, such, for instance, asBorodino, Leipzig, Sedan, etc. We have to remember that these and many other battles, as, for instance, Ladysmith, were fought from a political, not a military, motive. It is a well-known fact that the strategist frequently has to alter and adapt his plans so as to suit overmastering political necessity. Yet many people have failed to draw therefrom the generalization of Clausewitz that "war is only a continuation of State policy by other means." But having got it now, let us hold fast to it, with all its consequences.
"From this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things a necessary conflict between the political and military interests, and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded asimperfect knowledgeonly. That policy makes demands upon the war which it cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition thatit knows the instrument it is going to use, therefore contrary to a natural andindispensable supposition."
"None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made without an insight into the political relations; and in reality when people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy on the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different to what they intend. It is not this influence, but the policy itself which should be found fault with. If policy is right, if it succeeds in hitting the object, then it can only act on the war also with advantage; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the object, the cause is to be looked for in a mistaken policy.
"It is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes. Just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant sometimes says what he does not intend,so policy, when intending right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views.
"This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of political intercourse."
"Before going further we must guard ourselves against a false interpretation of which this is very susceptible. We do not mean to say that this acquaintancewith the nature of war is theprincipalqualification for a war minister. Elevation, superiority of mind, strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he must possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another."
"If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy to accommodate itself to the means available for war, there is only one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are not combined in one person (note, as William of Orange, Frederick the Great, or Napoleon), which is to make the chief commander anex-officiomember of the Cabinet, that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions."
"The influence of any military man except the general-in-chief in the Cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able, vigorous action."
We shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding dicta of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree.
Firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy.
Secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of his profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering, guiding, and controlling of war.As Clausewitz says, "it is anindispensable suppositionthat policy knows the instrument it is going to use." It is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations between two States cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the political negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued in another form—in the form of war. The statesman still retains control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his object. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well as of the peaceful, policy of the nation.
Thirdly, it is a disputed point how far the influence of policy is theoretically allowable during the course of actual operations,i.e.after the war has actually begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy should only act at the beginning and at the end of a war, and should keep clear during the actual operations. Clausewitz,however, holds that the two are so intimately related that the political influence cannot be lost sight of even during actual operations. Between two such authorities we may well hesitate to give a definite opinion, and must seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly, in history policy often has really affected the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813, 1814, 1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan, or Bismarck's interference to hurry on the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith in the Boer War, and in many other cases. That, we must admit. We must also admit that its interference frequently produces a weakening effect on the operations. Clausewitz says that that only occurs when the policy itself is wrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle way rule appears to be this, that policy should be dominant at the beginning and end of a war, but during actualoperations the statesman should exercise the greatest possible restraint, and avoid all interference, except when demanded byoverwhelming political necessity.
Fourthly, a politician is bound to study war. He is bound to study war as well as diplomacy, his two instruments. If he only studies how to use one of his two instruments, he will be a poor statesman indeed. It is plain that heMUSTstudy war, so that he may not try to use an instrument of which he knows nothing. It is not meant, of course, that a politician should study all the details of naval and military matters, but only that he should study the general principles of war, and the means, resources, and forces required to attain the political object of war, through the submission of the enemy.
Fifthly, in order that the object andthe means of policy may harmonize, it is necessary that the one to whom the national interests are entrusted should study the principles of war, so thathe may keep his policy proportionate to the means of enforcing it. That is to say, he must not propose or commit the nation to a policy which is likely to be strongly opposed by another Power, unless he has from careful study and enquiry made certain that he has sufficient armed force at his disposal, in case the opposing nation suddenly challenges his policy and declares war. He should not even consider a policy withoutat the same timeconsidering with his military and naval advisers the nation's means of enforcing that policy if challenged to do so. He must not think of embarking upon a war, or of provoking another nation to do so, till he has carefully provided sufficient armed force to give areasonable prospect, if not a certainty, of success. Otherwise,
Sixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war will be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall of the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be Great Britain or not) lies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as we shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy, the utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,—these points deserve the most serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the destinies of the Anglo-Saxon Race.