Seven other hospital trains, all adapted from existing rolling stock in Cape Colony or Natal, were made available for the transport of sick and wounded in the same war. One of these, No. 4, was arranged and equipped at the cost of the British Central Red Cross Committee, under the direction of Sir John Furley, then acting as the Society's Chief Commissioner in South Africa. The arrangement of the other converted trains was carried out by the Army Medical Service in South Africa, with the co-operation of the Government Railway officials in Cape Town and Natal. A number of specially-fitted carriages, placed at convenient distances on the railways occupied by the British, were made use of to pick up small parties of sick from the various posts along the lines, such carriages being attached to passing trains for the conveyance of the sufferers to the nearest hospital. Many of them had a regular service up and down a particular stretch of railway. Some were provided with iron frames for the support of service stretchers, and others were fitted up similarly to the ward-carriages of the converted hospital trains. Convalescents and "sitting-up" patients for whom no special accommodation was necessary travelled in such ordinary trains as might be available.
In effect, there are four classes of trains by which, under the conditions of to-day, the sick and wounded may be despatched from the seat of war:—(1) Permanent hospital trains, specially constructed for the purpose; (2) temporary hospital trains, made up either entirely of converted ordinary vehicles or partly of converted and partly of specially-constructedrolling stock, their use for this purpose continuing for the duration of the war; (3) ambulance trains improvised at railhead out of rolling stock bringing troops, supplies and stores to the front, the internal fittings for "lying-down" cases being of such a kind that they can be readily fixed or dismantled; and (4) ordinary passenger carriages for slightly wounded or convalescents.
The advantages conferred on armies from a strategical point of view, under all these improved conditions, are no less beyond dispute than the benefits conferred on the individual soldiers, and if railways had done no more in regard to the conduct of warfare than ensure these dual results, they would still have rendered a service of incalculable value. While, also, their provision of an efficient ambulance transport system, with its speedy removal of non-effectives, has served the purposes of war, it has, in addition, by its regard for the sick and wounded themselves, further served to relieve warfare of some, at least, of its horrors.
FOOTNOTES:[16]A saying attributed to Napoleon is that he preferred a dead soldier to a wounded one.[17]"Ueber den Transport Schwerverwundeter und Kranker im Kriege, nebst Vorschlägen über die Benutzung der Eisenbahnen dabei." 33 pp. Berlin, 1860.[18]"Les Institutions Sanitaires pendant le Conflit Austro-Prussien-Italien." Par Thomas W. Evans. Paris, 1867.[19]For "A short consideration and comparison of the regulations for the transport of sick and wounded by rail, as laid down in four of the leading Continental armies (the German, French, Austrian and Italian)," see a paper on "Continental Regulations for the Transport of Sick and Wounded by Rail," by Surg.-Capt. C. H. Melville, A.M.S.,Royal United Service Institution Journal, vol. 42 (1898), pp. 560-594.[20]In an article on "Military Hospital Trains; their Origin and Progress," inThe Railway Gazetteof December 4, 1914, it is said: "The comparatively small loss of the Germans by death from wounds in 1870 was due solely to the fact that they entered upon the war with what were then considered wonderfully elaborate arrangements for removing the wounded.... The trains were composed partly of first-class carriages, for the less badly wounded, and partly of covered goods wagons.... In these covered vans were placed beds formed of boards laid on springs. Each van would hold four or five men, and a sister rode in the van." One would not, however, consider to-day that there was anything wonderfully elaborate in an arrangement under which no more than four or five sufferers were accommodated in each goods van.
[16]A saying attributed to Napoleon is that he preferred a dead soldier to a wounded one.
[16]A saying attributed to Napoleon is that he preferred a dead soldier to a wounded one.
[17]"Ueber den Transport Schwerverwundeter und Kranker im Kriege, nebst Vorschlägen über die Benutzung der Eisenbahnen dabei." 33 pp. Berlin, 1860.
[17]"Ueber den Transport Schwerverwundeter und Kranker im Kriege, nebst Vorschlägen über die Benutzung der Eisenbahnen dabei." 33 pp. Berlin, 1860.
[18]"Les Institutions Sanitaires pendant le Conflit Austro-Prussien-Italien." Par Thomas W. Evans. Paris, 1867.
[18]"Les Institutions Sanitaires pendant le Conflit Austro-Prussien-Italien." Par Thomas W. Evans. Paris, 1867.
[19]For "A short consideration and comparison of the regulations for the transport of sick and wounded by rail, as laid down in four of the leading Continental armies (the German, French, Austrian and Italian)," see a paper on "Continental Regulations for the Transport of Sick and Wounded by Rail," by Surg.-Capt. C. H. Melville, A.M.S.,Royal United Service Institution Journal, vol. 42 (1898), pp. 560-594.
[19]For "A short consideration and comparison of the regulations for the transport of sick and wounded by rail, as laid down in four of the leading Continental armies (the German, French, Austrian and Italian)," see a paper on "Continental Regulations for the Transport of Sick and Wounded by Rail," by Surg.-Capt. C. H. Melville, A.M.S.,Royal United Service Institution Journal, vol. 42 (1898), pp. 560-594.
[20]In an article on "Military Hospital Trains; their Origin and Progress," inThe Railway Gazetteof December 4, 1914, it is said: "The comparatively small loss of the Germans by death from wounds in 1870 was due solely to the fact that they entered upon the war with what were then considered wonderfully elaborate arrangements for removing the wounded.... The trains were composed partly of first-class carriages, for the less badly wounded, and partly of covered goods wagons.... In these covered vans were placed beds formed of boards laid on springs. Each van would hold four or five men, and a sister rode in the van." One would not, however, consider to-day that there was anything wonderfully elaborate in an arrangement under which no more than four or five sufferers were accommodated in each goods van.
[20]In an article on "Military Hospital Trains; their Origin and Progress," inThe Railway Gazetteof December 4, 1914, it is said: "The comparatively small loss of the Germans by death from wounds in 1870 was due solely to the fact that they entered upon the war with what were then considered wonderfully elaborate arrangements for removing the wounded.... The trains were composed partly of first-class carriages, for the less badly wounded, and partly of covered goods wagons.... In these covered vans were placed beds formed of boards laid on springs. Each van would hold four or five men, and a sister rode in the van." One would not, however, consider to-day that there was anything wonderfully elaborate in an arrangement under which no more than four or five sufferers were accommodated in each goods van.
The greater the experience gained of the application of rail-power in practice, and the closer the study devoted to its possibilities, in theory, the more obvious it became that the fullest degree of advantage to be derived therefrom could only be assured as the result of preparation and organisation in peace; and this conclusion appeared specially to apply to countries whose geographical and political conditions led them to regard it as expedient that they should always be ready to meet some great national emergency. The Federal Government of the United States certainly did succeed, in the early sixties, in creating an excellent military rail-transport organisation after hostilities had broken out; but the conditions of warfare to-day make it essentially necessary that arrangements for the use of railways for military purposes should, as far as possible, be planned, perfected or provided for long in advance of any possible outbreak of hostilities.
Among other considerations which strengthen this view are the following:—
I. The increasing dependence of armies on rail transport owing to (a) the vastly greater number of troops employed now than in former days; (b) the supreme importance of time as a factor in enabling a Commander-in-Chief to effect, possibly, an earlier concentration than the enemy, and so obtain the power of initiative; and (c) the magnitude of the supplies, munitions and other necessaries wanted to meet the daily wants of the prodigious forces in the field, and only to be assured by the employment of rail transport from a more or less distant base.
II. The complications, confusion and possible chaos which may result if, without prior preparation, railway lines designed to serve ordinary transport purposes are suddenly required to meet military demands taxing their resources to the utmost extreme.
III. The further troubles that will assuredly arise if, in the absence of efficient control by properly-constituted and responsible intermediaries, railwaymen unfamiliar with military technicalities are left to deal with the possibly conflicting and impracticable orders of individual military officers themselves unfamiliar with the technicalities and limitations of railway working.
IV. The imperative necessity of having an organised and well-regulated system of forwarding military supplies, etc., in order both to avoid congestion of stations and lines and to ensure the punctual arrival of those supplies in the right quantities, at the right spot, and at the right time.
V. The need, in view of the vital importance of the part that railways may play in war, of having organised forces of railway troops and railway workers available, together with stores of materials and appliances, to carry out, speedily and thoroughly, all the work that may be necessary for the repair, construction or destruction of railway lines.
In making the necessary preparations, in time of peace, to ensure the successful realisation of these and other purposes, there is a vast amount of work that requires to be done.
In readiness for the excessive strain that will be thrown on the railways as soon as they pass from a peace footing to a war footing, on the order being given for mobilisation, the military authorities and the railway authorities must needs have at their command the fullest information as to the physical conditions, the resources and the transport capabilities of every line of railway in the country which, directly or indirectly, may be able to render useful service. Details as to double or single track; gradients; number of locomotives, carriages, wagons, horse-boxes and other vehicles available; and facilities afforded by stations in important centres as regards number and length of platformsand sidings, water supply, loading, unloading or storage accommodation, etc., are all carefully compiled and kept up to date. As regards rolling stock, lines not likely to be called upon to carry any military transports at all may still be able to contribute to the supply of carriages and wagons wanted to meet the heavy demands on other railways. By including all lines of railway in the collected data, it will be known exactly where additional rolling stock may be obtained if wanted. The carrying capacity of the different types of carriages, trucks, etc., is also noted. If necessary, arrangements will be made for the reduction of gradients, the improvement of curves, the construction of connecting links between different main lines, the lengthening of station platforms, or the provision of increased loading or unloading facilities.
On the basis of the information collected elaborate calculations are made in regard to such matters as (1) the number of vehicles required for a given number of men, with horses, guns, munitions, stores, road vehicles, etc., so that rolling stock can be used to the best advantage and according as to whether the troops carried belong to the Infantry, Cavalry or the Artillery; (2) the number of vehicles that can be made up into a train going by any one route; (3) the length of time likely to be taken for the entraining and detraining respectively of a given unit; (4) the time intervals at which a succession of troop trains can follow one another on the same line; (5) the speed of troop trains; and (6) the further intervals to be allowed in the arrival at one and the same station, or centre, of a number of trains starting from different points, so as to avoid the risk of congestion and of consequent delays.
Military time-tables, corresponding to those in everyday use, have next to be prepared, showing exactly what trains must run from given stations, at fixed hours, by clearly defined routes, to specified destinations as soon as the occasion arises. The great aim kept in view in the compilation of these time-tables is, not alone preparation in advance, but the most complete utilisation possible of the available transport facilities of the country as a whole.
A selection must also be made in advance of the stations at which troops on long journeys can obtain food, as well as of the stations to be used as depôts for stores and supplies, all the necessary arrangements being provided for.
After the initial great strain on the railway resources involved in mobilisation and concentration, there will still be an enormous amount of transport to be done during the campaign. In the one direction there will be a constant despatch of reinforcements, provisions, clothing, munitions and supplies or stores to the front; in the other direction there will be a steady flow of sick and wounded, of prisoners of war, and of materiel not wanted at the front, followed by the final return home of the troops at the end of the campaign.
At each important point along the lines of communication where special services in connection with the rail transport, in either direction, are to be rendered, there must be organisation of such kind as will ensure that whatever is necessary shall be done promptly and efficiently under the control of persons of recognised authority and responsibility, and without any of the friction that would, inevitably, lead to delays, traffic blocks and other complications.
Nor can the same system of organisation apply to the whole line of communication, from the base to the limit of the rail service at the front. A point will be reached therein where the control, if not the actual operation, of the railway lines must needs be transferred from the civil to the military authorities, rendering necessary a scheme of supervision and working different from that which can be followed on the sections not within the actual theatre of war.
Then, if the army should be compelled to retreat before the enemy, there should be available a sufficiency of forces skilled in the art of rapidly and effectively destroying lines, bridges, viaducts, tunnels, or other railway property, with a view to retarding the enemy's movements until, it may be, reinforcements can be brought up in sufficient number to check his further progress. If, alternatively, the army should advance into the enemy's country, there mustagain be a provision of Railway Troops fully qualified by previous training and experience both to repair quickly the demolitions or the damage which the enemy will have carried out on his own lines and to construct hastily such new lines—light railways or otherwise—as the circumstances of the moment require. These things done, and still further advance being made into the invaded territory, the need will also arise for a staff capable of operating, under war conditions, the lines of which possession has been taken, in order that communications with the advanced front and the forwarding of reinforcements and supplies can still be maintained.
All these and many other things, besides, must needs be thought out and prepared for in time of peace, long in advance of any probable or even any possible war. They are, in fact, made the subject of exhaustive and continuous study alike by military officers specially entrusted with the task and by railway managers commanding all the technical knowledge requisite for making arrangements calculated to ensure the prompt and efficient satisfaction of all such demands for military rail-transport as may, with whatever urgency, and under whatever conditions, some day be put forward.
Still more practical do the preparations in peace for war become when they include the construction of a network of strategical railways expressly designed to facilitate the mobilisation of troops, their speedy concentration on the frontier, or their movement from one point of attack to another at the theatre of war.
In no country in the world was the desirability of preparing in time of peace for military rail-transport in time of war recognised earlier than in Germany. In none has the practice of such preparation in peace been followed up with greater study and persistence.
As shown in Chapter I, the military use of railways led to the proposal and discussion in Germany of definite schemes for such use as early as 1833; and it is not too much to say that, from that date down to the outbreak of the World-War in 1914, the whole subject had received there an ever-increasing degree of attention from the military authorities, and, also, from a large body of writers as a question of the day in its relation more especially to German expansion.
One great mistake, however, made alike by historians, by writers in the Press, and by popular tradition, has been the attributing to Germany of a far higher degree of credit in regard to the alleged perfection of her preparations for theFranco-Prussian War of 1870-71than she was really entitled to claim. Nor, indeed, has the fact been sufficiently recognised that the organisation eventually elaborated by Germany for the efficient conduct of her rail-transport in war had been evolved from studies, investigations, trials, experiments and tests (in actual warfare or otherwise) extending over a period of half a century or more, during which time, also, there was issued a bewildering mass of laws, rules and regulations, each more or less modifying those that had gone before and adding still further to the elaborate, if not the extremely complicated, machinery laboriouslybuilt up as the result of the universally recognised genius of the German people for organisation.
The final great test of all this machinery was to be applied in 1914. Here, however, it must suffice, for present purposes, to show how the machinery itself was created and the form it finally assumed.
Down to 1861 Prussia had done no more, in the way of organising military transport by rail, than issue a series of Ordinances dealing with the movement of large bodies of troops, such Ordinances being akin to those which all the leading countries of Europe had either compiled or were engaged in compiling. Directly influenced by the developments of the Civil War in America, Prussia took the further step, in 1864, of forming a Railway Section of her General Staff. This new body was actively employed in the furtherance of Prussia's interests in the Danish War of the same year, when confirmatory evidence was given of the advantages to be derived from the use of rail transport for military movements, journeys that would have taken the troops sixteen days by road being done within six days by rail.
The organisation thus applied on a comparatively small scale in 1864 was further developed by Prussia in thecampaign of 1866.
On that occasion mobilisation and concentration of the Prussian troops were both carried out mainly by rail, under the direction of an Executive Commission consisting of an officer of the General Staff and a representative of the Ministry of Commerce. This Executive Commission sat in Berlin, and was assisted by Line Commissions operating on the different railways utilised for military purposes. Movements of troops by rail were certainly effected in one-third of the time they would have taken by road, while the Prussians, gaining a great advantage, by the rapidity of such movements, over Austria, routed her combined forces within seven days of crossing the frontier, and dictated terms of peace to her within a month.
Some serious faults were nevertheless developed, even in the course of this very short campaign, in Prussia's rail-transportarrangements, such being especially the case in regard to the forwarding of supplies. These were rushed to the front in excess of immediate requirements, the only concern of contractors or of officers at the base being to get them away, while the railway companies—bound to accept goods for transport and delivery as ordered—dispatched them without regard for any possible deficiency in the unloading and storage arrangements at the other end. The supplies, forwarded in bulk, followed as close up behind the troops as they could be taken; but the provision made for unloading was inadequate, the railway staffs disclaimed responsibility for the work, and, before long, stations and sidings at the front were hopelessly blocked, although elsewhere the shortage of wagons was so great that everything was at a standstill. Even when wagons had been unloaded, they were too often left on the lines, in long trains of empties, instead of being sent where they were most needed. Each railway company disposed of its own rolling stock independently of the other companies, adopting the view that it had no concern with what was happening elsewhere. In some instances special trains were dispatched for the conveyance of a few hundred men or a few hundredweights of stores. Orders which should have gone direct from one responsible person to another went through a variety of channels with the result that serious delays and no less serious blunders occurred. One East Prussian Battalion, for instance, was sent off by train in a direction exactly opposite to that which it should have taken.
All these and other troubles experienced were directly due to the absence of a central controlling body formed on such a basis that it could (1) govern the rail-transport arrangements as a whole; (2) supervise the forwarding of supplies; (3) provide for a proper distribution, and better utilisation, of rolling stock; (4) secure the prompt unloading and return of wagons, and (5) form a direct link between the military authorities and the railway managements and staffs.
Immediately on the close of the war a mixed committee of Staff officers and railway authorities was appointed,under the supervision of von Moltke, to inquire what steps should be taken to organise the Prussian military transport services on such a basis as would avoid a repetition of the faults already experienced, and give a greater guarantee of efficiency on the occasion of the next war in which Prussia might be engaged. The desirability of making such preparations in time of peace doubtless appeared the greater in proportion as it became more and more evident that the trial of strength between Prussia and Austria would inevitably be followed by one between Prussia and France.
The scheme elaborated by the committee in question took the form of aRoute Service Regulationwhich was approved by the King on May 2, 1867, and was, also, adopted by most of the other German States, but was kept secret until the time came for applying it in practice, as was done in the war of 1870-71.
The basis of the scheme was the creation of a system ofRoute Inspection("Etappen Inspektion") constituting a department of the General Staff, and designed—
I. To watch over the replenishing of the operating army with men, horses, provisions, ammunition, and other military stores.
II. To see to the removal into the interior of the country of the sick and wounded, prisoners and trophies of war.
III. With the assistance of the troops appointed for the purpose and the Railway Field Corps, to maintain the line of communication, viz., railway, roads, bridges, telegraphs, and postal arrangements; to undertake the government of the hostile conquered provinces, and other duties.
The preparation of the necessary plans for the attainment of these objects was entrusted to aCentral Commissioncomposed, partly of officers connected with the General Staff and the Ministry of War, and partly of prominent functionaries on the staffs of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Public Works (then in supreme control over the railways), and of the Minister of the Interior. Two of its members—a Staff Officer and a railway expert from the Ministry of Commerce—formed anExecutive Commissionand exercised a general supervision over the arrangementsfor military transports; though on the removal of the Great Head-quarters from Berlin, the Executive Commission was to be succeeded by anAuxiliary Executive Commission, which would supervise the railways in the interior to be made use of for supplying the needs of the army.
In time of war the Central Commission was to be supplemented byLine Commissionsformed by military officers and railway officers in combination, and operating each in a leading centre of railway traffic. Their function it would be—with the assistance ofDistrict Line Commissions—not only to communicate to the line or lines of railway in their district such orders as might be necessary for the transport of troops, guns, ammunition, horses, and supplies, but, also, to draw up or make the final arrangements in connection with the time-tables for the running of military trains; to fix the direction in which the trains would go; to decide at what stations the troops should stop for their meals or for their coffee; and, in fact, to arrange everything connected with the said transport down to—as it appeared at the time—the smallest details.
In the forwarding of supplies, each Army Corps was to have its own line of communication, separate and distinct from that of the other Army Corps, the object aimed at being that of avoiding the confusion and disorder which might result from the fact of several Army Corps using the same railway.
Each of such lines of communication would start from some large railway station forming aPoint of Concentration("Etappenanfangsort") for the collection and the dispatch therefrom of supplies for the Army Corps it would serve, or for the receipt and further distribution in the interior of persons or commodities coming back from the seat of war.
Along the line of railway, at distances of about 100 or 125 miles, stations were to be selected which would serve as halting-places for the feeding of troops, for the watering of horses, for the reception of sick and wounded unable to continue their journey, for the repair of rolling stock, or for other such purposes. The furthest point to be reached by rail from day to day would constituteRailhead("Etappenhauptort"),whence communication with the fighting line would be carried on by road, being further facilitated byHalting Places("Etappenörter")en route.
The whole of this elaborate organisation—and here we come to the weakest point in the system—was to be under the supreme direction and control of anInspector-General of Communications—a sort of Universal Provider of every requirement the Army could possibly need, and responsible for the fulfilment of a long and exceedingly varied list of obligations among which the conduct of military rail-transport became simply one of many items. The special merit of his position was assumed to be that of a superior authority who, having the rank of Commandant of a Division, and being in constant touch both with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and with the War Minister, would be able to establish harmony in the operations of the different services and corps. The principle itself was sound; but, in practice, such a multiplicity of duties fell upon him, or, through him, on his department, that the break-down which actually occurred in the campaign of 1870-71 should have been foreseen in advance.
On the declaration of war the Inspector-General was to organise the stations for the feeding of the troops and horses proceeding to the front, and was then himself to go to some station one or two marches from the fighting-line, and fix, each day, the Railhead Station for the time being, moving his own head-quarters as occasion might require. From these head-quarters he was to exercise control and direction over a staff among whose duties—apart from those relating to railways or rail-transport—were the following:—A centralisation of all the services through a Chief of the Staff giving a common impulse to them according to the instructions of the Inspector-General; the forwarding of all troops to the front, special precautions having to be taken that none were left behind; distribution of the troops on arrival at their destination; the forwarding of all supplies; decision of all personal questions that might arise in connection with the troops; the keeping of journals and registers, the drawing up of reports, and the carrying on ofcorrespondence with the War Minister and the Chiefs of the army; everything concerned with horses for the troops, transport and distribution of prisoners of war, and maintenance of good order among the troops; assurance of an ample supply of ammunition for the artillery; construction or provision of barracks, huts, or temporary hospitals; maintenance of roads and telegraphs; control of telegraphs and postal services at the seat of war; supervision of road communications; responsibility for the safe and regular delivery to the troops of all supplies and necessaries ordered to meet their requirements, and establishment of hospitals, infirmaries and convalescent homes, with the arrangements for the removal thereto of the sick and wounded.
In regard to railway matters, the Inspector-General was assisted by aDirector of Field Railwayswho, in turn, had many duties to perform. Acting in the name and with the authority of the Inspector-General, he gave directions to the Line Commissions concerning the succession in which supplies were to be forwarded, and, in conjunction with the military and railway authorities, drew up the time-tables for military transports, submitting them, however, for the approval of his chief before they were put into operation. The actual transport of troops and material—on the basis of principles the details of which would have been worked out in advance—was also to be conducted under the supervision of the Director of Railways. In the event of any of the lines being destroyed by the enemy, he was to undertake their reconstruction, obtaining through the Inspector-General such helpers—whether soldiers or civilians—as he might require to supplement his own working staff in the accomplishment of the necessary work. On the lines being restored, the Director was further to take control of their operation by means of troops and, also, of railway employés to be furnished by the Minister of Commerce on the requisition of the Inspector-General of Communications.
Such was the elaborate machinery which, constructed alike in peace and in secret by the Great General Staff, under the direct supervision of von Moltke himself, was tobe tested in the inevitable war with France for which it had been designed.
According to popular belief, Germany's preparations for that war were so complete that she had only, as it were, to press a button, or pull a lever, in order to ensure the immediate and perfect working of all the plans she had made in advance. Whether or not this was really so in regard to her transport arrangements, at least, is a point to which attention may now be directed.
At the beginning of the war aRoute Inspection, organised on the basis already detailed, and having its own Inspector-General of Communications in charge of, and responsible for, the efficient working of the entire network of duties and obligations, was called into being for each of the three German armies. Subsequently a fourth, under the Crown Prince of Saxony, was added.
So far as the mobilisation of the German troops and their concentration on the frontier were concerned the plans worked, on the whole, remarkably well; though even in this respect complete success was not attained. There were, in 1870, nine lines of concentration available, namely, six for the Northern and three for the Southern Army; and between July 24 and August 3, there were dispatched by these different routes 1,200 trains, conveying 350,000 men, 87,000 horses, and 8,400 guns or road vehicles. Yet the delays which occurred to some of these trains were alone sufficient to show that the machinery which had been elaborated was not working with perfect smoothness. On, for example, the route known as line "C," the troops sent toGiessenwere—as told by Balck, in his "Taktik"—eleven hours late in their arrival. They then had their first warm food after a journey which had lasted twenty-one hours. For the transport toHomburg-in-der-PfalzandNeunkirchenforty hours had been allowed. The first train did the journey in the time, but the next one took ninety hours.
It was, however, in the forwarding of supplies and in the provisioning of the troops that the greatest difficulties were experienced; and here there certainly appeared to be little real advance on the shortcomings of the campaign of 1866,notwithstanding all the preparations which had been made in the meantime.
Comprehensive as it undoubtedly was, the scheme prepared in time of peace included no adequate organisation for regulating the transport of supplies to the front and for ensuring alike their dispatch and their arrival in just such quantities, and under just such conditions, as would provide for the needs of the troops from day to day. Magazines had certainly been set up, but not in sufficient number or always in the right place. The system, too, of operating them was defective. Just as in 1866, so in 1870, army officers, contractors and railway companies, all inspired by zeal for the welfare of the troops, rushed off train-load after train-load of supplies to stations provided with an inadequate supply alike of sidings where the wagons could be accommodated and of labour for the work of unloading. Stores were handed to the railway staffs under the same conditions as in peace time, the idea being, apparently, that if they were only dispatched as soon as possible they would be sure to get to the troops in want of them.
As for the conditions at the other end, it not unfrequently happened that even though the supply-trains might go to stations where the facilities for unloading them were ample, the Commissariat or other officers in charge would follow the example already being set in France by regarding loaded railway trucks as convenient movable magazines which should not be unloaded until their contents were really wanted. This was done regardless of the fact alike that the trucks thus kept standing on the lines impeded the traffic and that they were urgently wanted to meet the shortage of trucks elsewhere. But for the stringent action taken to check it, the evil due to this use of railway trucks for storage purposes would have assumed even graver proportions than was actually the case. Defective, also, as the German arrangements in this respect undoubtedly were, they still did not attain to the same degree of inefficiency as was the case in France.
All the same, the general result of these various conditions was that serious difficulties were experienced on theGerman no less than on the French railways. No sooner had the concentration of the Prussian troops been completed than provisions and stores were sent after them in such volume that a hopeless block, extending to Cologne in one direction and Frankfort in the other, was speedily produced on the lines along the left bank of the Rhine, while the feeding of the troops was brought to a temporary standstill. The combined efforts of the Prussian Executive Commission, of the Minister of Commerce and of the Line Commissions failed for a time to overcome the conditions of chaos and confusion thus brought about, and on August 11, 1870, instructions had to be given that thenceforward supplies were to be forwarded only on the express order of the Intendant-General or of an Inspector-General of Communications. Yet on September 5 there were standing, on five different lines, a total of no fewer than 2,322 loaded wagons, containing 16,830 tons of provisions for the Second Army, or sufficient to keep it supplied for a period of twenty-six days. Such blocks on the German lines—though not always on so great a scale—were of frequent occurrence throughout the war.
Trouble arose, also, in getting provisions from the railway to the troops by reason either of the inadequate number of road vehicles or because of the use of these for the conveyance of ammunition or for other purposes, instead. Thus the Inspector-General of the First Army started with 2,000 road vehicles; but on October 17 the total number still at his disposal was only twenty. The position became still worse as the retreating French destroyed the lines behind them, increasing the difficulties of the invaders in maintaining their communications with the Fatherland.
While the food supplies for the German troops were thus blocking the railway lines—or, alternatively, were going bad on account either of the heated conditions of the closed wagons or of exposure to the weather after unloading—many of the German troops were suffering severe privations from lack of adequate nourishment; and they would have suffered still more but for the provision-trains or stores of supplies seized from the French at Metz, Forbach,Verdun, Dôle, Le Hans, and elsewhere. If, indeed, the French had only refrained from rushing their own supplies to the extreme front in excessive quantities, or if they had destroyed those they could not remove in time, the invaders would, on various occasions, have found themselves in a condition bordering on starvation. Even as it was, they were often reduced to the necessity of dependence on their "iron" rations.
Difficulty was especially experienced in feeding the army of occupation during the investment of Paris. The supplies received by train from Germany were equal to scarcely one half of the actual requirements; a resort to "requisitions" on the French territory occupied yielded inadequate results; and the making of a regular daily money-allowance to officers and men, so that they could purchase their own supplies in the open market or otherwise, was, at first, far from satisfactory. It was, in fact, only owing to the most strenuous effort on the part of the responsible officers, both during the investment of Paris and in earlier phases of the war, that the German troops were often saved from actual want.[21]
The main reasons for the defects and shortcomings thus developed in a scheme on which so much care and preparation had been bestowed were (1) that, while based on fundamentally sound principles, the scheme in its actual application threw too great a strain on the department of the Inspector-General of Communications, which, as we have seen, was expected to look after, not only rail transport, but route marching, telegraphs, postal arrangements, and a great variety of other things besides; (2) that, owing to the larger number of Army Corps, it was no longer possible, as had been done in 1866, to place a separate line of railway at the disposal of each, so as to allow the said department to superintend the traffic on the basis of its own organisation; and (3) the absence of a central administration specially designed (a) to act as an intermediary and to ensure co-operation and mutual working between the various Line Commissions and, also, between the individuals and administrations, both military and civil, engaged in the conduct of rail-transport; and (b) to control the traffic as a whole, avoiding difficulties, blocks and delays assuring a prompt and efficient distribution of supplies, and guaranteeing the utilisation of rolling stock to the best advantage.
With a view to overcoming, as far as possible, the trouble due to the wide extent and the great variety of duties falling on the department of the Inspector-General of Communications, it was arranged, during the latter part of the war, to relieve that department of all responsibility for the railway services and to transfer the control and direction of these to the Executive Commission established at the Royal Head-quarters. In this way it was hoped to utilise the rail-transport facilities to greater advantage, to decrease the risk of collisions and delays, and, through a central organisation, to distribute the transport demands more equally among the various railways concerned. By means of these provisional modifications in the original scheme a better system of operation was obtained during the remainder of the war. But the complete reorganisation that was really necessary was then impracticable, and much friction in the working of the railway services was still experienced, partly because this needful reorganisation could not be carried out, and partly because of the conflicting orders coming from different authorities, each of whom, under the conditions then existing, was perfectly within his right in giving them.[22]
The difficulties due to the attempts to rush supplies in excessive quantities direct to the fighting-line, or as near thereto as possible, were also met, to a certain extent, during the course of the war, by the setting up of additional railway magazines or depôts where the forwarding of necessaries could be better controlled; but it was not until the end of 1870 that any approach to regularity in supplying the wants of the German forces was finally secured.
No sooner had the war come to an end than the work of remedying the defects which had been developed was taken in hand by the Minister of War and the Great General Staff. Following the creation, on October 1, 1871, of a Railway Battalion on a permanent basis came, on July 20, 1872, a new Regulation cancelling the one of May 2, 1867, which had been in operation during the war, and substituting a new basis of organisation in its place.
While retaining the principle of a Central Commission in Berlin, the scheme of 1872 relieved the route authorities of all responsibility for rail transport as well as for railway restoration and operation at the theatre of war, transferring to a new military department all the duties falling under these heads, with the further advantage that such department would be able to control the railways in time of war independently of the civil authorities, and without the disadvantages hitherto resulting from the need to deal, in regard to railway questions, with nine separate Ministries of Commerce and about fifty different railway companies. At the same time the principle of co-ordination was to be maintained by the appointment of anInspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communicationwho, in each of these departments, would control a far more efficient organisation than had previously existed, and, also, as director-in-chief, would constitute a central authority and an intermediary between the services concerned and the head of the Great General Staff, under whose direction he would himself act.
Another important feature of the new Regulation was that a distinction was now drawn between (1) railways on or near to the theatre of war which could not be worked by their ordinary staffs, and must needs pass under military operation, with a paramount military control; and (2) "home" or other railways, in the rear of the fighting, whichmight carry ordinary traffic—except so far as the lines were wanted for military purposes—and might still be worked by their own staffs, but in the operation of which there should be a military element in time of war in order to facilitate the transport of troops and military necessaries.
Various other Regulations, and notably a series in 1878 and 1888, followed that of 1872, and eventually the whole scheme of organisation, with its additions and modifications, seeking to provide for every possible contingency, became extremely complicated. Of the multifarious instructions, provisions and orders which had been compiled, some applied to peace only, some to war only, and some to both peace and war; some to "home" railways and some to railways at the seat of war; some to military men and some to railway men, and so on. As an elaborate piece of machinery the organisation was more comprehensive and more complete than ever; but the fear arose that there had again been a failure to take the human element sufficiently into account. Of those in the military and the railway service who should have applied themselves in time of peace to a study of the elaborate and extremely involved provisions which would apply in time of war, comparatively few, it was found, were disposed to devote themselves to so uninviting a task.
So there was issued, on January 18, 1899, still another new Regulation which repealed some of the earlier ones and aimed at amplifying, condensing, rearranging and facilitating reference to the provisions remaining in force, in order that the whole scheme should be made clearer, simpler and easier to grasp. These results were fully attained, and, though still subject to the final test of a great war, such as that which broke out in 1914, the German Regulation of 1899 might certainly be considered a masterpiece of organisation as prepared in time of peace. One especially useful purpose it served was that of defining clearly the duties, responsibilities, and spheres of action of all the authorities, civil or military, concerned in the control and operation of railways for military purposes.
The various Regulations here in question have been supplemented from time to time byField Service Regulations,the first series of which, issued under date May 23, 1887, was designed to take the place of the Ordinances of 1861 relating to the movement by rail of great bodies of troops. These Field Service Regulations of 1887 constituted an epoch in the military history of Germany. They were regarded at the time as offering a resumé of the most advanced ideas of Moltke, if not, also, as the crowning glory of military organisation in the reign of William I; and they certainly exercised a powerful influence on German military literature. They were, further, the starting-point of a prolonged series of similar Regulations, all amending, modifying, adding to, or abbreviating their predecessors. These changes led to the issue, on January 1, 1900, of a new edition, based on the exhaustive studies of a Commission of fourteen members; and still later revisions resulted in the publication of a further series on March 22, 1908.[23]
Here, then, we get still further evidence of the keenness with which Germany has followed up, in times of peace, her preparations for war, while the Field Service Regulations, no less than the other Regulations already detailed, show the important place that military rail-transport holds in the view of those responsible in Germany for the making of these arrangements. "Railways," it is declared in the Regulations of 1908, "exercise a decisive influence on the whole conduct of a war. They are of the greatest importance for mobilising and concentrating the army, and for maintaining it in a state of efficiency, and they enable portions of it to be transported from one place to another during the operations." What the Field Service Regulations do is to present in concentrated and compact form the working details, in respect to field service requirements, of those other and fuller Regulations which cover the whole ground of military transport in general.
Taking these various sources of information, the nature of the organisation that Germany has thus effected as the result of so many years of study and experience may be summarised as follows:—
In time of peace the authorities entrusted with the task of ensuring, by their preparations in advance, the success of the whole system of military rail-transport include (1) the Minister of War; the Prussian Chief of the General Staff of the Army; the members of the Railway Section of the Great General Staff, the Line Commissions and the Station Commissions; authorities concerned in the forwarding, transport and receiving of supplies, and representatives of the Commissariat department; and (2) the Imperial Chancellor, the Imperial Railway Bureau, the Imperial Administration of Posts and Telegraphs, and the various railway administrations.
ThePrussian Minister of Waris the chief representative of the interests of the Army in all questions relating to the military use of the railways.
ThePrussian Chief of the General Staffof the Army has under his orders, in time of peace, the military authorities concerned in rail-transport, and gives them the necessary instructions. He keeps in close relations with the Imperial Railway Bureau, and serves as intermediary between that Bureau and the Prussian Minister of War. It is he who gives the directions according to which the use of the railways in war-time is regulated, and he prescribes all the preparations that are to be made in advance for the facilitating of such use. On mobilisation, he discharges all the duties appertaining to the office of the Inspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communication until that officer has himself taken them in hand. From that time he issues instructions according to circumstances.
TheRailway Section of the Great General Staffis required, among other duties, to collect, and have always available, the fullest and most complete information as to the powers and facilities of the railways for the transport of troops, etc. To this end it keeps in constant communication with the railway administrations, and, also, with the Imperial Railway Bureau (which centralises all questions affecting railway administration), completing, if necessary, through investigationsmade by its own officers, the information furnished annually by the Bureau. The Railway Section further takes charge of a wide range of details and preparations concerning military rail-transport in war-time.
On the outbreak of hostilities there is appointed for each theatre of war anInspector-General of Railways and Lines of Communicationwho, receiving his orders from the Chief of the General Staff, co-ordinates the two groups of services, and ensures harmony in their joint working. For the operation of the railways, as applied to military purposes, there is aDirector of Field Railwayswho, acting under the Inspector-General, controls the whole railway service. Through the Line Commissions or Commandants subordinate to him he conveys to the railway authorities the necessary demands or instructions in respect to military transport, and, in concert with his superior officers, he fixes the boundary between the lines to be operated on a peace footing and those that are to be subject to military working. In the discharge of these and other duties he is assisted by a staff composed partly of military men and partly of railwaymen. Each officer concerned in the transport arrangements has a recognised deputy who can act for him in case of need.
OfLine Commissions, placed in charge, for military purposes, over the lines of railway in certain districts, and becomingLine Commandantson the outbreak of war, there were twenty under the revised Regulation of 1899, the number being increased in 1904 to twenty-one. The headquarters of these Commissions are at such centres of traffic as Berlin, Hanover, Erfurt, Dresden, Cologne, Altona, Breslau, etc. They serve as intermediaries between the higher military authorities and the railway administrations with which they are associated. Each Line Commission consists, normally, of a staff officer of the active army and a prominent railway functionary, the former having a non-commissioned officer, and the latter a railway official, as secretary, with such further assistance as may be needed.
Subordinate, in turn, to the Line Commissions are theStation Commissions, which, receiving instructions from the former, see to the carrying out of the necessary transportrequirements either at their particular station or on the section of line of which they are placed in charge.
While full provision is thus made for the representation of the military element in the conduct of rail-transport in time of war, with a view to ensuring its efficiency, precautions are no less taken to avoid repetitions of earlier troubles due to questions of responsibility and control, and, more especially, to the interference of military officers in the technical operation of the railway lines. On this subject the Field Service Regulations of 1900 stated (paragraph 496):—
Railways can only fully accomplish their important and difficult task during war if no serious hindrances to their management are created by the conduct of the troops.
Railways can only fully accomplish their important and difficult task during war if no serious hindrances to their management are created by the conduct of the troops.
In the later Regulations of 1908 it was said (paragraph 527):—
The important rôle which railways have to fulfil renders it incumbent on every commander to do all in his power to prevent any interference with the traffic due to delay, etc., on the part of the troops. The railway staff and conducting officers are bound by the transport arrangements made by the railway authorities.The conducting officer is responsible for the administration of the detachment of troops or consignment of stores under his charge. It is his duty, as regards himself and his charge, to obey the instructions of the railway officials.Any interference with the service of the railways is forbidden.At important stations Railway Staff Officers are appointed who act as intermediaries between the conducting officers and the railway officials.
The important rôle which railways have to fulfil renders it incumbent on every commander to do all in his power to prevent any interference with the traffic due to delay, etc., on the part of the troops. The railway staff and conducting officers are bound by the transport arrangements made by the railway authorities.
The conducting officer is responsible for the administration of the detachment of troops or consignment of stores under his charge. It is his duty, as regards himself and his charge, to obey the instructions of the railway officials.
Any interference with the service of the railways is forbidden.
At important stations Railway Staff Officers are appointed who act as intermediaries between the conducting officers and the railway officials.
ConcerningLines of Communicationthe Field Service Regulations of 1908 say:—
A railway station, to serve as a Home Base ("Etappenanfangsort") will be assigned to every Army Corps. From these home bases supplies are sent forward to Collecting Depôts ("Sammelstationen"), which will be established at not too great a distance from the theatre of war.In the theatre of war a base will be assigned to each Army, the situation of which will change according to the progress of the operations. The Army Corps are connected with the Field Base by lines of communication roads ("Etappenstrassen"), and on these roads posts are formed about 13½ miles apart.
A railway station, to serve as a Home Base ("Etappenanfangsort") will be assigned to every Army Corps. From these home bases supplies are sent forward to Collecting Depôts ("Sammelstationen"), which will be established at not too great a distance from the theatre of war.
In the theatre of war a base will be assigned to each Army, the situation of which will change according to the progress of the operations. The Army Corps are connected with the Field Base by lines of communication roads ("Etappenstrassen"), and on these roads posts are formed about 13½ miles apart.
As for the mass of working details also included in the various Regulations, these may well appear to provide in advance for every possible requirement in regard to military transport by rail, from the movement of entire armies down to the supply of drinking water at stations and the taking of carrier pigeons in the troop trains.