Railway2 ft.Gauge.3 ft. 6 in.Gauge.Miles.Miles.Northern121119½Otavi425—Southern—340½North-to-South—317Total546777
Granting that the Northern Railway was needed to afford a means of communication between Swakopmund and the capital of the colony, and that the original purpose of the Otavi line was to provide an outlet for the copper obtained from the mines in that district, it is, nevertheless, the fact that the Southern and the North-to-South lines were designed to serve what were mainly or exclusively strategical purposes.
When the building of the first section of the Southern line—from Lüderitzbucht to Aus—was under consideration in the Reichstag, one of the members of that body, Herr Lattmann, recommended that the vote should be passed without being referred to a committee; and in support of his recommendation he said:—
This way of passing the vote would be of particular importance for the whole nation, since the railway would not then have to be regarded from the point of view of provisioning our troops, or with regard to the financially remunerative character of the colony, but because a much more serious question lies behind it, namely, what significance has the railway in the event of complications between Germany and other nations? Yes, this railway can be employed for other purposes than for transport from the coast to the interior; our troops can be easily conveyed by it from the interior to the coast and thence to other places. If, for example, a war had broken out with England we could send them into Cape Colony.
This way of passing the vote would be of particular importance for the whole nation, since the railway would not then have to be regarded from the point of view of provisioning our troops, or with regard to the financially remunerative character of the colony, but because a much more serious question lies behind it, namely, what significance has the railway in the event of complications between Germany and other nations? Yes, this railway can be employed for other purposes than for transport from the coast to the interior; our troops can be easily conveyed by it from the interior to the coast and thence to other places. If, for example, a war had broken out with England we could send them into Cape Colony.
From Aus the line was extended in 1908 to Keetmanshoop, a distance inland of 230 miles from Lüderitzbucht. Situate in theBezirk(district) of South-West Africa nearest to Cape Province, Keetmanshoop, with the railway as a source of supply from the chief harbour of the colony, developed into the leading military station of German South-West Africa.
At Keetmanshoop all the chief military authorities were stationed. It became the headquarters of the Medical Corps, the Ordnance Department, the Engineer and Railway Corps, and the Intelligence Corps of the Southern Command. It was the point of mobilisation for all the troops in that Command. It had a considerable garrison, and it had, also, an arsenal which a correspondent of theTransvaal Chronicle, who visited the town about two years before the outbreak of war in 1914 and gathered much information concerning the military preparations which had then already been made,[60]described as four times as large, and, in regard to its contents, four times as important, as the arsenal at Windhoek. Those contents included—47 gun carriages; fourteen 16-pounders; eighteen ambulances; 82 covered convoy vehicles; 3,287 wheels, mostly for trek ox-wagons; three large transportable marquees used as magazines and containing 28,000 military rifles; huge quantities of bandoliers, kits, etc.; three further magazines for ammunition, and large stores of fodder; while further military supplies were constantly arriving by train from Lüderitzbucht, whither they were brought from Germany by German ships. In the arsenal workshops was a staff of men actively engaged on the making of, among other military requirements, 1,000 saddles and water bags for the Camel Corps kept available for crossing the desert between the furthest limit of the railway and the Cape Province border.
It was, also, in this south-eastern district, and in immediate proximity, therefore, to Cape Province and Bechuanaland, that the military forces kept in the colony had all their principal manœuvres.
Of still greater importance, from a strategical standpoint, was the branch of this Southern Railway which, starting from Seeheim, forty miles west of Keetmanshoop, continued in a south-easterly direction to Kalkfontein, eighty miles north of Raman's Drift, on the Orange River, and less than ninety miles from Ukamas, where the Germans had established a military post within five miles of Nakob, situate on the Bechuanaland border, only forty miles from Upington, in Cape Province. From Kalkfontein the branch was to be continued another thirty miles to Warmbad, and so on to Raman's Drift—a convenient point for the passage of the Orange River into Cape Province territory by an attacking force. At Seeheim, the junction of this branch line, a Service Corps was stationed; Kalkfontein was the headquarters of the Camel Corps of 500 men and animals; and at Warmbad there was a military post and a military hospital.
The North-to-South line allowed of an easy movement of troops between the military headquarters at Keetmanshoop and Windhoek, or vice versâ. According to the original estimates this line was not to be completed before 1913. Special reasons for urgency—as to the nature of which it would be easy to speculate—led, however, to the line being opened for traffic on March 8, 1912. From Windhoek, also, troops were supplied to Gobabis, situate 100 miles east of the capital and about forty miles west of the Bechuanaland frontier. Gobabis became a German military station in 1895. Provided with a well-equipped fort, it became the chief strategical position on the eastern border of German South-West Africa. A railway connecting Gobabis with Windhoek was to have been commenced in 1915.
From Windhoek, as already told, there is rail communication with Swakopmund.
Grootfontein, the terminus, on the east, of the Swakopmund-Otavi line, had been a military station since 1899. Its special significance lay in the fact that it was the nearest point of approach by rail to the "Caprivi Strip," along which the German troops, conveyed as far as Grootfonteinby rail, were to make their invasion of the adjoining British territory of Rhodesia. Troop movements in this direction would have been further facilitated by a link at Karibib connecting the Swakopmund-Otavi-Grootfontein line with the one to Windhoek and thence to the military headquarters at Keetmanshoop. Karibib was itself a military base, in addition to having large railway offices and workshops.
With, therefore, the minor exceptions, the system of railways in German South-West Africa had been designed or developed in accordance with plans which had for their basis an eventual attack on British territory in three separate directions—(1) Cape Province, (2) Bechuanaland and (3) Rhodesia. The Southern and the North-to-South lines had, also, been built exclusively with the standard Cape gauge of 3 ft. 6 in., so that, when "der Tag" arrived, and German succeeded British supremacy in South Africa, these particular lines could be continued in order to link up with those which the Germans would then expect to take over from Cape Province. Keetmanshoop was eventually to be converted from a terminus to a stopping-place on a through line of German railway from Lüderitzbucht to Kimberley, the effect of which, it was pointed out, would be to shorten the distance from Europe to Bulawayo by 1,300 miles as compared with the journey via the Cape. Surveys had been made for extensions (1) from Keetmanshoop, via Hasuur, to the Union frontier near Rietfontein, and (2) from Kalkfontein, on the southern branch, to Ukamas, also on the frontier and in the direction of Upington, in Union territory. Each of these additions would have carried the original scheme a stage further, though it was not, apparently, thought wise to make them before "der Tag" actually arrived.
On these various railways the Government of German South-West Africa had expended, so far as the available figures show, a total of, approximately, £8,400,000, defrayed in part from Imperial funds and in part from the revenue of the Protectorate. This total includes the amount paid by the Government to the South-West Africa Companyfor their line from Swakopmund to the Company's mines at Otavi and Tsumeb, but it does not include the cost of the original narrow-gauge Government line from Swakopmund to Windhoek, of which the section between Swakopmund and Karibib was abandoned when the Swakopmund-Otavi line, via Karibib, was taken over, the remaining section from Karibib to Windhoek being then converted into the Cape 3 ft. 6 in. gauge. On most of the open lines no more than two or three trains a week were run, and on some of the branches there was only one train in the week.[61]
Further details as to the elaborate nature of the preparations made for the realisation of Germany's dreams of conquest in Africa are supplied by Mr. J. K. O'Connor in a pamphlet published at Capetown, towards the end of 1914, under the title of "The Hun in our Hinterland; or the Menace of G.S.W.A." Mr. O'Connor made a tour through German South-West Africa a few months before the outbreak of the war, assuming the rôle of a journalist in search of data concerning the agricultural resources of the territory. He obtained much information which had other than an agricultural interest.
He ascertained, for instance, that the German troops then in the territory consisted of Mounted Infantry, Field Artillery, Machine Gun Divisions, Intelligence Divisions, an Engineer and Railway Corps, Field Railway Divisions, an Etappen-Formation, a Camel Corps, a Police Force and a Reserve, representing altogether—apart from natives—a trained European force of approximately 10,000 men, whose duties and location in the event of war had all been assigned to them in advance.
He found that the railways had been supplemented by a strong transport service of natives, who had an abundant supply of oxen and mules for their wagons.
He tells how (in addition to the military stations already mentioned) the Germans had established throughout the territory a network of block-houses, strengthened by forts at intervals and supplemented by magazines and storehouses at central points; while 1,600 miles of telegraph and telephone wires, together with the "Funken-telegraph," placed all these stations and outposts in touch with one another as well as with the military headquarters and the various towns.[62]
He says concerning Keetmanshoop that its conversion into the chief military station in the territory was "the first move in the German game."
He points to the fact that "Das Koloniale Jahrbuch," published by authority, laid it down that the Boers in British South Africa must be constantly reminded of their Low-German origin; that German ideas must be spread among them by means of German schools and German churches, and he declares:—"For thirty years Teuton ideas have been foisted upon the Boer population of British South Africa. For thirty years, under the guise of friendship, Germany has plotted and planned for the elimination of the Anglo-Saxon element from South Africa."
Mr. O'Connor further writes:—
From what I was able to gather it was evident that the military plans of the Germans were completed for an invasion of the Union territory, and that they were only awaiting the day when Peace would spread her wings and soar from the embassies of Europe. It was not anticipated, however, that that would be in August, 1914.They were confident of success, and from the conversations that took place between officers and myself it was evident that the possession of the African continent was the greatest desire of the Teutons.The smashing up of France and Great Britain were only incidents that would lead to the whole continent of Africa becoming a German possession; and it was considered that as Germany would accomplish this, despite her late entrance upon the stage as a Colonial Power, she would have more to show for her thirty years as such a Power than could either England or France, who had started colonising centuries before her.
From what I was able to gather it was evident that the military plans of the Germans were completed for an invasion of the Union territory, and that they were only awaiting the day when Peace would spread her wings and soar from the embassies of Europe. It was not anticipated, however, that that would be in August, 1914.
They were confident of success, and from the conversations that took place between officers and myself it was evident that the possession of the African continent was the greatest desire of the Teutons.
The smashing up of France and Great Britain were only incidents that would lead to the whole continent of Africa becoming a German possession; and it was considered that as Germany would accomplish this, despite her late entrance upon the stage as a Colonial Power, she would have more to show for her thirty years as such a Power than could either England or France, who had started colonising centuries before her.
The great aim became to break France and England, for the purpose of acquiring their African possessions; and, having broken these Powers, Germany would have turned her attention to the African possessions of smaller Powers who, having neither England nor France to rely upon, would have been compelled to relinquish their possessions, and, by so doing, would have made Germany the supreme Power in Africa.
The great aim became to break France and England, for the purpose of acquiring their African possessions; and, having broken these Powers, Germany would have turned her attention to the African possessions of smaller Powers who, having neither England nor France to rely upon, would have been compelled to relinquish their possessions, and, by so doing, would have made Germany the supreme Power in Africa.
Summing up the conclusions at which he arrived, as the result of all that he saw for himself and all that he had heard from responsible German officers during the course of his tour, Mr. O'Connor says:—
From the day the Germans set their feet upon South-West African soil they have prepared themselves for a raid into British territory. For years the Reichstag has voted two million pounds per annum for the purpose. Had these millions been spent on the development of South-West Africa it would, to-day, be a colony of which any country might be proud. But what can they show for this expenditure? Nothing but a military camp.It is evident, then, that this territory has not been regarded by the Berliners as a colony, but as a jumping-off ground for an invasion of British South Africa.
From the day the Germans set their feet upon South-West African soil they have prepared themselves for a raid into British territory. For years the Reichstag has voted two million pounds per annum for the purpose. Had these millions been spent on the development of South-West Africa it would, to-day, be a colony of which any country might be proud. But what can they show for this expenditure? Nothing but a military camp.
It is evident, then, that this territory has not been regarded by the Berliners as a colony, but as a jumping-off ground for an invasion of British South Africa.
Here we have simply an amplification of ideas which, as we have seen, had long been entertained in Germany; though they were ideas it was now being sought to reduce to practice by a resort, in advance, to every step that could possibly be taken for ensuring their realisation. Any suggestion that the system of strategical railways which had been built, and the elaborate military preparations which had been effected, were merely precautions against a further possible rising of the natives would have been absurd.
What Mr. O'Connor says in regard to Germany's attitude towards the African possessions of the smaller Powers gives additional significance to a report published in theLeipziger Neueste Nachrichtenof May 31, 1914, concerning a project for building a line of railway along the coast of German South-West Africa to connect with PortugueseAngola. This was to be the first of a series of lines which "after lengthy discussions with the Imperial Government," were to be carried out in German South-West Africa by a syndicate of prominent shipping and banking houses in Germany, controlling an initial capital of 50,000,000 marks (£2,500,000). It was further reported that in the early part of 1914 the Governor of German South-West Africa made a tour through the northern part of the Protectorate, going as far as Tiger Bay, in Angola, "in connection with possible railway construction in the near future."
Angola was certainly an item on the German list of desirable acquisitions in Africa. It has been in the occupation of Portugal since the middle of the fifteenth century; but the point of view from which it was regarded by advocates of German expansion may be judged from some remarks made in theKölnische Zeitungby a traveller who returned to Germany from Angola in June, 1914:—
The game is worth the candle. An enormous market for industrial products, rich and virgin mineral treasures, a fruitful and healthy country equally suitable for agriculture, cattle-breeding and immigration, and the finest harbours on the west coast—that is the prize that awaits us.
The game is worth the candle. An enormous market for industrial products, rich and virgin mineral treasures, a fruitful and healthy country equally suitable for agriculture, cattle-breeding and immigration, and the finest harbours on the west coast—that is the prize that awaits us.
A territory offering these advantages, having an area estimated at 484,000 square miles, and extending inland for a distance of 1,500 miles, might be coveted for its own sake; but its possession would have been of still greater value to Germany (1) as a continuation, northwards, of German South-West Africa, and (2) as the starting point for a chain of communications, under German control, extending right across the African continent, from west to east.
The coast-railway spoken of by theLeipziger Neueste Nachrichtenwas to link up German South-West Africa with Angola, in which country, also, the Germans hoped to obtain extensive mining and agricultural concessions, thus forwarding their established policy of peaceful penetration by means of commerce and railways, and establishing economic interests which might be expected to lead topolitical developments in due course, and so prepare the way for an eventual seizure of "the prize that awaits us."
The Germans had also sought to finance the completion eastwards of the Lobito Bay or Benguela Railway, to which reference will be made later on in connection with the development of the Katanga district of the Belgian Congo; but the condition they advanced, namely that the control of the line should be left in their hands, coupled with their adoption of suspicious lines of policy in other directions,[63]led to their railway proposals being declined by the Portuguese, with thanks.
Then, in order to understand the full scope of the aspirations Germany was cherishing towards the African Continent, one must take into account her railways on the east coast no less than those on the west coast, since these, also, formed an essential part of the general scheme.
The line which stretches right across German East Africa, from Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of the Protectorate, to Kigoma, on Lake Tanganyika, and north of Ujiji, has a total length of 1,439 miles; and if the economic development of a territory estimated as having a total area of 384,000 square miles had been the sole aim in view, the Tanganyikabahn would have well deserved to rank as a notable enterprise in German colonial expansion, and one calling for commendation rather than criticism. The question arises, however, whether, in addition to the development of German East Africa itself, the railway in question was not intended, also, to facilitate the realisation of Germany's designs against Central Africa as part of her aforesaid scheme for the eventual conquest of the African continent.
The feverish haste with which the second and third sections of the railway were built sufficed, in itself, to give rise to suspicions of ulterior designs. The first section, from Dar-es-Salaam to Morogo (136½ miles), was constructed by a syndicate of German bankers acting under a State guarantee of interest, and the work, begun in February, 1905, was completed in September, 1907. The second section, from Morogo to Tabora (526½ miles), was to have been completed by July 1, 1914; but in 1910, the Reichstag voted a special credit both for the earlier completion of this second section—which was thus finished by February 26, 1912—and for surveys for the third section, from Tabora to Kigoma (776 miles). Such, again, was the celerity with which the work on this third section was pushed forward that, although the date fixed for the completion of the line was April 1, 1915, through rail communication from the Indian Ocean to Lake Tanganyika was established by February 1, 1914—that is to say, one year and two months in advance of time.
We here come to the two-fold question (1) Why was the railway extended at all for the 776 miles from Tabora to Lake Tanganyika, considering that this portion of the German Protectorate offered, in itself, the prospect of no traffic at all for the line[64]; and (2) why was it necessary that such haste should be shown in the completion of the undertaking?
To the first of these questions the reply is (1) that the traffic on which the western section of the Tanganyikabahn was mainly to rely for its receipts was traffic originating in or destined for the Belgian Congo; (2) that the control it was hoped to secure over Belgian trade was, in combination with the strategical advantages offered by the railway, to be the preliminary to an eventual annexation by Germany of the Belgian Congo itself; and (3) that like conditions were to lead, if possible, to the final realisation of von Weber's dream of 1880.
"That we are directing our gaze to the other side of Tanganyika," said theKolonial Zeitungof April 4, 1914, in referring to the completion of the railway to Kigoma—an event which occasioned a great outburst of enthusiasm in Germany—"goes, of course, without saying."
There certainly is much on "the other side of Tanganyika" to which Germany might look with feelings of envy. In regard to mineral wealth, alone, the resources of the South-eastern section of the Belgian Congo could not fail to make a strong appeal to her.
The great copper belt in the Katanga district,[65]commences about 100 miles north-west of the British South African post, Ndola (situate twelve miles south of the Congo border), and extends thence, in a north-westerly direction, for a distance of 180 miles, with an average breadth of twenty-five miles. "In the not far distant future, when the many problems of development are solved, the Katanga copper belt," says Mr. J. B. Thornhill,[66]"will be one of the controlling factors in the copper supply of the world." In the report of the British South Africa Company for the year ending March 31, 1914, it was stated that the copper-mining industry in Katanga had attained to considerable dimensions; that furnaces with a capacity of 1,000 tons of copper per month were at work, and that further large additions to the plant were being made.
Katanga has, also, a tin belt, and coal, gold, iron and other minerals are found there, besides.
In the German territory on the eastern side of Lake Tanganyika there are, indeed, minerals; but they are found in no such abundance as in the Belgian territory on the western side of the lake. German East Africa can, however, produce in great abundance the wheat, the rice and the other food supplies necessary for the workers in Katanga mines, and the German view has been that the eastern and the western sides of the lake should be regarded as complementary the one to the other, and that the Tanganyikabahn should convey these food supplies to the lake, for transfer to the other side by steamer, and bring back the products of the mines for distribution, via the German east coast route and the Indian Ocean, among the markets of the world. In the same way it was hoped that all goods and necessaries likely to be imported into the Katanga and Mweru districts from Europe would reach their destination via this German East Africa Central Railway; and German business houses were strongly advised to establish branches in those districts,[67]so that, apparently, Germany would eventually control the trade as well as the transport of "the other side of Tanganyika."
The development of the south-western section of Germany's east-coast Protectorate had, in itself, become a matter of vital importance ("eine Lebensfrage"[68]); but the Belgian Congo was the only quarter to which that section could look for markets for its produce. The possibility of securing sufficient traffic for the Central Railway to ensure its financial success may have been a secondary consideration; but the railway itself was to serve a most important purpose, economically, by helping Germany to capture the Tanganyika and trans-Tanganyika trade, and by making her East Africa colony more prosperous; politically, by strengthening her hold on the Belgian Congo through the increase of her commercial interests there; and strategically, by affording her the means of effecting a speedy concentration of troops in Central Africa, should the occasion for so doing arise.
This last-mentioned purpose was to be further attained by the projected construction of what would have been a purely strategical line from Tabora, on the Tanganyikabahn, to Mwanza, on the southern shores of the Victoria Nyanza, whence German troops would—in case of need—be in a position to make a rear attack on British East Africa.
Germany's hopes of thus strengthening her position in Central Africa by means of the Tanganyikabahn received, however, a serious set-back through the activity and enterprise of Belgian and British interests in providing, opening up or projecting alternative transport routes which threatened (1) to divert a large proportion of the traffic she had expected to secure for the East Africa Central line; (2) to diminish greatly the prospect of her achieving the commercial and political aims she cherished in regard to the Belgian Congo; (3) to make it still more difficult for German East Africa to emerge from a position of comparative isolation, and (4) to impede greatly the realisation of Germany's aspirations in regard alike to Central Africa and the African Continent.
It is the more necessary that the bearing of all these facts on the general situation should be understood because they tend to indicate the critical nature of the position into which the said aspirations had drifted, and the imperative necessity by which Germany may, by 1914, have considered she was faced for adopting some bold course of action if she were still to look forward to the possibility of those aspirations being realised.
The principle originally adopted by King Leopold in his efforts to develop the Congo State was that of supplementing navigation on the Congo by railways wherever these were necessary either to overcome the difficulties presented by rapids or to supply missing links in the chain of communication to or from the west coast. The same policy was followed by the Belgian Government when they assumed control, and the last of these links—the line, 165 miles long, from Kabalo to Albertville, connecting the Congo with the Tanganyika—was opened in March, 1915. One reason, in fact, given in Germany for the express speed at which the Tanganyikabahn was completed to Kigoma was an alleged fear that the Belgians might capture the trade and transport of the territory in question by getting to the lake first.
This combined river and rail transport still left it necessary for traffic from the Congo basin to the west coast tofollow the winding course of that river, with a number of transhipments; and if the route in question had been the only competitor of the Tanganyikabahn, Germany would have had less cause for uneasiness. Meanwhile, however, theCompagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congohad built a line—forming a continuation of the Rhodesian Railways—from the boundary of Northern Rhodesia, at Elizabethville, to Kambove (Katanga); and a continuation of this line to Bukama, on the Lualaba, a navigable tributary of the Congo, was (1) to give shorter and better access to the Congo for products from Katanga, and (2) to establish combined rail and water transport between the entire railway system of South Africa and the mouth of the Congo. Already the minerals from Katanga were finding their outlet to the sea on the east coast via the Rhodesian Railways and the Portuguese port of Beira, instead of via the Tanganyikabahn and the German port of Dar-es-Salaam. The former had, indeed, become the recognised route for this important traffic in preference to the latter. The line between Kambove and Bukama had not been completed when war broke out in 1914; but the provision of this through route, and the various facilities it would offer, rendered still more uncertain the prospect of Germany getting control of the trans-Tanganyika traffic for her own lines.
There were other important railway schemes, besides.
From Bukama rail communication is to be continued right across Central Africa to Matadi, to which point the Congo is navigable for large vessels from its mouth, less than a hundred miles distant. This line, in addition to avoiding the great bend of the Congo, will open up and develop the vast and promising territory in the northern districts of the Belgian Congo, south of that river.
Another scheme which is to be carried out is a line from Kambove, in the Southern Katanga, to the south-western boundary of the Belgian Congo, and thence across Portuguese territory to the present eastern terminus of the Lobito Bay Railway. This will give to the mining interests of Katanga direct rail communication, by the shortest possible route, with a port on the west coast, while the connectionat Kambove with the Rhodesian and South African systems will make the line a still more important addition to the railways of Africa for the purposes alike of development in the central districts and as a shorter route to and from Europe. German financiers were at one time desirous of undertaking the extension eastward of the Lobito Bay Railway—mainly, as it seemed, with a view to furthering German interests in Portuguese territory (see page314); but the Kambove-Lobito Bay line is now to be constructed with British capital.
Finally there is the Cape-to-Cairo Railway which, passing through the Katanga mining districts, is likely to divert still more of the traffic Germany had counted upon alike for her Tanganyikabahn and as a means towards the attainment of her political aspirations in Central Africa.
Whilst these various developments were proceeding, there were still others, in the Cameroons, to which attention may now be directed.
Anticipations of the great results for Germany which would follow from the building of railways in the Cameroons began to be entertained about the year 1897. The main objective of the schemes brought forward seems to have been, however, not simply the internal economic development of an already vast area, but the carrying of lines of communication to the furthest limits of that area in order, apparently, to extend German interests and influence to territories beyond.
One of these schemes was for the building of a line of railway from Duala, the chief port of the Cameroons, to Lake Chad (otherwise Tsâd), a sheet of water some 7,000 square miles in extent which, situate on the western borders of the Sudan, constitutes the extreme northern limits of German territory in this direction, while the shores of the lake are occupied jointly by Germany, England and France.
The proposed line was to have an estimated total length of about 1,000 kilometres (621 miles). In September, 1902,the German Imperial Government granted to aKamerun-Eisenbahn-Syndikata concession for building the line; an expedition sent out by the syndicate made a survey of the route in 1902-3; and aKamerun-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, with a capital of 17,000,000 marks (£850,000), was formed by a group of bankers and others in Germany to build the first section.
In December, 1903, the German Emperor, at his reception of the President of the Reichstag, gave his blessing to all such enterprises by declaring that an essential condition ("eine Lebensbedingung") for the welfare of Germany's colonies in Africa was that the building of railways should be taken earnestly in hand. In 1905 the prospects of the proposed line seemed so hopeful that the early commencement of construction was announced as probable; but various difficulties arose, including much trouble in regard to labour, and the line did not get beyond the end of its first stage, a distance of only 160 km. (100 miles) from the coast.
Although the scheme was thus not fully carried out, there was no doubt as to the nature of the purposes it had been designed to serve. In his official and detailed account of the proposed undertaking[69]—a book of exceptional merit from the point of view of the clearness and of the exhaustive data with which "the case for the line" is presented—the director of the syndicate says:—
My opinion is that only a great railway—one that unites the Sudan with the Atlantic, and that extends from Lake Chad to the west coast of Africa—will be in a position both to develop fully the economic interests of the Cameroons and to assure to Germany a means of access to the richest territory that Central Africa possesses.
My opinion is that only a great railway—one that unites the Sudan with the Atlantic, and that extends from Lake Chad to the west coast of Africa—will be in a position both to develop fully the economic interests of the Cameroons and to assure to Germany a means of access to the richest territory that Central Africa possesses.
Had the line been completed as far as Lake Chad, it would have been a powerful competitor of British railways via the Nile or the Red Sea for the traffic of the Sudan, with its vast commercial possibilities; and, had it been found the better route, it might have established German commercial supremacy in this part of Central Africa, with the inevitable political developments to follow. "The GermanTsâdsee-Eisenbahn," the director of the syndicate further wrote, "will, especially when it has been completed, be for the whole of Central Africa aKulturwerkof the first importance."
The Germanisation of Lake Chad, combined with an eventual acquiring by Germany of French interests in the Sahara and North Africa, would further have permitted the continuation of theTsâdsee-Eisenbahnfrom that lake to Algeria along the route already projected in France for a Trans-African line linking up the Mediterranean alike with the Congo and with the Rhodesian and other British railways in South Africa, via Lake Chad—a line which, it is said, would offer no great technical difficulty in construction.[70]
Another ambitious scheme was for the building of a Mittellandbahn which, crossing the Njong, would eventually link up the chief port of the Cameroons with a navigable tributary of the Congo. Here, again, the line as actually constructed has not been carried a greater distance than about 300 km. (186 miles). At one time, in fact, the original project seemed to have been abandoned; but quite recently it has been brought forward again under conditions which have a distinct bearing on what has already been said concerning Germany and Central Africa.
From the views expressed by Emil Zimmermann in his "Neu-Kamerun,"[71]one gathers that in 1913 Germany was regarding with some degree of concern alike the outlook for her Tanganyikabahn, on which over £7,000,000 had been spent, and the prospective set-back to her aspirations in regard to the Belgian Congo; and Herr Zimmermann, in giving an account of the additions made to her Cameroons possessions at the expense of France, under the agreement of November 4, 1911, following on the Agadir crisis, makes certain overtures to Belgium, and follows them up with a distinct threat, should she refrain from responding to them.
Belgium and Germany, he says, in effect, are the two dominant Powers in Central Africa; and he is of opinion that it will be to their mutual interest to co-operate in the development of that great territory. Belgium, however, he finds to be faced by the need for a great outlay of money (1) on account of necessary improvements of her Congo rail and river communication, to meet expanding traffic requirements, and (2) in order to develop her Katanga territory. She cannot herself command the necessary capital, but Germany could assist her to raise it, and would do so—provided Belgium undertook that traffic from her Tanganyika and Mweru districts, and, also, from points east of the Middle Congo, should reach the sea by "its natural outlet," that is to say, by the German East African Central Railway.
Should Belgium refuse to agree to these proposals, and should she, by her high tariffs, continue to impede the flow of traffic to German territory, then it would be open to Germany to construct lines of railway from the west coast either to navigable tributaries of the Congo or to the Congo itself, and so divert the traffic from the Belgian Congo at certain important points, to the serious prejudice of Belgian interests.
Apart from what might be done in the way of extending the Duala-Njong line to the said navigable tributaries of the Congo, as originally projected, Herr Zimmermann says that, under the treaty of November 4, 1911, Germany has the right to continue her Cameroons railways across French territory (France having reciprocal rights as regards German territory); and he points out how she could exercise this power, to the detriment of Belgium, should that country not accept her proposals in regard to the Congo basin and Central Africa. He specially mentions the fact that whenthe boundaries of the 100,000 square miles of territory added, at the expense of France, to the German Cameroons (then already 191,000 square miles in extent), were fixed by virtue of the treaty of 1911, the wedge-like strip on the south of Spanish Muni was so defined as to leave at the eastern point thereof a gap between the Spanish territory and the French Cameroons wide enough for either a road or a railway; and he emphasises the fact that, by taking advantage of the facilities thus open to her, Germany could, under the treaty of 1911, construct a railway 1,000 km. (621 miles) long from Muni Bay through the said gap and cross French territory to the junction of the Sangha with the Congo. Alternatively, and by arrangement with France, the line could start from Libreville. "What such a railway, tapping the Congo-Sangha-Ubangi traffic at its most favourable point, would mean, can," Herr Zimmermann remarks, "be left to the Belgians themselves to say."
He does not suggest that such schemes as these would in themselves be of great value to Germany; but he thinks they might have a powerful influence, both politically and economically, on the solution of the Tanganyika problem in Germany's favour. In fact, he considers that since the 1911 treaty Germany has practically controlled the situation in Central Africa; and from all he says it is a reasonable assumption that the Agadir crisis, the concession of territory exacted from France, and the undertaking as to the carrying of German Cameroon railways across French territory, had far more to do with German designs on the Belgian Congo and Central Africa than is generally supposed.
In another work, published a year later,[72]the same writer, adopting now a distinctly different tone, endeavoured to appease an "Anti-Central Africa agitation" which, he tells us, had developed in Germany and was protesting alike against the "danger" of acquiring any more "Congo-swamps" and against the "boundless German plans" in Africa. He further sought to soothe the suspicions which, he found, had been excited in Belgium and elsewhere as to the nature of Germany's plans in Africa. Germany, he declared, had no annexation projects in view. Her aspirations were purely economic. Kamerun, thanks to the German-French treaty of 1911 (which, he reiterated, had changed the whole situation), could now take a considerable share in the development of Central Africa, and was the more entitled so to do since she had, in Duala, "one of the best harbours on the west coast of Africa."
As against, however, affirmations such as these, there is the undisputable evidence of no less an authority than the German Foreign Minister himself as to the real nature of Germany's designs on the Belgian Congo.
In the second Belgian Grey Book, published in August, 1915, under the title of "Correspondance Diplomatique relative à la Guerre de 1914-15," there is given (pp. 2-3) a letter from the Belgian Minister in Berlin, Baron Beyens, to his Government, recording, under date April 2, 1914, a conversation which the French Ambassador in Berlin informed him he had had quite recently (and, therefore, only about four months before the outbreak of war) with the German Foreign Minister. Herr von Jagow suggested to him that Germany, France and England should arrive at an agreement on the construction and linking up of railways in Africa. M. Gambon replied that in this case Belgium ought to be invited to confer with them, as she was constructing some new railways on the Congo. He also expressed the view that any conference held on the subject should meet at Brussels. To this Herr von Jagow responded, "Oh no; for it is at the expense of Belgium that our agreement should be made. Do you not think," he added, "that King Leopold placed too heavy a burden on the shoulders of Belgium? Belgium is not rich enough to develop that vast possession. It is an enterprise beyond her financial resources and her means of expansion." The French Ambassador dissented, but Herr von Jagow went on to affirm that the great Powers were alone in a position to colonise, and that the small Powers were destined todisappear or to gravitate towards the orbit of the large ones. In the words of the Belgian Minister:—
Il développa l'opinion que seules les grandes Puissances sont en situation de coloniser. Il dévoila même le fond de sa pensée en soutenant que les petits États ne pourraient plus mener, dans la transformation qui s'opérait en Europe au profit des nationalités les plus fortes, par suite du développement des forces économiques et des moyens de communication, l'existence indépendante dont ils avaient joui jusqu'à présent. Ils étaient destinés à disparaître ou à graviter dans l'orbite des grandes Puissances.
Il développa l'opinion que seules les grandes Puissances sont en situation de coloniser. Il dévoila même le fond de sa pensée en soutenant que les petits États ne pourraient plus mener, dans la transformation qui s'opérait en Europe au profit des nationalités les plus fortes, par suite du développement des forces économiques et des moyens de communication, l'existence indépendante dont ils avaient joui jusqu'à présent. Ils étaient destinés à disparaître ou à graviter dans l'orbite des grandes Puissances.
The story here presented of Germany's aims in Africa has taken us over almost the entire African Continent. It now only remains to be seen how those aims were to be realised, not merely as the outcome of Pan-German dreams and advocacy, but as the result of many years of scheming, plotting and actual preparation, all directed to the wiping out of the influence in Africa of other Powers, great as well as small, and the final realisation of Germany's long-cherished purpose.
According to conversations Mr. O'Connor had with military officers in German South-West Africa just before the outbreak of war in 1914, the programme under which Germany hoped to become "the supreme power in Africa" when "der Tag" so long looked forward to should arrive was, in effect, as follows:—
Belgium was to be disposed of "at one gulp." This would make it an easy matter for Germany to take over the Belgian Congo.
France would be paralysed; and, being paralysed, she would not be able to prevent Germany from succeeding to the whole of her possessions in Africa.
The Dervishes would stir up a rebellion in Egypt,[73]and other rebellions were anticipated in Ireland and India.
While England was fully occupied in these directions the Afrikanders were to riseen masseand declare British South Africa an Afrikander Republic.
The forces in German East Africa would make a sudden raid into British East Africa. Having annexed that territory and got possession of the railway, they would next invade Rhodesia from the east, in co-operation with troops from German South-West Africa advancing to the Zambezi, via the Caprivi Strip, from the railway terminus at Grootfontein.
Meanwhile German columns would have moved (1) from the military station at Gobabis into Bechuanaland, crossing the desert of Kalahari, to effect the capture of Vryburg; and (2) from Keetmanshoop, and other points served by the Seeheim branch, into northern Cape Province, via Raman's Drift, Schuit Drift and the south-east corner of the territory.
Rhodesia having been seized, more troops would be available to proceed to the assistance of the Afrikander forces operating in the Cape Province, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State—a "rising" on the part of the Afrikanders as soon as they saw a good opportunity for one being taken for granted. In return for the services thus rendered by her to the Afrikanders in establishing their Republic, Germany would take a portion of the Transvaal, as well as part of the Zululand coast.
With Belgium and France effectively crushed, and the power of Great Britain in South Africa broken down, those countries would no longer be in a position to prevent Germany from annexing Portuguese Angola; and this she was to do next. She would "allow" the Afrikander Republic to take Delagoa Bay; but the Republic itself was to come under the "guardianship" of Germany. The word "suzerainty," Mr. O'Connor says, was not mentioned, "guardianship" being preferred; but, with the exception of Italian Somaliland—about which nothing was said—practically the whole of Africa was either to belong to Germany or to be brought directly or indirectly under her control.
Since the outbreak of the World-War in 1914 there has been much speculation as to the real objective and purpose of Germany in bringing it about.
Do the facts stated in the present chapter afford any help towards a solution of this problem?
We have seen the nature of the aims cherished by Germany towards Africa, the practical and persistent efforts she made during a long series of years for their attainment, and the substantial expenditure she incurred in the hope of at last securing the prize she considered was awaiting her.
We have seen how the purpose of Germany in Africa was less to develop colonies for their own sake than to regard them as points from which to absorb or to control neighbouring territories.
We have seen how the development of rival railways in Central Africa had recently threatened the supremacy Germany hoped to gain and may, indeed, have suggested to her the need for early vigorous effort, if she wished still to secure the realisation of her aims.
We have seen what, in the view of the German Foreign Minister, should be the fate of small Powers which stand in the way of the aggrandisement of great ones.
We have seen, also, how, in the opinion of officers serving in German South-West Africa, the real purpose of the war to which they were looking forward, and for which they were preparing, was the German annexation of Africa, and how the "smashing up" of France and Great Britain, the overthrow of Belgium, the seizure of Portuguese possessions, and the virtual absorption of the proposed new Boer Republics were to be the preliminaries to a final transformation of the whole African Continent into a German possession—the "new Empire" which, in the words of von Weber, was to be "possibly more valuable and more brilliant than even the Indian Empire."
May one not conclude, in face of these and of all the other facts which have here been narrated, that one, at least, of the main objectives of Germany (apart from minor ones) inprovoking the Great War was no less a prize than the African Continent;[74]and that when she invaded Belgium and France she did so less with the object of annexing the former country, and of creating another Alsace-Lorraine in the latter than of having "something in her hand" with which to "bargain"—in the interests of her projects in Africa—when the time came for discussing the terms of peace, assuming that she had not already attained her purpose at the outset by the sheer force of what she thought would be her irresistible strength?
If this conclusion should seem to be warranted, on the basis of what has already been told, it may certainly be regarded as confirmed by the fact that, down to the moment when these lines are being written, any suggestions coming from German sources as to possible terms of peace have invariably included proposals for the concession to Germany of territory in Africa as "compensation" for the surrender of territory she has herself occupied in Belgium and France.
Thus, in a despatch published inThe Timesof September 4, 1915, a statement was reproduced from the ChicagoTribunegiving, on the authority of "a writer in close touch with the German Embassy," the terms on which Germany would be prepared to agree to peace. These terms included the following:—
The cession of the Belgian Congo to Germany, as compensation for the evacuation of Belgium.The cession of African colonial territory to Germany by France, as compensation for the evacuation of Northern France.
The cession of the Belgian Congo to Germany, as compensation for the evacuation of Belgium.
The cession of African colonial territory to Germany by France, as compensation for the evacuation of Northern France.
Then, also, on October 24, 1915, theNew York Americanpublished a long interview with Professor Hans Delbrück on the terms of peace which Germany hoped to secure if "President Wilson and the Pope" would consent to act as mediators. The interview (which had been approved by the German censor) included the following passage:—
It is quite possible that peace could be secured by ceding to Germany such colonies as Uganda by England and the French and Belgian Congos as a ransom for the evacuation by Germany of Northern France and Belgium.
It is quite possible that peace could be secured by ceding to Germany such colonies as Uganda by England and the French and Belgian Congos as a ransom for the evacuation by Germany of Northern France and Belgium.
Such concessions, if one can conceive the possibility of their being made—would still leave Germany far from the attainment of her full African programme; but the fact of these proposals being put forward at all as "terms of peace" is quite in keeping with the whole course of Germany's policy in Africa, and points clearly to what may, in fact, have been her chief objective in the war itself.
Any moral reflections either on the said policy or on the "programme" by means of which it was to have been carried out would be beyond the scope of the present work.
What we are here concerned in is the fact that Germany's dreams of an African Empire, given expression to by von Weber in 1880, and the subject of such continuous effort ever since, were, in the possibilities of their realisation, based primarily on the extension and utilisation of such facilities for rail-transport as she might be able either to create or to acquire.