FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[363]On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Sáṅkhya Pr. Bhásh., p. 20; S. Sára, p. 11.[364]I.e., he revealed the Veda, and also originated the meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind in the arts of life.[365]I readyefortewith Dr. Hall's MS.Tapyameans rather "susceptible of suffering."[366]This is really Vyása's comm. on Sút., iv. 21.[367]Cf.Bháshá-parichchheda, 15,a.[368]Śatapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.[369]I read in the second clausetadbháve'pi, understanding bytadthe different conditions whichathais supposed to assume as being necessarily present.[370]These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity, &c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.[371]It may besukha-janaka, but it is not itselfsukha.[372]Granting thatathadoes not here mean "auspicious," why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the particleathadoes produce an auspicious influence?[373]i.e., a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without some other word to complete the construction.[374]This is found with some variations in the Mahábháshya (p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)[375]The commentators hold that the wordvṛiddhiḥis placed at the beginning of the first sútra, whileguṇaḥin the second is placed at the end (ad eṅ guṇaḥ), in order to ensure an auspicious opening,vṛiddhimeaning "increase," "prosperity," as well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."[376]In the old Bengali poem Chaṇḍí, we have an interesting list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Bráhman, a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling "milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya,"dúrvágrass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls, corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing a guana (godhiká). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to all śástras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard, and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.[377]These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the officiating Bráhmans.[378]He is here calledphaṇipati, "lord of snakes,"—Patañjali, the author of the Mahábháshya, being represented as a snake in mythology.[379]Cf. Śaṅkara, Vedánta-Sút., iii. 3, 49.[380]This is the Mímáṃsá rule for settling the relative value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1.Śruti, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2.Liṅga, "a sign," or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3.Vákya, "the being mentioned in one sentence,"i.e., the context, as in the text "'(I cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words "(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words "I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4.Prakaraṇa, "the subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its parts," as in thedarśa-púrṇamásasacrifice, where theprayájaceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts, a mystic influence (apúrva) which helps forward that influence of the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here theprakaraṇaproves them to be ancillary. 5.Sthána(orkrama), "relative position" or "order," as the recital of the hymnŚundhadhvam, &c., "Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention of thesánnáyyavessels, where this position proves that the hymn is ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6.Samákhyá, "title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for theadhvaryupriests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they areprima facieto be considered as the priests employed. The order in the aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the first,śruti, being the most important; the last,samákhyá, the least. Cf. Jaimini's Sútras, iii. 3, 14;Mímáṃsáparibháshá, pp. 8, 9.[381]I.e., Yogi-Yájñavalkya, the author of theYájñavalkya-gítá. See Hall,Bibl. Index, p. 14; Aufrecht,Bodl. Catal., p. 87b.[382]Karmanseems here used forkriyâ, which properly belongs only to the body, as the soul isdrashṭṛi.[383]Scil. samádhi, or the restraining the mind and senses to profound contemplation.[384]Scil."forbearance, religious observance, postures, suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and meditation (samádhi)."[385]See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3,samyag ádhíyate mano yatra sa samádhiḥ.[386]Thus,e.g., the antecedent non-existence and the destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by intimate relation (samaváya-sambandha).[387]I readniroddhavyánámfornirodhánám.[388]Chit-śaktiandchiti-śakti= soul.[389]Thesattvaof thebuddhior the internal organ.[390]This second substance, "mind" or "understanding" (buddhi,chitta), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the image of the object on a second looking-glass (sc.soul).[391]Váchaspati explainslakshaṇaaskálabheda.[392]I takeádias meaningasphuṭatva. The change of state takes place between the several moments of thelakshaṇa-pariṇáma. Cf. the Commentaries on iii. 13.[393]These are generally called the five states of the thinking principle,chittabhúmayasoravasthás. Cf. Commentary, i. 2, 18.[394]These three conditions respectively characterise men, demons, and gods.[395]Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.[396]Canchittamean "soul" here?[397]I.e., as,e.g., whether the senses produce the elements or the elements the senses, &c.[398]In p. 164, line 4infra, readsukhaprakáśamayasya.[399]In p. 164, line 2infra, readsattámátraforsattva-. Bhoja well distinguishesasmitáfromahaṃkára.[400]For these seeinfra, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.[401]I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the English translation.[402]Where the negation is prominent it is calledprasajya-pratishedha; but where it is not prominent, we have theparyudásanegation. In the former the negative is connected with the verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word, as,e.g.—(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."The former corresponds to the logician'satyantábháva, the latter toanyonyábhávaorbheda.[403]Cf. thevárttikain Siddhánta Kaum., i. 401.[404]Thusadhanastands foravidya-mánadhana, withvidyamánaomitted in the compound.[405]As its subject would confessedly bebuddhi.[406]As it isavidyáafter all.[407]In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of Váchaspati's Gloss),sarvavṛittinirodhasampannáyá api tathátvaprasaṅgát.[408]I readtanvavastháśchawith the printed edition of Váchaspati's Gloss. Iftanudagdháśchais correct, it must meantanutvena dagdháh.[409]As inrámalakshmaṇau, Ráma and Lakshmaṇa.[410]I readpakshatrayeforpakshadvaye.[411]In his Comm. on Sút., ii. 5.[412]Thusinimicusis not a "friend," nor, on the other hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." Soagoshpadais said to mean "a forest."[413]Cf. Yoga Sút., i. 8.[414]In p. 166, line 4infra, readkáyádauforkáryádau.[415]This couplet is quoted by Vyása in his Comm. on Yoga Sútras, ii. 5, and I have followed Váchaspati in his explanation of it; he calls itvaiyásakí gáthá.[416]Since the continued enjoyment of an object only increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret (cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).[417]Literally, "it has four feet."[418]Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification of the quality ofsattvaunobstructed byrajasandtamas.[419]"Let the affixṇinibe used after a root in the sense of what is habitual, when theupapada, or subordinate word, is not a word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."[420]"Letvṛiddhibe the substitute of a base ending in a vowel, when that which has an indicatoryñorṇfollows;"ṇinihas an indicatoryṇ.[421]Sc.anuśaya+ini=anuśayin.[422]Iniandṭhan, which respectively leaveinandika; thusdaṇḍagivesdaṇḍinanddaṇḍika. The line is quoted by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Páṇ. v. 2, 115, and is explained in theKáśiká,ad loc. The different prohibitions are illustrated by the examples:—(1.)svaván,khaván; (2.)kárakaván; (3.)vyághraván,siṃhaván; (4.)daṇḍavatí śálá(i.e.,daṇḍá asyáṃ santi).[423]By iii. 3, 56.[424]It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.[425]See theKáśikáon Páṇ. v. 2, 115. Forvivakshártha(meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Páṇ. ii. 2, 27. The edition in the BenaresPanditreadsvishayaniyamártha.[426]i.e., Thusnirodhais notvṛitter abhávaḥ, butabhávasyáśryaḥ.[427]I read in p. 168, last line,prakáśapravṛittiniyamarúpa, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.[428]See Káśiká, ii. 3, 36.[429]This passage probably occurs in theYájñavalkya-gítáof Yogi-yájñavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145, note.[430]Mímáṃsá Sútras, ii. 1, 35-37.[431]The tantras are not properly concerned with what isnityaornaimittika; they arekámya.[432]Thevíjaof air is the syllablejaṃ.[433]Thevíjaof water is the syllablebaṃ.[434]Hríṃ.[435]Śríṃ.[436]Táṇḍavais the frantic dance of the god. Śiva and his votaries.[437]Literally "they take severally in order the gender of one of the two." Cf. "Thebæ ipsæ quod Bœotiæ caput est,"Livy, xlii. 44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus hominem,"Cic.,Legg, i. 7.[438]I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's translation of the Sáhitya-darpaṇa.[439]Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of longevity.[440]I.e., an hour, aghaṭikábeing twenty-four minutes.[441]Thenáḍísor tubular vessels are generally reckoned to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principalnáḍís. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.[442]Mádhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the passage in the Aitareya Bráhmaṇa (iii. 29), where the relation of the vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a waterwheel (ghaṭíyantravat); hence the seasons never pause in their course."[443]This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism, that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra, as their sound expresses the wordso'haṃ(i.e.,haṃsaḥ), "I am he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours; it is called theajapámantra,i.e., the mantra uttered without voluntary muttering.[444]I.e., that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled breath.[445]I cannot explain this. We might readguruvarṇánámforguṇavarṇánáṃ, as the time spent in uttering aguruvarṇais avipala, sixty of which make apala, and two and a halfpalasmake a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the fifth act of theMálatímádhava.[446]Sixtypalasmake aghaṭiká(50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10 = 150,i.e., thepalasin two and a halfghaṭikásor one hour).[447]Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.[448]Literally "the being ever more."[449]For these colours cf.Chhándogya Up., viii. 6;Maitri Up., vi. 30.[450]This is an anonymous quotation in Vyása's Comm.[451]This seems a variation of Śloka 7 of theAmṛita-náda Up.See Weber,Indische Stud., ix. 26.[452]This is defined in the Yoga Sút., iii. 4, as consisting of the united operation towards one object of contemplation, attention, and meditation.[453]I.e., the internal organ (chitta).[454]This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the reading of the Bombay edition of the Puráṇa (only reading in line 3chalátmanám).[455]Vishṇu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The "perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.[456]The old name for the central part of Bengal.[457]A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it is the Λαρικἡ of Ptolemy.[458]In p. 178, l. 2,infra, readpravṛittaforpravṛitti. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyása's Comm.)[459]Readvikaraṇabhávaḥ; Váchaspati explains it as "videhánám indriyáṇáṃ karaṇabhávaḥ."[460]Vyása haskaraṇapañchakarúpajaya; Váchaspati explainsrúpabygrahaṇádi(cf. iii. 47).[461]I read in p. 179, l. 11,vyava-sáyavyavaseyátmakánám, from Vyása's Comm.[462]I.e., as past, present, or future.[463]Viśoká.[464]This is explained by Váchaspati, "The latent impressions produced by the states of the internal organ calledvyutthána(when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or 'darkness,' iii. 9) andnirodha(when it is chiefly characterised by the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself; this in 'egoism' (asmitá); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable' (i.e.,buddhi); andbuddhiinto the 'irresolvable' (i.e.,prakṛiti)."Prakṛiticonsists of the three 'qualities' in equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another becomes predominant.[465]This curious passage occurs in the Taittiríya-Áraṇyaka i. 11, 5. Mádhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and quotes the Śvetáśv. Up., iii. 19. Mádhava here takesavindatas "he pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the Comm.[466]This is taken from Váchaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii. 15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.[467]This probably refers to the Pañchadaśí. A Calcutta Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivaraṇa-saṅgraha (cf. Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devatádhyáya-bráhmaṇa, p. x), but, if this is the same as the vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, it is by Bháratítírthavidyáraṇya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p. 88).

[363]On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Sáṅkhya Pr. Bhásh., p. 20; S. Sára, p. 11.

[364]I.e., he revealed the Veda, and also originated the meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind in the arts of life.

[365]I readyefortewith Dr. Hall's MS.Tapyameans rather "susceptible of suffering."

[366]This is really Vyása's comm. on Sút., iv. 21.

[367]Cf.Bháshá-parichchheda, 15,a.

[368]Śatapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.

[369]I read in the second clausetadbháve'pi, understanding bytadthe different conditions whichathais supposed to assume as being necessarily present.

[370]These are, i., the discrimination of the eternal from the phenomenal; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or hereafter; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity, &c.; and, iv., the desire for liberation.

[371]It may besukha-janaka, but it is not itselfsukha.

[372]Granting thatathadoes not here mean "auspicious," why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the particleathadoes produce an auspicious influence?

[373]i.e., a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without some other word to complete the construction.

[374]This is found with some variations in the Mahábháshya (p. 7, Kielhorn's ed.)

[375]The commentators hold that the wordvṛiddhiḥis placed at the beginning of the first sútra, whileguṇaḥin the second is placed at the end (ad eṅ guṇaḥ), in order to ensure an auspicious opening,vṛiddhimeaning "increase," "prosperity," as well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."

[376]In the old Bengali poem Chaṇḍí, we have an interesting list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has the following good omens: On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Bráhman, a full-blown lotus; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling "milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya,"dúrvágrass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls, corals; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing a guana (godhiká). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to all śástras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of the water-lily, and a hare." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard, and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.

[377]These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the officiating Bráhmans.

[378]He is here calledphaṇipati, "lord of snakes,"—Patañjali, the author of the Mahábháshya, being represented as a snake in mythology.

[379]Cf. Śaṅkara, Vedánta-Sút., iii. 3, 49.

[380]This is the Mímáṃsá rule for settling the relative value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another. 1.Śruti, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice. 2.Liṅga, "a sign," or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the text "he divides by the ladle;" here we infer that the thing to be divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3.Vákya, "the being mentioned in one sentence,"i.e., the context, as in the text "'(I cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch;" here the words "(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words "I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4.Prakaraṇa, "the subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its parts," as in thedarśa-púrṇamásasacrifice, where theprayájaceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts, a mystic influence (apúrva) which helps forward that influence of the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here theprakaraṇaproves them to be ancillary. 5.Sthána(orkrama), "relative position" or "order," as the recital of the hymnŚundhadhvam, &c., "Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention of thesánnáyyavessels, where this position proves that the hymn is ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6.Samákhyá, "title;" thus the Yajur-veda is called the special book for theadhvaryupriests; hence in any rite mentioned in it they areprima facieto be considered as the priests employed. The order in the aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each; the first,śruti, being the most important; the last,samákhyá, the least. Cf. Jaimini's Sútras, iii. 3, 14;Mímáṃsáparibháshá, pp. 8, 9.

[381]I.e., Yogi-Yájñavalkya, the author of theYájñavalkya-gítá. See Hall,Bibl. Index, p. 14; Aufrecht,Bodl. Catal., p. 87b.

[382]Karmanseems here used forkriyâ, which properly belongs only to the body, as the soul isdrashṭṛi.

[383]Scil. samádhi, or the restraining the mind and senses to profound contemplation.

[384]Scil."forbearance, religious observance, postures, suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and meditation (samádhi)."

[385]See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3,samyag ádhíyate mano yatra sa samádhiḥ.

[386]Thus,e.g., the antecedent non-existence and the destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by intimate relation (samaváya-sambandha).

[387]I readniroddhavyánámfornirodhánám.

[388]Chit-śaktiandchiti-śakti= soul.

[389]Thesattvaof thebuddhior the internal organ.

[390]This second substance, "mind" or "understanding" (buddhi,chitta), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the image of the object on a second looking-glass (sc.soul).

[391]Váchaspati explainslakshaṇaaskálabheda.

[392]I takeádias meaningasphuṭatva. The change of state takes place between the several moments of thelakshaṇa-pariṇáma. Cf. the Commentaries on iii. 13.

[393]These are generally called the five states of the thinking principle,chittabhúmayasoravasthás. Cf. Commentary, i. 2, 18.

[394]These three conditions respectively characterise men, demons, and gods.

[395]Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.

[396]Canchittamean "soul" here?

[397]I.e., as,e.g., whether the senses produce the elements or the elements the senses, &c.

[398]In p. 164, line 4infra, readsukhaprakáśamayasya.

[399]In p. 164, line 2infra, readsattámátraforsattva-. Bhoja well distinguishesasmitáfromahaṃkára.

[400]For these seeinfra, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.

[401]I have ventured to alter the examples, to suit the English translation.

[402]Where the negation is prominent it is calledprasajya-pratishedha; but where it is not prominent, we have theparyudásanegation. In the former the negative is connected with the verb; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word, as,e.g.—(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."The former corresponds to the logician'satyantábháva, the latter toanyonyábhávaorbheda.

(a.) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."

(b.) "Unwatched the garden bough shall sway."

The former corresponds to the logician'satyantábháva, the latter toanyonyábhávaorbheda.

[403]Cf. thevárttikain Siddhánta Kaum., i. 401.

[404]Thusadhanastands foravidya-mánadhana, withvidyamánaomitted in the compound.

[405]As its subject would confessedly bebuddhi.

[406]As it isavidyáafter all.

[407]In p. 165, lines 16, 17, read (with my MS. of Váchaspati's Gloss),sarvavṛittinirodhasampannáyá api tathátvaprasaṅgát.

[408]I readtanvavastháśchawith the printed edition of Váchaspati's Gloss. Iftanudagdháśchais correct, it must meantanutvena dagdháh.

[409]As inrámalakshmaṇau, Ráma and Lakshmaṇa.

[410]I readpakshatrayeforpakshadvaye.

[411]In his Comm. on Sút., ii. 5.

[412]Thusinimicusis not a "friend," nor, on the other hand, a "non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." Soagoshpadais said to mean "a forest."

[413]Cf. Yoga Sút., i. 8.

[414]In p. 166, line 4infra, readkáyádauforkáryádau.

[415]This couplet is quoted by Vyása in his Comm. on Yoga Sútras, ii. 5, and I have followed Váchaspati in his explanation of it; he calls itvaiyásakí gáthá.

[416]Since the continued enjoyment of an object only increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret (cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).

[417]Literally, "it has four feet."

[418]Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification of the quality ofsattvaunobstructed byrajasandtamas.

[419]"Let the affixṇinibe used after a root in the sense of what is habitual, when theupapada, or subordinate word, is not a word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."

[420]"Letvṛiddhibe the substitute of a base ending in a vowel, when that which has an indicatoryñorṇfollows;"ṇinihas an indicatoryṇ.

[421]Sc.anuśaya+ini=anuśayin.

[422]Iniandṭhan, which respectively leaveinandika; thusdaṇḍagivesdaṇḍinanddaṇḍika. The line is quoted by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Páṇ. v. 2, 115, and is explained in theKáśiká,ad loc. The different prohibitions are illustrated by the examples:—(1.)svaván,khaván; (2.)kárakaván; (3.)vyághraván,siṃhaván; (4.)daṇḍavatí śálá(i.e.,daṇḍá asyáṃ santi).

[423]By iii. 3, 56.

[424]It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.

[425]See theKáśikáon Páṇ. v. 2, 115. Forvivakshártha(meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Páṇ. ii. 2, 27. The edition in the BenaresPanditreadsvishayaniyamártha.

[426]i.e., Thusnirodhais notvṛitter abhávaḥ, butabhávasyáśryaḥ.

[427]I read in p. 168, last line,prakáśapravṛittiniyamarúpa, from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.

[428]See Káśiká, ii. 3, 36.

[429]This passage probably occurs in theYájñavalkya-gítáof Yogi-yájñavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2), vol. i. p. 145, note.

[430]Mímáṃsá Sútras, ii. 1, 35-37.

[431]The tantras are not properly concerned with what isnityaornaimittika; they arekámya.

[432]Thevíjaof air is the syllablejaṃ.

[433]Thevíjaof water is the syllablebaṃ.

[434]Hríṃ.

[435]Śríṃ.

[436]Táṇḍavais the frantic dance of the god. Śiva and his votaries.

[437]Literally "they take severally in order the gender of one of the two." Cf. "Thebæ ipsæ quod Bœotiæ caput est,"Livy, xlii. 44; "Animal hoc providum, acutum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus hominem,"Cic.,Legg, i. 7.

[438]I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's translation of the Sáhitya-darpaṇa.

[439]Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man is like an ox from his stupidity; pure indication from any other relation, as cause and effect, &c., thus butter is the cause of longevity.

[440]I.e., an hour, aghaṭikábeing twenty-four minutes.

[441]Thenáḍísor tubular vessels are generally reckoned to be 101, with ten principal ones; others make sixteen principalnáḍís. They seem taken afterwards in pairs.

[442]Mádhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the passage in the Aitareya Bráhmaṇa (iii. 29), where the relation of the vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still; following each other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a waterwheel (ghaṭíyantravat); hence the seasons never pause in their course."

[443]This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism, that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra, as their sound expresses the wordso'haṃ(i.e.,haṃsaḥ), "I am he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every twenty-four hours; it is called theajapámantra,i.e., the mantra uttered without voluntary muttering.

[444]I.e., that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled breath.

[445]I cannot explain this. We might readguruvarṇánámforguṇavarṇánáṃ, as the time spent in uttering aguruvarṇais avipala, sixty of which make apala, and two and a halfpalasmake a minute; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical details. The whole passage may be compared with the opening of the fifth act of theMálatímádhava.

[446]Sixtypalasmake aghaṭiká(50 + 40 + 30 + 20 + 10 = 150,i.e., thepalasin two and a halfghaṭikásor one hour).

[447]Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.

[448]Literally "the being ever more."

[449]For these colours cf.Chhándogya Up., viii. 6;Maitri Up., vi. 30.

[450]This is an anonymous quotation in Vyása's Comm.

[451]This seems a variation of Śloka 7 of theAmṛita-náda Up.See Weber,Indische Stud., ix. 26.

[452]This is defined in the Yoga Sút., iii. 4, as consisting of the united operation towards one object of contemplation, attention, and meditation.

[453]I.e., the internal organ (chitta).

[454]This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the reading of the Bombay edition of the Puráṇa (only reading in line 3chalátmanám).

[455]Vishṇu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The "perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.

[456]The old name for the central part of Bengal.

[457]A country comprising Khandesh and part of Guzerat; it is the Λαρικἡ of Ptolemy.

[458]In p. 178, l. 2,infra, readpravṛittaforpravṛitti. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyása's Comm.)

[459]Readvikaraṇabhávaḥ; Váchaspati explains it as "videhánám indriyáṇáṃ karaṇabhávaḥ."

[460]Vyása haskaraṇapañchakarúpajaya; Váchaspati explainsrúpabygrahaṇádi(cf. iii. 47).

[461]I read in p. 179, l. 11,vyava-sáyavyavaseyátmakánám, from Vyása's Comm.

[462]I.e., as past, present, or future.

[463]Viśoká.

[464]This is explained by Váchaspati, "The latent impressions produced by the states of the internal organ calledvyutthána(when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or 'darkness,' iii. 9) andnirodha(when it is chiefly characterised by the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself; this in 'egoism' (asmitá); 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable' (i.e.,buddhi); andbuddhiinto the 'irresolvable' (i.e.,prakṛiti)."Prakṛiticonsists of the three 'qualities' in equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another becomes predominant.

[465]This curious passage occurs in the Taittiríya-Áraṇyaka i. 11, 5. Mádhava in his Comment, there explains it of the soul, and quotes the Śvetáśv. Up., iii. 19. Mádhava here takesavindatas "he pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the Comm.

[466]This is taken from Váchaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii. 15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.

[467]This probably refers to the Pañchadaśí. A Calcutta Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameya-vivaraṇa-saṅgraha (cf. Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devatádhyáya-bráhmaṇa, p. x), but, if this is the same as the vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, it is by Bháratítírthavidyáraṇya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat of Tanjore MSS. p. 88).

[As theupádhior "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of the sections in the Bháshá-parichchheda and the Siddhánta-muktávalí, which treat of it.]

cxxxvii.That which always accompanies the major term (sádhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu), is called the Condition (upádhi); its examination is now set forth.

Our author now proceeds to define theupádhior condition,[468]which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as laid down by another person;—"that which always accompanies," &c. The meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariablyaccompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being produced from wet fuel," as anupádhi, since "wet fuel" is necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, ase.g., in a red-hot iron ball.]

"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not follow that (a) in the case of the too wide middle term in the argument, 'This [second] son of Mitrá's, whom I have not seen, must be dark because he is Mitrá's son,' we could not allege 'the being produced from feeding on vegetables'[469]as a 'condition,'—inasmuch as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (b) Again, in the argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[470]because it is the site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense] is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably accompany perceptibility]. (c) Again, in the argument,'Destruction is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of existence'[471][destruction being a form of non-existence, called "emergent,"dvaṃśábháva],inasmuch as perishability is found in antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be included in any positive category of existence."

We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the definition is simply this,—that whatever fact or mark we take to determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition is not invariably to accompany. Thus (a) the "being produced from feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as determined by the fact that it is Mitrá's son, whose dark colour is discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (b) Again, "possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term "the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[472](c) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence" invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance, "antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends that this is produced at all.]

But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid middle terms,i.e., there is nothingtherewhich invariably accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark, and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined. This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term which is too general, the required general rule consists in the constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz., that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[473]or else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but excluding the said condition;[474]and it will be when the case is determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[475]

cxxxviii.All true Conditions reside in the same subjects with their major terms;[476]and, their subjects being thus common, the (erring) middle term will be equally too general in regard to the Condition and the major term.[477]cxxxix.It is in order to prove faulty generality in a middle term that the Condition has to be employed.

cxxxix.It is in order to prove faulty generality in a middle term that the Condition has to be employed.

The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of having a condition at all. (a.) Thus, where the condition invariably accompanies an unlimited[478]major term, we infer that the middle term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too general for that which is invariably accompanied. (b.) But where we take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which the condition is invariably to accompany,—there it is from the middle term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument, "B is dark because he is Mitrá's son," the middle term "the fact of being Mitrá'sson" is too general in regard to thesádhya, "dark colour," because it is too general in regard to theupádhi, "feeding on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitrá's second son [Mitrá's parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitrá herself not having fed on vegetables previous to his birth].

[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,' since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally employed to overthrow the contrary argument].

But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being always found elsewhere than in the subject"becomes a true condition, [and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in "the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by sense-evidence that fire is hot,[479][thus theupádhihere is a means of overthrowing the false argument].

Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[480]But "the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules of logical controversy.[481]

E. B. C.

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