FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[154]The Vaiśeshikas are called Aulúkyáḥ in Hemachandra'sAbhidhána-chintámaṇi; in the Váyu-puráṇa (quoted in Aufrecht'sCatal. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshapáda, Kaṇáda, Ulúka, and Vatsa are called the sons of Śiva.[155]He is here called by his synonym Kaṇabhaksha.[156]It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact, &c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the qualities of the soul, and the three causes.[157]For this extract from the oldbháshyaof Vátsyáyana, see Colebrooke'sEssays(new edition), vol. i. p. 285.[158]Cf.Bháshá-parichchheda, śloka 14.[159]"Particularity" (viśesha) resides by "intimate relation" in the eternal atoms, &c.[160]This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "duality" and "conjunction."[161]This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "existence" (sattá), which is thesummum genus, to which substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.[162]Existence (sattá) is the genus ofdravya,guṇa, andkriyâ.Dravyaalone can be the intimate cause of anything; and all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and disjunction.Somequalities (assaṃyoga,rúpa, &c.) may be mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the essence ofguṇa, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.[163]As all karmas are transitory,karmatvais only found in theanitya. I correct in p. 105, line 20,nityá-samavetatva; this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library.[164]I.e., it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility, however, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore, the former clause of the definition is added.[165]"Particularity" (whence the name Vaiśeshika) is not "individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"—but it is the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth, water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be thene plus ultra, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own indivisible nature. Ballantyne translatedviśeshaas "ultimate difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul hasviśesha.[166]Mutual non-existence (anyonyábháva) exists between two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;" but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.[167]"Samaváyasambandábhávát samaváyo na játiḥ," Siddh. Mukt. (Saṃyogabeing aguṇahasguṇatvaexisting in it with intimate relation).[168]The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union with fire" (Bháshá-parichchheda,sl.103, 104).[169]The organ of touch is an aërial integument.—Colebrooke.[170]Sound is twofold,—"produced from contact," as thefirstsound, and "produced from sound," as thesecond.Janyais added to exclude God's knowledge, whilesaṃyogájanyaexcludes the soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind and the senses, &c.[171]The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time with some body, &c., existing in time,—this latter is the intimate cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, readadhikaraṇaṃ.[172]Paratvabeing of two kinds,daiśikaandkálika.[173]Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the last, however, is not pervading but atomic.[174]The three otherpadárthas, beside soul, which areamúrtta,—time, ether, and space,—are not genera.[175]All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial,i.e., they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things themselves—each beingone; and they only become two, &c., by our choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.[176]Saṃskárais here the idea conceived by the mind—created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)[177]Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.[178]Every cause must be eitherjñápakaorjanaka;apekshábuddhi, not being the former, must be the latter.[179]Apekshábuddhiapprehends "this is one," "this is one," &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of these, but inbothtogether.[180]The Vaiśeshikas held that the jívátman and space are each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion has not. Dr. Röer, in his version of the Bháshá-Parichchheda, has mistranslated an important Sútra which bears on this point. It is said in Sútra 26———athákáśaśaríriṇam, avyápyavṛittiḥ kshaṇiko viśesha-guṇa ishyate,which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special qualities of ether and soul (i.e., sound, knowledge, &c.) are limited to different portions and of momentary duration."[181]The author here mentions two other causes of the destruction ofdvitvabesides that already given in p. 152, l. 14 (apekshábuddhi-náśa), viz.,áśrayanáśa, and the united action ofboth:—1.Ekatva-jñána|Avayava-kriyá|.......2.Apekshábuddhi|Avayava-vibhága|Avayava-kriyá.3.Dvitvotpatti and akatva-jñána-náśa|Avayava-saṃyoga-náśa|Avayava-vibhága.4.Dvitvatvajñána|Dvitvádhárasya (i.e., avayavinaḥ) náśaḥ|Avayava-saṃyoga-náśa.5.Dvitvaguṇa-buddhi and apekshábuddhi-náśa|Dvitva-náśa (i.e., of avayavin).|Ádhára-náśa (of avayavin).6.Dvitva-náśa and dravya-buddhi|.......|Dvitva-náśa.The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the course of the six steps ofekatvajñána, &c., one of the two parts is itself divided either at thefirstor thesecondmoment. In the first case, thedvitvaof the whole is destroyed in the fifth moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately precedingdvitvádhára-náśa, or, as Mádhava calls it,áśrayanivṛitti. In the second case, thenáśaarrives at the same moment simultaneously by both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united action of two causes,apekshábuddhi-náśaandádhára-náśa. Anykriyáwhich arose in one of the parts after the second moment would be unimportant, as thenáśaof thedvitvaof the whole would take place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and in this way it would be too late to affect that result.[182]I.e., from the destruction ofapekshábuddhifollows the destruction ofdvitva; but the other destructions previously described were followed by some production,—thus the knowledge ofdvitvatvaarose from the destruction ofekatvajñána, &c. (cf. Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.[183]From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another; thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black (or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two atoms.[184]I.e., a kind of initiative tendency.[185]These are explained at full length in the Siddhánta Muktávalí, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have—1. the destruction of thedvyaṇukaand simultaneously a disjunction from the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the destruction of the black colour in thedvyaṇuka, and the simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of thedvyaṇukawith that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.[186]The Vaiśeshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old black jar isdestroyed, its several compounds of two atoms, &c., being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds, eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of the Nyáya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes not the jar but its colour, &c.,—it is still the same jar, only it is red, not black.[187]In p. 109, line 14, I readgagaṇavibhágakartṛitvasya.[188]The Siddhánta Muktávalí, p. 112, describes the series of steps:—1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5. by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the pot.[189]The original has a pluralvibhágán,i.e., disjunctions from the several points.[190]I.e., the disjunction of the hand and the points of space.[191]The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad Gítá.[192]Fordravyádireadpṛithivyádi.[193]I am not sure that it would not be better to readviddhavevidhayá, rewounding the wounded, instead ofvṛiddhavívadhayá.[194]Unless youseethe rope you cannot mistake it for a serpent.[195]In p. 110, last line, read'bháve.[196]Read in p. 110, last line,anavadhánádishu.Vidhipratyayaproperly means an imperative or potential affix implying "command;" but the pandit takesvidhihere asbhávabodhaka-kriyá. It has that meaning in Kávya-prakáśa, V. (p. 114, l. 1).[197]The mind perceivesáloka-jñána, therefore it would perceive its absence,i.e., darkness, but this last is perceived by theeye.[198]I.e., light possesses colour, and we cannot see a jar's absence in the dark.[199]Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation is thedhvaṃsábháva, or "emergent non-existence."[200]The readingpratyayavedyatvenaseems supported by p. 110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have, therefore, ventured hesitatingly to readpratyakshavedyatvena, and would refer to the commentary (Vaiś. Sút. p. 250), "yadi hi níla-rúpavan nílaṃ rúpam eva vá tamaḥ syát, váhyálokapragraham antareṇa chakshushá na gṛihyeta."[201]Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.[202]"Relative non-existence" (saṃsargábháva) is the negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is "absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent," and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.[203]I.e., the absolute absence of the jar is found in the jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the spot of ground,—it is thejáti ghaṭatvawhich resides in the jar.[204]The opposite is "thereiscolour in the air."

[154]The Vaiśeshikas are called Aulúkyáḥ in Hemachandra'sAbhidhána-chintámaṇi; in the Váyu-puráṇa (quoted in Aufrecht'sCatal. p. 53 b, l. 23), Akshapáda, Kaṇáda, Ulúka, and Vatsa are called the sons of Śiva.

[155]He is here called by his synonym Kaṇabhaksha.

[156]It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact, &c., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the qualities of the soul, and the three causes.

[157]For this extract from the oldbháshyaof Vátsyáyana, see Colebrooke'sEssays(new edition), vol. i. p. 285.

[158]Cf.Bháshá-parichchheda, śloka 14.

[159]"Particularity" (viśesha) resides by "intimate relation" in the eternal atoms, &c.

[160]This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "duality" and "conjunction."

[161]This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "existence" (sattá), which is thesummum genus, to which substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.

[162]Existence (sattá) is the genus ofdravya,guṇa, andkriyâ.Dravyaalone can be the intimate cause of anything; and all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction and disjunction.Somequalities (assaṃyoga,rúpa, &c.) may be mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the essence ofguṇa, as many gunas can never be mediate causes.

[163]As all karmas are transitory,karmatvais only found in theanitya. I correct in p. 105, line 20,nityá-samavetatva; this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Library.

[164]I.e., it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility, however, is found in time, space, &c.; to exclude these, therefore, the former clause of the definition is added.

[165]"Particularity" (whence the name Vaiśeshika) is not "individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning,"—but it is the individuality either of those eternal substances which, being single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth, water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be thene plus ultra, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own indivisible nature. Ballantyne translatedviśeshaas "ultimate difference." I am not sure whether the individual soul hasviśesha.

[166]Mutual non-existence (anyonyábháva) exists between two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;" but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.

[167]"Samaváyasambandábhávát samaváyo na játiḥ," Siddh. Mukt. (Saṃyogabeing aguṇahasguṇatvaexisting in it with intimate relation).

[168]The feel or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union with fire" (Bháshá-parichchheda,sl.103, 104).

[169]The organ of touch is an aërial integument.—Colebrooke.

[170]Sound is twofold,—"produced from contact," as thefirstsound, and "produced from sound," as thesecond.Janyais added to exclude God's knowledge, whilesaṃyogájanyaexcludes the soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and mind, mind and the senses, &c.

[171]The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time with some body, &c., existing in time,—this latter is the intimate cause, while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the instrumental cause. In p. 106, line 12, readadhikaraṇaṃ.

[172]Paratvabeing of two kinds,daiśikaandkálika.

[173]Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the last, however, is not pervading but atomic.

[174]The three otherpadárthas, beside soul, which areamúrtta,—time, ether, and space,—are not genera.

[175]All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial,i.e., they are made by our minds; unity alone exists in things themselves—each beingone; and they only become two, &c., by our choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.

[176]Saṃskárais here the idea conceived by the mind—created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or mind. (Cf. the tables in p. 153.)

[177]Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.

[178]Every cause must be eitherjñápakaorjanaka;apekshábuddhi, not being the former, must be the latter.

[179]Apekshábuddhiapprehends "this is one," "this is one," &c.; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of these, but inbothtogether.

[180]The Vaiśeshikas held that the jívátman and space are each an all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion has not. Dr. Röer, in his version of the Bháshá-Parichchheda, has mistranslated an important Sútra which bears on this point. It is said in Sútra 26———athákáśaśaríriṇam, avyápyavṛittiḥ kshaṇiko viśesha-guṇa ishyate,which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special qualities of ether and soul (i.e., sound, knowledge, &c.) are limited to different portions and of momentary duration."

——athákáśaśaríriṇam, avyápyavṛittiḥ kshaṇiko viśesha-guṇa ishyate,

which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special qualities of ether and soul (i.e., sound, knowledge, &c.) are limited to different portions and of momentary duration."

[181]The author here mentions two other causes of the destruction ofdvitvabesides that already given in p. 152, l. 14 (apekshábuddhi-náśa), viz.,áśrayanáśa, and the united action ofboth:—1.Ekatva-jñána|Avayava-kriyá|.......2.Apekshábuddhi|Avayava-vibhága|Avayava-kriyá.3.Dvitvotpatti and akatva-jñána-náśa|Avayava-saṃyoga-náśa|Avayava-vibhága.4.Dvitvatvajñána|Dvitvádhárasya (i.e., avayavinaḥ) náśaḥ|Avayava-saṃyoga-náśa.5.Dvitvaguṇa-buddhi and apekshábuddhi-náśa|Dvitva-náśa (i.e., of avayavin).|Ádhára-náśa (of avayavin).6.Dvitva-náśa and dravya-buddhi|.......|Dvitva-náśa.The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the course of the six steps ofekatvajñána, &c., one of the two parts is itself divided either at thefirstor thesecondmoment. In the first case, thedvitvaof the whole is destroyed in the fifth moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately precedingdvitvádhára-náśa, or, as Mádhava calls it,áśrayanivṛitti. In the second case, thenáśaarrives at the same moment simultaneously by both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united action of two causes,apekshábuddhi-náśaandádhára-náśa. Anykriyáwhich arose in one of the parts after the second moment would be unimportant, as thenáśaof thedvitvaof the whole would take place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and in this way it would be too late to affect that result.

[181]The author here mentions two other causes of the destruction ofdvitvabesides that already given in p. 152, l. 14 (apekshábuddhi-náśa), viz.,áśrayanáśa, and the united action ofboth:—

The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the course of the six steps ofekatvajñána, &c., one of the two parts is itself divided either at thefirstor thesecondmoment. In the first case, thedvitvaof the whole is destroyed in the fifth moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately precedingdvitvádhára-náśa, or, as Mádhava calls it,áśrayanivṛitti. In the second case, thenáśaarrives at the same moment simultaneously by both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united action of two causes,apekshábuddhi-náśaandádhára-náśa. Anykriyáwhich arose in one of the parts after the second moment would be unimportant, as thenáśaof thedvitvaof the whole would take place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and in this way it would be too late to affect that result.

[182]I.e., from the destruction ofapekshábuddhifollows the destruction ofdvitva; but the other destructions previously described were followed by some production,—thus the knowledge ofdvitvatvaarose from the destruction ofekatvajñána, &c. (cf. Siddh. Mukt., p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.

[183]From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in the atoms of the jar; thence a separation of one atom from another; thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black (or unbaked) jar; thence the destruction of the compound of two atoms.

[184]I.e., a kind of initiative tendency.

[185]These are explained at full length in the Siddhánta Muktávalí, pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have—1. the destruction of thedvyaṇukaand simultaneously a disjunction from the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts); 2. the destruction of the black colour in thedvyaṇuka, and the simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of thedvyaṇukawith that place; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the simultaneous conjunction with another place; 4. the cessation of the action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.

[186]The Vaiśeshikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old black jar isdestroyed, its several compounds of two atoms, &c., being destroyed; the action of the fire then produces the red colour in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds, eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of the Nyáya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different compounds of two or more atoms, and, without any destruction of the old jar, produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes not the jar but its colour, &c.,—it is still the same jar, only it is red, not black.

[187]In p. 109, line 14, I readgagaṇavibhágakartṛitvasya.

[188]The Siddhánta Muktávalí, p. 112, describes the series of steps:—1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves; 2. the disjunction of the two halves; 3. the destruction of the conjunction which originally produced the pot; 4. the destruction of the pot; 5. by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the severed half from the old place; 6. the destruction of the conjunction with that old place; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the second disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the pot.

[189]The original has a pluralvibhágán,i.e., disjunctions from the several points.

[190]I.e., the disjunction of the hand and the points of space.

[191]The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad Gítá.

[192]Fordravyádireadpṛithivyádi.

[193]I am not sure that it would not be better to readviddhavevidhayá, rewounding the wounded, instead ofvṛiddhavívadhayá.

[194]Unless youseethe rope you cannot mistake it for a serpent.

[195]In p. 110, last line, read'bháve.

[196]Read in p. 110, last line,anavadhánádishu.Vidhipratyayaproperly means an imperative or potential affix implying "command;" but the pandit takesvidhihere asbhávabodhaka-kriyá. It has that meaning in Kávya-prakáśa, V. (p. 114, l. 1).

[197]The mind perceivesáloka-jñána, therefore it would perceive its absence,i.e., darkness, but this last is perceived by theeye.

[198]I.e., light possesses colour, and we cannot see a jar's absence in the dark.

[199]Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation is thedhvaṃsábháva, or "emergent non-existence."

[200]The readingpratyayavedyatvenaseems supported by p. 110, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument; I have, therefore, ventured hesitatingly to readpratyakshavedyatvena, and would refer to the commentary (Vaiś. Sút. p. 250), "yadi hi níla-rúpavan nílaṃ rúpam eva vá tamaḥ syát, váhyálokapragraham antareṇa chakshushá na gṛihyeta."

[201]Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.

[202]"Relative non-existence" (saṃsargábháva) is the negation of a relation; thus "the jar is not in the house" is "absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent," and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.

[203]I.e., the absolute absence of the jar is found in the jar, as, of course, the jar does not reside in the jar, but in the spot of ground,—it is thejáti ghaṭatvawhich resides in the jar.

[204]The opposite is "thereiscolour in the air."

The principle that final bliss,i.e., the absolute abolition of pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain sense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a particular tenet[205]of the Nyáya school, as is declared by the author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be proved, &c.,—from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the Nyáya Śástra. Now the Nyáya Śástra consists of five books, and each book contains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the first book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second those of the remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (váda). In the first daily portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses the four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that "presumption," &c., are really included in the four kinds of "proof" already given [and therefore need not be added by the Mímáṃsakas as separate ones]. In the first daily portion of the third book he examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the second, "understanding" (buddhi), and "mind" (manas). In the first daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" (pravṛitti), the "faults,""transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and "final liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth[206]as to the causes of the "faults," and also "wholes" and "parts." In the first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds of futility (játi), and in the second the various kinds of "occasion for rebuke" (nigrahasthána, or "unfitness to be argued with").

In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (pramáṇa) is first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined from the proper instruments [as the eye, &c.], and from the site of knowledge [i.e., the soul];[207]and this definition thus includes the peculiar tenet of the Nyáya School that God is a source of right knowledge,[208]as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared (ii. 68), "and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge." And thus too hath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth chapter of the Kusumáñjali:

"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the possession thereof; authoritativeness is, according to Gotama's school, the being separated from all absence thereof.

"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to Him and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various existing objects is contained,—all the chaff of our suspicion being swept awayby the removal of all possible faults as caused by the slightest want of observation in Him,—He, Śiva, is my authority; what have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be with rising doubts?"

"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference, analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their objects, understanding, mind, volition, faults, transmigrations, fruit, pain, and final liberation. "Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's possessing only qualities which are common to other things also, and therefore not distinctive,—or by its possessing only irrelevant qualities of its own, which do not help us in determining the particular point in question,[209]—or by conflicting testimony. The thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a motive" (prayojana); this is twofold,i.e., visible and invisible. "An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[210]A "tenet" (siddhánta) is something which is accepted as being authoritatively settled as true; it is of four kinds, as being "common to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," "a pregnant assumption" [leading, if conceded, to a further conclusion], and "an implied dogma" (i. 26-31). The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the sentence containing an inference for the sake of another; and these are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application, and the conclusion (i. 32-38). "Confutation" (tarka, i. 39) is the showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission of a false major[211](cf. Sút. i. 39, andiv. 3); and this is of eleven kinds, asvyágháta,átmáśraya,itaretaráśraya, &c.

"Ascertainment" (nirṇaya, i. 40) is right knowledge or a perception of the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" (váda) is a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment of truth (i. 41). "Wrangling" (jalpa) is the talk of a man only wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either side of the question (i. 42). "Cavilling" (vitaṇdá) is the talk of a man who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question (i. 43). "Dialogue" (kathá) is the taking of two opposite sides by two disputants. A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the "contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded" or "mistimed" (Sút. i. 44-49). "Unfairness" (chhala) is the bringing forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous sense; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase (i. 50-54). "Futility" (játi) is a self-destructive argument (i. 58). This is of twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Nyáya aphorisms) (1-38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, 44-67). We do not insert here all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too prolix,—they are fully explained in the aphorisms.

But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, &c., are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name of the Nyáya Śástra, [as reasoning,i.e.,Nyáya, or logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of?]" We allow the force of the objection; still as names are proverbially said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name Nyáya wasrightly applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said by Sarvajña, "This is the pre-eminent science of Nyáya from its establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing action;"[212]and by Pakshila Swámin, "This is the science of reasoning (ánvíkshikí) divided into the different categories, 'proof,' &c.; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in the declarations of science."[213]

But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained?" We reply, "No," for it is said in the second Nyáya aphorism, "Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,—on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it," by means of this knowledge of the truth. Now false notions are the thinking the body, &c., which are not the soul, to be the soul; "faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to it,[214]though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different "faults" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid. Moreover the man, impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus by the body he does injury, theft, &c.; by the voice, falsehood, &c.; by the mind, malevolence, &c.; and this same sinful "activity" produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions byhis body, as alms, saving others, &c., truthful speaking, upright counsel, &c., by his voice, and guilelessness, &c., by his mind; and this same right activity produces merit. But both are forms of activity, and each leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation; and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of "pain," which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain," is continually going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel. And whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with pain, he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to abolish the ignorance, &c., which are the causes that produced it.[215]Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right knowledge divided into the four sciences,[216]there arises in his mind the knowledge of the truth, or, in other words, a right view of things as they are; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions disappear. When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away; with them ceases "activity;" and with it ceases "birth;" and with the cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this, that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive, as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Nyáya Sútras: "Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,—since, on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation ofthe one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of them] final beatitude."

"But is not your definition of thesummum bonum, liberation,i.e., 'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue;[217]why then is this continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute?" We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do include therein the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the royal highway[218]of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the Mádhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is the abolition of pain. But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, &c., we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," (a.) the continued succession of cognitions, or (b.) something different therefrom? (a.) If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiyáyikas allow that cognition is evanescent,[219]and we do desire to abolish cognition as a cause ofpravṛittior action[220]], for who would oppose a view which makes for his own side? (b.) But if the latter, then, since it must be eternal,[221]its abolition is impossible; and, again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your supposed "summum bonum;" for surely no sensible person would strive to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on theprinciple that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure;" and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition].

"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure intelligence [i.e., the Yogácháras and the Sautrántikas[222]], that 'thesummum bonum' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on the cessation of the conscious subject?" To this view we object that there is an absence of means; and also it cannot be established that the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former, if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha contemplations[223]are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that, as [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all things] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations, they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct recognition of the real nature of things.

And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when accompanied by the natural obstacles[224]is said to be "bound," and when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be able to say that the very same being whichwasboundisnow liberated.

Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the releasing from all 'obstructions,'" a path entirely free from bars to impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what he means by "obstruction"?[225]If he answers "merit, demerit, and error," we readily grant what he says. But if he maintains that "the body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual upspringing of the soul consequent on thebody's annihilation, as of a parrot released from its cage," then we must inquire whether this said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known definition of an atom will apply here as "that which has form without parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.[226]If you say that it has parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal; and if this were conceded, then two grand difficulties [against the Providential course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and thus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped during life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a former birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's "upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an agent possessing form?[227]

Again, if we take the Chárváka's view "that the only bondage is dependence on another, and therefore independence is the true liberation,"—if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being equalled.[228]

Again, the Sánkhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul are utterly distinct, and then holds that"liberation is the soul's remaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has withdrawn,"—even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of pain; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve that previously it had been hampered by ignorance; nor can we say that it resides in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent. Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive? If the former, then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside; and if the latter, the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.

Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña and his followers, that "Liberation is the manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased;" but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not come within the range of definite proof. If you allege Śruti as the proof, we reply that Śruti has no place when the thing itself is precluded by a valid non-perception;[229]or if you allow its authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things as floating stones.[230]

"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of happiness,' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour rice-gruel?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The truth is that all happiness mustbe included under the category of pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by pain, either as admitting of increase,[231]or as being an object of perception, or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for its production. Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search," since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any attempt to establish happiness as thesummum bonum, since it is inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by rightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future issue which will be brought about. Let our intelligent readers consider all this, and not attempt to disguise their own conscious experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for him, pre-eminent among his fellows, who, through the favour of the Supreme Being, has, by the regular method of listening to the revealed Śruti, &c., attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.

But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence of a Supreme Being,i.e., perception, inference, or Śruti? Certainly perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, &c., must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[232]Nor can Śruti, since neither of the resultingalternatives can be sustained; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or as non-eternal? Under the former view an established tenet of our school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal]; under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[233]As for comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that sometimes called presumption, &c.], they need not be thought of for a moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply to the present case.[234]Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as unreal as a hare's horn." But all this elaborate disputation need excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, &c., must have had a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar." (a.) Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be rejected as unproved (asiddha), since it can be established beyond a doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we to understand by this 'possessing parts'? Is it 'existing in contact with parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as ether,[235]&c.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread, which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads. It therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class of those substances which exist in intimate relation."[236]Or we may adopt another view andmaintain that it is easy to infer the "possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their possessing intermediate magnitude.[237]

(b.) Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory" (viruddha),[238]since there is no such acknowledged universal proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term to that in our syllogism [i.e., that they must have had no maker]. (c.) Nor is our middle term too general (anaikánta), since it is never found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is thevipakshain the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. (d.) Nor again is it precluded (bádhitaorkálátyayopadishṭa), for there is no superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. (e.) Nor is it counter-balanced (sat-pratipakshita), for there does not appear to be any such equally valid antagonist.

If you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains, &c., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"—this pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn can stand the attack of the full-grown lion; for the additional words "by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the argument thus involves the fallacy calledvyápyatvásiddhi].[239]Nor can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise thesmallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable to limitation by any suggested condition (upádhi),[240][such as "the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason "from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains, &c., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably involves the idea of some sort of maker; and I mean by "being a maker" the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act, and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if the necessity of a maker were overthrown, the necessity of the action of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since these are dependent thereon; and this would lead to the monstrous doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all. There is a rule laid down by Śaṅkara-kiṅkara which applies directly to the present case—

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