FOOTNOTES:

"When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to establish its validity,"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the major term."

"When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to establish its validity,

"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the major term."

If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as "If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body," &c., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent, whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or not.[241]

As has been said by Udayana Áchárya [in the Kusumáñjali, iii. 5]—

"If Śruti, &c., have any authority, your negative argument fails from being precluded; if they are fallacious, our old objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than ever."

Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's being known or unknown.[242]

"Well, let all this be granted; but the activity of God in creating the world, what end did it have in view? His own advantage or some other being's? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain something desired, or to avoid something not desired? It could not be the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who possesses every possible desire gratified; and for the same reason too it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous; for who would call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another? If you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not checkered with misery, since this militates against His compassion; for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to create the world." This has been said by Bhaṭṭáchárya—

"Not even a fool acts without some object in view;"Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would be left undone by Him?"—

"Not even a fool acts without some object in view;

"Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would be left undone by Him?"—

We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, bepleased for a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by compassion; but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own independence [as He would thus seem to depend on others' actions], since there is the well-known saying, "One's own body does not hinder one;" nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims;[243]and for this there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the Śvetáśvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only; he admits[244]not of a second," &c. "But then how will you remedy your deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[245]It cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no possibility ofHisbeing produced; nor can it be in regard to their being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source; nor, again, can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda, for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived byanyyoginendowed with the transcendent faculties (tívra,[246]&c.)

Therefore, when God has been rendered propitious by the performance of duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is obtained; thus everything is clear.

E. B. C.

NOTE ON PAGES 172, 173.

We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies orhetvábhásasof the modern Hindu logic (cf.Siddhántamukt., § 71,Tarkasaṃgr., 55-67), viz.,anaikánta,viruddha,asiddha,kálátyayopadishṭaorbádhita, andpratipakshitaorsat-pratipaksha. The four first of these generally correspond to thesavyabhicháraor "erratic,"viruddhaor "contradictory,"sádhyasamaor "unproved," andatítakálaor "mistimed,"i.e., "precluded," as given in the list of fallacies of the older logic in p. 164; butpratipakshitacorresponds imperfectly toprakaraṇasama. Theprakaraṇasamaor "uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available for both sides, as,e.g., the argument, "Sound is eternal because it is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument, "Sound is non-eternal because it is audible;" or, according to other authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same difficulties as the original question, as,e.g., "sound is non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it;" here this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old question, "Is sound eternal?" But thepratipakshitareason is one which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it is a product."

FOOTNOTES:[205]Cf. Nyáya Sútras, i. 29.[206]In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I readdoshanimitta-tattvafordoshanimittakatva(compare Nyáya Sút. iv. 68).[207]Without this last clause the definition might include the objects (vishaya), as these are, of course, connected with right knowledge.[208]Íśvara is a cause of right knowledge (pramáṇa) according to the definition, because he ispramáyá áśrayaḥ.[209]On this compare Siddhánta-Muktávali, p. 115.[210]On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 315.[211]"Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while weseethe smoke, is the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (Ballantyne). Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke (vyápaka) if it has the absence-of-fire (the falsevyápya").[212]Action (pravṛitti) follows after the ascertainment of the truth bynyáya.[213]Cp. Vátsyáyana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition readsprakírtitáforparíkshitá.[214]The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid indifference,moha," which is however referred to presently.[215]In p. 116, line 3, I would readtannirvartakamfortannivartakam.[216]This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the eternal doctrine of polity,—these four sciences are the causes of the stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in Kámandaki'sNítisára, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in Vátsyáyana's Com. p. 3, from which Mádhava is here borrowing.[217]Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can lick her ear."[218]Literally the "bell-road,"i.e., "the chief road through a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with tinkling ornaments, proceed."—Wilson's Dict.[219]The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains during the second, and ceases in the third.[220]See Nyáya Sút. i. 2.[221]As otherwise why should we require liberation at all? Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiyáyikas have sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167, line 11.[222]Seesupra, pp. 24-32.[223]All is momentary, all is pain, all issui generis, all is unreal.[224]In the form of the variouskleśasor "afflictions."[225]Ávaraṇa, cf. pp. 55, 58.[226]But the Nyáya holds that the attributes of the soul, as happiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense, mind (Bháshá P. § 83).[227]The readingmúrtapratibandhátis difficult, but I believe thatpratibandhameans herevyápti, as it does in Sánkhya Sútras, i. 100.[228]The truesummum bonummust beniratiśaya,—incapable of being added to.[229]Yogyánupalabdhiis when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye, light, &c.[230]Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "grávánaḥ plavanti," see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phraseaśmánaḥ plavantioccurs in Shaḍv. Br. 5, 12.[231]Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."[232]Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.[233]Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward to reveal the existence of God.[234]The Nyáya holds presumption to be included under inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the relation of a name to the thing named.[235]Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of everything, ase.g., a jar.[236]The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances, ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the categoryviśeshadoes reside in them by intimate relation. The word "substances" excludestantutva, and "existing in intimate relation" excludes ether, &c.[237]Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all eternal substances being the one or the other.[238]Theviruddha-hetuis that which is never found where the major term is.[239]This and much more of the whole discussion is taken from the Kusumáñjali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage there. "The older Naiyáyikas maintained that the argument 'the mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of vyápyatvásiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily restricted (see Siddhánta Muktáv. p. 77). The moderns, however, more wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the validity of the assumed middle term."[240]For theupádhicf. pp. 7, 8.[241]As in the former case it would be clear that it is a subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable to the fault ofáśrayásiddhi, a "baseless inference," since your subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumáñjali, iii. 2). "Just as that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."[242]If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in p. 120 of the Calcutta edition,vikalpaparáhatatvát, and then begin the next clause withsyád etat. The printed text,vikalpaparáhataḥ syát tad etat, seems unintelligible.[243]The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes Hiraṇyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly constitutes his gross body (viráj).[244]The usual reading istasthurfortasthe.[245]For these divisions of theanyonyáśrayafallacy, seeNyáyasútra vṛitti, i. 39 (p. 33).[246]Fortívracf.Yoga sútras, i. 21, 22.

[205]Cf. Nyáya Sútras, i. 29.

[206]In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I readdoshanimitta-tattvafordoshanimittakatva(compare Nyáya Sút. iv. 68).

[207]Without this last clause the definition might include the objects (vishaya), as these are, of course, connected with right knowledge.

[208]Íśvara is a cause of right knowledge (pramáṇa) according to the definition, because he ispramáyá áśrayaḥ.

[209]On this compare Siddhánta-Muktávali, p. 115.

[210]On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 315.

[211]"Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while weseethe smoke, is the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (Ballantyne). Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke (vyápaka) if it has the absence-of-fire (the falsevyápya").

[212]Action (pravṛitti) follows after the ascertainment of the truth bynyáya.

[213]Cp. Vátsyáyana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition readsprakírtitáforparíkshitá.

[214]The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid indifference,moha," which is however referred to presently.

[215]In p. 116, line 3, I would readtannirvartakamfortannivartakam.

[216]This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the eternal doctrine of polity,—these four sciences are the causes of the stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in Kámandaki'sNítisára, ii. 2, and seems to be referred to in Vátsyáyana's Com. p. 3, from which Mádhava is here borrowing.

[217]Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can lick her ear."

[218]Literally the "bell-road,"i.e., "the chief road through a village, or that by which elephants, &c., decorated with tinkling ornaments, proceed."—Wilson's Dict.

[219]The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains during the second, and ceases in the third.

[220]See Nyáya Sút. i. 2.

[221]As otherwise why should we require liberation at all? Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiyáyikas have sufficiently established this point against its opponents, cf. p. 167, line 11.

[222]Seesupra, pp. 24-32.

[223]All is momentary, all is pain, all issui generis, all is unreal.

[224]In the form of the variouskleśasor "afflictions."

[225]Ávaraṇa, cf. pp. 55, 58.

[226]But the Nyáya holds that the attributes of the soul, as happiness, desire, aversion, &c., are perceived by the internal sense, mind (Bháshá P. § 83).

[227]The readingmúrtapratibandhátis difficult, but I believe thatpratibandhameans herevyápti, as it does in Sánkhya Sútras, i. 100.

[228]The truesummum bonummust beniratiśaya,—incapable of being added to.

[229]Yogyánupalabdhiis when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye, light, &c.

[230]Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "grávánaḥ plavanti," see Uttara Naishadha, xvii. 37. The phraseaśmánaḥ plavantioccurs in Shaḍv. Br. 5, 12.

[231]Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."

[232]Since the Supreme Being is a single instance.

[233]Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward to reveal the existence of God.

[234]The Nyáya holds presumption to be included under inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the relation of a name to the thing named.

[235]Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of everything, ase.g., a jar.

[236]The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances, ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the categoryviśeshadoes reside in them by intimate relation. The word "substances" excludestantutva, and "existing in intimate relation" excludes ether, &c.

[237]Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all eternal substances being the one or the other.

[238]Theviruddha-hetuis that which is never found where the major term is.

[239]This and much more of the whole discussion is taken from the Kusumáñjali, v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage there. "The older Naiyáyikas maintained that the argument 'the mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of vyápyatvásiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily restricted (see Siddhánta Muktáv. p. 77). The moderns, however, more wisely consider it as a harmless error, and they would rather meet the objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the validity of the assumed middle term."

[240]For theupádhicf. pp. 7, 8.

[241]As in the former case it would be clear that it is a subject for separate discussion; and in the latter you would be liable to the fault ofáśrayásiddhi, a "baseless inference," since your subject (or minor term), being itself non-existent, cannot be the locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumáñjali, iii. 2). "Just as that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."

[242]If God is known, then His existence must be granted; if He is not known, how can we argue about Him? I read lines 15, 16, in p. 120 of the Calcutta edition,vikalpaparáhatatvát, and then begin the next clause withsyád etat. The printed text,vikalpaparáhataḥ syát tad etat, seems unintelligible.

[243]The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes Hiraṇyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly constitutes his gross body (viráj).

[244]The usual reading istasthurfortasthe.

[245]For these divisions of theanyonyáśrayafallacy, seeNyáyasútra vṛitti, i. 39 (p. 33).

[246]Fortívracf.Yoga sútras, i. 21, 22.

An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that merit (dharma) comes from the practice of duty (dharma), but how is duty to be defined or proved?" Listen attentively to my answer. A reply to this question has been given in the older[247]Mímáṃsá by the holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mímáṃsá consists of twelve books.[248]In the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (vidhi), "explanatory passage" (arthaváda), hymn (mantra), tradition (smṛiti), and "name." In the second, certain subsidiary discussions [ase.g., onapúrva] relating to the difference of various rites, refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the third,Śruti, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (liṅga), "context" (vákya), &c., and their respective weight when in apparent opposition to one another, the ceremonies calledpratipatti-karmáṇi, things mentioned incidentally (anárabhyádhíta), things accessory to several main objects, asprayájas, &c., and the duties of the sacrificer. In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by thejuhúbeing made of thebutea frondosa, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which form subordinate parts of therájasúyasacrifice. In the fifth, the relative order of differentpassages ofŚruti, &c., the order of different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at thevájapeya], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words ofŚruti, order of mention, &c., in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, thesattraofferings, things proper to be given, and the different sacrificial fires. In the seventh, transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign." In the eighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed "sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (úha), the adaptation ofsámansandmantras, and collateral questions connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasions where the non-performance of the primary rite involves the "preclusion" and non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites are precluded because other rites produce their special result, discussions connected with thegrahaofferings, certainsámans, and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the fuller discussion oftantra[249][where several acts are combined into one], andávápa[or the performing an act more than once]. In the twelfth, a discussion onprasaṅga[where the rite is performed for one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference],tantra, cumulation of concurrent rites (samuchchaya) and option.

Now the first topic which introduces the discussions ofthe Púrva-Mímáṃsá arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a "topic" as consisting of five members, and these are (a.) the subject, (b.) the doubt, (c.) theprimâ facieargument, (d.) the demonstrated conclusion, and (e.) the connection (saṅgati). The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is whether the study of Jaimini'sśástraconcerning duty, beginning with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in theanváhárya," is to be commenced or not. Theprimâ facieargument is that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future fruit. (a.) If you say that this injunction must have a visible fruit, and this can be no other[250]than the knowledge of the meaning of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of, or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as we see in the rule for shelling rice.[251]It cannot be the former, for the reading of the Veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof from its very nature as reading, just as in the parallel instance of reading the Mahábhárata; and we see by this argument that it would present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative; just as the baked flour cake calledpuroḍásais made only of rice prepared by being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might have been unhusked by the finger-nails. There, however, the new moon and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect, which isthe principalapúrva, by means of the various minor effects or subordinateapúrvas, produced by the various subordinate parts of the whole ceremony; and consequently the minorapúrvaof the unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is no injunction to study the Púrva Mímáṃsá as a means of knowing the sense of the Veda. (b.) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit, although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned, is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the Viśvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to offer the Viśvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the present case also. As it has been said—

"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance, after the analogy of the Viśvajit, &c."

Thus, too, we shall keep the Smṛiti rule from being violated: "Having read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's house to read the Mímáṃsá discussions, and thus the idea of no interval between would be contradicted. Thereforefor these three reasons, (a.) that the study of Mímáṃsá is not enjoined, (b.) that heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (c.) that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled, we maintain that the study of the Mímáṃsá discussions on duty is not to be commenced.

The "authoritative conclusion" (siddhánta), however, is as follows:—

We grant that it cannot be a case ofvidhi, for it might have been adopted on other grounds; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case ofniyama. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read," the affixtavyaexpresses an enforcing power in the word,[252]which is to be rendered visible by a corresponding action in man, bringing a certain effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort. Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole wordadhyetavya, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind, consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as the end. For the mass of words called "Veda," which is what we really mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action," production, &c.[253]Therefore the only true end which remains to us is theknowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He has the right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of written books, &c. [from the well-known technical sense of the word "read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a duly authorised teacher]. Therefore, as the principalapúrva, produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and establishes the subordinateapúrvasproduced by the inferior sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, &c., so the mass ofapúrvaproduced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previousapúrvaproduced by the restricting injunction (niyama), which prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that aniyamacould have this future influence calledapúrva, the same doubt might equally invalidate the efficacy of avidhi[as the two stand on the same level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of theViśvajitoffering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to suppose any other future and unseen fruit. Thus it has been said—

"Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an unseen one; but if avidhihas the restricting meaning of aniyama, it does not thereby become meaningless."

But an objector may say, "Although a man who reads the simple text of the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he who reads the Veda with itsaṅgas, grammar, &c., may attain to this knowledge, the study of Mímáṃsá will be useless." But this is not true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of discussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed gravel," neither grammar nornigama[254]norniruktawill determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not with oil, &c.; it is only by a Mímáṃsá discussion that the true meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is brightness."[255]It is therefore established that the study of Mímáṃsá is enjoined. Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the passage of Smṛiti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of the injunction we conclude that the study of the Púrva Mímáṃsá Śástra, consisting of a thousand "topics,"[256]is to be commenced. This topic is connected with the main subject of the Śástra as being a subsidiary digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression which helps to establish the main subject."[257]

I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic" in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabhákara.

In the Smṛiti rule,[258]"Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when eight years old (by investing him withthe sacred cord), let him instruct him," the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction. Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher," since, by Páṇini's rule (i. 3, 36), the rootníis used in theátmanepadawhen honour, &c., are implied,i.e., here the duty which a teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Bráhman who girds his pupil with the sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiaryaṅgasand mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher (áchárya)." Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled without the learning which is the function of the pupil, and therefore the very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading the Veda the object of definite injunction, I reply, What matters it to us if it is not? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetualanuvádaor "supplementary repetition."[259]Therefore the formerprimâ facieargument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in another way to suit this new view.

Now theprimâ facieargument was that the study of Mímáṃsá, not being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced; the "conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus authoritatively enjoined.

Now the upholders of the former orprimâ facieview argue as follows:—"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following dilemma: Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the bare reading? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding what is taught [as this will depend on his ability as a recipient]; and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is sufficient, the Mímáṃsá discussions in question will have no subject or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda, which is doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu way; now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining the true meaning by means of laborious discussion? And therefore in accordance with the well-known principle, 'That which is a thing of use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and in contact with the external and internal senses,' as there is in the present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of Mímáṃsá is not to be commenced."

We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning; still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiaryaṅgas, and has comprehended the general connection of the words with their respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her son, 'Eat poison,' the meaning literally expressed by the words was not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his eating anything at all in such and such a house; so if the literal meaning of the Veda does not express itsreal purport, the old objection will recur with full force that the study of Mímáṃsá will have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead astray, and so common sense must be the ultimate judge"]. We reply, that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not really parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda, which is underived from any personal author, why should not the literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of Mímáṃsá discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper "end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not obtained[260]by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of Mímáṃsáisenjoined, and should be commenced.

"Well,[261]be it so" [say the followers of the Nyáya], "but how can the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintain that they have no personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case with the soul"?[262]This argument is weak, because the alleged characteristics [unbroken tradition, &c.] are not proved; for those who hold the human origin of the Vedas maintainthat the line of tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the universe. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author is not remembered? Is it (1.) that no author is believed, or (2.) that no author is remembered? The first alternative cannot be accepted, since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma, viz., is it meant (a.) that no author of the Veda is remembered by some one person, or (b.) by any person whatever? The former supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has overcome pride and anger," &c.[263]And the latter supposition is inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a personal author, for we argue as follows:—The sentences of the Veda must have originated from a personal author, since they have the character of sentences like those of Kálidása and other writers. And, again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent person, since, while they possess authority, they have, at the same time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

But [ask the Mímáṃsakas] may it not be assumed that "all study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character which was the same in former times as now;" and therefore this uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda? This reasoning, however [the Naiyáyikasanswer], cannot rise to the height of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously illusory reasoning, as "All study of the Mahábhárata was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since it is the study of the Mahábhárata, which must have been the same in former times as now." But [the Mímáṃsakas will ask whether there is not a difference between these two cases, since] the Smṛiti declares that [Vishṇu incarnate as] Vyása was the author of the Mahábhárata, in accordance with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishṇu could be the maker of the Mahábhárata?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any Smṛiti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless, since those words of the Purushasúkta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him sprang the Ṛich and Sáman verses; from him sprang the Metres; from him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.

Further [proceed the Naiyáyikas] we hold that sound is non-eternal[264]because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is.[265]"But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof arising from the fact that we recognise the letterg(for example) as the same we have heard before?" This objection, however, is extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute our argument, since it has reference only to identity ofspecies, as in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh. "But [asks the Mímáṃsaka] how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameśvara, who has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have pronounced the letters?" "This objection[answers the Naiyáyika] is not happy, because, though Parameśvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his worshippers. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."

I shall now [says the Mímáṃsaka] clear up the whole question. What is meant by thispaurusheyatva["derivation from a personal author"] which it is sought to prove? Is it (1.) mere procession (utpannatva) from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it? or (2.) is it the arrangement—with a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves? If the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between us.[266]If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established (a.) by inference,[267]or (b.) by supernatural testimony? (a.) The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the Málatímádhava [which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving clause, "while they possess authority,"[268][as supra, p. 188, line 21], even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by other evidence, this definition would be at oncecontradicted, just as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman. And even if we granted that Parameśvara might assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature.[269]Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabhákara] when he refutes the supposition of an omniscient author—

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